Sata Elyka Criminal Law Assignment 2

MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY
College of Law Extension

General Santos Campus
J.P. Laurel Avenue
CASES CITED
IN ARTICLE 4 OF
THE REVISED
PENAL CODE
Table of contents
Case Page #
People vs. Mariano (NO. L-45966, November 10, 1978) 4
US vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310 6
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People vs. Ural (No. L-30801, March 27, 1974. 56 SCRA 138, 144) 8
US vs. Divino, 12 Phil. 175 9
US vs. Villanueva, 31 Phil. 412 11
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 13
People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605 15
People vs. Umawid (G.R. No. 208719, 2014) 17
People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524 19
People vs. Tomotorgo (No. L-47941, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 238) 21
Peole vs. Monleon (No. L-36282, December 10, 1976, 74 SCRA 263) 23
US vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14, 19 25
People vs. Toling (L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17, 33) 27
US vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497 29
US vs. Sornito, 4 Phil. 357, 360 30
US vs. Zamora, 32 phil. 218, 226 32
People vs. Cornel, 78 Phil. 458, 261 (p. 76) 34
People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 372 (also mentioned in p. 84) 35
People vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 4 (p. 77) 36
People vs. Illustre, 54 Phil. 594 (also mentioned in p. 83) 38
People vs. Rodriquez, 23 Phil. 22 39
People vs. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341 40
Belbis vs. People (G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012) 42
People vs. Cutura, 4 SCRA 663 44
US vs. Bayutas, 31 Phil. 584 45
People vs. Cornel, 78 Phil. 418 47
Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 48
Quinto vs. Andres (G.R. No. 155791, March 16, 2005) 50
Case Page #
Vda. De Bataclan, et. Al. vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186, 187 53
United States vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22, 1912 55
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People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18 57

People vs. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54 59
People vs. Red 62
People vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1 63
People vs. Acuram (G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000) 65
People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038 67
People vs. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503 69
People vs. Palalon, 49 Phil. 177 71
US vs. Embate, 3 Phil. 640 73
Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 10 74
US vs. Monasterial, 14 Phil. 391 76
US vs. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 78
People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil. 395 80
People vs. Balmores, 85 Phil. 493, 496
Jacinto vs. People (G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009) 83
Intod vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103119) 84
Name: Elyka V. Sata 1-Alfarabi

Subject: Criminal Law 1
Professor: Atty. Kristian Josef Acedo
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO

MARIANO y ALEJANDRO alias Negro, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. L-45966, November 10, 1978
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Facts:
Mario Mariano (the accused) was charged on November 11, 1976, with
the crime of rape with homicide of 6-year-old Luningning Mapola. The
victim's catastrophic vaginal laceration, brain traumas that resulted in
bleeding, and other deadly injuries are what ultimately led to her demise.
On November 11, 1976, Juanita Mapola reported Luningning missing.

Using the boy's information, she was able to locate the victim the next
day at 3:00 PM in an abandoned home in Fernandez St., Tondo Manila.
The victim's eyes were swelled with blood seeping from the left eye, her
dress rolled up to her tummy, and she was already dead. She also didn't
have a panty.
While admitting culpability, the defendant disputes having intended to kill

the victim. The trial court reached the conclusion based on the evidence
that the accused had actually committed the alleged crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of the intent to kill can be used as a defense.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 4 of the RPC. Criminal Liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
In this case, The testimonies of Dr. Luis Larion, a prosecution witness,
and Dr. Angelo Singian, a defense witness, established beyond doubt that
the death of the victim was due to profuse hemorrhage brought about by
the laceration of the vagina caused by a stiffened male organ or by the
insertion of a hard blunt object.
There is no question base on the evidence that the death of the victim
was brought about by the rape committed by the accused. Therefore, his
contention of not intending to kill the victim cannot be upheld because a
person who performs a criminal act is responsible for all the
consequences of said act regardless of his intention.
The court hereby affirmed and the accused-appellant, sentenced to
death and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) for the death of the latter, and the sum of
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Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the

costs.
[G.R No.4935. October 25, 1909]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
JAMES L. BROBST, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
James L. Brobst, the defendant, and another American called Mann were
working on a mine in the Municipality of Masbate, where they employed
several local people. Simeon Saldivar, one of these laborers, was fired by
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Mann, who also advised the defendant not to hire him again since he was
a thief and a disruptive element to the other workers.
Saldivar went to the mine to look for work a few days later, on the
morning of July 10, 1907, along with three or four other people. The
defendant saw Saldivar and told him to leave. Despite repeated orders,
Saldivar did not comply and instead smiled or grinned at the defendant.
This infuriated the defendant, who then took three steps towards Saldivar
and delivered a powerful blow with his closed fist where the handle of
Saldivar's bolo rested against the belt from which it was suspended.
Saldivar threw up his hands after being struck, stumbled, and then fled
silently in the direction of his sister's home, which was some 200 yards
distant and 100 feet up the side of the hill. He passed away just as he got
to the house's door.
The defendant appealed to this court after the trial court found him guilty
of the crime of homicide and ordered him to serve six years and one day
in prison.
The defense attorney for the appellant claims that the trial court erred in
the following ways: (1) the evidence does not support a conclusion that
the deceased died as a result of the defendant's injuries; and (2) even if it
is proven that the defendant's touching the deceased caused his death,
the defendant cannot be charged with a crime because he had a legal
right to eject the deceased from the mining property.
Issue:
Whether or not Brobst liable, given that it was not his intent to kill
Saldivar, and he had a right to expel Saldivar from the property?
Ruling:
Yes. The law states that “any person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit”. In
such cases, the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for
the natural consequences of his illegal acts merely because he did not
intend to produce such consequence, but it does take that fact into
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consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in

this case.
What has been said sufficiently disposes of all errors assigned by counsel
for the appellant, except certain alleged errors of procedure in the court
below which we do not think it necessary to discuss, because even if it
be admitted that such errors were committed, they do not appear to have
in any wise prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. The
judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
Appellant.
[G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
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FACTS:
Felix Napola was intentionally set afire on July 31, 1966, by police officer
Domingo Ural after they had just finished boxing. On August 25, 1966,
Napola passed away. The cause of death was listed as "burn" on the
death certificate that the sanitary inspector issued.
ISSUE:
Is Ural criminally liable for the death of Napola?
RULING:
Yes. Ural is criminally liable for the death of Napola.
The Revised Penal code provides that he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused.
Hence, Ural is criminally liable as his act towards Napola is identified as

the cause of the latter’s death.
[G.R. No. 4490. December 4, 1908]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs
FELICIANO DIVINO, Defendant-Appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga, for Appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.
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Facts:
A complaint was filed regarding an incident that allegedly happened four

years ago on a particular night and resulted in injuries. In July 1903, in
the municipality of Davao, district of Davao, Moro Province, the accused,
in his residence, bound a girl by the hands and legs named Alfonsa, laid
her on the floor, stuffed a piece of cloth into her mouth, and fastened her
body to the boards of said floor; he then wrapped her feet in pieces of
cloth, soaked said cloth in petroleum, and set said cloth on fire with a
match. According to the defendant, the victim was taken to her by their
captain for medical attention because she had ulcers all over her body.
Thus, the accused argued that he acted in good faith since his intention
was to remedy the victim’s ulcers and not to injure her.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for physical injuries

through imprudence despite acting in good faith.
Ruling:
Yes. It is undeniable that the actions of the accused appear to have been
meant as a remedy rather than to cause an evil; nevertheless, taking into
account the imprudence defined in paragraph 2 of article 568 of the Penal
Code, as having been committed by an ignorant person who was
prohibited from exercising the art of healing not only by the regulations
governing it but also by the Penal Code.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. Even if the defendant
did not intend to commit a felony because his intention was to treat the
victim, he is still liable for physical injuries through imprudence since the
wrongful act resulted from the imprudence, a criminal negligence, which
is penalized by the law.
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Hence, Feliciano Divino was sentenced for simple imprudence to the

penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to suspension from office and
right of suffrage during the period of his sentence, and to pay the costs of
both instances.
[G.R. No. 10606 September 11, 1915]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Tirso de Irureta Goyena for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
Facts:
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Isidro Benter filed a complaint against defendant Andres Villanueva on

July 5, 1914, alleging that Villanueva "while quarreling with his
opponent, Isidro Benter, had suddenly snatched the bolo which the
latter was carrying at his belt and with it inflicted upon him a wound in
the palm of the right hand which incapacitated the aggrieved party
from performing work for more than thirty days and which Villanueva
did not hurt Benter in any way either. The latter sustained damage to
himself as a result of an accident he caused.
On October 10, 1914, the complaint could not be handled right away
since last July 5. Benter was able to attest that the wound took longer
than 40 days to heal as a result. On December 8, during the trial,
Benter displayed a scar in the right palm that extended from the little
finger's base to the index finger's first joint.
The judge observed that the man's ring finger could not be extended
and that his index finger was stiff. The complaint's claim that the right
hand had become completely useless was not supported by evidence
during the trial either. The court ordered the cirujano ministrante
called as an expert witness to examine the scar in order to determine
whether Benter could use his hand as effectively as he might have
when it was in its prior normal state. The witness said "no," explaining
that the internal damage had not fully healed; nonetheless, no arteries
had been hurt, as articulation would be impossible if they had.
Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva is criminally liable for the result which is
not intended.
Ruling:
The judgment appealed is reversed. Andres Villanueva was acquitted with

the costs of both instances de oficio.
Thus, one who, because of curiosity, snatched the bolo carried by the
offended party at his belt, and the latter instinctively caught the blade of
said bolo in trying to retain it, is not criminally liable for the physical
injuries caused, because there is no provision in the Revised Penal Code
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which punishes that act of snatching the property of another just to

satisfy curiosity.
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 says that criminal liability shall be incurred by

any person “committing a felony,” not merely performing an act. A felony
is an act or omission punishable by the R.P.C. If the act is not punishable
by the code, it is not a felony. But the felony committed by the offender
should be one committed by means of dolo, that is, with malice, because
paragraph 1 of Article 4 speaks of wrongful act done” different from that
which he intended.”
[74 Phil 257, G.R. No. 47722 July 27, 1943]

Vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Captain Godofredo Monsod, the provincial inspector of Cabanatuan, was
given orders to apprehend the notorious criminal Balagtas and, if he was
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outnumbered, to take him out alive or dead. The similar directive was
communicated to Police Chief Oanis, who was aware of Irene's
whereabouts as Balagtas' lover. Oanis approached Mallare at Irene's
home and inquired about the location of Irene's room. In response to
further questioning, Mallare pointed to the location and added that Irene
was having relations with her lover.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary)

went to Irene's room next, and when they saw a man sleeping with his
back to the door where they were, they either fired their.32 and.45
caliber revolvers at him simultaneously or one after the other. Irene was
awakened by the gunfire and saw her lover already injured. She then
turned to look at the door from which the shots had come and saw the
defendants continuing to shoot at him. Later, it was discovered that
Tecson, Irene's lover, and not Balagtas had been the victim of the
shooting and death.
Because of this, Oanis and Galanta were accused of murder. The trial
court determined that the appellants had committed homicide by reckless
imprudence. thus the current appeal. It is argued that because the
appellants believed Tecson to be Balagtas while acting honorably in the
performance of their official duties, they are not subject to criminal
prosecution. The U.S. v. Ah Chong case is cited by the appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable for the death of
Tecson.
Ruling:
Yes, both Oanis and Galanta were criminally liable for the death of
Tecson.
Under the law, “Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from which he intended." Appellants’ invocation of honest mistake of fact
is misplaced. In the instant case, appellants found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in
the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even
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effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by
defendants was not merely criminal negligence, it was intentional and not
accidental.
[G.R. No. 32066 March 15, 1930.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GONA (Mansaca), Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
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A gathering of Mansacas took place in Mansaca Gabriel's home on October

26, 1928. The guys present appear to have been given access to a lot of
booze, and some of them got drunk, which led to a fight between the
defendant and the Mansaca Dunca. Eventually, Mapudul and one Awad
departed the house, followed by Dunca and his son Aguipo.
With the purpose of attacking Dunca, the defendant left the house about
the same time. However, due to the darkness of the evening and the
defendant's inebriation, he mistaken Mapudul for Dunca and struck him
with a bolo, killing him. The defense lawyer claims that because the
defendant didn't want to kill the dead and committed the crime
accidentally, he should have been charged with homicide through
negligence under Article 568, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code rather than
the more serious charge of intentional homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the mistake of identity of the victim absolves the

defendant’s criminal liability and if it is also a mitigating circumstance.
Ruling
No. The mistake of identity of the victim does not absolve the defendant’s
criminal liability and also does not qualify for a mitigating circumstance.
Under paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, “A person

committing a felony is still criminally liable even if there is a mistake in
the identity of the victim”. In the case of United States v. Mendieta (34
Phil., 242), the court said: "Even admitting that the defendant intended to
injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the
mortal wound which he inflicted upon the latter, in no way could be
considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in
killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted
maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility.
Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the
wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstance”.
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Hence, the appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the
defendant.
G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
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The case's facts state that on November 26, 2002, at 4 p.m., Vicente
Ringor (Vicente) was visiting his 2-year-old granddaughter Maureen Joy
Ringor (Maureen) on the terrace of their home in Villanueva, San Manuel,
Isabela. Unexpectedly, Roger Ringor Umawid, the accused, showed there
and started assaulting Vicente with a panabas without cause or
provocation. Although Vicente was able to avoid Umawid's strikes,
Maureen was instantly killed when the latter struck her in the abdomen
and back. Umawid turned away after witnessing Maureen covered in
blood.
When Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey) was sleeping at Vicente's house9,

Umawid went to a nearby house that was just five (5) meters away.
When Jeffrey stepped outside after being awakened by the noise, he was
met by his uncle charging at him with his panabas. Instinctively, Jeffrey
ran into the house with his sister and cousin to seek refuge. Umawid, on
the other hand, managed to stop Jeffrey from shutting the door of the
house, allowing the latter to storm inside. With nowhere else to go and
being surrounded, Jeffrey knelt down and covered his head with his arms
to protect himself from Umawid's impending strikes.
Eventually, Umawid killed Jeffrey with a series of hacking blows that

severed his fingers. Only after witnessing Jeffrey, who was then
pretending to be dead, leaning against the wall, and covered in blood, did
Umawid halt his bombardment. The accused attempted to utilize insanity
as a defense but refrained from testifying in person. The RTC determined
that the accused did the crimes alleged in the information's and that they
were carried out in a treacherous way. He was further charged with
murder and frustrated murder. Umawid appealed to the CA out of
resentment. They supported the RTC's verdict. As a result, the accuser
did not present any proof that he was truly insane.
Issue:
Whether the defense of insanity of the accused has a merit or not?
Ruling:
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No. The defense of the insanity of the accused is lacking. The decision of
the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Under article 12 of RPC which provides that circumstances which exempt

from criminal liability. - the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1.
An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
The accused solely relied on the testimonies of the doctors to substantiate

his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that the testimony only
showed his mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March
2003. He was only examined six (6) months before the latter committed
the crimes and three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. These
cannot prove the accused insanity.
[G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs
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FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, alias

FRANCISCO ADMONES, alias BUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY),
Defendant-appellant
Facts:
In the District of San Nicolas, on the evening of July 24, 1932, Yu Lon and
Yu Yee, a father and son, paused to chat on the sidewalk near the
intersection of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets. Yu Lon had his back to
the street and was positioned close to the edge of the walkway. When Yu
Yee was going to leave his father while they were conversing, the man
who had been walking back and forth behind Yu Lon suddenly and
unexpectedly approached him from behind and punched him in the back
of the head with his fist. Yu Lon stumbled and landed awkwardly.
The bottom portion of his body fell onto the sidewalk as his head
impacted the pavement. His attackers took off right away. Yu Yee chased
him down Jaboneros, Camaba, and San Fernando Streets before losing
track of him. When Chin Sam and Yee Fung, two other Chinese, who were
strolling along Calle Mestizos, observed the incident, they joined him in
pursuing Yu Lon's attacker. After being transported to the Philippine
General Hospital, the injured man passed away around midnight.
The accused argue that rather than being found guilty of murder, they
should merely be found guilty of minor physical injuries under Art 266.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should only be charged with slight physical
injuries rather than murder.
Ruling:
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No. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a
felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is
indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That
a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the... crime committed by the
offender.
Because Yu Lon's death was a direct result of the defendant's criminal act
of striking him in the head, under the facts of this case, the defendant is
responsible for Yu Lon's death. If the accused had not carried out the
assault in a risky manner... Even if he didn't mean to kill the victim, if the
defendant had committed the crime in a treacherous way, he would still
have been guilty of homicide; and because treachery was a factor in the
crime, the defendant is now guilty of murder.
[G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985]
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vs.
JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
The accused, Jaime Tomortogo, appealed the Court of First Instance's

decision to sentence him to reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide
against his wife, Magdalena de los Reyes, by bringing this case before the
Court of Appeals. On June 23, 1977, while his wife was about to leave
him, the accused caught up with her and struck her with a piece of wood,
seriously hurting her. His wife suffered injuries from the alleged offender
and passed away shortly after. He turned himself in to the police and
entered a guilty plea at his second arraignment.
Three (3) mitigating circumstances were proved by the accused: (1)

voluntary surrender; (2) admission of guilt; and (3) obfuscation. At the
time of the occurrence, the accused said he merely wanted to cause
physical injury. That rather than the actual offense committed, the
maximum penalty of the intended act is to be imposed under Art. 49 of
the RPC. And because there are two or more mitigating factors and no
aggravating ones, the court ought to have set the punishment at the level
just below what is required by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be imposed a lower penalty.
Ruling:
No. The judgment of the Court of First Instance was correct. Though the
accused only intended to inflict physical injuries to the victim, considering
that his act causes the death of the victim, he is liable for all the
consequences of his felonious act.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
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Thus, the Court provided the correct judgment of the case. The accused
benefited from the Indeterminate Sentence Law as the accused was given
the minimum sentence of reclusion perpetua and not death. The Court of
Appeals upheld the recommendation of the Court to extend executive
clemency to the accused for manifesting a repentant attitude and
remorse.
[G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976]
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vs.
COSME MONLEON, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On June 1, 1970, about 7:00 p.m., accused Cosme Monleon, who was
intoxicated, got home and inquired with his wife Concordia about whether
their carabao had been fed by their son Marciano. Concordia gave him
that assurance, but Cosme later discovered that it had not been fed
properly, making him angry. Corcodia stopped him from hitting Marciano
just as he was about to do so. Cosme then sat on Corcodia's chest,
gripped her neck, forced her head against a post, and kicked her in the
abdomen. The next morning, Corcordia passed away from "acute
abdominal" after vomiting blood.
On June 18, 1970, Cosme thumb wrote a confession in which he admitted
to hitting his wife and expressed regret for the wrongdoing. He was
convicted of parricide by the CFI and given a life term in prison as well as
monetary damages. Cosme requested a reduction in the punishment after
hearing the verdict read aloud in open court. If he wasn't happy with the
punishment, the court recommended him to appeal. The Solicitor General
argues that the conviction should stand, but urges the president to grant
Cosme Monleon administrative clemency because the reclusion perpetua
penalty seems excessive in light of the severity of his crimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to
recommend Cosme Monleon’s case to the Chief Executive for a reduction
of penalty.
RULING:
YES, the criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he is
intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Cosme on Corcordia was the
proximate cause of her death. He was provoked to castigate his wife
because she prevented him from whipping his negligent son. The trial
court did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances in favour of Cosme.
The Solicitor General is correct in finding that the extenuating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and
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intoxication which was not habitual are present in this case. Hence, the
penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua but considering that Cosme had
no intention to kill his wife, the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to
be excessive due to lack of appropriate medical attendance. Therefore,
there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to recommend
Cosme’s case to the Chief Executive for a reduction of penalty
[G.R. No. 10037. December 23, 1914.]
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vs.
MAXIMO MALLARI, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
On the morning of September 25, 1913, in the neighborhood of Batasan,

Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, Defendant Mallari visited the home of
the married couple Vicente Sunga and Canuta Flores before heading to
work. Under the shed, Mallari implored Sunga to heal his wife of a disease
that she had been experiencing for a few days and that he believed was
the result of Vicente's enchantment.
The latter declined, claiming that he was not a wizard and had not been
responsible for the defendant's wife's illness. In a fit of wrath, Mallari
called the aforementioned spouses names. He climbed upstairs while
brandishing a short, sharp bolo and making death threats to them.
Vicente Sunga attempted to leave his home at his wife's urging so that he
might go to the teniente of the neighborhood, a few homes away, and
report the incident. However, when he encountered the defendant on the
stairs, he immediately went back inside and leapt out of a window. The
defendant immediately began to pursue Sunga, and when he finally
caught up to him and they were practically in front of the teniente's
home, he noticed that the defendant was following him closely.
Sunga turned to face his pursuer and used his bare fists to defend himself
as much as he could. Vicente Sunga was struck once in the belly, his
intestines protruding, by Mallari's bolo. In this state, the victim sat down
while his attacker fled, trying with his hands to prevent his intestines from
coming out. A short while later, the justice and peace of Macabebe
arrived, and there was a wounded man present who identified his attacker
as Mallari and claimed that he had pursued him inside his home before
inflicting his terrible stomach wound. Sunga's death three days later was
caused by the wound he received with Mallari's bolo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of homicide.
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RULING:
Yes. The accused is guilty of homicide.
A requisite supporting the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal

Code, states that “the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender.” It does not appear in the case that this was erroneous, for in
spite of the statement of the health officer that the deceased might have
been saved if the wound had been aseptically treated from the first, its
seriousness and fatal character being due to lack of antiseptics, still, the
person inflicting it is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal
action, and therefore for the death that occurred some days after the
deceased received the wound.
In accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is affirmed, with
the costs against the appellant.
[G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975]
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vs
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO,
Defendants-Appellants.
Facts:
Brothers Jose and Antonio Toling live in Northern Samar's Barangay
Nenita, which is close to Mondragon. They are uneducated farmers who
work their own fields. They resemble each other greatly because they are
identical twins. The brothers made the decision to travel to Manila to see
their children who were employed there.
The twins headed out for Manila on January 6, 1955. To get there, they
had to make multiple trips. On January 8, 1955, at around seven in the
morning, they landed in Paco, Manila. The only person who made it
through the city and saw his daughter was Antonio. None of Jose's
offspring could be found, unfortunately.
The twins then decided to go back home to Samar. After buying their
tickets hey boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in
the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
When the train stopped in Cabuyao, Laguna, Jose Toling got up and
attacked the passenger standing in front of him. The victim got to his feet
but soon fell on the ground. While this was going on, Antonio Tolling
stabbed an elderly woman who was dozing off across from him with a
knife. The victim was no longer able to stand up. The passengers fled for
safety at this point, but the twins, who had ran amok, stabbed everyone
they came across within the carriage. After continuing their rampage, the
twins were finally brought under control by two police officers.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, Constabulary soldiers

escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the Calamba
police. A total of twelve persons died from the bloody incident. Several
were also injured. Eight bodies who were found in the train died from stab
wounds while the other four were presumed to have jumped from the
moving train to avoid being killed. The two Constabularymen who
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subdued the twins, along with some of the injured victims, each gave
statements for the investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Toling twins should be criminally liable for the death of
the victims who jumped from the coach.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that “criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended”.
The twins are criminally liable for the death of the four victims who
jumped off the coach of the train since their rampage was responsible for
their jump and eventual death. Even if the twins never had the intent to
kill those four victims specifically, their violent actions led to the victims
fleeing from danger and jumping off the train in a state of panic.
The court stated “if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate
sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result”. Because of this, the Toling
twins, apart from the charges of murder and frustrated of murder should
be criminally liable for the death of the four victims who jumped off the
coach of the train.
But it is important to note that in this particular case, the twins were
never charged for the death of the four victims because of the absence of
eye-witness testimony supporting the presumption that the four bodies
who were found in the railroad tracks. The court stated, “Had the
necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the
proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of
the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their
deaths”.
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[G.R. NO. L-16486. MAR. 22, 1921]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
The person who passed away was a vessel's crew. The defendant is in
charge of the crew men helping to carry cargo into the ship. The accused
yelled at the offended party because he was taking his time to do his
task. The party who was insulted responded that it would be better if he
did not do so. This infuriated the accused, who grew enraged and walked
toward the victim while brandishing a large knife in an attempt to slay
him.
The victim plunged himself into the water, thinking he was in immediate
danger. The person drowned to death. The defendant was charged with
murder. He argued that because the victim was not even stabbed, his
liability should be limited to serious threats and that the victim's drowning
death qualifies as a supervening cause.
Issue: Whether or not the accused be considered the responsible author

of the death of Venancio Gargantel or convicted of the offense of
homicide.
Ruling: Yes, the accused is responsible author of the death of the victim
and he was convicted of the offense of homicide.
As the Supreme Court, enunciated the following Doctrine : That even
though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the
exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost
completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage
impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was
placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the
river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to
do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as
the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause
the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and
putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed
from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated
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homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured
person was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p.
183.)
[GR No. 1726, Mar 29, 1905]
UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee
vs.
PRUDENCIO SORNITO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants
FACTS:
Prudencio Sornito and Juan Sondia were accused of homicide on
September 24, 1903. The defendants were Santa Barbara town police
officers. On September 5, 1903, they injured Isabelo Hechanova by
shooting her with a gun and a revolver, respectively, and causing
significant injuries to various body parts. The defendants claim that the
reason for the attack was because Isabelo did not arrive right away when
summoned; as a result, Hchanova passed away eight days after he was
injured.
Following the commencement of the trial in accordance with the

aforementioned complaint, the judge sentenced the aforementioned
Prudencio Sornito to twenty years in prison and Juan Sondia to seventeen
years in prison. Additionally, both were ordered to jointly and severally
compensate the deceased's heirs in the amount of P1,000, pay half of the
costs, and suffer subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of homicide or not?
RULING:
Yes.
Under the law Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be

incurred:1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
The homicide was committed with malice, when death is presumed
to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted, and
when the following facts are established:
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1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was
in normal health.
2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.
In this case, Isabelo Hechanova was in a good and healthy

condition before being maltreated by the defendants, and that after this
attack he suffered from the wounds inflicted. Though the doctor Francisco
Ginco, who made the autopsy on the body could not explain the caused
but stated that the deceased had been wounded behind the right ear and
in the forehead, and that his back was swollen; that although he did not
see the deceased vomit blood, the people in the house assured him that
he had been bleeding and had vomited blood, and that he did not believe
that he died as a result of the blows received, because he was recovering
from same; that he did not know the cause of his death, but that the
deceased suffered from a very high fever, the liability of the defendant for
homicide necessarily follows from the premises stated.
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[G.R. No. 10615. November 16, 1915]

vs
ALEJANDRO ZAMORA, Defendant-Appellant.
McVean and Vickers for Appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.
FACTS:
That said accused, Alejandro Zamora, at or about the hour of 6 p. m. of
the 8th of December, 1914, in the municipality of Sibulan, Oriental
Negros, Philippine Islands, did maliciously, unlawfully, and feloniously
approach Custodio Pisan who was sitting chopping wood at the foot of the
stairs of his house, situated in the center of population of said
municipality, and without justifiable motive did assault said Custodio Pisan
with a pocketknife which he was carrying, dealing him by means of the
same a blow in the abdomen, thereby inflicting a wound in the right iliac
region which affected the skin, the subcutaneous tissue, muscular sheath,
the peritoneal serous membrane and the intestines. From the results of
this wound said Custodio Pisan died at 3 p. m. on the 10th day of
December, 1914, that is, two days later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is held criminally liable for committing
homicide
RULING:
Yes, the defendant was criminally liable. In connection with the
statements made by defendant himself, it cannot be held that he acted
unconsciously in wounding Custodio Pisan, as he claims, nor that the act
performed by him was not free and voluntary.
Under the law, Article IV section I of the Revised Penal Code: By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
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In this case, there was intention, there was will on the part of the
defendant, and although it be considered that his purpose was to cause
the harm to his sweetheart, Francisca Fonollera, and that, while frantic
and controlled by this purpose, he chanced to wound Custodio Pisan
whom he met on his way. He must be held liable for the act he performed
and for all its consequences, notwithstanding that such act and its effects
were inflicted upon and suffered by a different person than the one upon
whom he intended to wreak his vengeance.
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[G.R. No. L-204 May 16, 1947]

vs.
GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On June 8, 1945, when Fabian Burca was descending the stairs of his
house in Barrio San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, the
appellant attacked him with a bolo. When the victim fell after being hit in
the head, the appellant threw a rock at him, striking his left collarbone.
Following this, the appellant was seen running towards his home.
A few days later, the sufferer died of tetanus, which Dr. Mariano Cruel
diagnosed on his last medical visit on June 15, 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable for the death of the
victim.
RULING:
Yes, the appellant is criminally liable.
It is stated in Article 4 Section 1 of the Revised Penal Code that, Criminal

liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In this case, the death of the victim was a result of the initial felony
committed by the appellant. The victim would not have died if he had not
contracted tetanus and he would not have contracted tetanus if the
appellant had not attacked the victim, hence, the appellant is liable for
the victim’s death.
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[GR No. 234190, October 01, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee
vs
FERDINAND DE GUZMAN Y BUHAY, Accused- Appellant
Facts:
On March 8, 2005, the accused was charged with two (2) counts of
Statutory Rape at the RTC. The accused filed criminal case no. 05-29405
for an event that occurred on May 7, 2003, when he went to the bedroom
of his nine (9)-year-old niece by affinity at 4 a.m. and threatened and
forcibly had carnal knowledge with the girl. Similarly to the case no. 05-
29406, which occurred on June 17, 2003, the accused threatened and
forcibly performed carnal knowledge with his nine (9)-year-old niece by
affinity at 4 a.m.
These acts were revealed to the child's parents, resulting in the filing of
these cases. On September 15, 2015, the RTC found Ferdinand de
Duzman Y Buhay guilty of two (2) counts of statutory rape and ordered
him to pay civil damages and reclusion Perpetua. The accused petitioned
the CA for dismissal of the case, but the CA upheld the RTC's ruling on
June 29, 2017. The accused appealed again to the Supreme Court, which
upheld the verdicts of the RTC and CA while also modifying the charges
on civil damages to a higher cost, qualifying the case as statutory rape
and subjecting the defendant to indefinite incarceration without the
possibility of parole.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused has criminal liability under felony.
Ruling:
Yes. The accused has criminal liability under felony.
Under the law, the requisites on the paragraph 1 are the intentional
felony committed is present and the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be a direct, natural and logical consequence of felony.
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In this case, the requisites for felony were complete in which RTC,
CA and SC ruled the accused guilty finding all the requisites of felony in
the case of rape under the circumstance that the child was forced and
threatened to do carnal knowledge with him. Therefore, the accused has a
criminal liability under felony.
[G.R. No. 42122. December 1, 1934.]
vs
INOCENTES MOLDES, Defendant-Appellant
FACTS:
On the night of April 3rd, there was a dance in a private residence in the
neighborhood of Maya, municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, and the
dead was the master of ceremonies. The dead was reprimanded the
appellant for dancing out of turn. Appellant then walked to the house's
porch and began cutting down the decorations with his bolo. He stormed
into the house's yard and challenged everyone to a fight. He began
cutting at the bamboo trees, not attracting enough attention, and
reiterated his challenge to a fight.
The dead, unarmed, began down the steps, spoke to him in a friendly
manner, and as the deceased was about to reach the ground, appellant
struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm, which the
sanitary inspector described on post mortem examination as follows:
"A long incised wound located on the lower portion of the left arm
directed inwards downwards and extending as low as the anticubitai fossa
and cutting the inferior part of the biceps muscle, and the branches of the
brachial artery. It measured 3 inches long, 21/2 inches wide and 1 1/2
inches deep."
As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the

back and ran away from the scene of action.
The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary
inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care of a local
"curandero". This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the
deceased died on the 15th of April, 1934.
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The appellant's attorney also claims that if the deceased had received
proper surgical treatment, the wound would not have been fatal. A proper
modern surgical service is not available in the distant neighborhood where
this assault occurred.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant may not be held liable if the deceased had secured
proper surgical treatment and the wound would not have been fatal?
RULING:
NO.
Under the law, he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if
the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or
endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was
erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment. A person committing
a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary
course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a
rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of
the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
In this case, the appellant is held liable because the wound he inflicted
the deceased by striking him with bolo was the proximate cause of his
death. Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
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[ G.R. No. L –32076, March 14, 1930]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs
NATALIO ILUSTRE, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On St. John's Day, June 24, 1929, a procession was held in the barrio of
Canlurangbayan, Balayan. The parade includes going through town with a
roasted pig on a cane. A someone is assigned in charge to supervise the
procession and prevent the people from consuming the entire animal
before reaching the conclusion, and on the day of record, June 24,1929,
that man happened to be the defendant, Natalio Ilustre.
Juan Magsino, who was delicate and suffering from tuberculosis, tried to
get a piece of the crackling. To punish his bravado, Ilustre chased him
down, boxed him, and left him sprawled on the ground. Juan Magsino fell
very ill after being struck, and his comrades brought him home. He died
about three o'clock in the afternoon.
Based on the autopsy performed by three doctors, Magsino's death was
due to a contusion on the liver accompanied by an internal hemorrhage.
Issue:
Whether or not Ilustre’s blow caused the death of Magsino.
Ruling:
Yes. An internal hemorrhage caused by a blow on the right
hypochondrium resulted to the death of Magsino.
The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from
incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the defendant's criminal
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liability, for even if it rendered the blow more fatal", the efficient cause of
the death remains the same.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. The circumstance that
the defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability.
[No. 7123, August 17, 1912]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO RODRIGUEZ, defendant and appellant.
FACTS:
Rosalino Rodriguez, the defendant's disabled right-hand man, has been
charged with homicide after killing a guy named Marciano Magno, who,
according to the defendant's daughter, had caught hold of her hand with
unchaste designs. Rosalino intercepted this, prompting him to deliver two
punches (one to the left side toward the stomach and the other to the
back) that knocked him down. He arose with the assistance of the two
witnesses present at the time, but then testified against Marciano.
Rosalino Rodriguez was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to twelve

years and one day of reclusion temporal by the Trial Court, but the
sentence was reduced by the Court of First Instance to eight years and
one day of Prision Mayor after the defendant filed an appeal because it
appears that the defendant's act was preceded by an immediate
provocation on the part of the deceased and, evidently, the defendant did
not intend to cause such grave injury as he produced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide.
RULING:
When the fact is well established that the accused struck the victim twice
with his fist, in the abdomen and in the back, wherefore the latter fell to
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the ground and had hardly risen and started to walk when he again fell
down dead, the crime committed is rightly classified as homicide and the
accused is responsible therefor.
G.R. No. L-42117 March 29, 1935

vs.
GREGORIO REYES, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Fausta Tavera, dead, and Gregorio Reyes, appellant, had been living
together for a few weeks when her parents convinced her to return home
and demanded that appellant pay a dowry of P30 before the date of the
marriage celebration could be set. The dead and appellant were
discussing in the yard of the house on the evening of April 30, 1934,
during an impromptu dance for a barrio procession.
The deceased informed the appellant that she could not return to him and
that she was leaving to Catanduanes with her parents. The deceased was
pulled to the street and stabbed in the chest with a fan knife by the
appellant. The victim went to the house of the barrio lieutenant, a short
distance away, and died at the foot of the stairway, despite the fact that
the wound was relatively minor, not having penetrated the thoracic cavity
and striking a bone. The appellant was apprehended by three of the
deceased's relatives, but he soon fled. The appellant testified on his own
account that he was attacked by the deceased's three relatives and that
the wound he inflicted on the deceased was fatal.
Issue:
Whether or not the act done by the appellant is accidental
Ruling:
No, the court held that the act done by the appellant is not accidental.
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Article 4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states that, “By any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not or the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.”
In the present case, the trial court considered provocation as a mitigating
circumstance based on the testimony of appellant that he had been
attacked, overlooking the fact that the law requires that the provocation
come from the offended party. Certainly, the deceased did not attack
appellant, and her refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can
hardly be construed as legal provocation. The appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. He is sentenced from eight
years of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the
sum of P1,000.
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[G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012]

RODOLFO BELBIS JR. AND ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
The victim, Jose Bahillo (Jose), was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano,
Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. Jose left his house on the night of December
9, 1997 to make his rounds. Veronica Dacir, Jose's live-in partner, heard
Jose shouting and calling her name at 10:00 p.m. and rushed to where
Jose was and found blood on his back and shorts. Jose told Veronica that
he was being detained by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales) and stabbed
by Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.). Jose was taken to the Albay
Provincial Hospital and held there for six days. On January 7, 1998, Jose
was sent to the hospital, where it was discovered that his kidneys had
become irritated owing to infection. And he died the next day.
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store

in engaged in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them
and told them to go home. While on their way home, they heard Jose’s
whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is
the matter and the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a
nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. The night stick
was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. During the commotion,
petitioner Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo
to stop fighting. Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner
Rodolfo to their house because he suffered a hand injury and was then
brought Rodolfo to hospital.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a

reasonable doubt which would warrant his acquittal.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to
the Justifying Circumstances of self-defense and the mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense.
RULING:
No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had
done the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused
admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible,
clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim.
The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the

victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed
weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon, already
became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a
person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and
the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case,
four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent
the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter
was already without a weapon.
Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the
death of the victim is not controlling since what really needs to be proven
in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can
be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds,
the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on
caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
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[G.R. No. L-12702, March 30, 1962]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILEMON CUTURA, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
As a result of several situations involving Jesus Cimafranca and some
troops of the guerrilla forces stationed in Bohol, he was arrested two days
later under the authority of the commander of such forces, and when
brought before the commander, he was manhandled and tortured. He
died on the same day as a result of the injuries he sustained. Several
individuals assaulted Cimafranca: one beat him in the skull with a piece of
iron, another stabbed him in the belly with a bolo, and it emerged on the
record that defendant-appellant Cutura hit Cimafranca in the head with a
large piece of wood, which contributed to his death.
The trial court found the accused guilty of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Cutura actually participated in the assault which
culminated in the victim’s death.
Ruling:
Yes, Cutura actually participated in the assault which culminated in the

victim’s death.
A blow inflicted may not have been mortal, but if it certainly accelerates
the death of the victim, then the person participating in the assault is
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responsible for his death. It is not necessary that each of the separate
injuries be necessarily fatal in itself. It is sufficient if they cooperated in
bringing about his death or contributed mortally thereto.
In this case, even if each of the accused assaulted Cimafranca in different

ways, it was proven on record that his death was accelerated when
Cutura hit him on the head with a big piece of wood. The Court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
[G.R. No. L-10470, October 1, 1915]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILEMON BAYUTAS, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Upon the night of October 8, 1913, after Esteban Paras and Alfonso
Carvajal had finished playing a game of billiards n a hall of the pueblo of
Barili, Province of Cebu, and just as they were about to commence a new
one, the defendant, Filemon Bayutas, suggested laying a wager on
Carvajal and against Paras. To this Bayutas answered by telling Paras to
keep still and to go on playing. Then Paras replied saying "All right, as
you wish; name the bet; that is my proposition." Just then, with the cue
in his hand, Esteban Paras put himself in position to make a stroke with it
to start the game. At this moment the accused Bayutas struck Paras with
a piece of hard wood about two inches in diameter a heavy blow on the
nape of the neck and when the latter turned around to face his assailant,
he received another blow on the forehead from the effects of which he
fainted. When the defendant attempted to strike Paras a third blow, one
of the witnesses present at the time of the occurrence restrained him.
After the examination of the physician Dr. Cesar Mercader it was found
that Paras had received a contused wound in the middle of his forehead
extending obliquely from the medial line in a downward and outward
direction, as well as another wound, also contused, in the right side of
occipital region, also running in an oblique direction. The wounds required
58 days to heal, during which period of healing the victim showed
symptoms of brain fever, a consequence of the habitual drinking of tuba.
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In the Court of First Instance, Bayutas was charged with prision

correccional. From this judgment Bayutas appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not that defendant did not intend to cause the greatest
possible injury to the victim.
Whether or not that the victim was addicted to the habit of drinking
tuba, on account of which it is admitted that his constitution and physical
condition retarded the healing of his wounds.
Ruling:
Yes, Bayutas is responsible, because the wounded man, owing to his

physical condition and the state of his health, was not cured in a less
number of days than that specified, the perpetrator of the crime is
responsible nevertheless for all the consequences of the personal injuries
that resulted.
The Court stated that in the commission of the crime, one must take into
consideration the concurrence of the extenuating circumstance No. 7 of
article 9 of the Penal Code, as the reproach which Paras addressed to
defendant must have caused the latter temporarily to lose his reason and
self-control. As this extenuating circumstance is not offset by any
aggravating one, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium degrees, prescribed in the penultimate paragraph of the
aforementioned article 416, must be imposed upon defendant in the
minimum degree, as the trial judge has done in the judgment appealed
from, which is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case.
In this case, the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, the said judgment should be,
as it is hereby, affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant shall be
sentenced to pay the offended party P29 as damages for the wages which
the latter lost and failed to earn, and P80 as the cost of the medicine and
the fees of the physician who attended him, and, in case of insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with the costs of this
instance.
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[G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
This was an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Albay, which sentenced the defendant to homicide.
The defendant's lawyer emphasized two points: first, the alleged paucity
of evidence for the prosecution to establish the defendant's identity, and
second, the victim's death could have been caused by other diseases that
present tetanus-like symptoms.
The identification of the defendant was established by witness testimony.

According to them, the defendant assaulted Fabian Burac (dead) with a
bolo as he was descending his house's stairs, causing him to tumble off;
the defendant then flung stones that struck Fabian's right clavicle and fled
in the direction of his own house. The trial court gave complete credit to
the witness's positive testimony, Fabian's wife Trinidad, because Trinidad
knew the defendant well. Bendicio, on the other side, testified that Fabian
told him the defendant boloed him before he died. Fabian survived the
first injuries caused by the bolo and stones, but died a few days later
from tetanus.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the victim’s death even though
the latter survived the initial injury caused by his felonious act.
Held:
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Yes, the defendant is liable for the victim’s death even though the latter
survived the initial injury caused by his felonious act.
Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that “Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
In this case, the victim died of tetanus as a complication of the felony
committed by the defendant. Thus, the defendant must be held liable for
the death of the victim as the natural consequence of his wrongful action.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment with costs against
the defendant.
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,
LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN,
represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA.
DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina

Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano
Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the
vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by
themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan,
who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighborhood. Then
there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they
approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was
due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in
her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages
from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of
Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the amount
involved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
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RULING:
NO.
Under the law, Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result there from.
In this case, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend
the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the
coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
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[ G.R. No. 155791, March 16, 2005]

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioner
Vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents
Facts:
Edison Garcia and Wilson Quinto, both eleven years old, were in Barangay
San Rafael, Tarlac on November 13, 1995. Respondents Dante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco were spotted near the mouth of a drainage culvert.
They persuaded Wilson to join them for a fishing trip inside the drainage
culvert. Wilson agreed, but Garcia declined to join them because it was
dark inside.
Pacheco, the respondent, held a flashlight. He entered the drainage

system with respondent Andres and Wilson, which was covered by a
concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a
foot deep. Respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, emerged from
the sewage system and went without saying anything. Respondent Andres
also emerged, went back inside, and reappeared, this time holding
Wilson, who was already dead. Respondent Andres disposed of the boy's
lifeless body in the grassy area. Garcia fled the scene, taken aback by the
unexpected change of events. Respondent Andres, for his part, proceeded
to the home of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed
her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert
while respondent Andres followed her.
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The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having
been conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac did not file any criminal
complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of
respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto. Respondent Pacheco
alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with
respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson
already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his
carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic
Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and
submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings: CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning;
traumatic head injuries, contributory.
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco
with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the
occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-
centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could have rendered
the him unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the
right side of Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against
a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also
stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign
of strangulation. The RTC granted demurer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The CA Affirms the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not there is preponderant evidence to hold the respondents
criminally liable.
Ruling:
No, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
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The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting

injury. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of
their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The
offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA,
the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts
on which the civil liability of the respondent’s rest, that the petitioner has
a cause of action against the respondents for damages. The trial court
gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the
pavement, However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is
relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was
perpetrated on... the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to
kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in
fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent. Andres used to
go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death.
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[No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, ET AL, plaintiffs and
appellees, vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant and appellant.
Facts:
Juan Bataclan (dead) was on a bus owned by Medina Transportation,

owned by Mr. Mariano Medina, traveling from Cavite to Pasay shortly after
midnight. The bus driver was rushing through while on its trip, and when
he applied the brakes (after the tires ruptured), the vehicle toppled.
Except for Bataclan and three other passengers, the driver, conductor,
and several passengers were able to escape from the vehicle. The four
stranded travelers requested assistance.
Soon after, help arrived, and because it was dark, the locals took torches
with them. The driver and conductor neglected to notify onlookers that
gasoline had spilled from the overturned bus, resulting in a massive
inferno that engulfed the bus, killing the four passengers trapped inside.
It was also discovered throughout the trial that the bus's tires were old.
The Court of First Instance awarded P1,000 to plaintiffs plus other fees.
The plaintiffs and defendants appealed the decision to CA, but CA
endorsed to SC the appeal because of the value involved in the claim.
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Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was

their burning by the torches which ignited the gasoline.
Ruling:
No. The driver’s negligence was the proximate cause.
Under Article 1755, “a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers

safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
circumstances.” Further Article 1756 also states, “in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence”.
In this case, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which
was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding.
Also, he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did
not. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It
is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights,
torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could
have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to
provide warning about said fact to the villagers. Thus, the defendant
carrier is liable.
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[G.R. No. 7123, August 17, 1912]

vs.
ROSALINO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
Rosalino Rodriguez is charged with having dealt Marciano Magno two

blows with the fist, one on the left side toward the stomach and the
other on the back, which knocked him down. He got up by the
assistance of two witnesses who were present at the time of the
occurrence and by their aid endeavored to return to his home, which
he did not reach, for the reason that, having gone a distance of
twenty brazas from the place, he again fell to the ground, this time
dead. Two witnesses testified to having seen the defendant strike
those two blows.
The defendant defenses to counter the charge against him were,

First, the testimony of his daughter and two other witnesses; Second,
the fact that his right hand was disabled; and Third is the medical
certificate issued by a physician as a result of the autopsy. The
defendant’s daughter averred that it was she who struck Marciano
Magno the blow with the fist, for the reason that the deceased had
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caught hold of her hand with unchaste designs, and testified that her
father arrived after Magno had fallen to the ground, which testimony
was supported by two witnesses.
This defense was not sustained by the trial judge. But on the
contrary, the judge accepted the preponderance of evidence for the
prosecution, sustained by three witnesses, of whom two were
eyewitnesses to the crime, and the other, of the confession alleged to
have been made to him by the defendant when arrested by this
witness, to the effect that the victim’s death was an unlooked-for
misfortune. Nor was the defense advanced by the defendant to the
effect that his right hand was crippled and he was unable to work
with it sustained by the trial court, and rightly, since, as the
defendant testified, he worked with his left hand and sometimes used
a spoon with his right; moreover, it was proved that it was impossible
for him to strike blows with either hand. After the autopsy of the
victim’s corpse, the Physician declared that he had observed
hypertrophy of the heart, a discharge in the spleen, an increase of
this latter organ to four times its ordinary size, and abdominal
peritonitis cannot be determined for the blows the victim received
that could have coincided with the traumatism, and "the traumatisms
which that body received hastened the death of the said individual;"
and, finally, this witness being questioned by the defense as to
whether the cause of death was a traumatism or a shock, replied that
he was unable to determine which it was.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of homicide and his
act was preceded by an immediate provocation on the part of the
deceased
Ruling:
The trial judge found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide and
sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the
accessory penalties and an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased, and to the payment of the costs; from which judgment he
appealed. Though in the complaint it is alleged that the cause of the
assault was the fact that the defendant saw the deceased catch hold
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of his daughter Roberta’s hand, for the purpose of making love to her,
and the provincial fiscal stated at the trial that this assertion was the
result of a careful investigation made by him, which was indeed
confirmed by the facts proven. However, It appears to have been well
proven that the defendant did strike Marciano Magno in the abdomen
and in the back two blows with his hand, as a result of which the
latter fell to the ground, and scarcely had he gotten up and started to
walk when he fell down dead. The court decided based on the reason
that a blow with the fist or a kick, though causing no external wound,
may very well produced inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and
cause death; and although the assaulted party was previously affected
by some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or
the foot, the victim’s death was hastened, beyond peradventure the
defendant is responsible therefor in producing the cause for such
acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury.
[GR No. L-3002, May 23, 1951]

vs.
ANICETO MARTIN, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Aniceto Martin was a farmer and married to Laura Luiz. Aniceto Martin
courted Laura Luiz of the same barrio where they lived in the Municipality
of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. They had sexual intercourse before marriage and
Laura Luiz became pregnant. Laura Luiz got pregnant before they got
married.
On August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found inside the family toilet.
Around her neck, leaving circular marks around it with the exception of
the tape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and thick hair
covering.
When the chief of the police arrived, the defendant had not yet returned
home. A relative looked for him and found him in a farm. Upon being
interrogated by the police officer the defendant denied any knowledge of
the event but later made his confession about the death of his wife.
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At about 4 o’clock in August 01, 1948, Laura and the defendant had an
argument. The defendant told Laura Luiz that he doesn't love her and has
no interest in marrying her since he was not the author of her pregnancy.
He married her because she would file an action against him.
With major personal necessity of the defendant, Laura Luiz came after
him to the toilet, placed the rope around his neck. He snatched the rope
and in turn he placed it around her neck and tightened the rope which
caused the death of Laura Luiz.
Dr. Roman de la Cuesta, a physician, performed an autopsy on the corpse

of Laura Luiz. That the cause of death was heart failure due to fright or
shock; that the deceased was eight months pregnant at the time of her
death; that there was no expulsion of the foetus ; and that the foetus
must have been alive at the time of the death of Laura.
The trial Court consideredthe defendant acquitted of abortion and found

guilty of parricide. The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances
in favor of the defendant.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the death of Laura was not due to the strangling but to
her heart disease.
2.Whether or not the defendant was responsible for the death of Laura
Luiz.
Ruling:
1.In the case of People vs. Reyes (61 Phil. 341, 343,) a person is
responsible for the consequences of his criminal act and even if the
deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart (which
was not shown), appellants assault being the proximate cause of the
death, he would be responsible.
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In the case of U.S. vs. Brobst (14 Phil. 310), the following doctrine was
established: Where death results as the direct consequences of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of
the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility.
2.The Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the trial court. There
being two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower in degree should be
imposed which is that of reclusion temporal. The court imposed upon
appellant the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision mayor to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and P6,000.00 of accessory
penalties of the law.
[G.R. No. 35006, September 7, 1931]

vs.
PURIFICACION ALMONTE, defendant- appellant.
FACTS:
Until a week before the crime, the accused lived maritally with the
Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man. Because one Miguela
Dawal, with whom he had also lived maritally, threatened to bring suit
against him unless he rejoined her, the Chinaman and the accused
voluntarily agreed to separate. From that time on Te Sue lived in the
barrio of Guinlajon, municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
together with the said Miguela Dawal. On the morning of October 1, 1930,
the accused visited her former paramour and on entering the house,
found him with Miguela. When Te Sue saw her, he approached and told
her to go away at once because her new paramour might get jealous and
do her harm. The accused insisted upon remaining, and on being pushed
by Te Sue and Miguela, feeling that she was being unjustly treated, took
hold of a small penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the
abdomen. Horrified, perhaps, at her deed, she fled to the street, leaving
the blade sticking in her victim's abdomen, and, taking the first bus that
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chanced to pass, finally went home. The injured man was at once taken
to the provincial hospital where he was given first aid treatment, and
Doctor Ortega performed a slight operation upon him, cleaning and
sewing up his wound. It was not serious, according to the doctor, and
might be healed in a week; but on the sixth day the patient succumbed to
complications which we shall treat of later on. The relatives of the
deceased paid a little over P200 for the hospital treatment and the
expenses of his last illness.
Doctor Ortega declares the cause of the secondary hemorrhage that
produced his death, were due to the pain felt after the operation and
during his illness. It is contended that according to the record, the real
cause of the movements was, so the deceased himself declared, the
excessive warmth of the bed and the fact that he was unaccustomed to
such a bed. To ascertain this important point requires a careful
examination of the evidence upon this particular.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding the accused responsible for
the death of the offended party as the direct and immediate consequence
of the wound inflicted by the accused
RULING:
Yes. The trial court erred in holding the accused responsible for the death
of the offended party as the direct and immediate consequence of the
wound inflicted by the accused.
The court ruled that the defendant- appellant can only be made to answer
for the misdemeanor of slight physical injuries as defined and penalized in
article 587 of the Penal Code, in as much as the wound inflicted by her
might have been healed in seven days, the penalty fixed being arresto
menor. The court hold, therefore, that the real cause of death in this case
was not the bodily movements referred to, but the congestion of the
internal veins produced beforehand by the force of the blow which caused
the wound and the nervous condition of the deceased.
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In the case cited, the appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances

of not having intended to commit so serious a crime as that committed,
and of having acted with passion and obfuscation. The first is shown by
the fact that she made use of a small penknife, and the second, by the
fact that before the attack she had been pushed out of the room where
the victim was, and that she considered such treatment as an offense or
abuse. The penalty must therefore be reduced one degree or to prision
mayor.
Reference:
Penal Code Article 587. The penalty of arresto menor shall be imposed

upon any person who shall inflict upon another any physical injuries which
shall prevent the person injured from working for a period of from one to
seven days, or shall make medical attendance necessary for the same
period.
If the offender shall be the father, son, husband, or guardian of the
person injured, the maximum degree of the penalty shall be imposed,
whatever may be the circumstances of the case.
Article 587. The penalty of arresto menor shall be imposed upon any

person who shall inflict upon another any physical injuries which shall
prevent the person injured from working for a period of from one to seven
days, or shall make medical attendance necessary for the same period.
If the offender shall be the father, son, husband, or guardian of the
person injured, the maximum degree of the penalty shall be imposed,
whatever may be the circumstances of the case.
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People vs Red
Facts:
This is an appeal from the order by which the Court of First Instance of
Marinduque dismissed the thirty-six informations, submitted together for
consideration.
The provincial fiscal of Marinduque, conducting the prosecution, contends
that the court has committed an error in ordering the dismissal of these
cases. The judge of Lucena never called either Fiscal Aquino or Fiscal
Rivera to be examined as to the merits of the information in the cases
above enumerated. From the numbering of the papers in the record it is
evident that the district judge issued the warrant of arrest upon the
simple strength of the information and the letter explaining its
transmission, without making the investigation provided for in section 13,
Code of Criminal Procedure. The undersigned judge will have nothing to
do with a proceeding against the law, considering that the scope and
intent of section 13, General Order No. 58, is to safeguard the individual’s
sacred rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, etc.
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Issue:
Whether a warrant of arrest should issue on the information filed by the
prosecution
Ruling:
No. To deprive a citizen of his freedom without following a procedure
specifically required by law, namely, that the judge entertaining an
information, particularly, one filed by the provincial fiscal, must, under the
present law, examine under oath the prosecuting fiscal and such
witnesses as he may desire to make use of, reducing into writing the
testimony of the witnesses. Only when the judge, after conducting this
investigation, considers that the crime charged has been committed, and
that there is reason to believe the defendant guilty of it, that the warrant
of arrest or detention may be issued against the accused person. It is
clear that the warrant should not issue before such an investigation has
been made by the judge.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 42122. December 1, 1934.]
vs
INOCENTES MOLDES, Defendant-Appellant.
Fidel J. Silva for Appellant.

Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for Appellee.
Facts:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte of the
crime of homicide. On the night of the 3d of April in the barrio of Maya,
municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, there was a dance in a private
house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies at that dance.
The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the
deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of the house and with his bolo
began cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the
house and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient
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attention, he began chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his

challenge for a fight. The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs,
speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as the deceased had about
reached the ground, appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a
wound on his left arm. As the deceased fell to the ground, appellant
inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of
action.
The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary
inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care of a local
"curandero." This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the
deceased died on the 15th of April 1934.
The Attorney of the appellant averred that if the deceased had secured
proper medical treatment, the wound would have not been fatal, and she
wouldn’t have succumbed to her death. Averring that the inability to seek
proper medical attention was the cause of the death of the deceased.
Issue: Whether the appellant is acquitted of the crime despite the

deceased succumbing to death because of the improper medical
treatment
Ruling:
No. The appellant cannot be acquitted from his crime.
According to article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person committing a
felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act
are not intended by him. In the case of People v. Moldes, the court
declared that “he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if
the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or
endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was
erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment”. Unskillful and
improper treatment may be an active force, but it is not a distinct act or
fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act.
Therefore, the defendant still has criminal liability despite the cause of
death being the lack of proper medical attention.
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[G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Manabat and his
companions went to the market to buy fish. Since no fish was available at
that time, they decided to go home instead. They went to the national
highway, stood on the right side, and waited for a ride there. They
flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however,
swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Manabat shouted at
the and a passenger inside the jeepney shouted back angrily.
Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by
sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Manabat
shouted that he was shot. The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded in
the direction of Cagayan de Oro City.
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Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to

the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that
Rolando needed a blood transfusion and so they transferred him at
around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the
same city. Upon arrival at the hospital, Manabat’s BP was found to be just
over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily bandaged. He was
operated on when the BP stabilized but still died the next day.
The doctor testified that the death was due to massive loss of blood due
to a gunshot wound. The doctor stated that under normal circumstances,
the wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case, where the
wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He
clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered
at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right
knee, causing two wounds.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that Orlando was a policeman who
was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at the
front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its
passengers who was carrying a firearm. He later on surrendered and
when charged entered a plea of not guilty.
During the trial, he admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney
and had a gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was
impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting in
the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the
latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked and
wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed toward the driver.
Orlando also, in his attempt to exculpate himself, blames the death of the
victim on the lack of prompt and proper medical attention given. He
insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim
constitutes an efficient intervening cause that exempts him from criminal
responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctors can be held liable for the death of the victim
Manabat.
Ruling:
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No. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable for the death of the
victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does
not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the
appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute
an efficient intervening cause.
Article 4, par.1 of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred…”
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.”
The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by
Orlando. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all
the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in
consequence of the injuries. “A person commiting a felony is liable even if
the consequences is different from what he had wanted to do by virtue of
the principle el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado, in
English, he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.”
The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance would
not affect Orlando's criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the
practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape
from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were
otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by
merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death.
[77 Phil 1038, February 28, 1947]

vs.
RAYMUNDO RELLIN, defendant-appellant
Facts:
Raymundo Rellin was walking along Tavera Street, Marinduque, at about
eleven o'clock on the night of April 4, 1944, coming from his house and
heading for the patrol headquarters to see the head of the neighborhood
association, he saw three suspicious-looking people in the opposite
direction and shouted at them asking, "stop, who are you?" They
answered, "We are members of the patrol inspecting the guards of the
neighborhood association." Surprised or indignant, under the influence of
the "tuba", by the answer, since he was assigned that night to inspect the
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guards of his neighborhood, he asked them, "What kind of patrol?" They,

without answering, stopped;
He approached to recognize them: but since the first one had a suspicious
attitude, the accused punched him twice which knocked him to the ground
on the spot. The other two who were following, out of fear, began to run.
Graciano Rodas, that was the name of the man who fell to the ground,
stood up and attacked the accused, hitting him in the forearm. Then he
snatched his gun, threw it later, and immediately punched him until he
was lying on the ground again. As a result of these blows, Rodas had a
hemorrhage and died at half past one in the afternoon of the following
day. The lower court rendered a decision that the defendant is guilty of
the crime of homicide.
Issue:
Was the injury inflicted by the accused the proximate cause of death of
the victim?
Held:
Yes. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
and it is constant jurisprudence that the one who inflicts injuries is
responsible for all the consequences of his criminal action, such as the
death that occurs as a result of such injuries.
In the present case, there is no evidence that the death of the victim was
caused by any other reason than the hemorrhage produced by the
punches given to him by the accused. Two extenuating circumstances
have in his favor the accused: that of not having had the intention of
causing an evil as serious as the one he produced and that of having
committed the crime under the influence of the "tuba" and there is no
evidence that it is habitual in the drunkenness, nor is there evidence that
he has taken it for the purpose of committing a crime, however, due to
the punches of the accused which caused the victim to fall down on the
ground and eventually causing hemorrhage were direct, natural and
consequence of the latter’s death. Hence, the accused is liable for the
crime of Homicide.
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[39 Mich. 503, Oct. 29, 1878]

People
vs
Rockwell
Michigan Supreme Court
Facts:
Respondent was convicted of manslaughter for killing one Wilber. The

death occurred during a dispute concerning the possession of a horse.
Rockwell was shown to have struck Wilber with his fist and knocked him
down. It was not shown directly how he was killed, but it appeared
distinctly this blow did not kill him. The facts indicated either that
Rockwell kicked him after he -fell, or else that he was killed by the horse
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trampling on him. On a first trial the jury disdistinctly this blow did not kill
him.The charge before given was unqualified that if the blow was not
justifiable and Wilber so fell that the horse jumped and struck Wilber and
killed him with his feet, or kicking him, respondent was guilty.
It is impossible to maintain such a charge without making every one liable

not only for natural and probable consequences, but for all possible
consequences and circumstances which immediately follow a wrongful
act. There Was no necessary connection between the act of respondent
and the conduct of the horse, which he cannot be said from the record to
have been responsible for. And the case was not even put as permissive.
The liability was laid down as positive.The conviction cannot be
maintained. And inasmuch as it is clear from the record that the jury
would not have convicted except upon this instruction, we think the court
below should be advised to stop the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not that Rockwell is guilty of the crime of Murder even there
was no connection between the conduct of the respondent and the
conduct of the horse.
Ruling:
Yes, Rockwell is guilty of the crime of Murder againts Wilber.
Under the law provided in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines; Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
(6). With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Thefore, the coviction of the abovementioned respondent with the crimes

of Murder even there was no necessary connection between the conduct
of the respondent and the conduct of the horse once it was not falling
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within the provisions of Article 246 and when the felonious act was done it
will remain guilty with the said crime.
[G.R. No. 2530, July 31, 1926]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GRACIANO PALALON, Defendant-Appellant
Facts:
In the morning of July 20, 1925, the defendant, Graciano Palalon, was
acting as a foreman in the plantation of Andres Mendiola in Basac,
municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, and charge of a small group of
children, among whom was the deceased Roman Megio, who was a 10
year old boy gathering and piling sugarcane. The deceased was
reprimanded and ordered to work by the defendant for sitting down and
resting and not displaying the activity expected by the defendant. The
deceased treated the accused in an insolent manner that lead the latter to
lose his temper striking the boy with his backhand. According to the
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witnesses the boy fell on his back on the tramway with his mouth and
nose bleeding. However, according to the witnesses of the defense the
incident happened some distance away from the tramway and the boy’s
mouth and nose did not bleed. Despite what happened to him, the
deceased continued to work until 2 o’clock in the afternoon the following
day. The deceased had fever and was taken home by his father. 2 and a
half days later, he died. There is no doubt that the deceased was struck.
However it is doubtful that the stile caused the death since it is also likely
that it was caused naturally. During July 1925, fever was prevalent in the
locality. The theory of the prosecution, is that as the boy fell on the
tramway when he was struck, he acquired lethal injury that caused him to
be sick and eventually die. They based their theory on the testimony of
Dr. Jose V. Valero, who stated in substance that he examined the body of
the deceased on the day following the death and found ecchymosis on the
right shoulder and on the stomach and that, as a result of the former,
there was a congestion of the right lung, which was the principal cause of
the death; that the blows causing the ecchymosis must have been of such
force as to have made its effect felt immediately; and that the victim
could not have continued working. Which contradicts what happened
when the boy continued working for the next two days. No proper autopsy
was done. The ecchimosis as testified by the doctor, might have been
suggillations or “death spots”. The court of first instance, in Negros
declared the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide and sentencing him
to suffer twelve years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay
the costs. Thus, the appeal.
Issue:
Does the defendant have any criminal liability in this case?
Rule:
No, the defendant doesn’t have any criminal liability.
According to Article 8 of the revised penal code of the Philippines, “1. By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an
act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.” In this case, the
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defendant struck the deceased, however, it does not guarantee or mean

that the harm or action perform against the victim caused the death.
Under the law, a person is not criminally liable for all possible
consequences that might occur after his felonious act. In this case,
despite having been struck the victim still worked for more than two days
thus there is a reasonable doubt as to the cause of the deceased’s death.
The post mortem examination was done more than 24 hours after the
death and there was no incisions done to examine the body thoroughly,
and therefore unwarranted conclusions cannot be done. There is more
than a reasonable doubt as to the deceased’s cause of death, therefore
the defendant must be acquitted of the charges. The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the defendant-appellant is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged in the information, with the costs de oficio.
[G.R. No. 1614. April 9, 1904]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee,
vs
ANACLETO EMBATE, Defendant-Appellant.
Eleuterio Rodriguez, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
Facts:
The accused was charged with homicide after punishing the child for
disobedience. He struck him upon the thighs with a slipper and pulled, or
as the complaint says, pushed and dragged him toward it, throwing him
heavily upon the floor. One or two days after the child died. The doctor
testifies of his findings after examining the child that he found out the
bruises on the thigh and the child has serious heart disease, and that the
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bruises could not be the cause of death but might contribute to the fatal
result of the illness. He testifies further that “if in the first place the age of
the child is taken into consideration, and in the second its surrounding
circumstances, its conditions were such as to lead one to expect a fatal
result, no physician being in attendance and as no other proximate cause
is known that the great excitement produced by those blows, it may be
inferred that they were the sole cause which precipitated the fatal result
of the illness of the child."
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide.v
rrulingirtua1aw library
Ruling:
No.
Based on the result of the examination of the body and sufficient evidence
as the true cause of death, the accused is not guilty of homicide. He
committed only misdemeanor which should be punished under the
provisions of section 29 of general orders, No. 58.
In Article 4 of the revised penal code, it states that: Criminal liability shall
be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
In this case, the accused is criminally liable for physical injury but not
liable for homicide.
[G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988]
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
Facts:
Javier was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal of the
petitioner Urbano, the latter got angry and demanded the former to pay
for the his soaked palay. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier,
hitting the latter on his hand. Javier went to the police station to the
report the said incident. Later on, they agreed to settle their differences,
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however, Javier was rushed to the hospital and was diagnosed with
tetanus toxin and died the other day.
The RTC and CA charged Urbano of the crime of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from
any liability.
Ruling:
None.
Under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, Criminal liability shall be

incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. An accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.
In the said case, the proximate cause of the death of Javier was due to
his own negligence and that Javier got infected with tetanus toxin after
two weeks he returned to his farm and used his bare hands which wound
was exposed to harmful elements. The rule is that the death of the victim
must be direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. In the circumstances presented, there is a
likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which the petitioner have
nothing to do.
Hence, there was no intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded
until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability.
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[G.R. No. 5098. October 29, 1909]

vs
VENANCIO MONASTERIAL ET. AL., defendants-Appellants
Facts:
On July 21, 1908 at about 9 p.m., Fruto Payoyo was passing through one
of the streets of the town Ligao, Albay Province, coming from the house of
Jose Nieves, and was attacked by certain Aurelio Monasterial and
Venancio Monasterial for the reason that Payoyo had told the father of the
attackers that they had been hiring out the carabaos belonging to their
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said father, to which the latter denied. Payoyo got fractured arm on the
said incident which prevented him from working, and it took more than
ninety days to heal. It turned out that Payoyo could never use his said
arm as freely as he did before he was injured. With this, a complaint was
filed on August 19, 1908, charging Aurelio and Venancio with the crime
lesiones graves.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio and Venancio were responsible of the said crime
committed and should be charged with lesiones graves.
Held:
Yes.
Under the Revised Penal Code, lesiones graves is a criminal responsibility

where two individuals, acting in common accord and mutually assisting
each other, attack a third person, one after the other and within a few
seconds, if not simultaneously, they are criminally responsible for the
unlawful injury caused by their acts, inasmuch as each of them took a
direct and material part in the aggression with the common intent of
injuring the attacked person.
In this case, if Aurelio and Venancio had not attacked or maltreated

Payoyo, the latter would not have suffered fracture of an arm which
required not less than ninety days to heal, owing to complications that
ensued; persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are
also liable for all the consequences arising therefrom and inherent
therein, other than those due to incidents entirely foreign to the act and
executed, or which originate through the fault or carelessness of the
injured person, which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the present
case.
Therefore, Aurelio and Venancio Monasterial are both responsible of the

said crime and should be charged with lesiones graves.
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[G.R. No. 1272 January 11, 1904]

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
According to information, the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de

Leon, and Fidel Feliciano, are charged with the crime of illegal detention
under Articles 481 and 483 of the Penal Code. They are said to have
entered Felix Punsalan's home in Matang-tubig, Province of Bulacan, one
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night around the middle of November 1902 with other unidentified

individuals, armed with revolvers and daggers, and kidnapped the said
Felix Punsalan.
On appeal, the defendants' attorneys claimed that the law's provisions

effectively forced a defendant to testify in his own defense or face a
considerably harsher punishment. The weight of proof falls on him if he
wants to reduce the punishment, or, to put it another way, if he wants to
incriminate himself. After all, just stating the victim's whereabouts or
proving that the defendant released him amounts to a confession that the
defendant wrongfully detained the person. The counsel for the defendants
claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Philippine Bill
provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were

violated.
HELD:
Yes. The defendants’ rights against self-incrimination were violated.
Under the law, the right against self-incrimination was established on the
grounds of public policy and humanity because, if a party were required
to testify, the witness would be most likely to be persuaded to commit the
crime of perjury, and because it would prevent the coercion of
confessions.
In this case, it is the prosecution's responsibility to convict a defendant of

a crime and to present evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; the accused cannot be asked to contribute to the gathering of this
evidence through express words or deeds, and his silence should not be
used as evidence against him. Until the prosecution can establish that he
is guilty of every aspect of the crime for which he is charged, he has the
right to depend on the presumption of innocence.
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[GR No. L-5070, December 29, 1952]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs
PEDRO PETILLA, defendant-appellant
Facts:
On August 31, 1949, a case was filed in the Justice of Peace against
Petilla, for slight physical injuries and enjoin with a frustrated homicide.
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During the hearing at Justice of Peace, the wound of the victim was found
to heal within thirty (30) days against the claim of eight (8) days. The
case was then forwarded to the court of the first instance, together with
the frustrated homicide believing the lower court lacked jurisdiction over
the said case. In December 17, 1949, the provincial fiscal amended the
case to serious physical injuries. On February 22, 1950, the accused
prayed for a petition to quash, alleging among other grounds that if the
case were to be continued, he would be placed in jeopardy and was also
granted its petition dated February 28, 1950. It underwent a series of
trials from the court of first instance and justice of peace. As for finality,
the court affirmed the petition in favor of the accused since there was no
motion filed by prosecution after February 28, 1950 resolution thus, made
the judgment final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the case of Petilla held under double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No. The case of Petilla was not under double jeopardy.
Under the Constitution, “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy or

punished for the same offense." (Art. III, section 120.) In an attempt to
implement this constitutional mandate, the Rules of Court (Rule 113,
section 9) make conviction or acquittal of the accused a bar to his
subsequent prosecution, not only for the same offense, but also "for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information."
In this case, there is no question that the offense of serious physical

injuries charged in the last information necessarily includes the lesser
offense charged in the first complaint and of which the accused was
convicted. Thus, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a
new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense."
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[85 Phil. 493, 496]

People of the Philippines
vs.
Rafael Belmores
Facts:
Crime of estafa thru falsification of a security directly by overt acts...
tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine
1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true
and real unidentified number... writing in ink at the bottom on the left
side of said ticket... the figure or number 074000... presenting the said
ticket so falsified... that he is entitled to the corresponding... amount of
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P359.55 so won by said ticket... but the said accused failed to perform all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a security as a consequence by... reason of some causes
other than his spontaneous desistance... one Bayani Miller, an employee
to whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket... to suffer not less
than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 12 years and
1 day of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and the costs.
Issues:
(1) W/N the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense
and
(2) W/N the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of
guilty because, being illiterate, he was not assisted by... counsel
Ruling:
The fact that appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty although he was not assisted
by counsel. The decision expressly states... that appellant waived the
right to be assisted by counsel, and we know of no law against such
waiver.
But the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the
crime impossible within the purview of... paragraph 2, article 4, in relation
to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code.
[G.R. NO. 162540 : July 13, 2009]

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jacinto, a Megafoam International employee, got a cheque for
Php 10,000 as payment for Baby Aquino's purchase from Megafoam.
Instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she placed it in her bank account.
The check was later discovered to be insufficiently financed. The
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petitioner was found guilty of qualified stealing by both the RTC and the
CA. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only.
Under the law, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the
act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
In this case, Petitioner’s evil intent to gain or be unjustly enriched was

obviously displayed when she took the check meant for Mega Foam. Were
it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the
face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
due to the circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
the petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced.
The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
[G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992]

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and

Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Misamis Occidental
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and asked him to accompany them to Bernardina Palangpangan's house.

Following that, the men met with Aniceto Dumalangan. He told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan killed due of a land dispute, and that
Mandaya should follow the four other men or he would be slain as well.
Intod and the four other guys arrived at Palangpangan's residence in

Misamis Occidental at 10:00 p.m. on the same day, equipped with
weapons. Mandaya indicated Palangpangan's bedroom. The men opened
fire on the room, but Palangpangan was in another city. Her son-in-law
and his family were living in her house. There was no one in the
Palangpangan room, thus no one was hit by the gunfire. Witnesses
positively identified the petitioner and his associates. According to one
witness, the males threatened them before they departed the premises.
The Regional Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals charged the
petitioner of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks a modification of the
judgment citing Article 4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, pleading that he
shall be liable only for an impossible crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner is not guilty of attempted murder.
Under the law, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. Factual impossibility
occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
In this case, the petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and
thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual situation in
this case presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
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crime impossible of accomplishment. To uphold the contention of

respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence
of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will,
will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment .
. ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of
the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. In Philippine
jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself.
86 | P a g e

Sata Elyka Criminal Law Assignment 2

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Sata Elyka Criminal Law Assignment 2

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MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY

College of Law Extension

People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18 57

Name: Elyka V. Sata 1-Alfarabi

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO

On November 11, 1976, Juanita Mapola reported Luningning missing.

While admitting culpability, the defendant disputes having intended to kill

Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the

[G.R No.4935. October 25, 1909]

consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in

[G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974]

Is Ural criminally liable for the death of Napola?

Yes. Ural is criminally liable for the death of Napola.

Hence, Ural is criminally liable as his act towards Napola is identified as

[G.R. No. 4490. December 4, 1908]

A complaint was filed regarding an incident that allegedly happened four

Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for physical injuries

Hence, Feliciano Divino was sentenced for simple imprudence to the

[G.R. No. 10606 September 11, 1915]

Isidro Benter filed a complaint against defendant Andres Villanueva on

The judgment appealed is reversed. Andres Villanueva was acquitted with

which punishes that act of snatching the property of another just to

Paragraph 1 of Article 4 says that criminal liability shall be incurred by

[74 Phil 257, G.R. No. 47722 July 27, 1943]

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary)

[G.R. No. 32066 March 15, 1930.]

A gathering of Mansacas took place in Mansaca Gabriel's home on October

Whether or not the mistake of identity of the victim absolves the

Under paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, “A person

G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014

When Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey) was sleeping at Vicente's house9,

Eventually, Umawid killed Jeffrey with a series of hacking blows that

Under article 12 of RPC which provides that circumstances which exempt

The accused solely relied on the testimonies of the doctors to substantiate

[G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933]

FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, alias

[G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The accused, Jaime Tomortogo, appealed the Court of First Instance's

Three (3) mitigating circumstances were proved by the accused: (1)

Whether or not the accused should be imposed a lower penalty.

[G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

[G.R. No. 10037. December 23, 1914.]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

On the morning of September 25, 1913, in the neighborhood of Batasan,

Yes. The accused is guilty of homicide.

A requisite supporting the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal

[G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, Constabulary soldiers

[G.R. NO. L-16486. MAR. 22, 1921]

Issue: Whether or not the accused be considered the responsible author

Following the commencement of the trial in accordance with the

Under the law Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be

In this case, Isabelo Hechanova was in a good and healthy

[G.R. No. 10615. November 16, 1915]

[G.R. No. L-204 May 16, 1947]

Yes, the appellant is criminally liable.

It is stated in Article 4 Section 1 of the Revised Penal Code that, Criminal

[GR No. 234190, October 01, 2018]

As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the

[ G.R. No. L –32076, March 14, 1930]

[No. 7123, August 17, 1912]