Van Gulick.

University of Arkansas Press
Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness

Author(s): Robert Van Gulick
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 28, No. 2, Introspection (FALL 2000), pp. 275-305
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
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PHILOSOPHICALTOPICS
28,NO.2,FALL
VOL. 2000
Inward and Upward: Reflection ,
Introspection , and Self-Awareness
RobertVan Gulick
University
Syracuse
We areconscious, andintrospective.
self-aware, Butwhether thosethree ways
we aredependuponeachother, andifso howandwhyremains unclear.They
forma triadofrelatedaspectsofournature, butaretheyseparate andmerely
oraretheylinkedin somemoreintimate
similar, way?Theytypically overlap
inus,butcouldtheycomeapaitin specialcasesorinothercreatures? Do ties
of logicalor naturalentailment runin one-wayor two-waylinksbetween
somemembers ofthetrio,oraretheythreedistinct andmerely co-occurring
andcausallyinteractive aspectsof our mental
particular makeup.Theseare
largequestionstowhichI wishI couldgivecomplete andconvincing answers,
butforthepresent thebestI cando is articulate
theissuesa bitandoffer some
andpartialhypotheses
tentative aboutwhatthelinksmight be. I willdo so in
partbysituating theproblem within thecontext ofthehigher-order modelof
consciousness, i.e., within
the family of viewsthat attempt explaincon-
to
sciousnessinterms ofmeta-mentality andtheself-reflexive
turn bywhichthe
minddirects itsintentionalaimuponitselfanditsownstatesandoperations.
Therearemanydifferent theories
higher-order ofconsciousness,butall treat
thedistinction consciousandunconscious
between mentalstatesas a relational
275
matter aboutthepresenceorabsenceofa relevant meta-mental state.1
What
makesone of a personP's mentalstatesM a consciousstateis notsome
intrinsic factaboutM itself,butratherthefactthatP has a simultaneous
higher-order (i.e.,meta-mental) stateH whichrepresents orassertstoP that
P is in stateM. A consciousmentalstateis a stateofwhichoneis conscious;
e.g., one consciouslydesiresa cup of coffeeifone bothdesiresit and is
awareofdoingso. Mosthigher-order theories aimtoexplainconsciousness
(or atleasttheconscious/nonconscious distinction) in termsof self-aware-
ness,whichtheyexplicateinturnbyappealtohigher-order statesandmeta-
intentionality. Thus theyseem to regardthenotionof self-awareness as
morebasicthanthatofconsciousness orofbeinga consciousmentalstate.
Insofaras itis theadditionoftherelevantmeta-intentional self-awareness
thattransforms a nonconscious mentalstateintoa consciousone,suchthe-
oriesimplya dependence ofconsciousness on self-awareness.
However,higher-order theoriesdisagreestrongly aboutthestatusof
In
introspection.part thisreflectsthe major division amongcurrent higher-
ordertheoriesaboutthepsychological modality of the relevantconscious-
makingmeta-mental states;some theorists takethemto be higher-order
thoughts, but others regard them as quasi-perceptual higher-order statespro-
ducedbysomesystem(s)ofinternal monitoring - the mind's inward turn-
ingeye. Those in the former group, such as David Rosenthal, are said to
holda HOT (higher-order thought)view of consciousness, while thelatter,
includingDavid Armstrong andWilliamLycan,are classed as offering a
HOP (higher-order perception) model.2 On both models the higher-order
stateshave a similarreflexivemeta-intentional content, something like"I
nowhavea desirefora cafélatté";"I nowhave(orfeel)a sharpandcramp-
ingpainin myleftfoot";or "I am nowthinking abouttheelection."The
contentis moreor less thesameon thetwomodels;whatseparatesHOT
theoriesfromHOP theoriesis thepsychological modeofthemeta-mental
bearerofthatcontent:thought-like on theformer andquasi-perceptual on
thelatter.
The difference has immediateimplications forourpresentconcerns,
especiallyregarding the statusof introspection relativeto theothertwo
members ofourtriad.On theHOP model,introspection is theprocessthat
the
generates quasi-perceptual meta-mental states that make unconscious
statesintoconsciousones.3Thusintrospection turnsouttobe themostbasic
featureofthetrioon theHOP model.It producesthestatesof self-aware-
ness thatfunction as themeta-mental components of therelationalcom-
plexes needed for conscious mental states.Were there no introspection,
therewouldbe no perception-like statesofself-awareness, andwithout them
no mentalstatescouldcountas conscious.Thuson theHOP model,thereis
a veryreal sensein whichintrospection, understood as an inward-turned
276
systemor processof mentalmonitoring,is morebasic thanourtwoother
andmightevenbe said tobe theircause.We can showthepriority
features
relationsas follows:
- > HOP- > Conscious
Introspection Mental
States
The HOT modeldoes notaccordintrospection a similarlyfoundational
status.Rosenthaldeniesthattherequiredhigher-order statesareperceptual
or perception-like.4 He deniesthatthereanyorgansofinnerperception or
thatconscious-making meta-psychological stateshave any sensual or qual-
itativecharacter exceptin thesensethattheyrepresent someotherlower-
orderstatesas havingsuchproperties. My higher-order thought ofmypain
may make me aware of itshurtfulness but thethought itselfhas no qualia,
painful or otherwise. The HOT model requires no inner-directed monitors
through which introspection generatesself-awareness on the HOP view. The
mainconstraint thatRosenthalimposesis thattheconscious-making meta-
statesmustbe noninferential; ifI cometothink that1aminpainorangryby
observing my behavior and that
inferring my mental statefromtheoutward
evidencethentheresulting HOT wouldnotmakemysensationoremotion
a consciousmentalstate.The HOT mustarisenoninferentially, butbeyond
thatthereis no requirement thatitbe producedbyan innermonitoring sys-
temoreventhatitbe causedbyitslower-order mentalobject.
How then,ifatall,doesintrospection fitinon a Rosenthal-style model?
Rosenthal reservesthetermintrospection forthosecases in whichtheHOT
is itselfa consciousthought.5 ThoughHOTs maketheirmentalobjectscon-
scious,they are themselves not generallyconscious;indeedif theywere
generallysuch, an infinite regresswould be generatedby therelational
modelof consciousness.A givenHOT H* is itselfconsciousonlyifitis
accompaniedbya yethigher-order thought H** whosecontent is "I am in
stateH*." Rosenthalbelievesthatwe do notordinarily have such third-
orderthoughts. WhenI consciouslyfeel a pain by being aware of it in
thought, I do nottypicallyalso havethethought I in
that am aware thought
of mypain. I just have thesecond-order thought, and by doingso I am
aware of my pain but not of my thinking myselfas beingin pain.
of
However,eveniftheyarenotthenormofeveryday experience, I can and
sometimes do havesuchthird-order thoughts.am attimesawarenotonly
I
ofmypainbutofmyselfbeingawareofmypain.It is just suchcases that
Rosenthalclassifiesas introspective. Thus,ratherthanbeingthefounda-
tionaloperationof self-awareness and consciousnessas it is on theHOP
model,introspection on theHOT modelis a specialandderivative case of
meta-self-awareness thatis generatedby the iterativeoperationof the
higher-order thought loopingback on itself.Diagrammatically we might
represent thepriority relations on theHOT modelin thisway:
277
HOT about(lst-order
M-state)- > consciousM-state/self-
awareness
HOT about(HOT) - > conscious
HOT/meta-self-awareness/
introspection
Unsurprisingly thefoundational notionon theHOT viewis thatofhigher-
orderthought; it provides the basis notonlyforself-awareness and con-
scious statesin its initial operation, but also producesintrospective
awarenessthrough itsiterativeapplication.
Let us sumup therelationsthatthetwohigher-order modelsimply
amongourtrioof mentalfeatures. HOP and HOT modelsagreethatit is
self-awareness thatproducesconsciousmentalstates.However,theydis-
agreeabouttheprimacyofintrospection. HOP modelsaccordita founda-
tionalroleas thesource of the perception-like self-awareness thatmakes
statesintoconscious mental states.Thus, on the HOP model,conscious
mentalstatesdependupon self-awareness and self-awareness in turn
dependsuponintrospection. The HOT theoryaccepts theformer depen-
dencebutrejectsthelatter.It impliesthatconsciousmentalstatesdepend
uponself-awareness butofa thought-like type,andthatintrospection rather
thanserving as thegroundfloorbasisofself-awareness comesin onlyatthe
level of third-order states.For theHOT theorist, introspectionis notthe
sourceofconsciousness butmerelytheproduct oftheiterative operation of
a basicallythought-like process of self-awareness.
Ifoneis sympathetic tothehigher-order view- as I confessI am- then
it seemsone couldnotclarifythestatusofintrospection without deciding
betweentheHOP andHOT versionsofthetheory.6 However,thatassumes
thatthosetwovariantsexhausttheoptionsopento thehigher-order (HO)
theorist,andas we willsee belowin sectionIII thereareplausiblealterna-
tivewaysofdeveloping theHO viewthatfitneither theHOP northeHOT
modelandthatoffer quitea differentaccount of the roleandstatusofintro-
spection.Nonetheless, theHOP and HOT models are the dominant variants
discussedintheliterature, andwe shouldfirst reviewtheevidencefavoring
one of themovertheotherbeforeturning farther afieldto considerother
less-familiarformulations.
II
The basic issue thatdividestheHOP and HOT approachesis whether the

conscious-making meta-mental statesare or in
perception-likethought-like
nature.The issueis somewhatill definedin so faras itis unclearhowthe
notionof "perception-like" is to be interpreted.
No one supposesthatwe
havea literal"mind'seye"withwhichwe viewourinnermentalworkings,
278
butitremainsunclearjustwhatfeatures shouldleadus tocounta meta-state
as perception-like or quasi-perceptual in thesensesupposedby theHOP
theory. Tryingto definethenotionof "perception" is notoriously difficult,
andI do notintendtodo so here.Hopefully, itwillsuffice tolistsomeofthe
mainfeatures ofparadigmcases ofperception andconsiderwhichofthose
might be shared by our meta-mental states and theinnerprocessthatpro-
ducesthem.
Giventheprominence ofvisionin humans, philosophers typicallytake
someeveryday of an
example seeing ordinary object under normal condi-
tionsas theirparadigm ofperception, e.g.,seeinga mugofcoffeesitting on
thedeskbesidemycomputer monitor. The focuson visionmaynotbe the-
oreticallyinnocent, butforpresentpurposeslet's stickwiththestandard
practice. We can list at leasttwelvefeaturesinvolvedin suchcases that
seemrelevant totheirbeingperceptual.
1. Themental stateM generally provides anaccurate/vendicai
representation oftheobjectO.
2. Errorandillusion arepossible , evenif(necessarily) atypical.
3. M is informationally linked bysomereliable channel toO.
4. Thereis a causallinkbetween O andM,including morespecific
causallinksbetween O's having a givenproperty F andthoseof
M's features thatrepresent O as beingF.
5. Thecontent ofM represents theroughly simultaneous nature of
O; i.e.,perceptual statesinthefirst instancerepresent totheper-
ceiverhowtheworld isnow,
6. The processthatproducesM is noninferential (or at least
involves nopersonal-level inferences ofwhich theperceiver is
aware).
7. Theprocess thatproduces M is (toa highdegree) information-
allyencapsulated ormodular inthesensethatitis notpenetra-
blebypersonal-level beliefsorother information outside the
visualsystem. (Knowing thelinesarethesamelength inthe
Mtiller-Lyer illusion doesnotmakeoneseethem as equal).
8. Theprocessis on thewholenonvoluntary - we can control
wherewe lookbutwe cannotcontrol whatwe see whenwe
look.
9. Thereareorgansofsensation/perception involved inthelink
(e.g.,eyes).
10.Theobjectanditsfeatures arerepresented ina givensensory
modality (e.g.,represented visuallyas squarevs. tactilely as
square).
11.M's content ispresentational ; M presents O totheagent rather
thanmerely representing O. Thereis a senseinwhich from the
first-personperspective theperceiver seemsdirectly awareofO.
12.M's modeof representation involves(or at leastseemsto
involve)a sensuous medium ofpresentation withassociated
qualitative properties (orsensuous"feels")suchas thephe-
nomenal greenness ofmypercept ofthemugonmydesk.
279
Therearetwoquestionsto answer:Whichofthesetwelvefeatures are
sharedbytherelevantmeta-mental states?Anddo theanalogiesthathold
tocountthemeta-states
suffice orquasi-perceptual
as perception-like inthe
senseclaimedbytheHOP model?HOP andHOT theorists obviouslygive
different
answerstothesecondquestion, butthatis inpartbecausetheydis-
agreeaboutsomecasesin answering thefirst.Thoughtherearesurelysome
features
theybothregardas shared(orbothregardas notshared),thereare
othersaboutwhichthereis no consensus.Moreoverin manycases, the
comparison is a matter
of degree;themeta-mental statesharesat mostan
analogousfeaturewiththeperceptualcase, and thereis roomto disagree
aboutboththeclosenessandsignificance oftheanalogy.Forexample,nei-
therHOP norHOT theorists believethereareinner-sense organs,butHOP
theorists
do appealtoinnermonitors orinnermonitoring systems, andone
mightregardsuchmonitors as functionally
equivalent inimportant respects
to organsofoutersense.
Withthatin mind,letus runthrough thetwelvefeatures andconsider
to whatdegreeeachis oris notparalleledin themeta-mental case. I cannot
dojusticeheretothemanylargeissuesthatsucha surveyraises,butevena
first
approximation mayhelpus geta better gripon theunderlying dispute.
1. & 2. Accuracyand Illusion. Ourmeta-mental
statesaregenerallyveridi-
cal- at leastthosethatconcernoccurrent states
present - and contraryto
pastbeliefs aboutthe of most
infallibilityself-awareness, contemporary the-
oristsincludingbothHOP andHOT advocatesacceptthepossibility oferror
andillusionin atleastsomesuchcases. Nonetheless,
self-awarenessseems
to havean intimacy, and
immediacy, epistemically status
privileged thatis
notreadilyexplainedbyeithertheHOP ortheHOT model.
3. & 4. Causalityand ChannelConditions . HOP theorists withall theirtalk
ofinnermonitors andinternalscanningclearlyregardthemeta-mental case
as satisfying boththe informational channel(3) and causal conditions,
thoughLycanhas beenat painsto acknowledgethattherearelikelymany
scanning systems thatoperatein a diversity
ofways.By contrast Rosenthal,
themostprominent HOT advocate,is noncommittal on thecausalcondition.
He doesnotdenythatlower-order mentalstatesmaytypically be amongthe
causesofhigher-order thoughtsaboutthem,buthe declinesto buildsucha
causal requirement intohis accountof whena HOT makesa lower-order
mentalstateconscious.Itis theintentional relation
notanycausalcondition
thatmatters.Ifforexample,boththelower-order stateandtheHOT directed
at itwererelatednotas cause andeffect butrather as jointeffects of some
commoncause thatneednoton Rosenthal'sview excludetheHOT from
makingitslower-order objectintoa consciousstate.Indeed,oncesuchpos-
sibilitiesare raised,it seemsa HOP theoristas well mightacceptsome
280
relaxationof thecausal condition, as longas theinnermonitors werestill
linkedin some informationally reliableway withthestateswithintheir
domain.
Moreover,it seemsRosenthalmustconcurin acceptingthereliable
informationalchannelcondition, atleastas an overwhelmingly likelyempir-
ical hypothesisabouttherelevant meta-mental states,evenifhechoosesnot
to builditintohis analysis.Forwithout sucha channelcondition, thegen-
eralveridicalityoftheHOTs wouldseemlikemagicorwildlyimplausible
coincidence.So itseemslikelythatregardless ofwhether ornothe explic-
itlyincludesit in his analysisde jure, he is committed to regarding any
statesthatin factsatisfyhisanalysisas also defactosatisfying thereliable
channelcondition.
5. Simultaneity.HOP and HOT theorists agreein regarding roughsimul-
taneityboth as a condition on the co-occurrence of the higher-order state
withitslower-order objectas wellas an aspect ofthe intentional content of
thehigher-order state.One can havehigher-order awarenessof statesthat
oneis notnowin (e.g.,I mightnowrecognizeorremember thatI wantedto
contacta friendlast week),but suchnonsimultaneous HO statesdo not
maketheirlower-order objectsconsciouson eithertheHOP or theHOT
model.
AlthoughtheHOP andHOT theorist agreein thisregard, theHOP the-
oristmaybe better to
positioned explainwhy itis so. Leaving aside casesin
whichthecausalpathfromobjectto perceptual system is oflong duration
(e.g.,theextremecase oflighttraveling fromdistantstarsor galaxies)we
can normally perceiveonlywhatis nowthecase sinceourperceptual sys-
temsareinput-driven andconstantly trackingthecurrent state.Ourthoughts
bycontrast arenotso boundto thepresent moment. Thus,theHOT theorist
has a further
explanatory obligationtodischarge wheretheHOP theorist has
a readyexplanation thatfallsoutautomatically fromtheverynatureofper-
ception.The HOT theorist needstoprovidesomespecialaccountofwhythe
meta-thoughts involvedin makingstatesconsciouscan onlyconcernone's
roughly simultaneous mentalstates.Sincewe canhavethoughts aboutnon-
simultaneous mentalstates,whydo suchHOTs notmaketheirlower-order
objectsconscious?
6. Noninferentialityand Informational
Encapsulation. Higher-order theo-
riststypicallyincludea noninferential
conditionintheiranalysistoexclude
cases in whichone comestoknowofone's lower-order statesindirectlyby
inference orreasoning,forexample,fromevidenceaboutone'sownbehav-
ior.7As theresultofdiscussionsthatlead himto reflecton hispatterns of
behavior, inpsychotherapy
a patient may come to recognize thathe is often
movedby a powerfuldesireto avoid criticism. Thoughsuchself-insight
281
maybe of greatpracticalvalue,it does notinvolvethesortof HOTs or
HOPs thatmaketheirlowerobjectsintoconsciousmentalstates.As result
ofindirectly andinferentially comingtobe awareofone'sdesire,onemight
go on to become directlyaware ofitas wellin a waythatdidindeedmake
it a consciousdesire,buttheinitialindirectly derivedhigher-order states
wouldnotbythemselves do so on eithertheHOT orHOP models.
The additionofa noninferential conditionin theanalysismayindeed
be required toexcludecounter-examples, butitseemsinneedoffurther jus-
tification or explanation. Why should it matterthata givenhigher-order
statewas (orwas not)arrived atbya processinvolving inference? Ifitis the
intentional content ofthehigher-order statethatmakesitslower-order object
conscious,whyshouldit failto do so wheninference playsa rolein pro-
ducingthehigher-order state?EvenifthedivisionbetweenthoseHO-states
thatmaketheirobjectsconsciousandthosethatdo notshouldturnoutto
coincidewiththedivisionbetweenthosethatarearrived at noninferentially
andthosethatarenot,thatwouldseemat bestan extensional coincidence.
Thatis,basedon factsabouthowwe humansspecifically operate,we might
defacto be able to delimittheset of conscious-making HO-states byadding
a noninferential condition,butwe wouldnothaveexplainedwhythetwo
divisionscoincide.It wouldseemthatthereal explanationof whysome
HO-statesmaketheirobjectsconsciousandothersdo notmustbe foundat
a deeperlevelin someotherfeature(s) thatcovarieswiththeinferential/non-
inferential distinction ratherthanin thatdistinction itself.Forexample,the
sortsofmeta-representations generated by theinferential routemightbe dif-
ferent in someimportant ways from those producednoninferentially. But
immediatequestionsarise: What mightthatdifference be? Why is it
requiredformakinga stateconscious?Andwhydoes itcovarywithbeing
producednoninferentially?
As withthesimultaneity condition, theHOP proponent might claimthat
hisversionofthetheory gainsa small advantage. If,as many believe,per-
ceptionis a basicallynoninferential processbutthought ingeneralis not,then
theHOP theorist couldgivea simplenonad hocexplanation ofwhytherel-
evantconscious-making HO statesarenoninferential: they so because
are
they area form of inner and
perception perceptionby is nature noninferential.
However, theassumption onwhichtheexplanation reliesmaynotbejustified
bythefacts;perception maymoreinferential thanmanysuppose.
We admittedly drawa commonsense distinctionbetweenwhatone lit-
erally saw or heard and what one inferred on the basis of whatwas per-
ceived.In responseto crossexamination of histestimony aboutwhenthe
defendant lefthis house,a witnessmightadmitthathe heardonlythecar
pullingoutofthedriveway andthathe hadinferred thatthedefendant had
lefthome.Or a doctormightacknowledge thathe saw onlythepallorofthe
282
patientandinferred thatshewas in shock.Despitetheease withwhichwe
makesucheverydaydivisionsbetweenwhatwas perceivedandwhatwas
inferred,thedistinction blurswhenwe lookcloselyatourcurrent empirical
modelsoftheperceptual process.
Mostperception involvestheextraction ofinformation abouttheenvi-
ronment fromthefeatures ofthesensorysignalthrough thecomputational
derivationofa successionofrepresentations ofboththeproximal anddistal
stimulus.Many of these derivationaloperations areat least quasi-inferential
in thattheyinvolvecontent-sensitive processeswhoseconclusionsorend
pointsaremoreorless logicallyentailedbytheearlierrepresentations inthe
process.They are sometimes described as "ratiomorphic" to indicate the
degree to which they resemble more ordinary cases of reasoning. Forexam-
ple,thehumanvisualsystemuses stereopsis to computethedistanceofan
objectin thesceneon thebasis ofbinoculardisparity, i.e., fromtheslight
differences in theimagesthattheobjectprojectsontothetworetinae.The
detailsarefascinating butnotimportant here.Whatmatters is merelythe
factthattheprocessmovesin a content-appropriate way from representa-
tionsoftheretinalimagesandthedisparities betweenthemtorepresenta-
tionsofthe3D locationsthatobjectwouldhaveto occupytoproducesuch
slightlyoffsetpairsof images.8Is sucha processinferential? The answer
wouldseemtobe, "Yes andno." It involvessome,butprobablynotall,of
therelevantfeatures ofparadigminferences. The processproducesrepre-
sentations whosecontentis rationally impliedbythecontentoftherepre-
sentations fromwhichit derivesthem.If an engineercarriedoutsimilar
calculations we wouldhavelittlereluctance in labelingitas inferential. On
theotherhand,theprocessis automatic, unconscious, andrelatively encap-
sulatedand cognitively insulated.Othersourcesof information are not
typicallyable to influenceits outcome.Nor can therelevantrepresenta-
tionsenterintoothercontent-sensitive rationalprocesses;theiractivity is
restrictedto theinternal operations of the stereopsis module. To use a col-
orfultermfromStephenStich,therepresentations thatoccurwithin thepro-
cess ofstereopsis arenotveryinferentially promiscuous ; the inferences into
whichtheycan enterarestrictly limitedto thosethatoccurwithinthenor-
mal computation ofdistance.9 Althoughmystereopsis moduleuses repre-
sentationsof binocular disparityto compute distance, I have no
personal-level accesstothem,andI cannotintegrate themlogicallywithmy
general stock of personal-level beliefs.Nonetheless, theprocessis at least
"quasi-inferential"in so faras itmoves through sequenceofrepresentations
to conclusionsthatareimpliedbythejointcontent ofthosethatoccurear-
lierin theprocess.
Consideranother visualexample,thatofthesize anddistanceillusions
inducedin a viewerbya so-calledAmesroom.The famousexperimental
283
setup,designedbythepsychologist A. Ames,involvesa trapezoidalroom
whoserearwallrecedesat an angle,so thatitsfarleftcorneris twiceas far
froma front centralviewingpointas itsrightcorner.10 However,everything
in theroomis scaledto compensate fortheincreasein distance.The black
andwhitecheckerboard floortilesandthewindowin therearwall are all
trapezoidalratherthanrectangular andincreasein size fromrighttoleftjust
enoughto projectthesameretinalimageto theviewingpointas woulda
normally rectangular itemin a standard rectangular room.Whenthesubject
looks intotheroomfromthefixedfrontalviewingpoint,she sees what
appearstobe an ordinary room.However,iftwopeopleofequal heightare
placedintherespective backcorners oftheroom,theylooktotheviewerto
be ofenormously different sizes.The personin therightcornerappearsto
be a giant,and theone in theleftcorneris seen as muchshorter thanan
averageperson.Ifthetwoinhabitants oftheroomswitchlocationsso too
does theirapparent size,thoughtheybothbriefly "normalize"as theypass
at themidpoint ofthebackwall.
Two levelsofinferential-like processing areinvolved.First,thevisual
system interpretstheretinal imageas indicating rectangular objectsata con-
stantdistancealongtheback wall. Givenitslearnedfamiliarity withthe
rectangular construction ofmostrooms,itsassumptions arewelljustified
(thoughfalse),as is theconclusionitreachesaboutthelikelynatureofthe
distalstimulus.Interestingly,theillusiondoesnotappeartowork(oratleast
notnearlyso strongly) whenitis triedon subjectswhodo notlivein typi-
callyrectangular environments. Forexample,whenitis runwitha subject
population of southern Africanpeoplewholivein mostlycircularhuts,the
illusionis notgenerated. Thus,therelevantprocessesareat leastto some
extentcognitivelypenetrableby individuallyacquiredinformation or
beliefs.The secondstageoftheillusionis producedbyinferring thesize of
thetwoinhabitants fromtheconjunction oftheirretinalimagesize andtheir
erroneously represented distance. Once again as withthe stereopsiscase,the
process does not share all the features found in paradigmatic cases ofcon-
sciouslanguage-based reasoning, butitsharesenoughto qualifyin impor-
tantwaysas inference-like orquasi-rational.
As theseexamplesshow,once we beginto investigate thedetailsof
perceptual processing, the commonsense distinctionbetween whatis actu-
ally perceived and what is merely inferred getsquiteblurryand hardto
draw.Thus,theHOP theorist may not gainmuch of an advantage,ifany,
overtheHOT theorist in motivating or explainingtheircommoncommit-
mentto thenoninferential natureof thehigher-order processesneededto
produce conscious mentality. The more inference-like perception turnsout
to be in general,theless helpit providesto theHOP theorist in tryingto
the
explainwhy specific forms of inner perception required for conscious-
284
nessneedbe noninferential.Thus,bothHOP andHOT theorists areleftin
needof someexplanations ofwhytherelevantprocessesneedtobe nonin-
As notedabove,itseemslikelythattherealworkis beingdonenot
ferential.
thenoninferential
condition perse,butbysomemoredirectly relevantfea-
turethatcorrelates
withit.
. Whatwe perceiveis notgenerally
8. Involuntariness underourvoluntary
control.I can will whereto directmygaze butwhatI see is moreor less
determined bythestructure ofmysurroundings. Thoughexpectation, mem-
oryand acquiredknowledgeno doubtexercisesometop-downinfluence,
perception remainsa largelyinput-driven process.Priorknowledgemakes
some non zero contribution to mypresentperception of a keyboardand
computer monitor on thedeskin front ofme as I type,butnonetheless itis
thephysicalstimulusof thelightreflected fromthemthatplaystheover-
whelming role.As longas I keepmyeyesopenandlookingstraight ahead,
I cannotchooseto notsee themonitor ortoproducea visualexperience in
myselfof someothersortofobject.Giventheirevolutionarily basedfunc-
tionofproviding theorganism withaccuratecurrent information aboutthe
immediateenvironment, perceptualprocessesoperateautomatically and
beyondthe reach of interference by volition.Our voluntary controlis
restrictedto mattersof orientationand attention. We can decidewhereto
look,whatto focuson, and whatto attendto,butwe cannotin general
chooseorevenvoluntarily whatwe perceivewhenwe directourgaze.
affect
Fromthedesignperspective of naturalselectionthatis probablya good
thing.
The matteris quitedifferent withthought. We are farmoreable to
directand controlthestreamof ourthoughts. I can voluntarily shiftmy
thoughts fromthepaperI am writing to whatI am planningto preparefor
dinnerorto themoviethatI saw yesterday. EvenifI keepmyfocuson my
paper,I can move back and forthbetweenvariousissues and directmy
thinking downparticular linesofreasoning in searchofa morecompelling
or satisfyingargument or explanation.If mysearchsucceeds,whatI will
have "found"will be the mentalproductor resultof an intentionally
directedprocessof construction thatoperateslargelyundermyvoluntary
control.Thinkingfarmorethanperception respondsto volition,and the
evolutionary rationaleforsucha difference is obvious.Nonetheless, our
controlofourthoughts haslimits.Therearethings oneprobably cannotwill
oneselfto think,andsometimes we havethoughts thatobsessionally resist
ourbestattempts to banishthemfromourstreamofawareness.Yeton the
wholewe aremastersofourthoughts to a fargreater degreethanwe areof
whatwe perceive.
To whatdegreeis introspection underourvoluntary control. We obvi-
ouslyhavesomedegreeofcontroloverourawarenessofourmentalstates.
285
Throughan actofwill,thepatient in therapy becomesawareofpreviously
unconsciousdesires,and in moreordinarycontextswe can choose to
observedesires,beliefs,orevensensations thathadbeenbeyondourprior
notice.However,thismightbe solelya matter ofselectiveattention, direct-
ing our focus of inner awareness upon one or another area of our minds
muchas we maymoveourvisualgaze aroundthescenebeforeus. Perhaps
in theinnercase as well,we can determine wherewe "look"butnotwhat
we see there.If so, ourhigher-order awarenessmaybe no moreunderour
voluntary control thanis ourvision.IfI havea painin myleg can I turnmy
attention upon it and yetchoosenottobe awareofit?IfI yearnto winthe
prize, can I reflect uponmywantsbutvoluntarily excludethatdesirefrom
myhigher-order self-representation? In some cases, the answerswould
seem to be negative.I cannotby an act of will makemybeingin pain
appearto me as mymerelyhavinga tickle.PerhapsI can distract myself
andpullmyattention elsewhere,muchas I mightavertmyeyesfroma dis-
turbing scene.Butin so faras myinnerattention fallsuponthesensations
in myleg, I seem to lack thepowerto controlhow theyappearto my
higher-order awareness.However,thesituation is less clearwithothersorts
ofmentalstates,especiallythosethataremoredispositional in nature.
Most
ofus seemable on occasionto hideourmotivesfromourselves,and self-
deception - thoughproblematic - seems at least possiblein manysuch
cases.Thenature, indeedeventherealityofself-deception is controversial,
butinsofar as itdoesoccur,we seemtohavevoluntary control notonlyover
wherewe directourinnerattention, butalso somelimitedcontrol overwhat
we observewhenwe do so. However, it'snotclearhowmuchthiscountsas
a disanologywiththeperception. In theexternalcase as well,we accuse
people of willful blindness; we sayof sucha person,"He sees (hears)only
whathe wantsto."Againtherearelimits;one maychooseto notsee a foul
committed byone'steamorthemisbehavior ofa favoredchild,butcanone
easily choose not to see thelamp on the table beforeone's openeyes.
To theextentthatinnerawarenessseemsbeyondvoluntary it
control,
may seem more like perceptionthan like thought and thus to favorthe HOP
theory overitsHOT rival.However, theHOT theorist hasa readyreply.The
HOT theory requires an assertoriehigher-order thought tomakea statecon-
scious.11 One mustnotmerelyentertain orconsiderthethought, butthinkit
in a waythatinvolvestreating itas true,i.e.,thinking itin a belief-likeway.
Once theassertorie requirement comesto thefore,ourdegreeofvoluntary
controlseemsto shrink ifnotaltogether disappear.To whatdegree,ifany,
we can voluntarily controlour beliefsremainscontroversial and unre-
solved- Descartes,WilliamJames,and BernardWilliamsnotwithstand-
ing.12 Thus,theHOT theorist maywellarguethathisviewneednotconflict
in anywaywiththelimiteddegreeto whichourhigher-order awarenessis
286
underourvoluntary control.
AssertorieHOTs maybe justas involuntary as
HOPs.
Ifwe construethevoluntariness
ofhigher-order awarenessas primarily
an attentionalmatterof wherewe directourinnerfocus,itwouldseemto
favorneither theHOP northeHOT view.However,as we will see below,
thedistinctionbetweenwherewe focusandwhatwe areawareofwhenwe
do so maynotcarryoverso wellfromoutertoinnerawareness, especially
iftheshiftofourinnerattentionoftenalters,transforms,
orevencreatesthe
objectsthatitbringsintofocus.
9. OrgansofSensation.As notedabove,no one supposesthatthereis a lit-
eralmind'seyethatturnsitsgaze inwardon thementalrealm;thereareno
organsofinnersensethattransduce physicallyencodedinformation into
neuralpatternsforfurther processingas do oureyesandear.Nonetheless,
theHOP theoristsarecommitted toinnermonitors orinnerscanners thatin
somewayextract information aboutourmentalstatesandactionsfromthe
mentalfluxofourmind/brain's The connection
activity. maybe moredirect
andunmediated by anyphysicalcarrierofinformation thatplaystherole
thatpatternedlightand sounddo in externalsenseperception. Nor need
therebe anyanatomically distinct
brainunitthathas a separateanddistinct
monitoring function
as is thecase withexternalsenseorgans.Internal mon-
itoringmaybe realizedsolelybythepattern ofinterconnections between
brainregionsratherthanbyanydistinct organsofinnersense.Nonetheless,
theHOP theoristsmightarguethatthesystems ofinnermonitoring no mat-
terhowdiffusely realizedstillshareenoughsimilaritiesto sensorysystems
to countas perception-likeorquasi-perceptualin thesenseimpliedbythe
HOP model.The HOT theorist bycontrastwillemphasizethedifferences
and denytheanalogysuffices;he mightwell invoketheabsenceof any
organsofinnersenseas a basisforrejecting theHOP view.
10. Sensorymodality . In ordinarycases of externalperception, one is not
merely aware of objects andtheir
propertiesbut aware of them in a waydis-
tinctiveofone oranother sensorymodality.We see them, hearthem, orfeel
them.One maysee a book'srectangular shape or feelit.Although two
the
perceptual statesshare a common content, there areobvious differences in
howtheyrepresent thatcontent.Beingvisually aware of the is
shape quite
a differentexperience frombeingtactilely awareofit,evenifbothconcern
thesameexternal stateofaffairs.
Ofcourse,we do notsee orhearourmen-
talstates,butifourself-awareness is perception-like
onemight expectthere
to be somedistinctive modalityassociated with innersense. Yet it is not
obviousthatthereis anysuchaspect,andtheHOT theorist may thatas
see
a markagainsttheHOP theoiy.
HOP theorists can respondin at leastthreeways.Firstly, theymight
287
concedethatinnersensehasno modality akintothoseassociatedwithouter
sense,butarguethathavingsomesuchaspectis notessentialtoperception
butmerelya contingent featureofourhumanexternal senses.
Alternatively,theycoulddenythatevenourouterperceptions haveany
aspectsof whichwe are experientially awareotherthantheirrepresenta-
tionalcontents. A defender ofthestrong representational viewmightagree
thatseeingthebook's rectangular shapeis different fromfeelingit,but
arguethatthedifferences areall differences in content, in
i.e., differences
whatproperties theworldis represented as having.13My visualperception
ofthebookonlypartially sharesitscontent withmytactileexperience ofit.
Theformer's totalcontent concerns manyotherfeatures ofthebooksuchas
its color,its illumination, and the angle fromwhichI am viewingit.
Similarly thetotalcontent ofthetactilestaterepresents thebookas having
a certainhardnessandtexture andas resisting myfingers thatpushagainst
itwitha givenpressure. Accordingto thethoroughgoing representational-
ist,suchdifferences in totalcontentexhausttheexperiential differences
betweenthetwostates.Ifso,we neednotinvokeanymodaldifferences dis-
tinctfromcontent differencestoexplainwhythetwoperceptual experiences
seem so different. If thereare no special modal aspectsassociatedwith
externalperception, thentheHOP theorist shouldnotbe embarrassed by
theirabsencein case ofinnersense.
As a thirdoption,theHOP theorist mightarguethatourself-awareness
does involvea modality-specific aspect,notofcourseone sharedwithany
of ouroutersensesbutrathera distinctively introspective aspect.Such a
claimmightbe supported by an appeal to first-person phenomenological
evidence,andI mustadmitthatbasedon myownself-observation theclaim
has at leastsomeplausibility.
However,HOT theorists seemnotto sharesuchintrospectively based
intuitions.Whentheyexaminetheirownself-awareness, theyseemto find
onlybarepropositional representations unclothed in a modallydistinctive
form.If theybe correct,theHOT view mightbetterfitthefacts.If our
higher-order statesrepresent theirlower-order objectsin onlyan abstractly
propositional way, then higher-order thoughts mightseemmorelikelyas the
bearersofsuchcontent. Thus,whether one countsthemodalnatureofper-
ceptualstatesas favoring theHOP viewortheHOT viewturnsin parton
one's intuitions aboutthephenomenology ofself-awareness.
11. Immediacyand Presentness.Our ordinaryperceptualexperienceof
objectshasan immediacy paralleledin thought.
thatis nottypically In G. E.
Moore'sfamousphrase,perceptual experienceis "diaphanous";we "look
through" ourexperience
andareawareofobjectsright beforeoureyes.14As
a matterofphenomenology,themonitor,thekeyboard, andthelampon my
desk arepresentto me ratherthanrepresented to me. The objectsthem-
288
selves appearto me directly, or so at leastthatis howI experiencethem.
Thoughmyperceptual experiencemaydependuponrepresentational pro-
cesses,I amnotawareofitas such.The underlying basisofmyexperience
maybe representational, butas a matter offirst-person phenomenology I
simplysee theobjectson mydesk,anditis theythatappearpresentto my
awareness.
The objectsof thought do notseemsimilarly immediate orpresentto
awareness.IfI thinknowoftheEiffelTower,ofmybreakfast a fewhours
back,or even of thelampon mydeskwhichI believecontinuesto exist
whenI close myeyesor turnmygaze away,theintentional objectsofmy
thought do notseempresent withtheimmediacy ordirectnessI findinper-
ception.Thoughmyprimary focusis on theobjectsI am thinking about,
theirstatusas objectsof thought insinuatesitselfto somedegreeintothe
phenomenal content ofmyexperience.I am thinking first
andforemost of
theEiffelTower;itis therethatmyattention is focused.ButI am nonethe-
less also awarethatitis nottheToweritself,butmyidea or mentalactof
thinking of it thatis the immediateobjectof experience.Returning to
Moore's metaphor, thinking of an objectseemsless transparent thanper-
ceiving;themeansormediumofrepresentation is neverfullylostfromthe
experiential view.It is difficult ifnotimpossibleto "look through" one's
thoughtsas fullyas one typicallydoes in perception.The distinction
betweenmentalactandobjectseemsphenomenologically moresalientin
thecase ofthought andnevercompletely invisible.
As we will see belowin sectionIII, ourinitialintuitions maymislead
us here.As a phenomenological matter, perception may turnout tobe more
self-referentialandatleastimplicitly lessdiaphanous thanis commonly sup-
posed.Butfornow,letus acceptthecommonphenomenological assump-
tionthatperception presents itsobjectsto awarenessin an apparently more
immediate way than does thought. If that were so, what if
consequences any
wouldthathavefortheHOP vs. HOT debate?
At leastinitiallytheHOP viewmayseemto gaina slightadvantage.
Ourawarenessofourownmentalstatesandprocessdoes seemtohavethe
sortofpresentational immediacy thatcommonly occursinperception. When
I am awareofmyhavinga painin mytoe,ofmybeingthirsty, or evenof
myselfas now thinking of Paris,thementalobjectofmyawarenessdoes
itselfseempresent tomeinmuchthewaymykeyboard andlampappearas
present to me when I see them on my desk.Of course, theHOP theorist's
claimthatsuchstatesof innerawarenessare perception-like does notin
itselfexplaintheirapparent immediacy; indeed thatfeaturestands in need
of furtherexplanationwith regard to externalperceptionas well.
Nonetheless, theHOP theorist mightseembetter situatedtoprovidea satis-
factory account of the immediacy of self-awareness insofaras thatfeature
289
seemsanalogoustothatwhichwe findin othercases ofperception. By con-
the
trast, HOT theorist shoulders an extraburden of explainingwhythe
objectsof inner-directedthoughts are immediate in a waythatouter-directed
thoughts are Or
not. so at leastit seems.
The HOT theorist againhas multiple avenuesofreply:
• He might denytheallegeddifference ofimmediacy intheordi-
narycasebetween first-order
thoughtsandfirst-order percep-
tions.
• He might challenge theallegedimmediacy ofinner awareness
anddenythatwehaveanyrelevant sortofdirect acquaintance
withourmental states andprocesses.
• He might acknowledge thatourinner awareness ofourmental
states
hasanimmediacy nottypicallypresentinourfirst-order
outer-directed
thoughts, butprovide somesatisfactory explana-
tionofwhyHOTsshouldimmediately present theirobjectsin
waysthatfirst-orderthoughts donot.
Ofthethreestrategies, thethirdlooksthemostpromising sincethefirsttwo
seemtorequireoverturning powerful intuitions
first-person aboutthephe-
nomenalimmediacy ornonimmediacy ofvariousformsofinnerandouter
awareness. Nonetheless,evenwell-entrenched intuitions
canmisleadus and
mayhaveto be revisedgivenenoughevidence.So neither ofthefirsttwo
optionsshouldbe countedout,evenifthethird offersbetteroddsofsuccess.
To pursuethelatter,theHOT theorist mightappeal to theexistenceof a
directcausallinkbetweenthesortsofHOTs thatmakea stateconsciousand
theirlower-ordermentalobjects.Giventhenoninferential natureofthelink,
one mightsupposethatas a matter ofphenomenology theobjectof sucha
thought wouldbe experiencedas presentin an unmediated way.I am not
surethatwouldwork,butperhapssomething alongthoselinemightenable
theHOT theorist to explainwhyHOTs present theirobjectswithan imme-
diacythatfirst-order thoughts do not.In sum,theHOP theorist seemsat
betterable to accommodate
leastinitially theapparent immediacyof self-
awareness, buttheHOT theorist has optionsfordealingwithitas well.
12. Qualia. We comeatlasttothemostcontroversial feature
on ourlist.Our
perceptual encounterswith externalobjectstypically involvea richvariety
ofsensory such
properties as colors,
tastes, smells,sounds,and feels.When
I liftthecoffeemugtomylipsanddrink, I see itsceladongreencolor,I feel
thesmoothtexture ofitshandle,I smellthearomaofthejustbrewedcoffee,
I tastethepleasantlybitterjust-burnt edgeoftheFrenchroastbeans,andI
feelthewarmth of theliquidagainstmylips. Such experiencesare often
said to involvequalia or phenomenal properties. However,thestatusand
natureofsuchproperties remaina matter ofongoingphilosophical dispute.
Thereis no consensuson eventhemostbasicmatters: Arequalia identical
290
withordistinct fromtheproperties oftheexternal objects?15 Arequaliafea-
turesofinnerobjectsor aretheymerelyproperties thatinnerstatesrepre-
sentexternal objectsas having?16 Ifthereareanyqualia,aretheyineffable,
private,nonrelational, or intrinsic?17 Thesearenotquestionswe can settle
orevenbegintodiscusshere.Nonetheless, thefactthatperception involves
sensoryqualities of the sort that lead many to believe in qualia an issue
is
thatwe mustconsiderin assessingthestateofplaybetweentheHOT and
HOP theorist. So, letus setthecontroversies toone sideandspeakofqualia
in a relatively neutralway.Thatis, letus assumethatexternalperception
typicallyinvolvesqualia,butwherewe takethattomeanonlythatitinvolves
theperception ofsensory properties (e.g.,colors,tastes,smells,feels)ofthe
sortthatlead manytobelievein philosophical qualia.
Whatimplications mightthathavefortheHOP vs. HOT debate?The
HOP theoristmightseem to gain an advantagesimilarto thatwhichhe
appearsto haveon theissueofimmediacy. The situation withqualialooks
to parallelthatwithimmediacy;first-order externally directed thoughts
seem to have qualia, butfirst-order thoughts appearto lack them.If, as
manysuppose,self-awareness involvesqualitative character, thentheHOP
theoristmight seem better set to accommodate them byanalogywithcases
of externalperception, on a parwithhis advantageregarding immediacy.
Againthemerefactthattherelevant feature, qualia(orimmediacy), is pre-
sentin boththeexternally directedfirst-order case and in theinternally
directed higher-order case,does notbyitselfsuffice to explainitspresence
in thelatter,butatleastitprovidessomehopeoffinding an explanation that
relieson theperceptual natureofbothsortsof states.If thereis no similar
parallelbetweenexternally directed thoughts andinternally directed ones,
thentheHOT theorist wouldagainbe leftneedingan additional explanation
ofthatdisparity.
However,thephenomenological factsarefarfromclear.As longas we
do notpacktoomuchcontroversial philosophical baggageintothenotionof
"qualitative character" we can probably safely assume twothings:first, that
externalperceptioninvolvesqualitativecharacter, and second,thatself-
awarenessinvolvesawareness0/qualitative character. WhenI am awareof
as a
myself having pain mytoe, in I am aware ofitshurtfulness.
However,someoftheotherclaimsneededto maketheallegeddispar-
ityargument workaremorecontroversial. In particular,itis notobviousthat
first-order lack
thoughts qualitativecharacter, nor that our statesof self-
awareness - as opposedto someoftheirfirst-order mentalobjects- them-
selveshaveanyqualitative character. Ifeitherofthesetwoclaimswerenot
merely unobvious but in fact false,then thedisparity towhichtheHOP the-
oristappealswouldcollapse.Iffirst-order thoughts havequalitative
do char-
acter, then the HOT theorist would be at no in
disadvantage addressing the
291
qualitativenatureof self-awareness. Alternatively,if the only qualia
involvedin self-awareness are thosepresentin some of its first-order
objects,thenthereareno higher-order featuresthattheHOT needbe at a
disadvantagein explaining.How mighttheHOT theorist tryto motivate
eitherofthesetwomoves?Regarding thefirst,he mightarguethatinsofar
as thereis something thatit'sliketothink, thentherearequalitative features
associatedwithsuchthoughts eveniftheyarenotthesamequalia associ-
atedwithperceptual experience. WhenI thinkofdrinking thecoffeefrom
mymug,mymentalstatemaynotinvolveanytastequaliaorwarmth qualia
as itwouldwereI reallyto sipit,butthereis nonetheless a phenomenolog-
ical aspect,a "whatit's like-ness"to be havingsucha thought. If so, the
HOT theorist couldarguethatfirst-order thoughts havequalitative charac-
terandthusthathe is no worseoffin addressing thesupposedqualitative
character ofself-awareness. The alternative movewouldbe to challengethe
beliefthathigher-order statesthemselves havequalitativecharacter. Though
widelyheld,theHOT theorist mightattackthatbeliefas theresultofcon-
fusedlytreating thecharacter ofthestatesofwhichwe are aware as some
character ofthestatesofawareness,Rosenthalarguesthatwhenwe havea
consciouspain,we areawareofhurtfulness andwhenwe havea conscious
visualexperience ofa ripetomatowe areawareofphenomenal redness, but
neither thehurtfulness northerednessis a qualitative featureoftherelevant
higher-order state.18Thatstate,whichon hisviewis a HOT,has no qualita-
tivecharacter of itsown.Whathas qualitativecharacter is thefirst-order
perceptual or sensorystatethatis theobjectoftheHOT. By havinga rele-
vantlydirected HOT, we makethefirst-order stateintoa consciouspercep-
tion or conscious sensationand thusbecome aware of its qualitative
character. Sinceon Rosenthal'saccountthehigher-order statehas no quali-
tativecharacter ofitsown,theHOT theorist neednotbe embarrassed ordis-
advantaged ifthoughts lackqualitative character.Indeed,Rosenthaltriesto
turnthetablesandgaina pointagainsttheHOP theory. He arguesthatifthe
conscious-making higher-order stateswereperception-like, thentheyshould
havedistinctive qualia associatedwiththemjustas externally directed per-
ceptualstatesdo. But,as he goes on to argue,we encounter no suchdis-
tinctivehigher-order qualia; the only qualia we met are those of the
first-orderstatesthemselves. Therearedistinct qualiaassociatedwitha first-
orderstateof seeingred,and we becomeawareofthemifourvisualper-
ceptionbecomesconscious.However,thereareno further qualiaassociated
withthesecond-order stateof beingawareof thatperception, nordo we
becomeawareofanysuchsecond-order qualiaifand when we form a third-
orderawarenessof thatsecond-orderstate.Accordingto Rosenthal's
accountofourphenomenology, theonlyqualiathatevershowup arethose
offirst-orderstates.Thus,he believestheappealtoqualiasupports theHOT
292
viewrather thantheHOP. Once again,thereappearstobe no decisivereso-
lutionofthedebate.
Havingsurveyedeach ofthetwelvefeatures ofparadigmatic percep-
tion,letus recaptheirimplications fortheHOP vs. HOT debate.
Conditions1 through 5 appeargenerallycompatiblewithbothviews
andthusseemto favorneither; bothseemable to accommodate a normof
veridicality,thepossibilityof error,thecausal condition, theinformation
channelcondition, andthesimultaneity condition.Neitherviewseemsto
have an adequatenon ad hoc explanationof theirsharednoninferential
requirement. ThoughtheHOP theory mayseematfirst to garnersomesup-
portfromtheallegednoninferential natureofperception, thatbenefit van-
ishes upon a closerexamination of thenatureof perceptualprocessing,
yieldinga drawon noninferential (6) andinformational encapsulation con-
ditions(7). On someoftheotherconditions, one sideortheotherseemsto
gainatleastan initialadvantage, buttheopposingsidealwayshasresources
withwhichto fashiona plausiblereply.In thatsensetheHOP viewseems
favoredbythenonvoluntary
initially (8) andpresentational (11) conditions,
andtheHOT sidegetsprimafaciesupport fromtheorgansofsensation(9)
andsensorymodality (10). Butin eachcase theinitiallydisadvantaged side
has optionsforreply.Finally,thequalia condition(12) can tilteitherway
dependingon whatone takesthefactsto be aboutthephenomenology of
innerawareness.Thus,we areleftwithno clearjudgment in favorofeither
side,thoughI hopethatworking through thespecificconditions has clari-
fiedtheparameters ofthedispute.
Ill
We comebackthento ouroriginalquestionabouttherelationsamongour
triadof concepts:introspection,
consciousness,and self-awareness. The
HOP andHOT viewsgivedifferent answersaboutwhichofthethreeis fun-
damental.Introspectionin particular
turnsout to be foundational on the
HOP view,butderivativeon theHOT view.Insofaras we cannotdecide
betweenitstwomainvariants, thehigher-ordertheoryper se mayseemto
provideus withno real answerregardingthe statusof introspection.
However,we maygainsomeinsightbyconsidering an alternativeformof
thetheory thatdiffers
fromboththeHOP andHOT models.
Moreover,sucha movemightbe independently motivated by some
commonproblems thatconfrontbothofthemainstream in partic-
versions,
ulara challengeraisedbyFredDretske,amongothers, thatwe can call the
generalityworry.19The problemin briefis as follows.Whyand how do
higher-orderstatesturntheirlower-ordermentalobjectsintoconscious
293
states,giventhatin generalperceivingsome x or thinking of x does not
makex conscious.IfI perceivethepencilon mydeskorthinkofthesnow
thatfellyesterday, I do notmakeeitherthepencilor thesnowconscious.
They become objectsofmyawareness, butitwouldbe bizarreto holdthat
I hadthereby createdconsciouswriting instruments orconsciousprecipita-
tion.Buthowthencan therelational factofmyhavinga higher-order state
aboutsomefirst-order belief,desire,orsensation convert whathadbeenan
unconsciousstateintoa consciousone? We mightmeanby "conscious
state"merelyone ofwhichI am aware,butin thatsensethepencilas well
is consciouswhenI perceiveit.Ittoois an "x ofwhichI amaware."Butthe
distinction betweenconsciousand unconsciousdesires,beliefs,or sensa-
tionsseems to markmuchmorethanthat.The higher-order theorist-
whether HOP, HOT, or something else- needsto explainwhatis special
aboutthemeta-mental case in virtueofwhichmerely perceiving orthinking
ofsomething nonconscious canmakeitconscious.Norwillitdo toclaimit
is justa definitionalmatter; i.e.,thatwe applythewordconscioustomental
statesof whichwe are aware,butdo notapplyit to nonmental itemsof
whichwe are awarein eitherperceptualor thought-like A
ways. deeper
explanation is neededofwhywe use thewordthatwayandoftherealdis-
tinction thatwe believewe capturein doingso. To use ThomasNagel's
famousphrase,a consciousstateis one "thatit'slikesomething tobe in."20
Thereis something thatit'sliketohavea consciousdesire,a conscioussen-
sation,or a consciousthought. Consciousstateshavea subjectiveor phe-
nomenalaspect, and the generalityargumentturnson the apparent
inadequacyof thehigher-order theoryto explainhow a statewithoutany
suchaspectcouldbe transformed intoone withitbythemerelyrelational
additionof a meta-state having firststateas its intentional
the object.It
seemsthatconverting thefirst stateintoone thatthereis "something thatit
tobe in"wouldrequiresomechangein thestateitselfrather thanjustmak-
ingtheobjectofa higher-order thought orperception.
Higher-order theoristshave responded tothegenerality objection in sev-
eralways,butall seemlessthanadequate.Rosenthal hasdefended theHOT
theory byarguing thatnonconscious sensations andperceptions havequalia,
butsincethestatesthemselves arenotconsciouswe arenotawareoftheir
properties.21 Thus,thereis nothing thatitis liketobe a personhavingsuch
a nonconscious state.Itis onlywhenwe cometohavean appropriate HOT
aboutthesensationthatwe areawareofitsqualitative properties thus
and
thatthereis something thatitis liketo be in sucha state.On thisview,the
first-orderstatehaditsqualiaall along.Whenthepersonformsa HOT about
thestate,shedoesnotchangethatstate.However,shedoeschangeherover-
all stateofmindtoone thatthereis something thatit'sliketobe in because
now,andonlynow,is sheawareofthequaliain virtueofherHOT directed
atthem.
294
AcceptingRosenthal'saccountwouldindeedentailthatthereis some-
thingthat'sliketo havea consciousstate,butit seemsoddlyofftarget.It
impliesthatthereis something thatit's likefor theagentto be havinga
HOT about a first-order perception,but thatsubjectiveaspect seems
strandedbetweenthetwostates.It is notan aspectof thefirst-order state
itselfsincethereneedbe nothingthatit's liketo be in thatstate.Noris it
reallyan aspectof thehigher-order statesincethatstateon Rosenthal's
accounthas no qualia. The subjective"whatit's likeness"thusexistsin a
sortoftwilight zonebetweenthetwo;it'snotreallya feature ofeitherstate
but yet thereis somethingthatit's like forthe agent.In thatrespect
Rosenthal'sreplyto thegenerality argument is notlikelyto allayworries
abouthowtheadditionof a meta-state, itselfwithout qualitativecharacter,
somehowmovestheagentfroma statethatthereis nothing that"it'sliketo
be in"intoone thatthereis something thatit'sliketobe in.Merelyadding
a non-qualiathoughtaboutqualia seemsincapableof producingsuch a
transformation.
Lycanhas defended hisHOP versionofthetheory againstthegeneral-
in
ityobjection partby invoking a "divide and conquer"strategy.22 He
deniesthattheHOP modelis supposedto explainthe"whatit'slike-ness"
ofconsciousstates,a notionaboutwhichhe is deeplyskepticalandwhich
he regardsas engendering a wealthofconfusions. Accordingto Lycan,the
HOP modelaims merelyto markthedistinction betweenconsciousand
nonconscious states.Itdoes so bydefining theformer as statesofwhichwe
are awarein therelevantinnerperceptualmode.The HOP modelis not
intendedto explainqualia or a mentalstate'shavinga qualitativeaspect.
Lycandeals withqualia in another partofhisoveralltheory ofconscious-
ness, which offers a purelyrepresentational theory qualia as properties
of
thatactualobjects(orpossibleobjects)arerepresented as having.Giventhe
dividednatureofhisexplanatory project, complainthattheHOT model
to
does notadequatelyaccountforthequalitative aspectofconsciousmental-
ity is to faultitfor to
failing produce a result itnever aimedtoachieve.Fair
enough, butone might stillfaultthe HOP model for doingless thanone
wouldlikeor expectofthehigher-order theory. One can distinguish con-
sciousmentalstatesinmanyways.Lycan'sreadingofitas a "stateofwhich
we are aware"is one plausiblereading,butwe also oftenuse it to distin-
guishstateswitha qualitative aspectfromthosewithout. Insofaras thegen-
eralityargument appeals to thatlatter one
notion, mayreasonably criticize
theHOP modelforexplainingless thanwe maywant,evenifitmodestly
eschewsanyaimtoexplainsuchmatters. We wouldliketohavea convinc-
ing account of what the difference is between a consciousdesirewitha felt
experientialaspect and an unconscious, unfelt desire. Lycanmayperhapsbe
ableto satisfy ourexplanatory demandwithotherpartsofhistheory, butthe
generality argument seems to show that the HOP model by itselfdoes not
295
seemtodo so. Itwouldbe niceifwe couldfindan alternative versionofthe
higher-ordertheory thatdid.
Thus,we needtoconsiderwhatalternative formsthehigher-order the-
orymighttakethatwoulddifferfromboththestandardHOP and HOT
models.Bothagreein regarding therelevanthigher-order stateas distinct
andseparatefromitslowerobject.Thisis perhapsclearestandmostexplicit
on Lycan'sHOP model,sincehe acceptsa generalized languageofthought
viewofrepresentation anddescribesthehigher-order perceptions as being
realizedby tokenrepresentations thatoccurwithintheoperationsof the
monitorsthat produce higher-order inwardlydirectedperceptions.23
However,Rosenthal'sHOT modelis equallycommitted to thetokendis-
tinctness
ofthehigher- andlower-order states.As wejustnoted,he accepts
thatmanyfirst-order stateshave qualia, buthe deniesthathigher-order
stateshaveanyqualiaoftheirown.By a simpleapplication ofLeibniz'slaw
theycannotbe theverysamestates.Although bothHOP andHOT theorists
assumedistinctness ornonidentity, itis notentailedbythehigher-order the-
oryper se, and one HOT theoristhas disavowedit.24One could tryto
developthehigher-order viewin a waythatrejectedor at leastweakened
thatassumption, and fortheremainder of thepaperI will explorethat
option.Although theidea mayseeminitially odd andlittlemorethana mere
closerexamination
logicalpossibility, willrevealittobe farmoreplausible
thanone mightat firstsuppose.Indeed,it mayoffera lineof replyto the
generalityargument thatis stronger thananyof thoseproducedby more
mainstream HOP or HOT theorists.
Threestrandsfromthecurrent literature offerimportant clues about
howone mightgo aboutconstructing a nonstandard versionofthetheory
witha lessenedcommitment to thenonidentity oflower-order andhigher-
orderstates:DanielDennett'stheory ofconsciousness as cerebralcelebrity,
ChrisHill's view of introspection as a matterof volumecontrol,and the
widelyacceptedhypothesis thattheneuralcorrelateof consciousnessis a
globallydistributedbrainstate.Let me saya bitabouteach.
ASCEREBRAL
CONSCIOUSNESS CELEBRITY
AccordingtoDennett'smultiple draftstheory, betweencon-

thedistinction
sciousandnonconscious mentalstatesis blurry,admitsofdegrees,andturns
on twoprincipaldimensions.25 The firstconcernsthedegreeto whicha
mentalstate(orcontent influences
fixation) thesubsequent development of
the system'sstatesand its outputs.This is whatis meantby "cerebral
toputitcrudely,
celebrity"; themoreeffecta givencontent has on
fixation
whatothercontentfixationsoccur,themore"famous"itis. Consciousstates
takea morepowerful andbroaderrangeofcontent-relative effects
through-
outtheagent'smind;a consciousperception (thoughtordesire)anditscon-
296
tentwillbe accessibleto otherprocessingareas,moreable to affectother
states(thoughts, desires,memories), andhavemoreimpacton thosestates
driving thesystem's output, especiallyon thesystem'sreportsaboutitsstate
of mindsinceconsciousstatesare normally ones thatwe can reportour-
selves as beingin. All theseaspectsof influenceadmitof degree,and in
generalthegreater theimpactofanygivenstate,thegreater itslevelofcere-
bralcelebrity. Insofaras beinga consciousstateis a matter ofsuch"intra-
mentalfame,"whether ornota stateis consciousneednothavea strict yes
orno answer.
The otherdimensionofconsciousnesson themultipledrafts modelis
the degreeto whicha givencontentgets integrated intowhatDennett
describesas theongoingserialnarrative thesystemconstructs fromthe
"streamofconsciousness." Thisis nota separatemeta-narrative thatis pro-
ducedindependently or overand above thesystem'slower-order content
fixations.Rather,it is an assemblageof activatedlower-order contentful
statesthatcoheretogether in sucha waythattheyforma moreorless inte-
gratedsetfromtheperspective ofa unifiedself.Dennettdeniesthatthereis
any separateselfthatconstructs or views thesequence;to him,it is the
otherwayround.Itis thecoherent serialnarrativethatis fundamental, and
theselfis merelya virtualentity thatexistsas theperspectivai pointwhich
is implicitin thenarrative andfromwhichthenarrative hangstogether as
unified.
Dennett'smultiple draftstheoryis thusa higher-ordertheory ofa sort,
thoughit differs greatlyfrommoremainstream HOP andHOT models.A
statewitha highdegreeofcerebralcelebrity willtypicallybe one thatthe
agentcan reportbeingin, and such a reportwould expresstherelevant
higher-order thought. IndeedDennett,like Rosenthal,reliesheavilyon a
tightlinkbetweena state'sbeingreportable anditsbeingconscious.The
secondaspectof his theoryalso has a decidedlyhigher-order slant,since
incorporation intotheserialnarrative carrieswithitthestatusofbeingrep-
resentedas a statein thestreamofthe(virtual)self,whichat leastimplic-
itlyinvolveshigher-order representation.
ASVOLUME
INTROSPECTION CONTROLAND
ACTIVATION
ChrisHill has faultedthe"innereye"modelofintrospection as overlypas-
sive.26He has arguedthatintrospection is activein thesensethatit often
altersitslower-order mentalobject.
In a case ofparadigmaticexternalperception, as whenI see thelamp
on mydesk,myawarenessof theobjectdoes notchangeit.The lampis
unaffected by beingseen. However,innerawarenessdoes oftenseemto
alteritsobjects.WhenI turnmyinnerattention to thelingeringtasteofthe
olive thatI ate a fewminutesago or to theache in mylowerrightmolar,
297
directing myawareness uponthosesensations canchangemanyoftheirfea-
tures.The sensationoftengainsin intensity andvividness;varioussensory
properties maybecomemorespecific,shiftfromone specificcharacter to
another, or even emerge where no detailed character was previously present.
Of course,as notedabovein sectionIII, a redirection of attention typically
leadsto changesin external perception as well,butthereitis usuallyonly
theperceptual statethatchanges,notitsobject.WhenI visuallyscrutinize
mydesklamp,I becomeawareofmanydetailsthatwerepreviously unno-
ticed, but theproperties of the lamp itselfremain unchanged. Admittedly in
someexternalcases,theactofobservation does changeitsobject.Thatis
apparently so at thequantummechanicallevel and obviouslyso in many
social situations. Indeed,designingnonobtrusive measuresis a perennial
problem in the social sciences. However, in the interpersonal case,itis not
theactof observation per se that the
produces change but rather thesub-
ject's awareness at some level ofbeing observed that does so.
Hill contrasts the"innereye"modelofintrospection withalternatives
thathe refersto as "volumecontrol"and "activation"to emphasizethe
respectsin whichtheintensity, character, or eventheexistenceof a sensa-
tion(or otherlower-order state)can be affected by theoccurrenceof a
higher-order awareness directed at it.He seems to regardthisas a problem
fortheperceptual viewofintrospection andthusfortheHOP modelofcon-
sciousness.Lycan,however, deniesanysuchnegativeconsequencefollows
fortheHOP view.27 He acceptstheactivenatureofinnerawarenessandthe
manywaysin whichitmayalteritslower-order object,butdeniesthatthe
HOP viewis committed toa passivemodelofinnerperception as the"inner
eye"analogymightsuggest. Lycanaccepts the data Hill presents, butclaims
are
they folly consistent with the HOP For
theory. present purposes, we need
notsettlethatlatterdisputeoverconsistency; itis theactivenatureofintro-
spectionthatmatters, andaboutthattheyagree.
• Globallydistributed neuralcorrelate ofconsciousness.Current scientific
evidenceon theneuralcorrelates ofconsciousness indicatesthatthereis no
speciallocal brainarea(s)thatis theunique(or special)basisofconscious
experience.Rather,anygivenconsciousstateappearsto be realizedby a
globallydistributed pattern involving manydifferent corticalandsubcorti-
cal regionsthataresimultaneously activeandboundtogether in someway,
perhapsbyregular oscillationsthatentrain neural firing patterns indisparate
areasofthebrain.An important consequence of this resultis that thevery
sameregionsthatareinvolvedin theprocessing andrealization ofnoncon-
sciousmentalstatesare also amongthecorrelatesor realizationbases of
consciousmentalstates.Forexample,theareasofvisualorauditory cortex
thatareactivewhenone nonconsciously perceives a stimulus are also com-
ponents of one's conscious perception of such a stimulus. The difference
298
betweentheneuralcorrelates oftheconsciousandnonconsciousstatesis
notthattheinformation getspassedon andre-registered orre-represented
elsewhere, but rather that those same areas getintegrated intoa largeruni-
fiedpattern ofglobalbrainactivity in theconsciouscase.
Given thesethreesuggestionsfromDennett,Hill, and the neuro-
imagers,we arein a positiontoconstruct an alternative higher-order model
thatmoreintimately linksthemeta-mental stateswiththeirlower-order
objectsandthereby offers a possiblesolutiontothegenerality problem. We
can tentatively label it thehigher-order global state (HOGS) model. The
basic idea is thata mentalstatebecomesa consciousnessstateby being
recruitedinto a globallyintegrated patternof brainactivitythatis the
momentary neural realization of an episodein theexperiencing subject's
streamofconsciousness. Contrary theHOP andHOT models,thetransi-
to
tionfromunconsciousto consciousstatuson theHOGS modeldoes not
resultfromtheproduction ofan independent meta-representation, butrather
fromtheoriginallower-order representation's taking on a new systemic role
its
through integration into the largerpattern associated with the transient
andshifting dominant focusofneuralandmentalactivity.
Nonetheless, theHOGS modelremainsa typeofhigher-order theory
insofaras thechangethatoccursin a lower-order state'sfunction as it is
integrated intothemomentary globalcorrelate ofself-awareness transforms
itscontentin waysthatinvolvea heightened elementofexperiential self-
reference. Let me spellthisouta bitmorefully.Thoughsomemightdis-
agree,letus assumethatan intentional state'scontentis (at leastin large
part)a function of itsfunctional role with thesystemthatcontainsit(how-
everthatmightbe defined, whether narrowly, widely,or otherwise). When
thereis a significant change in a state'sfunction, there will typically be
also
a corresponding change in its content. If a lower-order statechangesits
function into a
bybeingintegrated largerglobalpattern, its content maywell
changeaccordingly. What sort of content changemight occur? The global
patterns associatedwiththeHOGS modelaretheneuralcorrelates orreal-
izationsofthesequenceofstatesofa self-consciously experiencing subject.
Whena previously nonconscious stateis recruited intosucha globalpattern
of activity,one wouldexpectitto takeon a roleandcontent relativeto the
mentalreality ofthatlargerunified organization. A nonconscious perception
ofa smallredbookin front totherightmightbe transformed so as to con-
tributean analogousaspectto theconscioussubject'sexperiential stream,
whichatleastimplicitly involvesa self-referential element.The content of
therelevantconsciousexperiencemightaptlybe specifiedas "I am now
aware(visually)ofa smallredbookinfront andtotheright ofme."To some
degree this self-referential be
aspectmay present in a limited andwholly
implicitway even in states that we typically regard as nonconscious. Even
299
nonconscious perceptions or nonconsciousdesiresmayincorporate some
implicitelementsof self-reference in theirsatisfaction conditions:a com-
plex such as "me-seeing:a tree/here/now" or "me-desiring: a drinkof
water/here/now" maydo a better job ofcapturing theintentionality ofsuch
nonconsciousstatesthanwould the merelyobjectual"tree/here/now."
Insofaras thisis so, thechangein content thataccompaniesthemovefrom
unconscious to consciousstatusis notthetotallyde novoadditionofa self-
reflexiveaspect,butrather thetransformation froma limitedandimplicit
self-referential
aspectto a richerandmoreexplicitone.
Thus,althoughtheHOGS modeldoes notdenythattherearecontent
differencesbetweenfirst- andsecond-order states,itrecognizesmoreconti-
nuitythaneithertheHOP or HOT models.In particular, it allows forthe
existenceofat leastsomeformsoflimitedimplicitmeta-mentality in non-
consciousstates.The transition fromnonconscious to consciousinvolvesa
significantincreasein thequantity, quality,andexplicitness ofthatmeta-
mentalaspectrather thanitsinitialonset.
DevelopingtheHOGS modelin detailis notsomething I can do here,
norcan I be surethatI wouldnotmeetinsurmountable obstacleswereI to
tryto do so elsewhere.Butat leastprimafacie,it seemsto offera promis-
ing alternative to boththestandardHOP and HOT models.Moreover,it
mayprovidea naturalandsatisfying wayoutofthegenerality problem.
On theHOGS model,lower-order statesare retainedin a somewhat
transformed wayas constituents oftheintegrated complexesthatrealizethe
transitiontoconsciousstatus.Forexample,therepresentations invisualcor-
texthatconstitute mynonconscious perception oftheredbookareretained
as elements in myconsciousperception ofit.Thosecorticalrepresentations
maynotbe exactlythesame,sincetheymaybe alteredin thesortsofways
suggestedbythevolumecontroland activation modelsdescribedbyHill.
Indeed,integration intothetemporary focusofglobalactivity willtypically
involvean intensification oflocalactivity inresponsetoreciprocal resonant
amplification throughout the global pattern,as well as perhapssome
strengthening fromattentional mechanisms suchas thosemediatedbythe
specificthalamocortical pathways.Even shouldthelocal pattern remain
largelyunchanged in itsintrinsicfeatures, itwouldstilllikelychangeboth
itsoverallfunctional profileanditsassociatedintentional content in virtue
of thenew patterns of global activityintowhichit enters.Nonetheless,
eithertheoriginallower-order state(orone ofitsnearanaloguesthatresults
fromthesevariouschanges)getsincorporated intothelargercomplexthat
makesit conscious.Thus,if theoriginalnonconsciousstatehad sensory
qualia,theywill be includedin a transformed wayin theassociatedcon-
sciouscomplex.Moreover, itis onlywhensucha stateis integrated intothe
of
largerglobalpattern activity thatit functions as an aspect of theexperi-
300
entiallifeoftheconscioussubject,andonlythenthatthereis something that
it'sliketohavesucha qualitative perception.
The possiblesolutionthisoffers to thegenerality problemis similarin
somerespects tothatoffered byRosenthal indefenseoftheHOT theory, but
also importantly different in waysthatmaymakeitmoresatisfying. Both
theHOGS modelandRosenthal'sdefensesaythereis nothing thatit'slike
to be in an unconscious perceptual state,evenifthestatehas nonconscious
qualia. Bothalso say thatthereis something thatit's liketo be in a con-
sciousqualitative state.However,forRosenthal therelevant qualiaareprop-
ertiesonlyof thelower-order state,and as we notedabove it is puzzling
whythereshouldbe something thatit's liketo havea HOT abouta qualia
stategiventhattheHOT itselfon Rosenthal'saccounthasno qualia.
On theHOGS model,thehigher-order statehas qualia,andindeedit
alonehas qualiaintheformneededtoproducean experiential whatit'slike-
ness.The qualia arethosethatwerepresentin thelower-order statesince
thatstateis preserved in a somewhat transformed wayas a constituent ofthe
globalcomplexthatrealizestheconsciousstatewithitsaddedhigher-order
aspects.Itis onlywhenthosequaliaareincorporated via thelargerstateinto
theself-conscious experiential stream ofthe agent thereis anything
that that
it'sliketobe in therelevant state.Thetransforming higher-order processis
notone ofgenerating a separatenon-qualiathought orrepresentation about
theoriginalqualitative perceptual state,but a matter of that
activating state
andintegrating itwithitsassociatedqualiaintothemomentary globalstate
as an aspectof theexperiential agent'sphenomenal world. This thenpro-
videstheavenueofresponseto thegenerality argument. a
Having thought
or a perception abouta non-mental itemsuchas thelampon mydeskdoes
notmakethelampconscious,sincethelampitselfcannotbe recruited into
a globalpattern ofactivation realizing the conscious experience of an agent.
Because itcannotbecomea constituent ofanysuchglobalstate,itcannot
contribute any qualia to it, nor does it have any qualia to contribute.
However,nonconscious mentalstatescan generally be recruited intosuch
large-scalecomplexes, and if such a nonconscious recruit has qualitative
features thentheymaycontribute totheexperiential "whatit'slike-ness" of
thatstretch oftheagent'sconsciousness.
The problemforRosenthalwas thepuzzleofwhyorhowtheaddition
ofa nonqualitative meta-representation ofa qualitative stateshouldcreatea
"whatit's like-ness"wherenone previouslyexisted.The HOGS model
appealsto thepart/whole natureofthelinkbetweenthenonconscious state
andtheconsciouscomplexintowhichitis recruited to answerthatworry.
Although recruitment intotheHOGS stateneednotinvolvethecreation of
any new higher-orderqualia, the HOGS state the
incorporates qualia of the
recruited stateandtransforms themintoaspectsoftheongoingphenomenal
301
worldof theexperiential agent.It is in just thosecircumstances thatwe
wouldexpectto findconsciousnessin the"something thatit's liketo be"
sense.
Let me back up a just a bit,sinceI havebeen speculatingat a pretty
rapidrate.I have notdone any morethanofferthe HOGS model as a
promising variantofthehigher-order theory.I havenotworkeditoutinrig-
orousdetail,andcertainly notshownthatitis thebestformofthehigher-
orderview. Nonetheless,I hope to have made it at least primafacie
plausibleandgivengoodreasonsforseriously pursuing itas an alternative
tothemorestandard HOT andHOP versionsofthetheory. I believeon bal-
ance it has manyadvantages, butI do notclaimto have shownthathere.
Doingso willhavetowaitforanother occasion.
Let me close byconsidering howtheHOGS answersourinitialques-
tionsabouttherelations anddependencies amongourtriadofnotions:intro-
spection, consciousness, and self-awareness. As we notedabove,theHOP
andHOT modelsbothviewconsciousmentalstatesas theresultof a type
ofself-awareness, involving distincthigher-order statesdirected ontolower-
orderobjects,whicharemadeconsciousbytheveryfactofbeingmeta-rep-
resented(whether in a thought-like orperception-like way).However,the
twoviewsdiffer aboutthestatusofintrospection. It is primary on theHOP
modelas theprocessthatgenerates therequiredHOPs, butitis derivative
on theHOT modelas merelya specialcase in whicha HOT itselfbecomes
theobjectofa yethigher-order thought. Whatarethecomparable relations
on theHOGS view?
The HOGS modelagreeswithboththeHOT and HOP viewson the
issueinsofaras thetransformation
first ofa nonconscious stateintoa con-
sciousinvolvesan elementof self-awareness. However,thewayin which
self-awareness comes into the processis quite different on the HOGS
model.It is nota matter ofproducinga distinct separate meta-state. Self-
awarenessfiguresinsteadas an essentialbutlargelyimplicitaspectofthe
overallglobalstateintowhichthelower-order stateis recruited. By being
integrated intothat largerpattern activity previouslynonconscious
of the
statebecomespartofthephenomenal experiential streamoftheconscious
agent.Self-awareness in atleastimplicit form is a basic featureofthestruc-
tureofphenomenal The
experience. empirical reality of "world over against
self'orof"selfconfronting world"is,as Kantshowedus twocenturies ago,
builtintotheverystructure and organization of experience.28 It is in that
sensethatthetransformation ofa nonconsciousstateintoa consciousone
essentially involves or dependsupontheadditionor enhancement of self-
awareness.We mighttakea cue herefromDennett'shypothesis aboutthe
virtualstructureoftheselfas implicitin theintentional perspectivai struc-
tureoftheserialnarrative. Whatmakesa systemofrepresentational states
302
intoa self(or perhapsitwouldbe betterto saymoreself-like)is largelya
matter oftheintentional coherenceandcausalunitythatbindstheelements
of thesystemtogether.29 A HOGS theorist mightgo one stepfarther and
that
argue recruiting a nonconscious stateinto the globalpattern wayof
is a
integrating it into the coherent structure of theconscious self.Giventhe
implicitly self-reflexive nature of phenomenal representation, theveryact
ofintegrating therecruited stateintotheglobalunitynecessarily embedsit
within a moreself-aware structure. Thereneedbe no further discreet explicit
higher-order representation to produceself-awareness as thereis on the
HOP andHOT models.The veryactofintegration itselfsuffices.
Introspection on the HOGS model is neither as fundamental as on the
HOP modelnoras marginalas it seemsto be on theHOT model.On the
HOGS model,thetransition fromnonconsciousto consciousstatesis not
producedbyintrospection,leastnotinsofaras introspection
at is thought of
as a formof innerperceptionas it seemsto be on theHOP model.The
modelofintrospection as a kindof"innervision"does notfitall thatwell
withthesortsof processesthatareinvolvedin recruiting a stateintothe
dominantpattern of globalactivity. of
Thinking introspection in termsof
Hill's alternative modelsofvolumecontroloractivation may better linkit
totheprocessofrecruitment, butitis notclearthatintrospection in any(but
themostexpansive)formneedbe involvedin everycase ofrecruitment. We
can anddo directourinnerattention tovariousaspectsofourminds,andby
doingso we can oftenbringa previously unconsciousstateor processto
consciousness. Butthemoment tomoment flowofconsciousness is notnor-
mally controlled byany such active or
"looking" attending. Other factors-
the
perhaps intensity of new local of
regions activity producedbypowerful
orsalientexternal inputsorperhapstheinternal dynamics within theunified
experiential globalpattern itself (e.g.,when I work through a conscious bit
of inferential reasoning) - are at least as likely to be responsible for the
shifting character ofthestreamof consciousness.Each shiftin thestream
involvestherecruitment andintegration of newmentalelementsthatare
thereby transformed into conscious mental states.But insofaras many
(most) such shifts do not relyuponintrospection, itcan hardlybe regarded
as foundational forconsciousnessas it seemsto be on thestandardHOP
model.On theotherhand,introspection does seemtoplaysomeroleatleast
someofthetimein determining whichstatesgetintegrated intothelarger
globalpattern, especially if we interpret introspection includingHill's
as
notionsof volumecontroland activationalong withthemorecommon
inner-vision variety.In suchcases introspection playsan activerolein pro-
ducing the first level of consciousness. It is not confinedto thederivative
third-order roleinvolving only HOTs about HOTs towhichRosenthal seems
torestrict it.Thus,iftheHOGS modelfulfills itsinitialpromiseas a viable
303
alternativeto theHOP andHOT models,itwouldyieldimportantly differ-
entconclusionsaboutwhatrelationsourtrioof notionsbearto each other
and to thehigher-ordertheoryof consciousness.Further
investigationis
clearlycalledfor.
NOTES
1.DavidM.Armstrong, "What Is Consciousness?" inTheNature ofMindandOther

, ed.DavidM.Armstrong
Essays N.Y.:Cornell
(Ithaca, University Press, 1980);David
Rosenthal,"Thinking ThatOneThinks," inConsciousness, ed.M. DaviesandG.
Humphreys (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992);William Lycan,Consciousness
(Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1987);andRoccoGennaro, Consciousness andSelf-
Consciousness(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.,1997).
2. DavidRosenthal, "TwoConcepts ofConsciousness," PhilosophicalStudies 97(1986):
329-54;Rosenthal, 'ThinkingThat OneThinks"; Armstrong,"What IsConsciousness";
Lycan,Consciousness; andWilliam Lycan, Conscious Experience (Cambridge, Mass.:
MITPress, 1996).
3. Lycan,Consciousness ; andLycan, ConsciousExperience.
4. Rosenthal,"Thinking That OneThinks."
5. Rosenthal,"TwoConcepts ofConsciousness."
VanGulick,
6. Robert "AFunctionalist PleaforSelf-Consciousness,"PhilosophicalReview
97(1988):149-88.
7. Rosenthal,"Thinking That OneThinks"; Lycan, Conscious Experience.
8. DavidMarr, Vision
(NewYork: W.H.Freeman, 1982).
9. Stephen Stich,"Beliefs andSubdoxastic States,"Philosophy ofScience 45 (1978):
499-518.
10.W.Ittelson andF.Kilpatrick, "Experiments inPerception,"ScientificAmerican 185
(1951):50-55;andIrvin Rock, TheLogic ofPerception (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,
1983).
11.Rosenthal, "Thinking That OneThinks."
12.ReneDescartes, Meditations ofFirst Philosophy (Paris:Michel Soly,1641);William
James,TheWill toBelieve andOther Essays inPopular Philosophy(NewYork: Long-
mans,Green andCo.,1897); andBernard Williams, "Deciding toBelieve," inProblems
oftheSelf,ed.Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1973),
136-51.
13.Michael Tye,TenProblems ofConsciousness (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1995).
14.George E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (NewYork: Harcourt Brace, 1922).Seealso
VanGulick, "AFunctionalistPleaforSelf-Consciousness," andGalen Strawson, Mental
Reality
(Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1994).
15.Lycan, Consciousness ; Lycan,Conscious Experience;Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal
Qualia,"American Philosophical Quarterly (1982):127-36; andSydney Shoemaker,
"QualitiesandQualia:What's in theHead?"Philosophy andPhenomenological
Research 50(1990):109-31.
16.Lycan, Conscious Experience; NedBlock, "Mental PaintandMental Latex,"inPhilo-
sophicalIssues;Perceptual Content, ed.E. Villanueva(Atascadero, Calif.:Ridgeview
Publishing,1996),19-50.
17.DanielC.Dennett, "Quining Qualia," inConsciousness inContemporary Science,ed.E.
BisiachandA.Marcel (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1988),42-77.
304
18.DavidRosenthal, "TheIndependence ofConsciousnessandSensory Quality,"in
PhilosophicalIssues ed.E.Villanueva
: Consciousness, Calif.:
(Atascadero, Ridgeview
Publishing,1991).
19.FredDretske, "Conscious Experience,"Mind102(1993):263-83;FredDretske,
NaturalizingtheMind (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1995);andAlexByrne, "Some
LikeItHot:Consciousness andHigher-Order Thoughts," Studies
Philosophical 86
(1997):103-29.
20.Thomas Nagel, "What IsItLiketoBea Bat?" Review
Philosophical 74(1974):339-56.
21.Rosenthal,"TheIndependence andSensory
ofConsciousness Quality."
22.Lycan,
Conscious Experience; WilliamLycan,"WhatIstheSubjectivity
oftheMental?"
in Philosophical Perspectives, 4: Action Theoryand Philosophy ofMind,ed.
J.Tomberlin (Atascadero,Calif.:
Ridgeview 1990):109-30.
Publishing,
23.Lycan,Conscious Experience .
24.Gennaro,Consciousness andSelf-Consciousness.
25.DanielC.Dennett, ConsciousnessExplained Little
(Boston: BrownandCo,1991).
26.ChristopherHill,Sensations(Cambridge: Press,
University 1991).
Cambridge
27.Lycan,Conscious Experience.
28.Immanuel Kant,Critique ofPureReason, trans.
Norman Kemp Smith(NewYork: St.
Martin'sPress,1965;orig. pub.1781).
29.DanielC.Dennett, "Why Everyone Isa Novelist,"
TimesLiterary
Supplement(1998):
1016-22; Dennett,Consciousness Explained; "AFunctionalist
andVanGulick, Pleafor
Self-Consciousness."
305

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Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness

Inward and Upward: Reflection ,

Introspection , and Self-Awareness

The basic issue thatdividestheHOP and HOT approachesis whether the

AccordingtoDennett'smultiple draftstheory, betweencon-

1.DavidM.Armstrong, "What Is Consciousness?" inTheNature ofMindandOther

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