Umut Korkut - 2

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The European union and the accession process in

Hungary, Poland and Romania: Is there a place for
social dialogue?
a
Umut Korkut
a
Central European University , Budapest, Hungary E-mail:
Published online: 29 Feb 2008.
To cite this article: Umut Korkut (2002) The European union and the accession process in Hungary, Poland and
Romania: Is there a place for social dialogue?, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3:2, 297-324, DOI:
10.1080/15705850208438838
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Umut Korkut
The European Union and the Accession Process in
Hungary, Poland and Romania: Is There a Place for
Social Dialogue1?
ABSTRACT
Downloaded by [University of California Santa Cruz] at 04:33 03 January 2015
This paper attempts to shed some light on the nature of the

ongoing accession negotiations between the European Union (EU)
and the East Central European countries (ECE). Hungary, Poland
and Romania are the focus of my paper. My principle argument
is that, the accession process is feeble in terms of its transparency
and in terms of providing participation routes for interest groups.
1 place this argument in a theoretical framework, which stresses
that participation in policy making through civil society is a sign
of consolidated democracy. I hypothesise that 'assumed' differ-
ences in terms of political and social structures, and the pace
of accession among these three countries does not affect the
conditions of democratic decision making during the accession
negotiations.The negotiations are carried out in an elitist and non-
transparent format. As a result social dialogue during the acces-
sion process is debilitated and unsubstantiated. As such, this process
gives substantial clues about the democratic consolidation process
in ECE. I place myself against an elite-ridden understanding of
accession. Therefore, I disagree with the idea that the sheer pol-
icy overload deriving from negotiations with the EU as well
as the enormous time pressure the process involves tend to en-
courage a decidedly elitist approach in practice.2 In opposi-
tion, I argue that democratic accountability cannot be sacrificed
for any efficiency considerations. After all, any technocracy or
benign dictatorship could achieve similar efficient policy outputs.3
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3:2

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2002
Furthermore as my paper will illustrate, social dialogue is not only debilitated in these count-
ries specifically in terms of accession negotiations, but its importance is also downplayed by
policy makers.
Introduction
At a specific glance, it appears that the governments in Hungary, Poland and

Romania seek to impose a form of monopoly on the negotiations at the expense
of large sectors of their respective societies. The accession negotiations also
experience a common illness in ECE: the discrepancy between formalised
structures and the way these structures work in practice. Although structural
means of social dialogue are in place, in practice these structures are far from
being effective and hence the dialogue is insubstantial.4 Another problem is

the assumption of consensus in the applicant countries regarding accession
to the Union. This assumption, however, prevents meaningful discussion of
important issues relating to the European integration and the applicant coun-
tries' national interests.5 Pridham6 considers this assumed consensus and pop-
ular support in the accession countries as a result of a low level of information
about the EU.
The paper will develop in the following way. Initially, I will briefly present
the changing attitude towards social dialogue at the EU level. The second
part is an evaluation of social dialogue in general and social dialogue dur-
ing the accession process in particular in Hungary, Poland and Romania. In
order to better understand and assess the social dialogue processes, I carried
out sixty three interviews with representatives from Hungarian, Romanian
and Polish interest groups over the period March 2001 to August 2001. In
this paper, groups interviewed are labelled as 'labour' (trade unions) and
'job-provider' (employers' organisations and agricultural producers' associ-
ations). I will introduce the results of my interviews to illustrate how inter-
est groups evaluate the nature of social dialogue in their countries in general
and in particular during the accession process. The third part will be based
on the EU Commission and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) reports
on social dialogue in these three countries. On the basis of the problems dis-
cussed in these two last sections, the fourth part will discuss possible ways
to increase the legitimacy of the accession process.
298 • Umut Korkut

The Position of Social Dialogue at the European Union Level
and during Enlargement
The social dimension of integration at the EU level has been prominent only
since the Maastricht Treaty7 and was later strengthened with the integration
of Social Protocol into the main body of the Treaty of Amsterdam.8 Hence the
ESC has played a major role in the integration process since then, and the
Treaty of Nice confirms its role as the institutional mouthpiece for civil soci-
ety organisations. Through vitalising the role of the ESC, the EU seeks to
extend to its citizenry the opportunity to interact and participate in an appro-
priate way. Therefore, responsiveness to grassroots concerns has become a
key feature of European policy making.9 Along with this emphasis on increas-
ing participation in governance at the EU levels, the Union also seeks to pro-
mote participation in the accession countries. Given the ongoing enlargement

process towards East Central Europe and Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, the ESC
plays a major role in ensuring the effective participation of organised civil
society in the integration and enlargement processes.10 Brussels feels that
incorporation of various actors in the accession process will assist a rapid
implementation of the acquis as well as serving to solve legitimacy problems
created by the accession process. As such, there is a shift from the traditional
inter-governmentalist mode of accession towards seeking to involve more
actors in the process. This is partly due to the growing scepticism in the appli-
cant countries towards membership as well as preparing social actors for the
post-accession process of social dialogue. In crude terms, authority resides
in Brussels and in many policy realms, accession countries are required to
implement regulations or change their existing laws to conform with EU leg-
islation. This process even puts national parliaments on the fringes in terms
of procedural involvement." Although a crucial legislative role lies with the
Parliament during the accession process, applicant countries may sometimes
seek to disregard this role due to considerations of efficiency. As has been
criticised in the country report, the Romanian government, for example,
turned more towards ordinances than utilising the Parliament for accession
related legislation.12 Citizens of the applicant countries often lack adequate
information on the accession process. Nevertheless,
only if the EU and the governments take account of the concerns [of the
people], can the enlargement process be free of serious political conflict.
The European Union and the Accession Process in Hungary, Poland and Romania • 299
This includes dialogue with the public - in other words an appropriate infor-
mation and communication policy on both sides channelled towards citi-
zens' needs ... An increasing emphasis must be placed on involving the
public and representatives of civil society organisations in the applicant
countries in order to facilitate acceptance and implementation of the acquis.13
That is why a social dimension in the enlargement process is required.
Traditionally, however, there are two sides to the accession talks: the national
government and the Commission. For the conduct of the negotiations, the
applicant countries submit their negotiating positions to the Commission
enlargement task force. On the basis of these position papers, therefore, the
European Commission develops EU common positions on each chapter. Then
the fifteen member countries should rapidly approve these common posi-
tions to allow substantive negotiations to start. The Commission's role towards

the applicant country is to determine and put forward proposals concerning
short and medium term priorities to be fulfilled by the candidates. Citizen
participation into the accession process comes at the very last stage, if the
constitution of the respective state requires a referendum to join an inter-
national organisation.14 Therefore until the very end of the process, the inter-
governmentalist approach does not necessarily entail social dialogue during
the accession talks.
The accession process, as a result, is flawed from a participatory view of
democracy. This is despite the fact that specific resolutions of issues at the
accession talks generate a potential flow of harms or benefits to a notably
large constituency. As a result if we agree that participation is one of the priv-
ileged marks of a modern society, the way accession negotiations are carried
out would be against the particulars of this modern society.15 Potentially the
chances of participation would be quite high, once the channels of involve-
ment through civil society organisations have been used efficiently. In this
respect, my paper strongly argues for the need for greater public involve-
ment, through evaluating the decision-making locus, public visibility, and the
types of decision-cycle16 used during membership negotiations.
The belief on the EU side is also that governments of candidate countries
should understand the value of the contribution from the social partners for
the successful adoption of the acquis communitaire. Thereby, the governments
of applicant countries should learn to rely on their social partners in prepar-
300 • Umut Korkut

ing their countries to take their place in the enlarged European Union.17 Flynn,
the EU Commissioner for Social Affairs and Employment, stresses that, "it is
essential that trade unions and employer groups in the candidate countries
organise themselves as independent and representative organisations. And
[hence], contribute to the full implementation and proper compliance with
EU legislation."18 Therefore, the candidate countries are invited to confirm
that social partners are sufficiently consulted on legislative drafts relating to
acquis.19 Flynn's argument is particularly in line with Agh20 and Vass and
Cox21 that 'Europeanisation' should be carried through a structural adjust-
ment within a social pact, which incorporates all major political and social
actors together. This would be a sign of, in Schmitter's22 words, a partial
regime rather than a single regime. In this partial regime, corporate-consen-
sual arrangements would become a crucial means of participation. A 'social

deficit', on the other hand, would only make the adoption of the 'social acquis'
and participation in the European social dialogue more difficult. Conversely,
the involvement of the social partners of candidate countries at the European
level will offer them a unique opportunity to strengthen social dialogue at
home.23 These suggestions from the EU side display a wish to introduce a
process of multi-governance into the accession procedure. I will try to illus-
trate how governance as such can work in practice in the last section. Before,
however, I would like to spend some more time on particular problems to
do with social dialogue in accession countries.
Social Dialogue Related Problems in Hungary, Poland and Romania

During my fieldwork, I had the impression that even interest groups in
Hungary, Poland and Romania had a rather shaky idea of how social dia-
logue works in their countries. In order to evaluate social dialogue, I asked
three different sets of questions. The first was an enquiry on whether inter-
est groups asked for a meeting with an official at the ministry level in 2000
and how many times. Then, I asked my respondents to evaluate how effec-
tive these meetings have been. I will present results of these enquiries along
with some quotations from informal talks. The third set of questions was an
assessment of certain channels facilitating discussion with governmental
officials about policy issues. Along with these, some respondents prefer to
emphasise specific problems to do with social dialogue during the accession
process. I will insert these problems, where appropriate.
In Hungary, labour and job provider sectors differ in terms of their chances
to reach officials at the ministry levels. On average, the job provider groups
find ministries more accessible. There is a discrepancy between the number
of times Hungarian labour groups asked for a meeting at the ministry level
and the number of times they managed to meet. Nine respondents from the
labour sector asked for a meeting for 'many' or 'ten' times, yet they could
either not meet with an official or met only once or twice. A few others (four
respondents) met a few times with an official. One respondent himself,
was a parliamentarian at the time of the interview, he stated that he could
meet with the officials as many times as possible. Whereas Hungarian job-
provider groups stated that, they asked for a meeting 'many' times and could
meet 'many' times, even 'daily' or 'weekly'. In Poland and Romania, how-
ever, there is no visible difference between sectors. Yet, there are discrepan-
cies among the groups. Some groups say that on average, they find their
.ministries accessible, while the others have fewer chances to talk with an
official. This can be explained by widespread patronage links in these coun-
tries. During the EU accession process, a certain number of respondents24 from
all three countries asserted that the nature of their industry determined
the governments' approach. Though roughly, this picture tells us that Hungar-
ian labour groups have the least chances to meet with officials at ministerial
levels compared to their counterparts from different sectors and countries.
This might be as a result of the more flirtatious relationship between labour
groups and political parties in Poland and in Romania compared to Hungary.
Still an assessment of how effective these meetings have been, was another
question.
At the aggregate level, job provider groups leave meetings with ministerial
personnel with more satisfaction than their labour counterparts. In Poland and
in Hungary, groups converge on evaluating the effectiveness of their meet-
ings with officials: somewhere in between 'effective' and 'somewhat ineffec-
tive'. Romanian interest groups, on the other hand, state that they have a more
co-operative relationship with officials at ministry levels. Their level of con-
tentment with these meetings is between 'somewhat effective' and 'effective'.
Groups from the labour sector evaluate these meetings more ineffective than
their job-provider counterparts. In Hungary, the level of satisfaction with these
meetings is the lowest. Table I displays answers to the question on the effec-
tiveness of these meetings in making ministries listen to organisations' views.
302 • Umut Korkut

Table I: Levels of Effectiveness of the Meetings Between Interest Groups and
Ministries/Number of Groups
Very Somewhat Effective Somewhat Very

Effective Effective Ineffective Ineffective
Hungary
Aggregate: 0 5 8 3 7
Labour: 0 3 7 2 6
Job-provider: 0 2 1 1 1
Poland
Labour: 2 0 1 3 3
Romania
Labour: 1 1 7 1 1
When I asked for evaluations of institutionalised channels, personal links and

the work of umbrella organisation (where applicable) in order to reach gov-
ernment, interest groups drew an interesting picture. Seemingly, among all
3 countries, only Hungarian respondents think that institutionalised chan-
nels of interest representation are important - if they exist. In Poland, almost
all respondents consider that personal links are the best means for interest
representation, hi Romania, on the other hand, respondents consider being
an umbrella organisation important to reach governments, while personal
links come second. Groups from the job provider sector have a more visible
inclination towards personal links than their labour counterparts. Table II dis-
plays interests groups' assessment of channels to reach government.
Notice that all my mean calculations are based on the assumption that ranks
lie at the same distance from each other.
Informal talks also provided me with crucial material on the nature of social
dialogue in countries. Some respondents from Romania complain that the
institutional and legal frameworks for interest representation have been miss-
ing in their countries,25 still with the realisation that time is unripe for the
framework.26 The process of social dialogue suffers a great deal from the
Table II: Interest Groups Evaluation of Channels to Reach Government/
Mean Calculations on Ranks
Institutionalised Personal links Being a part of

channels of between people an 'umbrella
interest representation working in organisation'
(if exists) ministries and
our organisation
Mean Values Standard Mean Values Standard Mean Values Standard
Deviation NR Deviation NR Deviation NR
Hungary
Aggregate: 1.53 2.00 2.20
0.68 1.10 0.91
15 21 15
Labour: 1.15 2.31 2.38
0.38 0.58 0.87
13 16 13
Job-provider: 2.33 1.00 2.50
2 5 2
Poland
Aggregate: 2.00 1.20 1.67
0.67 0.40 0.47
9 10 3
Labour: 2.17 1.17 1.50
0.75 0.41 0.71
6 6 2
Job-provider: 1.67 1.00 2.00
0.38 4 1
3
Romania
Aggregate: 1.95 1.78 1.73
0.94 1.00 0.59
20 18 15
Labour: 2.08 2.00 1.80
1.08 1.32 0.63
12 9 10
Job-provider: 1.75 1.56 1.60
0.71 0.88 0.55
8 9 5
Key: 1 = very influential while 4 = no influence
304 • Umut Korkut

hypocritical attitudes of governments or political parties. Either governments
do not respect the implications of the social accord27 or political parties seek
interest groups' assistance only before elections.28 Still, Romanian interest
groups state that they are 'satisfied' with the current government's attitude
towards interest group participation in policy making in Romania. Levels of
satisfaction are higher among the job provider sector compared to their labour
counterparts. The timing of the interviews just after the PDS success in
Romanian elections and following the political spring for Romania may have
determined the answers to this question to a large extent. Romania's progress
reports from the Commission on enlargement also underlines this positive
atmosphere in the country after the elections.
In Hungary, formally institutional structures are in place, but they do not

work in practice.29 The Government, reportedly, has its favourites30 among

the interest groups 'not as a part of power, but as a tool to keep power - cor-
ruption and connections are extremely important'.31 As Markus Imre (Vasutas
Szovetsege, Hungary) notes,
There are many groups, that have been patronised by the government. There
are those groups, which have only 10-15 members [that is what the law
requires]. Strange enough, these groups are mostly established at the expense
of the existing groups to weaken them. There are about 800 groups in our
field, but most of them are just cronies of government.
The Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party "FIDESZ-MPP" and

Hungarian Democratic Forum "MDF" coalition government32 in Hungary is
accused of being engaged in anti-trade union activities, especially by those
trade unions on the left side of the ideological spectrum. The EU progress
report on Hungary's accession also emphasises the need for an increased dia-
logue between the Hungarian government and trade unions. There is also a
significant cleavage among trade union groups over the issues of a rival trade
union's cooperation with government or with political parties in opposition.
Those trade unions from the left argue that governments only support their
cronies in order to push 'real' representatives of labour out of the social dia-
logue. Those from the right wing, on the other hand, insert that left wing
trade unions have patron-client type relationships with parties of the left.
The relationship between the Hungarian Socialist Party "MSZP" and trade
union confederations on the left continues regardless of the former being in
opposition or in power. At the country level, perhaps not surprisingly,
Hungarian respondents illustrated the least levels of satisfaction with their
current government. "This process [social dialogue] is not objective and polit-
ically not helpful, only personal links help the success of an interest group."33
According to my respondents, this was the case with FIDESZ-MPP and MDF
coalition governments in Hungary. During the previous governments, how-
ever, people had the opportunity to influence the government to a larger
extent,34 and labour, and business groups were equally represented.35 Lengyel,36
in contrast asserts for the MSZP government elected in 1994 that, "it is not
professional competence but only loyalty to the patron, the interest group
and to the party that matters". On the other hand, previous governments
especially the MDF government under Antall and Boross between 1990-1994
have equally been accused of failures as regards social dialogue.37
In Poland, interest groups noted that the previous government led by the
Solidarity Election Coalition "AWS" tended to favour some groups vis-a-vis
the others. The EU Commission progress report on Poland in 2000 also draws
attention to this unbalanced relationship. Polish respondents assert that they
are 'somewhat unsatisfied' with the current government. Even the Solidarity
groups were unsatisfied with the AWS government, despite significant lev-
els of cooperation between the two. Mr. Wladystaw Mucha likened social
dialogue in Poland to a shallow process. He asserted that, "governments did
not have any rules on decision making. They just listened to who was there
at the right moment in time". In this environment of shallow social dialogue
what counted was personal contacts.38 In this respect, Table III presents inter-
est groups' evaluation of the government's approach towards themselves on
country and sector levels.
In a comparison of party politicians and interest groups in terms of policy
making, interest groups assess party politicians either as more influential or
a lot more influential than themselves. At the country level, Romanian respon-
dents are a bit more optimistic on the role of interest groups in policy mak-
ing compared to their Hungarian and Polish counterparts. Table TV displays
responses from different countries and sectors.
306 • Umut Korkut

Table III: Satisfaction with Government's Approach Towards Interest
Groups/Number of Groups
Very Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Very

Satisfied Satisfied Unsatisfied Unsatisfied
Hungary
Aggregate: . 0 0 1 5 17
Labour: 0 0 1 1 16
Poland
Labour: 0 0 2 4 3
Romania
Labour: 0 2 4 3 2
Table IV: Comparison of the Effects of Interest Groups and Party Politicians
in Policy-Making/Number or Groups
interest interest party party party

groups groups are politicians politicians politicians
are a lot more and interest are more are a lot
more influential groups both influential more
influential than party have a than influential
than party politicians similar interest than interest
politicians influence groups groups
Hungary
Labour: 0 0 1 7 10
Poland
Labour: 0 1 0 2 6
Romania
Labour: 0 2 1 6 3
Implications of Missing Social Dialogue and Accession Process
Agh39 argues that in Eastern Europe the new political elite is not ready to
accept civil society and its representatives as partners. Therefore, legislatures
and governments either attempt to weaken and exclude interest groups from
policy making or to strengthen and include them in policy making through
co-opting them into political movements.40 The first option is a counterpro-
ductive strategy for governments, given the costs of economic transition and
increases in income discrepancies in Eastern Europe. If weakened, labour
organisations would be unable to moderate the effects of spreading mass
deprivation. As the accession process in Poland also illustrates, agricultural
producers' associations could also relinquish their roles as moderators if they
fell out of the policy making process. This would make the constituencies
appeal more towards extremist solutions.
Polish election results in 2001 gave certain clues about the shift of the un-
employed towards extremist parties.41 In Poland, the late success of anti-EU
parties in the parliamentary elections is significant. These parties were quick
to draw direct links between the tangible damage to the Polish economy and
the adaptation process to the acquis communitaire. Andrzej Lepper, head of
the Samoobrona, blames "the dominant role of an international alliance of
liberal elites and the financial and political corporations, [as being] ruthless
with regard to ordinary people and whole nations."42 Thereby, liberalism43 is
becoming the enemy number one! - and an anti liberalist attitude could gain
even more significance once Poland starts restructuring its agricultural sys-
tem.44 This form of anti liberalism is prone to take forms of protecting Polish
independence, welfare and averting the negative effects of the EU accession
on Polish families. Already, there even is an active anti-EU interest group
sector in Poland.45 In Hungary, as well, even the mention of a deal between
the country and the EU over the sale of land to foreigners was enough to
stir up a problem between the coalition partners over the summer of 2001.46
In 2000, similarly, suggestions to settle Dutch farmers in the country created
a vigorous debate in the country.47 Romania, on the other hand, has opted
for a major re-structuring of its economy along neo-liberal lines during the
EU accession process. This might create political problems in this already
much debilitated society.
308 • Umut Korkut

Testing a relationship between increasing appeal for extremist parties and
weak interest reconciliation is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that as political society becomes more obstruc-
tionist, interest groups cannot develop techniques to tame those marginalised
sectors of society. Faced with this strength of party politicians in policy mak-
ing, interest groups find themselves in a dilemma as to how to pursue their
members' interests. This dilemma also affects their respective routes of inter-
est articulation during the EU accession process.
First, groups can pursue their interests through street protests rather than
social dialogue. Typically, agricultural producers' unions from Poland and
Hungary made use of these protests. A Polish respondent from an agricul-
tural producers' association expresses what he feels about governments and
street protests in succinct wording, "Governments generally take action after

protest. Otherwise, they do not do anything" (Stanisfaw Wittek, Federaqa
Zwilakow Pracodawcow Rolnych, Poland).
Even with a government that was prepared to consult and listen, farmers
chose to press their interests through street protests. Also, trade union fed-
erations from various sectors turned more and more towards street protests.
It was only the employer's organisations, which quite traditionally, kept them-
selves out of protests.48 Therefore interest groups, rather than seeking routes
for successful interest representation for their members, can simply take them-
selves out of the system. Overall, they cannot develop profitable negotiation
techniques, which makes them ambiguous as to their roles in the system.
More on this ambiguous stream, an interest group may seek to be politicised.
Rather Macchiavellist, a complete self-transformation into a political party or
engaging themselves in a close relationship with political parties may seem
to be wise solutions. This is either due to the failure of institutionalised chan-
nels of social dialogue for interest articulation or to the political aspirations
of the leaders.
However, international links and especially the EU accession process some-

times strengthens the position of interest groups vis-a-vis their governments.
Some respondents49 from the labour sector have underline the importance of
their links with groups active at the transnational level in providing a lever-
age against national governments. Polish agricultural producers' associations
have also been quick to establish their own transnational links and operate
their own representation in Brussels, independent from the Polish govern-
ment. They have convened with their peers at the European level to put com-
mon pressures on the EU in the area of Polish agriculture.50 Other respondents
assert that the implementation and functioning of the social dialogue in their
countries is closely linked to the EU accession process. In Markus Imre's51
mind, the link between the EU accession and social dialogue is so strong that
he places the Hungarian government in the anti-EU camp, as the govern-
ment does not want social dialogue.
I think this emphasis on international links and on the EU accession process

as leverage against governments is extremely important. As I discussed above,
the accession process so far appears to be under the control of governments.
In lines of liberal intergovernmentalism,52 developed by Moravcsik, the acces-

sion process can be considered in a way that candidate governments utilise
the process to implement unfavourable - but necessary - policies. Therefore,
the accession process may be considered as strengthening the policy auton-
omy of national governments at the expense of particular groups. Nevertheless,
with increasing international co-operation between interest groups in acces-
sion countries and their peers at the EU level, domestic groups have been
able to exploit this new international capital in their struggle with national
governments. In my interviews, among the factors that affect the develop-
ment of interest representation, in all three countries, the EU enlargement
process has been noted as the second most important factor right after the
events leading to regime change in 1989. This gives us an insight into what
interest groups expected to come out of EU membership. Similar to the emer-
gence of non-state actors within the integration process in the EU, interest
groups from accession countries have sought a more active role in the acces-
sion process. But as to how many organisations in Eastern Europe have the
required capacities to be active in a beneficial interaction with their inter-
national peers remains to be seen. This issue can be the focus of a later research.
Along with the critiques directed towards governments and governing elites,
in the interviews interest groups also repeated that they lacked informa-
tion on the EU accession process.53 Gecov Krisztina from Munkastanacsok
trade union confederation, however, came up with a self-criticism. According
to Gecov,
310 • Umut Korkut

There is 'European Integration Council'. Even if it is a consultative body
[not a body for decision making], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in a
position to report to its members [in this committee]. [This Committee] asks
for contributions. We do not give enough contributions. It is not an issue
of money. Trade unions want to be involved in the political decision mak-
ing. Yet, they lack skills and expertise to contribute in the elaboration of
policies.
It appears that a system for social dialogue does not work partly because
interest groups cannot provide the decision making bodies with enough exper-
tise and partly due to their consultative structures. The latter was also empha-
sised during my interview with Panyko Antal54 from the Ministry of Economic
Affairs in Hungary.
On the other hand, Ion Albu from Meridian trade union confederation empha-
sised their expertise and asserted that Romanian trade unions could have a
contribution over the Community legislation even before accession. According
to him, "there is an imminent need for contribution to the Community leg-
islation in fields of mining" as they have the necessary local knowledge.
Farmers' Trade Unions from Poland also believe that they have enough expe-
rience to offer within the accession and integration processes regarding the
EU.55 Polish Employers' Organisations have also stressed their willingness to
be more effective during the EU negotiations. Their approach is that,
it is no one else, but Polish entrepreneurs . . . who will have to exert a par-
ticularly strong impact on Poland's integration with the European Union.
We, therefore, believe that close, reliable and mutually open contacts are
necessary between the business community and government agencies respon-
sible for the negotiation process. The ongoing development of Poland's
negotiating position vis-a-vis its EU partners should be the objective of such
systematic consultations.
Moreover, they expect the Polish government to provide a reliable presenta-

tion to the public of the costs associated with the implementation of the EU
legislation. Therefore, a fast completion of successive negotiation chapters
should be coupled with a careful analysis of costs and benefits that each
accepted option may carry.56
Evaluation of Social Dialogue in Accession Countries by the EU
In the Commission's Reports on Accession, criticisms towards Hungary,
Poland, and Romania converge to a large extent. Hungary and Poland have
been urgently advised to carry on with the required improvements in terms
of social dialogue. Poland and Romania have received critical reports as
regards legislative measures, which must be adopted to meet the acquis com-
munitaire. All in all, the reports emphasise the need to strengthen the role of
civil society during the accession process. Such a stregthening of civil soci-
ety may be accomplished by carving out new routes for the comprehensive
participation of civil actors and invigorating their role in social dialogue at
the EU level, once accession is actualised.
According to the Commission Report in 2000, Hungary has experienced "non-

functioning formal institutional structures". The implementation of a public
administration development programme is required in order for formal insti-
tutional structures to be strengthened. Along with this, an active promotion
of sound developments in social dialogue within the country is required. The
Commission considers that the lack of effective consultations at the national
*
level will have negative effects on social dialogue at the European level. In
Hungary, the Commission has been critical of the Governmnent's use of the
Economic Council as a conduit for the dissemination of information to a wide
range of interests groups but with no opportunity for dialogue. Hence, the
Hungarian government has been strongly advised to make additional efforts
to ensure that opportunities for real social dialogue are provided and are fol-
lowed up in the appropriate manners. The Report for the year 2001 does not
display any improvements in social dialogue in the country. The relationship
between the government and social partners in the area of social dialogue is
epitomised in the report as one, which lacks confidence and trust.57 As a
result, it appears that Hungary has two major problems in terms of social
dialogue: non-functioning formal structures of dialogue and a lack of trust
between the government and the social actors.
Along with the Commission reports, the Joint Consultative Committee formed
between the applicant countries and the ESC members also publish regular
reports on social dialogue. Representatives of employers, workers and vari-
ous interest groups from the EU and the applicant countries take part in these
committees. The Joint Consultative Committee between Hungary and the EU
312 • Umut Korkut
called on the Hungarian government to ensure a more intense dialogue with
civil society as regards preparation for EU accession. It also put an empha-
sis on the need for a communication strategy between the civil actors and
the government in Hungary. Thereby, in order to consolidate social dialogue,
the Hungarian government must "provide transparent information on posi-
tive and negative impacts of accession and involve all actors of civil society.
Public debate about accession will thus contribute to creating a greater level
of support for enlargement."58
Poland, on the other hand, experiences problems in terms of EU related leg-

islation. In order to resolve this problem, within the Sejm and the Senate,
accession committees have been created.59 These bodies are in a position
to oversee the adoption of the EU related legislation. This legislation is to
be carried out through a new concept of "horizontal laws". These laws

will consist of bundles of legislation, or amendments to legislation, neces-
sary to achieve harmonisation with the acquis. This improvement in terms of
legislation and the involvement of the Sejm in the accession process is a
positive step. Nonetheless, adopting legislation in haste without prior dis-
cussion and involvement of various civil actors is prone to create imple-
mentation problems. Even the Association Agreement of 1991 is considered
to have been drawn up in haste. According to Brzozka,60 agricultural issues
could have been better arranged had Poland signed the Association treaty
after consulting agricultural experts. Hence, autonomous social dialogue
is considered as an essential policy priority for the good implementation of
the EU acquis in Poland.
The previous AWS government has initiated a joint consultative committee

on the European integration. This gives representatives of social partners and
other interest groups the opportunity to regularly contribute with sugges-
tions on the ongoing negotiations with the EU.61 Yet, the problems between
AWS and the OPZZ trade union confederation resulted in the final with-
drawal of the latter from the Commission for Social and Economic Affairs in
2000. This is noted with major concern in the Commission report in 2000.
Furthermore, the report implies that, social dialogue requires further efforts
so that it facilitates the implementation of the acquis. In this context, a rein-
forcement of the government's administrative capacity is entailed so as to
better follow and motivate autonomous social dialogue. Even though the act
on the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Issues was adopted
in August 2001, still the tripartite process is to be made more effective and
ensure the participation of all relevant social partners.62
The Joint Consultative Committee believes that the Polish public cannot fully
take part in the debate on Polish membership to the EU. This is due to the
lack of clear, transparent and accessible information. Accordingly, this lack
of information also has a major effect on the current disappointing levels
of support for accession in Poland. In this context, the Joint Consultative
Committee suggests that "strengthening of civil society in the information
and the accession processes may increase the prospects that the results of
accession negotiations will be accepted".63
The EU Commission report on Romania drew attention to problems over the

adoption of accession legislation. The report criticised both the coalition gov-
ernments, which were in office before and after the December 2000 elections.
It also criticised the "PDS" government's use of ordinances to push through
accession legislation - thereby bypassing formal parliamentary procedures.
The Commission asserted that, the reliance on ordinances may lead to leg-
islative instability in the Parliament if such ordinances are subsequently
rejected. The use of ordinances also curbs the parliament's ability to carry
out the essential function of scrutinising legislation. Especially, in terms of
the EU related legislation, these ordinances are also prone to cause problems
in the long run. On the other hand, the Commission Report has praised
Romania's efforts to coordinate structures related to accession through the
creation of inter-ministerial working groups. The EU Commission thinks that
these measures have significantly improved the quality of Romanian prepa-
rations for accession.
In terms of social dialogue, despite existing legal provisions, much legisla-

tion is approved without adequate consultation of social partners and with-
out full consultation with the Economic and Social Committee. Romania is
still prone to routine problems in terms of structured social dialogue. Similar
to other countries, the structures exist but are not accorded sufficient impor-
tance. Structures need to be used in a way that permits effective social dia-
logue and the government's capacity to monitor these structures needs to
be reinforced. Along with this, consultation with stakeholders (social part-
ners, NGOs, the business community) when drafting legislation needs to be
314 • Umut Korkut

improved. Even though the Economic and Social Council "CES" ought to
allow social partners to comment on legislation, the Commission reports that
to date the Council has not been systematically consulted. It is repeatedly
bypassed in the decision making process.64 The government will need to help
the social partners to develop their capacity before they can play an active
role in the EU context. In terms of accession process, the Joint Consultative
Committee agrees that inclusion of other civil society organisations into the
CES (else than trade unions and employers) is an urgent requirement.
What is to be done?
On the basis of my interviews and the EU Commission reports, it appears

that national governments are major impediments for social dialogue during
the accession process. Enfeebled participation in policy making may be due
to the maturing democratic political culture in the ECE. Governments' using
the accession process to justify the need for unfavourable policies is an equally
good explanation for the exclusion of interest groups from the accession dia-
logue. This is evident when decision makers in the ECE countries use EU
demands to justify the passage and implementation of unpopular measures.65
Even though national governments sometimes attempt to formulate social
dialogue through designing certain bodies for interest articulation,66 as the
Commission reports also suggest, the task of these bodies do not go beyond
consultation. Thereby, enlargement negotiations tend to strengthen an elitist
bias. As I have argued above, even the EU has committed itself to forge co-
operation with civic actors in an attempt to recognise and cure the 'demo-
cratic deficit'. In the remainder of this paper, I will put forth practical proposals
to bring an end to the elitist bias in accession negotiations.
In a multi-level format, I think that a balanced framework among the national

government, parliament and parliamentary commissions of the applicant
country and interest groups would increase the legitimacy of the accession
process at home. Transnational links are also important for this process. Links
between domestic interest groups and their counterparts at the European
level strengthen the former, as I argued above. Domestic interest groups are
already becoming a part of the European system of interest articulation even
before membership actualises. Common lobbies will certainly have more
pressure on both the EU Commission and national governments during the
accession negotiations. This process also increases domestic actors' levels of
information about the accession process. Therefore, the accession process will
be more legitimate67 and it would be more difficult for the national govern-
ments to blame Brussels for unfavourable policy measures at home. Moreover,
such participation will serve to increase the cognitive mobilisation and dif-
fuse support68 towards the European Union in the accession countries. It will
also have a positive psychological effect on the communities in the accession
countries as a Rousseauesque understanding of participation69 suggests. A
multi-level interaction as such appears in the process of European integra-
tion. In this process, actors are organised at multiple levels (subnational,
national and supranational) and they share authority in policy-making in
these levels. As a result, the state would no longer monopolise European level
policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests. At the end of the day,

the crucial factor is the independent role that the different levels play in the
policy process.70
Odile Quitin71 has underlined a possible multilevel dimension of the EU
enlargement. In this context, a close relationship between social partners in
the accession countries and social partners at the European level is consid-
ered to pave the way for transnational links. As such, the EU side can
reinforce the message that the social acquis is not only about legislation but
also about a comprehensive system of social dialogue practices.72 The state's
role according to this perspective may range from that of a watchman ensur-
ing the independence of the partners to an active participant in and promoter
of dialogue.73 Hence, it is plausible to say that in cases where full responsi-
bility lies only with one actor, the accession process becomes unbalanced.
Thereby, it would have been better had the accession been carried out with
some form of synergy among all actors: the EU, EU level interest organisa-
tion, the member country, member county interest organisation, accession
country, accession country interest organisations. Needless to say, this entire
process ought to be transparent and participatory for the purposes of demo-
cratic accountability.
Conclusion
In this paper I have provided an overview of the accession negotiations

between the EU and Hungary, Poland and Romania. I have argued that inter-
3 1 6 * Umut Korkut
est group participation in the EU accession process is weak. Hungary, Poland
and Romania have similar problems; elite driven processes, paper tiger social
dialogue structures, low levels of information provided to their citizenry and
powerless interest groups. There is also convergence in terms of interest group
criticism towards political actors in their respective countries. The groups'
capacity to influence the accession process is quite low in institutional terms.
For example, personal links between interest groups and governments and
the representational domain of groups have dominate over institutional chan-
nels. Therefore, their problems are similar despite the assumed differences
among these countries - especially between Hungary and Poland on the hand
and Romania on the other. This is significant in terms of understanding the
consolidation of democracy and the developments in political culture in East
Central Europe. The corollary is that, policy-making in consolidating demo-

cracies of ECE is inevitably elite-ridden and the EU accession process reflects
a particular picture.
My paper also draws attention to the increasing legitimacy problems embed-

ded in the accession process. Here I demonstrate a link between low levels
of legitimacy and the development of anti-EU, anti-liberal political lobbies.
In order to improve the legitimacy of the accession negotiations, I attempted
to develop an argument that emphasises the need for greater participation.
The late attempt of the EU to introduce participation into the accession nego-
tiations reveals a changing attitude towards legitimacy from the Union side.
My belief is that there is an urgent need to "maintain discussions of accession
and integration in order to recognise and cure the inherent democratic deficit
relating to EU membership.
Central European University

Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: umutkorkut@hotmail.com
Notes
1
An early version of this paper was presented at the 'European Union's Eastern
Enlargement: Surveying the Social and Economic Divides' Conference at the Munk
Centre for International Studies, Toronto, 7-10 February, 2002. Funding for this
research has been generously provided by the Central European University and by
the Norwegian Research Council.
2
For a detailed account on the elitist approach see G. Pridham, 'EU Accession and
Domestic Politics: Policy Consensus and Interactive Dynamics in Central and Eastern
Europe', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 1(1) 2000, pp. 49-75.
3
C. Lord, 'Assessing Democracy in a Contested Polity', Journal of Common Market
Studies, 39 (4, November) 2001, pp. 641-62.
4
European Union (1999) "Social Dialogue for Success: The Role of the Social Partners
in EU Enlargement, Odile Quintin Speech at The Warsaw Conference, 18-19 March,
1999", <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/soc-dial/social/
index en.htm».
5
M. Bessenyey Williams, 'Exporting the Democratic Deficit', Problems of Post-
Communism, 48 (1, January/February) 2001, pp. 27-39.

6
Pridham, 'EU Accession'.
7
See 'European Union, Pádraig Flynn speech at Social Partners' Conference on
Enlargement, Warsaw, 18 March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employ-
ment social/soc-dial/social/index en.htm».
8
The Agreement on Social Policy assigns increased powers and responsibilities to
social partners. In addition, the Treaty opens up a veritable bargaining arena.
European social provisions must now be drawn up within the framework of nego-
tiations between social partners and the EU. See European Union, 'Brunhes
Communique, Welfare and Social Dialogue in Candidate Countries to the European
Union, 16 October 2000, Paris', <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/
areas/group12/conribution socialprotection en.pdf».
9
See European Economic and Social Committee, 'The ESC: A Bridge between Europe
and Civil Society', 2000-2002. <<http://www.esc.eu.int/pages/en / a c s /
SCO/SCO accueil en.htm».
10
See European Union (2001), 'Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on
Organised civil society and European governance: the Committee's contribution to
the drafting of the White Paper, Sub-Committee on Governance, Brussels, 25 April,
2001.' << http: / /europa.eu.int/comm / g o v e r n a n c e / a r e a s / g r o u p 3 / e s c
opinion en.pdf».
11
Williams held a round of elite discussions with the members of the Hungarian
Parliament on the role of the Committee on European Integration in the Hungarian
Parliament. Her results are significantly worrisome for the involvement of this com-
mittee in the accession process in Hungary. The committee is handicapped by a
3 1 8 * Umut Korkut
lack of financial resources, expertise and time. As there is no specific ministry to
follow this committee, it also suffers from its cross-cutting structure of representa-
tion. Bessenyey Williams, 'Exporting'.
12
European Union, 'Romania - 2000 Regular Report, From the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession, 8 November, 2000' <<http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/report_l l_00/pdf/en/ro_en.pdf».
13
European Economic and Social Committee, 'Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee on the employment and social situation in the central and eastern
European applicant states, REX/040, The Employment and social situation in the
CEEC, 25 April, 2001, Brussels'. «http://www.esc.eu.int/pages/Enlarg/docu-
ments/ELA documents en.htm>>.
14
G. Avery, 'The Commission's Perspective on the EFTA Accession Negotiations',
SEI Working Papers, 12 (Sussex European Institute: University of Sussex, 1995);

G. Avery & F. Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union (Sheffield: Aca-
demic Press, 1998).
15
K. Eder, New Politics of Class Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced
Societies (London: SAGE, 1992).
16
E.O. Lauman & D. Knoke, The Organizational State. Social Choice in National Policy
Domains (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
17
See European Union, 'Social Dialogue for Success: The Role of the Social Partners
in EU Enlargement, Odile Quintin Speech at The Warsaw Conference, 18-19 March,
1999', «http://europa.eu.int/romm/employment social/soc-dial/social/index
en.htm».
18
"Pádraig Flynn calls on social partners in the candidate countries to ensure that
they are organised and ready to play their role in the enlargement process", see
«http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/soc-dial /social/index en.htm».
19
European Union, 'Evaluation of enlargement process regarding Chapter 13 -
Employment and Social Policy, December 2001, «http://europa.eu.int/romm/
enlargement/negotiations/chapters /rhapi 3 /index.htm».
20
A. Agh, 'Meso-Politics in Central Europe: Fighting with the Infantile Disease in
Europeanization and Democratization' in A. Agh and G. Ilonszki (eds.), Parliaments
and Organised Interests. The Second Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Center for Democracy
Studies, 1996); A. Agh, The Europeanisation of the ECE Business Interest Associations:
The Models in Western Europe and the European Union' in A. Agh and G. Ilonszki
(eds.), Parliaments and Organised Interests. The Second Steps (Budapest: Hungarian
Center for Democracy Studies, 1996).
T h e European Union and t h e Accession Process in Hungary, Poland and Romania • 319
21
L. Vass, and T. Cox, 'Civil Society and Interest Representation in Hungarian Political
System', in T. Cox and A. Furlongs (eds.), Hungary: The Politics of Transition (London:
Frank Cass, 1995).
22
P. C. Schmitter, 'The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social
Groups', American Behavioral Scientist, 35 (4/5, March-June) 1992, pp. 422-441.
23
European Union, 'Social Dialogue for Success: The Role of the Social Partners in
EU Enlargement, Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead Speech at The Warsaw Conference,
18-19 March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/soc-
dial/sorial/index e n . h t m » .
24
Interviews with Tamás Érika, Transportation Workers' Union (VDSZSZ), Hungary;
Roman Wierzbicki, Solidarity Framers Trade Union (NSZZ RI), Poland; Kazimierz
Jakubiak Krajowa Rada Izb Rolniczych (National Council of Agricultural Chambers)
(KRIR), Poland; Vazile Lăzăr, ADER, Romania.

25
Interviews with Mircea Ionescu, AOAR, Romania; Vasile Berinde, Patronatul,
Romania; Sabina Hariga, Nutricomb, Romania.
26
Interviews with Stefan Mladen, BÂNESÂ Airport Transportation Trade Union,
Romania; Dorel Racolta, Umetal, Romania; Vasile Lazăr, ADER, Romania.
27
Interview with Ion Albu, Meridian, Romania.
28
Interviews with Nicusor Mihai Ciobanu, Sprenza-BNS; Gheorghe Isvoranu, Spiru
Haret Romania.
29
Gecov Krisztina, Munkástanácsok, Hungary; Antalffy Gábor, KISOSZ, Hungary;
Panykó Antal (Secretary of Social Dialogue in Hungarian Ministry of Economic
Affairs - Employers' Side).
30
Trenka Istvan from KDSzSz mentions SZEF, LIGA, Munkastanacsok trade union
confederations in this category. I did not come across any confirmation of his argu-
ment during my interviews with those organisations, mentioned by him.
31
Filipsz Laszlo, MOSz, Hungary.
32
By the time of the interviews, the Party of Independent Small Holders "FKGP"
was already falling out of the coalition over a case of corruption.
33
Márkus Imre, VasutásSzovetsége, Hungary.
34
Márkus Imre, VasutásSzövetsége, Hungary; Filipsz László, MOSz, Hungary.
35
Sarkozi Istvan, Femipari és Vas Szövetsége, Hungary.
36
L. Lengyel, A rendszerváltó elit tündöklése és bukása (The glory and failure of the elite
conducting the regime change), (Budapest: Helikon, 1996) cited from Z. Berényi,
'Constitutional Democracy and Civil Society in Post-communist Hungary', Ph.D.
Thesis, Queen's University, Belfast, 1999, p. 119.
320 • Umut Korkut

37
L. Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union. Transition in Blue, (Westport:
Praeger, 2000); A. Ágh, 'Understanding Politics in Hungary', in O. Noergaard and
K. Johannsen (eds.), Understanding Politics Series (The Department of Political Science,
University of Arhus: DEMSTAR, 2001).
38
Interview with Zwilzek Zawodowy Górniów w Polsce, (OPZZ - Miners' Trade
Union), Poland.
39
A. Ágh, 'The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the
Transition Process' in T. Cox and A. Furlong (eds.), Hungary: The Politics of Transition,
(London: Frank Cass, 1995); A. Ágh, 'Understanding'.
40
L. Brúszt, 'Az Antall Kormány es a Gazdasági Erdekképviseletek', in C. Gombar
et al. (eds.), Kormany a merlégen 1990-1994 (Government in Balance: 1990-1994), 1994,
pp. 208-231; P. Evans, 'The State as a Problem and Solution: Embedded Autonomy
and Structural Change' in S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of

Economic Adjustment. International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
41
V. Gomez and W. Kosc, 'Two Cities, One Election', Transitions Online, 27 September,
2001.
42
PNB-Weekend Supplement, 25 May, 2000.
43
Bratkowsky, 2000 cited from an interview by Prawo I Gospodarka, PNB - Economic
Review, 5 September, 2000.
44
Business News from Poland, 24 April, 2000; PNB - Economic Review, 8 September,
2000.
45
Club of Intellectual Catholics (KIK) from Bielsko-Biala; Polish Family Union; The
True Pole Association; Christius Civitas are groups worth of mentioning from this
anti-EU lobby.
46
Agence France-Presse, July 11, 2001.
47
BBC Monitoring, September 26, 2000.
48
T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research'
in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 3-44.
49
Interviews with Tamás, Érika, VDSZSZ Transportation Workers' Trade Union,
Hungary; Dorel Racolţa, UMETAL, Romania; Gheorghe Isvoranu, Spiru Haret -
Teachers' Trade Union, Romania (in terms of financial aid).
50
Farmers' Solidarity, Self-Defence (Samoobrona), the Union of Farmers, Circles and
Farming Organisation agreed on the need for pressing the EU for direct subsidies
in the future (Polish Press Agency, May 11, 2000). Along with that, there have been
efforts on the part of the Polish farmers to advocate their interests at the European
levels. See 'L'Agriculture Polonaise - L'Heure des Choix Difficiles', Congres de
L'Agriculture Européenne, Cracow, 25-27 September, 2000, p. 1.
51
Interview with Vasutás - Railroad Workers' Trade Union, Hungary.
52
Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism equally places states at a crucial juncture
where they became active in a two-step model of preference formation between
the domestic constituencies and Brussels. As a result, European integration actu-
ally strengthens national executives vis-à-vis their domestic constituencies. For a
detailed discussion, see A. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market
Studies, 314, December 1993, pp. 473-524; A. Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe. Social
Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1998).

53
Interviews with Filipsz László, MOSZ, Hungary; Wojciech Kaczmarek, OPZZ,
Poland; Wladyslaw Mucha, OPZZ - Miners' Trade Union, Poland; Czesław
Bonisławski, The National Union of Farmers, Farmer Circles and Organisations,
Poland; Stefen Mladen, BÂNESÂ Airport Transportation Trade Union, Romania.
54
Interview with the Secretary of the Employers' side in the Secretary of Social
Dialogue within the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Hungary.
55
Warsaw Business Journal, April 23, 2001.
56
'Position of the National Chamber of Commerce and the Polish Confederation of
Private Employers on Further Negotiations on Poland's Accession into the European
Union', April 3, 2001, Warsaw.
57
European Union, 'Hungary 2000 - Regular Report From the Commission on
Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, 8 November, 2000', «http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/report 11 00/pdf/en/hu en.pdf». European Union, '2001 -
Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, Commission of
the European Communities, November 13, 2001 SEC (2001) 1748, Brussels'
« http: //europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ report2001 /hu_en.pdf».
58
European Economic and Social Committee, '8th meeting of the EU-Hungary Joint
Consultative Committee held in Budapest - Joint Declaration, REX/057 JCC EU-
Hungary, 6 July, 2001, Brussels', «http://www.esc.eu.int/pages/en/enlarg.htm».
59
Reuters, 16 February, 2001.
60
An expert in Poland's Committee for European Integration, cited from an inter-
view in Gazeta Wyborcza 14 April, 2000, PNB - Economic Review, April 18, 2000.
61
European Union, 'Marian Krzaklewski Speech at "Social Dialogue for Success: The
322 • Umut Korkut

Role of the Social Partners in EU Enlargement", The Warsaw Conference, 18-19
March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/romm/emp1oyment social/soc-dial/
social/index en.htm».
62
European Union, 'Poland - 2000 Regular Report, From the Commission on Poland's
Progress Towards Accession, 8 November, 2000' <<http://europa.eu.int/cornm/
enlargement/report 11 00/pdf/en/pl en.pdf». European Union, '2001 - Regular
Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European
Communities, November 13, 2001 SEC (2001) 1752, Brussels', « h t t p : / /europa .eu.int /
comm/enlargement/report2001 /pl en.pdf».
63
European Economic and Social Committee, '2nd meeting of the EU-Poland Joint
Consultative Committee - Joint Declaration, REX/036, 22nd November, 2000,
Brussels', « http://www.esc.eu.int/pages/en/enlarg.htm».
64
European Union, '2001 - Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession,
Commission of the European Communities, November 13, 2001 SEC (2001) 1753,
Brussels', «http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ report2001 /ro_en.pdf».Euro
pean Union, 'Romania - 2000 Regular Report, From the Commission on Romania's
Progress Towards Accession, 8 November, 2000, « http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/ report_ll_00/pdf /en/ro_en.pdf».
65
G. Pridham, 'EU-Accession'.
66
In Poland, the SLD and PSL coalition government brought together two bodies
responsible for the EU integration in 1996: the Office of the Committee for European
Integration (UKIE) and National Council for European Integration (KIE) (Gazeta
Wyborcza February 19-20, 2000, cited in March 2, 2000, PNB - Weekly Supplement).
For respective bodies in Hungary and Romania, please refer to the previous sec-
tions of my paper.
67
Legitimacy of policies is strongly connected to the following: the way preferences
are reflected in the final goals (policy satisfaction), a positive or negative image of
institutions, strength of institutional, personal and ideological loyalties (institutional
loyalty), and to the length of time the individual expects to stay within the institu-
tions. See G. Marks, L. Hooghe, and K. Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s:
State-Centric vs. Multi-level Governance', Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, (3,
September), 1996, pp. 278-99.
68
D. Easton, 'A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support', British Journal of
Political Science, 5, 1975, pp. 435-457.
69
Rousseau's understanding of participation has a psychological effect on the par-
ticipants, ensuring that there is a continuing interrelationship between the work-
ing of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals inter-
acting within them. For a further discussion see C. Pateman, Participation and
Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
70
Marks et al., 'European'.
71
Acting Deputy Director General of Employment and Social Affairs DG, European
Commission.
72
EU Enlargement, Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead Speech at The Warsaw Conference,
18-19 March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/cornm/employment social/soc-
dial/social/index en.htm».
73
EU Enlargement, Longin Komolowski Speech at The Warsaw Conference, 18-19
March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/comm /employment social /soc-dial/

social/index en.htm».
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This paper attempts to shed some light on the nature of the

Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3:2

At a specific glance, it appears that the governments in Hungary, Poland and

being effective and hence the dialogue is insubstantial.4 Another problem is

298 • Umut Korkut

mote participation in the accession countries. Given the ongoing enlargement

tions to allow substantive negotiations to start. The Commission's role towards

300 • Umut Korkut

sual arrangements would become a crucial means of participation. A 'social

Social Dialogue Related Problems in Hungary, Poland and Romania

302 • Umut Korkut

Very Somewhat Effective Somewhat Very

When I asked for evaluations of institutionalised channels, personal links and

Institutionalised Personal links Being a part of

Key: 1 = very influential while 4 = no influence

304 • Umut Korkut

In Hungary, formally institutional structures are in place, but they do not

work in practice.29 The Government, reportedly, has its favourites30 among

The Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party "FIDESZ-MPP" and

306 • Umut Korkut

Very Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Very

interest interest party party party

appeal more towards extremist solutions.

308 • Umut Korkut

street protests in succinct wording, "Governments generally take action after

However, international links and especially the EU accession process some-

I think this emphasis on international links and on the EU accession process

In lines of liberal intergovernmentalism,52 developed by Moravcsik, the acces-

310 • Umut Korkut

Moreover, they expect the Polish government to provide a reliable presenta-

According to the Commission Report in 2000, Hungary has experienced "non-

Poland, on the other hand, experiences problems in terms of EU related leg-

be carried out through a new concept of "horizontal laws". These laws

The previous AWS government has initiated a joint consultative committee

The EU Commission report on Romania drew attention to problems over the

In terms of social dialogue, despite existing legal provisions, much legisla-

314 • Umut Korkut

On the basis of my interviews and the EU Commission reports, it appears

In a multi-level format, I think that a balanced framework among the national

policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests. At the end of the day,

In this paper I have provided an overview of the accession negotiations

Central Europe. The corollary is that, policy-making in consolidating demo-

My paper also draws attention to the increasing legitimacy problems embed-

Central European University

Communism, 48 (1, January/February) 2001, pp. 27-39.

SEI Working Papers, 12 (Sussex European Institute: University of Sussex, 1995);

(KRIR), Poland; Vazile Lăzăr, ADER, Romania.

320 • Umut Korkut

and Structural Change' in S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of

University Press, 1998).

322 • Umut Korkut

March, 1999', <<http://europa.eu.int/comm /employment social /soc-dial/

324 • Umut Korkut

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