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Rosenthal's Consciousness Theory

Probably the most perplexing concept known to man is consciousness. Everyone in

good health could be conscious, but absolutely no one can explain what consciousness is or

contribute to the mind. All dynamic living organisms have a conscience as an asset. Through

the conscious mind, an individual is equipped with the knowledge of living in and

communicating with the physical world. Consciousness recognizes all significant ecosystems

effects on the body. Thus, consciousness can be described as a condition of diverse

information about oneself and one's surroundings. It also involves the perception patterns of

consciousness that start when one awakens every morning from a peaceful sleep and last

during the day before one falls asleep at night, sinks into a stroke, passes away, or becomes

stops to sense stimuli.  Consciousness is impossible to quantify explicitly, although it can be

evaluated by studying how individuals respond to different factors. Many philosophers have

had other theories about consciousness, but Rosenthal's Higher-Order theory of

consciousness is outstanding.

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The higher-order theory of consciousness proposed by Rosenthal attempts to

understand the interaction between the different stages of psychological conditions. A higher-

order psychological state assumes some other mental state, just like thinking or feeling, as its

focus. The higher-order psychological status informs the lower-order psychological status.

For instance, I have visual perceptions of a colored desktop monitor. As per higher-order

theory, this perception is conscious due to a higher-order psychological, mental state. Higher-
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order philosophies all accept the notion that the consciousness of a mental state depends on

an individual's consciousness regarding that state. Higher-order theorists' fundamental task is

to provide a rationale for conceptual frameworks in higher-order consciousness regarding

them. There are also other types of higher-order philosophies. However, Rosenthal's higher-

order conscious hypothesis stands out. A higher-order thinking philosophy, as per Rosenthal,

is when a state of mind is cognitive only when there is a higher-order consciousness

regarding it. For instance, I am aware of the discomfort in my shoulder once I have felt that I

am in that condition of trauma. Rosenthal asserted once more that higher-order perceptions

are needed to differentiate between unconscious and active mental states. Suppose the simple

propensity to generate a higher-order thinking is necessary for a psychological state to be

aware. In that case, it appears that all cognitive functions will be active at all times. For

instance, occasional knee pain shows that we can be mindful of emotional conditions one

moment and not the next. Some of the benefits of the inner sense are shared by higher-order

feelings. Higher-order insights will support such surveillance if the tracked condition has a

sufficiently solid relationship with the event of higher-order thought. More specifically,

higher-order ideas can accommodate the evident immediacy of which we are mindful of our

consciousness.  Because the higher-order thoughts that render us aware of our consciousness

are never conscious themselves, it would seem that no deduction or other mechanism renders

us conscious of our states. To repeat, all that is required for urgency is that the consciousness

we have in our consciousness seems to the topic to be straightforward and unmediated. We

may be aware of our sensory perception in more or less fine-grained terms while we actively

see things. One's understanding of red may be conscious, for example, of a comparatively

generalized knowledge of color or awareness of a particularly unique shade of red. This

variability is often a feature of perceptual circumstances, though not every time. Paying care

to one's context will render one aware of it in more nuanced and fine-grained aspects. Higher-
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order thought s have a credible rationale for the variation of how we are aware of our

contextual interactions. According to the higher-order thought theorem, how we are aware of

a qualitative condition is determined by how the corresponding higher-order thought

conceptualizes the state's psychological characteristics.  The composition of grains wherein

our higher-order views reflect specific experiences influences our perceptions of our

subjective perceptions.

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According to Rosenthal, even in excluding any specified first-order condition, the

incidence of an appropriately induced higher-order thinking is necessary for awareness. For

instance, one can be having a cognitive impression of blue if they think they are having such

consciousness, even though one is not in some first-order visual condition. Higher-order

perceptions should not exist in an introverted environment. Because consciousness is an

everyday occurrence in our daily lives, higher-order thinking could be similarly visible on

this basis. According to Rosenthal, a higher-order emotional condition is only cognitive,

while there exists a higher-order awareness regarding it, and such cognitive higher-order

thinking represents introverted conditions. With the rarity of self-reflection, it is not shocking

that we are always unaware of our higher-order emotions. A further characteristic of the

philosophy is the role of individualized references inside the higher-order thinking material.

Conscious mental status is someone's internal emotional state. For instance, one can be aware

of my stomach ache and no other people's. Rosenthal (PN) emphasizes that only the capacity

to differentiate between personal feelings and anything apart from individual self-

consciousness is needed to maintain the connection essential for higher-order thinking. As a

result, organisms with reduced cognitive abilities can experience conscious

psychological traits. For instance, while we can say, 'I am experiencing stress, a much more

rational wording could well be that character is experiencing stress.  Although Rosenthal
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significantly reduces the need for individualized reference, in higher-order thinking material,

the self, as the topic of cognition, is fundamental to philosophy. Only an entity or organism

may be stative aware of what is happening. A psychological state by itself can carry the

necessary resemblance to certain other cognitive functions. Someone can be responsive as a

result of a psychological condition, specifically a higher-order perception. However, the

higher-order consciousness is not stately conscious of something.

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Most scholars protested the concept of higher-order perceptions. Dretske

strongly opposes the logic behind higher-order consciousness (Farrell & McClelland 1-22). 

He gives an example of envisioning a scenario wherein we closely study two illustrations.

Those illustrations are nearly identical in any way except one. As a result, one of the images

has a black mark, while the other does not. It is certainly possible that when studying such

two objects, one would have had a deliberate visual consciousness of the point where they

vary, commonly called the offending point. Although, as is expected, one may be in this

situation without realizing that both illustrations are distinct or how they differ. In any case,

because one may have a conscious perception of the point rather than becoming mindful that

somebody is getting it, cognition does not necessitate high-order knowledge. According to

my opinion concerning Rosenthal's theory of consciousness, having a conscious awareness is

a single aspect to distinguish the two conscious states. However, determining the two as

separate is an individualized preference which may not be the case. Knowingly noticing the

additional position in one illustration does not imply that the two are distinct. Thus, when

examining the two conscious states, one would have a conscious knowledge of the additional

mindful. A higher-order thinking philosopher would conclude that this implies having an

experience with the reference area inducing consciousness, which is the goal of higher-order

assertions that somebody is having an understanding of that stimuli. A further

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personal reaction towards the higher-order philosophical viewpoint of the conscious

state is how the nature of higher-order perception decides the substance of conscience.

Whenever a higher-order mind is working correctly, the sense of an occurring emotional state

determines the nature of the higher-order perception. It is plausible, though, for higher-order

thinking material to be null or distort a mental condition. In certain circumstances, I can be

aware of a pain in my stomach when, in reality, the feeling is localized in my pancreas.

Besides, Rosenthal has contended that such types of comparison are uncommon and

measurable, and therefore do not pose a concern for higher-order thinking logic. By

determining where cognition derives from the mind, stimulation responses appear to indicate

that awareness emerges from the concerted activation of the whole brain.  Few

neuroscientists have also proposed that cognition may originate from a single point in the

brain. However, the dominant theory assigns the conscious state to a broader networking

aspect of the brain. Finally, consciousness emerges as an intrinsic phenomenon of individual

imagination. However, fundamental concerns regarding the exact nature, place, and

mechanisms of neuronal activity providing cognitive awareness to stimuli remain

unanswered.

In conclusion, conscious awareness has a subjective aspect. Every individual’s

conscience is unique to that particular individual, establishing a relationship between them

and external and internal stimuli such as itchiness, feelings, pain, and emotions that other

people are not exposed to such stimuli. The essential purpose of the higher-order concept is to

accommodate the existence of sensory perceptions concerning the duality in the mental state.

Therefore, the high-order consciousness theory can be termed to have its strengths and

weaknesses in the attempt to explain consciousness.

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Works Cited

Farrell, Jonathan, and Tom McClelland. "Consciousness and inner awareness." Review of

Philosophy and Psychology 8.1 (2017): 1-22.

Rosenthal, David M. "A theory of consciousness." (1997).