The Decline of the Liberal Global Order and the Revival of Nationalism

Yale H. Ferguson
Richard W. Mansbach
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190923846.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter addresses the erosion of the postwar liberal global order and the accompanying
disorder in global politics. It describes the perceptions of declining US hegemony during the
Obama administration of American decline and the return of geopolitical and economic rivalries
that are undermining the liberal order. The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 in the
United States was the most significant manifestation of national populism that has emerged in
recent years in Europe and elsewhere. The profile of supporters of national populism are much
the same globally. They oppose so-called elites and immigrants (especially minorities) whom
they blame for the loss of manufacturing jobs. After defining national populism, the chapter
describes how it fosters isolationism and malignant nationalism and focuses on national
interests rather than global cooperation. Such policies threaten the movement of goods and
people, multinational global organizations, and the postwar order in which globalization thrives.

Keywords: Donald Trump, European Union, globalization, global liberal order, hegemonic decline, hegemonic
stability, income inequality, migration, national populism

I. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed growing unpredictability and disorder in global politics that raise
questions about the direction and durability of the global liberal political order that came into
existence after World War II. “The liberal international order,” writes Robin Niblett, “has always
depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open
markets, democracy, and individual human rights would gradually (p.32) spread across the
entire globe. Today, such hopes seem naïve.”1 That order, which was reflected in the
establishment of the Bretton Woods economic institutions and the United Nations and was later
reinforced by institutions ranging from globalized corporations to international criminal courts
intended to enforce human rights law. Led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington
helped found the United Nations and the organizations that became the European Union, and
an open global economy flourished as barriers to trade and investment were reduced, and
corporations became increasingly transnational. Bretton Woods established the pillars of
economic globalization—the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT (later the World Trade
Organization), which fostered an open and thriving economic order even as America took
responsibility for both the political and economic dimensions of that order. However, as Joseph
Nye points out, critics, notably Donald Trump, “have argued that the costs of maintaining the
order outweigh its benefits and that Washington would be better off handling the interactions
with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis, making sure it ‘wins’ rather than
‘loses’ on each deal or commitment.”2
Thus, “the U.S. global leadership,” Niblett continues, “which until now has sustained the order
through good times and bad, looks weaker than at any point since World War II,”3 As Ian
Buruma observes, Donald Trump’s “America First sentiments . . . are hostile to these
organizations”4 and have fostered hostility toward globalization, open markets, and immigration
at home and abroad. European Union President Donald Tusk was so concerned about Trump’s
comments about US foreign policy that he added the new administration to a list of threats to
the European Union that included China, Russia, and Islamic extremism. Tusk declared that
“particularly the change in Washington puts the European Union in a difficult situation seeming
to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign policy” and that “worrying
declarations by the new American administration, all make our future highly unpredictable.”5 A
Brazilian diplomat’s pithy comment was simply: “Time to buckle your seatbelts and cross your
fingers.”6

To some extent, however, the advocates of the liberal global order are themselves responsible for
its erosion and for the rise of populist nationalism. As Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane observe:
“The Brexit and Trump phenomena reflect a breakdown in the social contract at the core of
liberal democracy: those who do well in a market-based society promise to make sure that those
disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind. But fall behind they have. . . . Elites
have taken advantage of the global liberal order—sometimes inadvertently, sometimes
intentionally—to capture most of the income and wealth gains in recent decades, and they have
not shared much with the middle and lower classes.”7 Indeed, (p.33) as Peter Hall concluded
about Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, the British vote was the result of “a
virulent populist nationalism, stirred up by a campaign laden with wild and inaccurate claims
that 80 million Turks were on the brink of gaining EU membership and that a British
contribution of 350 million pounds ($460 million) a week might otherwise be spent on the
National Health Service.”8 The profile of many pro-Brexit voters was similar to that of pro-
Trump voters in the United States, and Trump applauded the “leavers” because they had “taken
back their country,”9 and in Britain’s June 2017 general election neither major party embraced
globalization.
Donald Trump’s election reflected widespread alienation of Americans in areas outside the
country’s cosmopolitan and relatively prosperous cities who believe they have been ignored by
the country’s political elites in both major political parties. In addition to everything else, their
populist nationalism reflects what Arthur C. Brooks calls “the dignity deficit.” Brooks addresses
the programs put in place by President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and thereafter, which
Johnson regarded as a commitment to human dignity. Although such programs were well
intentioned, they “got the U.S. government into the business of treating people left behind as
liabilities to manage rather than as human assets to develop.”10 Although Brook’s does not
regard those Trump supporters—“rural and exurban whites who possess few in-demand skills
and little education”—as the only “vulnerable group” in the United States, they are suffering an
“acute dignity crisis” and “have languished while elites have largely ignored them or treated
them with contempt.”11

II. The Elements of Populist Nationalism

The spread of populist nationalism portends the possible end of the liberal order12 and even a
decline in democracy.13 Populist nationalism reflects the politics of anger. It involves “the belief
that each country has an authentic ‘people’ who are held back by the collusion of foreign forces
and self-serving elites at home” and embraces a leader who “claims to represent the people and
seeks to weaken or destroy institutions such as legislatures, judiciaries, and the press and to cast
off external restraints in defense of national sovereignty.”14 Former British Prime Minister Tony
Blair describes the phenomenon as “rightist populism,” which “is intent on blowing up
traditional conservative politics and replacing it with a new coalition, comprising traditionally
left-leaning supporters in working-class communities who feel left behind by globalization and
traditionally right-leaning supporters who hate liberalism. Both constituencies believe that
traditional culture is at risk from immigration and ‘political correctness.’ Both believe in the
nation-state as opposed to international alliances. (p.34) Both feel let down by the so-called
elites and think that the solution is an authoritarian figure strong enough not to care what a
biased establishment thinks about him.”15 Although populists claim to represent the voice of a
country’s citizens and repeatedly advocate plebiscitary democracy, they frequently undermine
representative democracy owing to their attacks against institutions like the courts, legislatures,
government bureaucracies and the media, and are contemptuous of alternative views and
policies. When winning elections by the narrowest of margins (for example, Turkey’s Erdoğan)
or even (as Trump) without a majority in the popular vote, populists nonetheless claim a
“mandate” and attempt to run roughshod over any and all opposition. Criticism from any
quarter is excoriated, blatant lies and conspiracy theories abound, and unflattering facts are
labeled “false news.”
Walter Russell Mead views populist nationalists in America as “Jacksonians” prepared to
jettison US foreign policies that have been followed for seven decades in favor of aiding
Americans at home.16 Mead argues that Trump’s supporters perceive their country as being
attacked by internal enemies such as “an elite cabal or immigrants from different backgrounds”
that “offers economic benefits and social advantages” to “African-Americans, Hispanics, women,
the LGBTQ community, Native Americans, Muslim Americans” but not to white males of
European ancestry.17 And he concludes that globalists who believed “tribal loyalties” were
obsolete “failed to understand the deep roots of identity politics in the human
psyche.”18 Frankly, rather than Jacksonians at home or abroad, we would characterize most
American populists as inclined to illiberal democracy (or worse, authoritarianism), racism,
misogyny, militant ignorance, and isolationism.

Popular nationalism entails a rejection of globalization and seeks to raise barriers to the free
movement of persons, things and ideas, although the idea of populist nationalism itself has been
globalized. Blair characterizes the cleavage as between the “open-minded” who “see
globalization as an opportunity but one with challenges that should be mitigated” and “the
close-minded” who “see the outside world as a threat.”19 Many in the United States are relatively
unskilled working-class white males with a high-school diploma20 who believe that global trade
and immigration have caused them to lose their jobs in manufacturing or shut them out of the
labor market completely.

Anti-immigration politicians are also active in post-Brexit not-so-United Kingdom and

elsewhere in the European Union—Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden—as well as other countries as varied
as Switzerland, Argentina, Australia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.21 Austerity
measures (p.35) (e.g., Greece) have helped fan the flames; in many there is a distinct ethnic-
preservation or openly racist dimension; and also for some a fear of Islamic terrorism. Populist
nationalism and increasing authoritarianism in Turkey is a special case, where regional
instability, long-standing suppression of a Kurdish minority, a moderate religious revival,
persistent rejection of Turkish membership by the European Union, gravely divided traditional
parties, influences from the worldwide Gulenist movement, a residual Kemalist secular element
in the military, and Erdoğan’s cult of personality have all played a part.22
In fact, in the case of the United States, domestic factors, notably automation—especially
“breakthroughs in sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence”23—and outsourcing
“noncore” jobs by major corporations within the United States to low-wage and non-union
subcontractors have probably been the most important factors in the loss of manufacturing
jobs.24 “Neither Brexit nor Trump,” observes Buruma, “are likely to bring great benefits to these
voters,” but “they can dream of taking their countries back to an imaginary, purer, more
wholesome past.”25 Richard Haass reminds us, “the era of globalization will continue to evolve,
and existing arrangements will be increasingly inadequate in dealing with contemporary
challenges” such as climate change.26 “Globalization,” Haass concludes, “is here to stay, and the
inadequacies of the traditional approach to order, based on sovereignty, will only become more
obvious over time.”27

Trump halted progress toward US involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and has
threatened to initiate a trade war with countries that he perceives to be treating America
“unfairly” and contributing to the US trade deficit and loss of US jobs. In addition, Treasury
Secretary Steven Mnuchin has explicitly refused to condemn protectionism and endorse free
trade. Trump has denounced and has threatened to terminate the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) that governs trade among the United States, Mexico and Canada, despite
the fact that it has demonstrably raised the growth rate of all three.28 Trump “starts off by
thinking about any negotiation as zero sum,” said Chad P. Bown, a trade expert. “If he’s the big
player, the bully, he’s going to get a better deal by negotiating with one other
country.”29 Although the US trade deficit with Mexico was $58 billion in 2015, additional
impediments to trade with Mexico would harm, among others, US farmers (p.36) in states such
as Iowa, Texas, Nebraska, and Idaho (all of which supported his election).30 The
administration’s trade policy was outlined in a document sent to Congress in March 2017.
Expressing a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral deals, it recommended using
Sections 201 and 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which permit imposing tariffs to protect US firms
from “serious injury” (201) caused by a surge of imports (though not an unfair practice) and
taking action against unfair trade practices (301) such as “dumping” or selling goods below the
cost of producing them. The document also implies that in defending “national sovereignty” in
trade, Washington might ignore the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).31
Protectionist sentiment, of course, is not uniquely American. China, for example, has announced
a plan to achieve self-sufficiency in crucial high-tech industries ranging from aircraft to electric
cars by 2025 by providing low-interest loans from state funds and banks, research subsidies, aid
for buying foreign competitors, and high taxes on foreign cars. Foreign firms such as Boeing,
Airbus, General Electric, Siemens, Nissan, Renault, Samsung and Intel fear that the plan will
effectively shut them out of China’s market and prevent them from successfully competing
elsewhere as well.32 In addition, Beijing refuses to admit that it has become an economically
developed country, still insisting it is a less developed country. As such, the WTO permits China
to have average tariffs roughly three times higher than the United States, thereby allowing
Beijing to export far more to the United States than it imports.33 Thus, John Paulson concludes
that “Chinese firms have almost unrestricted access to U.S. markets, yet U.S. firms face severe
restrictions and roadblocks when trying to do business in China.”34 Nevertheless, China has
profited from and “worked hard to embed itself firmly in the current order”35 and “is a
disruptive power but not a revolutionary one.”36 That said, China opposes the West’s liberal
political norms, seeks to assert increasing influence in Asia and well beyond via its highly
ambitious “Belt and Road” foreign investment strategy, and is aggressively pursuing overblown
and patently illegal territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.

Populist nationalism also involves territoriality and “national interest” in the realist sense,
including reliance mainly on oneself for security. Trump’s “realism” also denies American
exceptionalism, that is, its uniqueness in upholding and spreading democracy and human rights
even though, as one observer notes, “altruism has helped to unite America and make it strong,
not weak.”37 Trump apparently views the United States as a “normal” country that seeks to
enhance its security and seek advantages in dealing with other countries in any policy arena. He
emphasizes relative gains and losses instead of recognizing why principles matter in foreign
policy and sustain a nation’s soft power. “Every president in recent history except Donald
Trump,” writes Daniel Baer, “has understood (as Russian President Vladimir (p.37) Putin
surely does) that America has a strategic as well as a moral interest in standing with democrats
around the world, and that America grows stronger and more powerful the more successfully it
represents universal values on the world stage.”38 In a word, Trump failed to see that for
America “values” served US “interests.” Instead, for the president the pursuit of values was no
longer of significance.39
Regarding human rights, the Trump campaign and subsequent administration repeatedly
criticized various civil rights measures at home, spoke approvingly of the torture of terrorism
suspects, railed against the admission of “legal” refugees, sold military aircraft to Bahrain
without imposing human-rights conditions, and decided not to raise the subject of human rights
with Egypt’s authoritarian president.40 The administration also seems to regard raising human
rights issues as an unnecessary impediment to trade.41 Ever inconsistent, however, Trump did
declare that “America stands for justice.”42 Further confusing the Trump administration’s
human-rights policy (as well its policy regarding Syria43), Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson
declared following Syria’s use of illegal poison gas against civilians that the United States would
punish those “who commit crimes against the innocents anywhere in the world.”44

Trump believes that the United States should maximize its gains and minimize its losses in a
zero- sum world and that values are reflections of idealism rather than genuine interests. For
example: “The trade deficit is the number that determines for him who wins and loses,” declared
trade historian Douglas Irwin. “But trade deficits are not determined by trade agreements.
Trade agreements just determine the rules for trade.”45 “The world is in trouble,” according to
Trump, “but we’re going to straighten it out, O.K.?” And he added: “That’s what I do—I fix
things.”46 And Trump and other xenophobic nationalists (p.38) “question everything and turn
punitive. They expand their military. They import less. They demand more from partners. They
underinvest in diplomacy and, of course, foreign aid.”47
“For Jacksonians—who formed the core of Trump’s passionately supported base—,” argues
Mead, “the United States is not a political entity created and defined by a set of intellectual
positions rooted in the Enlightenment and oriented toward the fulfillment of a universal
mission”48 but a state that should be preoccupied with domestic issues. In contrast to his
predecessors, “Trump has promised a foreign policy that is nationalist and transactional,
focused on securing narrow material gains for the United States.”49 His campaign rhetoric
promised to turn away from foreign policy traditions dating back to World War II and
condemned traditional diplomacy. Erratic, unpredictable, inconsistent—all of these descriptions
fit his decision-making style. For instance, after Trump’s meeting with German Chancellor
Angela Merkel in Washington in March 2017, Sylke Tempel, editor-in-chief of Internationale
Politik wrote: “Once again, we’ve seen Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. He was Mr. Jekyll while reading
his statement, saying nice things about economic ties, his commitment to Ukraine, common
friendship; all the niceties.” “Then, in the question-and-answer session, he’s his old self:
disparaging the media, criticizing the British.”50 Similarly, in the midst of South Korea’s
presidential campaign, Trump suddenly commented that that country should pay for operating
the Thaad anti-ballistic missile system and simultaneously assailed the bilateral free trade
agreement with South Korea as “horrible.”51 Two days later, the administration reaffirmed that
the United States would indeed pay for the missile system.52 All this leads Philip Gordon to
contemplate a worst case, “a future in which Trump’s erratic style and confrontational policies
destroy an already fragile world order and lead to open conflict—in the most likely cases, with
Iran, China, or North Korea.”53
As we have noted, populist nationalism frequently involves cultural and religious traditions,
opposes immigration, and scapegoats minorities—religious, ethnic, and racial—for perceived
economic, political and social woes. Thus, after Hungary had held a referendum regarding
whether to accept its EU quota of refugees, an elderly Holocaust survivor observed, “It very
much feels like the atmosphere in the 30s before the second world war. In the 1930s, we were in
a very bad economic situation. People had to be blamed, and then it was the Jews. And that’s
what I’m reminded of when I read the Hungarian (p.39) government’s propaganda. It’s very
dangerous. Because it can contaminate all of Europe.”54 Blair concludes that: “The modus
operandi of this populism is not to reason but to roar,” and “[i]ts supporters welcome the
outrage their leaders provoke.”55 Trump, of course, is the archetypal populist,56 but, as we shall
see, other politicians elsewhere fit the description equally well. Ironically and perhaps
ominously, the rise of populist nationalism has been accompanied by the “downfall” of social
democratic parties including Blair’s own Labour Party.57
America’s 2016 presidential election and its recent foreign policies have fed perceptions of
America’s decline and, in academic circles, the end of hegemonic stability that some theorists
believe is crucial for maintaining the liberal order. Hegemonic stability and the consequences of
hegemonic decline have been treated extensively by scholars like Robert Gilpin, who concluded
that “a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a liberal international economy” like that
established and sustained by the United States after World War II.58 Gilpin described the
cyclical conflicts—hegemonic war “the ultimate test of change in the relative standings of the
powers in the existing system”59—that occur when a hegemon is threatened by a challenger.

III. Hegemonic Decline and The Liberal Global Order

Those who believe that a hegemon like America is crucial for global order and maintenance of
international institutions that are pillars of globalization point to America’s “decline” as a key
factor in growing global disorder. G. John Ikenberry argues that “the liberal principles that
Washington has pushed enjoy near-universal appeal, because they have tended to be a good fit
with the modernizing forces of economic growth and social advancement,” while Washington’s
foes were not “just up against the United States; they would also have to contend with the most
globally organized and deeply entrenched order the world has ever seen, one that is dominated
by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic.”60 “The (p.40) United States,” writes
Ikenberry, “took on the duties of building and running an international order, organizing it
around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states. . . . Defined in
terms of the provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement, this liberal
hegemonic order has been, arguably at least, the most successful order in world history.” But, he
continues, observers believe we “are witnessing a passing of the American era” that began with
the George W. Bush administration’s unilateralism, “a return to multipolarity, and the rise of
rival nonliberal order-building projects.”61 If hegemonic stability theory is correct, in time there
will be an absence of a single, benign hegemonic power able to shape global institutions and
enforce the rules and norms that enable globalization to flourish.
The belief that the global liberal order is eroding is closely related to a second belief—that
American power is waning. With the end of the Cold War, the United States stood alone as an
unchallenged hegemon in a “unipolar” world in which globalization had made people more
interdependent economically, politically, socially, and culturally and had removed many
obstacles to the movement of persons, ideas, and things. The proliferation of nongovernmental
and interstate groups advocating solutions to collective problems like global warming fostered
global civil society and enhanced the prospects of global governance in a variety of issue areas
that featured US-supported international regimes.

The other side of the decline argument focuses on growing Chinese and Russian capabilities.
Any decline, however, is relative not absolute; that is, other countries are increasing their
capabilities while America remains the world’s sole superpower. Nye, for example, has argued
that the American century will continue beyond 2041, when the United States will still have
“primacy in power resources and play the central role in the global balance among states.”62 But
what matters is, as Nye contends, that, although there is “a history of premature and misleading
predictions of decline,”63 a belief in and (false) perception of decline may actually produce it or
may tempt the putative “decliner” or “challenger” to begin a war to determine which will be the
global hegemon. Nevertheless, Nye also notes that, in fact, thus far “China has not tried to
overthrow the current order but rather to increase its influence within it.”64
Robert Kagan, too, argues that the global liberal order was created by and continues to depend
on the power and determination of hegemonic America.65 For Kagan, “The United States, in
short, was the ‘indispensable nation,’ as Bill Clinton proclaimed—indispensable, that is, to the
liberal world order.”66 He observes that defending the liberal world order “was the thinking
behind most of Clinton’s foreign policy initiatives: the enlargement of NATO, which included the
extension of unprecedented military guarantees to such nations as Poland, the Czech Republic,
and the Baltic states; the billions sent trying to save Boris Yeltsin’s faltering democratic
experiment in Russia; and the intense focus on containing North Korea, Iraq, and Iran,
designated as ‘rogue states’ because they defied the principles (p.41) of a liberal world
order.”67 This “context,” Kagan believes, guided Washington’s actions even where immediate
interests were not at stake. George W. Bush’s policies, too, “had begun as a world order
issue”68 before Washington’s 2003 invasion of Iraq ended in a disaster that continues to shape
American public opinion, and contributed to President Barack Obama’s reluctance to lead “from
in front.”
We must, however, take seriously Nye’s caution that “[a] nation may also decline in power
relative to other nations because it chooses not to use the power resources at its
disposal.”69 Although the United States may retain the capabilities to remain a superpower, even
a hegemon, in the near future, a problem with US foreign policy in recent years has been the
Obama administration’s overreaction to the hubristic excesses of the previous Bush
administration. George W. Bush’s “neo-conservative” triumphalism, militant unilateralism, and
reckless and ill-fated intervention in Iraq did immense damage to America’s global image and
left the US public exceedingly war-weary. The Bush administration had been widely regarded by
allies and domestic foes as overly eager to use military force and violate human-rights norms in
fighting the War on Terror and in its futile effort to spread democracy and engineer regime
change in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The United States, in the words of former diplomat
Haass, was becoming a “reluctant sheriff,”70 involving itself when local powers could not
maintain peace. But neither the War on Terror nor the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were
part of a coherent global strategy, nor did America’s allies regard them as such. Instead, as
Kagan suggests, “the rest of the world saw the United States not as a global leader seeking the
global good but as an angry Leviathan narrowly focused on destroying those who had attacked
it.” He warns: “the only thing worse than a self-absorbed hegemon is an incompetent self-
absorbed hegemon.”71

When President Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, he touched upon the dilemma he would
face in the following years: “So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly
irreconcilable truths—that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of
human folly.”72 It was that dilemma and the absence of a clear ends and means strategy that
became manifest in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, anywhere countries
questioned American commitments and in so doing were presumed to threaten the post–Cold
War international order and the credibility of its deterrence of China, Russia, and Iran. Obama
had assumed office committed to ending the “bad” war in Iraq and pacifying and reforming
Afghanistan in a “good” war. In neither case did Washington achieve its objectives. Iraq finds
itself in the midst of a sectarian war between Shia and Sunni Muslims with little that is positive
to show for over a decade of US intervention. Afghanistan remains threatened by the Taliban-
led insurrection against a government installed by Washington. Obama sought to end America’s
military presence in that country before leaving office, even though the Taliban remained a
threat to the US-supported government that was not yet prepared to defeat its foe. In addition,
the United States assisted America’s NATO allies in protecting Libyans from Muammar al-
Qaddafi. Qaddafi was overthrown, but the US ambassador was murdered; chaos soon resumed;
and Libya became a failed state. (p.42)
The Obama administration adopted a cautious and restrained foreign policy posture, preferring
negotiations and multilateralism, and deferring to allies as though the world
were already multipolar. His caution was apparent when he defended his foreign-policy legacy
by asking: “Why is it that everybody is so eager to use military force after we’ve just gone
through a decade of war at enormous cost to our troops and to our budget. And what is it exactly
that these critics think would have been accomplished?” And he expressed what may someday
be called the Obama doctrine with a baseball analogy: “You hit singles, you hit doubles; every
once in a while we may be able to hit a home run. But we steadily advance the interests of the
American people and our partnership with folks around the world.”73 His policy of restraint was
reasoned and thoughtful, but led a former national security official in his administration to
conclude rather pointedly, “We’re seeing the ‘light footprint’ run out of gas.”74
Obama’s presidency coincided with the Great Recession and a period of escalating partisanship
in US domestic politics that produced legislative deadlock. Meanwhile, Obama had to face a
world that many commentators observed, seemed to be “falling apart.” It was Obama’s
misfortune that he was simultaneously confronted with a financial crisis and geopolitical
challenges in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and elsewhere that made a coherent strategy
virtually impossible to design and drove down his domestic foreign-policy rating. While
imposing sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, he hoped to cooperate with Moscow on arms
control and enter into negotiations with North Korea and Iran. While differing with Shia Iran
over the future of Syria and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he sought common ground with Tehran
over IS, even as he formed a coalition against the Islamic State consisting of Sunni states and
opponents of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Simultaneously the president sought to reassure
Israel regarding Iran while condemning Israel’s war in Gaza and seeking a two-state solution
and an end to settlement expansion. Former Obama adviser Gary Samore admitted, “You name
it, the world is aflame. Foreign policy is always complicated. We always have a mix of
complicated interests. That’s not unusual. What’s unusual is there’s this outbreak of violence
and instability everywhere.”75

Many of the foreign-policy issues that confronted the Obama administration reflected the return
of geopolitics that was antithetical to the liberal global order. This coincided with intensified
nationalism in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere. In Russia. Putin was determined to restore
Russia’s great power status. In China, President Xi Jinping strove to give China a status equal to
that of the United States and expand Chinese control into the South China and East China Seas.
And in Iran, the ruling theocrats sought to acquire nuclear weapons and extend Shia influence
across the Middle East. Both Russia and China, writes Michael Mazarr, “feel disenfranchised by
a US-dominated system that imposes strict conditions on their participation and, they believe
menaces their regimes by promoting democracy.”76 (p.43)
Having “pivoted” to Asia in response to China’s assertiveness, Washington failed to convince
Beijing that the United States was not seeking to “contain” China generally. With
uncharacteristic forthrightness, the Obama administration condemned China’s island-building
campaign, and reiterated the right of the United States to fly military aircraft over disputed
territory and send naval vessels anywhere in international waters. With only a minor increment
in military forces in Asia, however, Washington’s scolding of China irritated Beijing but did not
persuade other Asian countries that US commitments were credible.

With the removal of most US forces from Europe, the Obama administration was pitifully
unprepared to respond to Russia’s “hybrid war” in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Few
Americans wanted to see US troops in Ukraine, but the limited economic sanctions imposed by
Washington and its European allies and Washington’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with arms
were plainly insufficient to prevent Russian “volunteers”—the “little green men”—from aiding
those in Ukraine seeking to “federalize” the country or secede entirely from it. The situation
became yet another “frozen conflict” like those in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
Moldova (Transnistria), and Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh).77 As described by
French analyst Franςois Heisbourg, “Mr. Putin does not do frontal attacks, he does judo,”78 that
is, enough to achieve his immediate objectives, but not enough to justify a major Western
response. Even if Washington responded militarily were Russia to invade a NATO country like
Estonia, a former US defense official, commented, “I would worry that it would be late. Not too
late, but late, and that would send a message round the world.”79

Other than killing Osama bin Laden, US policy in the Middle East seemed consistently
irresolute. Having threatened to use force against Syria’s President Assad if he employed
chemical weapons, the Obama administration backed off in return for a deal with Assad
brokered by Russia for destroying Syria’s remaining chemical weapons, a deal that many believe
undermined the credibility of US threats regarding Iran over that country’s nuclear program. At
the same time, Washington in early 2013 began to contribute non-lethal aid and weapons to
Syria’s Sunni opposition and the following year authorized additional military aid. By this time
Assad was in the driver’s seat again aided by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, with the opposition
involved in its own civil war, and without fear of overt American intervention.

America’s passivity during Syria’s civil war and Egypt’s turmoil also enhanced Islamic
extremists in the Middle East and North Africa, and the region became the “chief cauldron of
contemporary disorder.”80 If America’s 2003 intervention in Iraq had radicalized Muslims
worldwide, Washington’s indecisiveness mobilized al-Qaeda affiliates around the world. And
after the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Iraq again descended into sectarian violence with a
Shia government that had grown more dependent on Iran as it grew less dependent on America,
which had installed it in the first place. Responding with characteristic tentativeness to the
threat of the Islamic State, Obama authorized additional US aid and dispatched several hundred
troops to train and arm moderate Sunni rebels for a year, (p.44) even though an internal CIA
study found that covert aid to insurgents usually failed without the presence of American
advisers on the ground.81
Elsewhere in the region, having supported the overthrow of a military regime in Egypt in the
name of democracy, Washington said little about the new government’s anti-democratic policies
and even less after that government was ousted in a military coup. Obama’s willingness to
negotiate with Iran over that country’s nuclear ambitions intensified Sunni Arab and Israeli
suspicion of US motives. Iran continued to aid President Assad and remained on the threshold
of building a nuclear weapon, even as North Korea continued its nuclear tests and moved
toward deploying long-range missiles. Domestic partisan rancor resulted in a Republican
invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to denounce the US-Iranian agreement
as “a bad deal,” an event that was followed by a letter written by Republican senators to Iran’s
leaders, informing them that Congress could revoke the agreement later. Both events
contributed to an appearance of foreign-policy disarray. US negotiations with Iran and pressure
on Israel to stop building settlements in the occupied territories alienated Israel’s hardline
leaders. A new round of peace negotiations prompted by Secretary of State John Kerry yielded
little and collapsed in mutual recriminations. Following the July 2015 nuclear deal with Iran,
Obama defended it as the best that could be had short of war.

Kagan criticizes the Obama foreign-policy establishment and the generation it represented when
he writes of a “sense of futility” that followed the country’s financial crisis and embodied what
John Mueller calls the “Iraq syndrome,”82 the fear that America could be dragged into another
Middle East civil war. “Senior White House officials,” writes Kagan, “especially the younger
ones, look at problems like the struggle in Syria and believe that there is little if anything the
United State can do. This is the lesson of their generation, the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan:
that America has neither the power nor the understanding nor the skill to fix problems in the
world.” And he adds that this “is also escapism”83 because such officials including the president
did not appreciate what is at stake and how quickly the liberal global order could disappear.
Writes Fred Kaplan, “many officers and defense officials” cite Obama’s foreign-policy
accomplishments, but conclude that “too often . . . he has avoided taking action, waiting for
conditions to get better—circling the block, in his own metaphor waiting for a better parking
spot to open up.”84 And this caution severely damaged US credibility.

IV. The Trump Presidency

Donald Trump’s campaign slogan (also Ronald Reagan’s in the 1980 presidential campaign)
“Make America Great Again” reflected in part the outrage of his supporters about the alleged
impact of existing global and regional trade regimes on America’s trade deficit and decline of
manufacturing. Trump’s voters were also convinced that illegal immigrants were “stealing” jobs
from America’s traditional workforce. Support for Trump additionally (p.45) came from voters
who were weary of foreign entanglements and doubtful that the United States and the West in
general could any longer maintain the existing global order. Thus, paradoxically, Trump’s “Make
America Great Again” projected a neo-isolationist message. That message echoed around the
world and encouraged other populist nationalist movements that were already complaining
about economic stagnation, income inequality, migrants streaming across porous borders, and
erosion of sovereign autonomy. President Trump’s belief in US decline and his rhetorical
isolationism underscore Nye’s view of the role that perception of weakness may play in
undermining a country’s policies. For example, a Chinese foreign ministry official declared that
President Xi’s advocacy of free trade in a speech at the World Economic Forum “is not China
rushing to the front, but rather the front-runners have stepped back, leaving the place to
China.”85 And President Xi’s willingness to become the leading global advocate of free trade was
echoed some months later by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.86
Of the two US presidential candidates Hillary Clinton promised in the main to adhere to the
rule-based attributed of liberal globalization. Her ideas regarding “smart power,” that is,
“choosing the right combination of tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and
cultural—for each situation,”87 were on the public record. Her foreign-policy objectives included
pushing back against Putin’s provocations in Europe, defeating the Islamic State, enhancing
relations with Israel, retaining the deal with Iran regarding nuclear proliferation, ending China’s
cyberespionage and resisting that country’s maritime territorial claims, while cooperating with
Beijing where interests overlapped—slowing climate change and denuclearizing the Korean
peninsula.

Candidate Trump had no foreign-policy experience and expressed (flamboyantly) vague and
frequently inconsistent positions during the campaign.88 Thus, concerning policy regarding
North Korea, he talked about everything from renewing direct talks to launching a preventive
military attack. Rather than supporting internationalism and multilateralism, as we have seen,
Trump emphasized isolationist and unilateralist themes. He spoke of major increases in military
expenditures while threatening to cut US funding for UN peacekeeping.89 He proposed a vast
increase in US military expenditures,90 without outlining a clear set of strategic objectives. And
Trump’s adviser Stephen Bannon predicted (p.46) a “war in the South China Sea in five to 10
years.”91 Unilateralism and contempt for traditional diplomacy are also embodied in Trump’s
proposed budget increases for the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security
compared with dramatic reductions in the State Department’s budget92 and the extraordinary
delay in filling State’s senior positions.93 “Mr. Trump,” writes one critic, “is all about
intimidating more and negotiating less. This is the hallmark of xenophobic nationalism.”94
Trump’s administration initially labeled NATO “obsolete” and (with ample justification)
criticized the level of most member states’ military spending. Another administration target has
been the United Nations, where the US ambassador to that organization, Nikki Haley,
belligerently declared, “For those who don’t have our back, we’re taking names.”95 Thereafter,
Ambassador Haley described the United Nations as “basically a club” and spoke of “a wave of
populism that is challenging institutions like the United Nations, and shaking them to their
foundations.”96 Not surprisingly, a draft of a presidential order that was leaked in January 2017
suggested that the Trump administration sought significant cuts in America’s financial
contribution to the United Nations and its programs,97 which a UN spokesman declared “would
simply make it impossible for the U.N. to continue all of its essential work advancing peace,
development, human rights and humanitarian assistance.”98

Rather than economic engagement with China, Europe and Latin America, Trump initially
threatened a trade war with China and policies that stressed economic self-sufficiency.99 Trump
also assailed alleged Canadian protection of its dairy industry, declaring: “What they’ve done to
our dairy farm workers is a disgrace,” and “We can’t let Canada or anybody else take advantage
of what they did to our workers and farmers.”100 Trump’s economic (p.47) adviser, Peter
Navarro, even accused Germany of currency manipulation.101 Finally, at the Group of 20 (G20)
conference in March 2017, the United States pointedly refused to join other member states in
expressing concern about protectionism. The G20 communiqué merely noted: “We are working
to strengthen the contribution of trade to our economies.” Secretary of the Treasury Steven
Mnuchin declared: “Balanced trade has to be what’s good for us and what’s good for other
people. It has to be a win-win situation.”102
However, there remain more liberal currents regarding trade. Thus, the European Parliament
approved a broad trade deal with Canada that seemed to be a rebuke to Trump’s protectionism.
“We want to make clear in this vote,” declared a German member of the parliament, “that we
don’t want to build walls, we want to build bridges.” Added Canada’s minister for international
trade, “The world was waiting for a strong voice from Europe and Canada, and today, Europe
has spoken with a strong voice for open and progressive trade.”103 Indeed, a 2016 poll found that
almost two-thirds of Americans believe that globalization and free trade were good for
Americans.104

Trump’s campaign promised to limit immigration, deport undocumented Hispanic aliens, and
ban Muslim immigration. His administration’s antipathy to Hispanics ignores numerous studies
suggesting Mexican immigration to the United States neither costs Americans jobs nor reduces
their income.105 Moreover, skilled immigrants from many countries are crucial for high-tech
centers in the United States. Declared one entrepreneur, “The U.S. is sucking up all the talent
from all across the world,” adding, “Look at all the leading technology companies globally, and
look at how overrepresented the United States is. . . . That’s because we have managed to create
this engine where the best and the brightest from around the world are coming to Silicon
Valley.”106
The president’s initial executive order to prevent Muslims from entering the United States in
January 2017 was struck down by a federal appeals court, but he signed a revised version in
March that temporarily barred visitors from six Muslim countries,107 on grounds (p.48) of
potential terrorism. “Unregulated, unvetted travel,” declared John Kelly, Trump’s secretary of
homeland security, “is not a universal privilege, especially when national security is at
stake.”108 The administration also added additional checks on those seeking visa to the United
States as tourists, business travelers, or relatives of Americans as part of a policy of “extreme
vetting”109 although an intelligence report from Kelly’s own department concluded that “country
of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.”110 Two federal
judges blocked the revised executive order. Judge Derrick Watson, of Federal District Court in
Honolulu, wrote that a “reasonable, objective observer” would view even the new order as
“issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously neutral
purpose.”111 That position was upheld in successive appeals. UN Secretary General António
Guterres declared that the proposed ban “violates our basic principles” and, in any event, would
not reduce the threat of terrorism.112
Comments by Trump and some of his advisers intentionally stoked Islamophobia in the United
States. Trump’s first national security adviser General Michael Flynn (now notorious for his
Russian connections) tweeted “Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL,” adding: “Islam is not
necessarily a religion but a political system that has a religious doctrine behind it.”113 “They’re
tapping into the climate of fear and suspicion since 9/11,” declared a professor of Islamic
studies, “It’s a master narrative that pits the Muslim world against the world” that appeals to
Trump’s supporters in the United States and populist nationalists in Europe and seems to
confirm the claim of Muslim extremists that the West is opposed to Islam and not terrorism.
Trump defended his ban on Muslims by declaring, “The hateful ideology of radical Islam” must
not be “allowed to reside or spread within our own communities.”114 In fact, the proposed ban
has almost certainly helped recruit additional supporters to the extremist cause. According to a
Turkish academic: “Terrorists can say, ‘See, their aim is not terror but Muslims,” and a former
US ambassador noted that “[t]he Islamic State says it is leading the war against the U.S. Now it
only has to pump out our press releases to prove that.”115 (p.49)
Trump’s nationalism also implied a rejection of multilateralism in regard to pressing global
issues. For example, concerning the environment, the new president expressed skepticism that
global warming was man-made. He advocated renewed dependence on coal, reneging on the
Paris accord,116 rolling back the environmental initiatives of the Obama years, and making deep
cuts in the Environmental Protection Agency budget, including support for research on climate
change. China, however, appeared ready to assume the lead in multilateral efforts to reduce
global warming, which would be yet another step toward replacing the United States as a global
hegemon.117 “Even analysts who make a living predicting a great shift of wealth, power and
global leadership from the United States to China never anticipated the speed with which
Donald Trump appears to be marginalizing his homeland.”118 UN Secretary General António
Guterres warned that if America retreated from leadership in issues like climate change it would
“be unavoidable that other actors occupy that space.”119 America is historically the largest source
of greenhouse gases, but China is at present the largest source of such gases. Nevertheless, at the
G20 meeting in Hamburg in June 2017, Trump was alone is opposing the Paris climate accord
as nineteen members of the group signed a communiqué, which endorsed the agreement.
“Whatever leadership is,” declared a French diplomat, “it is not being outvoted, 19 to 1.”120

Trump repeatedly expressed admiration for “strong” (authoritarian) leaders like Putin and
Saddam Hussein. His tweets frequently suggest he shares common ground with Turkey’s
Erdoğan,121 China’s Xi Jinping, the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte,122 Syria’s Bashar (p.50) al-
Assad123 and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. He even declared he would be “honored” to meet with
North Korea’s murderous dictator Kim Jong-un, and his press secretary commented that Kim’s
behavior owed much to the fact he was young: “There was a lot of potential threats that could
have come his way. He’s managed to lead a country forward, despite the concerns that we and so
many people have.”124 Such comments frequently reflect a blatant contempt for human
rights.125 According to historian Timothy Garton Ash, the Trump administration has
inaugurated “a new era of nationalism” in which “the nationalists are giving one another the
Trumpian thumbs-up across the seas.”126
Regarding regional issues, the Trump administration stressed markedly revisionist themes. His
references to burden-sharing with NATO and East Asian allies cast doubt on his willingness to
uphold American commitments.127 These concerns triggered growing sentiment for larger
German128 and Japanese military forces and spending, a significant departure from their policies
since World War II, and started discussion by Europeans of a possible nuclear
“Eurodeterrent.”129 Trump’s ambivalent comments regarding Putin and his involvement in
Ukraine created profound distrust among European allies about America’s (p.51) policy toward
an aggressive Russia. The timing of this is especially unfortunate owing to Russia’s growing
military capabilities. Since 2008 Russia has been modernizing its forces, has shown a
willingness to use military force to further foreign-policy objectives, and has improved its ability
to project that force at greater distances. “As a result, there is a growing perception in the West
that Russia has reemerged as a revanchist, neo-imperialist, expansionist, and hostile power bent
on dismantling the post–Cold War European security system and dividing the continent into
spheres of influence.”130
During and after the presidential campaign, there were numerous contacts between Trump’s
aides and Russians, including connections with Russian banks and Russian intelligence.131 And
in December 2016, the CIA announced its judgment that Russian computer hacking during the
campaign had been intended to make Trump president; as one journalist expressed it, “the
Russians put a thumb on the scale for Mr. Trump, and got their desired outcome.”132 Some
members in Trump’s coterie, including Secretary Tillerson, Trump’s son-in-law and confidant
Jared Kushner, NSA adviser Michael Flynn133 and his former campaign chairperson Paul
Manafort had direct business and/or political links to Russia. Not without reason, the
administration’s political opponents demanded an investigation to determine whether some or
all of these ties were improper or even treasonous.

Trump also expressed concern regarding America’s presence in East Asia and even suggested
that Japan and South Korea consider acquiring nuclear weapons, which runs counter to US anti-
proliferation policy and could destabilize relations in the region as a whole. He promised to end
the multilateral nuclear proliferation agreement with Iran, which the director of the CIA warned
would be “the height of folly,”134 and criticized the New Start Treaty with Russia. “It’s a one-
sided deal,” Trump declared. “It gave them things that we never should have allowed. . .
.”135 (p.52)
Six months (at this writing) into the Trump presidency, the administration remains in day-to-
day chaos, oscillating between positions on many vital foreign policy issues with almost reckless
abandon. Much of this appears to be the product of Trump’s own ignorance of world affairs
coupled with his volatile personality and “keep ‘em guessing” style. There obviously are also
major policy differences among his immediate advisers, including family, business, military, and
right-wing ideologues. A conservative Republican majority in Congress and powerful interest
groups—including multinational companies, which generally favor multilateral trade
agreements—have thus far been able to do little more than express “concern” about the
administration’s most egregious positions and desperately attempt to stop investigations
demanded by outraged Democrats. In sum, at this stage the United States hegemon appears to
be flailing, in a dangerous condition of near-collapse, and American prestige in the world is at a
low ebb except among Trump’s counterparts abroad.

V. Populist Nationalism: The European Dimension

Even as the United States falls prey to populist nationalism and retreats from its role in
sustaining the global liberal order, Europe is gripped by growing numbers of voters and
politicians with similar views regarding territorial, economic, and political “sovereignty.” For
example, “the conservative-populist nationalists in both the United States and Europe view
Putin as a potential ally because they are focused on a sharply contrasting set of international
priorities: resisting Islamic radicalization, unwinding global economic integration, and fighting
the secularization of Western societies.”136

American and European nationalists support one another. Trump voiced his strong support for
Brexit during his campaign, and Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán praised Trump’s
election as bringing an end to “liberal non-democracy” and showing “that democracy is creative
and innovative.”137 Such views as well as growing cleavages in the perceived interests of Europe’s
democracies are endangering the very existence of the European Union, which is among the
central pillars of the liberal order. Although nationalism has re-emerged throughout the
European Union, its supporters have proved less successful in getting elected in the older
member states such as the Netherlands, Germany, and France than in more recent members in
Eastern Europe such as Hungary and Poland. The latter have a shallower democratic tradition
and less resilient political systems and institutions than the former. One factor that helps
determine the relative success of different populist politicians and parties is the nature of a
country’s electoral system and political parties, and whether voters are selecting members of a
parliament or voting in a referendum.138 (p.53) Thus, although a majority of voters in the
British “Brexit” referendum supported leaving the European Union, the political party most in
favor of that decision had only a single member of parliament at the time.
Following expansion eastward after the Cold War, the European project has suffered significant
setbacks. The European Union’s expansion eastward after the Cold War has made its
membership politically and economically more diffuse, its management more complex, and
negotiations among member states increasingly fractious. An extended period of economic
malaise during the Great Recession, threats from Russia and Islamic terrorism, and a flood of
refugees from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa have all undermined the European
Union’s cohesion. Stewart Patrick observes, “The European Union is locked in a perpetual state
of crisis management. It has had to head off the collapse of the Eurozone, deal with waves of
undocumented migrants, and now come to terms with a renewed terrorist threat, underscored
by the recent attacks in Brussels and France. On top of all this, the EU confronts a British exit,
or Brexit. . . . The European idea, which has helped to inspire the continent’s integration since
World War II, may be the next casualty.”139

EU critics emphasize what they regard as the disadvantages of membership in the group. First,
the Schengen agreement, it is claimed, facilitates the movement of migrants and allows
criminals and terrorists to operate across national borders. Poland reneged on a pledge to accept
6,000 refugees because, as a government spokesperson declared, “We can’t allow for events in
Western Europe to happen in Poland.”140 Second, membership entails a variety of fees and costs
which are thought onerous, which raises the question of relative costs and benefits. Third,
members must adhere to EU laws and regulations such as the free movement of persons
regardless of costs and preferences. And fourth, complaints about “meddling eurocrats” are
linked to a more general concern about the loss of sovereignty to Brussels. Fifth, unified
monetary policy in the Eurozone prevents currency devaluation by less competitive member
states.

Finally, even the claim that the European Union has deepened democratic values among
member states is contested, especially among newer members. Poland’s Law and Justice Party
(PIS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski has been criticized by the European Union for seeking to
control the country’s state media, “pack” Poland’s constitutional court, and staff public
enterprises with those who, according to treasury minister Dawid Jackiewicz, “identify with the
government’s programme.”141 The European Parliament accused Poland’s government of
“endangering democracy, human rights and the rule of law” by appointing additional justices to
the country’s Constitutional Tribunal and limiting the tribunal’s legal authority. And Polish
opposition by its right-wing leaders to the reappointment of former Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusk as president of the European Council was described (p.54) by one observer as an
example of “nationalistic populism,” which “entails attacks on the European Union.”142
In Hungary, Prime Minister Orbán, writes James Traub, “has openly championed the idea of
‘illiberal democracy’,” and “has been evincing his disdain for liberal values ever since his Fidesz
party gained power five years ago. His contemptuous language—even more than the measures
that have accompanied it—has made him as popular among his own voters as any other leader
in Europe.”143 Orbán and other Fidesz leaders have also denounced “foreign-funded”
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and imposed control on those receiving foreign funding,
especially those aided by George Soros that focus on institutionalizing democracy in post-Soviet
Eastern Europe.144 They have passed legislation to close down Budapest’s Central European
University, founded by Soros after the collapse of the Soviet bloc to institutionalize democratic
values.145 As a former Polish foreign minister observed, Soros “has been a consistent advocate of
the liberal order, and the liberal order itself is under attack,”146 and accused Orbán of making
Hungary a “Mafia State.”147

Elsewhere in Europe illiberal right-wing, euro-skeptic, nationalist, and even racist politicians
and political parties such as Austria’s Freedom Party, Geert Wilders (known as a “Dutch
Trump”148) and his Dutch People’s Union in the Netherlands,149 Italy’s Beppe Grillo and the Five
Star Movement, Udo Voight and the National Democratic Party of Germany, Marine Le Pen and
France’s National Front, Pia Kjaersgaard and the Danish People’s Party, and most recently
Germany’s Alternative for Germany threaten mainstream political parties of the left and center.
Following the Brexit referendum, Le Pen had called for a “Frexit” vote, Wilders demanded a
“Nexit” referendum,150 and sentiment for “Grexit” remains high. (p.55) Like Trump, many of
these politicians use social media to taunt foes, denounce mainstream media, and animate
supporters.151 In addition, Europe is even witnessing the revival of overtly racist neo-fascist
groups like People’s Party Our Slovakia,152 Greece’s Golden Dawn, and Germany’s National
Democratic Party.153
Le Pen lauded Trump supporters who had “kept faith with their national interest” while
insisting that the French had been “dispossessed of their patriotism.”154 She described her
supporters as “patriots” and her foes as “globalists” who were pro– European Union and
supported the admission of Muslim refugees. Despite her belated efforts to characterize herself
as a moderate, far-right neo-Nazis were among Le Pen’s closest advisers.155 Le Pen also echoed
Trump’s admiration of Putin and Russia. “She’s the only one who can speak with both Putin and
Trump,” declared one of her advisers. “She’s got a privileged relationship with Putin. You can’t
be isolated when you’ve got both Putin and Trump on your side.”156

In the first round of the French presidential election in April 2017, Le Pen came in second in a
large field of candidates, qualifying for a second round run-off with Emmanuel Macron who had
established a new party, En Marche! (Onward!). Macron is a centrist who believes in liberal
democracy and free trade, and supports the European Union. Neither was a candidate of
France’s mainstream parties, although Obama and French President Hollande endorsed
Macron, and Trump (as well as Putin) indicated that he supported Le Pen.157 Macron won the
second round easily with over 63 percent of the vote, to the immense relief of beleaguered
defenders of the European Union and the global liberal order, although large numbers of voters
did not vote at all. Had France followed Britain out of the European Union, the organization
might have been fatally weakened.158 At the 2017 (p.56) G20 meeting, Macron indirectly
criticized Trump and his nationalist opposition to globalization, declaring, “Our world has never
been so divided. Centrifugal forces have never been so powerful. Our common goods have never
been so threatened.” He added, “We need those organizations that were created out of the
Second World War. Otherwise, we will be moving back toward narrow-minded nationalism.”159
Several EU cleavages involve security issues. One arises from different perceptions of the degree
of threat posed by Russia and a different assessment of Russian motives especially its
intervention in Ukraine and conflict with Georgia after those countries sought closer relations
with the West. A second issue involves differences over the flood of refugees from Muslim
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq into the European Union from Turkey and the
appropriate response to this development.

The first issue mainly pits the early continental members of the group160 against more recent
post–Cold War members that were either Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia Lithuania) or
members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia) and former Yugoslav republics (Croatia and Slovenia). They regard the
European Union and NATO as safeguards against a new Russian empire. They also are aware of
the economic benefits derived from EU membership in the European Union. Poland, for
example, is the largest recipient of Structural Funds from the European Union.161 The others in
Eastern Europe also benefit greatly from both EU largesse in terms of grants, Structural Funds
and other EU outlays. Trade has risen enormously owing to membership in the European
Union, as has economic growth—GDPs grow at an average of 5 percent a year in Eastern Europe
(except Hungary)—and they have also been recipients of major investments from the west.162

Eastern members of the European Union view the crisis in Ukraine and Moscow’s annexation of
Crimea as threatening Russian reassertion of domination in countries formerly part of the USSR
or the Soviet bloc. Hence they advocate more militant responses to Russia than the more
cautious western members. Indeed, the crisis in Ukraine was triggered by that country’s effort to
align itself more closely with the European Union and the West in general.

Most western Ukrainians speak Ukrainian and are pro-European while many eastern
Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language and are pro-Russian (an anomaly from post–
World War II frontier adjustments). Ukraine seemed eager to sign an EU association agreement
at a meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, in November 2013. Such agreements, part of the European
Union’s Eastern Partnership program, establish a framework for bilateral relations with the
European Union that provide for liberalization of trade between them and may lead to EU
membership. (p.57)
Moscow tried to dissuade Ukraine from accepting this agreement, coercing Kiev by imposing
costly restrictions on trade between the two countries and warning Ukraine that signing the
association political and free-trade agreements would be “suicidal.”163 Moscow wanted Ukraine
to join the Eurasian Economic Union, established by Russia, Armenia. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan (but not Ukraine) in 2014. “For its part, Moscow seeks not political change in the
region but domination. That means it framed Ukraine’s future as a zero-sum game with the
EU.”164 Russian threats and promised rewards persuaded Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovich to turn down the EU agreement. His eastward turn left pro-European Ukrainians in
the country’s western region aghast and triggered large demonstrations. The agreement was an
important EU initiative. “The union,” wrote a European scholar, “has major strategic and
economic interests at stake: strategically, the EU strives to create a benign environment for itself
by spreading its model of rule of law and transparency to its periphery. And inducing Russia to
respect the sovereignty [of Ukraine] would finally cement the post–Cold War European
order.”165

Without Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership program was at risk. “Everyone thought the Eastern
Partnership was just another flabby European project,” observed a Russia expert. “But once a
country signs up, it is in Weight Watchers and, if they follow the regimen, they change, Russia
realized this and did not like it.”166 For the European Union, Ukraine’s decision to capitulate to
Soviet pressure was a serious setback. As protests continued in late February 2014 violence
exploded and special police and shadowy government supporters massacred more than 100
demonstrators. Ukraine’s parliament ultimately impeached the president who fled Kiev.
Thereafter, Russian initiated hybrid war against Ukraine, aided pro-Russian separatists in the
county’s eastern region, and finally annexed Crimea.

The Baltic states, members of both the European Union and NATO, are especially concerned
about Russia’s actions in Ukraine because of their large ethnic Russian populations that
constitute what Moscow terms its “near abroad.” The doctrine’s “most substantial feature lies in
its declaring the post-Soviet region to be an area of exclusive Russian interest. . . .”167 Russian
minorities in the Baltic republics are indeed subject to persecution. For example, in Estonia:
“Ethnic Russians are somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of the population. And yet,
after Estonian independence in 1991, they were not given citizenship, even if they were born
there. Russians who weren’t living in Estonia before Soviet times are given a gray passport
connoting their official status as ‘aliens.’ They can’t vote in national elections and have trouble
finding work. To get citizenship, they have to pass an Estonian language exam. . . . The
Language Inspectorate, which Russia Today derisively labeled ‘the language police,’ performs
spot checks on bureaucrats and teachers to make sure they know Estonian. If they fail the test,
they lose their jobs.”168 Thus, the (p.58) Baltic EU members are especially concerned about the
threat from the east and the intensification of Russia’s military presence in and around the
Baltic and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Based on geography and history, they fear that
Putin’s Moscow at a minimum is intent on bullying and blackmailing them and at worst
threatens their recently won independence.169
What explains Russian intervention in Ukraine? Was the Ukraine crisis Russia’s fault, as most
Americans and Europeans believe? John Mearsheimer concludes that Western failure to
recognize Russian interests and Western efforts to export liberal values to Russia’s neighbors
were responsible for the crisis. “The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central
element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.
At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy
movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements,
too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in
recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically
important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin the overthrow of Yanukovich ‘was
the final straw.’ ”170

By contrast, Jeffrey Mankoff argues that Russian policy toward Ukraine “is at once a replay and
an escalation of tactics that the Kremlin has used in recent decades to maintain its influence
across the domains of the former Soviet Union” by supporting “breakaway ethnic regions” in
Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. “Moscow’s meddling has created so-called frozen conflicts in
these states. In which the splinter territories remain beyond the control of the central
governments and the local de facto authorities enjoy Russian protection and influence.”171 In
addition, Moscow has deployed cruise missiles in southern Russia that violate the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) that threatens America’s NATO allies.172 For such reasons
Alexander Motyl concluded that “Kennan’s case for containing Russia makes just much sense
now”173 as it did during the Cold War, especially to reassure NATO’s (also the European Union’s)
Baltic members.

If Russia were allowed to exercise influence in eastern Ukraine and retain Crimea, which of the
eastern EU members would be next? Russia exerts pressure on these countries, and, although
the European Union as a whole has imposed punishing economic sanctions on Moscow, western
members remain reluctant to go further in defense of Ukraine and take additional measures like
providing Kiev with arms. EU sanctions have a differential impact on members as do Russian
energy exports to Europe. For example, 6,000 German companies are involved in selling to
Russia, and 300,000 German jobs depend on exports to Russia. Britain’s financial sector profits
from investments by wealthy Russians in everything (p.59) from bonds and property to private
schools for Russian children, and France sells arms to Moscow. Thus, an executive in a German
chemical company warned that sanctions “would not just hurt Russia, but also Germany and
Europe as a whole.”174
Differential European access to energy accentuates differences within the European Union.
Germany gets natural gas—a Russian geopolitical weapon—directly from Russia via the Nord
Stream pipeline. Western Europe has easier access to pipeline gas than Eastern Europe, much of
which is landlocked and lacks access to liquefied natural gas delivered by sea. Pipelines already
link some European countries. Germany can send gas to Italy, Poland and the Czech Republic,
but the Baltic countries and Bulgaria depend entirely on Russian gas. Hungary, Slovakia and
Poland can re-route gas to Ukraine (“reverse flow”) but are reluctant to do so, fearing Russian
retaliation.

Migration is another vexing security issue in Europe. Europeans in many EU member states like
many Americans “fear that governments have lost the ability to manage who may or may not
cross their borders, supposedly one of their primary responsibilities to citizens.”175 Unlike
Trump’s preoccupation with illegal migration from Mexico and efforts to bar Islamic refugees
(neither of which pose a significant homeland security threat), Europe’s concern with migration
intensified owing to the dramatic problem posed by the flood that peaked in 2015 that brought
with it a number of terrorists. Driven by civil wars in Syria and Iraq, the war in Afghanistan,
poverty in Kosovo and Albania, and violence in Pakistan, the number of asylum applications in
the European Union in 2015 was 1,321,560.176 (This figure does not include those who had not
yet made claims for asylum.) The largest number of these applications were made in Germany
(476,000), with Hungary second (177,130). Hungary had the highest proportion to its
population—1,800 per 100,000, with Sweden and Austria ranking second and third,
respectively. By mid-May 2016 an additional 189,414 migrants had entered Europe by sea.177

Germany initially took the position that the European Union should welcome the refugees.
Chancellor Merkel defended a liberal posture toward asylum seekers, but, as the number of
refugees in Germany mounted, she began to face growing opposition among German
voters.178 Opposition grew after sexual assaults upon women by migrants in Cologne on New
Year’s Eve 2016,179 and a deadly terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin in December
2016.180 Consequently, she modified her position, proposing a plan to distribute the refugee
burden among EU members. As one observer noted, “It is a European (p.60) problem, and it
needs a European solution.”181 Instead, the European Union divided into several groups. One led
by Austria and including several Balkan countries limits the number of refugees they are willing
to accept, imposed strict border controls on those permitted to move northward, and aided
Macedonia to close its border with Greece, stranding many migrants in that country. Croatia,
Macedonia and Serbia also began to screen migrants and refugees by nationality, admitting only
those from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.182
“We are now entering a situation in which everybody is trying to stop the refugees before they
reach their border,” noted Ivan Krastev, chairman of a Bulgarian research institute. “The basic
question is,” he continued, “which country turns into a parking lot for refugees.”183 Greece, it
appeared, was becoming that “parking lot” because the European Union’s Dublin Regulations
requires refugees to register in the first EU country they enter. And the proliferation of border
control in countries like Austria, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia184 threatened the
Schengen agreement to which they are parties. Southern member states like Greece and Italy
point out that most migrants cross their borders first, and thus they have to bear a huge burden
of rescue and care. As we shall see, they are also the same states that are faced with fiscal crises.
The media have focused on Greece where some 50,000 asylum seekers remain in camps,185 but
violence erupted among migrants who could not enter Macedonia.186
Not only are there added fiscal burdens on the least capable EU members, but other members
conclude that Greece and Turkey fail to vet those who are coming across, adding to the threat of
terrorist attacks in the European Union. After the multiple terrorist attacks in Brussels, a former
French intelligence official observed, “We are in a situation of structural vulnerability. That’s
what democracy is. It’s an open society.”187 But, “open borders,” as one scholar observes, are an
immutable fact in Europe,” and “[i]t is the failure to coordinate across divides that is the real
problem.”188 As one observer suggests, “these attacks will (p.61) increase xenophobic and anti-
immigration sentiment across the E.U., which has already been rising in light of the E.U’s
ongoing refugee crisis.”189 And terrorist attacks in Europe, especially those by followers of the
Islamic State, are cited by the Trump administration to demand tighter controls on immigration
to America.
France has been a particular target of terrorism in recent years,190 with deadly attacks in Paris
against the Charlie Hebdo office and other sites in January 2015,191 a concert hall and a stadium
in November 2015,192 and in Nice, against marchers on Bastille Day in July 2016.193 Several of
the terrorists in France had traveled from Belgium, and Brussels’ airport and a metro station
were the victims of attacks in March 2016.194 Germany, too, was the victim of four attacks in six
days in July 2016, two of which were committed by asylum seekers from Afghanistan and
Syria195 as well as the later attack in Berlin. And in March 2017, central London was the target of
an IS-influenced terrorist using vehicles as they had in Berlin and Nice, and Manchester was the
victim of a brutal terrorist attack at a pop music event in May.

“The great fear that swept through the Continent focused on the threat from within,” writes
Henry Porter, “from suburbs such as Molenbeek, in Brussels, and St. Denis, just outside Paris’s
Périphérique, and urgent questions were asked. How come the jihadists . . . were allowed to
move so freely across the Schengen area to carry out their atrocities? How had the intelligence
agencies failed to spot them? The silence that meets these questions says one thing: Europe
cannot protect its citizens, let alone defend its borders.”196 Porter pointed out the irony that
“Molenbeek is only a 10-minute drive from the center of Brussels. Where Eurocrats and
politicians dream of integration and harmonization programs.”197

Anti-Muslim sentiment among some eastern members reflects both racism and historical
memories. Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria believe that the flow of refugees will slow
their economic development, increase unemployment, and permit the entry of potential
terrorists into the Schengen zone. They also recall the Ottoman Turkish occupation of much of
the Balkans. Like Austria, they have aided Macedonia in its efforts to isolate refugees in Greece
and supported police efforts in Austria, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia to screen asylum seekers
with greater care. (p.62)
Hungary tried to stop the flow by closing its frontier with Croatia in October 2015 and held a
referendum a year later about whether to cease accepting its EU quota of refugees, which passed
easily but was not valid because too few Hungarians had voted. Orbán described migration as a
“Trojan horse of terrorism.”198 Georges Zirtes writes: “Christian Europe Hungary is defending
from Muslim hordes and terrorists,” and Orbán “wants to save Hungary for ‘genuine’
Hungarians: . . . Needing the genuine Hungarians’ support, he sent out a questionnaire implying
that migrants were spongers or terrorists, and put up billboards, addressed to the refugees, in
Hungarian—a language none of them can read—telling them that they would not be allowed to
take Hungarian jobs. Hardly any actually want to stay, of course, but you have to reassure the
natives—especially after frightening them in the first place. . . . The Ottoman empire is striking
back, he warns. . . . Hence the wire; hence the army; hence, as from today, the state of
emergency; hence the fierce, unrelenting rhetoric of hatred. Because that is what it has been
from the very start: sheer, crass hostility and slander.”199

In addition to trying to redistribute asylum seekers so that neither Greece nor Italy at the
frontiers of Europe nor Germany and other major recipients of migrants would have to bear an
unfair share of the burden, a second initiative was a deal with Turkey that was described as “a
temporary and extraordinary measure, which is necessary to end the human suffering and
restore public order.”200 Under the agreement Turkey agreed to the repatriation of migrants
arriving illegally in Greece if they did not seek asylum or if their applications were rejected.
Ankara would also take “all necessary measures” to prevent refugees from opening new routes
from Turkey into Europe.201 In return Turkish citizens would be allowed to travel to the
European Union without visas,202 the European Union would accelerate its consideration of
Turkey’s application to become a member,203 and the European Union would provide Turkey
with funding to cope with its refugee own population. The European Union would also accept
genuine asylum seekers from Turkey equivalent to the number who would be sent back to
Turkey.204 The deal was criticized by UN officials and NGOs as illegal under international law.
To some observers, it also seemed to imply approval of President Erdoğan’s authoritarianism.
“Visa liberalization,” declared a Swedish parliamentarian, “would now be sold by the Erdogan
regime as its victory and, by default, the E.U. will be seen to be rewarding the worrying political
direction in which President Erdogan has taken Turkey, and his departure from hard-won
democratic norms.”205

The EU-Turkish deal was further undermined by the massive arrest and/or purge of thousands
of dissidents including teachers, journalists and political foes in Turkey (p.63) following an
unsuccessful military coup in that country in July 2016. After European criticism of Turkey’s
repressive measures, Turkey’s foreign minister declared: “Unfortunately the EU is making some
serious mistakes. They have failed the test following the coup attempt . . . Their issue is anti-
Turkey and anti-Erdoğan sentiment. We have worked very hard towards EU (membership)
these past 15 years. We never begged, but we worked very hard. . . . Now two out of three people
are saying we should stop talks with the EU.”206
Another fissure in the European Union is the result of economic woes. Italy, Greece, Spain,
Cyprus, and Portugal were among those hardest hit by the Great Recession and are relative poor
compared with Germany, France and the Scandinavian members. They view themselves as the
“backward” economies of the EU nations and seek the help of the European Union to even the
economic playing field. Along with economic differences, there are perceptions of different
values between these groups of member states. The wealthier populations view themselves as
hard-working, dedicated, and pragmatic and condemn the laggards for their alleged focus on the
good life and unwillingness to knuckle down and put in the hours at the job. The former cite the
latter’s shorter working hours, longer vacation times, and earlier retirement ages. One scholar
concludes that in Greece and Italy over a third of all taxes are never collected. Exceptions allow
55 percent of households to pay nothing at all. And a number of those counted as “bad loans”
could actually pay them off but are taking advantage of the fiscal crisis to avoid payments.207

This issue has an important financial dimension. The worldwide financial crisis of 2008 hit the
European Union especially hard, and it has not yet fully recovered. Much of the media and
public attention has tended to focus on Greece with its debt situation and recurrent fiscal
problems. As recently as late May 2016, Greece again faced an inability to service its debt and
had to get refinanced.208 Each time this occurs209 the European Union demands further
austerity and refuses to discuss debt reduction. Greece protests. Demonstrations are held, and
the Greek government finally capitulates. But each time the rigors of austerity bring more
resentment of both the current government (whichever party is in power) and the European
Union itself.

Although the European Union has taken several steps to reform its financial structure including
the Stability Mechanism, EU budget oversight, and the special fund for economic downturns,
there is still no overall financial strategy. Unemployment remains stubbornly high. Growth rates
stubbornly low.210 Worse yet, the Brexit problem distracts any attempts to address these issues.
The very mechanisms that were designed to avoid another crisis like the one of 2008 are
themselves subjects of controversy. The Stability Mechanism and special bailout funds are
underwritten by additional levies on member states, and many citizens, are reluctant to increase
their countries’ contributions, anticipating that the funds will wind up bailing out the laggards.
The latter object not just to the austerity measures (p.64) that are imposed on them, but to the
ongoing oversight of their budgets by the European Central Bank and the European
Commission. For them, these measures represent a loss of sovereignty and interference with
national policies.

VI. Trump’s Unpredictability

In fact, the new US president has retreated from highly controversial positions on a number of
key issues.211 In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Trump startlingly appeared
both to abandon America’s long-standing positions that a Palestinian-Israeli peace requires a
two-state solution and US opposition to additional Israeli settlements in Jerusalem and the
West Bank, even as Israel, too, “has become more ethno-nationalist and less
universalist.”212 Nevertheless, his foreign-policy advisers reiterated the administration’s
commitment to an independent Palestine, and Trump’s press secretary suggested that “while we
don’t believe the existence of settlement is an impediment to peace, the construction of new
settlements beyond their current borders may not be helpful in achieving that goal.”213 Then,
after Trump hosted Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, whom he praised, there was concern
among pro-Israeli hardliners in the United States that Trump was coming under the influence of
moderate Jewish friends like Ronald S. Lauder.214 Such concern deepened after his visit to Israel
in May during which he spent only a few minutes at the country’s Holocaust Museum and
refused to let Israel’s prime minister accompany him to the Wailing Wall, implying that he
regarded it to be within the occupied territories.215

Also in the Middle East, having denounced the deal with Iran to end that country’s nuclear
program, the administration seemed in no hurry to abandon it and continued to waive the
economic sanctions as promised in the agreement. In addition, despite Trump’s pledge to ramp
up the war against the Islamic State, the administration largely has continued to limit
operations to drone strikes and raids by Special Forces.216 In addition, during his trip to Saudi
Arabia in May 2017 where he met a number of Sunni Arab leaders, the president did not criticize
Islam as he had previously done or declare that “Islam hates us,” but focused largely on the
common fight against terrorism as a challenge to “decent peoples” of all religions.217 In June he
claimed that his visit had been largely responsible for the fact that Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
the UEA, and Yemen subsequently imposed a diplomatic and commercial boycott of longtime
US regional military ally for funding of (p.65) terrorist groups.218 In addition, Trump sided with
and even encouraged Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their quarrel with and
blockade of Qatar, contradicting his secretary of state shortly after the latter had called for an
end of the blockade as did the State Department which Secretary Tillerson leads.219 These events
suggested that the president and his own secretary of state were at odds over this issue as well as
other issues.220 Pointing out that Qatar hosted America’s largest airbase in the region but its
Arab foes hosted some of Trump’s business assets, a former State Department adviser said,
“Other countries in the Middle East see what is happening and may think, ‘We should be
opening golf courses’ or ‘We should be buying rooms at the Trump International.”221
As for China, shortly after his election, Trump had a highly controversial phone conversation
with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, which implied that the new administration might not feel
compelled to adhere to the “One-China” policy that has undergirded Sino-American relations
since the establishment of US diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979. In December 2016
Trump also declared that “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one China policy unless
we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”222 However, Trump
agreed in February 2017 to honor the existing one-China policy “at President Xi’s request.”223 In
addition, the administration has acted cautiously on the related issues of trade, retreating from
its description of China as a “currency manipulator,”224 and has seemed to back away from
Obama’s policy of asserting the right of free navigation in the South China Sea by sending US
naval patrols into the area.225 The explanation may well be Trump’s preoccupation with North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions. “He needs China to help implement what he wants on North Korea,”
said a Chinese analyst. “It (p.66) won’t work. Trump will change his attitude to China very
soon. I don’t think he will be so nice to our president for very long. His policy toward China is
not durable.”226
There were at least partial policy reversals in other areas as well. Only hours after an official in
the administration said Trump was going to sign an order to begin the process for the United
States to leave NAFTA, the president had “pleasant and productive” phone calls with the leaders
of Canada and Mexico and declared: “It is my privilege to bring NAFTA up-to-date through
renegotiation,” and “I believe that the end result will make all three countries stronger and
better.”227 Although Trump’s “bark quieted down” initially after taking office, as Gary Clyde
Hufbauer, a trade expert at the Peterson Institute, observed in April 2017, “[n]ow the volume of
the bark is going up” but “[s]o far no bites.”228

Europeans were also shocked by Trump’s campaign talk about “America First” economic
protectionism, his criticism of the European Union, his insistence that NATO was “obsolete” and
inadequately supported financially by European allies, and his open skepticism about climate
change and threat to withdraw from the Paris accord. Observed Mark Leonard, the director of
the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Trump is the first American president since the
E.U. was created not to be in favor of deeper European integration. Not only that, but he’s
against it and sees the destruction of the European Union as in America’s interest.” As a result,
“Europeans see Trump as the biggest threat to global order and the European ideal of how the
world should be organized.” Leonard concludes: “It’s like you suddenly discover that the
medicine you’ve been taking is making you sicker than the illness itself.”229

To reassure US allies, Secretary of Defense James Mattis described NATO as the “fundamental
bedrock for the United States and the trans-Atlantic community,”230 an assurance he repeated in
Lithuania some months later.231 Vice President Mike Pence delivered a similar message when
visiting Europe. Nikki Haley, America’s UN ambassador, stated, “We do want to better our
relations with Russia,” but “the dire situation in eastern Ukraine is one that demands clear and
strong condemnation of Russian actions.”232 She stressed that US sanctions on that country
would continue. Secretary Tillerson also spoke favorably of NATO: “Let me be very clear at the
outset of my remarks: the US commitment to NATO is strong and this alliance remains the
bedrock for trans-Atlantic security.”233 He too endorsed (p.67) the sanctions against Russia, but
later seemed to contradict himself when he asked the foreign ministers of the G7: “Why should
U.S. taxpayers be interested in Ukraine?”234
Trump’s ambivalence about NATO and complaints about leading European government
economic policies and EU foreign policy priorities have only become more pronounced over
time. Attending a NATO meeting in late May 2017, he refused to publicly endorse Article 5 of the
NATO treaty, which commits all members to collective defense in the event of foreign
aggression, even though Secretary Tillerson hastily told reporters, “Of course we support Article
5.” Trump once again hectored NATO members about the need for them to increase defense
budgets and singled out Germany in an angry tweet: “We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with
Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military.”235 A few days later,
he shifted again and reaffirmed Article 5,236 but, in the face of irrefutable scientific evidence
concerning the human causes and consequences of climate change, Trump confirmed he was
pulling the United States out of the Paris accord that had been signed by virtually every other
country in the world. China was no doubt delighted to inherit the role of global leader
concerning the environment as it had earlier regarding globalization and free trade.237

Trump’s divisive posturing led Chancellor Merkel to conclude, “The time in which we could rely
fully on others, they are somewhat over.” As for the Paris agreement, she added pointedly,
“There’s a situation where it’s six . . . against one.”238 “This seems to be the end of an era, one in
which the United States led and Europe followed,” observed Ivo Daalder, a former US
ambassador to NATO. “Today, the United States is heading into a direction on key issues that
seems diametrically opposite of where Europe is heading. Merkel’s comments are an
acknowledgment of that new reality.”239 (p.68)
Meanwhile, US-Russian relations deteriorated owing to differences over Syria. National Security
Adviser, H. R. McMaster declared: “We need changes in words and the nature of the [US-
Russia] relationship, but what we really need to see is change in behavior.” This led a foreign
policy analyst to suggest: “The Russians are basically scratching their heads and asking, ‘What
are we going to get from this?’ ”240 Russia’s UN ambassador admitted it would be “frivolous” to
speculate about Trump’s policies toward Russia,241 and the editor of a Russian radio station,
noted that Russian leaders think Trump is “unstable, that he can be manipulated, that he is
authoritarian and a person without a team.”242 The chaos in Washington, declared Putin, “made
us laugh at first” but has become “a matter of concern”243 in Moscow.

Following the Syrian government’s use of illegal nerve gas against civilians despite Assad’s
earlier assurance that Syria had disposed of such weapons,244 the White House condemned the
event but initially retreated from the demand that President Assad step down. However, the
United States launched multiple cruise missiles that struck the airbase from which the use of
nerve gas had originated. “So after only after a couple of months in office,” writes Elliot Abrams,
“the ‘America first’ administration had used U.S. military force on behalf of justice, the
international community, and international norms.”245

Some members of the administration including Ambassador Haley called for Assad’s
removal,246 and Trump’s announced his decision to arm Syrian Kurds despite Turkish
opposition.247 Secretary Tillerson, while refusing to advocate regime change and simultaneously
suggesting Assad should not be part of Syria’s future, described Russia as “incompetent” for not
assuring that all chemical weapons had been removed from Syria. Russia’s meddling in US and
European elections “undermines any hope of improving relations.”248 “This
was (p.69) inevitable,” argues Philip H. Gordon, of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Trump’s
early let’s-be-friends initiative was incompatible with our interests, and you knew it would end
with tears.” The Russians’ behavior has not changed, Mr. Gordon added, and they “are using
every means they can—cyber, economic arrangements, intimidation—to reinsert themselves
around the Middle East and Europe.”249
Notwithstanding the airstrike, the US administration’s objectives and policies in Syria remained
obscure.250 One foreign ambassador declared: “Nobody can tell us on Russia what the American
policy is, on Syria what the American policy is, on China what the American policy is.” He
added: “I’m not sure there is a policy. They will listen to me and tell me. ‘We will get back to you
when there is a policy’.”251 Another ambassador complained that the leaders of US allies “have
the impression that the chair of the leader of the Western world is a little bit empty. We are
reaching out to test those relationships, but we have no answer.”252

As previously noted, Trump questioned the US presence in Japan and South Korea and their
costs to America, and even suggested that perhaps those countries should develop their own
nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in February 2017 Defense Secretary Mattis in his first trip
overseas assured Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that “we stand firmly, 100 percent,
shoulder with you and the Japanese people,” and “I want to make certain that Article 5 of our
mutual defense treaty is understood to be as real to us today as it was a year ago, five years ago,
and as it will be a year and 10 years from now.”253 On the same trip, Mattis gave a similar
assurance to South Korea,254 and Vice President Pence reiterated it shortly afterwards.255 “It’s
sad that we’ve even come to this point,” declared an observer. “But in the context we’re in, that
reassurance is very important.”256 Nevertheless, as one analyst noted, “Japan and South Korea
are like skittish small dogs that need constant reassurance and are constantly
nervous.”257 (p.70)

VII. Conclusion
Overall, the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been unpredictable and indeed chaotic in
the extreme. In collective defense, trade, environment, and other issues, Trump has been
surrendering US leadership, undermining the liberal global order, and increasing America’s
isolation. “Right now,” declared a Russian observer, “the Kremlin is looking for ways that Russia
can use the chaos in Washington to pursue its own interests.”258 China is surely doing the same.
Patrick fears that Trump’s policies may persuade traditional allies to “begin hedging their bets
between the United States and the most relevant regional power—China in Asia, Russia in
Europe, and Iran in the Middle East.”259 The result, he predicts, will accelerate “the demise of
the world the United States made.”260 This is no small thing. Nye is certainly correct in his
warning: “Americans and others may not notice the security and prosperity that the liberal order
provides until they are gone—but by then, it may be too late.”261

Notes:
(*) Professor of Global and International Affairs (Emeritus), Rutgers University, USA.

(**) Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University, USA.

(1) Robin Niblett, Liberalism in Retreat, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 17 (January/February 2017)Find it

in your Library.

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Will the Liberal Order Survive, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 12Find it in your
Library.

(3) Niblett, supra note 1, at 17.

(4) Ian Buruma, The End of the Anglo-American Order, N.Y. TIMES, November 29, 2016,
available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-
order.html>Find it in your Library.

(5) Cited in EU Chief Sees Trump Announcements as Threats, BOSTON HERALD, January 31,
2017, available at
<http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2017/01/eu_chief_sees_trump_announce
ments_as_threats>.
(6) Cited in Azam Ahmed, Steven Erlanger & Gerry Mullany, Leaders Abroad, Joyful or Wary,
Face Uncertainty of Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES, January 21, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/world/donald-trump-reaction-france-germany-japan-
brazil.html>Find it in your Library. See also Steven Erlanger, For Leaders of U.S. Allies, Getting
Close to Trump Can Sting, N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/europe/donald-trump-us-alllies.html>Find it
in your Library.

(7) Jeff D. Colgan & Robert O. Keohane, The Liberal Order Is Rigged, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 38
(May/June 2017)Find it in your Library.

(8) Peter A. Hall, The Roots of Brexit, FOREIGN AFF., June 28, 2016, available at
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-kingdom/2016-06-28/roots-brexit>Find it in
your Library.

(9) Cited in Buruma, The End of the Anglo-American Order. French supporters of Ms. Le Pen
have a similar profile, consisting of poorly educated males living in old industrial
towns. Fractured, THE ECONOMIST, March 4, 2017, 15–17.

(10) Arthur C. Brooks, The Dignity Deficit, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 109 (March/April 2017)Find it in
your Library.

(11) Id.Find it in your Library, at 110.

(12) See The New Nationalism, THE ECONOMIST, November 19, 2016, 9 and League of
Nationalists, THE ECONOMIST, November 19, 2016, 51–54.

(13) See Amanda Taub, How Stable Are Democracies? Warning Signs Are Flashing Red, N.Y.
TIMES, November 29, 2016, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/americas/western-liberal-
democracy.html>Find it in your Library.

(14) Colgan & Keohane, supra note 7 at 36.

(15) Tony Blair, Tony Blair: Against Populism, the Center Must Hold, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,
2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/opinion/tony-blair-against-
populism-the-center-must-hold.html?rref=collection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Feditorials-and-
opeds-about-world-news>Find it in your Library.

(16) Walter Russell Mead, The Jacksonian Revolt, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 2–7 (March/April
2017)Find it in your Library.

(17) Id.Find it in your Library, at 4, 5.

(18) Id.Find it in your Library, at 7.

(19) Blair, supra note 15. Other analyses also discount the negative impact of international trade
on national economies. See Jonathan Rothwell, Globalization: Scapegoat for Economic
Problems, GALLUP, February 27, 2017, available at
<http://www.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/204317/globalization-scapegoat-economic-
problems.aspx>Find it in your Library.

(20) Forgotten Men, THE ECONOMIST, February 18, 2017, 22. The British government officially
notified the European Union of its intention to leave the group on March 29, 2017, under Article
50 of the EU treaty.

(21) See, for example, Dan Bilefsky, In Denmark, Passage of Rules on Immigration Called for
Cake, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.ch 15, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/world/europe/denmark-immigration-cake-inger-
stojberg.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope,%20and%20Simon%20Romero%
20and%20Daniel%20Politi>Find it in your Library; Argentina’s Trump-Like Immigration
Order Rattles South America, N.Y. TIMES, February 4, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/americas/argentinas-trump-like-immigration-
order-rattles-south-america.html>Find it in your Library.

(22) Yale H. Ferguson, Competing Identities and Turkey’s Future, 25 EUR. REV. (February
2017)Find it in your Library, at 1–15.

(23) Fred Hu & Michael Spence, Why Globalization Stalled, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 58 (July/August
2017)Find it in your Library.

(24) Eduardo Porter, Shaky Jobs, Sluggish Wages: Reasons Are at Home, N.Y. TIMES, February
28, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/business/economy/economy-
labor-wages-subcontracting.html>Find it in your Library.

(25) Buruma, supra note 4.

(26) Richard Haass, World Order 2.0, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 7 (January/February 2017)Find it in
your Library.

(27) Id.Find it in your Library, at 9.

(28) Lexington, NAFTA on Notice, THE ECONOMIST, February 18, 2017, 26. Notwithstanding
Trump’s heated rhetoric about NAFTA, the administration seems willing to accept reforms
rather than scrapping the agreement. See Kirk Semple & Paulina Villegas, Mexico Welcomes
U.S. Shift on Nafta, but Mistrust of Trump Persists, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/americas/mexico-trump-
nafta.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Famericas>Find it in your Library.

(29) Cited in Peter S. Goodman, On Trade, a Politically Feisty Trump Risks Economic Damage,
N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/business/trump-nafta-trade-
economy.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection
=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=s
ectionfront>Find it in your Library.

(30) Playing Chicken, THE ECONOMIST, February 4, 2017, 25.

(31) Plan of Action, THE ECONOMIST, March 4, 2017, 59–60.

(32) Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, China’s Plan to Build Its Own High-Tech Industries Worries
Western Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/business/china-trade-manufacturing-
europe.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library.

(33) Keith Bradsher & Karl Russell, Building Trade Walls, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2017, available
at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/trade-china-
protectionism.html?ref=business>Find it in your Library.

(34) John Paulson, Trump and the Economy, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 11 (March/April 2017)Find it in
your Library. In 2015, the United States imported $482 billion in goods from China and
exported $116 billion to China. IbidFind it in your Library.

(35) Michael J. Mazarr, The Once and Future Order, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 28 (January/February
2017)Find it in your Library.

(36) Evan A. Feigenbaum, China and the World, 96 FOREIGN POL’Y 33 (January/February
2017)Find it in your Library.

(37) Lexington, America’s Forgotten War Victory, THE ECONOMIST, April 8, 2017, 28Find it in
your Library.
(38) Daniel B. Baer, Trump’s Silence on Russia’s Corruption Protests Shows Just How Big Putin
Won, FOREIGN POL’Y, March 29, 2017, available at
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/29/trumps-silence-on-russias-corruption-protests-shows-
just-how-big-putin-won-in-taking-down-hillary-clinton/?wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1>Find
it in your Library.

(39) Goodbye to Values, THE ECONOMIST, June 3, 2017, 53–54.

(40) Peter Baker, In a Shift, Trump Will Move Egypt’s Rights Record to the Sidelines, N.Y.
TIMES, March 31, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/middleeast/in-major-shift-trump-taking-
egypts-human-rights-issues-
private.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast>Find it in your Library.

(41) Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, To Trump, Human Rights Concerns Are Often a Barrier
to Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/middleeast/rex-w-tillerson-saudi-arabia-
human-rights.html>Find it in your Library.

(42) Cited in Peter Baker, The Emerging Trump Doctrine: Don’t Follow Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES,
April 8, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/us/politics/trump-doctrine-
foreign-
policy.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=wo
rld&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=sectio
nfront>Find it in your Library.

(43) On Syria, an Administration in Disagreement with Itself, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2017,
available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/on-syria-an-administration-in-
disagreement-with-itself.html?rref=collection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Feditorials-and-opeds-
about-world-news>Find it in your Library.

(44) Cited in Gardiner Harris, Tillerson Says U.S. Will Punish “Crimes Against the Innocents”
Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/europe/rex-tillerson-russia-
syria.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your Library.

(45) Cited in Eduardo Porter, Trump and Trade: Extreme Tactics in Search of a Point, N.Y.
TIMES, January 31, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/business/economy/trump-and-trade-extreme-tactics-
in-search-of-a-point.html>Find it in your Library.

(46) Cited in Steven Erlanger, For Europe: There’s a New Threat in Town: The U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, February 2, 2017, available at <https://www.iastate.edu/>Find it in your Library.

(47) Javier Corrales, The Blind Spots in Trump’s Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2017,
available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/opinion/the-blind-spots-in-trumps-
foreign-policy.html?rref=collection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Feditorials-and-opeds-about-
world-news>Find it in your Library

(48) Mead, supra note 16, at 3.

(49) Stewart M. Patrick, Trump and World Order, FOREIGN AFF. 96:2 (March/April 2017),
52Find it in your Library.

(50) Cited in Melissa Eddy, Germany Reacts to Merkel-Trump Visit: “Could Have Been a Lot
Worse”, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-
germany.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope&_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(51) Choe Sang-Hun, Trump Rattles South Korea by Saying It Should Pay for Antimissile
System, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/asia/trump-south-korea-thaad-missile-
defense-north-korea.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library.

(52) Choe Sang-Hun, U.S. Confirms It Will Pay for Antimissile System, South Korea Says, N.Y.
TIMES, April 30, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/donald-trump-south-korea-missile-
system-thaad.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library.

(53) Philip Gordon, A Vision of Trump at War, FOREIGN AFF., March 22, 2017, available at
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-03-22/vision-trump-war?cid=nlc-twofa-
20170323&sp_mid=53691138&sp_rid=bWFuc2JhY2hAaWFzdGF0ZS5lZHUS1&spMailingID=5
3691138&spUserID=MjEwNDg3NTgxNTQ5S0&spJobID=1123983649&spReportId=MTEyMzk
4MzY0OQS2>Find it in your Library.

(54) Hungary’s Refugee Referendum Not Valid After Voters Stay Away, THE GUARDIAN,
October 2, 2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/hungarian-
vote-on-refugees-will-not-take-place-suggest-first-poll-results>Find it in your Library.

(55) Blair, supra note 15.

(56) Trump’s populist antecedents in Latin America include politicians such as Argentina’s Juan
Perón & Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez Bello, A Peronist on the Potomac, THE ECONOMIST,
February 18, 2017Find it in your Library, at 29.

(57) Pierpaolo Barbieri, The Death and Life of Social Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., April 25,
2017, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-04-25/death-and-
life-social-democracy%3Fcid=nlc-twofa-
20170427&sp_mid=53952057&sp_rid=bWFuc2JhY2hAaWFzdGF0ZS5lZHUS1&spMailingID=
53952057&spUserID=MjEwNDg3NTgxNTQ5S0&spJobID=1144755899&spReportId=MTE0ND
c1NTg5OQS2>Find it in your Library. See also Cracking Under Pressure, THE ECONOMIST,
May 20, 2017, 43–44.

(58) ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 88

(1987). The largely is usually applied mainly to economic relations but is equally relevant to
political, social, and military cooperation. Graham Allison refers to this situation as the
“Thucydides Trap.” Allison, How Trump and China’s Xi Could Stumble into War,
WASHINGTON POST, March 31, 2017, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/31/how-trump-and-chinas-
xi-could-stumble-into-war/%3Futm_term=.3d5a0cc990e1>Find it in your Library. A
prominent argument that cooperation could persist even after the decline of a benign hegemon
like the United States owing to interdependence and the presence of “international regimes” is
offered by Robert O. Keohane, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984)Find it in your Library.

(59) Robert Gilpin, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981)Find it in your Library, at
198. See id., at 197–209.

(60) G. John Ikenberry, The Illusion of Geopolitics, 93 FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2014)Find it
in your Library, at 84, 89.

(61) G. John Ikenberry, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND

TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER (2011)Find it in your Library,
Preface.

(62) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., IS THE AMERICAN CENTURY OVER? (2015)Find it in your Library, at
14. See also id., supra note 2, at 12–14.

(63) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER
(1990)Find it in your Library, at 13.

(64) Nye, supra note 2, at 13.

(65) Robert Kagan, THE WORLD AMERICA MADE (2012)Find it in your Library. For similar
critiques of Obama, see Robert J. Lieber, RETREAT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLD ORDER (2016)Find it in your Library,
and Eliot A. Cohen, THE BIG STICK: THE LIMITS OF SOFT POWER AND THE NECESSITY
OF MILITARY FORCE (2016)Find it in your Library.

(66) Robert Kagan, Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 2014, 21Find it
in your Library.

(67) IdFind it in your Library.

(68) IdFind it in your Library.

(69) NYE, supra note 63 at 15. Emphasis added.

(70) Cited in Robert Kagan, The September 12 Paradigm, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 29

(September/October 2008)Find it in your Library.

(71) IdFind it in your Library. at 30, 36.

(72) Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, The White House,
December 10, 2009, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize>Find it in your Library.

(73) Cited in Mark Landler, Ending Asia Trip, Obama Defends His Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
April 28, 2014, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/world/obama-defends-
foreign-policy-against-critics.html>Find it in your Library.

(74) Cited in David E. Sanger, Global Crises Put Obama’s Strategy of Caution to the Test, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2014, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/obamas-
policy-is-put-to-the-test-as-crises-challenge-caution.html>Find it in your Library.

(75) Cited in Peter Baker, Crises Cascade and Converge, Testing Obama, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2014, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/world/crises-cascade-and-converge-
testing-obama.html>Find it in your Library.

(76) Mazarr, supra note 35, at 27.

(77) See, for example, David Orttung & Christopher Walker, Putin’s Frozen Conflicts, FOREIGN
POL’Y (February 13, 2015), available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-
conflicts/>Find it in your Library.

(78) Cited in The Decline of Deterrence, at 24.

(79) Cited in id., at 25.

(80) Richard N. Haass, The Unraveling, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 70 (November/December 2014)Find

it in your Library.

(81) Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels,
N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 2014, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/politics/cia-study-says-arming-rebels-seldom-
works.html>Find it in your Library.

(82) John Mueller, Iraq Syndrome Redux, FOREIGN AFF., June 18, 2014, available at
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141578/john-mueller/iraq-syndrome-redux>Find it in
your Library.

(83) Kagan, supra note 66, at 26.

(84) Fred Kaplan, Obama’s Way: The President in Practice, FOREIGN AFF., December 7, 2015,
available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-07/obamas-way>Find it in your
Library.

(85) Cited in Tortoise v Hare, THE ECONOMIST, April 1, 2017, at 36.

(86) Keith Bradsher, China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, Praises Free Trade, in Contrast to Trump,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/business/china-li-keqiang-summer-davos-
trade.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library.

(87) HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, HARD CHOICES (2014), at 31.

(88) For a summary of Trump’s campaign positions on foreign policy, see Max Fisher, What Is
Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy?, N.Y. TIMES, November 11, 2016, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/world/what-is-donald-trumps-foreign-
policy.html>Find it in your Library, and “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech,”
April 27, 2016, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-
trump-foreign-policy.html>.

(89) Somini Sengupta, U.N. Peacekeeping Faces Overhaul as U.S. Threatens to Cut Funding,
N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/united-nations-peacekeeping-trump-
administration.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&content%20
Collection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4
&pgtype=sectionfront>Find it in your Library.

(90) Michael D. Shear & Jennifer Steinhauer, Trump to Seek $44 Billion in Military Spending,
N.Y. TIMES, February 27, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-budget-military.html>Find it in
your Library.

(91) Cited in Max Fisher, Trump’s Military Ambition: Raw Power as a Means and an End, N.Y.
TIMES, March 3, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/world/americas/donald-trump-us-
military.html>Find it in your Library.

(92) Secretary of Defense Mattis once observed: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully,
then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” Cited in China First, THE ECONOMIST,
March 25, 2017, at 10.

(93) A Tradition Traduced, THE ECONOMIST, April 29, 2017, at 19–20.

(94) Corrales, supra note 47.

(95) Cited in Somini Sengupta, World’s Diplomats, Seeking a Bridge to Trump, Look to Haley,
N.Y. TIMES, February 12, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/world/world-diplomats-trump-nikki-haley.html>Find
it in your Library.

(96) Cited in Nikki Haley Calls United Nations Human Rights Council “So Corrupt”, N.Y.
TIMES, March 29, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/nikki-
haley-un-human-rights-council-
corrupt.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=
world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=se
ctionfront>Find it in your Library.

(97) US v UN, THE ECONOMIST, March 25, 2017, at 52.

(98) Cited in Rick Gladstone, U.N. Says Trump Budget Cuts Would “Make It Impossible” to Do
Its Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/americas/un-trump-budget-cuts.html>Find it
in your Library.

(99) Cancellation of the TPP will not only reduce US political and economic influence in Asia but
also harm numerous workers in that region. See Neil Gough, The Workers Who Regret Trump’s
Scrapping of a Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/business/trump-tpp-trade-vietnam-labor-
environment.html>Find it in your Library.

(100) Cited in Mark Landler, Trump Roars Again on Trade, Reviewing Steel and Chiding
Canada, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/business/trade-canada-trump-
steel.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=wor
ld&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectio
nfront>Find it in your Library. Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau denied Trump’s claims,
noting that the United States had a dairy surplus with Canada. See Leah Schnurr & David
Ljunggren, Trudeau Defends Canada’s Dairy System Against Trump Protectionist Charge,
REUTERS, April 20, 2017, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-politics-
trudeau-idUSKBN17M21L>Find it in your Library.

(101) Charlemagne, Surplus War, THE ECONOMIST, 40.

(102) Cited in Jack Ewing, U.S. Breaks with Allies over Trade Issues Amid Trump’s “America
First” Vows, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/business/group-of-20-summit-us-
trade.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=wo
rld&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectio
nfront>Find it in your Library.

(103) Cited in James Kanter, E.U. Parliament Votes to Ratify Canada Trade Deal and Send
Trump a Message, N.Y. TIMES, February 15, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/canada-eu-trade-ceta.html>Find it in your
Library.

(104) Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura & Lily Wojtowicz, Actually, Americans Like Free Trade, The
Chicago Council of Global Affairs, September 7, 2016, available at
<https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/actually-americans-free-trade#tablist1-tab1>.

(105) Man and Machine, THE ECONOMIST, February 4, 2017, at 25–26.

(106) Cited in Farhad Manjoo, Why Silicon Valley Wouldn’t Work Without Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, February 8, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/technology/personaltech/why-silicon-valley-wouldnt-
work-without-immigrants.html>Find it in your Library.

(107) Iraq had been listed in the original order but was omitted in the later one. In addition, the
original order had included permanent residents with green cards or legal visa, and these, too,
were also reversed. See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump’s Rush to Enact an
Immigration Ban Unleashed Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, January 29, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/donald-trump-rush-immigration-order-
chaos.html>Find it in your Library.

(108) Cited in Glenn Thrush, Trump’s New Travel Ban Blocks Migrants From Six Nations,
Sparing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/travel-ban-muslim-
trump.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast>Find it in your Library.

(109) Michael D. Shear, Trump Administration Orders Tougher Screening of Visa Applicants,
N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/us/politics/visa-extreme-vetting-rex-
tillerson.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=
world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=5&pgtype=se
ctionfront>Find it in your Library.

(110) Cited in Ron Nixon, People From 7 Travel-Ban Nations Pose No Increased Terror Risk,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/politics/travel-ban-nations-terror-
risk.html?_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(111) Cited in Alexander Burns, Revised Travel Ban Is Blocked Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, March
15, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-
ban.html?hp&action=click&%20pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-
lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your Library.

(112) Cited in Somini Sengupta, U.N. Leader Says Trump Order “Violates Our Basic Principles”,
N.Y. TIMES, February 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/trump-immigration-ban-un.htmlFind it in your
Library.

(113) Cited in Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg & Eric Lipton, Trump Pushes Dark View of Islam
to Center of U.S. Policy-Making, N.Y. TIMES, February 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/politics/donald-trump-islam.html>Find it in your
Library.

(114) Cited in id.Find it in your Library

(115) Cited in Declan Walsh, Fears That Trump’s Visa Ban Betrays Friends and Bolsters
Enemies, N.Y. TIMES, January 27, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/world/middleeast/muslims-trump-visa-restrictions-
.html>Find it in your Library. See also WRAPUP 1-Trump fights criticism, protests, legal
challenges over travel bans, REUTERS, January 29, 2017, available at
<http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-immigration-idUSL1N1FJ0B2>Find it in your
Library, and In Middle East, US Travel Curbs Decried as Unjust, Insulting, REUTERS, January
28, 2017, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-refugees-mideast-
idUSKBN15C0KG>Find it in your Library.

(116) A German official warned that were Trump to do so it would risk “lasting damage” to US-
European relations. Cited in Sophie Yeo, Trump Told He Risks “Lasting Damage” to Ties
Between U.S. and Europe, WASHINGTON POST, May 22, 2017, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/22/trump-risks-
lasting-damage-if-u-s-pulls-out-of-paris-climate-agreement/?utm_term=.a68ad132190a>Find
it in your Library.

(117) Edward Wong, China Poised to Take Lead on Climate After Trump’s Move to Undo
Policies, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/asia/trump-climate-change-paris-
china.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=wo
rld&%20region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sec
tionfront>Find it in your Library.

(118) Banyan, Still Shy of the World Stage, THE ECONOMIST, June 10, 2017Find it in your
Library, at 46.

(119) Cited in Somini Sengupta, U.N. Chief Warns U.S. of Risks of Rejecting Leadership Role,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/americas/united-nations-secretary-general-
antonio-guterres.html?emc=eta1&_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(120) Cited in Steven Erlanger, Feeling That Trump Will “Say Anything,” Europe Is Less
Restrained, Too, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/europe/donald-trump-europe.html>Find it in
your Library.
(121) Along with Putin, Trump congratulated Erdoğan on his narrow victory in the referendum,
which will allow the Turkish president to establish a virtual dictatorship. Erdogan the
Maleficent, THE ECONOMIST, April 22, 2017Find it in your Library, at 43.

(122) Notwithstanding the extrajudicial murders authorized by Duterte, President Trump had a
“very friendly conversation” with him issued an invitation to him in April 2017 to visit the White
House. “By essentially endorsing Duterte’s murderous war on drugs, Trump is now morally
complicit in future killings,” said John Sifton, an advocacy director of Human Rights Watch.
“Although the traits of his personality likely make it impossible, Trump should be ashamed of
himself.” Cited in Trump’s “Very Friendly” Talk With Duterte Stuns Aides and Critics Alike,
N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/politics/trump-
duterte.html?emc=edit_th_20170501&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=4332168>Find it in your
Library.

(123) The Trump administration does not regard the removal of Assad as a priority, thereby
reversing the policy of the Obama administration. See Removing Assad No Longer a Priority—
US, BBC NEWS, March 30, 2017, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
39450570.attack.html%3frref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&content
Collection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&p
gtype=sectionfront>.

(124) Cited in Jeremy Diamond & Zachary Cohen, Trump: I’d Be “Honored” to Meet Kim Jong
Un Under “Right Circumstances”, CNN POLITICS, May 2, 2017, available at
<http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/donald-trump-meet-north-korea-kim-jong-
un/>Find it in your Library. See also Mark Landler, Trump Follows Instincts, Not
Establishment, with Overtures to Kim and Duterte, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/world/asia/trump-north-korea-kim-jong-
un.html?emc=edit_th_20170502&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=4332168&_r=0>Find it in your
Library.

(125) See Philip Rucker, Trump Keeps Praising International Strongmen, Alarming Human
Rights Advocates, WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 2017, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-keeps-praising-international-strongmen-
alarming-human-rights-advocates/2017/05/01/6848d018-2e81-11e7-9dec-
764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.dfdcf446c0af>Find it in your Library.

(126) Cited in Rod Nordland, Authoritarian Leaders Greet Trump as One of Their Own, N.Y.
TIMES, February 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/asia/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-rodrigo-
dutert-kim-jong-un.html>Find it in your Library.

(127) It also has led America’s NATO allies to increase their defense spending in an effort to reach
the minimum of 2% of their GDP agreed to by the alliance. Pay Up, THE ECONOMIST,
February 18, 2017, at 44–45. At present, other than the United States, only Britain, Poland,
Estonia and Greece achieve the 2% level although European military spending was up by 3.8%
in 2016. See Charlemagne, The Gryfs of Europe, THE ECONOMIST, February 25, 2017, at 46.

(128) Anthony Faiola, In the Era of Donald Trump, Germans Debate a Military Buildup,
WASHINGTON POST, March 5, 2017, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-the-era-of-trump-germans-debate-a-
military-buildup/2017/03/05/d7fc2ef6-fd16-11e6-a51a-
e16b4bcc6644_story.html?utm_term=.3c344992c521>Find it in your Library. Among the
NATO allies, Germany spends one of the alliance’s lowest percentages on defense. Nevertheless,
some 77% of Americans believe that remaining in NATO is good for America. Stephen
Sestanovich, The Truth About Populism and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN POL’Y, May 30, 2016,
available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-05-30/truth-about-
populism-and-foreign-policy>Find it in your Library, at 10.

(129) Max Fisher, Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent, N.Y.
TIMES, March 6, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-
weapons.html>Find it in your Library. For a critique of this idea, see Ulrich Kühn & Tristan
Volpe, Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear, 96 FOREIGN AFF. (July/August 2017)Find it in
your Library, at 103–112.

(130) Richard Sokolsky, The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European
Security, TASK FORCE ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 13, 2017, available at
<http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=68222>Find it in your Library.

(131) Nicholas Kristof, Connecting Trump’s Dots to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2017, available
at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/connecting-trumps-dots-to-
russia.html?rref=collection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Feditorials-and-opeds-about-world-
news>Find it in your Library.

(132) Mark Mazzetti & Eric Lichtblau, C.I.A. Judgment on Russia Built on Swell of Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, December 11, 2016, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/us/politics/cia-
judgment-intelligence-russia-hacking-
evidence.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your Library.

(133) Flynn was forced to resign shortly after taking his position owing to contacts with Russian
diplomats that he had not previously revealed and was replaced by Lieutenant-General H.R.
McMaster. Tillerson was awarded Russia’s Order of Friendship in 2013.

(134) Cited in Dan Bilefsky, C.I.A. Chief Warns Donald Trump Against Tearing Up Iran Nuclear
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, November 30, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/cia-trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.html>Find it in your Library. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has apparently advised
Trump that the deal with Iran is the “least bad” of the available options. See Bibi Consults a
Real-Estate Expert, THE ECONOMIST, February 18, 2017, at 41.

(135) Cited in Assured Destruction, THE ECONOMIST, March 4, 2017, at 22. A new nuclear arms
race with Russia would reduce the intended impact on conventional forces of Trump’s increase
in the defense budget and limit first-hand mutual knowledge of each other’s nuclear program
that assuage mutual suspicions. The administration may, however, have no choice owing to
Russian development of a hypersonic warhead (“Object 4202”) and a new ICBM (RS-28) to
deliver it. See Scott River, The Russians Have Won the Arms Race, THE WASHINGTON
SPECTATOR, March 20, 2017, available at <https://washingtonspectator.org/russian-arms-
race-ritter/>Find it in your Library.

(136) Ronald Brownstein, Putin and the Populists, THE ATLANTIC, January 6, 2017, available at
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/putin-trump-le-pen-hungary-
france-populist-bannon/512303/>Find it in your Library.

(137) Cited in Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán Celebrates Donald Trump
Victory as End of “Liberal Non-Democracy”, THE INDEPENDENT, November 12, 2016,
available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-us-election-
win-hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-end-liberal-non-democracy-a7413236.html>Find
it in your Library.

(138) See Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, Populism, Far from Turned Back, May Be Just Getting
Started, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/europe/populism-far-from-turned-back-may-
be-just-getting-
started.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=w
orld&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectio
nfront>Find it in your Library.

(139) Stewart Patrick, An Ever-Looser Union, FOREIGN AFF., March 29, 2016, available at
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-03-29/ever-looser-union>Find it in
your Library. See also Charlemagne, Ever Farther Union, THE ECONOMIST, February 27,
2016, at 46.

(140) Citied in Liz Alderman, Migrants in Greece, Ready to Go Anywhere in Europe, Scramble
to Enter E.U. Relocation Program, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/world/europe/migrants-in-greece-ready-to-go-
anywhere-in-europe-scramble-to-enter-eu-relocation-program.html>Find it in your Library.

(141) Cited in Red and White Cavalry, THE ECONOMIST, April 30, 2016, at 50Find it in your
Library. See also Poland Drifts in the Wrong Direction, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/opinion/poland-drifts-in-the-wrong-
direction.html>Find it in your Library. In 2015, PIS won 38% of the
vote. Charlemagne, Illiberalism Lives, THE ECONOMIST, April 29, 2017Find it in your Library,
at 41.

(142) Cited in Joanna Berendt & James Kanter, Poland Opposes 2nd Term for Donald Tusk, an
Ex-Premier, to Lead E.U. Council, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/poland-tusk-european-
council.html%3Frref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your Library.

(143) James Traub, Viktor Orban Wades into Hungary’s Dark Waters, FOREIGN POL’Y,
October 26, 2015, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/26/viktor-orban-wades-into-
dark-waters-eu-hungary-refugee-crisis-europe-jobbik/Find it in your Library>.

(144) Rick Lyman, After Trump Win, Anti-Soros Forces Are Emboldened in Eastern Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/world/europe/after-trump-win-anti-soros-forces-are-
emboldened-in-eastern-europe.html>Find it in your Library.

(145) Palko Karasz, Hungary Plan That Could Shatter Soros’s University Is Called “Political
Vandalism”, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/europe/hungary-george-soros-
university.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your Library,
and Palko Karasz, Hungary’s Parliament Passes Law Targeting George Soros’s University,
N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/europe/hungary-george-soros-
university.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your Library.

(146) Cited in Public Enemy Number 1, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2017, at 26.

(147) Palko Karasz, George Soros Accuses Viktor Orban of Turning Hungary Into “Mafia State”,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/george-soros-accuses-viktor-orban-of-
turning-hungary-into-mafia-state.html>Find it in your Library.

(148) Cited in Alissa J. Rubin, Geert Wilders, Reclusive Provocateur, Rises Before Dutch Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, February 27, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/europe/geert-wilders-reclusive-provocateur-
rises-before-dutch-vote.html>Find it in your Library.

(149) Wilders’ political party ran second in the Dutch elections of March 2017, but won fewer
seats than had been predicted.

(150) Steven Erlanger, “Brexit” Aftershocks: More Rifts in Europe, and in Britain, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/brexit-aftershocks-more-rifts-in-
europe-and-in-britain-too.html>Find it in your Library.

(151) Twitter Harvest, THE ECONOMIST, March 4, 2017, at 41.

(152) Prosecutors Push to Ban Slovak Far-Right Policy, REUTERS, May 25. 2017, available at
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-extremism-idUSKBN18L1V5>Find it in your
Library.

(153) Rick Lyman, Once in the Shadows, Europe’s Neo-Fascists Are Re-emerging, N.Y. TIMES,
March 19, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/europe/europe-
neo-fascist-revival-
slovakia.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=
world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=secti
onfront&_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(154) Cited in Adam Nossiter, Marine Le Pen Echoes Trump’s Bleak Populism in French
Campaign Kickoff, N.Y. TIMES, February 5, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/marine-le-pen-trump-populism-
france-election.html>Find it in your Library. See also Far-Right Hopeful: French Election
“Choice of Civilization”, BOSTON HERALD, February 5, 2017, available at
<http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2017/02/far_right_hopeful_french_electi
on_choice_of_civilization>Find it in your Library.

(155) Adam Nossiter, Le Pen’s Inner Circle Fuels Doubts About Bid to “Un-Demonize” Her Party,
N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/europe/marine-le-pen-national-front-
party.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-
package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your Library.

(156) Cited in Adam Nossiter, Marine Le Pen of France Meets with Vladimir Putin in Moscow,
N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/europe/marine-le-pen-of-france-meets-with-
putin-in-
moscow.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=
world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=secti
onfront>Find it in your Library.

(157) Alissa J. Rubin, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen Advance in French Election, N.Y.
TIMES, April 23, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-
france-election.html?emc=edit_th_20170424&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=4332168&_r=0>Find
it in your Library.

(158) Steven Erlanger, Macron Embraces E.U. to Put France “Back in the Picture”, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/world/europe/france-eu-
macron-president.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your
Library.

(159) Cited in Erlanger, Feeling That Trump Will “Say Anything,” Europe Is Less Restrained,
Too.

(160) Great Britain, while geographically western, tends to be more sensitive to the concerns of
the European Union’s eastern members.

(161) Artur Gruszczak, Poland: A Skillful Player, in THE EU AND THE MEMBER STATES
(Eleanor Zeff & Ellen B. Pirro eds., 2015), at 267Find it in your Library. Despite its government’s
nationalist turn, Poles still support EU values. See Alison Smale, “We Don’t Need to Be Alone”: A
Political Shift Has Poland Assessing Its Values, N.Y. TIMES, August 10, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/world/europe/poland-debate-values.html>Find it in
your Library.

(162) <europa.eu/en/multiannual-financial-framework-2014-2020-and-eu-budget-2014-
pbKV0413055/ ?CatalogCategoryID=mpgKABstFogAAAEjbIUY4e5K>.
(163) Cited in Trading Insults, THE ECONOMIST, August 24, 2013, at 49.

(164) Jonas Grätz, Freedom of Association, FOREIGN AFF., November 20, 2013, available at
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140280/jonas-graetz/freedom-of-association>Find it
in your Library.

(165) Id.Find it in your Library

(166) Cited in Andrew Higgins, Ukraine Upheaval Highlights E.U.’s Past Miscalculations and
Future Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2014, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/world/europe/ukrainian-tumult-highlights-european-
unions-errors.html?hpw&rref=world>Find it in your Library.

(167) Bohuslav Litera, The Kozyrev Doctrine—A Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine,
PERSPECTIVES 4 (1994), at 47Find it in your Library.

(168) Julia Ioffe, Ethnic Russians in the Baltics Are Actually Persecuted. So Why Isn’t Putin
Stepping In?, NEW REPUBLIC, March 11, 2014, available at
<https://newrepublic.com/article/116970/estonia-lithuania-mistreat-ethnic-russians-nato-
keeps-putin-out>Find it in your Library.

(169) For example, see Rick Lyman, Poles Steel for Battle, Fearing Russia Will March on Them
Next, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2015, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/world/europe/poland-steels-for-battle-seeing-echoes-
of-cold-war-in-ukraine-crisis.html>Find it in your Library.

(170) John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault, 93 FOREIGN AFF.
(September/October 2014)Find it in your Library, at 77. See also Sokolsky, The New NATO-
Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security.

(171) Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia’s Latest Land Grab, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 60 (May/June 2014)Find it
in your Library.

(172) Michael R. Gordon, Russia Has Deployed Missile Barred by Treaty, U.S. General Tells
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/politics/russia-inf-missile-
treaty.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope. Their presence is likely to preclude
productive US-Russian arms control negotiations>Find it in your Library.

(173) Alexander J. Motyl, The Sources of Russian Conduct, FOREIGN AFF., November 16, 2014,
available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142366/alexander-j-motyl/the-sources-of-
russian-conduct>Find it in your Library.

(174) Cited in Alison Smale & Danny Hakim, European Firms Seek to Minimize Russia
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2014, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/europe/european-firms-seek-to-minimize-
russia-sanctions.html>Find it in your Library.

(175) Looking for a Home, Special Report, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 2016, at 7.

(176) Frontex estimated the total number of refugees arriving in Europe in 2015 as over
1,800,000.

(177) Rick Gladstone, Smugglers Made at Least $5 Billion Last Year in Europe Migrant Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/europe/migrants-refugees-
smugglers.html>Find it in your Library.

(178) Charlemagne, An Ill Wind, THE ECONOMIST, January 23, 2016, at 49Find it in your
Library.
(179) Cologne’s Aftershocks, THE ECONOMIST, January 16, 2016, at 57–58. Migrant crimes also
played a role in Austrian elections. Alison Smale, Migrant Crimes Add Volatile Element to
Austria’s Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/world/europe/migrant-crimes-add-volatile-element-
to-austrias-election.html>Find it in your Library.

(180) Germany Attacks: What Is Going On?, BBC NEWS, December 20, 2016, available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36882445>.

(181) Cited in Jim Yardley, With No Unified Refugee Strategy, Europeans Fall Back on Old
Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/world/europe/with-no-unified-refugee-strategy-
europeans-fall-back-on-old-alliances.html>Find it in your Library.

(182) Nick Cummings-Bruce, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia Start Screening Refugees by
Nationality, N.Y. TIMES, November 19, 2015, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/world/europe/macedonia-serbia-croatia-refugees-
limit.html>Find it in your Library.

(183) Cited in Yardley, With No Unified Refugee Strategy, Europeans Fall Back on Old Alliances.

(184) Slovakian Prime Minister Fico declared that Muslims would alter Slovakia’s traditions,
which have “been present here for centuries. The Latest: Slovakia Not a Place for Muslims,
Premier Says, ABC NEWS, May 25, 2016, available at
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-german-cabinet-approves-measures-
migrants-39359226>Find it in your Library.

(185) Juliet Eilperin & Anthony Faiola, Obama Confronts Refugee Crisis on His Final Trip to
Europe, WASHINGTON POST, November 14, 2016, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-confronts-refugee-crisis-on-his-final-trip-
to-europe/2016/11/13/faaad3a8-a87f-11e6-ba59-
a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.1a3631490756>Find it in your Library.

(186) Liz Alderman, Greece Holds Activists as Migrants and Police Clash Anew at Macedonia
Border, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/world/europe/migrant-crisis-idomeni-
protests.html>Find it in your Library.

(187) Cited in Adam Nossiter, Brussels Attack Underscore Vulnerability of an Open European
Society, March 22, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/belgium-security.html>.

(188) Cited in Jytte Klausen, Europe’s Real Border Problem: Openness Isn’t the Issue, FOREIGN
AFF., November 16, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2015-
11-16/europes-real-border-problem>Find it in your Library, at 3. See also Alison Smale &
Barbara Surk, Paris Attacks Complicate Europe’s Already Strained Border Controls, N.Y.
TIMES, November 16, 2015, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/paris-attacks-complicate-europes-
already-strained-border-controls.html>Find it in your Library.

(189) Cited in Steven Erlanger, Brussels Attacks Fueled Debate Over Migrants in a Fractured
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/belgium-attacks-migrants.html>Find it
in your Library.

(190) See Robin Simcox, France’s Perpetual Battle Against Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF.,
November 17, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2015-11-
17/frances-perpetual-battle-against-terrorism>Find it in your Library.

(191) Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBC NEWS, January 14, 2015, available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237>Find it in your Library.
(192) Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS, December 9, 2015, available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237>Find it in your Library.

(193) Nice Lorry Attack: Five Suspected Accomplices Charged, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2016,
available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36859312>Find it in your Library.

(194) Brussels Attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek Bombs Kill Many, BBC NEWS, March 22, 2016,
available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869254>Find it in your Library.

(195) Melissa Eddy, German Police Detain Asylum-Seeker Suspected of Plotting Terrorist
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, August 9, 2016, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/germany-mutterstadt-terrorism-
rheinland-pfalz.html. A third asylum-seeker was arrested on suspicion of plotting an attack at a
soccer match>Find it in your Library.

(196) Henry Porter, Terrorism, Migrants, and Crippling Debt: Is This the End of Europe?,
VANITY FAIR, February 2016, available at <http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/01/europe-
terrorism-migrants-debt-crisis>Find it in your Library.

(197) Id.Find it in your Library

(198) Cited in Jim Brunsden, Europe Refugee Policy Is “Trojan Horse of Terrorism”, Says
Orban, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 30, 2017, available at <https://www-ft-
com.libproxy.newschool.edu/content/538b2a0a-154e-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c>Find it in your
Library.

(199) Georges Zirtes, Hungary Has Been Shamed by Viktor Orbán’s Government, THE
GUARDIAN, September 16, 2015, available at
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/16/hungary-shamed-viktor-orban-
refugee-hungarian-serbian>Find it in your Library.

(200) What’s in the E.U. Deal with Turkey? Controls, Concessions and Swaps, N.Y. TIMES,
March 18, 2016, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/europe/european-
union-turkey-migrants.html>Find it in your Library.

(201) Id.Find it in your Library

(202) James Kanter, E.U. Proposes Visa-Free Travel for Turks, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2016,
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/world/europe/europe-turkey-
visa.html>Find it in your Library.

(203) What’s in the E.U. Deal With Turkey?, supra note 200.

(204) Migrant Crisis: Concern Rises as EU-Turkey Deal Looms, BBC NEWS, April 2, 2016,
available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35949685>, and “Desperate times,
desperate measures”, THE ECONOMIST, March 12, 2016, at 49.

(205) Cited in Kanter, supra note 202.

(206) Cited in Ece Toksabay & Tuvan Gumruksu, Turkey Warns EU It Is Making “Serious
Mistakes” over Failed Coup, REUTERS, August 10, 2016, available at
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-europe-minister-idUSKCN10L0S9>Find it
in your Library.

(207) Stathis N. Kalyvas, Greece’ s Next Bailout Battle, Council on Foreign Relations, May 3,
2016. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1117432>Find it in your Library.

(208) Temporary Relief, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 2016, at 45.

(209) James Kanter, Eurozone Agrees to Debt Relief and Bailout Aid for Greece, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2016 available at <http://nyti.ms/25/fP8yy>Find it in your Library.
(210) Eurostat 2015, available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=
en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1>.

(211) See Elliot Abrams, Trump the Traditionalist, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 10–16 (July/August
2017)Find it in your Library.

(212) Six Days of War, 50 Years of Occupation, THE ECONOMIST, Special Report, May 20,
2017, at 7.

(213) Cited in Mark Landler, Peter Baker & David E. Sanger, Trump Embraces Pillars of Obama’s
Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-missile-test-trump.html>Find
it in your Library.

(214) Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Mixed Signals From Trump Worry Pro-Israel Hard-
Liners, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/middleeast/palestine-israel-trump-abbas-
adelson.html>Find it in your Library.

(215) Isabel Kershner, Preparation for Trump’s Visit Expose Political Rifts in Israel, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/trump-israel-visit.html>Find it in
your Library.

(216) Eric Schmitt, Trump Continues U.S. Use of Special Forces Keeping Wars at Arm’s Length,
N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/africa/trump-special-forces-navy-
seals.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast>Find it in your Library.

(217) Cited in Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Trump Softens Tone on Islam but Calls for Purge
of “Foot Soldiers of Evil”, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/trump-saudi-arabia-islam-
speech.html?_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(218) Mark Landler, Trump Takes Credit for Saudi Move Against Qatar a U.S. Military Partner,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/middleeast/trump-qatar-saudi-
arabia.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your Library.

(219) Gardiner Harris, State Dept. Lashes Out at Gulf Countries over Qatar Embargo, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-trump-
tillerson.html?emc=eta1>Find it in your Library.

(220) David E. Sanger, Gardiner Harris & Mark Landler, Where Trump Zigs, Tillerson Zags,
Putting Him at Odds with White House, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/world/americas/rex-tillerson-american-
diplomacy.html?emc=edit_th_20170626&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=4332168>Find it in your
Library.

(221) Cited in David D. Kirkpatrick, Trump’s Business Ties in the Gulf Raise Questions About His
Allegiances, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/world/middleeast/trumps-business-ties-in-persian-
gulf-raise-questions-about-his-allegiances.html?_r=0>Find it in your Library.

(222) Cited in One China, Many Meanings, THE ECONOMIST, March 11, 2017, at 13.
(223) Cited in The Great Brawl of China, THE ECONOMIST, March 11, 2017, at 23. See
also What Is the “One China” Policy?, BBC NEWS, February 10, 2017, available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354>Find it in your Library.

(224) See Keith Bradsher, Trump Talks Tough on U.S.-China Trade but Delays Real Action,
NEW YORK TIMES, March 31, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/business/trump-trade-executive-orders.html>. Trump
has ordered a review of Sino-American trade relationsFind it in your Library.

(225) Helene Cooper, Trump’s Turn Toward China Curtails Navy Patrols in Disputed Zones,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/asia/navy-south-china-
sea.html%3f;hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>. In late May, however, a US warship did
sail within the twelve miles of one of the islandsFind it in your Library.

(226) Cited in Jane Perlez, Why Trump’s Budding Bromance with Xi Is Doomed, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/why-trumps-
budding-bromance-with-xi-is-
doomed.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library.

(227) Cited in Mark Landler & Binyamin Appelbaum, Trump Tells Foreign Leaders That Nafta
Can Stay for Now, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/politics/nafta-executive-order-
trump.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection
=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=s
ectionfront>Find it in your Library. See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Sends Nafta
Renegotiation Notice to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/nafta-renegotiation-trump.html>Find it in
your Library.

(228) Cited in Landler & Appelbaum, supra note 227.

(229) Cited in Erlanger, supra note 46.

(230) Cited in “Pay Up,” supra note 127, at 44.

(231) Gardiner Harris, Jim Mattis, in Lithuania, Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to NATO, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/world/europe/jim-
mattis-nato-us-lithuania.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in
your Library.

(232) Cited in Landler, Baker & Sanger, supra note 213.

(233) Cited in Nick Wadhams, Jonathan Stearns & Alex Morales, Tillerson and Mattis Blast
Russia for Aggression, BLOOMBERG, March 31,
2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-31/tillerson-calls-nato-critical-in-
countering-russian-aggressionFind it in your Library. Tillerson also urged the Senate to confirm
Montenegro’s admission to NATO despite Russian opposition.

(234) Cited in Nick Wadhams & John Follain, Tillerson Asks Why U.S. Taxpayers Should Care
About Ukraine, BLOOMBERG, April 11, 2017, available at
<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-11/tillerson-asks-why-u-s-taxpayers-
should-care-about-ukraine%3f;utm_content=politics&utm_campaign=socialflow-
organic&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&cmpid%3D=socialflow-twitter-
politics&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1>Find it in your Library.

(235) Cited in Mark Landler, Blind Spots in Trump’s Tirade Against Germany, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/world/europe/trump-merkel-
germany-macron.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your
Library.
(236) Peter Baker, Trump Commits United States to Defending NATO Nations, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/europe/trump-nato-
defense-article-
5.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=wor
ld&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=section
front>Find it in your Library.

(237) Somini Sengupta, Melissa Eddy & Chris Buckley, As Trump Wavers on Climate Pact, Other
Nations Are Defiant, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/climate-paris-agreement-trump-
china.html>Find it in your Library.

(238) Cited in Alison Smale, Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-alliances-g7-
leaders.html>Find it in your Library.

(239) Cited in Smale, supra note 238. See also Mark Landler & Michael D. Shear, Mild in
Mideast, Trump Is All Elbows in a Europe Eager to Jab Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2017,
available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/world/europe/trump-europe-
g7.html>Find it in your Library, and Michael D. Shear & Mark Landler, Trump Ends Trip
Where He Started: At Odds with Allies and Grilled on Russia, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2017,
available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/world/europe/trump-paris-climate-
accords-g7.htm1>Find it in your Library.

(240) Cited in Neil MacFarquhar, Russia, Feeling Slighted by Trump, Seeks a Reset, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/europe/trump-putin-
russia-
relations.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollecti
on=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=9&pgtype
=sectionfront>Find it in your Library.

(241) Cited in Somini Sengupta, Trump’s U.N. Envoy, Nikki Haley, Condemns Russia’s
“Aggressive Actions” in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/europe/nikki-haley-trump-ukraine-russia-
putin.html>Find it in your Library.

(242) Cited in Neil MacFarquhar, Russia Looks to Exploit White House “Turbulence,” Analysts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, February 27, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/europe/russia-looks-to-exploit-white-house-
turbulence-analysts-say.html>Find it in your Library.

(243) Cited in Ilya Arkhipov, Evgenia Pismennaya & Henry Meyer, Chaos Engulfing Trump Stirs
Anxiety in Russia over U.S. Ties, Bloomberg, May 19, 2017, available at
<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-18/russia-grows-anxious-over-u-s-
political-chaos-engulfing-trump>Find it in your Library.

(244) Anne Barnard and Michael Gordon, Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S. Blames
Assad, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.htmlFind it in
your Library>.

(245) Abrams, supra note 211, at 14.

(246) Trump’s U.N. Envoy Says Ouster of Al-Assad Is a Priority of U.S., REUTERS, April 9,
2017, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-haley-
idUSKBN17B026>Find it in your Library.

(247) Michael R. Gordon, Trump to Arm Syrian Kurds Even as Turkey Strongly Objects, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/trump-
kurds-syria-army.html%3f;hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>Find it in your
Library.

(248) Cited in David E. Sanger, Tillerson, on Eve of Russia Trip, Takes Hard Line on Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, April 9, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/us/politics/tillerson-russia-syria-chemical-
weapons.html%3f;emc=edit_th_20170410&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=4332168&_r=0>Find it
in your Library.

(249) Cited in Id.Find it in your Library

(250) Peter Baker & Gardiner Harris, On Trump’s Syria Strategy, One Voice Is Missing:
Trump’s, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/middleeast/syria-trump-
assad.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection
=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sect
ionfront>Find it in your Library.

(251) Cited in Kevin Sullivan & Karen Tumulty, Trump Promised an “Unpredictable” Foreign
Policy. To Allies, It Looks Incoherent, WASHINGTON POST, April 11, 2017, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-an-unpredictable-foreign-policy-
to-allies-it-looks-incoherent/2017/04/11/21acde5e-1a3d-11e7-9887-
1a5314b56a08_story.html%3f;utm_term=.69339ee0a052>Find it in your Library.

(252) Cited in idFind it in your Library.

(253) Michael R. Gordon & Motoko Rich, Jim Mattis Says U.S. Is “Shoulder to Shoulder” with
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, February 3, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/us-japan-mattis-abe-defense.html>Find it
in your Library.

(254) Michael R. Gordon & Choe Sang-Hun, In South Korea, Defense Secretary Mattis Tries to
Reassure an Ally, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/asia/james-mattis-us-korea-thaad.html>Find
it in your Library.

(255) Roberta Rampton, In Seoul, U.S. Vice President Pence Makes Geopolitics Personal,
REUTERS, April 16, 2017, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pence-asia-
idUSKBN17I0IB>Find it in your Library.

(256) Cited in Gordon & Rich, supra note 256.

(257) Cited in Motoko Rich, Rex Tillerson, in Japan, Says U.S. Needs “Different Approach” to
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/world/asia/rex-tillerson-asia-trump-us-
japan.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection
=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sec
tionfront>Find it in your Library.

(258) Cited in MacFarquhar, supra note 242.

(259) Patrick, supra note 49, at 53. See, for example, Damien Cave, In Australia, a Call for Closer
Ties to China Gains Support, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2017, available at
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/world/australia/trump-us-china-relations-
fitzgerald.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia>Find it in your Library, Jason
Horowitz, With Italy No Longer in U.S. Focus, Russia Swoops to Fill the Void, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/world/europe/russia-
courts-italy-in-us-absence.html%3f;emc=eta1>Find it in your Library, and Alison Smale & Jane
Perlez, China Sees an Opening in Rift Between Trump and Germany, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/world/europe/china-sees-an-
 opening-in-rift-between-trump-and-
germany.html%3f;rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope>Find it in your Library.

(260) Patrick, supra note 49, at 57.

(261) Nye, supra note 2, at 16.