The New Intelligence Process

(Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle)

Part 1 -- Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle

Part 2 -- "We''ll Return To Our Regularly Scheduled
Programming In Just A Minute..."
Part 3 -- The Disconnect Between Theory And Practice
Part 4 -- The "Traditional" Intelligence Cycle And Its History
Part 5 -- Critiques Of The Cycle: Which Intelligence Cycle?
Part 6 -- Critiques Of The Cycle: The Intelligence Cycle vs.
Reality
Part 7 -- Critiques Of The Cycle: Cycles, Cycles And More
Damn Cycles!
Part 8 -- Tweaking The Intelligence Cycle
Part 9 -- Departures From The Intelligence Cycle
 1. Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle (Original Research)

I mean it.

The "intelligence cycle", as a depiction of how the intelligence process works, is a WWII era
relic that is way past its sell-by date. It has become toxic. It no longer informs as much as it
infects. It is less a cycle than a cyclops -- ancient, ugly and destructive.

I want it dead and gone, crushed, eliminated.

I don't care, frankly, what we have to do. Remove it from every training manual, delete it from
every slide, erase it from every website.

Shoot it with a silver bullet, drive a wooden stake through its heart, burn the remains without
ceremony and scatter the ashes.

(Geez, Kris, why don't you tell us how you really feel...)

OK, OK, so, yes, I am being intentionally provocative but I have been doing quite a bit of
research on the intelligence process over the last several years and have come to the conclusion -
- as have others before me -- that our current best depiction of this process, the so-called
"intelligence cycle" is fatally flawed. Moreover, I believe these flaws have become so severe, so
grievous, that continued adherence to and promotion of the cycle is actually counterproductive.

My intent, beginning on Monday and over the next several weeks, is to lay out the evidence I
have gathered about the cycle itself, about attempts to save it from its worst flaws, about attempts
to replace it altogether and let you decide for yourselves.

In the end, I intend to recommend (with no hubris intended and well aware of the possibility of
hamartia) my own generalized version of the intelligence process; one which I think is more
appropriate for the intelligence tasks of the 21st Century and which works, in both theory and
practice, across all three major sub-disciplines of intelligence -- national security, business and
law enforcement.

2. "We'll Return To Our Regularly Scheduled Programming In Just a

Minute..." (Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle)

My intent today was to jump right into my series on the intelligence cycle and why we
should get rid of it (put a wooden stake through its heart were the exact words I think I
used...).

However, over the weekend, I received a torrent of emails and the post received a
number of comments and it occurred to me that, before I got started in earnest, it might
be useful to do a little wholly unscientific sentiment analysis on this issue.

Using the Swayable tool (which many of you have already tested here and here), I intend
to first test the underlying assumption behind this study and second to ask two related
but independent questions about your perceptions of the intelligence cycle and its place
in intelligence theory.
The Assumption Check

The first question is: "Is the traditional intelligence cycle a perfect representation of the
current intelligence process? By "perfect" I mean perfect -- does the intelligence cycle
accurately model the intelligence process as it is currently done? Trivial issues count
here (we will deal with them later).

Something A Bit More Substantial

The second question addresses the degree to which the cycle is imperfect (assuming you
thought it was imperfect in the first place): "Do the benefits derived from continuing to
use the intelligence cycle as a depiction of the intelligence process outweigh the costs?" I
would ask you to think carefully about both the costs and the benefits before answering.

Finally, I want to get at your beliefs: "Without reference to perfection (or imperfection),
costs or benefits, do you believe that a better general description of the modern
intelligence process is possible?" (Note: Extra credit for guessing why I chose pictures of
Leibniz and Voltaire and double secret extra credit for knowing which is which...)

That's it. Please do not hesitate to pass this post and the series on to anyone who might
be interested. In addition, please do not hesitate to join in the discussion by dropping
me an email or posting a comment (comments are better as they can be seen by all but I
understand if that is not possible).
 3. The Disconnect Between Theory And Practice (Let's Kill The
Intelligence Cycle)

Intelligence is not something that appears, autogenously; it is something that gets done,
a process. This idea, that intelligence is a process, is one of the least controversial among
intelligence professionals.

However, a general description of the process of intelligence -- that is, the best way
to characterize and classify those consistent elements across intelligence sub-disciplines
--is still very much an open theoretical question.

Intelligence professionals have long known that the traditional way of describing the
intelligence process, the so-called "intelligence cycle", is flawed; yet none of the
alternatives proposed has yet captured the nuance of the process as practiced or, for that
matter, the mind of the intelligence community.

This disconnect between theory and practice, between the imperfections of the
intelligence cycle and the way intelligence is actually done, has real-world
consequences. While I will return to this theme many times throughout this series of
posts, it is useful to get a sense of the costs associated with perpetuating a faulty model
of the process.

 For example, without a consensus on the way in which intelligence "happens" that works
across the various sub-disciplines of law enforcement, business and national security
intelligence, it is impossible to study the process for potential improvements.
 In addition, reforms proposed under flawed models are likely to be flawed reforms,
incapable of solving systemic problems because the system itself is so poorly
understood.
  Furthermore, training students with models of a process that falls apart when first
touched by reality reduces the perceived value of training as well as the morale of those
trained.
 Budgets built around a flawed model are likely to mis-allocate funds and require work-
around solutions that consume even more scarce resources.
 Hiring people to fill positions created under an unsound model of the process is nearly
certain to create a mismatch in terms of skills and competencies needeed vs. skills and
competencies acquired.

The list goes on.

In this series of posts, I will begin by examining the intelligence cycle and some of the critiques
of it. Next, I will examine the alternatives to the intelligence cycle. Finally, I will lay out my own
understanding of the process. While every intelligence project is different, my own experience
and the evidence I have collected over the last eight years indicates that there are patterns in this
activity, whether in the national security, business or law enforcement fields, that are consistent
across the entire intelligence profession.

The final goal of this exercise, then, is to outline this new description of the process as clearly as
possible based on intelligence, as it is practiced, across all its sub-disciplines and regardless of
the size of the intelligence activity involved. Furthermore, I want to balance the need for both
simplicity and detail such that this explanation of the process is accessible to all students of
intelligence -- at whatever age or level of experience.
 4. The "Traditional" Intelligence Cycle And Its History (Let's Kill The
Intelligence Cycle)

Finding descriptions of the

intelligence cycle is not difficult. Virtually every organization, company or law enforcement
agency that has even a modest intelligence capability has a picture, much like the one to the
right (which, until recently, graced the US national security intelligence community‟s main web
site, Intelligence.gov).

So pervasive is this traditional image of the intelligence process that it comes across as generally
accepted theory. Indeed, many private sector practitioners have built much of their marketing
campaigns on touting the benefits of the cycle.

Likewise, it is commonplace to see the cycle featured prominently in government publications,

statements of doctrine, training publications and even in critiques of intelligence. The entire
architecture of intelligence, across all three major sub-disciplines of intelligence, is caught up in
this more or less common vision of how intelligence professionals perform the functions of
intelligence.

Despite its popularity, the history of the cycle is unclear. US army regulations published during
WWI identify collection, collation and dissemination of military intelligence as essential duties
of what was then called the Military Intelligence Division (Fun fact: According to Congressional
testimony in 1919 the whole budget for military intelligence in 1913 was $10,000 -- or roughly
$227,000 in 2011 dollars) but there was no suggestion that these three functions happen in a
sequence, much less in a cycle.

By 1926, military intellgence officers were recommending four distinct functions for tactical
combat intelligence: Requirements, collection, "utilization" (i.e. analysis), and dissemination,
though, again, there was no explicit mention of an intelligence cycle.

The first direct mention of the intelligence cycle (see image to the right) I could find is from the
1948 book, Intelligence Is For Commanders (more on this book here). I hypothesize that the
intelligence cycle probably came into use during WWII as a training aid but I have not been able
to find any evidence to corroborate this bit of speculation on my part.

Since that time, the cycle, as a model of how intelligence works, has become pervasive. A simple
Google image search on the term, "Intelligence Cycle" rapidly gives one a sense of the wide
variety of agencies, organizations and businesses that use some variant of the cycle.

(Note: Experienced intelligence professionals might want to skip the next few paragraphs,
which outline a more or less generic version of the intelligence cycle based on the image at
the top of the post. I include it here for readers who are not familiar with the cycle or for
students of intelligence who might need a refresher.)
While the actual details vary dramatically (something we will turn to in the next post) in a
typical description of the process, the intelligence cycle usually begins with planning and
direction or similar language. Direction usually comes from the decisionmakers that the
intelligence activity supports although it can also come from the senior leaders of the
intelligence activity or even from the analysts themselves.

It is important to note here that direction and planning can be formal but is often done
informally (most variants of the cycle make no distinction). This is seen most often when there is
no time for a more formal process. Less formal tasking is also often seen in smaller intelligence
units, such as in business environments, or in units where the intelligence professionals and
decisionmakers have a long-term relationship.

After the planning and direction phase, the collection phase, in a typical version of the
intelligence cycle, begins. Here the intelligence professional begins to execute the plan to collect
the types of information necessary to understand and answer the requirement.

Once the intelligence unit collects the information necessary, other intelligence professionals
within the same unit might have to process and exploit it. Processing and exploitation takes on a
number of forms including decrypting encrypted transmissions, turning a variety of
conversations into a single cohesive report, translating source information from one language
into another or identifying buildings and other features in an aerial image, among others. In
short, processing and exploitation is the phase where very raw information becomes usable to
the largest number of people authorized to view it within the intelligence organization.

With planning, direction, collection, exploitation and processing complete, the focus of the
traditional intelligence cycle shifts to analysis and production, or the interpretation of the
collected data and the creation of a product that best meets the decisionmaker‟s needs.

Analysts need the widest possible variety of information sources in order to be able to corroborate
other information and to answer the requirement with which they are dealing. The notional source of
the information is much less important than its relevance to the requirement at hand and that source’s
reliability.

Production carries its own concerns and they are often independent of the analysis. If the
analyst is concerned with the content of the analysis, the intelligence production specialist is
concerned with its form. Appropriate forms, in turn, depend on the needs and desires of the
decisionmaker the intelligence unit supports. For example, while the traditional intelligence
product within many areas of the US national security community is a written document with a
smattering of pictures and graphs to explain key points, business decisionmakers tend to be
much more comfortable with charts, graphs, and numerical data accompanied by a few
explanatory bullets.

The final phase according to the diagram is dissemination. This is where the intelligence
specialist delivers the final product to the decisionmaker. While this sounds fairly easy, it, too,
has a number of pitfalls associated with it. Questions concerning exactly to whom an intelligence
document should go to and exactly how it should get there are fundamental to this phase. For
example, classification, or the level of secrecy or confidentiality associated with the intelligence
product, is one such issue.

Likewise, many people in developed countries take high-speed voice and data communications
capabilities for granted. Yet, in many cases, particularly in intelligence work, such capabilities
are scarce or degraded due to geographic isolation. In these cases, the bandwidth available may
determine where the intelligence product is sent or even if it is sent via electronic means at all.
 5. Critiques Of The Cycle: Which Intelligence Cycle? (Let's Kill The
Intelligence Cycle)

Despite its popularity, the intelligence cycle is widely criticized by intelligence professionals.
These criticisms generally break down along three lines. First, there are those who say that what
appears to be a theoretical monolith is actually open to a wide variety of interpretations,
depending on perspective. Indeed, there is not one intelligence cycle but a series of intelligence
cycles, each substantively different from the rest.

Second, many authors have claimed, quite convincingly, that the intelligence cycle, as generally
described, does not, in many material ways, reflect the reality of how intelligence actually is
done. The simplicity of the cycle, to these critics, is both seductive and deceiving.

Finally, there are those critics who claim that the so-called intelligence cycle is simply a
marketing tool that rebrands overly simplistic "cycles" from business and leadership courses. I
intend to discuss each in turn.

Which Intelligence Cycle?

Compare the diagram of the intelligence cycle which, until recently, graced the Intelligence.gov
website (owned by the Director of National Intelligence -- DNI) with the diagram of the
intelligence cycle from the Federal Bureau Of Investigation (FBI) below.
 FBI Version Of The Intelligence Cycle

Recent DNI Version Of The Intelligence Cycle

Besides the obvious differences in graphic representation, what differences in content do you
notice? If you look carefully, you will see that the FBI has decided to include a phase that is not
in the DNI‟s image, the “requirements phase”.

For a seasoned professional, this difference is trivial. Indeed, as I discussed in my overview of

the intelligence cycle in Part 4 of this series, there is an explicit need for requirements and the
FBI‟s inclusion of them as a separate phase of the process might seem to be a matter of
professional choice.

A student of intelligence, particularly a new student, might legitimately question this

explanation, however. Perhaps there is a difference. Perhaps the FBI‟s characterization
represents a new way of thinking about intelligence as a process.

Perhaps, in fact, one description of the process is substantively better than the other. If this is
not the case, then what is the explanation for the differences? There does not seem to be a good
reason why the FBI‟s take on the intelligence cycle should differ from that of the main
intelligence site for the US Government, particularly since the FBI‟s intelligence function, since
the 2004 restructuring of the US intelligence community, is, in many ways, subordinate to that
of the Director of National Intelligence. In short, does this difference represent legitimate
theoretical differences or is it merely the result of a lack of coordination or, worse, sloppy
thinking?

To make matters worse, the DNI's recently updated version of the intelligence cycle confuses the
issue even more. You can see the the graphic currently in use at intelligence.gov below:
A quick examination of the current version of the DNI's cycle seems to differ from the previous
version is several substantive ways. "Direction", "Exploitation" and "Production" all appear to
be subsumed into broader categories of activities. Is there a reason for this? Did the DNI
conduct studies to determine the best, most accurate, description of the cycle? Or was this a
graphic design decision made becasue there was simply not enough room in the graphic for the
additional words?

It gets worse.

On the same page that contains the graphic above, the DNI promotes not one but two
additional variations of the cycle. In the first, more modest, variation (contained in the text that
describes the picture), the DNI says, "The process begins with identifying the issues in which
policy makers are interested and defining the answers they need to make educated decisions
regarding those issues. We then lay out a plan for acquiring that infromation and go about
collecting it." If this is true, then why doesn't the graphic also "begin" with requirements? Why
does the graphic seem to begin with planning?

It gets even worse.

The third variation of the cycle (all on the same page) from the DNI comes at the very top of the
page. Here one finds five links, "Management", "Data Gathering", "Interpretation", "Analysis
and Reporting", and "Distribution". Clicking on the "Management" link indicates that
management -- not requirements, not planning -- "is the initial stage of the intelligence cycle".

Sigh.

I wonder which version is taught in the Intel 101 courses?

I wonder how you grade a student who uses an "alternative" cycle as an answer on a test?

I wonder, if the intelligence cycle is perfect (as about 15% of the people I have polled indicate),
which of these cycles is perfect-est?

Were these differences the only differences within the US national security intelligence
community, they might be explained away more simply but they are not. In fact, there is very
little consistency across and even within a number of important elements of the US national
security community. These inconsistencies also exist across disciplines as well.

Examine the chart below. Only one function, collection, is universally attributed to intelligence
across all 10 organizations examined.

Within the DNI, CIA and FBI there are minor but important differences – not one of the three is
exactly like either of the other two.
Even more baffling are the differences within the US military, however. The Defense Technical
Information Center (“the premier provider of Department Of Defense technical information”)
has a streamlined four-part description of the cycle, one that largely (but not completely) agrees
with the cycle as taught at Fort Huachuca, the Army‟s home for its military intelligence
professionals. This cycle, however, is substantially different from the process defined in the US
Military‟s highest-level publication on intelligence doctrine, Joint Publication 2.0.

The differences evident in the US military may well be due to different publation dates or my
own lack of access to the most recent revisions of some of these documents. In this regard,
though, the 2007 Joint Pub is worthy of further commentary. In it, the US military seems to
abandon the intelligence cycle in favor of a more generic intelligence "process". Some have
suggested that this proves the military has already killed the intelligence cycle (but it just didn't
get the memo...).

While it is (from my viewpoint, at least) a step in the right direction, it only exacerbates the
impression that either the left hand is not speaking to the right in the US national
security intelligence community or that the DNI doesn't control or doesn't care what the Joint
Staff puts out with respect to the intelligence process. All of those alternatives make the US IC
look sloppy and disorganized.

I also think the Joint Staff is trying to have its cake and eat it, too. Compare the two images
below. The first is from the most recent public version of Joint Pub 2.0. The second is from the
1990 version of the US Army's Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis. While the words in the
two publications contain many significant differences, the pictures seem to say that the military
has not backed too far away from its conception of the process as a cycle.
Join Pub 2.0 Intel Process 2007

FM 34-3 Intel Cycle 1990

These descriptions of the cycle differ, again, in significant ways from the descriptions provided
by two oversight bodies commissioned to examine intelligence activities listed on the chart, the
1996 Graham Rudman Commission and the 2004 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
To round out the confusion, the description of the cycle offered by the International Association
Of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and the classic competitive intelligence model (as
described by longtime private sector intelligence specialist, John McGonagle) also differ from
each other and from the other 8 examples.

This analysis, while interesting, comes across as perhaps a bit more picky than it should. Other
processes in other disciplines lend themselves to various descriptions. Indeed, despite the
differences, there are clear themes that emerge even from this analysis. Few, for example, would
question whether requirements, needs, direction, and planning fell into a single, generic
category.

Themes, however, is all these are. A rigid approach to intelligence, implied visually in the
pictures above and in many of the descriptions of these processes by each of these intelligence
organizations, seems inappropriate under these conditions for teaching these concepts to new
members of the intelligence profession or, indeed, explaining the process to the decisionmakers
that intelligence supports. Instead, a more nuanced and less absolutist approach appears to be
called for.

There is one specific area where this analysis does create cause for concern, however. Only three
of the 10 organizations examined include a feedback or evaluation function within their versions
of the cycle.

While some of the other organizations did include feedback as a subset of the dissemination
process, subordinating this crucial evaluative process is not likely to endear the intelligence
function to the decisionmakers that intelligence supports. It seems much better practice to
include explicitly the role of feedback in the process, whether the decisionmaker chooses to take
advantage of it or not.
 6. Critiques Of The Cycle: The Intelligence Cycle Vs. Reality (Let's Kill
The Intelligence Cycle)

Were the lack of precision the only criticism of the intelligence cycle, it might be able to
weather the storm. As suggested previously, there do appear to be general themes that are
relevant, and the cycle’s continued existence suggests that its inconsistencies are outweighed, to
some extent, by its simplicity.

Unfortunately, the second type of criticism typically leveled against the cycle is much more
damning. In fact, it is fatal. Simply put, there is virtually no knowledgeable practitioner or
theorist who claims that the cycle reflects, in any substantial way or in any sub-discipline, the
reality of how intelligence is actually done.

Consider these quotes from some of the most authoritative voices in each of the three
intelligence communities:

"When it came time to start writing about intelligence, a practice I began in my later years at the CIA, I
realized that there were serious problems with the intelligence cycle. It is really not a very good
description of the ways in which the intelligence process works." Arthur Hulnick, "What's Wrong With
The Intelligence Cycle", Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 1 (Loch Johnson, ed), 2007.

"Although meant to be little more than a quick schematic presentation, the CIA diagram [of the
intelligence cycle] misrepresents some aspects and misses many others." -- Mark Lowenthal,
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2nd Ed.,2003)

"We must begin by redefining the traditional linear intelligence cycle, which is more a manifestation of
the bureaucratic structure of the intelligence community than a description of the intelligence
exploitation process." -- Eliot Jardines, former head of the Open Source Center, in prepared testimony in
front of Congress, 2005.

"The traditional intelligence cycle has been described as an "ideal-type" process that will always be
subject to the real constraints of time." -- Jerry Ratcliffe, Strategic Thinking In Criminal Intelligence, 2004
"The classic intelligence cycle is neat, easily displayed, and quickly understood. The problem is that it
doesn't really work that way. It's too static, too rigid, with too much distance between leaders and
intelligence professionals." -- T.J. Waters, Hyperformance: Using Competitive Intelligence For Better
Strategy and Execution, 2010

"Over the years, the intelligence cycle has become somewhat of a theological concept: No one
questions its validity. Yet, when pressed, many intelligence officers admit that the intelligence process,
'really doesn't work that way.'" -- Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach, 2010.

Once you start looking for them, it is easy to find detailed critiques of the intelligence cycle (and, please,
don't hesitate to add your own). The only argument that still seems worth debating is whether or not
the cost of maintaining this flawed model of the process is worth the benefit (a question about which
readers of this blog were almost evenly split).

In addition to the quotes above, my colleague, Steve Marrin, provided me with an interesting update
shortly after I started this series. According to him, the intelligence cycle was the subject of "vigorous
discussion" at a 2005 RAND/ODNI Conference on intelligence theory and that this topic will also be the
subject of a panel at the 2012 International Studies Association Conference. For a carefully crafted and
articulate dissection of the intelligence cycle, I don't think I could recommend a better article than
Steve's own chapter, "Intelligence Analysis and Decision-making: Methodological Challenges from the
2009 book, Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debate).

Once again, themes emerge from the general discontent with the inadequacies of the intelligence
cycle. Many of these themes I will touch upon as I discuss alternatives to the intelligence cycle in later
posts. One theme, however, leaps off each page and tends to dominate the discussion: The intelligence
cycle is linear and intelligence, as practiced, is not. Tasks move from one part of the cycle to another like
an assembly line, where parts are bolted on in a specific order to create a consistent product.

While this approach might be appropriate for early 20th century manufacturers, it doesn’t work with
intelligence, where each product, ideally, contains information that is somehow unique. Consider, for
example, this hypothetical dialogue between Mary, the CEO of Acme Widgets and Joe, her chief of
competitive intelligence:
Mary: I need to know everything there is to know about the Zed Widgets Company.
Joe: Sure. What’s up?
Mary: We are thinking about introducing a new widget and I want to know what the competition is up
to.
Joe: Anything in particular you are interested in?
Mary: Well, I can see their marketing efforts on the TV every day, so I am not really interested in that. I
guess the most important thing is their cost structure. I want to know how much it costs them to make
their widgets and where those costs are.
Joe: Right. Labor, overhead, materials. Got it. Is one part of the cost structure more important than
another to you?
Mary. They pay about the same amount in labor and overhead that we do so I guess I am most
interested in the materials; particularly Material X. That is our most expensive material.
Joe: I just read a report that indicated that the cost of material X is set to rise worldwide. Would you also
like us to take a harder look at that and give you our estimate?
Mary: Absolutely.

While this example is simplistic, it makes the point. Intelligence, even in this one minor example within
only one of the many parts of the traditional intelligence cycle is, or should be, at least, interactive,
simultaneous, iterative. In the above example, this interaction between the intelligence professional and
the CEO resulted in a more detailed and nuanced intelligence requirement going, as it did, from the very
general, “Tell me everything…” requirement to the highly focused, “Tell me about Zed Company’s
Material X costs and give me an estimate of where the price of Material X is likely to go.”

It is equally easy to imagine this kind of interaction within and between parts of the cycle as well.
Collectors and analysts will inevitably go back and forth as the analysts attempt to add depth to their
reporting and as the collector develops new collection capabilities. It is even likely that parts of the cycle
that are not adjacent to one another will work very closely together, such as an analyst and the briefer
responsible for the final dissemination of the product (in its oral form). Decisionmakers, too, may well
remain involved throughout the process, seeking status reports and perhaps even modifying the
requirement as new information or preliminary analysis becomes available.

The US military's Joint Staff Publication 2.0, Joint Intelligence, states the case more strongly:
"In many situations, the various intelligence operations occur nearly simultaneous with one another or
may be bypassed altogether. For example, a request for imagery will require planning and direction
activity but may not involve new collection, processing, or exploitation. In this example, the imagery
request could go directly to a production facility where previously collected and exploited imagery is
reviewed to determine if it will satisfy the request. Likewise, during processing and exploitation, relevant
information may be disseminated directly to the user without first undergoing detailed all-source
analysis and intelligence production. Significant unanalyzed combat information must be simultaneously
available to both the commander (for time-critical decision-making) and to the intelligence analyst (for
production of current intelligence assessments). Additionally, the activities within each type of
intelligence operation are conducted continuously and in conjunction with activities in each of the other
categories of intelligence operations. For example, intelligence planning is updated based on previous
information requirements being satisfied during collection and upon new requirements being identified
during analysis and production."

The situation is even more complex when you imagine an intelligence unit without teams of people
working each of the discrete parts of the cycle. In situations involving small intelligence shops, where a
single indivdual collects, processes, translates, analyzes, formats and produces the intelligence, the cycle
breaks down completely.

The human mind simply does not work in this strictly linear fashion. Instead, it jumps from task to task.
Imagine your own habits when researching a topic. You think a bit, search a bit, get some information,
integrate that into the whole and then search some more. This approach inevitably leads to analytic
dead ends, requiring more collection. At the same time, you are thinking about the form of the final
report. If you are putting together an intelligence product that will use multimedia in its final form, for
example, you are constantly on the lookout for relevant graphics or film footage you can use, regardless
of its analytic value. To even suggest that you should collect all of your information, stop, and then go
and do analysis without ever doing any further collection, is absurd.

One of the most recent and widely publicized innovations within the US national security community is
the advent of “Intellipedia”, a Wikipedia-like tool for the intelligence community. Wikipedia, of course, is
the online encyclopedia that is free to use and editable by anyone. It is one of the most popular sites on
the web and, according to at least some research, is as accurate as other generally accepted
encyclopedias. It has become, in its short lifespan, the tertiary source of first resort for both analysts and
academics.

One of the things it is not is linear. There is no "Table of Contents" and researchers, authors and editors
choose their own path through the resource. Some people generate full articles; others only dive in
occasionally to fix a particular fact or even a grammatical or spelling error. There are even full-fledged
“edit wars” where a particular version of an especially hot topic changes back and forth between
competing points of view until either one side gets tired and gives up or, more likely, the sides reach a
version acceptable to all. In the end, it is openness and interactivity that give Wikipedia its strength.

The US national security community acknowledged the value of such a tool, at least with respect to its
descriptive products, when it launched Intellipedia. Begun in April, 2006, Intellipedia, according to
information from June, 2010, now has 250,000 registered users and is accessed over 2 million times per
week. This effort, which is clearly far beyond the experimental stage, plainly shows that collaboration
and interactivity – the anti-intelligence cycle -- are core to any modern description of the intelligence
process.
 7. Critiques Of The Cycle: Cycles, Cycles And More Damn Cycles (Let's
Kill The Intelligence Cycle)

While intelligence professionals often tout the intelligence cycle as something unique, to
experienced business, law enforcement and national security decisionmakers, the intelligence
cycle looks like many other linear decisionmaking processes with which decisionmakers are
already familiar.

Moreover, this familiarity has bred a certain amount of contempt as all of these disciplines are
wrestling with re-defining their own processes in light of 21st century technology and systems
thinking. In short, the intelligence cycle not only fails in its attempt to explain the intelligence
process but also comes across as an archaic sales pitch to a decisionmaker who is typically all too
familiar with the flaws of linear process models.

http://home.ubalt.edu/ntsbarsh/opre640/opre640.htm

Every military officer, policeman or business student who has attended even relatively low level
training in their profession is familiar with a model of decisionmaking that typically includes
defining the question, collecting information relevant to the question, analyzing alternatives or
courses of action, making a recommendation and then communicating or executing the
recommendation (see image to the right).

This model, of course, bears a striking resemblance to the “intelligence cycle”; a resemblance
that may fool the uninformed but is unlikely to pass unnoticed by the decisionmakers that
intelligence supports. These decisionmakers, who are never blank slates and rarely outright
fools, are also unlikely to accept such a simplistic explanation of the process unless accepting
such an explanation serves their own purposes or they simply don't care.

This, in turn, results in two negative consequences for intelligence. First, decisionmakers will, at
best, see intelligence as “nothing special”. The process used appears, from their perspective, to
be just a glorified decisionmaking process.

At worst, however, decisionmakers will see the “intelligence cycle” as mere advertising puffery, a
fancy way of talking about something which could, in their eyes, be defined much more simply
using a linear process model (albeit an out-of-date one) with which they are already
familiar. Many private sector intelligence organizations have problems convincing the
decisionmakers they support of the importance of intelligence. Over emphasis on the value of
the intelligence cycle, particularly when faced by an educated decisionmaker, might well be part
of the problem.

More insidiously, however, such a perception clouds the true role of intelligence in the
decisionmaking process. Decisionmakers, trained in and used to working with the
decisionmaking process, will look for intelligence professionals to provide the same kinds of
outputs – recommendations – as their process does.

Intelligence, however, is focused externally, on issues relevant to the success or failure of the
organization but fundamentally outside that organization's control. Intelligence does best when
it focuses on estimating the capabilities and limitations of those external forces and poorly when
it attempts to make recommendations to operators as the intelligence professional is generally
less well informed than others in the organization about the capabilities and limitations of the
parent entity.

In short, because the intelligence cycle creates the impression in the minds of many
decisionmakers (particularly those unfamiliar with intelligence but well -educated in their own
operational arts), that intelligence is “just like what I do”, only with a different name, the value
of intelligence is more difficult to explain to decisionmakers than it needs to be.

Furthermore, once the decisionmakers think they understand the nature of intelligence, the way
that nature has been communicated to them predisposes them to ask questions of intelligence
that the intelligence professional is poorly positioned to answer.
 8. Tweaking The Intelligence Cycle (Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle)

A number of scholars and practitioners have attempted, over the years, to rectify the
problems with the intelligence cycle. While, from a theoretical standpoint, virtually all
of these attempts have resulted in a more nuanced understanding of the intelligence
process, none has caught on among intelligence professionals and none has been able to
de-throne the intelligence cycle as the dominant image of how intelligence works.

These new schools of thought fall into two general patterns: Those that are tweaking the
intelligence cycle in order to bring it closer to reality and those that seek to overhaul the
entire image of how intelligence works (which I will discuss tomorrow).

Several authors have sought to modify the intelligence cycle in order to create a more
realistic image of how intelligence “really” works. While some restructuring of the
intelligence cycle is done within virtually every intelligence schoolhouse, the four
authors most commonly discussed include Lisa Krizan, Gregory Treverton, Mark
Lowenthal and Rob Johnston. These authors seek to build upon the existing model in
order to make it more realistic.

From: Intelligence Essentials For Everyone

Krizan, in her 1999 monograph, Intelligence Essentials For Everyone provides a slightly
restructured view of the Intelligence Cycle (see image to the right) and, while quoting Douglas
Dearth, states “These labels, and the illustration ..., should not be interpreted to mean that
intelligence is a uni-dimensional and unidirectional process. „In fact, the [process] is a
multidimensional, multi-directional, and - most importantly - interactive and iteractive.‟”

From: Reshaping National Intelligence

Treverton, in Reshaping National Intelligence In An Age Of Information, outlines a slightly

more ambitious version of the cycle. In this adaptation, Treverton seeks to more completely
include the decisionmaker in the process. You can see a version of Treverton's cycle to the right.

Lowenthal in his classic, Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy, acknowledges the flaws of the
traditional intelligence cycle which he calls “overly simple”. His version, reproduced below,
demonstrates “that at any stage in the process it is possible – and sometimes necessary – to go
back to an earlier step. Initial collection may prove unsatisfactory and may lead policymakers to
change the requirements; processing and exploitation or analysis may reveal gaps, resulting in
new collection requirements; consumers may change their needs and ask for more
intelligence. And, on occasion, intelligence officers may receive feedback.” Lowenthal's revised
model, more than any other, seems to me to capture that the intelligence process takes place in a
time constrained environment.
 From Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy

Perhaps the most dramatic re-visioning of the intelligence cycle, however, comes from
anthropologist Rob Johnston in his book, Analytic Culture In The US Intelligence
Community. Johnston spent a year studying the analytic culture of the CIA in the time frame
immediately following the events of September 11, 2001.

His unique viewpoint resulted in an equally unique rendition of the traditional intelligence
cycle, this time from a systems perspective. This complicated vision (reproduced below)
includes “stocks” or accumulations of information; “flows” or certain types of activity;
“converters” that change inputs to outputs and “connectors”, which tie all of the other parts
together.

While, according to Johnston, “the premise that underlies systems analysis as a basis for
understanding phenomena is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”, the subsequent
model does not seek to replace the intelligence cycle but only to describe it more
accurately: “The elements of the Intelligence Cycle are identified in terms of their relationship
with each other, the flow of the process and the phenomena that influence the elements and the
flow.”

From: Analytic Culture In The US Intelligence Community

While each of these models recognizes and attempts to rectify one or more of the flaws inherent
in the traditional intelligence cycle and each of the modified versions is a decided improvement
on the original cycle, none of these models seeks to discard the fundamental vision of the
intelligence process described by the cycle.
 9. Departures From The Intelligence Cycle (Let's Kill The Intelligence Cycle)

Other authors have proposed, however, radically different versions of the intelligence process,
overthrowing old notions in an attempt to more accurately describe how intelligence is done in
the real world.

The first of these attempts, by longtime academic and former CIA officer, Arthur Hulnick, was
the Intelligence Matrix. Hulnick believed that intelligence was better described in terms of a
matrix (see image below). For Hulnick there were three main activities, parts of which, in many
cases, occurred at the same time. These three “pillars” were collection, production, and support
and services. Hulnick's model, while capturing more of the functions of intelligence, does not
seem to provide much guidance on how to actually do intelligence.

Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card of the Palo Alto Research Center also attempted to re-define the
intelligence process (see image below). This re-definition has gained some traction outside of
the intelligence community. While much more complex than the cycle and typically perceived as
a departure from it, Pirolli and Card's sensemaking loop is still both very sequential and very
circular -- with all the limits that implies.
Probably the most recent and most successful move away from the intelligence cycle, however,
has been Robert Clark‟s target-centric approach to intelligence analysis (see image
below). What makes Clark unique in many respects is that he is not merely attempting to
describe the current intelligence process; he is attempting to examine how intelligence should be
done.
Clark expressly rejects the intelligence cycle and advocates a more inclusive approach, one that
includes all of the “stakeholders”, i.e. the individuals and organizations potentially affected by
the intelligence produced. Clark claims that, to include these stakeholders, “the cycle must be
redefined, not for the convenience of implementation in a traditional hierarchy but so that the
process can take full advantage of evolving information technology and handle complex
problems.”

Clark calls this a “target-centric approach” because “the goal is to construct a shared picture of
the target, from which all participants can extract the elements they need to do their jobs and to
which all can contribute from their resources or knowledge.” This approach does a very good
job of describing a healthy relationship between the intelligence professional and the
decisionmaker he or she supports.

This description of the way intelligence should work seems to fit well with at least some of the
initiatives pursued by the US national security intelligence community. The example of
Intellipedia, discussed in a earlier post, seems particularly close to Clark‟s vision of the way
intelligence should work.

What remains less clear is which came first. Is Intellipedia a natural extension of Clark‟s
thinking or has Clark merely identified the value of a more inclusive, interactive, Intellipedia-
like world? Furthermore, beyond describing an ideal relationship between intelligence and
decisionmakers, how does the intelligence product actually come about? On this point, as with
Hulnick, the model provides little guidance.