Rule 78

1. Ventura v Ventura 160 S 810 - STA. ANA

Doctrine:
The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred."

Facts:
● Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and
Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse. (appellants)
● Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano but their paternity was denied by the deceased in his will. (appellees)
● Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees. In the said
will (the court later on held that they were preterited).
○ In said will, Maria, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be
the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.
● When Maria filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, the appellees opposed,
assailing the the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses
which allegedly are not administration expenses.
● A joint motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura was filed based on the ff grounds:
(1) that she is grossly incompetent;
(2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the
inventory;
(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the
appellees;
(4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts
(5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as
an executrix
● The lower court ruled against Maria. She was found to have squandered the funds of the estate, was
inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting
up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate.

Issue:
W/N the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified? - Moot & academic since preterition →
intestacy.

Held:
● Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria
Ventura as executrix moot and academic.
 ● This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
○ Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
● In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next
of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been
defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property.
● Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura.
● Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in
order to represent both interests.

Rule 79

2. De Guzman v Angeles 162 S 347 - TOLENTINO

Doctrine:
The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in order that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.

Facts:
● Private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of (her
husband) Manolito de Guzman before the RTC Makati.
● The petition alleges that: [You can skip this part if you like. This only pertains to the jurisdictional
allegations]
(1) on March 22, 1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila;
(2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila;
(3) decedent left personal and real properties as part of his estate, listed in Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, & “D”
(4) the properties were acquired after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in their
conjugal partnership;
(5) the estate of the decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less;
(6) the possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable and existing claims against the firm C. Santos
Construction are listed in Annex “E”
(6) the compulsory heirs of the decedent are Elaine De Guzman as the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children
namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman, 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old;
(7) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found
and according to the best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate; and
(8) the Elaine De Guzman as the surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of
administration.
● Elaine De Guzman filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles registered under the name of
Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzmans but which are at present in the
possession of Elaine’s father-in-law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
 ● The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, Elaine must have the possession of said vehicles in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband.
● On the same day, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987
directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of Elaine.
● While Pedro and his counsel kept postponing and resetting the hearing for the motion, Elaine filed her
“Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman.”
● In an order dated May 28, 1987, the aforesaid motion (Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman) was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same
order, the lower court directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order
was given to Pedro.
● RTC granted the Elaine’s motion to be appointed as special administratrix.
● Trouble ensued when Elaine et.al tried to enforce the above order. Pedro resisted when the deputy
sheriffs tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal properties.
● According to Pedro, this resulted in a “near shoot-out” between members of the Makati Police, who were
to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding the sheriffs and Elaine,
and that “the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile situation which
resulted in an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be temporarily
placed in the custody of Mayor Binay.
● Pedro contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the RTC not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de
Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules
of Court.
● Pedro also stresses that the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion
for having been made without giving him and other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
● Anent the June 8, 1987 order, Pedro alleges that the immediate grant of the motion praying for the
court’s assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, without notice to the him, and its
immediate implementation on the very same day by Elaine with the assistance of deputy sheriffs, at no
other place but at the home of the Pedro, are eloquent proofs that all the antecedent events were
intended solely to deprive Pedro of his property without due process of law.

Issue:
W/N a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession [of alleged properties of a
decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said
deceased person] even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court? - NO.

Held:
● In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings
upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the
petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts.
● But the distinction between the (1) jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for the
administration of an estate and its (2) jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement
of the estate of the deceased person.
● The court may also have jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased person but the determination of the
properties comprising that estate must follow established rules. Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
 Court to set time for hearing - Notice thereof. - When a petition for letters of administration is
filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in
sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.”
● It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons
within the court’s jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
● Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the
proceeding in order that no person may be deprived of his right to property without due process of law.
● Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment.
● In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused
to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions Elaine to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in her favor, and
to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
● The Judge’s explanation for his haste in appointing Elaine was the threatening dissipation of the assets. If
emergency situations such as that mentioned justify a court’s immediate taking some kind of temporary
action even without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The need for the
proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of
this case. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment
of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from
the records
● Pedro as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as Elaine who
happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as
mandated by the Rules of Court.

Rule 80

3. De Guzman v Guadiz 96 S 938 - VILLADOLID

ER:
The alleged sole universal heir of a will filed a petition for letters testamentary, he also being appointed as the
executor in the will. Persons were claiming that they owned the properties through a donation made by the
decedent during his lifetime, and at the same time are in possession of the properties, opposed. Petitioner filed for
determination of the validity of the donation, at the same time filed for petition to be appointed as the special
administrator which the lower court denied since the oppositors were already administering the property. SC held
that there are sufficient grounds for appointing a special administrator, as there was delay in the probate of the
will and the appointment of the executor. Should distinguish between neutral possession and partisan possession

Facts:
● Feliciano de Guzman filed petition for probate of a will alleged to have been executed by Catalina Bajacan.
 ● The will instituted Feliciano as Catalina's sole and universal heir
● The will also named Feliciano as the executor
● Respondents filed MTD/Opposition: All properties of Catalina were now owned by them by virtue of a
Donation inter vivos executed by Arcadia and Catalina Bajacan in their favor
● Decision on motion to dismiss deferred until presentation of evidence
● Feliciano filed a motion to be appointed as the special administrator (delay in the probate of the will and
appointment of executor if MTD unresolved)
● That the property of the decedent consists of rice land which would yield P50k worth of rice twice a year
so somebody must represent the estate pending the probate of the will
● RTC: denied the motion for appointment of a special administrator – the properties are in the custody of
the oppositors who claim they own the property so no need to appoint special administrator to take care
of the properties where there is a considerable delay

Issue:
W/N a special administrator should have been issued to administer the properties allegedly of the estate when the
oppositors who claim ownership over the property are in possession of the same? - YES.

Held:
Rule 80 Sec. 1
under R80.1, the probate court may appoint a special administrator when:
There is delay in granting letters testamentary/administration (Irrelevant whatever caused the delay.)

For period: until the cause of delay is decided and executors or administrators are appointed, the appointment of
a special administrator lies in the DISCRETION OF THE COURT - which must be sound: not whimsical, not contrary
to reason, justice, equity or legal principle

What types of delays usually considered/sufficient grounds for granting special administration:
(1) Where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court
(2) Where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor/administrator
(3) Where the parties cannot agree among themselves
(4) When general administration cannot be immediately granted

Reasons why appoint a special administrator:

"The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment
usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor in being
capable of acting, however."
"Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs."

Here, what are the causes of delay:

The oppositors claimed that they own the properties of the estate through a donation allegedly made by the
decedent. The petitioner thus filed a civil case for the annulment of the deed of donation pending the hearing of
the probate of the will. The same judge was the judge in the civil case, and ruled that petitioner had no personality
to sue, the will from which he claims interest in the property not yet being probated.
The hearings for the probate of the will has been postponed several times and upon filing of this petition, the judge
postponed the hearing of the probate of the will pending the outcome of this case

ON THE POSSESSION OF THE OPPOSITORS OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION: should have differentiated between
partisan possession vs. neutral possession
● when appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties
suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, an officer of the court.

4. De Guzman v Angeles, supra - TOLENTINO

Doctrine:
(1) Notice through publication of the petition is a jurisdictional requirement even in the appointment of a
special administrator.
(2) The object for the appointment of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into
the hands of a person fully authorized to preserve it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.

Facts: [Please refer to the same facts of this case under Rule 79]

Issue: [Same issue under Rule 79]

Held:
● The Supreme Court held the notice through publication of the petition is a jurisdictional requirement
even in the appointment of a special administrator. A special administrator has been defined as the
representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is appointed. Pedro, as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in
the preservation of the estate as Elaine, who happens to be the widow of the deceased. Hence, the
necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court.
● The court, however, observed that it is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have
ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties
were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular
administrator is apparent from the records. Hence, it held that the "need for the proper notice even for
the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case." Notably, the
court did not squarely address the issue of whether or not, if there was an emergency, such as dissipation
of the estate, a special administrator may be appointed immediately without notice. The object for the
appointment of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a
person fully authorized to preserve it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.

5. Munsayac v Loreto (*Case title is actually MANUNGAS v LORETO) 655 S 734 -

YAP

Doctrine:
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed discretion, which must be
sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice, or equity.
Facts:
● Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children but adopted Samuel Avila.
Florentino died intestate. Avila died thereafter and was survived by his wife Sarah.
● Engracia then filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino, of
which she was the administrator. She stated that Florentino’s legal and compulsory heirs were her, Avila,
and Ramon Manungas—an acknowledged son of Florentino. A Decree of Final Distribution of Florentino’s
estate was issued distributing properties to Engracia and Ramon.
● Engracia was found to be incompetent. Hence, RTC appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia, as Judicial
Guardian of her properties and person.
● Diosdado Manungas filed a petition for issuance of letters administration over the Estate of Engracia in his
favor. He alleged that being an illegitimate son of Florentino, he is an heir of Engracia.
● The petition was opposed by Margarita Loreto and Parreño, alleging:
(1) Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas
(2) He was not a Manungas
(3) He was not an heir of Engracia
(4) He was not a creditor of Engracia or her estate
(5) He was in fact a debtor of the estate—having been found liable to Engracia for P177k
● RTC: Appointed Parreño as the administrator of Estate of Engracia.
● Diosdado filed an MR with TRO. Diosdado argued:
(1) Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Engracia was by virtue of her
being judicial guardian of the latter, but which relation ceased upon Engracia’s death, concluding
that her appointment as special administrator was without basis.
(2) Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator having already been fined by the court for
failing to render timely accounting of Engracia’s property as her judicial guardian.
(3) Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative of Engracia, while he is the illegitimate son of
Florentino.
● RTC: Reversed itself. Ordered revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the
Estate of Engracia, while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator. Parreño and Loreto appealed
to the CA.
● CA: GADALEJ in RTC’s ruling in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño. CA appointed Diosdado
instead and reinstated Parreño as the special administrator.

Issue:
W/N CA erred in annulling the appointment of Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the
appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator? - NO.

Held:
● The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino
Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Engracia. Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within
the discretion of the court.
○ Heirs of Castillo v Lacuata-Gabriel: “As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in
the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.”
 ● While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice, and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate
until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec 2, Rule 80:
“Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.”
● Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would be prudent and reasonable to appoint
someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such would ensure
that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share.
While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, there is no logical reason to
appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. Such would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
● Evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
preserving the latter’s estate. Whereas, Parreño, as former judicial guardian and niece of Engracia is
interested in protecting and preserving her estate as she would reap the benefit of wise administration.
Hence, the Order revoking the appointment of Parreño as special admin constitutes reversal error and
GADALEJ. The lower court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary, or capricious manner as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino, is still not an heir of Engracia and is
not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Engracia.

Fallo: AFFIRMED.

6. Ocampo v Ocampo 623 S 559 - ACABADO

Doctrine:
The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules covering regular administrators,
hence no priority is given to nearest of kin. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based
on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at its discretion. There is no need to apply the order of
preference or pass upon the issue of fitness or unfitness.

Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no
longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.

Facts:
● Petitioners Ocampo et al are the surviving wife and children of Leonardo Ocampo. Leonardo and his
siblings, the respondents, are the legitimate children and heirs of the sps. Ocampo, who left several
properties before dying intestate.
● 5 months after Leonardo died, his heirs initiated a petition for intestate proceedings with the RTC-Bian,
Laguna, alleging that after the death of the sps. Ocampo, Leonardo and his siblings jointly administered
their estate. Leonardo had been receiving his 1/3 share of the estate’s income.
 ● When Leonardo died, his siblings took possession and control of the properties, excluding the petitioners.
Hence the petition for settlement of the estate of the sps. Ocampo, the estate of Leonardo, and the
appointment of an administrator to divide and award the two estates among the heirs.
● Respondents, Leonardo’s siblings, opposed on the ground that the petition sought judicial settlement of
two estates in a single proceeding, and the settlement of Leonardo’s estate was premature, being
dependent upon the settlement of the estate of the sps. Ocampo. They filed a counter-petition seeking to
be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of the spouses.
● RTC - denied the opposition but admitted the counter-petition. It clarified that the settlement was only for
the estate of the spouses. However it appointed Leonardo’s wife, petitioner Dalisay, and respondent
Renato as special joint administrators.
● Respondents sought reconsideration - Dalisay was unfit since she failed to care for her husband, she
abandoned her appointment when she nominated Bian Rural Bank to act as special administrator, and
they had priority to be appointed administrators, being the next of kin of the sps. Ocampo, while Dalisay
was just a mere daugher-in-law.
● RTC revoked Dalisay’s appointment, replaced her respondent Erlinda. But later revoked the appointment
of both respondents on the ground of their failure to post the required bond and their failure to perform
their duties and responsibilities such as the submission of an inventory of properties and income
statement of the estate. It then appointed petitioner Melinda (Leonardo’s daughter) as regular
administratrix.
● CA reversed. RTC revoked respondents’ appointments without ruling on their motion for exemption from
bond, and appointed Melinda without hearing to determine her competency. Posting of the bond is a
prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as special joint
administrators, hence their failure to do so when the motion for exemption remained unacted upon.

Issue:
W/N the revocation of respondents’ appointments as joint special administrators was proper? - YES.

Held:
● Under Sec. 1 of Rule 80, the RTC deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators, pending
determination of whom letters of administration should be issued to. It considered that disagreement
would cause undue delay, hence special administration was needed.
● A special administrator is an officer of the court, subject to its supervision and control, expected to
work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement. He or she is not an agent or representative of the parties. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
● The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules covering regular
administrators, hence no priority is given to nearest of kin. The probate court may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at its discretion.
There is no need to apply the order of preference or pass upon the issue of fitness or unfitness.
● CA found that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking the appointment of respondents as special
administrators, when as early as their Motion for Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, they had
already prayed for their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as such. The RTC effectively
denied this prayer when it appointed respondent Renato and petitioner Dalisay as special administrators
and ordered them to post bond. It was likewise reiterated when the RTC substituted Dalisay with
 respondent Erlinda. The revocation of their appointment for failure to post bond was another denial of
their plea for exemption.
● The RTC revoked the respondents’ designation as joint special administrators for the following reasons:
○ Respondents had admittedly already been distributing the income from the properties of the
spouses’ estate, yet they failed to post their respective bonds despite collection of advances from
their supposed shares
○ They were insincere in their administration, as they executed a Deed of Conditional Sale for a
certain property, and excluded the representing heirs of Leonardo therefrom.
○ Another Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property was discovered, with the same
vendees, for a much lower price than that in the Deed of Conditional Sale.
● No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as
joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle.
Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the
appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving
no valid effect thereto.

(Purpose of the bond)

● Under Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator
namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account
within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an
inventory within three (3) months.
● Under Section 4 of the same, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of
the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2)
truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the
person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to
receive them.
● The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and heirs, as it compels the administrator,
regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in him and to discharge his duties. Its object and
purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent.

(On Melinda’s appointment as regular administratrix)

● Despite the lack of hearing, Melinda’s appointment was not specifically challenged by the respondents.
● With the objective in mind of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the spouses and putting an end to
the squabbles of the heirs, the Court takes into account the fact that Melinda had already posted the
required bond, received Letters of Administration, and filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate.
● These acts clearly manifest her intention to serve as administratrix, but her appointment should be
converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration.

7. Corona v CA 116 S 316 - BANGUIS

Doctrine:
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to
protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected
to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.
Facts:
● On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a
holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as
one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral
conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law".
○ She bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L.
Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and
appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
● On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
● On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte as
Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.
● On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and
prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that
they were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time
when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's
husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime.
○ Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special
Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected,
besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.
● Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also filed by respondent (1)
Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the
decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3) Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo
Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate children of the deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres,
full blood sister of the decedent.
● On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath of office before a Notary
Public.
● Probate Court = Set Aside Order of appointing Nenita and appointed surviving husband as special
administrator with a bond of 200K. Husband was the first in preference and that he had interest in the
estate. Disinheritance not among the grounds for disqualification for appointment as administrator. Next
of kin appointed only when husband is incompetent and that Nenita was just a niece. MR = Denied.
● CA = Dismissed the petition. Probate Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the
Rules. MR = Denied.

Issue:
W/N the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly
disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify him
from the trust? - In this case, Nenita was also appointed by Court as co-administrator for the best interest and
earliest settlement of the estate. Executor may be represented which in this case was Nenita.

Held:
● The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which they respectively filed,
essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the
appointment of the surviving husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and unavailing
 as the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court and is unappealable; that co-
administratorship is impractical and unsound and as between the surviving husband, who was responsible
for the accumulation of the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest
in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct choice; and that the legality
of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect the appointment of a Special Administrator.
● This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the allegations, arguments
and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte,
should be appointed as co-Special Administrator.
○ The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the
wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the
highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and
lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of
the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management
of the decedent's estate.
● En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective
interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate
Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and
its earliest settlement.

SC = Modify judgment of CFI Rizal. Ordered to appoint Nenita as co-Special Administrator, properly bonded, who
shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.

8. Liwanag v Reyes 12 S 43 - BRIES

Doctrine:
The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the
estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in
cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if we are now to deny the present
action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very
purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.

Facts:
● The late Pio D. Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage on a
parcel of residential land with the building and improvements thereon, at M. H. del Pilar Street, Manila, to
secure the payment of a loan in the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P180,000.00) It
was stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amount of mortgage debt be fully paid a year
thereafter. Before the one year period expired, the mortgagor Pio D. Liwanag died intestate.
● As the total mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully paid within the stipulated period, the
mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., instituted in the CFI, a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of
Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate. The action also prayed for the
appointment of a receiver.
● The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that
she may not be sued as special administratrix.
● The said defendant also filed opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of receivership, stating
that the property subject of the foreclosure proceeding is in custodia legis, since administration
proceedings had already been instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
 ● In two separate orders, the writ of receivership was issued, despite opposition, and action on the motion
to dismiss was deferred "until after the trial of this case on the merits because there is a possibility that
the estate of the deceased may be in a position to pay the amounts claimed by the plaintiff, in which case
the latter may choose to file its claim against the decedent in the office of the Clerk of Court, and waive
the mortgage."

Issue/s:
(1) W/N filing an action for foreclosure against the special administratrix is allowed? - YES.
(2) W/N the appointment of the receiver was proper? - YES.

Held:
● Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies:
(1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding and share in
the general distribution of the assets of the estate;
(2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged
property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and
(3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of
limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not be admitted as creditor of
the estate, and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.
● The herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the
administratrix of the property.
● On the question as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix. The Rules of
Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in
cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if we are now to deny the
present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be
delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.1awphèt
● As to whether there was abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in the issuance of its order for
the appointment of a receiver. This should be answered in the negative. It is to be noted that the contract
of mortgage between the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing, Inc., provides:
... In case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment of the
president of the mortgagee corporation or any of its officers as receiver, without any bond, to
take charge of the mortgaged property at once, and to hold possession of the same, and the rents
and profits derived from the mortgaged property, before the sale, less the costs and expenses of
the receivership, the expenses of collection and attorney's fees, which shall be fifteen per cent
(15%) of the total indebtedness then unpaid, exclusive of all costs and fees allowed by law, shall
be applied first to the payment of the interest and then to the capital of the indebtedness
secured hereby.
● It was therefore, the will of the deceased himself that, in case of foreclosure, the property be put into the
hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected by the administratrix of the estate. The cases
cited by petitioner in favor of the theory that property in custodia legis can not be given to a receiver is
not applicable, considering that this is an action to enforce a superior lien on certain property of the
estate and the appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient and feasible means of preserving
and administering the property, has been agreed upon by the contracting parties. Wide latitude of
 discretion is usually given to the trial courts in the matter of receivership and unless that discretion is
exercised arbitrarily.

9. Zayco v Hinlo Jr 551 S 613 - CARO

● Case didn’t mention anything about special or regular administrators

Doctrine:
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal
should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,
the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Facts:
● Enrique Hinlo died intestate thus his heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate in RTC
Negros Occidental.
● Ceferina Hinlo, the widow, was initially appointed as special administratrix.
● Subsequently, petitioners Nancy Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of
their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as special
administratrix.
● Respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., Enrique’s grandson and heir (by virtue of representation), filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of
petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique’s estate → RTC ruled in his favor, ordering the revocation of
the appointment of Zayco and Hinlo as co-administrators and directed the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of Atty. Hinlo Jr.
● Zayco received a copy of the said order on 2 August 2002.
● They filed MR on 9 August 2002 → denied on 23 July 2003
● Zayco received order of denial on 31 July 2003 → they filed a notice of appeal on the same day
● They also submitted a record on appeal on 29 August 2003 → RTC denied both appeals on 5 January 2004,
ruling that Zayco resorted to a wrong remedy because the subject order was interlocutory thus not
subject to appeal.
● Even assuming that appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late.
● The 30-day reglementary period to file an appeal in special proceedings started to run on 2 August 2002.
It stopped to run when they filed their MR. But it started to run again 31 July 2003 until they filed their
Record on Appeal on 29 August 2003. Thus, from 2 to 9 August 2002 petitioners already consumed a
period of 7 days. And from 31 July to 29 August 2003, a period of 29 days. Or a total of 36 days.
● CA affirmed.

Issue:
What is the proper remedy? Was it resorted to in time? - Record on appeal is the proper remedy, and it was filed
in time.

Held:
● An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights
of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s
estate. It is a final order hence, appealable. [see doctrine]
 ● From the time petitioners received the 23 July 2003 (denying their MR o) on 31 July 2003, they had 30
days or until 30 August 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August 29,
2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.

10. Tan v Gederio Jr. 548 S 528 - CELESTE

Doctrine:
The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator provision does not apply to the selection of
a special administrator.

Facts:
● Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died, leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of
Gerardo, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
● Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
● Respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special
administrator to take possession and charge of GerardoÊs estate until the Petition can be resolved by the
RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
● Petitioners opposed, arguing that non of the respondents can be appointed as the special administrator
since they are not residing in the country. They contend further that Romualdo does not have the same
familiarity, experience, or competence as that of their co-petitioner, Vilma Tan (Vilma) who was alreadu
acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
● Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity
as de facto administratrix:
(a) To deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the
banks which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within 5 days
(b) To deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any,
done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate
(c) Submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or
deposited in banks, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration and other
relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission
will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court.
● More than a year later, the RTC, acting on the respondents’ Ex parte Motion to resolve mending incident,
gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive. Again, no compliance has been made.
● Consequently, the RTC appointed Romulado as special administrator of the estate. MR denied. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
● Petitioners contend that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are
allegedly the legitimate heirs of Gerardo, as opposed to the respondents, who are purportedly Gerardo’s
illegitimate children. They rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is
more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.
● Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than respondents or their attorney-in-fact to
administer the estate. Petitioners Vilma and Jake Tan claim to have lived for a long time and continue to
reside in Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in the Philippines, having long established
residence abroad. They also claim that Vilma has been acting as administratrix of the estate since
Gerardo’s death and is thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate, which
essentially consists of agricultural landholdings.
Issue:
W/N the court a quo both erred in denying petitioners’ plea to be given primacy in the administration of their
father’s estate? - NO.

Held:
● This Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 78, does not apply in the selection of a special administrator.
● The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the
latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
● Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion.
● We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s
estate, but decided against her appointment for the reason that she continuously failed to comply with
the directive of the court appointed commissioner (Nuevo).
● The court is called upon to preserve the estate for the benefit of Gerardo’s heirs be that heir is the
nearest of kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of Vilma does not satisfy the requirement of a special
administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of Gerardo for the best interest of
all the heirs.
● Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner
Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of
Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the
lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
● We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special
administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer
Gerardo’s estate.
● If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.
The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters,
testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent
leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.
● In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of
the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed
special administratrix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of
the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.

Rule 82
11. Mendiola v CA 190 S 421 - CORONEL

Doctrine:
If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may
permit him to resign.

Facts:
● The petitioner(son), Reynaldo Mendiola, and private respondents are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos
Mendiola. A petition for probate of a will was filed by the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila entitled 'Probate of the Will and Testament of Deceased Carlos Mendiola.
● The Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision allowing the will and issuing letters testamentary in favor
of the petitioner, who was declared executor of the estate of the deceased in the will. Petitioner took
his oath and letters of testamentary was issued in his favor. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a
motion for the removal of the executor and another motion for the appointment of Redentor Mendiola
as executor.
● The Trial Court granted the motion and ordered the removal of the petitioner as executor and revoked
the letters testamentary. Subsequently, the trial court also ordered the appointment of Redentor
Mendiola as executor. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was opposed by the
private respondents, Trial court denied said motion for reconsideration. On Appeal the CA affirmed, hence
this petition. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in not annulling the probate court's
order removing him as executor for: (a) no evidence had been adduced by the respondents in support of
their motion for his removal (b) that he was not given his day in court.

Issue:
W/N petitioner Mendiola was rightly removed as executor of the estate? - YES, the removal was in accordance
with the provisions of Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
● If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him,
or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in
error. The removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court
appointing him.
● In this case, Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, that
petitioner failed to pay the estate tax. Petitioner's own counsel, Atty. Gregorio Ejercito, admitted in a
Manifestation that his client indeed has no proof or receipt of payment of the estate tax. Petitioner also
failed to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law. Furthermore, he
involved the heirs in a transaction with Villarica Pawnshop which, because of petitioner's failure to honor
his part of the bargain, resulted in the filing of a suit by Villarica against the heirs. CA Affirmed
12. Gabriel v CA 212 S 413 - DOLAR

Doctrine:
The order of preference set in Sec. 6, Rule 78, despite its mandatory tone, may be disregarded for valid cause.

Facts:
● Domingo Gabriel on August 1987.
● 9 month after Domingo’s death, private respondent Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for letters of administration for Domingo’s estate, alleging that he was: a the son of the decedent,
a college graduate, engaged in business, and is capable of administering the estate.
● It was only later stated in the ruling but apparently Roberto was Domingo’s illegitimate son.
● The probate court set the hearing of the petition and directed all persons interested to show cause why
the petition should not be granted. It also ordered for the publication of said order. Thereafter Roberto
was appointed as administrator.
● Aida Valencia, Roberto’s mother, then filed a claim against Domingo’s estate alleging that she was a
judgment-creditor of Domingo from a civil case between them and that said amount was still unsatisfied,
thus she had an interest in the estate.
● Roberto then filed for the approval by the probate court of an “Inventory and Appraisal” which placed the
value of the properties of the estate at Php 18,960,000.00.
● Petitioners (all surnamed Gabriel), filed an opposition and motion praying for the recall of such letters of
administration issued to Roberto and for the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel.
● Petitioners later filed another opposition and motion, alleging that: (1) they were not informed by
personal notice of Roberto’s petition for administration; (2) that Nilda as the legitimate daughter should
be preferred over Roberto; (3) that Roberto has conflicting interests against the estate because her might
prefer the claims of his mother; and (4) the ownership of most of the properties included in the inventory
of the estate had already been transferred to them and should not be included in the value of the estate.
● Both the RTC and the CA ruled for Roberto and against Petitioners.
● Petitioners now bring the matter before the SC on petition for review on certiorari, primarily contending
that it is the deceased’s surviving spouse, Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, that has preference to be
appointed as administrator under Sec. 6, Rule 78, ROC.

Issue:
W/N private respondent Roberto may be removed as administrator? - NO.

Held:
● Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration
 be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
● Evidently, the foregoing provision prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of
administration, and categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors. It also
requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.
● In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. Interest in the
estate is also the consideration in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrators. It is assumed that they will benefit from the correct administration of the estate, and
suffer if wasted or mismanaged.
● Roberto argues that Felicitas may no longer be appointed as administratrix due to her failure to apply for
letters of administration 30 days after Domingo’s death, as required by the Rules. However, it is the
opinion of this Court that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the
estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration. Here, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas from being appointed
as administratrix. Moreover, the preference set by the rules may be disregarded for valid cause.
● On the other hand, the Court feels that we should not nullify the appointment of Roberto as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a
great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment
is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a
right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. To remove an administrator, there must be some fact that would justify such
removal. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to
remove an administrator. In the instant case, there is no factual and substantial basis to remove Roberto.
The removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate.
● After pondering on the legal provisions, the Court sees no reason why more than 1 administrator may not
be appointed. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators
has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or,
from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and
the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him
in the office.
● Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-
administration of the estate of the deceased by Felicitas and Roberto. Wherefore, the judgment of the CA
is modified, affirming the appointment of Roberto and ordering the appointment of Felicitas.

13. Vda de Bacaling v Laguda 54 S 243 - LOYOLA

Doctrine:
Contracts entered into by administrator binding upon his successor.

Emergency Recit:
Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the estate of her late
husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the
amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced. Such a view
is not tenable. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to
terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in
good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to
rights acquired under a previous grant of administration.

Facts:
● Private Respondent Hector Laguna is the registered owner of a residential land in Iloilo City.
● Petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the permission of the respondent, constructed
a residential house on the said lot, paying a monthly rental of P80.00.
● Petitioner failed to pay rental totaling P2,160.00.
● An action for ejectment was filed against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate
of her late husband Dr. Bacaling.
● The filing of said case spawned various court suits.
● Eventually, Petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, with private respondent
Laguna.
○ Petitioner agreed to vacate the premises and remove residential house therefrom before Dec.
31, 1996.
○ For the use and occupation of the said premises, petitioner will pay P80.00
○ Upon failure of petitioner to comply with any provision of the amicable settlement within 50
days, respondent shall be entitled to immediate execution to restore defendant in possession of
the premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents.
● July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement and enjoined the parties to
comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions
of the settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguna moved for execution which the
Court granted.
● Petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution.
● Respondent Laguna filed an opposition to the petitioner’s motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix,
she was legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated
July 30, 1964 sought to be executed and, therefor, her act was binding upon the present judicial
administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on November
28, 1964.
● City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon representations of private respondent
Laguna, copies of which were served by the sheriff upon the petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his
capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling.
● A Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon motion of private
respondent Laguna and over petitioner’s opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo.
● Respondent Laguna filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying for the
confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis.
 ● Petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:
○ That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the
amicable settlement became due and payable;
○ That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to
reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in
transferring the same to another place; and
○ That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion for the issuance
of an order of demolition.

Issue:
(1) W/N the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and
binding upon her successor? - YES.
(2) W/N petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or reasonable
expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place? - NO.
(3) W/N due process was denied to the minor children of deceased Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in
connection with the motion for the issuance of the order of demolition? - NO.

Held:

(1)
Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner’s lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of
administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It
is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the
authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior
to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired
under a previous grant of administration.

(2)
The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover
the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed.

(3)
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that
there was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger,
guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the
assailed special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his
opposition dated August 4, 1966, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the
certification of private respondent’s counsel at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, likewise filed
with the same Court.

Rule 83

14. Munsayac-de Villa v. CA

414 S 436 | GR No. 148597 | October 24, 2003 | J. Panganiban | Magsanay
Petitioners: Grace Munsayac-De Villa (De Villa), Lily Suna (Sunga), Roy Munsayac (Roy)
Respondents: Gelacio Munsayac, Jr (Junior), Nora Vispera (Vispera), Judge Reyes

Facts:
● On November 17, 1998, De Villa, Sunga and Roy, who are children of the late Sps. Munsayac, filed a
petition for letters of administration nomination De Villa as administratrix of the intestate estate of their
parents.
● Junior and Vispera opposed to the nomination of De Villa, and nominated Junior as administrator.
● The court appointed Junior as administrator, replacing Atty. Oracion as special administrator.
● De Villa and Sunga filed for a Request to Inhibit Judge Reyes. Before the judge could be act on it,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, questioning, among others, the
Judge Reyes’ order directing De Villa to produce certain bank time deposit certificates/documents, and
the order of arrest of De Villa for failure to produce the said bank certificates.
● Pending resolution thereto, petitioners filed an administrative case, praying not only for the judge’s
suspension but also his permanent removal from office on ground of grave misconduct.
● Judge Reyes ORDERED the surrender, under pain of contempt, the amount of bank investment in the
names Vincenta (their dead mother), De Villa and Sunga, and to surrender all the pieces of jewelry by the
late Vicenta to De Villa and Sunga, subject of the “freeze order” with the China Banking Corp.
● Later, The Court ordered the arrest of De Villa, Sunga, and Roy for failure to comply with the said Order.
● Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before the CA. CA nullified the arrest order only.
Hence this petition, arguing that the inhibition is still needed as the issue on withdrawal/release of the
money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of the freeze order on certain jewelry is pending.

Issue:
WON the court still has authority to hold in custodia legis the properties in a probate proceeding even after the
parties have already agreed on an extrajudicial settlement? - NO.

The Court ordered the TC to lift the freeze order and cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis.
The inhibition of the respondent judge became moot and academic.

Held:
It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No. 704R found that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the“final, complete and absolute settlement of their
respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac.” As such,
any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.

When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to
freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the
presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704R. Now that the case has finally
been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the
subject of his Orders in the special proceedings.

Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court
should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited
should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be
lifted. This ruling reiterates the longstanding principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited
jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its
probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only provisional —not conclusive—in character and subject to the final
decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

This Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of
collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are
not impaired. These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed,
every litigation must come to an end.

To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered
frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now.
Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the
point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete
and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any
freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.

15. Heirs of Miguel Franco v CA 418 S 60 - PAYAD

Doctrine:
While the intestate court does not have the authority to rule with finality on questions of ownership over the property of the
decedent, it is not precluded from making a provisional determination over such questions for purposes relevant to the
settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to include properties in the inventory of the estate.

Facts:
● After the death of Quintin Franco, Miguel Franco was appointed as the special administrator of the Quintin Estate.
However, such was opposed by the private respondents.
● The intestate court issued an Order declaring inter alia that, based on the evidence, Quintin was the absolute owner
of the subject property. This finding was subsequently used by the intestate court as one of the grounds for granting
the motion to remove Miguel as special administrator. In the latter Order, the intestate court said that since Miguel
was claiming ownership over half of the subject property, his conflicting interest rendered him incapable of rendering
a true and faithful account of the estate.
● On the basis of this General Power of Administration Miguel had filed a Petition before the Court of First Instance in
Dipolog seeking the cancellation of the title of Quintin over the disputed property which then granted by the court
and ordered that new transfer certificates of title be issued, one in the name of the heirs of Quintin and the other
name of Miguel.
● Consequently, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed before the RTC a complaint, seeking the cancellation of the new
transfer certificates. The court however dismissed such complaint.
● On appeal, the court a quo reversed the decision of the RTC ordering the cancellation of the new transfer certificates
granted to the Miguel Franco.

Issue:
W/N the intestate court have the authority to rule with finality questions of ownership over the properties of the deceased? -
NO.

Held:
● While the intestate court does not have the authority to rule with finality on questions of ownership over the
property of the decedent, it is not precluded from making a provisional determination over such questions for
 purposes relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to include properties in the inventory
of the estate.
● Due to such declaration by the intestate court, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The disputed
property belongs to Quintin Franco. Miguel Franco explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin,
at the same time he was remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof during the lifetime of
Quintin. He asserted his claim to the subject property quite belatedly. This tolerant silence militates against Miguel
Francos claim of co-ownership.
● The declaration of the intestate court that Quintin was the absolute owner of the property and accordingly denied
Miguel’s claim of ownership over half the subject property was to be given great weight that tantamounts to Miguel’s
judicial admission and declaration against the interest.
● Although the Order was apparently issued for the purpose of determining which properties should be included for the
inventory of the estate of Quintin yet conformably to ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to
dispute such an order which rejects his claim of ownership. Miguel’s inaction unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable
weight that should be accorded the statement as a declaration against interest and a judicial admission.

16. De leon v CA 386 S 216 - SANTOS

Doctrine:
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals: The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action.

Facts:
● Petitioner appointed administratrix of Estate of Rafael Nicholas.
● Respondent filed a Motion for Collation stating that the decedent during his lifetime has given real
properties gratuitously and Pet. Failed to include it on the inventory of the estate.
● The RTC ordered some of the properties collated.
● Petitioner questions the decision of RTC stating that since properties was already titled years ago, it
cannot be collaterally attacked anymore.
● The CA denied the appeal of petitioner stating that the Order of Collation of RTC is Final and Executory
bec. Of pet’s failure to file an appeal within the period.

Issue:
W/N RTC Decision is Final and Executory? - NO.

Held:
● The Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is because
the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the
appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
● Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles thereto
are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should
be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
● Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order of
Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have
 already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at
the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we
found no indication that the debts of the decedent’s spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the
conjugal estate have already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing
of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation
is still premature.
● And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final order, still,
the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine that a final order is
appealable/

17. Santera v CFI 153 S 728 - STA. ANA

Note: This pertains to the old Rule 83, Sec. 3, which states: Allowance to widow and family.— The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, owing the settlement of the estate, shall receive there from
under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

Doctrine:
● While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.

Facts:
● Petitioners (Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Willy Santero) are the legitimate children of
the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa. Private respondents (Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel) all surnamed Santero are four of his seven illegitimate children with Anselma Diaz.
● Private respondents filed a Motion for Allowance for support which included educational expenses,
clothing and medical necessities. It was granted and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in
their motion.
● Private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court
to include the three other children (Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito) as children of the late Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diaz, and prayed that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to
deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the
estate of Pablo Santero.
● Petitioners opposed it. Their arguments:
○ Private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority
age, two are gainfully employed and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the
Rules of Court. Thus, they are no longer under guardianship.
○ They further allege that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient
funds to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit
properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are derived.

Issue:
W/N respondents are entitled to support? - YES.

Held:
● The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should
not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
 ● While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
● Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled
to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the
provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to
receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
● Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not
common law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

18. Ruiz v CA 252 S 541 - CALANTOC

Doctrine:
Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the deceased’s estate. The law limits the
allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.

Facts:
● Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, respondent Montes, and his 3 granddaughters, respondents Cathryn, Candice and Angeline, all
children of Edmond. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties
and named Edmond as executor of his estate.
● Hilario died and immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond and the respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. Edmond, however, did not take any
action for the probate of his father’s holographic will.
● 4 years after Hilario’s death, Montes filed before the RTC a petition for probate and approval of Hilario’s
will, and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground
that the will was executed under undue influence.
● It was later found that one of the properties of the estate (Valle Verde property) which the testator
bequeathed to his granddaughters, was leased out by Edmond to 3rd persons. The probate court ordered
Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments representing the 1-
year lease.
● Edmond moved for the release of P50,000 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate
and the probate court approved the same. Edmond also withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Consequently, the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to petitioner conditioned upon the filing of the bond.
● The Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond as executor, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
Funds”, praying for the release of the rent payments it earlier deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a “Motion for Release of Funds to Certain
Heirs” and “Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will”, praying that the release of
the said rent payment be made to Cathryn, Candice and Angeline.
● The probate court granted Montes’ motion in view of Edmond’s lack of opposition. It thus ordered the
release of the rent payments to the decedent’s 3 granddaughters, and further ordered the delivery of the
titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters and Montes upon the filing
of a bond.
 ● Edmond manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the
lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year. The probate court,
however, still ordered the release of funds to Edmond but only “such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support” of the testator’s 3 granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. On the other hand, the release of
the titles to Montes and the 3 granddaughters was held in abeyance until the lapse of 6 months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
● An appeal was made to the CA, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts and
obligations, has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren? - NO.

Held:
● Allowances for support under Sec. 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated”
children of the deceased. Art. 188 of the Civil Code, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator’s death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate.
● However, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the deceased’s estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error for the CA to sustain the probate
court’s order granting the allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.