Can China Change The International02020

The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, 163–186
doi: 10.1093/cjip/poaa002
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Can China Change the International
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System? The Role of Moral Leadership
Deborah Welch Larson*,1
Deborah Welch Larson is Professor of Political Science at University of California, Los Angeles.
*Corresponding author: dlarson@polisci.ucla.edu
Abstract
Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should
follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership.
Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive
for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example
and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion.
This essay evaluates the feasibility of China’s attainment of humane authority,
which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward
rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But
double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent
psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them
with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior
existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China’s growth will lead to a
bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent.
Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a
‘new Cold War’, which would hamper China’s efforts to widen its circle of followers.
To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a
risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security di-
lemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of
labour, by accepting the other’s pre-eminence in different areas through social
cooperation.
Introduction
Recently, Western scholars and policy analysts have tried to predict how China’s
rise will affect the liberal world order. According to China hawks, China wants
to overthrow US hegemony and establish its domination over the world.1 These
hardliners are opposed by other scholars, who argue that China benefits from the
1 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America
as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015).
C The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of International Relations,
V
Tsinghua University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
164 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, Vol. 13, No. 2
existing rule-governed international order, and would prefer to integrate more

deeply.2 A more moderate position is that China would like to alter some aspects
of the current liberal order in line with its interests, but does not intend to over-
throw the system.3 To the contrary, some predict that China will fundamentally
alter the character of the international order if it becomes the world’s leading
superpower.4

In contrast to Western writings, Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of
Great Powers adopts the perspective of the rising power. If the rising state has ef-
fective reform-minded leadership, and the dominant state does not, he argues, it
will eventually surpass the former leading state in comprehensive capabilities.5
But Yan cautions that even if China surpasses the USA in overall power, it will
not be able to exercise international leadership unless it can attract followers,
which requires articulating and defending an ideology that will appeal to other
cultures. China has an opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the decline of
support for liberalism and loss of US prestige and influence due to the Trump
administration’s withdrawal from international agreements and treaties. To do
so, China should consistently follow moral values in both its domestic politics
and international relations, a requirement for moral leadership. Without a
consistent policy and a replacement ideology, China’s rise could lead to a bipolar
system with no dominant ideology.6
My goals in this essay are to evaluate Yan’s theory of humane authority given
current research on great power status and then to discuss real world implica-
tions. As Yan proposes, humane authority requires convincing followers that the
leading state is benevolent and just. For China to exercise humane authority, it
will have to deal with potential obstacles to attracting followers such as differen-
ces in domestic political systems, mistrust, and intuitive psychological biases.
As an intervening step between the current situation and China’s potential exer-
cise of humane leadership, I propose a division of labour, whereby the USA and
China would each recognize the other’s superiority in different areas.
In the first section, I will review the concept of ‘moral realism’, the basis for
Yan’s recommendations for Chinese foreign policy. In the second section, I dis-
cuss the role of domestic leadership and the relative effectiveness of alternative
2 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 160.
3 Michael Swaine, ‘Chinese Views on Global Governance Since 2008-2009: Not Much New’,
China Leadership Monitor, No. 49 (2016), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/clm49ms.
pdf.
4 Charles A. Kupchan, ‘The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to
Pax Americana’, Security Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2014), pp. 219–57; Martin Jacques, When
China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order
(New York: Penguin, 2009).
5 Yan Xuetong, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2019), pp. 2, 25–6.
6 Ibid., pp. 50–1, 137–9.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, Vol. 13, No. 2 165
strategies for achieving global power status, which is related to authority. In

the third section, I make the case that China should not abandon its no-alliance
policy but seek to lay the basis for its humane authority through other means.
The fourth and fifth sections concern whether China will be able to exercise hu-
mane authority if bipolarity leads to a new Cold War or the power transition is
accompanied by military conflict. Even if China continues to seek influence

through economic means, there is a risk that technological competition will be-
come the new Cold War. While a US–China war is unlikely, security dilemma dy-
namics caused by military competition could lead to perceptions that China is
untrustworthy, undermining its ability to appeal to supporters. US ideological
dominance is entrenched in economic and political institutions that were set
up after World War II and cannot be easily dislodged without conflict. In the con-
clusions, I recommend a division of labour or social cooperation to allow
both China and the USA to enjoy privileged status while avoiding destructive,
zero-sum competition. The conclusions also suggest additional research into con-
ditions conducive for the exercise of humane authority by one or more leading
states in a diverse international system. Before evaluating prospects for China’s
leadership of the international system, it is important to explicate Yan’s concep-
tion of ‘moral realism’, which underlies his case that China can more effectively
shape the international order by setting a good example than by use of power and
coercion.
Moral Realism
Yan writes from the perspective of ‘moral realism’.7 The term ‘moral realism’
may seem to be an oxymoron, but it is reminiscent of the ideas of classical real-
ism. Offensive realist John Mearsheimer questions whether realism is compatible
with concern for moral values. The values and morals of societies differ, he
argues, and there is no rational means of determining which is objectively best.
Societies do not share the same values and norms, and insistence on one’s own
values as the sole truth can lead to animosity between states and even war.8
Classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau asserts that realists must not confuse their
state’s values with universal moral values.9 Contrary to Mearsheimer, there is no
reason why realists cannot possess moral values while also showing tolerance to-
ward those with different ethics.
7 On moral realism, see Jannika Brostrom, ‘Morality and the National Interest: Towards a
“Moral Realist” Research Agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4
(2016), pp. 1624–39. For an early characterization of Yan as a moral realist, see Zhang Feng,
‘The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations’,
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012), pp. 73–102.
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), pp. 29–33, 42.
9 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, 6th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 13.
Another argument against the notion of moral realism is that the highest duty
of the ruler is to serve the state, not to embark on some moral crusade. In this re-
gard, classical realism has been deeply influenced by the doctrine of raison d’état,
a philosophy introduced in the seventeenth century, according to which morality
depended on what would advance the interests of the state. Raison’ d’état implied
that the state had interests apart from the personal or political interests of its rul-

ers; that objectives should not exceed capabilities; and that the task of a statesman
was to ascertain what would enhance the state’s interests, even if this would vio-
late ethical standards.10 In the 19th century, the term raison d’état was replaced
with Realpolitik, the German version, but the substance was the same. A shrewd
ruler could violate treaties, abandon allies, or engage in aggression when doing so
increased the state’s power.11 On the other hand, Yan suggests that morality and
the national interest are not necessarily incompatible. Pursuing moral values can
enhance a state’s influence and the legitimacy of its rules, which is useful in per-
suading others to accept a state’s authority.12
Moral realism does offer the qualification that what is moral for a state
depends on the situation and prevailing standards of a historical era.13
Morgenthau cautioned that ‘universal moral principles cannot be applied to the
actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but . . . must be filtered
through the concrete circumstances of time and place’.14
Moral realists are consequentialists; they argue that leaders must consider
moral values not in the abstract, but by weighing the potential outcome of their
pursuit for the national interest.15 Consistent with the concern for outcomes, clas-
sical realists stress that leaders must temper their pursuit of state interests with
prudence. Classical realists also maintain that moral conduct should take into
consideration the practice of states and theory.16
Yan asserts that strategic credibility is the most important moral quality for
international leadership. Strategic credibility includes keeping promises and car-
rying out commitments to allies. Maintaining a reputation for trustworthiness
and fidelity to promises helps attract allies, which increases a state’s military
capability.17 President Donald J. Trump views allies as an economic burden, but
does not understand how allied support enhances US military power projection
10 Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 9.
11 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 58, 63–7, 103.
12 Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 163–4.
13 Brostrom, ‘Morality and the National Interest’, p. 1628.
14 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, p. 12.
15 Brostrom, ‘Morality and the National Interest’, p. 1630.
16 Robert G. Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International
Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1984), p. 303.
17 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 22, 40–1.
and bargaining power in international negotiations.18 Most important, maintain-

ing credibility allows other states to trust the would-be great power, which con-
tributes to its authority, that is, the willingness of subordinate states to carry out
its wishes voluntarily.19 Yan points out that the Chinese conception of authority
or quanwei means ‘prestige or popular trust’, which is distinct from power based
on the implied threat to use force.20

Realists in general would qualify Yan’s prioritization of strategic credibility by
adding the condition that a policy be in the national interest. While realist theory
is concerned with maintaining a reputation for credibility, at times this principle
conflicts with the other realist rule that a state should only uphold commitments
that are in its interests, which can change over time. For example, should a
hegemon support an ally in an aggressive war? Pursuit of strategic credibility
might be carried to extremes, as happened to the USA, which intervened in the
Vietnam War to preserve its credibility in Europe but ended up weakening its
power and reputation.21 But this is an illustration of how application of moral
principles by states should be tempered by consideration of the consequences.
To be sure, credibility is a useful trait for a would-be great power, which offers
security and protection to other states in return for their deference. The Trump
administration was widely condemned as immoral for abandoning its allies in
fighting the Islamic State, the Kurds in Syria.22 The Trump administration will be
a test of the extent to which a great power can behave erratically and unpredict-
ably without losing influence over allied and friendly states. Trump’s behaviour
in coercing a small vulnerable state such as Ukraine for compromising material as
a condition for security assistance may cause allies to wonder if future US leaders
may adopt a similar amoral, transactional approach.23
Credibility is not enough for a great power’s leadership to be accepted as au-
thoritative. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan contends that the highest
form of international leadership is humane authority, which is regarded by others
as both credible and trustworthy. Humane authority achieves influence over
others through beneficial interactions—mutually rewarding exchanges—rather
than threats or coercion and by setting a good example in observing norms.
Benevolent leadership naturally evokes trust and voluntary deference on the part
of subordinates. The US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who led the allies
18 Martin Wolf, ‘How the US Should Deal with China’, Financial Times, 13 November, 2019,
https://www.ft.com/content/3a719258-0483-11ea-9afa-d9e2401fa7ca.
19 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 22–3.
20 Ibid., pp. 16–7.
21 Franklin B. Weinstein, ‘The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1969), pp. 39–56.
22 David M. Halbfinger, ‘As Trump Abandons Kurdish Allies, Israelis Ask if They Can Rely on
U.S.’, The New York Times, 9 October, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/mid
dleeast/israel-us-syria-kurds.html.
23 ‘Allies Confront a Less Reliable America’, Financial Times, 7 October, 2019, https://www.ft.
com/content/50b8a344-e6b0-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc.
to victory over Nazi Germany and Japan and helped to create the United Nations,
illustrates humane leadership.24
Yan argues that humane authority is superior to hegemony in its ability to at-
tract supporters in the international system. A ‘hegemon’, which has a negative
connotation in traditional Chinese thought, faithfully carries out its promises to
its allies but behaves ruthlessly towards adversary states. In other words, a

hegemon applies a double standard to dealings with friendly states and rivals.25
In contrast, a humane authority would carry out its promises to adversaries as
well as friendly states. Social psychology, however, suggests that double-standard
norm enforcement may not be a deliberate strategy—it is an intuitive
psychological bias. States perceive their own behaviour as defensive, and similar
behaviour by the opponent as aggressive. It may be difficult for even a humane
authority to refrain from interpreting the actions by allies and adversaries
differently.26 One means to overcome such double standards is to try to
empathize with the other, which entails listening and trying to see the situation
from the other’s perspective.27 Nevertheless, having a reputation for observing
treaty commitments is a valuable trait for a great power.
Domestic Leadership and Great Power Status

As a realist, Yan recognizes that humane leadership requires that a state possess
superior material capabilities as well as exemplary moral values. A state’s ability
to attain such capabilities depends in part on the quality of its domestic leader-
ship—a area in which he believes that China is superior to the USA.
Yan presents a typology of rising state leadership based on its orientation to
status. An inactive leadership seeks to avoid domestic controversies by adopting a
quiescent foreign policy. A conservative leadership wants to maintain the state’s
international status by maintaining a strong economy. A proactive leadership
aims at improving the state’s status through political means, by carrying out
domestic reforms that will increase its capabilities. Finally, an aggressive leader-
ship seeks to advance the state’s standing by fighting wars and establishing an
empire.28
Yan contributes to the power transition literature by identifying enhanced sta-
tus as well as power as goals of the rising state. Status differs from power in that
it is an intersubjective concept, depending on ‘collective beliefs of states about a
given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture,
24 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 43–4, 48–9.
25 Ibid., pp. 43–4.
26 Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 23–4.
27 Dennis T. Regan and Judith Totten, ‘Empathy and Attribution: Turning Observers into
Actors’, Vol. 32, No. 5 (1975), pp. 850–6.
demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)’.29

Status encourages voluntary deference out of esteem and respect, whereas power
induces compliance out of instrumental considerations, fear or the desire for re-
ward.30 Status is related to authority, in that both lead to voluntary compliance.
In Yan’s typology, the current Chinese leadership would be classified as pro-
active, because it has become more assertive in claiming China’s improved inter-

national status position and ambitious in outlining goals for the future. When Xi
Jinping assumed the positions of general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and military commander-in-chief in November, 2012, he declared
that the ‘greatest Chinese dream’ was the ‘great revival of the Chinese nation’.31
In October, 2017, President Xi articulated more ambitious status goals for China
at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. In the political
work report, he declared that China had crossed the threshold into a ‘new era’, in
which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would move ‘closer to center stage’.
By the middle of the 21st century, China would become a ‘global leader in terms
of composite national strength and international influence’.32
Xi’s address was further evidence that China has moved away from following
Deng Xiaoping’s advice about ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguang yanghui) in fa-
vour of ‘striving for achievements’ (dili fenjin).33 Not only would China contrib-
ute to global governance, but it could assume a leadership role in reforming the
world order. A year later, at a Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Xi
called for China to ‘take an active part in leading the reform of the global govern-
ance system’.34
A conservative leadership seeks to enhance its influence over other states
through economic means, such as trade and aid, creating a sense of dependence
on the state.35 But an aspiring power cannot rely solely on wealth and prosperity
to achieve superpower status. Chinese analysts emphasize ‘comprehensive
29 Deborah Welch Larson, T V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Status and World Order’, in T.
V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 7.
30 Susan T. Fiske, ‘Interpersonal Stratification: Status, Power and Subordination’, in Susan T.
Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2,
5th edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p. 941.
31 ‘Xi Jinping’s Vision: Chasing the Chinese Dream’, Economist, 4 May, 2013, p. 24, https://
www.economist.com/comment/1997029; Yan, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for
Achievement’, pp. 153–84.
32 ‘Full text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress’, China Daily, 4 November,
2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/qingdao/2017-11/04/content_34771557.htm.
33 Wang Peng, ‘“Kung Fu Panda” Diplomacy for a New Era’, China Daily, 24 October, 2017,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201710/24/WS5a0cf1a4a31061a73840722d.html.
34 ‘Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’,
24 June, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/24/c_137276269.htm.
national power’—having superiority in a variety of domains—political, military,

economy, and culture.36 While relying on economic means to achieve great power
status, the Chinese leadership is not neglecting the military dimension. At the
19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping called for building a ‘world-class military’ by
2050, one that could ‘fight and win’.37
An aggressive leadership is likely to initiate military conflicts against weaker

states to show off its capabilities.38 Using military force against a weaker state
alters other states’ beliefs about the state’s capabilities—it is public, dramatic,
and salient. In a statistical study, Jonathan Renshon found that states that were
dissatisfied with their status were more likely to use force against a weaker state
and that doing so improved their relative ranking.39 Throughout history, states
have achieved great power status through military power, by defeating another
major power in war.40
A great power can maintain its own security without assistance and project
military power outside its borders. But having superior military power alone has
not been sufficient to achieve recognition by other states as a great power. To be
admitted to the great power club, a state must adopt at least some international
norms and standards. The Soviet Union had conventional military superiority and
intervened around the world, but was not accepted as an equal great power by
the West because of its communist ideology.41
Great powers also have more expansive interests than territorial security,
extending to the continent or globe, including having a sense of responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security for the system as a whole.42
Initially, beginning in the mid-1990s, China tried to act as a ‘responsible power’,
in line with Western notions, but after 2012, the PRC increasingly followed its
36 Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China and its Power Status’, Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5–33; Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, p. 13.
37 Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Views of Foreign Policy in the 19th Party Congress’, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 55 (2018); Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to
Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2019’, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_
POWER_REPORT.pdf.
38 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, p. 36.
39 Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 58–9, 65–6, 162–71.
40 Martin Wight, Power Transition, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York:
Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp. 46–7.
41 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), p. 246.
42 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 200–2; Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power
System: 1495-1975 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), pp. 16–8.
own moral code, calibrating its policy based on a country’s friendliness to China
and giving priority to relations with neighbouring countries.43
Granted, admission to the great power club does not require absolute con-
formity to prevailing international norms, and indeed most major powers would
prefer to maintain some distinctive national characteristics. An aspiring great
power can improve its status by pointing to new areas in which it is superior to

the dominant state or by establishing new norms and institutions.44 Playing an ac-
tive role in creating and leading international institutions is an innovative means
of enhancing a state’s status, one that was not considered in classical realist theo-
ries. In the 1950s, India, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, along with Egyptian President
Gamal Nasser and Yugoslav leader Josip Tito gained status as founders of the
Non-aligned Movement of states.45 In the current era, clubs such as the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Group of 20 (G20) and Group of
7 (G7) provide prestige to members.46 China has gained enhanced status through
its creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its leadership
role in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.47
Proactive leadership seeks to enhance the state’s status by widening the circle
of international supporters. One means of acquiring followers is to attract allies
by offering them protection against external threats. Indeed, a great power will
naturally offer security support and assistance to friendly states, to bring them
into its sphere.48 This raises the question of whether a rising China should active-
ly pursue international allies, at the risk of conflict with the USA.
Should China Abandon the No-Alliance Policy?

In Yan’s view, for China to form its own alliance system would be conducive to
its exercise of humane authority. Yan observes that since the end of the Cold
43 Deng Yong, ‘China: The Post-Responsible Power’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4
(2015), pp. 117–32; Yan, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, pp. 153–
84.
44 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict’, in William G.
Austin and Stephen Worchel, eds., The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations
(Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1979), p. 43; Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, pp. 11–2.
45 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power
Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 79–80, 135–44; Odd Arne Westad,
The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 101–3, 106–7.
46 Deborah Welch Larson, ‘New Perspectives on Rising Powers and Global Governance:
Status and Clubs’, International Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2018), pp. 247–54.
47 Yang Hai, ‘The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into
Global Economic Governance’, Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2016), pp.
754–78.
War, the question of whether to enter into alliances has had moral connotations.
An alliance in which a major power provides security to weaker powers is a pub-
lic good. There are also instrumental considerations in favour of acquiring allies.
Having allies increases the influence and capabilities of a rising power, potentially
altering the global distribution of capabilities, which would allow a newly domin-
ant power to reshape international norms.49 Historically, great powers have

formed alliances with a number of other major powers. In this regard, China is an
anomaly, because it has just one formal ally—North Korea.50 But because the US
alliance system is already in place, and allies tend to have similar domestic sys-
tems, the option of acquiring authority by providing security assistance is not
readily available to China.
Since 1982, when China formally adopted an ‘independent foreign policy’ at
the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,51 Beijing has
eschewed formal alliances with other states, viewing them as exemplifying an ar-
chaic, zero-sum ‘Cold War’ mentality despite global interdependence and win-
win diplomacy. The Chinese government’s official position is that alliances are
entangling and likely to increase regional conflicts and tensions.52 Xi Jinping
has reaffirmed China’s long-standing rejection of alliances. In an address to the
important CCP Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in
November, 2014, Xi called on China to ‘make more friends while abiding by
the principle of non-alignment and build a global network of partnerships’.53
More recently, in a speech given at the Bo’ao Forum in Hainan on 10 April,
2018, Xi said that China should ‘follow a new approach to state-to-state
relations featuring dialogue rather than confrontation, and partnership instead
of alliance’.54
Strategic partnerships are of varying degrees of importance, but they are not
directed against any third country and are oriented towards cooperation rather
than confrontation. In March 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared
that China would ‘enrich, upgrade, and expand existing partnerships’, especially
neighbouring countries and the developing world, and ‘build a closer network of
49 Ibid., pp. 41, 65.

50 Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng, ‘Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy’, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2017), p. 156.
51 Hu Yao Bang, ‘Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization’, Beijing
Review, 13 September, 1982, pp. 29–30.
52 Liu and Liu, ‘Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy’, p. 153; Adam P. Liff, ‘China
and the US Alliance System’, The China Quarterly, No. 233 (2018), pp. 142–3.
53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, ‘The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign
Affairs was Held in Beijing’, 29 November, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_
662805/t1215680.shtml.
54 An Baijie, ‘Openness for Greater Prosperity, Innovation for a Better Future’, China Daily,
10 April, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201804/10/WS5acc515ca3105cdcf6517425_
2.html.
global partnerships’.55 By June, 2019, China had officially established strategic

partnerships with over 110 countries and regional organizations.56
Through strategic partnerships, China creates a favourable environment for its
rise by encouraging multipolarity and anti-hegemonism.57 Strategic partnerships
are intended to convey the message that relations between states should not be
influenced by differences in values, institutions, form of government, or social

system. Each state should be allowed to determine its own developmental path
and social–political system, free from outside interference.58
Official Chinese government sources have been increasingly critical of the US
alliance system in East Asia, characterizing it as destabilizing, exclusive, ana-
chronistic, and zero-sum.59 Some Chinese analysts have concluded that China’s
rise to global power status is blocked by the US alliance system. For example,
neighbouring countries may be wary of moving too close to China for fear of
antagonizing the USA and losing American protection.60
A major obstacle to China’s adoption of an alignment strategy is that most
major states in East Asia are already allied with the USA. It is unlikely that China
would be able to replicate the US hub-and-spoke alliance system, which was the
product of a special set of circumstances during the early Cold War, including the
defeat of Japan and strong anti-Communism.61 On the other hand, if the Trump
administration further withdraws from responsibility for security in East Asia and
US commitments are viewed as unreliable, this may create opportunities for
China to replace the USA. China is adopting a more proactive strategy of differen-
tiating its policies towards US allies, depending on their stance towards Chinese
objectives, to help the regional system gradually move away from US dominance
towards a Chinese-style partnership network.62 To accomplish this goal,
55 Wang Yi, ‘Work Together to Build Partnerships and Pursue Peace and Development’,
20 March 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/
t1448155.shtm.
56 Cao Desheng, ‘Xi Calls for Expansion of Global Partnerships’, China Daily, 9 September,
2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/09/WS5d754883a310cf3e3556a5bd.html; Xi
Jinping, The Governance of China, Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai Press, 2018), pp. 588–601;
Liza Tobin, ‘Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for
Washington and its Allies’, Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2018), p. 158.
57 Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, ‘China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a
Changing World’, ESP Working Paper, No. 8, June 2014, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/.
58 John W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic
of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 548–50.
59 Liff, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, pp. 141–3.
60 Liu and Liu, ‘Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy’, pp. 157–8.
61 Liff, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, p. 158.
62 Beverley Loke, ‘China’s Rise and U.S. Hegemony: Navigating Great-Power Management in
East Asia’, Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2019), p. 51; Zhou Fangyin, ‘The U.S. Alliance System
in Asia: A Chinese Perspective’, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2016), pp. 215–6.
however, China will need to reassure states in the region that it is not a threat and
offer credible security guarantees.63
Among major powers, Russia appears to be the most likely candidate for an alli-
ance with China. Under Xi Jinping, China has carried out more ‘first visits’ to
Russia than to any other country, which symbolizes the importance that China
places on the relationship. Xi’s first foreign visit after being elected to succeed Hu

Jintao in 2010 was to Russia. In 2012, the newly installed Chinese Prime Minister
Li Keqiang also made his first visit to Russia. In 2013, Xi visited Russia on his first
foreign trip as president of China and general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party. Xi Jinping’s June, 2019 visit to Russia was his first foreign visit.64
China and Russia have carried out numerous joint military exercises, begin-
ning with land-based exercises in 2005, but extending to joint naval exercises in
2012. China and Russia have conducted joint naval drills in the Mediterranean in
2015, the South China Sea in 2016, in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Japan in 2017,
and in the Yellow Sea in 2019.65 At their meeting in Russia in 2019, Xi and Putin
characterized their relationship as a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of co-
ordination for a new era’.66
Both states are dissatisfied with their status in the international system, and
would like to restore their position as global great powers. Both place a high
value on sovereignty and preventing international interference in other states’ in-
ternal affairs.67 At the same time, both China and Russia assert their right to have
a droit de’ regard in neighbouring areas, to have their superior interests accepted
and recognized by others within their regions.68 On the other hand, China and
Russia also have policy differences over Central Asia, India, Ukraine, and Crimea
and differing priorities.69
Neither state has expressed a desire for an alliance. In an authoritative article
in Foreign Affairs, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and chair of the for-
eign affairs committee of the National People’s Congress Fu Ying stated that the
Chinese–Russian partnership is ‘complex, sturdy, and deeply rooted’, but ‘China
has no interest in a formal alliance with Russia’.70 Russian Foreign Minister
63 Liff, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, p. 156.

64 Marcin Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order (London:
Routledge, 2015), pp. 18–9.
65 ‘Unlikely Partners’, Economist, 29 July, 2017, pp. 35–6; Yu Bin, ‘Beautiful Relationship in a
Brave/Grave New World’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2019), p. 117.
66 Yu, ‘Beautiful Relationship in a Brave/Grave New World’, p. 114.
67 Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘In Search of the “Other” in Asia: Russia-China Relations Revisited’,
Pacific Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2017), pp. 116–7.
68 Samuel Charap, John Drennan, and Pierre Noel, ‘Russia and China: A New Model of Great-
Power Relations’, Survival, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2017), pp. 37–8.
69 Pavel K. Baev, ‘Three Turns in the Evolution of China-Russia Presidential Pseudo-Alliance’,
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2019), pp. 4–18.
70 Fu Ying, ‘How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow Are Close but Not Allies’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 1 (2016), pp. 96–7.
Sergei Lavrov recently declared that ‘neither Russia nor China are planning to
create an alliance’.71
Allies are not always a benefit to the state. Some allies are ‘troublesome’ or dif-
ficult, with security interests at odds with those of the leading state.72 China’s
economy is growing much faster than that of Russia, which makes it more risk
averse and patient in achieving its goals than is Russia. Russia’s diplomatic style

is bolder, more unpredictable, and likely to catch other states off guard. If allied
with Russia, China might become associated with some of Moscow’s more con-
flictual or assertive actions, contrary to achieving its goal of maintaining a peace-
ful environment in which to modernize its economy and maintain trade links with
a variety of nations.73
The risk of China taking the blame for Russia’s behaviour is illustrated by the
recent tendency for the US government to lump China and Russia together as
‘great power competitors’, despite differences in the two states’ political systems,
ideologies, and foreign policies. According to the 2018 US National Defense
Strategy, China and Russia are ‘revisionist powers’, desirous of shaping a ‘world
consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other
nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions’.74
If the USA and Europe feel threatened by a supposed China–Russian axis, they
may agree to put aside differences with Russia in order to balance against China,
which has greater political and economic resources.75 Possible Cold War-type
restrictions on the West’s dealings with China would not further China’s goal of
widening the number of international supporters and enhancing its authority as a
trustworthy partner.
Will the Sino-American Rivalry Become a Cold War?

If China does continue to increase its capabilities, the world will become bipolar.
Much depends on the quality of American and Chinese leadership, their ability to
implement reforms, and the foreign policy orientation of other major states such
71 ‘Russia, China Not Planning to Create an Alliance, Lavrov Says’, 31 October, 2019, https://
tass.com/politics/1086469.
72 Evan S. Resnick, ‘Strange Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience’,
International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2010), pp. 144–84; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Defending
Frenemies: Alliances, Politics, and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2019).
73 Andrej Krickovic, ‘The Symbiotic China-Russia Partnership: Cautious Riser and Desperate
Challenger’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2017), pp. 299–329.
74 US Department of Defense, ‘Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America’, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-
Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
75 For such a recommendation, see The New York Times editorial board, ‘What’s America’s
Winning Hand if Russia Plays the China Card?’, The New York Times, 17 July, 2019, https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/21/opinion/russia-china-trump.html.
as Russia, Turkey, or India. Yan predicts that the world will eventually become
bipolar, as the US relative power advantage declines, while China narrows the
gap. But Yan argues that this will not necessarily lead to a Cold War between
the USA and China, similar to that between the USA and the Soviet Union.76
While history is unlikely to repeat exactly, there is a risk of a new type of Cold
War between the USA and China, one that is based on economic and technologic-

al competition. A new Cold War would be an obstacle to China’s efforts to win
over other states through benign policies because it could reduce interactions
between US allies and China as well as exacerbate mutual mistrust.
Certainly, tensions between the USA and China today do not rise to the level
of the superpower rivalry. The Cold War was more than a normal strategic com-
petition—it was perceived as an existential rivalry in which there could be no
more than temporary, limited cooperation between the superpowers. It is ques-
tionable whether the bipolar structure made the US–Soviet Cold War inevitable.
Given a bipolar distribution, the USA and the Soviet Union could have defined
their relationship in a variety of ways, apart from the Cold War. For example, the
two states could have entered into a spheres of influence agreement dividing
Europe between them. The superpowers could have pursued a détente-style
limited adversary relationship much earlier, cooperating on some issues while
competing on others. Or there could have been a hot war. To explain why there
was a Cold War, we have to move to lower levels of analysis and consider other
variables.77
The conditions that led to Cold War between the USA and Soviet Union, Yan
asserts, included nuclear weapons, ideological competition, and the absence of
interactions between the superpowers. While nuclear weapons help to prevent
military conflict between the USA and China, the other conditions for a Cold
War are absent. The differences between China and the USA do not revolve
around ideological issues but competition for material benefits and status.
Globalization reduces the vulnerability of either China or the USA to loss of raw
materials or markets so that neither state has incentives to conquer territory. The
internet and computers encourage competition over technological innovation,
while reducing the significance of control over territory and natural resources.78
Yan’s analysis is largely correct. In the contemporary era, both China and the
USA have more than enough nuclear weapons to devastate the other. The exist-
ence of mutual assured destruction should inhibit either side from taking actions
that could escalate to a war between them.79

77 Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 328–31.
78 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 87–8, 90–3.
79 Fiona S. Cunningham and Taylor M. Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear
Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability’, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2015), pp.
7–50.
Neither state is promoting the spread of its ideology or domestic system to

other states. Ideological competition is a zero-sum rivalry, in which neither side
can tolerate the existence of the other’s political system. Soviet Marxism–
Leninism held that capitalist states were fundamentally illegitimate and the
imperialists were bent on destruction of socialist systems.80 China’s aim of na-
tional rejuvenation does not require the destruction of the USA or its political sys-

tem.81 During the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union each tried to prove
that its ideology could provide the most material benefits to average citizens as
well as securing fundamental values such as justice and equality.82 With ideology
removed from the equation, competition between the USA and China is less
intense and much more narrow in scope.
The USA and China also interact with each other much more frequently and
over a wider range of issues than the USA and the Soviet Union did, reducing mis-
trust and providing positive incentives for good relations. During the Cold War,
the US containment policy aimed to isolate the Soviet Union both militarily and
politically. The USA tried to prevent its allies from trading with the Soviet Union
and imposed restrictions on products that might enhance the military power of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).83 Far from an economic embargo
like the Cold War, the economies of the USA and China are connected not only
through trade but investment and multinational production networks, providing
both states with incentives to resolve disputes that would endanger their prosper-
ity as well as world economic growth.84 Today, the US and Chinese economies
are so intertwined that attempts to decouple them would wreak great damage not
only on their economies but those of the rest of the world. American manufac-
tured products rely on global supply chains, which include those in China, and
these connections cannot be readily undone. Despite Trump’s trade war, the USA
is still the leading trading partner of China.85
80 Nigel Gould-Davies, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold
War’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), pp. 90–110.
81 Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a
New Cold War?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5 (2019), p. 91.
82 Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, pp. 106–10.
83 Michael Mastanduno, ‘Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the
Soviet Union’, World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1985), pp. 503–31; Michael Mastanduno,
Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992).
84 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2015), p. 42; Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics:
China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press,
2018), pp. 110–1; George Magnus, ‘China and the US Are Too Intertwined to Keep Up the
Trade War’, Financial Times, 7 June, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/6d0534f2-8870-11e9-
b861-54ee436f9768.
85 US Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peo
ples-republic-china.
Because of globalization, it is unlikely that the world will return to the

mutually exclusive trading blocs of the Cold War. As part of the economic
containment policy, the USA sought the cooperation of its allies in blocking
the sale of military or strategic goods to the Soviet Union and its allies. As a re-
sult, during the acute Cold War in the 1950s, political and economic divisions
between the two sides were mutually reinforcing.86 But states do not want to

have to choose between trading with the USA and China. Today, states that
are allies or friendly towards the USA such as Australia and Britain also have
trading and investment relations with China and may take the side of China on
some issues, such as reform of international institutions. Few countries have fol-
lowed the US exhortation to ban Huawei from developing 5G communications
networks.87
Nevertheless, a return to heightened tensions is still possible, even if neither
state tries to promulgate its ideology or political system. The existence of differen-
ces in domestic systems and values can lead to mutual mistrust.88 For example,
after the 19th Party Congress, which helped to strengthen the party’s authority
and the future status of Xi Jinping, US approval of China declined. Some US ana-
lysts were disillusioned by China’s failure to move towards liberal Western-style
democracy and called for a re-evaluation of the previous US policy of engagement
of China.89
If there is a ‘new Cold War’ between the US and China, it will differ in signifi-
cant respects from that between the USA and the Soviet Union. For one thing, the
main arena of competition is likely to be status, rather than military power.
Status is more intangible and symbolic than material capabilities, based on
collective beliefs, and does not necessarily require the other’s military defeat.90
Historically, aspiring powers have used varying strategies for enhancing their
relative status as the technology and norms of the international system have
evolved.91 In the late 19th century, the major powers sought to attain prestige
by acquiring overseas colonies. But after World War II, the norms of self-
86 Richard N. Cooper, ‘Economic Aspects of the Cold War, 1962-1975’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and
Odd Arne Westad, eds., Cambridge History of the Cold War: Vol. 2, Crises and Détente
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 52–4.
87 Yan Xuetong, ‘The Age of Uneasy Peace: Chinese Power in a Divided World’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 1 (2019), pp. 40–6; Edward Wong, ‘U.S. vs. China: Why This Power
Struggle Is Different’, The New York Times, 27 June, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/26/world/asia/united-states-china-conflict.html.
88 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2012).
89 Zhao Minghao, ‘Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic
Competition’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2019), p. 378; Schell
and Shirk, ‘Course Correction,’ p. 12.
90 Zhao, ‘Is a New Cold War Inevitable?’, pp. 385–6, 394.
91 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
determination eventually led to the breakup of colonial empires, such as those of

Britain and France. Having a superior economy could prove to be more important
in an age of globalization than in past historical eras, because states can gain ac-
cess to markets and raw materials through trade and investment without having
to control territory, and the existence of nuclear weapons deters major powers
from aggression.92

According to Yan, China is relying primarily on economic means for influenc-
ing others and achieving great power status. Attributes that enhance the PRC’s
prestige include China’s rapid economic growth, developmental model, and eco-
nomic assistance to other countries. China is not trying to compete for global
military dominance with the USA.93 Instead, the USA and China will compete in
the economic sphere, in technological innovation and establishing economic rules
to govern trade, investment, exchange rates, and intellectual property, rather than
in acquiring nuclear superiority or ideological alliance blocs.94 Presumably eco-
nomic competition is less likely to escalate to war.
But economic rivalry can affect the security of states, and thereby increase mu-
tual tensions and fears. Increasingly, Sino-American economic competition has
focused on dual-use technology such as artificial intelligence, robotics, drones,
cloud computing, and virtual reality, which have potential military applications.
The US government perceives such Chinese policies as ‘Made in China 2025’ and
‘military-civil fusion’ as threatening American security, aiming not just at import
substitution and self-sufficiency but at using Chinese state power to undermine
US military superiority.95 Many of the most important dual-use technologies on
which US defence relies are in the private sector, and the use of commercial mar-
kets with supply chains involving China could be a source of vulnerability for the
US Defence industrial base.96
The Trump administration has responded by enacting regulations on exports
of US technology and on Chinese investment in the USA as well as by discourag-
ing Western allies from buying Chinese high-tech products, such as Huawei
5-G.97 The ‘securitization’ of economic and technological competition increases
mutual mistrust and misperception.98 At a New Economy Forum in Beijing in
November, 2019, former National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger warned that
92 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 63–4, 100.
93 Ibid., p. 100.
94 Yan, ‘The Age of Uneasy Peace’, pp. 40–6.
95 Schell and Shirk, ‘Course Correction’, p. 11; Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The Changing Fundamentals
of US-China Relations’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2019), p. 99.
96 Medeiros, ‘The Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations’, p. 99; Demetri Sevastopulo,
‘US Targets Companies with Chinese Military Ties’, Financial Times, 11 September, 2019,
https://www.ft.com/content/5e3ce2bc-d4e2-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.
97 Kathrin Hille and Richard Waters, ‘Washington Unnerved by China’s “Military-Civil Fusion”’,
Financial Times, 7 November, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/8dcb534c-dbaf-11e8-9f04-
38d397e6661c; Schell and Shirk, ‘Course Correction’, p. 11.
98 Schell and Shirk, ‘Course Correction’, p. 27.
the US and China are on the ‘foothills of a Cold War’ where tensions could escal-
ate into a conflict that would be worse than World War I.99
Former US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson advised that viewing economic
competition through a national security lens could lead to a technological cold
war, with competing Chinese and US standards, which would not be in the inter-
ests of either country. Should the USA and China divide the world into two exclu-

sive technological blocs, with different standards, this would not only restrict
globalization and economic development,100 but hinder China’s efforts to be rec-
ognized as a humane authority by increasing other states’ mistrust.
Will A Power Transition Remain Peaceful?

For China to succeed the USA while exercising benevolent leadership requires
that there be no major war between the two states. Contrary to conventional the-
ories of power transition, Yan discounts the likelihood of a Sino-American war
over control of the international system on the grounds that an international lead-
er must be able to reshape international norms, a task that can be accomplished
more efficiently by setting a good example than by coercion. Still, tensions may
occur due to security dilemma dynamics so long as both states build up their
naval forces in the Asia Pacific. Overconfidence that war will not occur could
make such a war more likely, which would be disastrous for China’s efforts to es-
tablish itself as a moral leader.
According to Robert Gilpin, over time, due to uneven growth in power among
states, eventually an imbalance develops between the distribution of power and
the hierarchy of prestige. Governance of the system breaks down, because lesser
states will no longer defer to the previously dominant state. Eventually, the rising
state will fight a hegemonic war against the leading power in order to redistribute
territory and spheres of influence as well as change the international division of
labour to suit its interests.101 Gilpin does not believe that peaceful change of the
system is possible, because the dominant state is not likely to give up its privileges
and interests without a fight, especially if the rising power has a different set of
values and political system.102
A related theoretical framework is power transition theory, which holds that
upon reaching parity with the dominant state, a dissatisfied challenger will go to
99 Evelyn Cheng, ‘Fallout from US-China Trade Conflict Could be “Even Worse” than WWI,
Kissinger Says’, 22 November, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/22/us-china-econom
ic-conflict-could-be-worse-than-wwi-henry-kissinger-says.html.
100 Andrew Sorkin, ‘Paulson Warns U.S.-China Relations May Get Worse’, The New York
Times, 11 November, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/business/dealbook/henry-
paulson-china.html.
101 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1981), pp. 13–5, 31, 33, 198–9.
102 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 208–9.
war to attain its rightful position within the system.103 The most important vari-
able determining whether a rising power goes to war is its satisfaction with the
existing international order, which can be affected by institutional similarity, eco-
nomic interdependence, and the flexibility of the dominant power.104
Whereas power transition theorists stress that the rising power’s satisfaction
with the international order will determine if the power transition is peaceful or

leads to war, offensive realists assert that all states are driven to acquire more
power. Mearsheimer predicts that China will try to attain regional hegemony and
to push the USA out of East Asia, in a version of the Monroe Doctrine. The USA
will respond by aligning with other states in the region such as Vietnam, India,
and Japan105—a trend that is already visible.
Drawing on Thucydides, Graham Allison argues that conflict between a ris-
ing power and the dominant state is caused by ‘structural stresses’. Thucydides
wrote that war between Athens and Sparta was fuelled by ‘interest, fear, and
honor’. Allison refers to the conflict between a rising power and the dominant
state as the ‘Thucydides Trap’.106 Despite the structural contradictions, Allison
suggests that war between China and the USA may be prevented through nego-
tiated mutual accommodation, long-term agreements to put aside differences,
or emphasis on shared interests in controlling proliferation, climate change, or
pandemics.107
Contrary to existing theories of power transition, Yan suggests that war be-
tween the USA and China is unlikely, because the PRC is pursuing a predomin-
antly economic strategy for attaining status, although a proxy war might occur.
In addition, both states will avoid any conflicts that might result in nuclear
war.108 While Yan’s observations are astute, an inadvertent war might break out,
as the result of an unplanned naval encounter, despite the presence of nuclear
weapons. As an aspiring great power, China wants to police its coastal waters
and prevent a hostile power from taking control of sea lanes on which 85% of its
103 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 328–9; A. F. K.
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980),
p. 23; Jack S. Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in Robert S. Ross and
Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 11–33.
104 Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, pp. 14--5, 17.
105 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2001); John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’,
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2010), pp. 381–96.
106 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2017), pp. 29, 39–40. For a critique of Allison’s reading of
Thucydides, see Jonathan Kirshner, ‘Handle Him with Care: The Importance of Getting
Thucydides Right’, Security Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2019), pp. 1–24.
107 Allison, Destined for War, pp. 221–31.
108 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, p. 100.
goods travel.109 The Chinese Navy is also expanding its mission beyond coastal
waters to ‘far seas’. At the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the leadership adopted
the ideas of American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in declaring that China
would ‘build itself into a maritime power’. The PRC now possesses the region’s
largest navy with more than 300 surface and underwater vessels compared with
187 vessels for the USA.110

At the same time that China has become a naval power, the USA has aug-
mented its naval activities in the Asia Pacific, as part of the ‘pivot to Asia’
announced by President Obama, which actually began under his predecessor
George W. Bush.111 As a result, China’s modernized naval forces are increasingly
encountering US vessels, raising the risk of a collision.112 While nuclear weapons
may make a major war between the USA and China unlikely, the risk of escal-
ation may not deter proxy wars or low-level skirmishes. Paradoxically, the stabil-
ity of the nuclear balance could make low-level naval encounters more likely,
especially in the ‘grey zone’. With less possibility of an existential threat to sur-
vival, one state might be willing to use force to settle a dispute over maritime sov-
ereignty or freedom of passage, in the belief that there was little probability that
the conflict would escalate to a war between the USA and China.113
Overconfidence about the improbability of escalation could make war more
likely.
There are also fewer ‘bright lines’ that would assist both sides in avoiding the
risk of escalation. During the Cold War, the firm East-West division of Europe
deterred either side from undertaking any military action against the other.
Sending military forces across the line dividing Germany would have signalled the
outbreak of World War III. In addition to clarifying intentions, a military inva-
sion across recognized boundaries could have resulted in the conquest of Europe,
upsetting the balance of power. Thus, the stakes of any military encounter were
greater in Europe than they would be in the Asia Pacific.114 The Sino-American
rivalry in East Asia is over maritime boundaries, where there are no clear lines,
109 ‘A Chained Dragon: China’s Maritime Expansion Reflects a Curious Mix of Ambition and
Paranoia’, Economist, 6 July, 2019, p. 35, https://www.economist.com/china/2019/07/06/chi
nas-maritime-expansion-reflects-a-curious-mix-of-ambition-and-paranoia.
110 ‘Why China Wants a Mighty Navy’, Economist, 27 April, 2019, p. 40, https://www.economist.
com/printedition/2019-04-27; Cary Huang, ‘China Takes Aim at the US for the First Time in
its Defence White Paper’, South China Morning Post, 7 August, 2019, https://www.scmp.
com/comment/opinion/article/3021273/china-takes-aim-us-first-time-its-defence-white-
paper; OSD Annual Report to Congress, China Military Power 2019, p. 35.
111 Nina Silove, ‘The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in
Asia’, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2016), pp. 45-88.
112 Schell and Shirk, ‘Course Correction’, p. 26; Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World
Politics, p. 138.
113 Tunsjø, ibid., p. 129.
114 Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm’, p. 392.
and there are competing claims to sovereignty over territory in the South and East
China Seas.115
The likelihood of conflict could be exacerbated by security dilemma dynamics,
whereby one state’s efforts to defend its interests are perceived as aggressive by
the other, potentially leading to a spiral of conflict and mistrust.116 Efforts by the
USA to upgrade and reaffirm its alliances in Asia are regarded as offensive and

threatening by the Chinese, whereas the Trump administration has raised alarms
about China’s modernization of its military forces and operations.117 The 2018
US National Defense Strategy accused China of pursuing a long-term, whole-
nation strategy and predicted that China will ‘continue to pursue a military
modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-
term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the
future’. In response, the 2019 Chinese Defence White Paper, the first since 2015,
declared that it was the USA that has ‘provoked and intensified competition
among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditures, pushed
for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and
undermined global strategic stability’. In contrast, China’s national defence policy
is characterized as ‘defensive’.118
To prevent crises, the US Defence Department and the Chinese Ministry of
Defence signed two memoranda in 2014, one concerning notification of major
military activities and the other on rules of behaviour for safety of air and mari-
time encounters. The two states also agreed to apply the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea.119 These crisis prevention measures should be reinforced and
strengthened.
According to Yan, it is not enough for China to have the strongest economy or
the most powerful military to change the international system. A leader of the
international system must have followers, which requires the ability to persuade
others to accept its vision of order and international norms. To replace the USA
115 Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics, p. 136.

116 John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (1950), pp. 157–80; Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167–214.
117 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military
Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma’, International Security, Vol. 39,
No. 2 (2014), pp. 57–8.
118 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National
Defense in the New Era (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm; Ben Lowsen, ‘China’s New Defense White
Paper: Reading Between the Lines’, The Diplomat, 30 July, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/
2019/07/chinas-new-defense-white-paper-reading-between-the-lines/.
119 ‘Parleying with the PLA’, Economist, 22 December, 2018, pp. 53–4, https://www.economist.
com/china/2018/12/18/the-us-and-chinese-armies-struggle-to-learn-how-to-talk-to-each-other;
Yao Yunzhu, ‘Sino-American Military Relations: From Quasi-allies to Potential Adversaries?’,
China International Strategy Review, No. 1 (2019), p. 90.
as the world’s leading state, China must formulate and defend an ideology that is
appealing to other states. China will also have to follow the ideology consistently
in both its domestic and foreign policies.120
Yan argues that in order for the international system to change, in addition to
the structure of power, there also should be a change in the type of international
leadership and prevailing international norms. The newly dominant state will es-

tablish norms in line with its ideology that legitimize its role and induce others to
cooperate.121 Norms can only change if enough states observe them in their con-
duct. Yan believes that the dominant state is more likely to be successful in alter-
ing prevailing norms if it leads by example rather than coercing other states to
follow, a distinguishing attribute of humane authority.122 Consistent with that
recommendation, the 19th Party Congress work report claimed that China ‘offers
a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their develop-
ment while preserving their independence’ and ‘offers Chinese wisdom and a
Chinese approach to problems facing mankind’.123
China often portrays itself as a ‘new type of great power’, one that seeks to
promote a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ and a ‘new type of inter-
national relations’. Xi outlined his conception of the ‘community of common des-
tiny’ in speeches to the United Nations in 2015 to the General Assembly and in
2017 in Geneva. In both instances, he described political, security, development,
culture, and environmental dimensions, advocating settlement of disputes
through consultation, partnerships, openness, and multilateralism.124 The Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to build ‘policy, infrastructure, trade, financial
and people-to-people connectivity’, resulting in a ‘new platform for international
cooperation’. Through the BRI, China will build pipelines, ports, bridges, rail-
ways connecting China with Southeast Asia and South Asia, Central Asia, the
Middle East, and Europe.125
121 Ibid., pp. 166–70.
122 Ibid., pp. 113, 118.
123 Full text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress, http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/m/qingdao/2017-11/04/content_34771557.htm.
124 ‘Working Together to Build a New Partnership of win-win Cooperation and Create a
Community of Shared Future for Mankind’, at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the
UN General Assembly, 28 September, 2015, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gas
tatements/70/70_ZH_en.pdf; Xi Jinping, ‘Work Together to Build a Community of Shared
Future for Mankind’, 19 January, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_
135994782.htm. For discussion and interpretation, see Zhang Denghua, ‘The Concept of
“Community of Common Destiny” in China’s Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and
Implications’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2018), pp. 196–207; Liza Tobin,
‘Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and
its Allies’, Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2018), pp. 155–66.
125 Full text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress.
Despite these efforts, Yan does not anticipate that China will have sufficient
power to alter existing international norms.126 The USA has exceptional
leverage due to its shaping of institutions after World War II and alliance net-
works.127 Economic liberalism—open markets, free trade, rules, multilateral
institutions—still has many supporters, including among Chinese government
officials.128

Conclusions
Yan Xuetong’s book presents a solid deductive theory that ties together a number
of theoretical foci and issue areas and has many implications. Yan’s theory has
the advantage over previous work in that it is applicable to Chinese and Western
international systems, and he presents historical examples from China’s imperial
foreign relations. The concept of ‘moral realism’ highlights an element of inter-
national authority that has been overlooked by conventional realists—the need
for a great power to adhere to international norms rather than acting on the basis
of short-term self-interest and to articulate a compelling ideological narrative.
He directs attention to an overlooked factor that is extremely important if also
intangible and difficult to measure—the quality of leadership—and in so doing,
undermines determinist predictions of structural conflict by highlighting the im-
portance of human choice. Because human beings have the power to shape
whether there is peace or war, the USA and China can take steps to mitigate the
possibility of an inadvertent conflict resulting from a skirmish or proxy war.
There should be more communication and dialogue between Chinese and US
military, and ongoing negotiations regarding crisis management and nuclear
weapons.
Yan asserts that the competition between China and the USA is likely to be pri-
marily over status rather than military power or material resources. The two
states can control their status rivalry by recognizing the other’s preeminence in
different areas, following a strategy of social cooperation.129 As part of a division
of labour, China could take the lead in providing economic assistance and trade
in East Asia, while the USA would offer security guarantees.130 China has
127 Wu Xinbo, ‘China in Search of a Liberal Partnership International Order’, International
Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5 (2018), p. 1017.
128 Wu, ibid., p. 1017; Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R. Heath, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, China
and the International Order (Santa Monica: Rand, 2018), pp. 26, 60–1.
129 Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, pp. 12–3, 249–50.
130 Yang Yuan, ‘Escape Both the “Thucydides Trap” and the “Churchill Trap”: Finding a Third
Type of Great Power Relations under the Bipolar System’, Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2018), pp. 213–8, 229–33.
expressed willingness to cooperate in specific areas of common interests, while

competing with the USA in other issue areas.131
Sceptics might argue that Sino-American rivalry over technology may threaten
each other’s security, potentially leading to a new Cold War. To avoid this,
technological innovation should be ‘de-securitized’ as much as possible, allowed
to develop independently rather than being driven by the needs of military compe-

tition. Before ‘weaponizing’ technological innovations, each state needs to
consider how its actions might affect the other’s threat perception and the risk of
a further escalation of an arms race. Each should try to empathize with the other’s
perspective, trying to avoid double standards. If there is technological rivalry,
mutual recognition of status and managed competition may be the best available
outcome. With mutual respect, it should be easier to resolve disputes over the
security implications of technology as they arise. If the USA and China focus
on achieving status in different domains, their competition will be less intense.
The goal should be a fair competition, with reciprocal treatment of investment
and foreign firms.
To illuminate how China as well as other rising powers might exert humane
authority, it would be worthwhile to conduct more research into instances of ben-
evolent international leadership in a context of heterogenous domestic systems
and ideologies—the 19th century, early 20th century, and the Cold War. How
did the leading power establish the legitimacy of its exercise of authority? How
did the dominant state build trust despite differences in domestic systems and
ideologies? Possible examples of humane leadership include the foreign policies of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who helped to create the United Nations, and Deng
Xiaoping. More research also needs to be done on how a great power can provide
economic benefits to other states without being perceived as attempting to domin-
ate them. Features of the US Marshall Plan after World War II may provide some
insights.
Regardless of which country has superior material capabilities, China and the
USA are larger and more powerful than any countries in history, and they need
to consider in advance how they can jointly exercise international leadership.
131 Fu Ying, ‘Beijing and Washington Should Prepare for an Era of “Co-opetition”’, Financial
Times, 1 November, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/beb6c052-ff00-11e9-a530-16c6c29e70ca.

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The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, 163–186

Can China Change the International

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*Corresponding author: dlarson@polisci.ucla.edu

existing rule-governed international order, and would prefer to integrate more

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strategies for achieving global power status, which is related to authority. In

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and bargaining power in international negotiations.18 Most important, maintain-

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Domestic Leadership and Great Power Status

demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)’.29

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national power’—having superiority in a variety of domains—political, military,

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Should China Abandon the No-Alliance Policy?

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49 Ibid., pp. 41, 65.

global partnerships’.55 By June, 2019, China had officially established strategic

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63 Liff, ‘China and the US Alliance System’, p. 156.

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Will the Sino-American Rivalry Become a Cold War?

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76 Yan, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, pp. 86–8.

Neither state is promoting the spread of its ideology or domestic system to

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Because of globalization, it is unlikely that the world will return to the

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determination eventually led to the breakup of colonial empires, such as those of

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Will A Power Transition Remain Peaceful?

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115 Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics, p. 136.

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expressed willingness to cooperate in specific areas of common interests, while

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