Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness

Author(s): Christian Barth

Source: Vivarium , 2014, Vol. 52, No. 3/4, Special Issue: Varieties of Subjectivity (2014),
pp. 333-357
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24775477

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 VIVARIUM 52 (2014) 333-357 V
RI U M
BRILL brillcom/viv

Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness

Christian Barth
Humboldt-Universitât zu Berlin

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phe
nomenal consciousness from Leibniz's (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view,
which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to
Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order concep
tion of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness
is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn,
is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a repre
sented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content.
Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that
Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this
view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the con
fusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents.
Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary stan
dard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia
accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet sev
eral objections these standard accounts are confronted with.

Keywords

Leibniz - phenomenal consciousness - sensation

That a mental state is phenomenally conscious means that there is something

it is like for the subject, who is in this state, to be in this state. For instance,
there is something it is like for an experiencing subject to be in the state of
smelling coffee and what it is like to be in this state differs from what it is like
to be in the state of smelling a rose. Different accounts of phenomenal con
sciousness have been proposed in the contemporary debate. For an overview

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2014 | DOI 10.1163/15685349-12341280

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334 BART H

it is helpful to draw a general distinction between first-order and higher-or

accounts.

(1) Higher-order accounts claim that there is something it is like for a

to be in a mental state S in virtue of the fact that the subject entertain
ond act intentionally directed at S.1 This second act represents the first
an experience featuring a specific phenomenal character2 (of smellin
or of smelling a rose) to the subject. Hence, for higher-order accoun
nomenal consciousness rests on the presence of two distinct acts, one of
is higher-order in that it represents the other.3
(2) Proponents offirst-order accounts do without higher-order acts an
tend that phenomenal consciousness rests on features of the state in qu
alone. Qualia accounts claim that mental states are phenomenally co
in virtue of specific intrinsic and introspectively accessible qualities
called "qualia"—these states exhibit. These qualia are considered no
within the scope of what is (merely purportedly or successfully) repres
by the state, i.e., they are not intentional objects. In contrast, representa
accounts argue that mental states are phenomenally conscious in virtue
specific type of representational content they exhibit. The type of repr
tional content in question is usually characterised as sensory and int

1 In contemporary literature, a second kind of higher-order account has been propose

higher-order content theories (see, for instance, U. Kriegel, 'The Same-order Mo
Theory of Consciousness', in Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, ed. U
and K. Williford (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 143-170). In contrast to higher-order act theorie
do without positing a second higher-order act. According to them, that there is som
it is like for the subject to be in a mental state is due to the fact that this same act
two levels of content. The second-level content is higher-order in kind in that it re
the act it is contained by as an experience of a specific character to the subject. Thi
higher-order content accounts are often called "self-representational" accounts of
enal consciousness. In this paper, I will not relate Leibniz's view of phenomenal c
ness to higher-order content accounts.
2 The description of phenomenal consciousness in terms of there being something it i
the subject to be in the respective state indicates a distinction between two aspec
nomenal consciousness: first, there is something it is like to be in the mental state a
something it is like to be in the state of smelling coffee. Talk of there being something
to be in the mental state refers to the phenomenal character of the state. Second
nomenal character of a phenomenally conscious state is always a character the state
for a subject. This feature can be called the for-me-ness aspect of phenomenal consc
In this paper I will only be concerned with phenomenal character and leave the for
aspect aside.
3 For a classic statement of the higher-order account, see D. Rosenthal, 'Two Concepts of
Consciousness', Philosophical Studies 49 (1986), 329-359.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 335

but non-conceptual in kind. Furthermore, representationalists u

this content additionally in functionalist terms. They usually s
states are phenomenally conscious in virtue of a sensory and in
non-conceptual content that plays a specific functional role by
as input for conceptual activity.4
Higher-order and first-order accounts usually agree that ther
enally conscious as well as phenomenally unconscious mental
disagree on whether it is possible that one and the same men
phenomenally conscious (in some circumstances) as well as
unconscious (in other circumstances). Higher-order theorists say
the same mental state can be phenomenally conscious as well as
unconscious, depending on the presence of a proper higher
order theorists deny this claim. For them, if a mental state
conscious, i.e., if it exhibits qualia or the right kind of repr
tent, the state is necessarily phenomenally conscious and could
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, I would like to sho
develops a fairly elaborate account of phenomenal consciousn
aim is to relate Leibniz's view to the sketched contemporar
tions. Leibniz's account of phenomenal consciousness draws
notion of attention. According to a prevalent interpretation
stands attention in this context in terms of acts of reflection.
tion leads directly to an attribution of a higher-order account
consciousness to Leibniz. In contrast to this view, I will arg
does not conceive of the relevant kind of attention in terms of
in terms of cognitive appetites and cognitive activity. Furtherm
position does not coincide with a qualia account either, nor
tationalist account. Instead, his position is unorthodox and c
of all three contemporary standard positions, which I have d
For instance, Leibniz agrees with higher-order theorists in claim
that are phenomenally conscious are not necessarily so. But he d
explaining phenomenal consciousness in terms of higher-ord
also does without the imposition of qualia, but accounts for
character of phenomenally conscious states in epistemic rath
logical terms. And his epistemic account implies that he is a
representationalist who proposes that phenomenal conscious
a matter of the right kind of representational content. Leib
phenomenal consciousness neither by positing qualia nor by

4 See M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA, 1995) for an i

of a representationalist theory.

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336 BART H

what is represented by a phenomenally conscious state. Instead, his epistemic

explanation of phenomenal character heavily draws on the idea that acts of
attention directed at representational contents confuse the components of
these contents. In sum, Leibniz develops a first-order explanation of phenom
enal consciousness that possesses features of higher-order theories, represen
tationalist accounts, and accounts that posit qualia, without coinciding with
any one of these approaches. As I will explain in the concluding section, his
unorthodox position helps to avoid some problems contemporary standard
positions tend to encounter.
In the course of analysing Leibniz's account of phenomenal consciousness,
I will focus on the case of phenomenally conscious acts of outer sense percep
tion and leave other cases aside, such as phenomenally conscious emotions,
moods, and bodily feelings. In the first section, I will analyse Leibniz's view of
the structure of phenomenally conscious sensation. In particular, I will be con
cerned with the way in which Leibniz sees phenomenally conscious sensation
as depending on the operation of sense organs and with his view of the inter
nal complexity of acts of phenomenally conscious sensation. This will provide
us with background against which we can tackle the question of how Leibniz
understands phenomenal consciousness in the case of sensation. In Section 2,
I will provide an interpretation of how Leibniz explains that a phenomenally
conscious sensation is phenomenally conscious rather than unconscious.
I will call this an explanation of the "consciousness aspect" of phenomenal
consciousness. In Section 3, I will suggest an interpretation of Leibniz's view
of phenomenal character. Section 4 concludes the paper. Let me finally note
that when I talk about conscious sensation in the following sections, I mean
sensations that are phenomenally conscious (and not conscious in any other
sense of the term).

1 The Structure of Sensation

1.1 Sensations (in the Wide Sense) and Operations of Sense Organs
As is well known, Descartes subsumes all acts of immaterial substances und
the concept of thought (Latin: cogitatio-, French: pensée). Leibniz's general
cept for acts of immaterial substances within his theory of cognition is not
concept of thought,5 but the concept of perception (Latin: perception Fren

5 Having said that, I hasten to add that at times Leibniz uses the term "cogitatio" or its F
equivalent "pensée" synonymously with the terms "perceptio"/"perception." In some pass
Leibniz himself directs the reader's attention to this particularity of his use of these t

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 337

perception). However, it is important to note that the e

concept of perception is broader than the extension of the
of thought in two respects: first, whereas Descartes on
existence of rational immaterial substances, i.e., of min
edges three types of immaterial substances. Applying the t
late monadological metaphysics, Leibniz describes them
animal souls, and rational souls, i.e., minds.6 Hence, Leib
ception not only embraces the acts of minds, as Descartes'
does, but also the acts of animal souls and simple monad
adheres to the famous doctrine that all thoughts, i.e., a
are conscious.7 Again, Leibniz's notion of perception is b
because Leibniz acknowledges perceptual acts that are u
(as well as in simple monads and animal souls).
Leibniz defines perception as the representation of many
this definition he means that an act of perception repre
marily the monad's own body),9 which is mereologically co
terial substance, which is mereologically simple.10 The rep
itself is to be understood in terms of structural preservati
represents an item B in virtue of sharing at least part of th
that B exhibits. This requires mapping internal elements of
B and mapping qualities and relations among those elem
of elements of B. The paradigmatic example of represen
with is geometrical projection, for instance, of a circle on
Leibniz also distinguishes between three types of pe
perception, sensation, and thought.12 The first two typ

(see G.W. Leibniz, Sdmtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. by Preuf

Brandenburgische und Gôttinger] Akademie der Wissenschaften
[later: Leipzig, now: Berlin], 1923-), [henceforth cited as aa], 6.6.161,
volume 6, pp. 161,171, and 210]).
6 See Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz, ed. C.I. Gerhardt,
(henceforth cited as gp), VI 609-612 (= volume VI, pp. 609-612). S
gp VII529, and gp VI599-601.
7 See Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, 12 vols.
(= volume VII, 160), VII 232, VII246, and VIIIA 7.
8 See, for instance, aa 6.4.1625 and gp VI 608.
g See gp VII 529.
10 See gp III 72 and gp III 574.
11 See C. Swoyer, 'Leibnizian Expression', Journal of the History of Philosophy 33.1 (1995),
65-99
12 See aa 2.2.240-241, gp VII330-331, gp VII529, gp VI599-601, and gp VI610-612.

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338 BART H

non-intellective, whereas thoughts are intellective acts. Sensations (Lati

sensio; French: sensation, sentiment) comprise bodily sentiments and out
sense perceptions. In this paper I will focus on the latter type of sensation
Although Leibniz often has conscious acts in mind when he speaks of s
sations, texts reveal that his concept of sensation also covers unconscio
acts.13 Furthermore, at times he defines sensation in relation to being stored
in memory,14 implying that sensations are perceptions that—in some sen
to be specified—can be remembered later on.15 In other passages, however, it
seems that being stored in memory is not required for sensation. For instance
Leibniz says in the New Essay on Human Understanding (henceforth ne):

While sleeping, even without dreams, one always has some faint sens
ing going on. Waking up is itself a sign of this: the easier someone is to
awaken, the more sense he has of what is going on around him, though
often this sense is not strong enough to cause him to wake.16

Surely, what we perceive during periods of dreamless sleep does not fa

within the scope of what we can remember later on. Hence, it seems tha
Leibniz employs two different notions of sensation. The wide notion of sensa
tion includes perceptions that are not stored in memory and that we cann
remember later on; the narrow notion requires for sensation storage in memor
In the remaining part of this sub-section, I will be concerned with the
wide notion of sensation only, whereas the narrow notion will be a topic
the following sub-section. Concerning the wide notion of sensation, a qu
tion arises: since the concept of simple perception already covers unconscious
perceptions, what distinguishes simple perceptions from unconscious sen
tions? The answer is that sensations are representations of specific kinds
bodily states, namely states of sense organs. More precisely, sensations (in the

13 See AA 6.6.54, AA 6.6.115, AA 6.6.119, AA 6.6.169, and GP VI 599.

14 Two different types of storage in a monad need to be distinguished. According to Leibniz
famous doctrine of traces, each occurring perception leaves a trace in the monad. Apart
from that, some perceptions are also stored in memory (memoria, memoire). Being store
in memory implies that the perception can be remembered under specific circumstance
and, thus, is available for cognitive activity. Mere traces of perceptions, in contrast, are not
available and cannot naturally be remembered (see AA 6.6.55 and AA 6.6.114-115). In this
paper, when I talk of memory, 1 will only be concerned with cognitively accessible mem
ory and not with mere traces.
15 See G P VI 5gg. I will discuss this passage in detail later.
16 Translation from G.W. Leibniz: New Essay on Human Understanding, trans, and
P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge, 1996), 115; aa 6.6.115.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 339

wide sense) represent those areas of sense organs that rece

the outside. Those areas have a special feature that consists i
impressions become sufficiently powerful they lead to con
Leibniz says that we have sensations even in dreamless
tions of this kind in mind. Awakening happens when the r
become sufficiently forceful, as Leibniz points out. A subje
a noise becomes loud enough. Sensations (in the wide s
sively of all those perceptions that can develop into con
when the bodily impressions become sufficiently forceful.
only true of sense organs that their received impressio
ciently forceful that they give rise to conscious mental sta
special feature of sense organs. According to Leibniz, se
operation have a bundling effect on the impressions they r
this bundling effect, the incoming impressions add up to a
that is much stronger in force than the impact of impress
of the body. Leibniz's favourite example for the bundling ef
is the eye. As he says in Principles of Nature of Grace (hen

But when a monad has organs that are adjusted in such a

them, there is something heightened and distinguished
they receive, and consequently something heightened a
in the perceptions that represent them (as, for example,
are concentrated and act with greaterforce because of th
humors), then this may amount to sensation [.. .].18

In this passage, Leibniz describes the overall impression th

dling as containing something "heightened." The metap
ened stands for the greater measure of "force" the imp
through being bundled. This passage also reveals that L
metaphorical expression in order to refer to the correspon
monad's perception that represents the greater impact

17 See aa 2.2.176, gp VI 599, and gp VI 611.

18 Translation from G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. R
(Indianapolis, 198g) (henceforth cited as ag), 208; translation modif
gp VI 599: "Mais quand la Monade a des organes si ajustés, que pa
relief et du distingué dans les impressions qu'ils reçoivent, et pa
perceptions qui les représentent (comme, par exemple, lorsque par
des humeurs des yeux, les rayons de la lumiere sont concentrés e
force) cela peut aller jusqu'au sentiment [...]."

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340 BART H

impressions on the sense organ. This perception is "heightened" in an analogi

cal sense, which is appropriate to mental acts. Hence, perceptions possess a
"mental strength" which is analogous to the bodily force of impressions on
the body. Due to his doctrine that monads represent their bodies fully and
perfectly,19 "heightened" impressions on sense organs are always represented
by equally "heightened" perceptions. As we will see in more detail shortly
being "heightened" is a necessary condition for a perception to qualify as a
conscious sensation. This means that the presence of conscious sensations is
dependent on properly operating sense organs in the following sense: the pres
ence of conscious sensations depends on the presence of "heightened" percep
tions, which, in turn, depend on the presence of "heightened" impressions on
sense organs; and impressions on sense organs become "heightened" in virtue
of the bundling effect these organs have on impressions they receive.
Let me summarise the results of this sub-section: Leibniz distinguishes
between sensation in a wide and in a narrow sense. Sensations in the wide

sense comprise all and only those perceptions that, given that they are not
already conscious, can become conscious if impressions on the body become
sufficiently forceful. But only sense organs are designed in such a way that
the impressions that they receive can exhibit the required degree of forceful
ness. This is due to the bundling effect properly operating sense organs have
on impressions they receive. Hence, all and only those perceptions qualify as
sensations (in the wide sense) that represent areas of sense organs that receive
impressions from outside.

1.2 The Components of Sensations (in the Narrow Sense) and of

Phenomenally Conscious Sensations
From now on, 1 will leave aside the notion of sensation in the wide sense and
focus on the notions of sensation in the narrow sense and of conscious sensa
tion. In order to sort out the conditions for sensation in the narrow sense and
for conscious sensation, it is helpful to take a look at three significant character
izations of sensations that Leibniz presents in his texts. The leading question
will be: what notion of sensation is characterised in the respective passages?
The first characterisation stems from the 1688 text A Specimen of Discoveries
about Marvellous Secrets of a General Nature:20

It is also clear what perception, which belongs to all forms, is, namely the
expression of many things in one, which differs widely from expression

îg See aa 6.4.1550.
20 Specimen Inventorum DeAdm.irand.is Naturae Generatis Arcanis, aa 6.4.1615-1630.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 341

in a mirror or in a corporeal organ, which is not truly one. But if the per
ception is more distinct, it makes a sensation.21

As we will learn from the next quotation, Leibniz's characterisation of percep

tions as being "more distinct" is closely connected to their feature of being
"heightened," which we have already come across above. When perceptions
are "heightened" they are distinguished from other co-occurring perceptions
due to their greater "mental strength." Leibniz's talk of perceptions as being
"more distinct" should be seen as referring to that fact. However, not just any
"heightened" perception amounts to sensation. In order to do so, it needs to be
"heightened" to a sufficient level. Hence, the comparative form "more distinct"
indicates not only a level of "mental strength" above the level of "strength" per
taining to other co-occurring perceptions, but also above some sufficient level
of "mental strength." The first characterisation then states that fulfilling the
distinctness condition is sufficient for sensation, where the distinctness condi
tion requires the perception to possess sufficient "mental strength."
The second characterisation stems from png 4. We have already quoted it
before. In expanded form, it says:

But when a monad has organs that are adjusted in such a way that through
them there is something heightened and distinguished in the impres
sions they receive, and consequently something heightened and distin
guished in the perceptions that represent them (as, for example, when
the rays of light are concentrated and act with greater force because of
the shape of the eye's humors), then this may amount to sensation, that
is, to a perception accompanied by memory—a perception of which there
remains an echo long enough to make itself heard on occasion.22

21 Translation from Leibniz. Philosophical Writings, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, trans. M. Morris
and G.H.R. Parkinson (London, 1973), 85; translation modified; my highlighting.
AA 6.4.1625: "Patet etiam quid perceptio sit, quae omnibus formis competit, nempe
expressio multorum in uno, quae longe differt ab expressione in speculo, vel in organo
corporeo, quod vere unum non est. Quodsi perceptio sit distinctior, sensum facit."
22 AG 208; translation modified; my highlighting, gp VI 599: "Mais quand la Monade a des
organes si ajustés, que par leur moyen il y a du relief et du distingué dans les impressions
qu'ils reçoivent, et par consequent dans les perceptions qui les représentent (comme, par
exemple, lorsque par le moyen de la figure des humeurs des yeux, les rayons de la lumiere
sont concentrés et agissent avec plus de force) cela peut aller jusqu'au sentiment, c'est à
dire jusqu'à une perception accompagnée de memoire, à savoir, dont un certain echo
demeure longtemps pour se faire entendre dans l'occasion[.]"

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342 BART H

Here, Leibniz elaborates on the distinctness condition and spells it out in ter
of there being something "heightened and distinguished" in the percept
As explained, the perception's feature that is described as being "heightened"
its "mental strength." The feature of being "distinguished" is closely connec
to "being heightened": a perception is "distinguished" from co-occurring
ceptions in virtue of being "heightened," i.e., in virtue of possessing "menta
strength" that is greater than the "strength" of co-occurring perceptions. T
important point of the png 4 passage is that fulfilling the distinctness cond
tion is characterised as a necessary but not sufficient condition for sensatio
Fulfilment of the memory condition is also required. A distinct percept
amounts to sensation only if it is accompanied by memory.
A further condition is mentioned in the following third characterisation
sensation:23

For sensation is perception that includes something distinct and is com

bined with attention and memory.24

From this passage we learn that sensation requires fulfilment not only of the
distinctness and of the memory condition, but also of a third condition, which
I will call the "attention condition."

As we learn from the three passages, Leibniz presents different characterisa

tions of sensation in different texts. Why do these discrepancies between the
three characterisations obtain? One possibility is that Leibniz changed his view
in the course of his career and developed an increasingly complex account of
sensation. However, this view has to face the objection that the third, most com
plex characterisation (1710) comes earlier than the second (1714). Furthermore,
the attention condition is mentioned in earlier texts already composed in 1686
and 1694.25 In Larry Jorgensen's recent writings on Leibniz's conception of
consciousness we find an ingenious proposal that would solve the problem 26
On the basis of considerations related to the principle of continuity, Jorgensen
suggests that we should take the first characterisation presented above as

23 See also gp VII 529.

24 gp VII330: "Sensio enim est perceptio, quae aliquid distincti involvit, et cum attentione et
memoria conjuncta est."
25 See aa 6.6.1582-3 and GP IV574-5.
26 See L. Jorgensen, 'The Principle of Continuity and Leibniz's Theory of Consciousness',
Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.2 (2009), 223-248, and L. Jorgensen, 'Leibniz on
Memory and Consciousness', British Journal for the History of Philosophy ig.5 (2011),
887-916.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 343

Leibniz's considered definition of conscious sensation, while

found in the two other characterisations spell out features that
conscious sensation.27 Rather than being "constitutive of"
tion, memory of and attention to the sensed object are consequ
conscious of the object. Hence, according to Jorgensen, percept
conscious sensation once its degree of distinctness has excee
required for consciousness. Once this has happened, memor
sensation get established and attention gets focused on it. If Jo
we would have an elegant solution to our puzzle. Leibniz w
scious sensation in terms of the distinctness condition all along
he would add to this definition descriptions of what "results fr
sensations such as entering the subject's memory and captur
attention. Although Jorgensen's account has strong merits, it a
problem: it does not cohere well with the texts. First, it just seem
Leibniz expresses constitutive conditions of conscious sens
ond and third characterisation presented above. At least, he now
that mentioning memory and attention is merely intended to d
"results from" conscious sensation. Second, in the passage from
says that a "heightened" perception that is also accompanied by
not at such constitute a conscious sensation. Rather, it only
heard on occasion."28 This suggests that sufficient "heightenedn
ception does not suffice for conscious sensation, not even if it
by memory. Hence, Jorgensen's reading cannot help us to solve
Does this mean that there is no way of reconciling these t
characterisations of sensation? I do not think so. Let us begi
ing the second characterisation from png 4. According to th
tion requires a sufficiently "heightened" perception, which is a
memory. As already noted, since both conditions do not yet lea
sensation, but only to a sensation that can become consciou
is obvious that Leibniz does not intend to characterise conscious sensation in

this passage. But he is also not concerned with sensation in the wide sense,
because the latter does not require storage in memory. Hence, what Leibniz is
concerned with is the notion of sensation in the narrow sense to which I have

already alluded in the last sub-section. It comprises a sub-class of sensations

in the wide sense, namely those that are sufficiently "heightened" (through the
bundling effect of sense organs) in order to be stored in memory. Yet, the class

27 See Jorgensen, 'Continuity', 242.

28 For a more extensive critique of jorgensen's account, see A. Simmons, 'Leibnizian
Consciousness Reconsidered', Studia Leibnitiana 43.2 (2011, published 2013), 196-215.

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344 BART H

of sensations in the narrow sense is wider than the class of conscious sensa
tions, because not all sensations that are stored in memory are also conscious.29
Next, let us turn to the first characterisation of sensation. Here it seems to
me that Leibniz is giving a contracted account of sensation in the narrow sense.
In this passage, he only mentions the distinctness condition without making
explicit the memory condition. Why does he not do so? One might assume
that he is just careless. But there is a better reading of the passage: he does not
mention the memory condition because sufficient "heightenedness," at least in
normal circumstances, leads to being stored in memory. Perceptions are stored
in memory if they are sufficiently "heightened," whereas those that are not do
not find entrance into memory.30 Hence, it is not the case that he just neglects
to mention one of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
for sensation (in the narrow sense), which are fully independent of each other.
Instead, since being sufficiently heightened leads to entering memory, fulfill
ing the distinctness condition is—at least in normal conditions—necessary
and sufficient for sensation (in the narrow sense). It is just that he does not
unpack fully the psychological mechanism that constitutes sensation, i.e.,
in the first characterisation Leibniz does not unpack the fact that sufficient
"heightenedness" also leads to being stored in memory.
Finally, let us turn to the third characterisation. Here Leibniz adds a third
condition for sensation, namely the attention condition. In view of the fact
that the distinctness and the memory condition only account for sensation in
the narrow sense, which comprises unconscious and conscious acts, it is plau
sible to understand the attention condition as marking only conscious sen
sation. This hypothesis is substantiated by passages in which Leibniz alludes
to attention in explaining the difference between conscious and unconscious
sensations. For instance, in a striking passage from ne he explains:

For there are always objects which strike our eyes and ears, and there
fore touch our souls as well, without our paying heed to them. For our
attention is held by other objects, until a given object becomes powerful
enough to attract it, either by acting more strongly upon us or in some
other way. It is as though we had been selectively asleep with regard to
that object; and when we withdraw our attention from everything all
together, the sleep becomes general.31

29 Apart from gp VI599, see also the example Leibniz presents at aa 6.6.54.
30 See aa 6.6.54 and gp VI600.
31 aa 6.6.115/RB 115.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 345

As this passage makes clear, unconscious sensations of obje

scious when the objects attract our attention, which, in turn
ciently strong impact on our sense organs. And even the gen
between being awake and being asleep is a matter of atten
Hence, a sensation that fulfils the attention condition is a consc
To conclude this sub-section: we have learned from three characterisations
of sensation that, apart from the notion of sensation in the wide sense, Leibniz
distinguishes between sensation in the narrow sense and conscious sensa
tion. Furthermore, Leibniz presents the distinctness condition and the mem
ory condition as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for sensation in
the narrow sense. Conscious sensation additionally requires fulfilment of the
attention condition. In section two of this paper, I will focus on the attention
condition. In doing so, I try to determine Leibniz's account of the conscious
ness aspect of phenomenally conscious sensation.

2 The Consciousness Aspect of Phenomenally Conscious Sensation

In this section, I will be concerned with Leibniz's explanation of the fact that a
phenomenally conscious sensation is conscious rather than unconscious. I will
call this the "consciousness aspect" of phenomenally conscious sensation. In
the next section, I will address Leibniz's account of the phenomenal character
that phenomenally conscious sensations exhibit.
A prominent account claims that, for Leibniz, mental acts are conscious in
virtue of being reflected on by the respective subject.32 If this account were
true, the difference between conscious and unconscious mental acts would
boil down to the distinction between mental acts that are and those that are
not objects of reflection. Leibniz would hold a reflective account of the atten
tion condition. Furthermore, proponents of the reflection account point out
that Leibniz characterises the kind of act of reflection responsible for con
sciousness as a special act of memory. According to their view, this is why
Leibniz claims that "[mjemory is needed for attention."33 Accordingly, the
tripartite conception of phenomenally conscious sensation would have to be
understood as follows:

32 See R. McRae, Perception, Apperception, and Thought (Toronto, 1976), and M. Kulstad,
Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection (Munich, 1991).
33 aa 6.6.54.

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346 BARTH

(Ri) Distinctness condition: conscious sensation requires a suff

distinct perception.
(Ra) Memory condition: in virtue of being sufficiently distinct, t
ception leaves a disposition in memory34 whose actualisation consi
a reflective act of remembering of the form "I sense X" or "1 sense
(R3) Attention condition: the disposition in memory gets imm
actualised such that a reflective act of remembering of the form
X" or "I sense that p" occurs.

If the reflection account were right, Leibniz would hold a higher-orde

of consciousness. A sensation would be conscious in virtue of the fact th
the object of an act of reflection, which represents the perception that
in memory to the subject.
This interpretation of Leibniz's account of conscious sensation fa
ous problem, however. As the most prominent adherents of the r
account have already recognised, Leibniz explicitly ascribes consci
tion to animal monads but strictly denies them the capacity of ref
Hence, in order to avoid attributing an obvious incoherence to Le
should not be seen as holding a reflection account of consciousness. Th
vates a search for an alternative account.
I think that there is an alternative account available that solves the
problem. Within the confines of this paper, however, I will only

34 Leibniz describes these dispositions as residues ("restes") of the original disti

tion (see AA 6.6.140). It is an important and difficult question as to what Leibn
tion of mental dispositions amounts to and what it means for them to be r
perceptions. However, I will not be able to address this topic in this paper.
35 Robert McRae recognises this problem, but charges Leibniz with an incohere
(see McRae, Perception, Apperception, and Thought, 34). But since the inco
question is an obvious one, it seems improbable that Leibniz could have failed
it. Mark Kulstad tries to improve on McRae's version of the reflection account
ducing a distinction between two types of reflection, one of which animals are
(see Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, 23-26). The problem with this view, howev
there is no sufficient textual evidence for a distinction between two types of re
Leibniz. Within this paper, I will not be able to present these objections in deta
my 'Apperception in the New Essays concerning Human Understanding. A Crit
Reflective Account and a Sketch of an alternative Proposal', in Natur und Subje
des IX. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, ed. H. Breger, J. Herbst, and
(Hannover, 2011), 37-43, for a more extended presentation of them.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 347

present outlines of this account.36 I call the alternative account

account," since it revolves around the concept of attention. Acc
attention account, sensory perception is conscious not in virtue
the subject reflects on the perception, but in virtue of the fact
attends to the perception in a specific way. The kind of attenti
not rest on an act of reflection, but is non-reflective. Hence, in
headway with understanding Leibniz's account of consciousn
get a grip on this non-reflective kind of attention. Leibniz defin
attention in aa 6.6.161 in terms of "distinguishing" an object fr
ring" it to other objects. This definition is arguably intended t
tary attention, since the definition is formulated in active voic
the kind of attention Leibniz is concerned with in this pass
selective attention to an object that belongs to a range of ob
is already conscious of (e.g., taking a closer look at the statue in
The kind of attention we are looking for, however, is neithe
attention to an object that is already within the scope of th
sciousness. Yet, the passage from aa 6.6.161 is important in that i
Leibniz understands attention as a matter of appetite. This is th
preference is a conative state and, for Leibniz, the conative nat
states is to be explained in terms of appetites, which are the in
monads and which propel the monadic inner activity.37 Hence,
is that we should understand the kind of attention relevant for
sation in terms of a specific sub-class of appetites. What might
be like? In general, appetites are strivings towards the (appa
towards promoting pleasure and avoiding harm. The strivings r
kind of attention that constitutes conscious sensation are specia
concern objects of sensation. These strivings are, so to speak, "a
or not the objects sensed can promote pleasure or do harm, i.e.,
are helpful in satisfying one's needs (edible, can give shelter, et
they are dangerous. In particular, there will be strivings th
harm-causing potential of the sensed objects in order to be prep

36 In my paper 'Apperception in the New Essays' I presented the first ste

tion account of apperception. The outline of the attention account p
paper goes beyond the initial sketch, first, in that it is much more detai
that revises some of its basic elements. This holds true, in particular, of
tites in attention.

37 For the intimate connection between attention and appetite, see also Opuscules et frag
ments inédits de Leibniz, ed. L. Couturat (Paris, 1903), 493, where Leibniz defines attention
in terms of desire. For discussion, see M. Bolton, 'Leibniz's Theory of Cognition', in The
Continuum Compendium to Leibniz, ed. B. Look (London, 2011), 136-158, esp. 156.

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348 BART H

to occurring dangers. However, depending on the current state of the subject,

the strivings can also be more specific. For instance, in the case in which the
subject is searching for something (mother cat for its kitten, for instance), a
striving will be present that "asks" whether the object searched for (the kitten)
is among the objects it senses. And in the case of hunger, thirst, or feeling cold
strivings are present that "ask" whether there is something edible, drinkable,
or warming among the objects sensed. Hence, among the strivings relevant for
attention, which contribute to the constitution of conscious sensation, we can
distinguish between at least three different types of strivings: (a) strivings that
generally "ask" for the harm-causing potential of the sensed objects; (b) striv
ings that "ask" whether a particular object searched for is among the sense
objects; (c) strivings that "ask" whether or not there is an object among th
sensed objects that could satisfy a current need. Of course, it is not the ca
that strivings of all three kinds must to be present in every case of conscious
sensation (one is not always searching for something when one has conscious
sensation). But there must be some striving of these or related38 kinds.
The strivings, which constitute conscious sensation, can be called "cogn
tive" because they are strivings toward a cognitive good. They are striving
toward knowledge about the sensed objects, namely whether the sensed
objects can be expected to be harmful, whether the sensed objects include an
object searched for, or whether the sensed objects include an object that ca
be expected to satisfy a current need. The means that are employed in ord
to achieve these aims (i.e., to "answer" these "questions") consist in cognitiv
operations. These operations work on the content of the original distinct per
ception, which is stored in memory. In order for these operations to occu
the disposition in memory, which was left by the original distinct perception
must be actualised such that an act of remembering occurs. These acts I ca
"acts of immediate content-repetition," since they merely repeat the content
of the original distinct perception.39 Actualising an act of immediate content
repetition is the primary effect of the cognitive appetites we are concerne
with. Once the dispositions have been actualised, the relevant cognitive opera
tions on the repeated content can be carried out. For instance, Leibniz account
for expectations concerning the general harm-causing potential of objects in
terms of the capacity of associative reasoning he ascribes to animals as we

38 This list is surely not comprehensive and I do no pretend to give a full list of relevant kin
of strivings here.
39 Leibniz's technical notion for acts of content-repetition is the notion of reminiscence (s
aa 6.6.161).

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 349

as to rational monads.40 The repeated contents are compared with contents

stored in memory. If there is a fit between these contents, associative expecta
tions (concerning being dangerous) can come about, which represent what
the subject has experienced before in similar situations.41 Furthermore, if an
object is searched for, the repeated contents are compared with the represen
tation of the missing object stored in memory, thereby determining whether
the missing object is among the sensed objects. Finally, whether sensed objects
have the potential of satisfying current needs is, again, determined by com
parisons between the repeated contents and contents stored in memory, such
that associated expectations about the need-satisfying potential of the sensed
objects can get activated.42
How does this story about cognitive appetites as constituting attention
explain the consciousness aspect of phenomenally conscious sensations?
Conscious sensations are exclusively and exhaustively those whose memory
dispositions have been activated through cognitive strivings. These are the sen
sations (in the narrow sense) that the subject attends to. The kind of attention
that constitutes conscious sensation is cognitive attention. That a represented
object is attended to and, thus, becomes conscious means that cognitive striv
ings activate the corresponding disposition in memory with the aim of gaining
knowledge (related to questions of pleasure and harm) about it by means of
initiating appropriate cognitive operations on the repeated content.
So far we have only addressed the attention condition. We still need an
account of the dependence of attention on memory. I would like to suggest
that, for Leibniz, attention requires memory because attention requires an act
of remembering that contains the representational content of the original dis
tinct perception and holds it present for being attended to, i.e., as an object for
cognitive operations. Note that the original distinct perception belongs to a set
of perceptions that are in constant flux due to the permanent inner monadic
activity. Hence, in order for there to be a content present that can be operated
on, the content needs to remain present, even if only for a short time span. This
requirement cannot be fulfilled by the original distinct perception, because it
immediately changes into another perception. Holding the content present is
achieved by the act of immediate content-repetition.

40 See aa 6.6.143, aa 6.6.475-476, and gp VI611.

41 See Leibniz's famous dog-example, aa 6.6.143 ar>d g p VI600.
42 Things become more complicated if we take into account the rational capacities of ratio
nal monads like the capacity of rational reasoning and deliberation (see, for instance,
aa 6.6.50-51). In order to keep things manageable, however, I leave rational capacities aside.

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350 BART H

In contrast to the reflection account, the attention account avoids attrib

uting an obviously incoherent conception of the consciousness aspect to
Leibniz, because it only appeals to elements that are available to non-rationa
animals. Non-rational animals possess sufficiently distinct perceptions due to
their sense organs, they possess memory and acts of content-repetition,43 they
exhibit cognitive strivings,44 and they possess the capacity of associative rea
soning.45 They do not possess the capacity of reflection, though, but this does
not undermine the attention account, because it conceives of the required
kind of attention as being non-reflective.
In sum, then, according to the attention account the three conditions of
conscious sensation possess the following form:

(Ai) Distinctness condition: the perception needs to be sufficiently

distinct.

(A2) Memory condition: in virtue of being sufficiently distinct, the per

ception immediately leaves a disposition in memory whose actualisa
tion results in a special act of remembering, namely an act of immediate
content-repetition.
(A3) Attention condition: the subject attends to the content stored in
memory in virtue of cognitive appetites that strive for (pleasure and harm
related) knowledge about the represented object by means of cognitive
operations on the representation of the object. In order for these cogni
tive operations to occur, the appetites activate the memory disposition.46

3 The Phenomenal Character of Phenomenally Conscious Sensations

In ne and related writings, Leibniz distinguishes between three types of repre

sentational content: first, there is the representational content of the monad's
highly complex and, in most respects, unconscious perception of its own body.
This content can be understood as a structural model or structural map of

43 See aa 6.6.271.
44 They are required for associative reasoning, which animals are capable of.
45 See, for instance, aa 6.6.50-51, aa 6.6. 271, and aa 6.6.475-476.
46 As we will see in the next section, the kind of attention that is constitutive of the con
sciousness aspect of conscious sense perception always confuses the components of the
complex content attended to. This will be central to the explanation of the phenomenal
character.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 351

the body.47 Second, there are images, which belong to the content of conscious
sense perception.48 Third, ideas constitute the representational contents
of intellective acts.49 Whereas ideas are characterised as the components of
propositional contents of thoughts, images do not enter propositions (at least
not merely as images), but contribute to the contents of conscious sensations.
They are responsible for the phenomenal character of phenomenally con
scious sensations. But what do images consist in? And how do they emerge?
Two accounts of images have been proposed in the literature:

(a) The ontological or reifying account—proposed by Robert McRae and

Martha Bolton—claims that images as contents of sensations are mental
entities in their own right. These images constitute a separate layer of
content additional to the layer of representational content that models
perfectly the corresponding bodily sense impression. This answer can be
spelled out in terms of Leibniz's tripartite conception of sensation as fol
lows: when the original distinct perception leaves a disposition to an act
of content-repetition in memory, the content of the disposition that is
left is not a fully faithful copy of the original content. Instead, the con
tent of the original distinct perception is transformed into an image. This
image gets attended to in conscious sensation.
(b) The epistemic account—a version of which is proposed by Alison
Simmons50—says that an image is nothing else but the representational
content of the original distinct perception, which models the bodily
sense impression, but attended to in a way, which confuses (the com
ponents of) the content. Again, this account can be fleshed out in terms
of the tripartite conception of sensation. It then says that the act of con
tent-repetition merely repeats the representational content of the previ
ous distinct perception. No transformation of content is involved in this
step. That we nevertheless become conscious of an image when sensing
consciously is due to the attention, which confuses (the components of)
the repeated representational content. Images are merely an epistemic
rather than an ontological phenomenon.

47 Cp. Bolton, 'Leibniz's Theory of Cognition', 142.

48 Leibniz refers to images in ne not only by the term 'image', but also by 'apparence' and
'phantôme'.
49 For the distinction between image and idea, see aa 6.6.137 an<i aa 6.6.261-263.
50 See A. Simmons, 'Changing the Cartesian Mind', Philosophical Review 110.1 (2001), 31-75.

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352 BART H

There is textual evidence in favour of the epistemic account. In several pa

sages, Leibniz states that sensations are composed (composée) of little pe
ceptions, which are individually unconscious.51 In line with these statements,
he also explicitly points out that the contents of sensations are formed
{forment)52 or composed (composée)53 of the representational contents o
little perceptions. If the contents of sensations are composed of represent
tional contents of little perceptions, they must themselves be internally com
plex contents. But Leibniz emphasises that secondary qualities appear to us as
simple and homogeneous in sensation, i.e., the images that constitute the phe
nomenal character of conscious sensations of secondary qualities are simpl
and homogeneous rather than complex and heterogeneous. So if the contents
of sensations are formed or composed of contents of little perceptions and if
they are, thus, internally complex, then images, as being simple and hom
geneous, cannot be an ontologically self-standing part of the content of co
scious sensations. But neither can they be mental entities that are in monads
in addition to representationally acts of perceptions, since in monads we find
only perceptions (and appetites). But if images can be neither representational
contents as such nor special immaterial entities that exist besides acts of per
ception in monads, they must be accounted for in a non-reifying manner. Thi
is exactly what the epistemic account does. At the same time, the epistem
account does justice to Leibniz's claim that images of secondary qualities ar
composed of contents of little perceptions. It does so by analysing images
internally complex representational contents that are attended to in a way tha
confuses (the components of) them.
Despite this textual evidence, Robert McRae and Martha Bolton claim tha
Leibniz is committed to reifying images of secondary qualities. They think th
the right account is ontological and not epistemic in kind. McRae writes:

But if [an image of] green is not really composed of [images of] blue and
yellow, is there some sense in which blue or any other sensible percep
tions can be said to be composed of petites perceptions? Again the answer
will have to be, no. As qualitatively simple these sensible perceptions are
not aggregates of insensible perceptions. Rather, they are novel emergents
from a mass of insensible perceptions [.. .].54

51 See aa 6.6.134.
52 See aa 6.6.54-55 and Leibniz's notorious example of the sensation of the roaring sea at
aa 6.4.1582-1583 and aa 6.6.54.
53 See aa 6.6.120 and aa 6.6.296-297.
54 McRae, Perception, Apperception, and Thought, 38; my underlining.

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 353

McRae denies that images like those of colours can be co

ceptions. This is impossible, McRae claims, because colou
for Leibniz. From this, McRae draws the conclusion that
be novel emergent entities. But as already pointed out, the
which are simple, appear to be rather mysterious entities w
ception of monads. There does not seem to be a place f
ontology of monads. Furthermore, the conclusion McRae d
to be forced upon us. The simplicity and homogeneity o
also be explained by the epistemic account. The simplici
is explainable as being due to the confusing way in wh
of) complex representational contents are attended to. T
the complex content is confusing means that, in attending
ponents of the content are not kept distinct but run toget
actually highly complex representational content of a high
(like a colour) appears to the experiencing subject as bei
geneous, i.e., in the form of an image of a simple and hom
Martha Bolton presents a different attack on the epistem
of images of secondary qualities. Her target is Alison Sim
of this interpretation.55 Bolton objects that the epistemic
ders incomprehensible Leibniz's claim that there is a repres
between images or appearances, as she calls them, of sec
the corresponding qualities of bodies:

It might seem that appearances are mere seemings w

cal standing (Simmons, 2001, pp. 64-6). But Leibniz i
to reify appearances. He is keen to challenge Locke
sensory ideas represent certain mechanical affection
tue of nothing but inexplicable causal connections to
Leibniz has metaphysical reasons for opposing this: '[I]t
to act in such an unruly and unreasoned fashion. I woul
there is a resemblance of a kind—not a perfect one w
way through, but a resemblance in which one thing
through some orderly relationship between them' (n
ances resemble physical qualities, it cannot be denie
are subjects of qualities themselves.56

55 In Simmons, 'Changing'.
56 Bolton, 'Leibniz's Theory of Cognition', 149.

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354 BART H

But, again, the argument for the reification of secondary quality images does
not seem to be compelling. Leibniz's claim that images represent physica
properties by structural similarity can be made sense of if we take into accoun
that the image is a complex representational content appearing simple to the
subject due to confusing attention. Remember that a secondary quality image
has two aspects: the first aspect consists in a complex representational content
representing a complex physical property. The second aspect consists in th
attention to this complex content, which confuses (the components of) con
tent and the result of which is the simple image (for instance, a colour image)
Characterising images of secondary qualities as simple refers to the secon
aspect, i.e., to the result of the confusing act of attention. But this is reconcil
able with saying that secondary quality images are also complex, if we focu
on the complex representational content whose components are attended t
in a confusing way. I understand Leibniz as referring to the latter aspect o
images of secondary qualities, when he claims them to be representationa
Furthermore, this is exactly what Leibniz points out in the following passage
from ne:

[Little perceptions] are also the insensible parts of our sensible percep
tions, which bring it about that those perceptions of colours, warmth
and other sensible qualities are related to motions in bodies which cor
respond to them.57

As Leibniz states here, sensations of secondary qualities represent motions in

bodies in virtue of their internal complexity due to composition from little pe
ceptions and not in virtue of additional secondary quality images that play
as entities in their own right—a representational role.
Overall, the epistemic interpretation of images in Leibniz seems to be more
promising than the reifying interpretation. Images should be understood
complex representational contents the components of which are attended t
in a confusing way rather than as entities in their own right. Note, however,
that the epistemic interpretation as presented so far does not provide us with
full story of Leibniz's conception of images. In particular, we have not yet see
how the simplicity of secondary quality images can be explained in terms of a

57 Translation from G.W. Leibniz, New Essay on Human Understanding, trans, and e
P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge, 1996), 56; aa 6.6.56: "Ce sont aussi le parties insen
sibles de nos perceptions sensibles qui font qu'il y a un rapport entre ces perceptions de
couleurs, des chaleurs et outre qualités sensibles et entre les mouvements dans le corps
qui y repondent, [...]."

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 355

confusing way of attending to structurally complex contents. Ne

some suggestions for an answer to this question.
Recall Leibniz's tripartite conception of conscious sensat
sensation is a complex act involving a fleeting distinct percepti
to an act of content-repetition left in memory, and attention to
object due to cognitive appetites that actualise the act of con
and propel cognitive operations on the repeated content for
ing knowledge about the sensed objects. As Leibniz explains
constitutive of images of secondary qualities results from the a
which confuses the repeated representational content:

[T]hese perceptions, when there are many of them, are

from the other, although our attention cannot always distin
and this is what makes the perceptions confused, [.. .].58

And since we have this kind of attention as cognitive atte

referred the latter to the presence of cognitive appetites, th
stitutive of images of secondary qualities must go back to these
what does it mean for the act of attention to be confusing? We
that, for Leibniz, images of secondary qualities are composed of
tions. Images of secondary qualities are in one respect highly co
same time they are essentially confused. The notion of confusio
is that of internal confusion. Images of secondary qualities are
nally confused. This means that a manifold of little perceptions
in the act of attending to them. According to the epistemic int
ferred here, the running together is not literally an operation
ceptions the result of which is a novel entity. Instead, it is to b
an imperfect way of attending. The imperfection consists in
tion to the internal complexity of the representational cont
The complex content is conscious to the experiencing monad
because attention is only directed to the content as a whole, bu
structural complexity. The internal details of the content rema
and unnoticed. As a result, what is conscious to the subject
simple and homogeneous secondary quality. Such images con
nomenal character of phenomenally conscious sensations of
ties like in sensations of colours.

58 gp VI 628: "[C]es perceptions si multipliées sont différentes l'une d

notre attention ne puisse pas tousjours les distinguer, et c'est ce qui fa
confuses, [..

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356 BARTH

We can go one step further in our analysis of images of secondary qu

if we take into account the role of cognitive appetites in attention. I ha
that the presence of cognitive appetites is responsible for a monad's att
to the representational content in conscious sensation. Internal details o
content are not attended to because they are not relevant for what
nitive appetites strive for. Recall that the appetites in question "ask" w
sensed objects can be expected to be harmful, whether they match
sought, or whether they can be expected to satisfy current needs. In al
cases, the level of structural complexity that is at issue is a superficial
is the mesoscopic level of our ordinary objects. The details of inter
plexity that these objects exhibit are not relevant. When a mother cat
for her kitten, she identifies her kitten by its superficial structural p
like its shape and the colour of its fur, but not by internal structural de
the hairs of the kitten's fur. Accordingly, the cognitive appetites strive
for instance, associative reasoning resting on associative links between
complex representational contents, but not toward reasoning resting on
between parts of these complex representational contents. This is w
inner complexity of these contents does not get attended to and why i
not become conscious to the experiencing subject. Instead, the subject is
conscious of images of simple and homogeneous secondary qualities.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that Leibniz provides an elaborate account of phe
nomenally conscious sensations according to which phenomenally conscious
sensations exhibit a tripartite structure. Moreover, this account includes expla
nations of the consciousness aspect as well as of the phenomenal character
of phenomenal consciousness. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a
higher-order account of the consciousness aspect to Leibniz, I have argued
that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it.
According to this conception, Leibniz conceives of the consciousness aspect
in terms of attention and understands attention in terms of cognitive appetites
that give rise to acts of immediate content-repetition and initiate cognitive
operations on the repeated representational contents. Furthermore, against
the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account of phenomenal character,
I have argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of it. According to
this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests
on the confusing effect of acts of attention, which are directed at representa
tional contents.

VIVARIUM 52 (2014) 333-357

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LEIBNIZ ON PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 357

Leibniz's account of phenomenal consciousness does n

contemporary standard positions like higher-order theo
or representationalist views. But neither is Leibniz's accoun
positions, since it shares some features with each of them.
order theories, the property of being phenomenally consci
not a necessary feature of perceptions, which are, as a mat
nally conscious. Instead, whether or not a sufficiently distin
phenomenally conscious depends on whether or not its con
and attended to. But whether this happens is a contingent
if the cognitive system of a monad is malfunctioning, t
absence of cognitive appetites required for attention. Ther
agree with higher-order theorists that in the famous blind
nomenal consciousness occurs.59 On the other hand, sin
construe phenomenal consciousness in terms of higher-
not face standard objections to higher-order theories. For
objection" asks why higher-order acts representing first-o
order acts conscious, while first-order acts representing a
rock conscious. Leibniz does not need to address this no
higher-order theories, because in his explanation he nev
order acts.

Leibniz agrees with representationalist accounts in re

positing qualia. Hence, like the representationalist he is fre
burden of heavy ontological commitments. On the other h
alism implies the problematic commitment to realism co
qualities. In the case of veridical visual sensation, for instan
character is constituted by the colour properties of the see
account of phenomenal character is different on this score
account, the phenomenal character is constituted by con
the (components of) representational contents and not by p
cal objects. Similar to qualia accounts, Leibniz's concep
consciousness does not commit him to realism of second
way in which the representationalist account does.60

59 For the phenomenon of blindsight, see L. WeiSkrantz, Blindsight

60 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2012 Annual Co
Society of North America, the 2nd Arctic Circle Seminar in Early
2013, and the Seminar for Early Modern Philosophy at Yale Univer
I am grateful to the audiences who attended these events for th
ments. Thanks are due to the two anonymous referees and to Ma
mented on an earlier draft of this paper.

VIVARIUM 52 (2014) 333-357

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