BUNAG VS CA

FACTS:

Plaintiff Bunag filed a case against Bautista for recovery of possession of parcel of
land in Pampanga. He contends that the property was originally owned by his father
Apolonio and that he has been living there with his father until 1920 when they
transferred to Tarlac.
Jose Bautista, a nephew in law was allowed to build a house and live therein on
condition that he would pay the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land.
After becoming a widow, he transferred his residence and accompanied his sister
Estrudes to stay in that house.

Thereafter, he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista to vacate the land.
The defendant answered that he is the owner of the land in question by
virtue of a deed of sale signed by Apolonio with his thumbmark. Brigida
Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio and that
she was present when Bunag affixed his thumbmark on the document

The trial court decided in favor of Bunag and ordered the defendants to vacate the
property and deliver its possession thereof to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals, finding the deed of sale to have been validly executed, set aside the
decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale has been properly proved to be authentic and validly
executed.

RULING;

It must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a
notary public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for
the signatures of the attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in
English and over the typewritten name of Apolonio is a thumbprint. The deed is not
notarized and therefore a private writing whose due execution and
authenticity must be proved before it can be received in evidence as
required in Sec. 21 Rule 132 (now Sec. 20 Rule 132) of the Rules of Court.
The Court upheld the decision of the trial court that private respondents have failed
to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale. It should be noted
that the document was written in English and was merely thumbmarked which could
be reasonably inferred that he was illiterate. The minimum proof should in the least
include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and translated to him.
Furthermore, there are no instrumental witnesses to the deed. The mischief that
lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumbmarked
without any witnesses to it and not acknowledged before a notary public could be
one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules of evidence. Petition is
therefore granted reinstating the decision of the trial court.
BARTOLOME VS IAC

FACTS:

Doroteo Bartolome, to whom Epitacio had entrusted his land, migrated to Davao
City. Doroteo died there two years later.

Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the said land
involved herein (Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow
of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928, filed an answer in
Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660
square meters. The land was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance
from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased husband, Bernabe. More
than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome, the
grandchild of Epitacio Batara, also filed an answer in the same cadastral case
claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864 square
meters alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his grandfather and
grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales.

From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case. In June 1968
(after 34 years), the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out notices for the
"continuation of the hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. 53. It should
be remembered, however, that from the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome
filed their answers to the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress
in the proceedings. A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case
No. 53 a motion to admit answer in intervention, alleging that she is one of the
children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been excluded in
Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore prayed that the answer of Ursula
Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome alleging that
they were co-owners of the said Lot No. 11165 which they inherited from Doroteso
Bartolome..

Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to reflect the
complete ground or basis of acquisition of Lot No. 11165. In her amended answer,
Ursula Cid stated that she was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had
been the possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over fifty years; she claimed that her
husband, Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her, purchased the said lot which
used to be three adjoining lots from their respective owners; and that Lot No. 11165
had been declared for tax purposes in the name of her late husband Bernabe
Bartolome.

No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that she and
her husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds
of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid
bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin
and Josefa Manrique (Exhibit 2); [b] another document dated February 18, 1913
executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of
another lot also for fifteen pesos (Exhibit 3); and [c] still another deed executed by
Maria Gonzales (wife of Epitacio Bitara) on February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75
(Exhibit 4). The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by
Resurreccion Bartolome.
On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision which
held that the deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales (Exhibit 4) has no probative
value as the same is incomplete and unsigned. The court also held that Ursula Cid's
possession of the land after the claimants had filed their respective answer(s) or
after the declaration of a general default, did not confer ownership on her because
said possession was interrupted and merely tolerated by all the parties during the
pendency of the case.

Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision
reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale presented
by Ursula Cid are ancient documents under Section 22 (now Section 21), Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous possession of the lot
from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested her with
the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title.

ISSUE;

Whether or not deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales (Exhibit 4) is an ancient

document under Section 22 (now Section 21) of Rule 132 which would be admissible
in evidence even without proof of its execution?

RULING;

No, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) is not an ancient document.

The SC agreed with the IAC that the first two requirements ordained by
Section 22 (now Section 21) are met by Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was
executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was
offered in evidence in 1983. It was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep
it.

However, the third requirement, that no alterations or circumstances of

suspicion are present was not conformed with.

According to Dominador Bartolome (son of Ursula Cid), he first saw Exhibit 4 in the
possession of his mother when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the
document had a fourth page containing the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all
four pages were sewn together. However, when the document was entrusted
to him by his mother in 1947 as he was then representing the family in
litigation concerning the land, the document's fourth page was already
missing. He stated that his mother told him that the fourth page was lost during the
Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao City.

On its face, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) appears unmarred by alteration. However,
the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. It is important because it
allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in
question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights
over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete.
Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered
contents.
Necessarily, since Exhibit 4 is not an ancient document, proofs of its due execution
and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 (now Section 20) of Rule 132, the due
execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who
saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Ursula Cid's and her son
Dominador on the authenticity of Exhibit 4 do not fall within the purview of Section
21 (now Section 20). The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of
Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine.
But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the
deed of sale since the said fourth page was missing, the same must be excluded.

ANCHUELO VS CA

FACTS:

In their complaint filed on April 27, 1972, Antonio Anchuelo and petitioner Celsa
Puncia alleged that they are the owners of seven (7) parcels of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (Free Patent) No. 586;

that on May 19, 1961, they secured a loan from Benito Gavino and Juana Euste in
the amount of P3,000.00 but, instead of executing a deed of mortgage over
the said parcels of land, the Gavinos induced the Anchuelos to execute a
supposed... deed of sale with the understanding that the Gavinos would
execute another document on the same day to make the transaction
appear as an agreement to resell but its essence is one of repurchase of
the same properties after the lapse of nineteen (19) years from... the date
of execution; that the consideration on both documents in the amount of
P28,000.00 is fictitious, the truth, being that the actual amount of the loan
obtained was only P3,000.00; that the Anchuelos offered... to repurchase
the properties for the actual amount of the loan obtained but the Gavinos
refused; that Benito Gavino had transferred the properties to his sister and
codefendant Martha Gavino and thereafter re-transferred the same properties... to
his other co-defendants Jaime and Juan both surnamed Gavino; that these transfers
resulted in the issuance of certificate of title to those other defendants which were
fictitious for want of consideration; hence, the petitioners prayed... among others,
that the deed of sale be annulled; that they be allowed to repurchase the subject
properties; and that the certificate of title of the various defendants covering the
subject properties be annulled.
In their Answer, the Gavinos denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that
the deed of sale correctly reflects the true intention of the actual transaction
between them and the plaintiffs, and that the amount of P28,000.00 stated in the
document as... consideration thereof is the purchase price of the subject properties;
and that the transfer of the properties from the defendants Benito Gavino and Juana
Euste to Martha Gavino and thereafter to Jaime and Juan Gavino... were true and
legitimate transactions and that there were considerations in such sales.  They
admitted the execution of the document "Promise to Resell" but alleged it was void
for want of consideration.
In the course of the proceedings in the lower court, Antonio Anchuelo died and he
was substituted by his children with Celsa Puncia Anchuelo.

ISSUE:

whether or not the petitioners have established their right to repurchase the subject
parcels of land.

RULING:

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that the disputed deed of sale reflects the true transaction
between the Anchuelo spouses on one hand and the Gavino spouses... on
the other.  This is clearly seen in the execution of public documents
evidencing the parties' various transactions involving the land and leading
to the execution of the questioned deed of sale.

"It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing
his desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of
redemption price fell short of the requirements of law.  Having failed to
properly... exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year
period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing
of an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.  x x... x."
There is nothing in the records nor in the factual findings of the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to indicate that there was a valid tender of payment of
the repurchase price during the five-year period under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act

PEOPLE VS PECARDAL

FACTS;

 The accused-appellant stands convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide

and has been sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 victim of the offense was a taxi driver whose body was found in the luggage
compartment of his vehicle in the morning of May 27, 1982. He had been
stabbed twenty three times with a balisong that had later been left on the
dashboard of the car. Apparently, Rogelio Florendo had also been robbed for no
money was found on his person or in the taxicab.
 accused-appellant was picked up by the police and questioned in connection
with the crime. As a result, an information for the said offense was filed against
him and his unidentified co-accused, who was then at large and so was not tried
with him.
 Presented as prosecution witnesses were the victim's wife, Concepcion Florendo,
who testified on the civil damages
 last witness and Pat. Ernesto Daria declared in a joint affidavit that Pecardal
"when questioned readily admitted his participation in the fatal stabbing of
victim ROGELIO LORENDO after robbing him of his daily earnings amounting to
P200.00; and named EDUARDO AZARCON as his partner in the commission of
 the said offense. they thereafter turned over the accused-appellant to the
Quezon City Police Headquarters, where he signed a statement confessing his
guilt. The statement described in detail how the offense was committed and was
marked as Exhibit "H" at the trial.
 prosecution made much of this confession and argued it could not have been
made except by the actual perpetrator of the crime because of its detailed
narration. Moreover, it had been given by the accused-appellant voluntarily,
after he had been apprised of his constitutional rights
 accused-appellant took the stand in his defense mainly to denounce
this confession. He testified on the physical punishment inflicted on
him by the police investigators that ultimately forced him to sign the
statement which he said had been prepared unilaterally by them
 In the decision convicting the accused-appellant, 11 the trial judge relied
strongly, if not almost mainly, on this confession. This is strange because, to
repeat, that piece of evidence was never formally offered by the
prosecution or, for that matter even the defense.
 This document should never have been considered at all because of
Rule 132, Section 35, of the Rules of Court providing as follows:

Sec.35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which

has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.

In his demurrer to the evidence, the accused-appellant stressed the failure

of the prosecution to present this confession, 13 but the prosecutor simply
said it was part of its strategy and left it at that. 14

The confession which could have corroborated them was not formally
offered by the prosecution. In any case, it is void because it was obtained
without the advice or even the presence of counsel, besides having been
vitiated by force and threats.

We note that at the time the accused-appellant was apprehended and

interrogated, he was only seventeen years old. That is a susceptible age.
One can accept how easily a teenager can succumb to the pressure
exerted upon him by hardened investigators experienced in extracting
confessions through the use of methods less than legal. That pressure was
in this case irresistible.