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Lewis Carroll's visual logic

a
Francine F. Abeles
a
Department of Mathematics & Computer Science, Kean
University, Union, NJ, 07083, USA
Published online: 17 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Francine F. Abeles (2007) Lewis Carroll's visual logic, History and Philosophy of
Logic, 28:1, 1-17, DOI: 10.1080/01445340600704481

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 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 28 (February 2007), 1 – 17

Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic*

FRANCINE F. ABELES
Department of Mathematics & Computer Science, Kean University, Union, NJ 07083, USA

Received 29 December 2005 Revised 19 April 2006

John Venn and Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) created systems of logic diagrams capable of
representing classes (sets) and their relations in the form of propositions. Each is a proof method for
syllogisms, and Carroll’s is a sound and complete system. For a large number of sets, Carroll diagrams are
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easier to draw because of their self-similarity and algorithmic construction. This regularity makes it easier
to locate and thereby to erase cells corresponding with classes destroyed by the premises of an argument, a
particularly difficult task in Venn diagrams for more than four sets. Carroll diagrams can represent
existential propositions easily, so they are capable of clearly representing more complex problems than
Venn’s system can. Finally, both Carroll and Venn diagrams are maximal, in the sense that no additional
logic information like inclusive disjunctions is able to be represented by them. Carroll’s logic diagrams and
logic trees constitute his visual logic system.

1. Introduction
George Boole’s calculus of logic from 1847 (The Mathematical Analysis of Logic),
and 1854 (The Laws of Thought) opened the way to the mechanization of logic rules,
first realized by William Stanley Jevons, when he constructed a logic machine in 1869
(Jevons 1864, 1958; Grattan-Guinness and Bornet 1997; Hailperin 2004). Boole set for
himself the goal of creating a general method in logic so that ‘given a set of premises
expressing relations among certain elements, whether things or propositions:
required explicitly the whole relation consequent among any of those elements
under any proposed conditions, and in any proposed form’ (Boole 1958, p. 10). In
1880, John Venn published geometric diagrams to denote classes (sets), and the truth
values of the corresponding propositions in his paper, On the Diagrammatic and
Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings. He incorporated them in
his book, Symbolic Logic, of 1881.
Venn’s diagrammatic system was a considerable improvement over the more
limited system given by Leonhard Euler, from 1761, who had represented the
relationships among sets by the relationships of the circles drawn to depict them. In
1886, Charles L. Dodgson, writing under his pseudonym, Lewis Carroll, privately
published The Game of Logic, where he created a diagrammatic system to solve
syllogisms. Ten years later, in his book, Symbolic Logic, Part I, he extended his
diagrams to handle the construction of up to 10 classes (sets) depicting their
relationships and the corresponding propositions.
In this paper, I discuss an algorithm for constructing Carroll diagrams and show
that his well-defined system of three-set diagrams constitutes a sound and complete
proof system for syllogisms. (For background material, see Corcoran 1974, 2003;
Allwein and Barwise 1996.) I also compare Venn’s and Carroll’s diagrammatic
approaches in terms of how simply their diagrams can be constructed, the range of

*Commemorating the one hundred and seventy-fifth anniversary of the birth of Charles L. Dodgson.

History and Philosophy of Logic ISSN 0144-5340 print/ISSN 1464-5149 online ª 2007 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/01445340600704481
 2 Francine F. Abeles

what they can express, and how easily they can be extended. Finally, I argue that
Carroll abandoned diagrams and constructed logic trees to handle sorites, arguments
that are much more complex than syllogisms. Together these two methods are the
elements of his visual logic system (Coumet 1976; Abeles 1990, 2005a).

2. Venn’s diagrammatic system

Venn showed that symmetric geometric diagrams could be constructed for up to
five simply connected regions that overlap each other in every possible way of
overlapping, i.e. each single closed curve intersects exactly once each of the pre-
existing subregions that were produced earlier.
As an example, consider the first diagram in figure 1. If all of the circle marked x,
except its intersection with the circle marked y, is empty, we can read this as: all x is y
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(there exists no class of things as ‘x that is not y’); symbolically, xy0 ¼ 0. We shade
this region. If, in addition, all of the circle marked y, except its intersection with the
circle marked x is empty (there exists no class of things as ‘y that is not x’, i.e. all x is
all y); symbolically, x0 y ¼ 0. We shade this region and now have the equation xy0 þ
x0 y ¼ 0 (Venn 1881, p. 112).
Actually, the five-set figure is not as good because the small ellipse in its centre is
part of the outside of the class c, i.e. its four components are inside b and d, and are
part of c0 . Although Venn recognized that his method would enable any number of
sets to be drawn, he did not think it was worth the trouble to do the construction; nor

Figure 1. Venn diagrams for two, three, four, and five sets.
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 3

Figure 2. Venn’s alternative diagrams for four and five sets.

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did he think there would be many problems requiring more than five sets. Figure 2
gives the alternative diagrams he provided for four and five sets that suggest how this
might be done (Venn 1880, p. 8). He gave just a description of the construction for six
sets where he proposed using two five-set figures, realizing that the advantage of
having a single figure would thereby be lost.
Here is an example of the kind of problem easily handled by a Venn diagram
involving four classes. The object is to show the relation between a and b from the
following propositions:

All a is either b and c, or not b.

If any ab is c, then it is d.
No da is bc.

The first premise removes the class ‘all ab that is not c’, i.e. abc0 ¼ 0. The second
premise removes the class ‘abc that is not d’, i.e. abcd0 ¼ 0. The third premise removes
the class ‘da which is bc’, i.e. dabc ¼ 0. When we put these relations into a diagram,
we see that the intersection of the a and b classes is empty, i.e. ab ¼ 0. As a
proposition, we can conclude: no a is b (Venn 1881, pp. 116–117).
Venn used his diagrammatic system as a proof method for this and similar types
of problems, but not until 1894 in the second edition of his book did he appreciate
that his diagrams could be used to show the equivalence of different solutions to the
same problem. He wrote, ‘If the expressions in such cases are really identical, this can
very readily be proved: if they are not, we can with equal ease localize the
discrepancy’ (Venn 1971, pp. 138–139).
Although Venn’s system is isomorphic to Boole’s logic of classes, it is not
isomorphic to a Boolean algebra because there is no way to illustrate inclusive
disjunctive propositions, i.e. propositions other than those that can be expressed in
terms of the removal of classes as in the previous example, and in other exclusive
disjunctive expressions like: x0 w(yz0 þ y0 z), viz. what is not x but is w, and is also
either, y but not z, or z but not y (Venn 1881, p. 102). Although existential
propositions can be represented in Venn diagrams, Venn did not provide the
mechanism until the second edition of Symbolic Logic (actually two different
representations: horizontal line shading and integers). The choice of a small plus
sign in a region ‘þ’ to indicate that it is not empty appears to have been made after
1894 and was reported by Carroll in his symbolic logic book (Carroll 1958, p. 174;
Venn 1971, pp. 131–132).
 4 Francine F. Abeles

In 1959, Trenchard More, Jr proved what Venn knew to be true, that Venn
diagrams can be constructed for any number of simply connected regions. His
construction preserves the property Venn deemed essential, that each subregion is
simply connected and represents a different combination of overlapping of all the
simply connected regions bounded by the Jordan curves. But the diagrams resulting
from More’s construction are quite complex and involve what More called a
‘weaving curve’ (More 1959).

3. Carroll’s diagrammatic system for syllogisms

In 1887, after having privately published The Game of Logic a year earlier, Carroll
officially published the book which includes a diagrammatic system to solve
syllogisms. A syllogism is an argument having two premises and a single conclusion,
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with each proposition being one of four kinds, A: ‘all . . . are . . .’; E: ‘no . . . is . . .’; I:
‘some . . . are . . .’; O: ‘some . . . are not . . .’ . There are three terms (classes) in the three
propositions: subject, predicate (an expression that attributes properties), and the
middle term, which occurs once in each premise. There are several classification
systems for syllogisms involving the relative position of the repeated middle term
(figure) and the way that a syllogism can be constructed within a figure (mood). The
number of valid syllogisms ranges between 18 and 24. Carroll’s visual logic method
which employs triliteral and biliteral diagrams is a proof system for categorical
syllogisms that we now know is sound and complete. Ten years later, in his book,
Symbolic Logic, Part I, he extended his diagrams to handle the construction of up to 10
classes (sets) depicting their relationships and the corresponding propositions, but he
did not use the method as a proof system beyond three sets. For more complex
arguments, he settled on a tree method that he first constructed in 1894 (which
remained unpublished until 1977 when it appeared in W. W. Bartley III’s book, Lewis
Carroll’s Symbolic Logic) as a proof system for multiliteral propositions in complex
sorites that, by modern standards, is also sound and complete. A sorites is an argument
having many premises and a single conclusion. It can be resolved as a list of syllogisms,
the conclusion of each becoming a premise of the next (Abeles 1990, 2005a).
From a diary entry, we know that Carroll devised his Method of Diagrams for
three sets on 29 November 1884:

Devised a way of working a syllogism, . . . . Universe divided into eight categories,

e.g. the upper right corner triangle is (gl0 m0 ), i.e. ‘g, not-l, not-m’, where ‘m’ is the
middle term, ‘g’ the greater, i.e. the ‘major’ term, and ‘l’ the less, or minor.
(Wakeling 2004, p. 155)

He wanted to demonstrate graphically the solution of syllogisms and to identify any

fallacies. The ‘game’ employs two and three set diagrams only. His diagrams can
represent both universal and existential propositions. This slim text, intended for
young people as an instructive amusement, has more pages of problems and
solutions, forty, than pages of text, thirty-six.
In the Appendix to his Symbolic Logic, Part I, and later in part II of this book,
Carroll gave diagrams for up to eight sets, and described the constructions for nine and
10 sets. However, he provided no problems using diagrams depicting more than three
sets. In figure 3, in the diagram for five sets, the inside and the outside of the fifth set, as
in Venn’s diagram, are separate, i.e. the regions are no longer simply connected.
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 5
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Figure 3. Carroll diagrams for two, three, four, and five sets.

He wrote in his diary on 27 November 1888:

Devised a Logic Board, with which five attributes can be worked. (I had made the
adjoining one for four attributes, last Saturday). The new one has an additional
zigzag line working in and out so as to divide each of the existing 16
compartments. (Dodgson 1888)

Carroll’s original drawing of a five-set diagram and his improvement reported on the
next day are in figure 4 (Wakeling 2004, p. 434).
Here is one of his problems involving three sets:

No x are m.
Some m are y0 .
Some y0 are x0 .

The first premise asserts that no xm exist, so the xm cells are empty. They are
marked with a ‘0’; symbolically: xm0. The second statement (premise) asserts that
some my0 exist, so the my0 cell is occupied and it is marked with a ‘1’; symbolically:
 6 Francine F. Abeles
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Figure 4. Carroll’s original diagram for five sets.

my0 1. (Actually, it is the x0 my0 cell that is occupied.) We can see from the relation
between x and y that some x0 y0 exist, i.e. the conclusion is the proposition that some
x0 are y0 (equivalently some y0 are x0 ); symbolically, x0 y0 1. We can write these three
propositions using his subscript method as: xm0 { my0 1 { x0 y0 1 (actually, Carroll used
a reverse paragraph symbol; Carroll 1958, p. 183).
Both Venn and Carroll diagrams can represent exclusive disjunctions; neither is
capable of representing inclusive disjunctive propositions like x þ y when x and y
have something in common. Exclusive disjunctions are important in syllogistic logic
because existential propositions like, ‘some x are y’ can be written as the
disjunction, xyz or xyz0 ; and the proposition, ‘some y are z0 ’ can be written as the
disjunction, xyz0 or x0 yz0 . Actually, it is not possible to represent general disjunctive
information in a diagram without adding an arbitrary additional syntactic device,
and that addition would result in a loss in the visual power of the diagram. Carroll
also represented the universal set by enclosing the diagram, a feature Venn did not
think important enough to bother with, but one that is essential in depicting the
universe of discourse, a key concept in modern logic discussed by Boole (Boole
1847, pp. 15–16) and developed further by him seven years later (Boole 1958, pp.
42–43).
In a diary entry dated 8 December 1888, Carroll stated,

[W]e can form a set of six premisses, from which a, b, c, d can only be eliminated
in a series of 7 syllogisms. . . . Such a sorites is best done in one step. . . . The six-
attribute board, which I invented November 28, exhibits the lawfulness of this.
(Wakeling 2004, p. 436)

He also wrote that he intended to use more complex diagrams in part II of his book,
but when it was finally published by Bartley in 1977, none appeared.
Carroll used his diagrammatic method in several ways: as a proof method for
syllogistic problems, as a technique to reduce what he considered were the current 19
or more forms of the Aristotelian syllogism and its later codifications, and to classify
fallacies. Syllogistic reasoning from the time of Aristotle until George Boole’s work
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 7

in logic in the mid-nineteenth century was the essential method of all logical
reasoning. In Britain, Aristotle continued to dominate logic until 1925 (Grattan-
Guinness 1985).
Carroll’s idea of syllogistic construction differed from both the classical and the
medieval as well as from his contemporaries such as George Boole, Augustus De
Morgan, W. Stanley Jevons, John Neville Keynes, and John Venn. Some reasons he
gave for consolidating the 19 different forms appearing in current textbooks
included: the syllogistic rules were too specialized, many conclusions were
incomplete; and many legitimate syllogistic forms were ignored. Although Boole
believed that the solutions that were found when his methods were used were
complete, it has been shown that this was not always the case (Carroll 1958, p. 183;
Corcoran and Wood 1980).
Carroll made several changes to syllogistic constructions compared with what
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was currently accepted in his time. First, he permitted only the propositions A, E
and I, subsuming propositions in O under I, e.g. some x are not y is equivalent to:
some x are y and some x are y0 . Second, he split an A proposition into I and E
propositions, e.g. all x are y is equivalent to the two propositions: some x are y;
no x are y0 . Third, he allowed an A proposition as a conclusion from premises E
and A, and an E proposition as a conclusion from premises A and A. Also, if
necessary for completeness, he permitted two A propositions in the conclusion
from premises A and A. Finally, he allowed, under proper conditions, two addi-
tional syllogisms: I and E ! I; E and E ! E that he considered to be valid. The
result is the 15 valid syllogisms, although he did not actually list them, that
Carroll recognized in examples (in the form: premise and premise implies
conclusion) that are given in table 1.
Carroll understood that the two additional syllogistic forms he allowed, I and
E ! I; and E and E ! E can give rise to fallacies. When the two E premises contain
like eliminands, (the word he used for the terms ultimately eliminated in arriving at
the conclusion), both of which are not asserted to exist, Carroll classified this as a
fallacy of type 1. A fallacy of type 2 can occur in the case of premises I and E ! I, or
even in the standard syllogistic form E and I ! I, where the premises contain unlike
eliminands. Carroll’s last category, a type 3 fallacy, corresponds with two I premises
(yielding no conclusion), which is not a valid syllogistic form. Below are several
examples of the unusual constructions Carroll permitted. The first two illustrate an
additional conclusion not normally permitted in a standard syllogistic form. (Carroll
1958, p. 138, no. 12; p. 141, no. 11).

Table 1. Fifteen valid syllogisms.

Premise Premise Conclusion Premise Premise Conclusion

1. A A I 9. A A E
2. A I I 10. E E E
3. I A I 11. E A E
4. A E I 12. A E E
5. E I I 13. E A A
6. I E I 14. A A A (one statement)
7. E A I 15. A A A (two statements)
8. A E E
 8 Francine F. Abeles

A and A imply E

Audible music causes vibration in the air; All m are x;

Inaudible music is not worth paying for. All m0 are y0 .
No music is worth paying for, unless it causes vibration in the air. No x0 are y.

E and A imply A

No x are m;
All y are m.
All y are x0 .

The next two examples illustrate non-standard syllogistic forms that Carroll
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permitted (Carroll 1958, p. 107, no. 32; p. 101, no. 6).

E and E imply E

No x are m;
No y0 are m0 .
No x are y0 .

I and E imply I

Some, who deserve the fair, get their deserts; Some m are x;
None but the brave deserve the fair. No y0 are m.
Some brave persons get their deserts. Some y are x.

Carroll’s 15 syllogisms can be represented by Venn and even Euler diagrams, but
not with the visual clarity of Carroll diagrams. Carroll himself showed this when he
presented a solution to a syllogism of the type: E and I imply I by Euler’s method, one
that involves 18 diagrams, and a solution that Venn provided for the same syllogism
where, possibly for the first time, since it does not appear in the second edition of his
symbolic logic book, Venn used a small ‘þ’ to indicate a non-empty region. (Carroll
1958, pp. 180–182).
Carroll gave two sets of rules to represent a syllogism diagrammatically. The first
set is for the premises.

1. Break up ‘all’ propositions into two equivalent propositions: ‘some’, ‘no’.

2. On the same triliteral diagram (hereafter TD) represent ‘no’ propositions first
by placing a ‘0’ in the appropriate cell, then represent ‘some’ propositions by
placing a ‘1’ in the appropriate cell.
2.1 Order the remaining premises so that a ‘1’ can be placed inside a cell (if
possible) rather than on a fence.

The second set of rules is for the conclusion.

3. Transfer the information from the first set of rules to a biliteral diagram
(hereafter BD) in this way:
3.1 For each quarter of the TD, do
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 9

3.1.1 if there is a ‘1’ in either cell, mark the corresponding cell of the BD
with a ‘1’.
3.1.2 if there is a ‘0’ in both cells, mark the corresponding cell of the BD with a ‘0’.
3.1.3 else transfer nothing.
3.2 The BD gives the complete conclusion (if it exists) of the syllogism; else the
argument is a fallacy. (Carroll 1958, pp. 53–54)

Figure 5 provides an example of this diagrammatic method. The black counter is

actually a red one that he used to denote an occupied cell (equivalent to a ‘1’), while
the clear counter is actually a grey one that he used to denote an empty cell
(equivalent to a ‘0’).
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Figure 5. Frontispiece of Symbolic Logic, Part 1.

 10 Francine F. Abeles

As another example, consider the two premises:

(1) All m are x;

(2) All y are m.

The first is equivalent to the two propositions:

1. Some m are x; and 2. No m are x0 .

The second is equivalent to the two propositions:

3. Some y are m; and 4. No y are m0 .

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The obvious conclusion is: All y are x.

We can take the four premises in the order 2, 4, 1, 3 or 2, 4, 3, 1. Starting with
premise 2, we then add the information to a TD from premise 4. From rule 2.1, we
select premise 3 next to obtain the final TD which has a ‘0’ in each of the NW and
SW outer cells, and in each of the SW and SE inner cells; and a ‘1’ in the NW inner
cell. Transferring the information from the TD to a BD, we obtain a diagram with a
‘0’ in the SW cell and a ‘1’ in the NW cell that easily can be read as: All y are x
(Carroll 1958, pp. 52, 55).
Let T denote the set of information from the premises placed in the final TD (‘0’s
and ‘1’s, each with a location tag). Let B denote the set of information transferred
from the final TD to the BD (‘0’s and ‘1’s each with a location tag). If B is not empty,
the syllogism is valid; otherwise the syllogism is invalid (a fallacy). If the terms
appearing in the conclusion of a syllogism are x and y (Carroll used the word
retinends for these), and m is the eliminand, the possible contents of B appear on the
right-hand side of table 2.
The 15 valid syllogisms can be mapped to the 20 diagrams in this way: A and
A ! A, where the conclusion is two statements, maps to four possible BDs. A and
A ! A, where the conclusion is one statement; and E and A ! A map to eight BDs.
The five syllogisms that have E conclusions map to four BDs, and the seven
syllogisms that have I conclusions map to four BDs. So, each valid syllogism maps to
one of 20 BDs.

Table 2. Twenty biliteral diagramsa.

Proposition type Propositions Representation in a BD

I Some xy exist; some xy0 exist; 1 in one cell (in four ways)
Some x0 y exist; some x0 y0 exist
E No xy exist; no xy0 exist; 0 in one cell (in four ways)
No x0 y exist; no x0 y0 exist
A All x are y; all x are y0 ; (0,1) in a pair of horizontal cells (in four ways)
All x0 are y; all x0 are y0 ;
A All y are x; all y are x0 ; (0,1) in a pair of vertical cells (in four ways)
All y0 are x; all y0 are x0

a
When the complete conclusion consists of one ‘all’ proposition, the representation is (0,1) either vertically
or horizontally, obtainable in eight ways. When the complete conclusion consists of two ‘‘all’’ propositions,
the representation is (0,1,1) as the sum of a horizontal (0,1) and a vertical (0,1), obtainable in four ways.
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 11

Using an algebraic expression (subscript form), Carroll classified the 15 valid

syllogisms by their conclusions into just three figures. He stated his purpose in this
way:

When once we have found, by Diagrams, the Conclusion to a given Pair of

Premises, and have represented the Syllogism in subscript form, we have a
Formula, by which we can at once find, without having to use Diagrams again,
the Conclusion to any other pair of Premisses having the same subscript forms.
(Carroll 1958, p. 74)

In part II of Symbolic Logic, Carroll gave a second reason for his classification of
the 15 syllogisms into just three figures.
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One of the favourite objections . . . is that a Syllogism has no real validity as an

argument, since it involves the Fallacy of Petitio Principii . . . the essence of which
is that the whole Conclusion is involved in one of the Premisses. This formidable
objection is refuted, with beautiful clearness and simplicity, by these Diagrams,
which show us that, in each of the three Figures, the Conclusion is really involved
in the two Premisses taken together, each contributing its share. (Bartley 1977, pp.
128–129)

Relating this classification into three figures to the list of syllogisms in table 1,
we see that the first figure corresponds to numbers 8–11; a variant figure Ia
corresponds to number 14; a second variant Ib corresponds to numbers 12, 13, and
15. Figure II corresponds to numbers 1–3, 5, and 6. Figure III corresponds to
numbers 4 and 7.
Using Carroll’s rule systems for triliteral and biliteral diagrams, we can see that
each of the 15 valid syllogisms corresponds to one of the 20 diagrams, and each of the
20 diagrams corresponds to one of the 15 valid syllogisms. Hence, this diagrammatic
system is a sound and complete proof system for syllogisms. The soundness of a
proof system ensures that only true conclusions can be deduced. (A proof system is
sound if and only if the conclusions we can derive from the premises are logical
consequences of them.) Conversely, its completeness guarantees that all true
conclusions can be deduced. (A proof system is complete if and only if whenever a
set of premises logically implies a conclusion, we can derive that conclusion from
those premises.)
A fallacy also can be detected by the diagrammatic method using the rule
systems, i.e. when the information from the premises is depicted in a TD and none of
that information can be transferred to a BD, the result is a fallacy. Carroll wrote,

[T]he Fallacy may be detected by the ‘Method of Diagrams’, by simply setting

them [the propositions] out on a Triliteral Diagram, and observing that they yield
no information which can be transferred to the Biliteral Diagram. (Carroll 1958,
p. 81)

4. Carroll diagrams for any number of sets

In 1995, Anthony J. Macula showed how to construct Carroll’s set diagrams for
any number of sets using a linear iterative process. (He called them ‘Lew k-grams’.)
 12 Francine F. Abeles

More recently, in his book published in 2004 on Venn diagrams, Anthony Edwards
wrote, ‘[T]he Carroll diagram holds the key to the canonical representation of an
arbitrary number of sets’ (Edwards 2004, p. 27). But Edwards’s method of
constructing this canonical representation is too general to specifically generate
Carroll diagrams (Edwards 2004, p. 33).
We observe that Carroll’s set diagrams are self-similar, i.e. each diagram remains
invariant under a change of scale. For example, a five-set diagram results from
placing a vertical line segment in each of the 16 partitions of a four set diagram, and a
six-set diagram is obtained by putting the 22 partitions of a suitably reduced two-set
diagram into each of the 16 partitions of a four-set diagram. Seven- and eight-set
diagrams are similarly constructed. We see that each k-gram (a k-set diagram) has 2k
partitions, e.g. a five-set diagram has 32 partitions, while an eight-set diagram
has 256.
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The algorithm for constructing the diagrams is not immediately apparent from
Carroll’s work for two reasons. First, he did not give a one-set diagram. When the
two partitions of this diagram in figure 6 are placed in each of the 16 partitions of a
four-set diagram, we can see immediately that a five-set diagram results, but only if
the line segments in the partitions are drawn vertically rather than diagonally as
Carroll drew them.
Below is Macula’s algorithm. The building blocks are the 1-gram, 2-gram, 3-gram,
and 4-gram. Into each of the 24 partitions of a 4-gram, place the partitions of a:

. 1-gram to produce a 5-gram;

. 2-gram to produce a 6-gram;
. 3-gram to produce a 7-gram;
. 4-gram to produce an 8-gram.

To produce a new (k þ n)-gram where k 4 4 and a multiple of four and n ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4:

put the 2k partitions of a k-gram into each of the partitions of an n-gram,
respectively. The algorithm constructs a (k þ n)-gram for any such k by iteration.
It is now easy to see that Carroll’s description of a nine-set diagram as composed
of two eight-set diagrams, one for the inside and one for the outside of the eighth set,
is the result of placing the partitions of an 8-gram into each of the two partitions of a
1-gram. And the 10-set diagram, which he described as an arrangement of four octo-
literal diagrams in a square, is the result of putting the partitions of an 8-gram into

Figure 6. Macula’s one and five set diagrams.

 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 13
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Figure 7. Carroll diagrams for six, seven, and eight sets.

each of the four partitions of a 2-gram. We observe that when k 4 4, the construction
of a new (k þ n)-gram reverses the order of the insertion of the partitions because the
insertions are multiples of 4-grams into n-grams. (Carroll 1958, pp. 178–179; Macula
1995, pp. 269–271; Edwards 2004, pp. 33–34).

5. Setting for Carroll’s visual logic

Carroll set himself the goal of showing that the syllogistic form permits much
more general reasoning than commonly believed. And he used as premises not only
what was actually asserted, but also what ‘we may reasonably understand to be
implied’ (Carroll 1958, p. 194). In effect, he was pushing the envelope of the standard
classical forms (syllogism and sorites) to their ultimate use.
In an unpublished letter on 23 April 1890, one of many to Edith Rix (Dodgson
1890a), a mathematically gifted 24-year-old pupil of Dodgson’s to whom he had
dedicated his book of amusing mathematical questions, A Tangled Tale (Carroll
1885), originally created for readers of the popular Monthly Packet, Dodgson posed
what is known as Venn’s problem: A certain Company had a Board of Directors.
Every Director held either Bonds or Shares; but no Director held both. Every
Bondholder was on the Board. Deduce all that can logically be deduced, in as few
propositions as possible (Lindseth Collection).
 14 Francine F. Abeles

The problem had been published earlier by Venn in Mind (Venn 1876, p. 487), as
an illustration of the inadequacies of Aristotelian forms of reasoning and the
superiority of Boolean methods. Venn had given the problem, whose conclusion is
‘no shareholders are bondholders’, as a test question to Cambridge University
undergraduates. He remarked that of the 150 or so students, only five or six were able
to solve this simple problem.
Another example of Carroll’s thinking in this direction, is evident in an
unpublished letter that he wrote to his mathematically inclined sister, Louisa
Dodgson, on 5 March 1897 (Dodgson 1890b). In it, Carroll asked two questions
about three propositions. First, whether the three propositions are compatible;
second, whether any one of them is contained in any of the others. These
propositions are from the conclusion that Carroll arrived at in an essay in connection
with a problem in hypothetical (conditional) propositions that De Morgan had first
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written about in 1860 which is reproduced in Bartley (1977, p. 480), followed by

Dodgson’s essay dated 15 March 1897. After Carroll corrected the ambiguity in De
Morgan’s wording of the propositions, he answered his own questions by stating that
the three propositions are identical.
Carroll went on to create a much more difficult version of this problem, a sorites
that he named ‘The Great-Grandson Problem’ (Bartley 1977, p. 362). Carroll also
dealt with hypothetical statements in problems he called sequences. These appear in
‘The Problem of the School-Boys’, and in excerpts from his 8th and 9th papers on
logic from 1892 (Bartley 1977, pp. 323–327). The complete texts are in the Morgan
Library.
Carroll understood that in order to solve the complicated problems he was
grappling with, diagrams were no longer useful. For these problems, he needed a
formal logic technique, the logic trees discussed in Abeles (2005a), that he first
conceived of on 16 July 1894 when he recorded,

Today has proved to be an epoch in my Logical work. It occurred to me to try a

complex Sorites by the method I have been using for ascertaining which cells, if
any, survive for possible occupation when certain nullities are given. I took one of
40 premisses, with ‘pairs’ within ‘pairs’, & many bars, & worked it like a
genealogy, each term proving all its descendents. [sic.] It came out beautifully, &
much shorter than the method I have used hitherto—I think of calling it the
‘Genealogical Method’. (Bartley 1977, p. 279; Unpublished diaries)

Three months later, he wrote,

Made a discovery in Logic, . . . the conversion of a ‘genealogical’ proof into a regular

series of Sorites . . . . Today I hit on the plan of working each column up to the
junction—then begin anew with the Prem. just above and work into it the results of
the columns, in whatever order works best. . . . This is the only way I know for
arranging, as Sorites, a No. of Prems much in excess of the No. of Elims, where every
Attribute appears 2 or 3 times in each column of the Table. My example was the last
one in the new edition of Keynes. (Unpublished diaries, 30 October 1894)

Worked from 10 to 7 at my new discovery, & found a new ‘dodge’ in the

genealogic method—suppose abc0 , I now do not write it , but .
(Unpublished diaries, 31 October 1894)
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 15

We immediately see that Dodgson has discovered how to use the cut rule (modus
ponens) in working with a tree, a method that was not fully worked out until the
1930s (Abeles 2005b).
The essential feature of the tree method is that when a conclusion following from
a set of premises is assumed to be false, then if reasoning from it together with all the
premises results in a contradiction, the original argument is proved to be valid. This
is the earliest modern use of a truth tree employed to reason efficiently in the logic of
classes.
In another letter to Louisa Dodgson, dated 13 November 1896, in which he
answered questions she had raised about one of his problems that she was attempting
to solve, we can see that Carroll’s use of his two visual methods progressed from his
method of diagrams to his method of trees. He wrote,
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As to your 4 questions, . . . . The best way to look at the thing is to suppose the
Retinends to be Attributes of the Univ. Then imagine a Diagram, assigned to that
Univ., and divided, by repeated Dichotomy, for all the Attributes, so as to have
2n Cells, for n Attributes. (A cheerful Diagram to draw, with, say, 50 Attributes!
There would be about 1000,000,000,000 Cells.) If the Tree vanishes, it shows that
every Cell is: empty. (Abeles 2005a, p. 40)

6. Conclusion
In their diagrammatic methods, both Venn and Carroll used simple symmetric
figures, and valued visual clarity and ease of drawing as the most important
attributes. Like Boole and Jevons, both were in the tradition of calculus ratiocinator,
i.e. mechanical deduction. Each of them used a system of symbolic forms isomorphic
to their diagrammatic forms. As W. and M. Kneale wrote,

The diagrammatic methods used by J. Venn in his Symbolic Logic of 1881 and by
Lewis Carroll in his Symbolic Logic of 1896 for testing the validity of syllogisms
are in effect anticipations of this [H. Behmann’s 1922 decision procedure]
technique. (Kneale and Kneale 1962, p. 726).

Both Venn diagrams and Carroll diagrams are maximal, in the sense that no
additional logic information like inclusive disjunctions is representable by them.
But Carroll diagrams are easier to draw for a large number of sets because of their
self-similarity and algorithmic construction. This regularity makes it simpler to
locate and thereby erase cells corresponding with classes destroyed by the premises
of an argument. (Recall the difficulty of locating the outside of the fifth set in a
Venn diagram.) Although both Venn and Carroll diagrams can represent existential
propositions, Carroll diagrams are capable of easily handling more complex
problems than Venn’s system can without compromising the visual clarity of the
diagram. Carroll only hinted at the superiority of his method when he compared
his own solution to a syllogism with one that Venn had supplied (Carroll 1958, pp.
182–183).
Why, then, are Carroll’s visual methods not better known? I believe the main
reason for the poor reception is that Carroll’s reputation as the author of the ‘Alice’
books cast him primarily as an author of children’s books so that his mathematical
work was not treated seriously. His own more literary style of writing contributed to
 16 Francine F. Abeles

this impression. That this was his reputation is apparent in anonymous reviews of
Symbolic Logic, Part I during his time (The Athenaeum 1896, pp. 520–521; The
Educational Times 1896, p. 316), as well as in an unpublished letter to Venn dated 11
August 1894, where he wrote,

You are quite welcome to make any use you like of the problem I sent you, & (of
course) to refer to the article in ‘Mind’—[Dodgson 1894a, pp. 436–438 concerning
an example of hypothetical propositions] Your letter has, I see crossed one from
me, in which I sent you ‘Nemo’s algebraical illustration. I hope you may be able
to find room for it in your next book. Perhaps you could add it, as a note, at the
end of the book, & give it, at p. 442, a reference thereto? I shall be grateful if you
will not mention to anyone my real name, in connection with my pseudonym. I
look forward with pleasure to studying the new edition of your book. (Dodgson
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1894b)

And on p. 442 of the second revised edition of his Symbolic Logic, Venn
wrote,

[T]hat the phrase ‘x implies y’ does not imply that the facts concerned are known
to be connected, or that the one proposition is formally inferrible from the other.
This particular aspect of the question will very likely be familiar to some of my
readers from a problem recently circulated, for comparison of opinions, amongst
logicians. As the proposer is, to the general reader, better known in a very
different branch of literature, I will call it Alice’s Problem.

In his own writings, Carroll referred to the work of many of the best logicians of
his time. In Book XXII of Symbolic Logic, Part II, ‘Solutions of Problems Set By
Other Writers’, Carroll included items by De Morgan (1847), Boole (1854), Keynes
(1887), Venn (1894), Jevons (1958), and members of the Johns Hopkins University
from the book, Studies in Logic (Peirce 1883), which although he did not cite them by
name, included pieces by Peirce’s students: Allan Marquand, Christine Ladd
Franklin, Oscar Howard Mitchell, and Benjamin Ives Gilman.
As Bartley noted, the sale of Carroll’s library at his death included (in
addition to books by De Morgan, Jevons, and Venn), a copy of Keynes’s Studies
and Exercises in Formal Logic (1894 edition) inscribed to Dodgson, copies in
English translation of Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s work, and works in logic by
James William Gilbart, Bernard Bosanquet, Francis Herbert Bradley, John Stuart
Mill, Sir William Hamilton, and William Whewell (Bartley 1977, p. 31; Lovett
2005, pp. 99, 172, 325, 179, 197, 129, 49, 54, 209–210, 140, 336).
Other British logicians with whom Carroll corresponded were: John Alexander
Stewart, White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and editor of Aristotle,
James Welton, author of the Manual of Logic (1896); John Cook Wilson, Professor
of Logic at Oxford from 1889 until his death in 1915, Thomas Fowler, Wykeham
Professor of Logic at Oxford (1873–1889) and author of The Elements of Deductive
Logic (1887), and William Ernst Johnson, a University of Cambridge logician. But
the barrier created by the fame Carroll deservedly earned from his ‘Alice’ books
combined with a writing style more literary than mathematical prevented the
community of British logicians from properly recognizing him as a significant
logician.
 Lewis Carroll’s Visual Logic 17

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