LESSONS L E A R N E D FROM M I S S E D PREDICTIONS

By John A. Focht Jr., 1 Fellow, ASCE

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the broad factors critical to the prediction
process that govern the quality of predictions of the geotechnical performance of
completed structures. After a discussionof these critical factors, a series of examples
is described to show performance that deviated from prediction, and the probable
causes of the variancesare discussed. Minimal effort is made in the paper to improve
the technical aspect of the predictive method. The importance of judgment (i.e.
the questioning of each aspect of the prediction process) and intuition in devel-
opment of geotechnical predictions is emphasized. Some kinds of predictions for
which success is expected to be limited are identified. The paper concludes with a
brief discussion on the development of good judgment.

INTRODUCTION

I sincerely appreciate the invitation from the Geotechnical (GT) Exec-

utive Committee to be the 1993 Terzaghi Lecturer, the 29th in this series
honoring Dr. Karl Terzaghi, the founder of modern soil mechanics and
foundation engineering. The paper focuses on the broad factors involved
in the prediction process that affect the quality of predictions of the geo-
technical performance of completed structures. Only limited attention is
given here to redefining or refining technical aspects pertinent to our profes-
sional practice. It is important to recognize and acknowledge that the prac-
tice of civil engineering, and geotechnical engineering in particular, still
remains as much art as science, perhaps more of an art but combining both.
I hope that this paper is of benefit to all levels of geotechnical engineers,
from the very computer-literate recent graduates to the graybeards among
us.
Looking back at the contents of the prior 28 Terzaghi lectures, four had
a major philosophical theme, three more had strong philosophical over-
tones, and the remainder were concerned with technical topics--projects,
theory, problems, and solutions. My intent is to add to the philosophical
background started by Casagrande (1965) with his lecture " T h e Role of
'Calculated Risk' in Earthworks and Foundation Engineering," followed by
Leonards' (1982) "Investigation of Failures," Osterberg's (1989) "Necessary
Redundancy in Geotechnical Engineering," and D ' A p p o l o n i a ' s (1990)
"Monitored Decisions." Each of these four lectures emphasized that in all
investigations, appropriate balance and reliance must be maintained on all
aspects of the problem solution--field investigation, laboratory testing, the-
oretical studies, application of prior performance, and utilization of judg-
ment, frequently enhanced by personal intuition. Lambe (1973) added sig-
nificantly to this philosophical theme with his 1973 Rankine lecture entitled
"Predictions in Soil Engineering." I have also relied on two other papers
on predictions, by Duncan (1988) and Van Weele (1989).

lSr. Consultant, Fugro-McClelland, Inc., P.O. Box 740010, Houston, TX 77274.

Note. Discussion open until March 1, 1995. To extend the closing date one month,
a written request must be filed with the ASCE Manager of Journals. The manuscript
for this paper was submitted for review and possible publication on January 14, 1994.
This paper is part of the Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Vol. 120, No. 10,
October, 1994. @ASCE, ISSN 0733-9410/94/0010-1653/$2.00 + $.25 per page. Paper
No. 7686.
1653
PREDICTIVE PROCESS

Lambe's Rankine lecture was prepared from the standpoint of the pro-
fessor-researcher-consultant using as examples major projects with extensive
investigations and large budgets rather than from the perspective of the
practicing geotechnical engineer, who usually must cope with abbreviated
time schedules, limited budgets, and a litigious environment. The present
paper is based more on routine performance predictions required of the
geotechnical engineering consultant confronted with the myriad limitations
encountered in commercial practice. Furthermore, the practicing consultant
is faced almost entirely with making Lambe's class A "before-the-fact"
predictions.
In large measure, most of our commercial predictions are found to be
acceptably close to actual performance in that the deviation of performance
from prediction is usually not sufficient to cause the client, the project user,
a regulatory agency, or others to complain about poor-quality predictions.
Despite our best efforts, however, our predictions occasionally miss the
mark and we are confronted by performance that is significantly at odds
with our best predictive efforts. We must carefully evaluate and openly
discuss such projects whenever possible, since the majority of real leaps in
our knowledge have been the result of well-documented analyses of per-
formance and, unfortunately, of some major failures. The lessons to be
learned are not only the technical calibrations from class C-1 "after-the-
fact" predictions or from Leonards' failure analyses, but, equally important,
improved definitions of the critical factors in the prediction process and
improvements in our mental approach to predictions.
I have been fortunate to have avoided being associated with a catastrophic
failure, although a number of my projects did not behave quite as I had
expected. A series of examples--several from my own personal practice--
will show performance that deviated from prediction, and the probable
causes of the Variances will be discussed. The discussion of cause will attempt
to identify the procedural defect in the predictive process, with minimal
effort to improve the technical aspect of the predictive method. The ob-
jective is to minimize deviations of predictions from performance by elim-
inating these defects in the process. I will also strive to emphasize the
importance of judgment and intuition throughout development of predic-
tions. Another secondary objective will be to identify some kinds of pre-
dictions for which our success will be limited.
Before starting with the examples, the critical elements that are part of
the solution of most geotechnical problems should be examined. The geo-
technical engineer must have

1. Developed an adequate representation or modeling of the foundation

stratigraphy, including water-level position, and an understanding of the
site and regional geology
2. Developed an appropriate representation or modeling of soil param-
eters critical to the particular problem (and if stability is involved in the
prediction, the factor of safety to be applied must be compatible with the
soil parameters and the method of analysis)
3. Selected an applicable theory for the analysis
4. Gathered and evaluated historical performance data on similar struc-
tures or problems in the area or in similar geologic settings
5. Utilized his or her judgment by questioning the applicability of the
1654
approach to the prediction, and in critical review of the conclusions and
predictions
6. Judiciously employed gut feeling, or intuition, in relation to the entire
problem.

Other critical aspects may also be important for some particular problems,
but with some interpretation those aspects could be considered to be in-
cluded within one of these six main elements.
These six elements are not independent of one another but actually are
very interdependent and must be compatible with each other, particularly
elements 2 and 3. A great many of our numerical predictive techniques have
been derived by empirical correlations, essentially class C-1 predictions, in
which the soil parameters utilized must conform to those used in derivation
of the technique. A number of predictive techniques in the literature for
clays, for example, rely on shear strengths determined by unconfined
compression tests on ordinary, good-quality, undisturbed samples. A po-
tential error by an inexperienced engineer is to conclude that he or she
should use results from a "better" test method such as the in-situ vane or
special triaxial tests on highest-quality piston samples with the original em-
pirical coefficients and thereby obtain a "better" prediction. Unfortunately,
that engineer will be wrong.
Elements 5 and 6 are most important. If a theoretical numerical prediction
derived from 1, 2, and 3 differs from the engineer's judgment as applied to
historical data, or even if intuition alone raises questions about the predic-
tion, he or she should reexamine the numbers. Most of us are, or should
be, familiar with Terzaghi's admonition that if theory did not match his
expectations based on experience, he would look for a new theory.

QUALITY OF PREDICTIONS

I have adopted for the sake of presentation the concept, as shown in Fig.
1, that a circle can represent the range of presumed knowledge or under-
standing inherent in each of the six critical elements and that the circle
represents the limits of accurate prediction. This graphical presentation is
intended to be thought-provoking and intuitive rather than fully appropriate
or correct from a mathematical perspective. We will assume, then, that
when all of the element circles overlap in one area, the actual performance
will be located in that overlying area. Unfortunately, we won't know until

FIG. 1. Concept of Circular Limits of Accurate Prediction

1655
the structure is built and performance is monitored whether the prediction
is valid or not.
Schematically, then, each of the elements could be represented by a circle,
not all necessarily of the same size with bigger circles representing better
understanding, as presented in Fig. 2, with just four circles rather than six
to simplify the diagrams. In fact, the relative size of the circles will vary
from project to project, and individual circles will be strongly affected by
the uniqueness of the site, the project, and the geotechnical engineer. For
a perfect prediction, as in Fig. 2(c), all elements must be fully compatible,
each must be valid and correct, and the process must be completed without
numerical error. If all of the element circles overlap, even partially, as shown
in Fig. 2(a) by the small shaded area, our prediction will probably be sat-
isfactory. If the circles do not overlap, our prediction will not be satisfactory
unless we achieve it by blind luck resulting from compensating errors. In
the examples to follow, an effort is made to identify which element in the
prediction process was off target, causing the prediction to deviate from
actual performance.
Two other conceptual ways of looking at accuracy of predictions as related
to accuracy of method and data were suggested by Lambe (1973). One is
conventional wisdom--the better the data and the method, the better the
prediction, as indicated by the intersections of the dashed lines in Fig. 3.
The second was an intuitive belief of his, with which I agree. This graph
suggests that the engineer must "be consistent in the sophistication of his
method of analysis and in the quality of his data." The dashed lines on Fig.
4 show that for a given quality of analysis, improved quality of data will
improve the prediction up to a certain point; any further improvement in
data quality will cause a deterioration in prediction accuracy.
The importance of these conceptual illustrations and my circles is that
the engineer-predictor--the ordinary geotechnical consultant--must apply

FIG. 2. Types of Prediction Quality

1656
 ,0o

O
I.-
uJ

,.I

O
0 mbe, 1
100
QUALITY OF DATA
FIG. 3. ConventionalConcept of Accuracyof Predictions

lOO %

0
~ L a m b e , 1!73)
0 100
QUALITY OF DATA
FIG. 4. Lambe Concept of Accuracyof Predictions

his or her judgment by questioning the approach to the prediction, the

validity of each element, the compatibility of the several elements, the
appropriateness of the numerical method, and the basic correctness of the
final prediction.

EXAMPLE 1: CHICAGO APARTMENT

The level of precision required for a "satisfactory" prediction can be quite
variable. As Peck (1978) [reprinted in Judgment (1984)] pointed out many
years ago, tolerable settlement may be governed by a factor as nontechnical
as paint color. He described a settlement problem for a Chicago apartment
building. The predicted and observed settlements and differential settle-
ments were all small, within the usual tolerances set by structural perfor-
mance. But several occupants had painted some of the plaster walls in their
apartments dark brown and dark green. The fine hairline plaster cracks that
would not have been noticeable with light-colored paint were very obvious
in the dark walls. So the normally tolerable settlements that produced only
1657
slight cracking of the plaster walls were intolerable for these building oc-
cupants. Definition of acceptable deviation of performance from prediction
is an important but often overlooked part of the prediction-making process.
The prediction should be presented in terms of that tolerance rather than
being stated like a computer printout with many significant figures. We must
continually remind ourselves of the difference between precision and ac-
curacy.

EXAMPLE 2: SETTLEMENT OF THE SAN JACINTO MONUMENT

The San Jacinto Monument at the San Jacinto Battleground, near Hous-
ton, Tex., was planned and built as part of the 1936 centennial celebration
of Texas Independence and the decisive battle at the site that influenced
Texas, American, and world history. The monument is 169 m (555 ft) from
first floor to the tip of the unique 10 m (33 ft) "star." The monument shaft
and the museum gallery around its base are supported on a single reinforced
concrete mat 37.8 m (124 ft) square, placed 4.6 m (15 ft) below original
grade, as shown in Fig. 5. The mat is 5.5 m (18 ft) thick in the central
portion beneath the shaft and 1.5 m (5 ft) thick at its edge. The gross dead-
load pressure applied to the underlying soil is 225 MPa (4,700 psf) and the
net foundation pressure is 139 MPa (2,900 psf). In a 125 mph design wind
storm, the maximum toe pressure will be 273 MPa (5,700 psf) (Cummins
1944; Fenske and Dawson 1984).

(b)

9.1n : _ ~ m ~ - - " ~ 1,5rn

(a) I (After Cummins, 1944)

FIG. 5. San Jacinto Monument: (a) Section through Shaft; (b) Foundation Plan

1658
 The original site investigation consisted primarily of four field loading
tests on 0.43 m (17 in.) square plates at foundation grade at the time of
construction. These tests indicated an ultimate bearing capacity of about
790 MPa (16,500 psf). In addition, there was one boring at the site during
construction, with three undisturbed soil samples from the top 6 m (20 ft).
The soil stratigraphy to a depth of 60 m (200 ft) as determined in 1953,
shown in Fig. 6, is mostly stiff to hard clay with layers of dense sand. These
soils are typical of the Beaumont clay formation, a deltaic deposit of Pleis-
tocene age. Based on tests on the original 1936 samples and stratigraphy
from a nearby water well, Professor Raymond F. Dawson at the University
of Texas estimated in 1938 an ultimate settlement of 180 mm (7.35 in.) to
occur in 800 years (Dawson 1938). His predicted time-settlement curve is
shown in Fig. 7, with the typical parabolic shape representing classical pri-
mary consolidation of clay. This prediction was made just after the First
International Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering,
held in Cambridge, Mass., in 1936.

DESCRIPTION

0 Stiff to very stiff clay 0

25
SUffclayandsand - 10
layers t-
50 Dense clayey sand

Hard clay
20
n~
I-.-
UJ
75 W
UJ Dense silt
LL UJ
Silt, sand, and clay
100 ayers / -- 30
13..
ara clay :i:"
I--
LU Silt, sand, and clay
o 125 layers LU
40 121
Dens~ clayey sand
150 Stiff clay
Dense sand
,c 50
L~Stiffclay
sand
1 7 5 I Stiff t~ h - ~ clay
f
/ 60
200
(AfterGreer& McClelland,1953)
SOIL PROFILE
FIG. 6. 1953 Boring Log, San Jacinto Monument
1659
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
0 0
CO
2 -- 50
co ~, PREDC
I TED~. SETFLEMENT
I
IU
"1" 100
0 4 ~'~ ~. . . . . . . . . jr. . . . . To 7.35 In. (180mm)
Z
~: 6 In 800 yr 1so .~
Z
ILl
:S 8
LU
..J
_ Notes:
1. Start date for observations
Is November 10,1936. ~ ~ - ~OBSERVED
,00
10 2. Predicted cunte starts 0.5 yr - - 250 ,,,,
ILl ~ SI:FrLEMENT -
co later at midpoint of
12 constructlon. 300 CO
(aRer Fenske and Dawaon, 1984)
14 I I I I 35O
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
TIME, YEARS

FIG. 7. Predicted and O b s e r v e d Settlements, San Jacinto M o n u m e n t

Settlement observations were initiated by Dawson on 50 points set

throughout the mat and referenced to two 7.5 m (25 ft) deep benchmarks
set about 84 m (275 ft) northeast from the monument. The observations
made over a period of more than 40 years yield the average settlement curve
also shown in Fig. 7. After about two years, the settlement became almost
linear with time with a slight decrease in rate occurring in about 1960 (about
25 years), but continuing to be linear. After 44 years, in 1980, the maximum
settlement was 328 mm (12.9 in.) near the mat center under one edge of
the shaft, the average settlement was 312 mm (12.3 in.), and the minimum
settlement was 295 mm (11.6 in.) at the northeast corner of the mat. Analysis
of the 1980 set of observations indicated a slight tilt north to south of 19.5
mm (0.77 in.), or 0.00052 m per m, with no significant tilt east and west.
Precision surveying of the monument shaft, also in 1980, showed a tilt north
to south of 0.00063 m per m, a close match with the settlement data (Fenske
and Dawson 1984).
The magnitude of the settlement and the shape of the time-settlement
curve as observed are obviously different from those predicted. Fenske and
Dawson concluded in a 1984 paper that "secondary consolidation may not
have been included properly in the field curve." I am inclined to agree even
though secondary consolidation is usually not arithmetically linear.
In reference to our critical elements, the i~formation available to Dawson
on soil stratigraphy and soil properties was insufficient. There were no
historical data to guide his prediction or to influence his judgment. At the
time, I doubt if any of us would have disagreed with his prediction. But the
performance of the San Jacinto Monument has served as a major piece of
historical performance data, guiding predictions for many major engineering
structures throughout the Texas Gulf Coast. That is one reason it was
recognized in 1992 as a National Historic Civil Engineering Landmark.

EXAMPLE 3: TENNECO BUILDING TILT

In 1967, the Gerald D. Hines Interests joined Shell Oil Co. in planning
for construction of the 52-story One Shell Plaza in downtown Houston, to
be designed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM). Tenneco Oil Co. had
completed its 33-story home office building in 1962 on the block diagonally

1660
 City
North

I
Basement Wall - ~

Edge of Mat /4
Walker
I
ONE
SHELL
PLAZA

~ 18.2m Exc. --/4

Curb Une
r-

E
Mc~nney "3
~o
o,
Edge of Mat (lSm)---.%

J-1

TENNECO
[] []
BLDG.

[] ~p J-18 []

Lamar

0 20 40 60m
I II I ' ' I

FIG. 8. Site Plan of Tenneco and One Shell Plaza Buildings

across the street from the O n e Shell Plaza site, as shown in Fig. 8. A senior
vice president of Tenneco was concerned about the potential effects the
construction of One Shell Plaza might have on his building. A s the geo-
technical consultant for Hines, I a t t e n d e d a high-level conference that in-
cluded senior officials from the Tenneco, Hines, and S O M organizations
and representatives of the contractor. In that meeting, the Tenneco senior
vice president had a n u m b e r of p o i n t e d questions. O n e of those questions
was " W h a t will construction of O n e Shell Plaza do to the foundation per-
formance of our structure?" I had been a special consultant to the architect

1661
for the Tenneco building to supplement the work of E T C O Engineers, who
were the primary geotechnical consultants for Tenneco, and consequently
was generally familiar with the Tenneco building foundation. But at that
time, as the soil consultant on One Shell, I had not yet made even a crude
analysis of what the offsite effects of One Shell construction would be.
The proposed Shell building construction was to require an 18.2 m (60
ft) excavation for the 40 by 59 m (132 by 192 ft) mat, with a 15.2 m (50 ft)
excavation around the perimeter to occupy the full 83 m (272 ft) square
block (Focht et al. 1978). As shown by the soil profile beneath the Shell
building as presented in Fig. 9, the water table before construction was
about 10 m (35 ft) below grade, thus requiring construction dewatering to
lower the water table at least 7.6 m (25 ft) around the deeper portion of
the excavation. Actually, as much as 9-10.5 m (30-35 ft) of water level
lowering at the limits of the block was anticipated. A permanent ground-
water control system had been planned to maintain the water level at the
building perimeter after construction at a position at least 15 m (50 ft) below
grade, a permanent lowering of at least 4.5 m (15 ft). The building con-
struction would result in a net positive foundation load of 35.9 MPa (750
psf) on the mat and a net decrease of 263 MPa (5,500 psf) in the annular
area around the mat. A prediction of the effect of One Shell on Tenneco
was needed on the spot, with no opportunity for analysis.

WATER
DESCRIPTION CONTENT, %
0 20 40 60
0

25
10

50

20
75
IJJ
uJ l-
Lt.
3~ 100 30
a~
a. i--
LIJ n
C~ 125 w
40

150
50
175

200 60
(after Focht et aL 1978)
FIG. 9. Soil Profile, One Shell Plaza
1662
 My immediate answer to the vice president's question was that the Ten-
neco building would tilt a little bit but not enough that anyone other than
a surveyor would even know. The follow-on question was " H o w much?"
The answer "Probably less than three-quarters of an inch" (19 mm). As I
remember, that answer was satisfactory to Tenneco, and the meeting went
on to other Tenneco concerns.
McClelland Engineers was authorized by Hines to make movement ob-
servations of the Tenneco and other buildings in the vicinity. The surveys
were initiated in mid-1967 and continued at regular intervals for the next
four years, until late 1971--after the completion of One Shell Plaza.
Our record of the differential movement between the column closest to
the Shell Building, J-l, and point J-18, the column in the middle of the side
furthest away, located as shown in Fig. 8, is presented in Fig. 10. The data
show an obvious tilting of nearly 13 mm (0.5 in.) by mid-1970, not markedly
different from the magnitude estimated primarily on judgment and intuition.
This graph clearly shows a rebound for more than a year after the structural
frame of One Shell was completed in mid-1970. Load development on the
One Shell mat continued at a slower rate until mid-1971.
Let me add more information on the Tenneco building performance.
After we began our regular surveying and reporting of the building move-
ment, we learned that E T C O had been regularly monitoring the Tenneco
building movement since its completion in late 1962. Adding their historical
data, the total differential settlement record from 1962 through 1971 in Fig.
11, shows that the Tenneco Building had been undergoing slight tilting since
early in its life (McClelland Engineers, Inc. 1972). Further, the record shows
that the rate of differential settlement increased only slightly after One Shell
construction began. Review of the records for J-18 and the other four col-
umns on the "south" half of the block (shown shaded in Fig. 8) suggests

IJJ 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

0.0
z One Shell
Strug2ural Frd me --
Z 0.2

i0.4
IJ.I .J
(/)
._1 One Shell
<r Excavation Began
1-
W-0.6 15 z
}
I
W
Z ~ One Shell
UJ Mat Poured
n- u.
I
"'
IJ. 0.8
(After I~,Clelland Englnce~, Inc., 1972)
2O ---
a
IJ.
a
FIG. 10. McClelland Differential Settlement Data for J-18 Relative to J-l, Tenneco
Building

1663
 U~
uJ 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
"1" 0.0 I I I , I I I 0
O
m ETCO Data ~ McClelland Data
z
zuJ 0.2 5

uJ
,.J
\ One Shell
Structural Frame
ul

Completed = 10 uJ
IE 0.4 U)
141 One Shell __ ,.I
Excavation Began
.J
~ 0.6 I ~ ~ - 15 I--
Z
I Ul
ul One Shell
w Mat Poured W
(AfterMicC]ellandiEngin..... line.,1972) 2O m
u.
IL 0.8 a

FIG. 11. ETCO and McClelland Differential Settlement Data for J-18 Relative to
J-l, Tenneco Building

that the incremental differential settlement of Tenneco due to One Shell

was only about 8 mm (1/3 in.). It is interesting to note that the total dif-
ferential in the nine-year period was 18.3 m m (0.72 in.); coincidentally close
to the 19 mm (0.75 in.) predicted effect of One Shell. This record might
actually have been taken by some as verification of my off-the-cuff estimate
(rather than prediction) of 19 mm (0.75 in.).
At this point it is well to return to my specific prediction statement.
Perhaps you realized I did not predict which way Tenneco would tilt. Prior
experience with another deep mat foundation in downtown Houston had,
however, shown that the stress release due to the excavation would have a
greater effect on an adjacent building than that of the dewatering, and that
a tilt away would occur. But I did refrain in the meeting from saying which
way Tenneco would tilt. What I did not know was that the ongoing tilting
was as significant as the effect that construction of One Shell would be.
A quick explanation of the ongoing tilt is in order. Houston is undergoing
area subsidence due to major water-level lowering in deep aquifers. Ac-
tually, one of the many private and public wells in the area is located under
the southwest corner of the Tenneco building, which was installed to provide
makeup cooling water for the building's air-conditioning system. The local
subsidence due to the local water-level drawdown in the deep aquifers due
to that well most likely contributed to the tilt. Other movement data from
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) releveling survey programs show that the
nearly 2 m (6 ft) of measured subsidence in downtown Houston has created
measurable differential subsidence between benchmarks only several blocks
apart. Construction of the 1100 Milam Building, just south of the Tenneco
building, began in 1972, adding new impacts on the settlement record of
Tenneco and obscuring the effects of One Shell (Williams 1989).
Looking back, my first predictive answer was quite correct and appro-
priate. One Shell would cause Tenneco to tilt but not in a magnitude to
cause any problems. The second part of the answer putting dimensions to
the prediction was necessary at the moment to satisfy the technical back-
1664
ground of the engineer/senior vice president asking the question but was
admittedly without any precise support. I am confident that Tenneco re-
membered only the general answer, and believed that performance matched
the prediction. But a purist could argue that the prediction was off target
without any mention of direction.
The slight mismatch of prediction from performance in this case can be
largely attributed to the prediction's really being a guesstimate, since there
was no analysis. Also contributing to the mismatch was the nonuse of his-
torical data for the structure, even though its availability was unknown to
the predictor. Yet as far as the Tenneco organization was concerned, the
performance was compatible with the prediction in that no one but a sur-
veyor (and a few engineers) knew the building was tilting. The lessons to
be learned are to make use of all available historical data applicable to the
project and to consider all of the physical events having potential impact
on the performance. Other construction details or activities might influence
structure performance.

EXAMPLE 4: PILES IN BASS STRAIT

In planning for construction of petroleum development platforms in Bass
Strait (see Fig. 12) off the southeast coast of Australia, Esso-Standard Oil
(Australia), Ltd., had a number of borings made at five sites by a local
contractor over a period of about three years in the 1960s. Logs of the
borings and some samples were sent to us in Houston for evaluation and
development of pile-capacity curves. The water depths at the four locations
varied from 45 to 68 m (150-255 ft).
The soils at all of the locations were found to be granular, as shown by
the boring log in Fig. 13 from the Tuna location. The samples were retrieved
by a procedure approximating the standard penetration test (SPT). The
blow counts and drilling records suggested that the granular formation was
relatively dense and contained cemented layers, some more rock-like than

BASS STRAIT
TASMANIA

SITE LOCATIONS
~
FIG. 12, Bass Strait Location

1665
 DESCRIPTION o~ "

(by Wlmpey) ' ~ , *~ 0

0
Very dense light brown 50/g'
sand (253, 50/6" 15
Very dense yellow-brown !ss~ 15
50 _ silty sand (603.50/4"
~ l t y ~ 50/10" 16- 20
sand with shells (863 50/9" 15 ~,"
~ 54 19
Dense to very dense light
100 - brown silty sand and shell, 35 12 - 30 f~
~ weakly cemented t110~ r 50/7" 11
IVerydensewhlteslltysand ' t'I 5SoO~ 2473 - - 40
/ana shell (12~ i 14 25 O~
,,d, 150 -Medium dense to dense green- 62 23 ~jj
m gray silty sand with occasional 38 S0 m
shells, more silty In some areas 50/9"
5o/s" 60
200 32 20 --
35 38
53 13_ 70
UJ S0/8" U.I
35 Z
z 250
LU
rl 50/7" -- 80 I,JJ
50/~' a.
52
(After McClelland Engineers, Inc, 1969) 50/7" 42
9 50/5" - 90
300
FIG. 13. Boring Log, Tuna Platform, Bass Strait

others. The grain-size curves in Fig. 14 from a boring at Kingfish A were

typical of all of the borings in the area and many other offshore deposits.
At some locations the silt content of the sand was relatively large. The
boring and sample data were studied in our office in preparation for de-
velopment of pile-capacity curves for use by the structural engineer in his
selection of pile lengths to be driven. We used our then-standard procedures
applicable to piles driven into sands to compute pile capacity (McClelland
Engineers, Inc. 1967), which were later adopted by the American Petroleum
Institute (API) (1969).
The piles for the Barracouta platform in 45 m (150 ft) of water were
driven in late 1967. The piles drove hard, which was attributed to the
presence of dense sand. The second platform, Marlin, was installed in 58
m (192 ft) of water in the spring of 1968. While the piles had low driving
resistance and their penetration was arbitrarily increased in the field, the
lower-than-expected driving resistance was attributed at the time to a sig-
nificant silt content in the sand. The piles for Halibut, installed in 75 m (238
ft) of water in the fall of 1968, also had lower-than-expected driving resis-
tance. This was also considered to be due to the presence of silt in the
formation. The Kingfish A piles were driven in early 1969 in 78 m (255 ft)
1666
 U.S. S T A N D A R D SIEVE
3/8 1/4 4 6 8 101416 20 30 40 50 7 0 1 0 0 200
1oo I'1 I t'-.I "~. ,,',ll~'t"~'l I I o
90 I l",l'. N III I f ~ 1 4 ' 1o =
"!"
(~ 80 72' 20

"' 70 ~2'
I I ",\ lIllll}l
-~
', t32, 30
>-
>. m
IZI 60 40 r

n- uJ
U,I 50 50 r
Z n"
E 40 60
I- ;\\ \\
Z 30 ~,~
w \. 70 pz
o b".~". %..\ /'" ,,,

- 90 I,LI
1o II k~ =-
0 I Ill [i I 1 1 1 = I i [ r I I]l,l Ii , , i r r I r , 100
10 5 1 0.5 0.1 0.05

G R A I N SIZE IN M I L L I M E T E R S
FIG. 14. Grain-Size Curve, Kingfish A Platform, Bass Strait

of water and, as anticipated based on high silt content, also had relatively
low driving resistance.
A blowout occurred at the Marlin platform in December 1968 creating a
crater as much as 12 m (40 ft) deep, encompassing the conductors and some
of the platform piles. Concern about reduced capacity of these piles due to
the crater led to additional borings and pullout tests on conductors at several
platforms and a comprehensive program at Kingfish A. Six pullout tests at
Kingfish A were performed on conductors 0.5 m (20 in.) in diameter and
driven to penetrations of 45-83 m (148-271 ft). These tests revealed that
the average mobilized frictional resistance was on the order of only 9.6-
15.6 MPa (200-330 psf). Pullout curves as reported by Angemeer et al.
(1973) are presented in Fig. 15. These frictional values are much lower than
the average tensile skin-friction value of 63.2 MPa (1,320 psf) we computed
in our analyses of piles driven to 61 m (200 ft) of penetration. We concluded
that the frictional capacity of the piles in place was only one-quarter of what
we originally predicted. Why?
Closer examination under a microscope of washed sand samples from
new borings showed them to be calcium carbonate, not the silica sands that
we were familiar with. The grains of calcium carbonate are mostly skeletal
remains of marine organisms, which are relatively soft and crushable. Other
particles are fecal pellets, coated grains (ooliths), shell fragments, and de-
1667
 ESTIMATED AVERAGE SKIN FRICTION, MPa
0 5 10 15
3.0
70
2.5
60
w
3:2.0 5O
z_ 3 (sS.2m) p:
Z
40 Ir
Z 1.5
lU I.iJ
tU
30 >
O
:> 1.0
O
20

0.5
10
(After Angemeer et al. 1973)
0
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
ESTIMATED AVERAGE SKIN FRICTION, PSF
FIG. 15. Results of Conductor Pullout Tests, Kingfish A Platform, Bass Strait

trital, all within a matrix of line mud, or micrite. Individual grains are bonded
together leaving considerable voids and creating a very delicate fabric, even
though the undisturbed material may be hard and rock-like. It became
apparent that when an open-end pipe pile is driven into these materials,
the grains crush, the bonds break, and there is no buildup of lateral soil
pressure and frictional resistance on the pile wall. Consultations with ge-
ologists and carbonate sedimentologists confirmed that the marine origin of
these deposits resulted in a structure markedly different from that of the
silica sands in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, with which we were
familiar.
Immediately, emergency investigations were performed to evaluate this
severe new problem, and very comprehensive studies were initiated on the
capacity of piles in calcareous deposits. The first results were published in
1973 by Angemeer et al., followed by reference to the problem by Mc-
Clelland (1974) in his Terzaghi Lecture. An excellent review of pile capacity
in calcereous sands was presented by Murff in 1987. The results of studies
undertaken worldwide to better understand marine carbonate deposits were
presented in a specialty conference held in Perth, Australia, in 1988 (Jewell
and Khorshid 1988).
The lesson to be learned from Bass Strait in the context of this lecture
is that simple extrapolation of a predictive procedure to a different geologic
setting is fraught with hazard, particularly without having closely examined
the samples. Yet this is a risk that many of us run at various times in our
careers. Because of the empiricism of many of our predictive techniques,
we must try every time to be sure that each aspect of our problem is com-
patible with those on which the correlation was developed.
1668
EXAMPLE 5:1989 NORTHWESTERN PILE CAPACITY
PREDICTION EXERCISE

As part of the 1989 Geotechnical Congress, held at Northwestern Uni-

versity, Professor Richard J. Finno organized a predictive exercise focused
on the axial capacities of a 0.46 m (18 in.) pipe pile, a 0.36 m (14 in.) H-
pile (HP 14 x 73), a cased drilled pier, and a slurry-installed drilled pier
(Finno 1989). The latter two were a nominal 0.46 m (18 in.) in diameter.
All four foundation elements had 15.4 m (50 ft) of penetration through 7
m (23 ft) of sand into an underlying soft to medium stiff clay. All of the
participants were furnished geotechnical data, as shown in Fig. 16, from the
test site and were asked to predict a number of aspects of performance
including capacity at three different times after installation, load-deflection
curves, pore pressures adjacent to the piles during driving, residual loads
after driving, and capacity contributions from the sand and the clay. On
capacity, participants were asked first for a best estimate of the ultimate
capacity and then a "lower bound estimate of capacity, with 90 percent
confidence that the actual value would be higher than this lower bound."
Predictions were received from 24 participating teams, although not all
participants predicted everything.
For this paper, my review and comments are limited to the two driven
piles and their ultimate capacity nominally one-year after driving (43 weeks).
In the summary of the program, Finno et al. (1989b)chose to use the
maximum applied load as the ultimate capacity, and I will stick with that
convention. The measured capacities of the two driven piles were similar,
1.02 kN (230 kips) for the pipe pile and 0.98 kN (220 kips) for the H-pile.
The predictors used a wide range of predictive procedures as documented
in ASCE's Special Geotechnical Publication No. 23 (Predicted 1989). The
mean best-estimate prediction of ultimate capacity for each of the test piles
was reasonably close to the measured capacity--0.96 kN (215 kips) for the
pipe pile and 1.0 kN (224 kips) for the H-pile (see Figs. 17 and 18). Maybe

WATER UNDRAINED
DESCRIPTION CONTENT, % SHEAR STRENGTH, KSF
0 20 40 0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0
(a) ,. , f i(b j (c)
~,/w% (1999)
10 - Sand -
Fill 5

20 - Ir
PL LL FIELD VANE (1 188) UJ
MJ
M. ~-. + . . . + J
9I- 3 0 - + - 9 . . . . . . _1.+ --
I'-
I1.
Iii
Soft to
+.-~ . . . . . +
.~ ....... +
+~.---+
,;
.g-
/o I,om
W
40 - Medium a
Clay .99
- .+
20
50 -
9 F ul (1960)
-'1---9 . . . . . . '+
i 9 I I I
6O
(After Flnno, 1 9 8 9 0 20 40 60
UNDRAINED
SHEAR STRENGTH, MPa

FIG. 16. G e o t e c h n i c a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , N o r t h w e s t e r n T e s t Pile Site

1669
what clients need to do is to hire 24 consultants for each project and average
their predictions.
Some of the predictions were too optimistic, as shown by the histograms
in Figs. 17 and 18 of the ratio of predicted ultimate capacity to the measured
capacity. The largest predicted capacity of the pipe pile was 1.65 kN (370
kips), 161% of the measured value, while for the H-pile it was 1.69 kN (380
kips), 173% of the measured value. At the other extreme, the smallest
capacities predicted were 0.56 and 0.62 kN (126 and 139 kips), respectively,
for the pipe and H-piles, or 55% and 63% of the measured values. Eleven
of the 24 predictions for the pipe pile were within _ 20% of its measured
capacity. For the H-pile, 14 of the 22 predictions were in the same range.
It is particularly pertinent to note that for each of the two piles, 10 of the
"on target" predictions were in the 80-100% range, right where most con-
sultants would like to be, close to but just on the conservative side of the
true value.
Combining the results from both piles into a single histogram, Fig. 19
shows that there were 25 "satisfactory" predictions, i.e. within _+20%.
These were made by 16 different predictors using nearly that many different
procedures. The conclusions that can be drawn are: (1) On average, the
predictions were quite close; and (2) individually, the deviation from mea-
sured was fairly large--from an underprediction of 45% to an overpre-
diction of 73%. The lower-bound 90% confidence capacity values are con-
sidered further in a discussion on factors of safety later in this paper.
I was not surprised that different techniques produced satisfactory an-
swers. Also, I was not surprised that similar, if not identical, techniques
produced both satisfactory and unsatisfactory predictions. Presumably, the
predictions falling outside the acceptable range did not have proper judg-

10 45
22
Values
4O o~
r
Underpredlctlons-9~- I - ~ Overpredlctlons Z
Z 8
O 35 O
}-
I-
O Median
30
IJJ
"'
ri- 6 I n-
D. Mean 25 0-
Li.
O 20 O
r 4 I--
IJJ H-PILE Z
15 uJ
m
10 uJ
Z 2 a.
5

i i I i , ~ , 0
00 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

RATIO O F
PREDICTED TO O B S E R V E D
CAPACITY

FIG. 17. Histogram of Ratio of Predicted to Observed Ultimate Capacity, H-Pile

1670
 10
24 40
: . Values
ffl - I" Meaian
_u nderpredlctlons--~-I -~--- Overpredlctlons 35 (n
oZ 8 Z
O
I- - Mean
30 ~-
(J

LU 6 ~ PIPE PILE 25 w
a,. n
[L
20
0 0
n- 4 p-
UJ 15 Z
111 W
0
10
Z 2 W
a.
5

0 ! I 0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

R A T I O OF
P R E D I C T E D TO O B S E R V E D
CAPACITY
FIG. 18. Histogram o f R a t i o o f P r e d i ~ e d t o O b s e r v e d U I t i m a t e C a p a c i t y , PipePile

20
: 46 40
, Values
18
-Underpredlctlons ---5-1- ~ - Overpredlctlons
35 u)
Z
Z 16 9i -Median
O O
m
I- 30 ~"
O
r 14
~ - Mean
UJ 12 Z 25 uJ
h-
rr
0. Z a.
LI. 10 20 "
O iBOTH PILES O
n- 8 I.-
UJ 15 z
m LU
6 (J
10 rr
UJ
Z 4
5
2
I I I I
0
00 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

RATIO OF
PREDICTED TO OBSERVED
CAPACITY

FIG. 19. Histogram of Ratio of Predicted to Observed Ultimate Capacity, Both

Piles

1671
ment applied to the data interpretation to appropriately model the soil
properties for the numerical model utilized. The interpretation of undrained
shear strength, s,, for the clay used by the predictors ranged from 22.5 to
47.9 MPa (470-1,000 psf), obviously such a wide range that some of the
predictions would have to be substantially in error. Likewise there was an
equally large range in the friction-angle values used for the sand, 28~ to 47~
with the tangent of the friction angle varying from 0.53 to 1.07. Perhaps
each predictor's local experience played a part in producing these wide
ranges. I wonder how much intuition was applied to the highest and lowest
predictions based on the predictor's experience.
It is also important to emphasize that this situation is one in which a
correct capacity prediction could occur due to two compensating errors
because there were almost equal penetrations in clay and in sand. Nineteen
of the predictors provided their estimate of capacity contributions from the
sand and the clay, a total of 38 predictions for the two piles (Finno et al.
1989a). Of these 38 combinations of predictions, there were 21 total capacity
predictions within _+20% of the measured total capacity. But of these 21
predictions, there were only six companion predictions of the relative con-
tributions from the sand and the clay within _+20% of the actual relative
contribution of sand and clay. That means that more than two-thirds of the
21 "correct" total predictions were correct because of compensating errors,
some overestimating the contributions from the sand and others from the
clay, divided about half and half. These results strongly suggest that for
mixed-soil profiles, right predictions may be produced by compensating
errors in the contributions from the major soil components. Interestingly,
there were two teams that were within _+20% on total capacity and on the
distribution between clay and sand for both piles.
The other predictions (time rate of capacity gain, pore pressures, residual
loads after driving, load deflection performance) were generally quite scat-
tered, indicating very low reliability. We cannot claim a very high degree
of individual reliability for capacity predictions for piles in mixed soil profiles
even though the bulk of the individual predictions (30 out of the 46 total)
were within - 3 0 % to + 20% of the measured capacity, a very desirable
range.
Perhaps we could interpret the distribution of predictions on a percentage
basis from this exercise as representing what a single predictor might expect
for his predictions for a variety of piles in varying soil profiles. Hopefully,
application of the aforementioned critical elements 5 and 6 would tend to
eliminate the extremes at both the upper and lower ends of the diagram in
Fig. 19, but particularly at the upper end.
The major lesson learned from this example is that valid predictions may
be derived due to compensating errors. We can also infer that extrapolation
of local experience to a distant site may introduce deviations between pre-
diction and performance.

EXAMPLE 6:1-95 EMBANKMENT

A wide range of conclusions on prediction reliability can be drawn from
results of the 1974 program to predict failure height of an 1-95 embankment
test section near Boston (Massachusetts 1974). This program, conducted
under the guidance of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), sought predictions as to the
additional height of fill required to cause the test section on 1-95 to fail.
The original existing section, as shown in Fig. 20, was about 10.4 m (34 ft)
1672
 WEST NEW FILL EAST-- 20
50 1969FILL ~ Y~115pcf
10
'7 ~~ / Gravelly send fill
-r 7 Y~119pcf H-1 --~ H-2 _
(/)
V =o 0 rr
P"
LU
0 Peat ~
SIltY sand
9 ~P-1 [ Peat ', ~ - -
UJ
UJ IA
14.
9 10
e6
9
o 50 Clay 9 4 Z
O

.J
jJ -2 2O W-
><
uJ 100 30
TIll SI SLOPEINDICATOR _ UJ
9 SETn.EMENT PLA'I~
9 PIEZOMETER 40
V HEAVEMARKER --
150 -- - ? . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . ?. . . . . . . . ?- - -
Rock (After MIT, 1974) - 50

FIG. 20. 1-95 Test Fill Cross Section

WATER
DESCRIPTION CONTENT, % UNDRAINED SHEAR STRENGTH, KSF
0 20 40 60 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3,0
O --Peat v-- ,i,I t,t t 0
Fine : I I
\ Sand P 9 9 U TEST
20 -~ S t i f f B l u e / - == "A / 9 UU TEST
.\ clay /~ 9 :~ 9 FIELDVANE _ 10
40 -

60
.
Medium
. Blue
- f u . Clay
-

_
. :,. )
9 t 9 ~fromCKoU -- 29
z Z
O
80 ~-,u
1" ,l~ r~. C ~ reselon Tests _o
:'
..J 100 -
u4 e "KoU IX - 30
}- Soft Blue 9
120 " Ulav -
99 t 2%- T e s t s , N --
F q I "~ P,J II , \ , 40

20 40 60 80 100 120 140

,PL LL
160 UNDRAINED SHEAR STRENGTH, MPa
(After D'Appolonla et al. 1971)

FIG. 21. Geotechnical Characteristics, 1-95 Test Fill Site

high, with a lv on 2h slope on the east and a lv on 1.9h side slope 7.6 m
(25 ft) high above a berm on the west. The west s!ope was to be extended
upward with slight steepening. The east slope would be steepened to the
angle of repose of the sand fill, or about lv on lh, as the e m b a n k m e n t was
raised over a 91 m (300 ft) long section centered on Sta. 263. The intent
was for the east slope to fail but not the west. The original foundation
stratigraphy is typical of the Boston a r e a - - a few feet of peat underlain by
a thin layer of well-graded silty sand. The foundation stratum of interest is
Boston blue clay, stiff and overconsolidated at the top, becoming soft and
normally consolidated with depth. The upper surface of the basal glacial till
slopes down from east to west across the site, as shown in Fig. 20. Note the
locations of i n s t r u m e n t s - - s l o p e indicators, piezometers, settlement plates,
and heave markers.
The participants were furnished detailed geotechnical data, including pi-
1673
ezometer records, slope-indicator deflection observations during the life of
the existing fill, and comprehensive laboratory test results, which are sum-
marized in Fig. 21 (D'Appolonia et al. 1971). The participants were asked
to predict first the amount of additional fill, T, "to cause a stability failure
(defined as differential deformation at crest greater than 0.5 m)." They were
also asked to predict movements indicated by reference plates (SP-1, 4-1,
and H-2) and inclinometers (SI-1, 2, 3, 4), and pore pressures recorded in
piezometers (P-3, 4, 6), all shown in Fig. 20, at various stages during fill
placement.
The embankment failed at a total height of 16 m (52.5 ft), with both
slopes failing early one morning with no one present. The failure was of
"extraordinary proportions." The crest dropped about 9 m (30 ft) and the
sides heaved as much as 3 m (10 ft). The length of the failure was 313 m
(1,030 ft), extending 137 m (450 ft) south of the heightened test section and
85 m (280 ft) to the north. There was no warning from the slope indicators
or piezometers of impending failure.
The predictions of additional fill height to cause failure ranged from 2.4
to 5.2 m (8-17 ft); a histogram of the ratio of predicted to observed ad-
ditional height to failure is shown in Fig. 22. The ratio ranges from 44% to
144%. Six of the 10 predictors underestimated the incremental failure height
and four overpredicted. According to Dr. Francisco Silva-Tulla, who was
closely associated with the exercise, the concensus of the participants and
the audience at the exercise symposium was that the predictions varied
widely (Silva-Tulla, personal communication, 1993). In another light, total

5 50
lO
Values

Median - ~
40
(n U)
Z Mean - - ~ Z
O
I-- I,--
O O
30
UJ LU
n- n-
n. O..
IJ. U.
O O
rr p-
20 z
UJ uJ
m Z Q
:S n-
//// uJ
Z D.
10

0 I I I ....~ I I I I 0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2,0
R A T I O OF
PREDICTED TO OBSERVED
ADDITIONAL HEIGHT

FIG. 22. Histogram of Ratio of Predicted to Observed Additional Failure Height

1674
 5 50
10
,,~Median
, Values
45
,~Mean r
z 4 : 40 Z
0 O
i
I-
k-
0 35 rc~
a LLI
m
re 3 30 n-
13.
O. //

LL
//
25 O
0 //

O: 2 //
20 z
W //
w
Ol
15 cc
// uJ
Z // o.
10

0 " " " ~ " " " " 0

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
RATIO OF
P R E D I C T E D TO O B S E R V E D
TOTAL H E I G H T
FIG. 23. Histogram of Ratio of Predicted to Observed Total Failure Height

height could be used as a basis for comparison of predictions with obser-

vation, because slope failure is related to the total fill height. On that basis,
the histogram of the ratio of predicted to observed total height to failure
in Fig. 23 shows seven of the 10 predictions to be within 13% of the ultimate
height even though different procedures were employed. The range of pre-
dictions was from 12.5 to 18.3 m (41-60 ft) and the mean prediction was
14.9 m (49 ft), or 93% of ultimate. This instance is a good demonstration
of our collective technical competence. Silva-Tulla has speculated, however,
that if the exercise and the fill had started from level ground, some of the
predictions would have been for a total fill height to failure of less than 10.4
m (34 ft), the height at the start of the exercise. He attributes this dilemma
to difficulties in predicting the pore-pressure response and thereby the shear
strength of the Boston blue clay.
Everyone, including the investigators, was surprised by three aspects of
the failure: (1) No prior indication of impending failure; (2) both slopes
failed simultaneously; and (3) the failure extended well beyond the limits
of the test fill. The investigators had planned to take a time-lapse movie of
the failure from a specially set pole about 100 ft south of the heightened
section, but the slide encompassed the pole.
When 6 ft of new fill had been placed, filling was stopped for two days.
The predictions of vertical and horizontal movements for the end of this
period were considerably greater than observed. The average predicted
movements were 3 to 10 times greater than the actual values, with very few
predictions of less than actual. Pore-pressure predictions were a little closer
1675
but the averages of the predicted pore-pressure increments were 1.5-2.0
times those observed even though there were a few predictions less than
observed. Perhaps our prediction capabilities for movements and pore pres-
sures have improved in 20 years, but I am somewhat doubtful.
One value of a property that was underestimated by the investigators and
used by the predictors was the density of the additional fill. The problem
definition given in Fig. 20 gave the expected density of the new fill as 115
lb/cu ft (pcf). The actual measured in-place density of the new fill was 122
pcf, an increase of 6%. The potential effect on the prediction histogram for
incremental height in Fig. 23 to-correct for this deviation would be to shift
the ratio of predicted to observed by 6%, not much in this case, but illus-
trative of the importance of accurately predicting all properties, not just
strength.
The lessons from this predictive exercise fall more into the category of
what we can and cannot predict with reliability. Total stability for staged
construction was reasonably well predicted. Incremental stability was not.
Incremental pore pressures were not too well predicted as to specific values
but were good enough for stability computations. Deformations were poorly
predicted, with everyone, including the investigators, surprised by the extent
of the failure. Shape, limits, and specific location of a failure surface are
relatively unpredictable. In his analytical review of the 1-95 test fill in his
Terzaghi Lecture, Leonards (1982) concluded that a designer of an em-
bankment on soft clay "must continue to rely heavily on experience within
a given geologic region--experience that has been carefully digested in
terms of local practice for site investigation, sampling, testing, and analysis."
This program had a later desirable outcome. It led to Ladd's Terzaghi
Lecture of 1986 (Ladd 1991).

EXAMPLE 7: SELECTION OF FACTOR OF SAFETY

In none of the previous examples was safe stability an element of the
prediction, so there was no consideration of a factor of safety. Yet for most
commercial geotechnical predictions, the consultant must complete his or
her prediction process with a recommendation for an allowable load on a
pile, an allowable bearing pressure for a footing, or an allowable slope for
an embankment or excavation of a given height. Let's examine the process
of selecting a factor of safety to be applied to a computed ultimate capacity
of a pile.
The Northwestern University pile exercise (Finno 1989) provides some
guidance on what some of the participants viewed as appropriate conser-
vatism to be utilized in computing the ultimate capacity to which a factor
of safety should be applied to obtain a safe working load for design. Finno
asked the predictors for their "best estimate" of ultimate capacity--their
prediction of the ultimate failure loads of the test piles. He also asked them
for "a lower bound estimate of capacity, with 90% confidence that the actual
value will be higher than this lower bound." While not stated, it was Finno's
expectation that this lower-bound estimate would be the one that the pre-
dictor would use in a design assignment to which a factor of safety would
be applied. Only 15 of the predictors provided lower-bound estimates. Fig.
24 is a repeat of the histogram of the best estimates for both piles from Fig.
19 but with the 30 values from the group of 15 predictors shown, with a
second cross hatching imposed on the results from all 24 predictors. This
diagram shows that the pattern, median, and mean of the partial group do
1676
 20
18 I

Underpredlctlons~ - I ~ - - Overpredlctlons
(n (46)~
z 16
O J 30~~ Medians
i--
(J 14
r~ U/ ~JMeans
uJ 12
m
Q. ,/

u. 10
O ~ BOT.._._HHPILE_ S_
rr 8
uJ
m 6

z 4

2
t
00 0,5 ,0 1.5 2.0
RATIO OF
PREDICTED TO OBSERVED
CAPACITY
FIG. 24. Histogram of Ratio of Predicted to Observed "Best Estimate" Ultimate
Capacity for Groups of 15 and 24, Both Piles

not differ materially from those of the total group. Thus, we can use the
lower-bound estimates of the partial group to represent the total group.
The upper histogram in Fig. 25 of the ratio of predicted to measured
capacity is for best-estimate capacities for the predictor group of 15; the
inverted lower histogram is for the lower-bound estimates. Note that the
median dropped from 0.93 to 0.60 while the mean shifted down from 1.02
to 0.77. Note also that three of the lower-bound predictions were still 30-
50% greater than measured (two for the pipe pile and one for the H-pile).
Remember, these are predictions that were to have had 90% confidence
that they would not be exceeded.
Looking at the data another way to evaluate the degree of conservatism
each predictor thought he was injecting into his lower-bound estimate, the
histogram in Fig. 26 is of the ratio of the individual lower-bound capacity
to the respective best-estimate capacity. Of the six values in the range from
0.9 to 1.0, there were two values of 1.0, both for the pipe pile. The medians
and the means were practically identical for the two piles and the distri-
butions for each pile were identical. These data suggest that the predictors
would perhaps apply an average conservative multiplier of 0.75 to their best
estimate before applying a usual factor of safety. If they would have used
a typical value of 2.0 to arrive at a working design load for these two piles,
these "designing" predictors would have achieved real factors of safety
ranging from 3.7 to as little as 1.43.
Another measure of perceived reliability of pile-capacity predictions was
obtained in a survey reported at the 1985 International Conference on Soil
Mechanics and Foundation Engineering (Focht and O'Neill 1985). Nearly
25% of the respondents to that survey thought their pile-capacity estimates
1677
 14
9~ - M e d i a n Values_
30
12
BEST i~-i~ Mean 40
~o ESTIMATE
_30 ~.
0 8
6~

o ,, ,.~ F,.~,. ~ .
~i~~ ilO~
~o., ~ 1 . o Y/~I.S'. o
r.,, 9,9,"~- /A-- 1
I , - EI~_~,~ ,ow~. ~o,~
BOUND
6 i ~-~Mean -~ 20 O.
8
.ed,an--~t 30
10
RATIO OF
PREDICTED TO OBSERVED
CAPACITY

FIG. 25. Histograms of Ratio of Predicted "Best Estimate" and "Lower Bound"
to Observed Ultimate Capacity for Group of 15, Both Piles

14
30 45
values
Median
12
Mean --~ 40
z z
o_ 10 35 O
-/i/

BOTH PILES ~;~;

//// 30 r
o
uJ
Iz 8 ///,

////
25
==
uJ

i.i. ////
z/x/
U.
O
Iz
6
,///

Vl/ ....
llll
~ 2o O
I'-
uJ y/Z,H, 2:
/iiJ
till
i/ll
UJ
=! 4
Y/A U.I
eL
Y/z
2
~//~

0 . . . .
.... ~ o
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
RATIO
LOWER BOUND CAPACITY
BEST ESTIMATE CAPACITY

FIG. 26. Histogram of Ratio of Individual "Lower Bound" to "Best Estimate"

Ultimate Capacities, Both Piles

1678
were reliable within + 10-20% nearly 30% to be valid within _+20-30%,
and another nearly 25% expected their predictions to be good only within
+ 30-50%. The results of this worldwide survey involving 56 respondents
are not particularly different than the implications of the smaller North-
western University group. Focht and O'Neill (1985) also present other dis-
cussions on choices of and approaches to selection of factors of safety for
pile foundations.
The choice of a specific factor of safety for a specific problem must be
based on a relatively large number of considerations, which I have grouped
into four categories.

9 Quality of strength data (volume of data, adequacy of test technique,

scatter of data, quality of samples)
9 Appropriateness of analytical technique (new procedure, long-es-
tablished procedure, multiple procedures, applicability to geologic
environment, compatibility with strength data)
9 Type of loading (sustained, intermittent, cycling, dynamic, seismic,
single event, mode of failure, redundant structure) and confidence
in magnitude of load
9 Consequences of failure (loss of life, structure collapse, major dam-
age to structure, aesthetic damage)

All of these considerations enter into the confidence level the predictor
wishes to achieve. Some of the considerations are amenable to statistical
and probabilistic analyses, but others can only be approached on a judg-
mental basis because statistical data are not available. Not included at all
in any of these factors is the uncertainty of construction quality. Many
failures of pile foundations in particular have been the result of construction
defects rather than of design. But usually this uncertainty is not included
in the design factor of safety.
Load and resistance factor design (LRFD) is rapidly taking over structural
design of steel and concrete structures (Salmon and Johnson 1980; AISC:
Manual 1986). It is also entering geotechnical foundation design, particularly
for piles. All of the foregoing comments on conventional factor of safety
are also applicable to the resistance factor to be included in an LRFD
approach to structure foundations.
The judgment of the designer that his factor of safety or resistance coef-
ficient is fully compatible with all of the factors entering into the process
including the loads and the structure characteristics is of vital importance.
The experience of the predictor with the characteristics of the soil formation,
the type of supported structure, the economic and social consequences of
failure, and other factors all must be taken into account even if only in a
general automatic, almost subconscious, step in the mental process of the
predictor.
Before concluding, there is one additional point that should be made.
Good geotechnical engineering requires broad understanding of civil en-
gineering in general. A geotechnical engineer must also have a good under-
standing of geology. He or she has to be a civil engineer first, with an
appreciation for structural design, elements of projects such as water-supply
projects, drainage, highways, bridges, waterfront facilities, dams, construc-
tion procedures, and the like. The geotechnical consultant must not lose
sight of the fact that his or her technical solution (and prediction) must be
compatible with the remainder of the project and its constructability.
1679
CONCLUSION
These several examples have shown that predictions will probably deviate
from actual performance when one or more of the critical elements of the
predictive process is deficient or missing. The matrix of the six critical
elements and the six numerical examples in Fig. 27 shows the major and
minor causes of the missed predictions as I judge them. Lack of proper
judgment is the major cause for four out of the six examples. Inadequate
modeling of the soil properties and inappropriate analytical methods played
a role as either a major or minor cause in four of the six examples. It is
very often more important to know what we do not know than what we do
know.
Returning to the predictive process, the six critical elements could be
considered steps within the process. However, if that were done, an ex-
tremely important first step would be missing. Therefore, I have added as
the first step in the following list, which outlines the prediction process, the
application of sound judgment (and perhaps intuition) to the problem at
hand to select the approach to the prediction and to define the critical
components of the process for the particular problem.

1. Utilizing sound judgment, select an approach to a problem and define

critical components of the process.
2. Develop an adequate model of the stratigraphy, including water level,
and an understanding of site and regional geology.
3. Develop an adequate model of applicable soil parameters.
4. Select a method of analysis and select a factor of safety compatible
with parameters, method of analysis, and the problem.

Critical San Bass North- 1-95

Chicago Jacinto tenneco Strait western
Elements Piles Fill

Stratigraphy @
Properties @ @
Analytical @ | | |
History 9
Judgment @ @|
Intuition (Not Applicable)
I
Major @ Minor

FIG. 27. Matrix of Causes of Missed Predictions

1680
 5. Gather and evaluate historical data that are applicable to problem.
6. Apply judgment and intuition in review of conclusions, predictions,
and recommendations.

The absence of step 1 in the foregoing list may not have influenced the
validity of the example predictions that were described. There are, however,
many consulting assignments that are or can be adversely affected by the
absence of proper judgment at their beginning. The other five steps are the
six critical elements with application of intuition included with the judg-
mental review of conclusions, predictions, and recommendations.
Good judgment has been referred to many times in this paper. Where
does good judgment come from? To paraphrase Mark Twain, who when
asked that question replied, "Good judgment comes from experience. And
where does experience come from? Experience comes from bad judgment."
Try to rely on the bad experience of others rather than your own. Good
judgment is more than good technical knowledge. My advice to the young
geotechnical engineer is to read all of the Terzaghi lectures and the Dun-
nicliff and Deere volume ]Judgment (1984), which reprints Peck (1969, 1978,
1980)]. Then make use whenever possible of all the processes advocated in
the aforementioned publications--calculated risk, redundancy, monitored
decisions, and the observational approach. In addition, the writings of Pe-
troski (1984) and Ferguson (1993) are excellent recent commentaries on
development of engineering judgment.
There are four thoughts that summarize this paper:

1. Judgment must be applied at least twice--at the beginning and at the

end of a numerical prediction exercise; actually, it is necessary throughout
the process.
2. Every element of the prediction process is important--they are in-
terrelated, and all must be compatible.
3. The prediction should be stated in terms compatible with the expected
reliability, without an indication of more precision than it contains.
4. It is better to be approximately correct than to be precise and wrong.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer is grateful to the many associates and clients that contributed
to the personal learning process that led to this paper. In particular, ac-
knowledgments are due to Ralph B. Peck, Carl W. Fenske, Charles E.
Williams, Bramlette McClelland, C. A. Swanlund Jr., Richard J. Finno,
and Francisco Silva-Tulla, who reviewed and contributed to sections on the
individual examples. Special thanks go to my son, John A. Focht III, who
assisted materially in development of the paper's theme and content.

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