Science Technology Innovation Policies: A Comparative Study of Ecua-

dor and Colombia

Políticas de ciencia, tecnología e innovación: un estudio comparado de

Ecuador y Colombia

Resumen
Este artículo presenta un estudio comparado del cambio de segundo orden
de la política pública de ciencia, tecnología e innovación (CTI) de Ecuador y
Colombia entre 2006 y 2013 a través de una explicación de redes de política
pública. Mientras en Colombia la política de CTI se institucionaliza a fines de
los años sesenta con la implementación del modelo lineal y asume un giro
hacia el triángulo de Sábato (gobierno-academia-empresa) a inicios de los
noventa; en Ecuador, su institucionalización apenas arranca en 2008 con un
fuerte énfasis en el modelo lineal y en las relaciones gobierno-academia.

Palabras clave: cambio de segundo orden; redes de política; ciencia, tecno-

logía e innovación; análisis comparado; sociogramas.

1
STI Policies: A Comparative Study of Ecuador and Colombia

Summary
The trajectory of public policy of science, technology, and innovation (STI) in
Ecuador and Colombia is well differentiated. In Colombia, STI policy was insti-
tutionalized at the end of the 1960s with the implementation of the linear
model and assumed a turn towards the Sábato triangle (government-
academia-enterprise) in the early 1990s. In Ecuador, however, its institutional-
ization began only in 2008 with a strong emphasis on the linear model focus-
ing on government-academia relations. This article presents a comparative
study of the second-order change of STI public policy in Ecuador and Colom-
bia between 2006 and 2013 through an explanation of policy networks as an
independent variable.

Key words: second-order change; policy networks; science, technology, and

innovation studies; comparative analysis; sociograms.

Introduction
Studies on science and technology policies in Latin America have an im-
portant history of case studies on the social impact of science and technology
indicators (Albornoz, 2008; Casas et al. 2014; Godin, 2005), and the role of
national and international actors in the institutionalization of science and tech-
nology (Barreiro, 1999; Carlotto, 2013). The work on comparative studies of
STI policy (Science, Technology and Innovation) is rather recent (Casas y
Mercado, 2015) and has mainly focused on changes in public research sys-
tems, actors and governance of STI, knowledge transfer, technological fore-
sight and planning. The contribution of science, technology and society stud-
ies has been fundamental in the assessment of these policies in the region.
Building on this direction, we propose a comparative study between two
neighboring countries through the analysis of more diverging cases.

2
We compare the change in STI public policy of Colombia and Ecuador that
began in 2006, the year during which a change of government took place in
both countries. Moreover, we propose the second order change of policy as a
dependent variable (Hall, 1993) and policy networks as an independent varia-
ble (Marsh y Smith, 2000). This contribution is based on the perspective of
policy networks (Bressers y O’toole, 1998; Knoke, 1993; Montpetit, 2005;
Toke, 2003) because it allows us to understand how the actors’ programmatic
ideas are stabilized (Kisby, 2007; Klijn, 1998), and how strategic learning is
enhanced within a policy domain (Knoke, 1982).

We apply this approach because we consider that it has a considerable ex-

planatory capacity. It allows us to show why a public policy change took place
on the base of the factors of the context of the policy, the actors’ beliefs, as
well as from the institutions and the instruments of public policy. Actors use
ideas when building the problem-solution relationship of a policy, therefore,
ideas can be inscribed in the selection of instruments, such as policy reports.
Thus, ideas as the “Sábato triangle” matter not as a theoretical model, but be-
cause of the meaning it acquires by inscribing itself in policy instrument, giving
meaning to an event in the trajectory of policies.

While both Ecuador and Colombia maintain a top-down policy type in the de-
sign of their public policies, the differences between these two countries as
regards STI are quite significant. In order to explain the different policies at
hand we use policy networks, which can show us how actors define them-
selves in direct relation to other groups of actors, what their capacities are, as
well as their preferences and the structure of their relations (Montpetit, 2005).

We consider that Ecuadorian political networks are more closed than their Co-
lombian counterparts, with more power being centralized in the hands of the
State, although less vertical within it. Whereas Colombian networks are more
diverse, with greater negotiations needed to maintain power, and more hierar-
chical to achieve consensus and decision-making. As a result, Colombian de-
cision-makers have established closer relations with academia and the busi-
ness sector, while Ecuadorian decision-makers have failed to include the

3
business sector in policy change, and have only established closer relations
with the academy instead. For this reason, in the case of Colombia, policy
change translates to incorporating the notion of social innovation through Law
1286 to the model based on Sábato’s triangle. In the case of Ecuador this
translates to the consolidation of the linear model through the strengthening of
the university system and the construction of Yachay City of Knowledge.

This contribution is set out in three parts. In the first part, we identify the dif-
ferences in public policies between Colombia and Ecuador. In the second, we
present the perspective of policy networks, while in the third we apply the pol-
icy networks approach to explain the differences in STI policy between the
two countries. This analysis is based on official documents, press articles, and
interviews with key players in the field of STI policy. The reports refer to
agents who have been relevant in the events associated with policy change in
each country, and the diversity of sources allows for the triangulation required
to achieve reliable and coherent research (Yacuzzi 2005). We have used the
Gephi system to process information and establish policy networks quantita-
tively through sociograms.

For each country, a descriptive construction is favored, which in turn allows

the network to be constructed as a representation of the associations regis-
tered in the description. This is done in order to inquire into the structural pat-
terns produced by those associations. In Latour's terms, the “network does
not designate a thing out there that would have roughly the shape of intercon-
nected points, much like a telephone, a freeway, or a sewage network. It is
nothing more than an indicator of the quality of a text about the topics at hand”
(Latour 2005, 129).

Finally, the network is a product of the trajectory’s history of the public policy.
Furthermore, it represents sufficiently persistent associations equivalent to the
social relations that influence agent’s behavior against a window of opportuni-
ty. Networks are structural forms or patterns that can explain policy change.
In this sense, even if networks have a dynamic within a temporal dimension,

4
they represent fundamental relationships that influence policy change in this
specific policy analysis.

Differences in STI policies

Starting on the basis that policies are not conceived once and for all (Lind-
blom, 1959), this comparative note proposes policy change as a dependent
variable, understood as the result of a social and political process that occurs
in a given period (Rayner, 2009). We are interested in showing that this is a
second order change in Hall terms (1993) at the level of the selection of new
policy instruments. These changes are deeper than the simple adjustment of
instruments, but they do not become so extreme as to replace the system of
ideas and rules that operate to redefine policy issues and their objectives. We
are faced with a policy change that maintains the STI models of the past, but
that redesigns the instruments of the policy as a result of strategic actions.

The dependent variable allows comparing Ecuador and Colombia through a

small-N methodology (Godin, 1996; Godin y Klingemann, 2001) and most dif-
ferent cases (Gerring, 2008; Hopkin, 2010; Przeworski, 1970). In both cases,
we study the change in STI policy from the basis of a policy window in 2006 to
explain the differences in public policy trajectories. The most different tech-
nique is very useful to test the results of the dependent variable by country
and the patterns that both cases have maintained over time.

Ecuador

The change of STI policy has as context the beginning of the presidency of
Rafael Correa and his proposal of a Citizen’s Revolution in 2006. With the
new government, a Constituent Assembly was drawn up to draft the 2008
Constitution, and with this, opened the policy window (Kingdon, 2011) to mod-
ify the STI policy in the country. That same year, the National System of Sci-
ence, Technology, Innovation and Ancestral Knowledge (Sistema Nacional de
Ciencia, Tecnología, Innovación y Saberes Ancestrales) was created, and it
moved from a policy with a weak institutionality to the strengthening of a more
centralized institutionality. The Vice-Presidency of the Republic ceased to be

5
in charge of STI policy and the entities that were in charge of policy imple-
mentation1 disappeared and were replaced by a new institutional framework.

In 2009 the National Secretariat for Planning and Development (SEN-

PLADES) published the National Plan for Good Living (PNBV 2009-2013).
This policy instrument became a crucial reference for organizing the new
higher education system, since the Constitution itself indicates that this sys-
tem must be articulated with the National Development Plan.2 The 2010 Or-
ganic Law of Higher Education (LOES) established a new institutional design
for higher education and created the following public bodies: the National Sec-
retariat for Science, Technology, and Innovation (SENESCYT)3, which is in
charge of executing the public policy on higher education, and scientific and
technological research; The Council of Higher Education (CES) whose mis-
sion is the planning, regulation and internal coordination of the system of
higher education; The Council for Evaluation, Accreditation and Quality As-
surance of Higher Education (CEAACES) 4 , which undertakes the task of
evaluating technical and technological institutes, universities and polytechnic
schools.

The autonomy of the university sector was vastly affected with the shutting
down of its governing body, the National Council for Higher Education
(CONESUP), whose functions were transferred to the CES. Moreover, Ecua-
dor’s National Council of Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education
(CONEA) was replaced by the CEAACES. It must be noted that both the CES
and the CEAACES are State agencies.

STI policy was placed under the direction of SENESCYT, thus creating the
structure needed to implement the linear model of innovation: basic research -
applied research - development - production and dissemination (Ames, 1960;

1 Secretaría de Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (SENACYT), Fundación para la Ciencia y

la Tecnología (FUNDACYT) y CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología)
2 Article 351 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution.
3 Article 182 of the LOES
4 Article 15 of the LOES

6
Bush, 1999, Godin, 2006; Rogers, 1962). The higher education system be-
came the centre of public policy, focusing on the first two phases of the linear
model. To ensure that universities and technical institutes were able to gener-
ate knowledge and technology aligned with the National Plan for Good Living,
a process had to be initiated to determine the quality of education in the coun-
try.

For the first time the university system was evaluated and university catego-
ries were established (A, B, C, D and E). Of the 68 universities evaluated, 24
of category E had to be closed through legal action, a competence of the Na-
tional Assembly (CONEA, 2009). Until November 2013, the CES approved
the suspension of 125 technical institutes following the evaluation carried out
by the CEAACES. It also transformed the allocation of State resources to pub-
lic universities and implemented a formula of distribution of resources for per-
formance that qualified the universities on the basis of the following indicators:
Academia, equity and gender balance, and research and innovation.

The purpose of the policy was to improve the country's indicators in STI, al-
lowing the SENESCYT and the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses
(INEC) to raise indicators on science, technology and innovation activities for
the very first time. Between 2009 and 2014 total spending on science, tech-
nology and innovation activities grew by 122% and the number of researchers
reached 1.59 per 1,000 people of the economically active population (EAP),
exceeding the average rate of Latin America, which is 1.30 (SENPLADES-
INEC, 2014). In 2014, the Government was responsible for 63.80% of the
overall R&D spending.

Figure 1: Total expenditure on science and technology in 2009-2014

7
Source: INEC - Encuesta Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2014

Instrument selection of STI policy had as its context a stronger and more cen-
tralized institutionality, whose most important programmatic belief held that
the development of science and technology must be promoted from the higher
education system to achieve innovation in productive structures. Thus, in-
struments were designed to promote the production of basic and applied re-
search. This included new budgets for the higher education system, an ag-
gressive program of scholarships to enable Ecuadorian students to study
abroad, and a significant investment to attract researchers worldwide with the
Prometeo Old Wise Men project (proyecto Prometeo Viejos Sabios). This pro-
ject intended to contribute to the training of researchers and the increase in
the number of indexed publications.

One of the most important instruments was the budget that went to higher ed-
ucation. Between 2007 and 2015 the Ecuadorian State allocated 11.4 billion
USD to higher education. This investment raised the percentage correspond-
ing to GDP from 0.8% to 2.0% in these eight years. Universities received
State resources according to criteria of excellence. Thus, the best education
centers were the ones that received the largest budgets.5 One of the ways
used to measure the expected excellence is the number of publications by
Ecuadorian researchers in indexed journals. It is worth noting that in this peri-
od annual publications went from 344 to 1237 in Scopus, according to
SENESCYT data.

5http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/ecuador-es-lider-en-inversion-en-educacion-superior-
presentacion/

8
Within the scholarship program for third and fourth level studies abroad,
18,645 scholarships were awarded between 2007 and 2015 with an invest-
ment of 402.32 million USD, 42 times more than the investment made be-
tween 1995 and 2006 (SENESCYT, 2015). The selection of international uni-
versities was based on criteria of institutional excellence that refer to rankings
such as Shanghai, Times Higher Education, or QS World University Ranking.6

The Prometeo project is a SENESCYT initiative, whose purpose is to

strengthen the institutional capacities of universities, research centers and
public entities in the country by linking researchers with PhD degrees from dif-
ferent parts of the world. As of December 2015, 1014 researchers from 48
countries were approved for basic sciences (57%), production and innovation
(17%), social sciences, art, culture and education (26%).7 Ten public research
institutes, 43 universities and 48 public bodies benefited from this project.8

The SENESCYT-SENPLADES relationship was strengthened through the

Yachay City of Knowledge project. Within the framework of the change of
productive matrix, SENPLADES took the experience of South Korea as a ref-
erence and in 2009 signed the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), a cooper-
ation program, with an extension of 3 years (2012-2015). This program con-
tains a five-point agenda to achieve the change of productive matrix: (1) de-
velopment of the petrochemical industry; (2) applied biotechnology to agricul-
ture and food processing; (3) development of human resources; (4) research
and development, and; and (5) resource mobilization (SENPLADES, 2012).
Yachay was designed on the basis of the South Korean experience of

6 http://www.educacionsuperior.gob.ec/mejores-puntuados-en-el-enes-podran-estudiar-en-
institutos-tecnicos-y-tecnologicos-de-excelencia-en-el-mundo/
7 Ten public research institutes, 43 universities and 48 public bodies benefited from this pro-
ject. Researchers under this program received salaries within a range of 4,320 USD to 6,000
USD, depending on their degrees, research and publications, with a contract that can last
between two months and a year, http://www.elcomercio.com/tendencias/ecuador-prometeos-
ateneos-universidades-educacion.html
8 http://prometeo.educacionsuperior.gob.ec/logros-achievements/

9
INNOPOLIS - IFEZ and its master plan was contracted from a Memorandum
of Understanding between both governments.

The construction of the Yachay project supplements a policy focused on the

promotion of knowledge from public universities and research centers. The
project was first promoted from SENPLADES, then hosted by SENESCYT,
and later it started to operate autonomously following the establishment of the
Yachay as public company in March 2013. With a budget of over 624.5 million
USD for the 2013-2016 period, Yachay is by far the most ambitious STI pro-
ject in the country. The commitment to the linear model of innovation is deep-
ened in the Yachay project with the approval and construction of the Universi-
ty of Experimental Technology (Yachay Tech), directly supported by the Co-
ordinating Ministry of Knowledge and Human Talent.

It should be noted that other institutions of the State that used to be in charge
of programs to promote innovation were ousted of their role in STI policy. This
was notably the case of the Coordinating Ministry of Production, Employment
and Competitiveness of Ecuador. The latter designed three projects within the
Agenda for Productive Transformation 2010-2013 aiming to promote innova-
tion in the country: (1) EmprendEcuador that supports seed capital of up to
50,000 USD to dynamic enterprises to convert them into medium-sized enter-
prises that impact the productive transformation; (2) CreEcuador that makes
investments of high impact of up to 600,000 USD in medium-sized companies
belonging to the 14 productive sectors prioritized in the Agenda and9; (3) In-
novaEcuador, which finances up to 300,000 USD for high-impact sector tech-
nology to be freely used in the 14 productive sectors mentioned above. In-
stead, in 2014 SENESCYT inaugurated the initiative Banco de Ideas, a plat-
form to register innovation projects for access to various services such as
building innovation networks, exposing projects to potential investors, support-

9 Production sectors: 1. Fresh and processed food, 2. Biotechnology, 3. Clothing and foot-
wear, 4. Renewable energy, 5. Pharmaceutical industry, 6. Metalworking, 7. Petrochemical, 8.
Wood products, 9. Environmental services, 10. Technology, 11. Vehicles, automotive, bodies
and parts, 12. Construction, 13. Transportation and logistics and 14. Tourism (SENPLADES
(2012).) Transformation of the Productive Matrix. Productive revolution through human
knowledge and talent Quito: Edicuatorial, 19)

10
ing the business model, technical support through incubators until the market-
ing phase and seed capital.10

To summarize, the institutionalization of STI public policy starts from SEN-

PLADES, the Coordinating Ministry of Knowledge and Human Talent,
SENESCYT, CES, CEAACES to Yachay. The new model promoted by the
Government excludes other institutions and actors such as the Coordinating
Ministry of Production, Employment and Competitiveness, the private sector,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, only to name a few of the most important ones.
In this way, STI policy focuses on the higher education system and the
Yachay public enterprise project and Yachay Tech above all.

Colombia

The STI policy was institutionalized in Colombia at the end of the 1960s fol-
lowing the linear model proposed by Vannevar Bush (1999) and supported by
entities such as the OAS and UNESCO to promote science and technology-
based innovation to solve development problems (Nupia, 2013; Plata, 2013).
This can be seen in Decree 2869 of 1968, which promotes research through
project financing (article 7), and in second instance seeks to support the dis-
semination and use of the results of research produced in the country. Re-
search institutes and public universities supported by institutions such as the
Ministry of Education, Colciencias, and the National Science and Technology
Council (CNCyT) were also modernized.

The linear model loses relevance with the adoption of the neoliberal model in
the 1990s and STI policy was consequently oriented toward productivity, with
the inclusion of the National Innovation System (NIS) concept. Colciencias
and the National Planning Department (DNP) were in charge with an increas-
ingly inclusive planning of the private sector. The National System of Science
and Technology (SNCyT) was created to support the academy and the Na-
tional Innovation System (SNI), which fosters innovation in companies with

10 http://senescyt.boostlatam.com/index.php?r=usuario/bancodeideas

11
resources from international loans agreed with the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB).11

In the midst of a pre-constituent environment, which would lead to the 1991

Constitution, the role of STI and the lack of adequacy of the linear model were
re-examined. In this way, the Sábato triangle was used to define new strate-
gies and articulate the existing systems. National S&T programs were pro-
posed to convene specific scientific communities. To this end, policy instru-
ments already used at the international level, such as doctoral training among
others, were used as incentives.

The SNCyT organized the Caldas Knowledge Award to recognize research-

ers, and the Caldas Network to articulate the Colombian diaspora of re-
searchers (Granés, 1998). What is central is to encourage scientific publica-
tions without losing quality, and to evaluate the quality of journals and publica-
tions through peer review. The SNI sought to increase investment in innova-
tion by private companies and created "Service Centers" for technological de-
velopment and regional productivity, and technology-based incubators.

The strategies of both institutions followed different paths, thus, in 2006 the
initiatives of SNCyT had a positive trend (figure 2), whereas those of SNI had
a decreasing tendency (figure 3). Decision-makers looked with concern on the
policy’s results and searched for an opportunity for change:

...we believed Sábato, and Sábato said that we had to unite the State,
the academy and the private sector, and we came to do it in Colcien-
cias. We did not have all the success we wanted, but we tried, that was
the purpose. [Sábato] had not said how to do it and we did not ask him
and we came to do it without knowing how. Looking a little what the
Brazilians and the Koreans had done, to see what could be done ...
(José Luis Villaveces, interview October 28, 2011, deputy director of
Colciencias 1990-1994 and 2000-20001. In Plata, 2013).

11 National Planning Office, 2009.

12
 Figure 2: International indexed articles and S&T policy 1996-2005

Source: Presentation Jaime Cuartas. Director Colciencias

Figure 3: Investment in innovation companies 2003-2010

Source: Surveys of Development and Technological Innovation (Lucio-Arias

and co. 2013)

In 2006, President Uribe Vélez's promise to deepen his democratic security

policy allowed him to be re-elected. The priority of the armed conflict affected

13
the resources of the national programs maintained with the national budget,
thus, diminishing the possibilities of promoting research. The context of 2006
created a policy window (Kingdon, 2011) to change the STI public policy in
Colombia. The plan was to deepen the Sábato model through an agreement
between Colciencias and the academy taking advantage of the mining bonan-
za. The National System of Royalties (SNR) allocated 10% for STI activities in
order to support externalities of the mining bonanza, thereby avoiding the
known "Dutch disease" or curse of resources (Cuervo, 2013: 379).

Changing the model required profound institutional changes, based on the di-
agnosis which gave Sábato’s triangle an entire new meaning. This can be
seen in the country’s policy in 2008:

"The Councils of the National Programs of Science and Technology

(CPNCyT) which were also conceived with a Sábato’s triangle struc-
ture, turned out to have very unequal vortices: a strong and very partic-
ipative academic sector; a productive sector that is practically non-
existent or passive (depending on the program); and an uncommitted
State where there was no continuity and sometimes not adequately
represented”. (National policy to promote research and innovation in
2008. Colombia construye y siembra futuro, P. 32-33 Colciencias).

Colciencias was placed at the first level of the state's structure, and resources
from the national budget and the SNR were allocated for STI policy. Further-
more, the SNCyT and the SNI were integrated into the National Science,
Technology and Innovation System (SNCTI). Law 1286 of 2009 is the policy
instrument that was designed for this purpose. Colciencias was transformed
into an administrative department, which allows it to participate in national de-
cision-making and have its own resources to finance the new system through
an autonomous management fund for the promotion of STI.

The Development Plan of President Juan Manuel Santos, "Prosperity for all"
supports the change of STI policy, because the national priority was no longer
the conflict, but peace. Peace would be sustained by regional development

14
leveraged in the highways of innovation.12 The National Planning Department
(DNP) took over the coordination of the SNCTI above Colciencias. Moreover,
the new National Innovation Strategy (ENI) was defined with the support of
international experts in productivity. The experts proposed to redirect re-
sources to the private sector, and Innpulsa Colombia was created. The latter
was attached to Bancóldex, a new entity created to promote business innova-
tion.

In this way, the Colciencias-academia relationship was weakened and the in-
novation-private sector relationship acquired strength. The resources of the
National Royalties System (SNR) are associated with the National System of
Competitiveness and not with the National System of Science, Technology in
Innovation (SNCTI). The mechanism of resource distribution was designed by
the National Planning Department (DNP) and favors territories with higher un-
satisfied basic needs (UBN) without investment in the promotion of STI. Thus,
municipalities and governorates begin to endorse and present STI projects
without previous experience. These projects must be submitted to the tech-
nical secretariat of the OCAD13 in charge of Colciencias, which evaluates the
projects through a system of peers. The final decision of approval corre-
sponds to a group made up of representatives of the academy (six universi-
ties), the national government (three ministers, Colciencias and the DNP) and
territorial government (six governors).

On the other hand, research groups and centres of excellence must negotiate
their research projects with the governorates. However, scientists consider
that the political interests of the governorates leave aside the basic quality cri-
teria of any research project. Likewise, regional governments do not approve
the evaluation mechanisms used by Colciencias, nor the amount of time Col-
ciencias needs for the approval of projects, maintaining that the approval sys-
tem as a whole is inefficient. Paradoxically, Colciencias has managed to
reach a higher level in the institutional structure within the State, but it has lost

12 National Development Plan 2010. Colombia.

13 Collegiate Body of Administration and Decision.

15
the capacity to govern the resources with which the system of science, tech-
nology and innovation counts on. This last issue has been heavily criticized by
Colciencias’ historical ally, the academy:

... we all applaud the decision to allocate 10% of royalties to science,

technology and innovation. But it turns out that these resources will be
spent in full on regional projects. This is contradictory to the policy of
innovation that has been adopted by the government itself and with
simple common sense. Most of the programs and projects of an effi-
cient innovation system are national in scope and are not tied to a por-
tion of the territory. We all hoped that the additional resources required
by Colciencias, Bancóldex and other innovation policy programs would
come out of this 10%. Thus another great opportunity was wasted (Per-
ry, 2012).

Although in general terms the country praised the increase in resources for
STI, the fact that STI investments are to be maintained through the mining
boom, implying non-renewable and unsustainable resources in the long term,
instead of having an allocation of the national budget, has been heavily criti-
cized (Salazar, 2013).

As a result of the new strategies and controversies to obtain the resources for
STI, the academy has lost its confidence in the institutionality that had been
constructed in 50 years of public policy. In spite of the fact that the academy
managed to mobilize its agenda in the formation of the National System of
Science, Technology and Innovation, it is the private sector that profited at the
end. The latter greatly benefited from the change of policy having innovation
turn towards the productive sector with the creation of the National System of
Competitiveness, Science, Technology and Innovation (SNCCTI) that subor-
dinates STI policy to competitiveness. In short, the vast majority of govern-
ment actors still act in coherence with business interests, if it is possible to
use analogy, as an expression of a State structured towards capital (Tilly,
1993).

16
Perspective of policy networks
The analysis of differences in STI policy change in Ecuador and Colombia
contributes to comparative studies that use policy networks as an explanatory
variable (Marsh & Smith, 2000; Montpetit, 2005; Toke, 2003).

Figure 4: Comparison of STI policies in Colombia and Ecuador

Trigger Principle Model Instruments

Colombia Policy window: Productive Deepening of the Law 1286

change of innovation Sábato triangle
government
Ecuador Institutionalization Institutionalization of Creation of
2006
of STI public policy the linear model SENESCTY
and Yachay

Networks show the structure of the relations established by actors and institu-
tions during the change of public policy, and this structure is fundamental to
understand the programmatic ideas of the actors, their preferences and the
negotiations of influence and domination that they exercise between each
other (Knoke, 1993). In both cases we took the change of government in 2006
as the policy window that allowed the STI policy change. In Ecuador this win-
dow contributed to the institutionalization of policy through the linear model,
with new governmental entities and projects like Yachay. In Colombia, this
policy window helped to turn public policy towards productive innovation and
the deepening of the Sábato triangle through Law 1286.

These preferences help to explain decision-making processes and the selec-

tion of instruments in policy change. Through the political networks of both
countries, we can see the distribution of power and the conflicts of the past
that have influenced the present results of public policy, including the actors’
strategic learning (Hay, 1995). Policy networks also institutionalize the actors'
values and belief systems, and from their structure, they can even shape their
attitudes and behaviors. In this sense, they are carriers of agency and main-
tain a vision of the world that functions as a structural limitation derived from a

17
common culture that conditions the action of the members of the network.
That is why it is so important to understand how patterns of behavior within
the network are produced, reproduced, and changed. The agents’ prefer-
ences and their discursive constructions help to generate the limits and oppor-
tunities that the structure of the network offers, and at the same time, the
structure of the network conditions such preferences and discourses (Marsh
and Smith, 2000).

These characteristics are structural characteristics and not simple attributes of

the nodes of the network. This allows us to overcome Dowding's (1995, 2001)
criticism that the explanatory capacity of networks is low because it usually
focuses on analyzing the actors’ individual attributes. Although it is inevitable
to present their individual attributes, the analysis of networks only does so
once the actors’ information is contextualized. In other words, the preferences
and programmatic ideas of an individual actor are constructed in relation to
the other actors in the network with whom he or she has a relationship over a
period of time. Thus, networks and not actors are the ones that explain the
policy change.

We have used the same network-building strategy in both countries in order to

allow their comparison, since the way a network is built influences the struc-
tural behaviors that can be inferred from it. In this work networks have been
constructed to account for the trajectory of public policy change, so the small
world network model with a high degree of clustering has not been used
(Watts, 1998). This is due to the fact that the model is ahistorical and symmet-
rical, which does not allow us to account for how power stabilizes within the
network. The nonrandom network model of preferential connections, known
as free-loop networks (Barabási, 1999), has not been used either. This is be-
cause the latter, albeit historical and capable of model influence (a more rec-
ognized node is more likely to construct a new association), privileges the
construction of the network from the nodes and not from within the relation-
ships.
In this case, the analysis focuses on the associations because it is in them
that we can trace the influence and domination that some actors have over

18
others. We have built the network from the direct relationship between nodes
that have achieved an association that has influenced the change of public
policy. These are non-directed relationships, and they do not have statistical
weight as only their existence is valued, thus each node represents a relevant
actor of the business sector, academia, government, or of international organ-
isms, and the basic relationships it has established with the other actors.

In our comparative study we used three network characteristics to explain the

change in STI policy in Ecuador and Colombia: cohesion, degree of openness
and intermediation. With them we show the stabilization of the power of one of
the networks over others in one case, and the reordering of power with the
inclusion of a new network in the other. Network characteristics are closely
related and cannot be understood separately. For example, the lower the de-
gree of openness in the State actors’ network, the lower the degree of influ-
ence the academia or the private sector will secure. Therefore, the whole
network and not its individual characteristics serve as an independent variable
(Montpetit, 2005).

Policy networks as an explanation of policy differences

Both Ecuador and Colombia present two major policy networks that absorb
various types of actors. Ecuador, for example, has on the one hand, the gov-
ernmental network that includes State actors, international actors with whom it
negotiates, and the private sector. On the other hand, it has the academic
network that includes the actors of the higher education system, the universi-
ties, as well as the network’s self-governing entities before the change of STI
policy occurred. In the Colombian case, the academic network also includes,
besides organizations of the higher education sector, certain State actors.
Moreover, in Colombia the network of companies includes the actors of the
productive private sector and several State actors as well, creating a set of
actors that manage to influence change of public policy with greater force than
the academic network.

Figure 5: STI policy networks from Ecuador and Colombia

19
Countries Ecuador Colombia

Policy Government Academia Private sector Academia

networks

Key actors YachayEP SES CNCI Colciencias

SENESCYT YachayTech CRC MEN

SENACYT Universities CPC CPNCyT

CES CONESUP Presidencia CDCTI

SENPLADES CONEA CIGR ACIET

BancóIdex CPL ACUN

EmprendEcuador DNP

CreEcuador MinCom

InnovaEcuador CMN

Prometeo CGN

CEAACES CTPDP

MCPEC CTCTI

CIP MInTIC

Vice-presidency ComEje

CONACYT ProColombia

FUNDACYT MinAgr

PB CONFECA-
Private sector MARAS

Rafael Correa PTP

AN CPSCI

INEC Sena

MCCTH ANDI

20
 Countries Ecuador Colombia

MCE SAC

KSP Bancóldex

IFEZ

INNOPOLIS

The networks are based on the path of the policy described above for each
country and the assessment of the relevance of the actors from a process of
interpretation of the sources (Latour, 2005). For example in the case of Co-
lombia, the sources refer to various universities that participate in the debates,
but we refer to the guild as a conglomerate of university interests. The inter-
pretation also has to do with the levels in the decision-making process. For
instance, this is the case of the SNCCTI, in which there are various decision-
making committees, but the sources refer to the system as a whole.

Multiplicity of networks

Figures six and seven present the graphs of the policy networks’ associations
established by type of actor on the moment of the decision-making during the
policy change. Furthermore, in figure eight the networks of each country are
compared in terms of node types, cohesion and density coefficients. Factors
that are descriptive of the Ecuadorian and Colombian networks allowing us to
observe which actors have the most capacity of making decisions, which ones
become more peripheral, and what kind of model they favor.

Figure 6: Ecuador policy network

21
State actors—— Academia —— International actors ——Private sector ——

Figure 7: Colombia's policy network

22
 State actors—— Academia —— Private sector—

Figure 8: Ecuador and Colombia Networks

Ecuadorian network Colombian network

No. of relations = 65 No. of relations = 100

No. of nodes = 31 No. of nodes = 56

Government: 70,97% Government: 80,36%

Private sector: 9,68% Private sector: 14,29%

Academia: 16.13% Academia: 5,36%

International: 3,23%

Global coefficient of cohesion = 0,568 Global coefficient of cohesion = 0,087

Coefficient of density = 0.140 Coefficient of density = 0.064

A very similar feature, even notorious when looking at the graphs, is that in
both the government actors prevail: approximately 71% of the nodes of Ecua-
dor and 80% of the nodes of Colombia. It should be noted that in the case of
Ecuador, international actors are 3.2% of the nodes of the network and re-
spond to government interests, which could show the increase of State action
through its strategic action. In any case, the privilege of government actors
refers to a State-led top-down policy model that seeks to organize decision-
making related to policy change through the redesign of strategic instruments
and actions (Hall, 1993).

In both countries the policy instruments are forged in institutional building

spaces and, in turn, reinforce the institutionality that defines the strategic play
of the other relevant actors. In Colombia we can see a path of continuity of the

23
top-down model with a greater incidence of the actors of the business sector
in policy change. In the case of Ecuador, the change is even more profound
because it shows the effectiveness of the State's strategies to achieve a
change from the university-run bottom-up model to a top-down model orga-
nized by the State.

The first difference lies in the degrees of influence of academia and the pri-
vate sector. In Ecuador, the academia represents 16.13% of the network
nodes as opposed to 9.68% in the case of the private sector. The preemi-
nence of the academy can help to explain the linear model that underlies the
policy change with greater influence than the private sector in decision-
making. The latter is peripherally linked to State projects such as the Banco
de Ideas, and the ones carried out by the Ministry of Production, Employment
and Competitiveness, far away from the decision-making space. Meanwhile,
the SENESCTY and Yachay are at the core of the decision-making process.

In the case of Colombia, the situation is the opposite since, after the State, the
next group of influence is the private sector with 14.29% of the network
nodes, compared to 5.36% represented by the academia. This situation is ex-
plained by the model of innovation supported by the presidency and the CNC,
which, when imposed, determines the low influence of academia in the deci-
sion-making process. In order to strengthen Sábato's triangle, according to
decision makers in 2008, more weight was given to the productive vertex to
balance the old preponderance of the academic sector. In the new situation
the academia’s peripheral action has to do with its historical allies, Colciencias
and the CPNCyT, which are subordinated to the productivity system that em-
bed the STI policy of the country.

Cohesion
We start from the basis that a network that can hold cohesive subgroups of
actors with close relationships that enables them to share information, create
solidarity and act collectively (Granovetter, 1983). A highly cohesive group is
likely to make decisions in a corporate manner with the participation of all its
members and to exclude from decision-making all those who do not consider

24
members of the community. Structural aspects associated with cohesion can
be represented from the direct relationships between nodes that form groups,
in that they establish "nuclei" of at least one triad, and can be qualified in func-
tion of the density of the relationships they establish. The coefficient of cohe-
sion that characterizes the network (clustering) can be obtained from the co-
hesion degrees of the local groups and can reach the value (1) when all its
nodes are directly related, or it can have value (0) when the network does not
have cohesion.

At the comparative level, the overall coefficient of cohesion from (0) to (1)
shows a large difference between the two countries, with 0.568 in Ecuador
and 0.087 in Colombia. What this means is that the policy network in Ecuador
is more cohesive and decisions are more likely to be taken from groups of
"comrades" that establish consensus among the actors in the network. The
policy network in Colombia is less cohesive and fewer consensuses are to be
expected in decision-making within the network. The implication of the indica-
tor in relation to policy networks is that it shows who makes decisions in each
country, in terms of policy communities (Marsh and Rodhes, 1992).

The k-core groups allow searching for the groups with the highest number of
nodes with a high degree of cohesion (figure 9). In the Colombian network
there are no groups with a k greater than 5, and there is only one 5-core
group made up of 11 nodes. This means that in the 11-nod core, each nod is
associated with at least 5 other nodes. As for the affiliation in the 5-core
group, government actors (9) prevail, and complement private sector actors
(2), which excludes academia type nodes from the core. As shown by the in-
termediation coefficient, actors that belong to the core are highly influential in
decision-making. This implies that the same core has a high degree of influ-
ence and constitutes the power group that adopts the relevant public policy
decisions. That in this case consolidates the government-business relation-
ship and excludes the academia.

Figure 9: higher k-core in Ecuador and Colombia networks

25
 Ecuadorian network Colombian network

Groups with greater cohesion: 1 single Groups with greater cohesion: 1 single
4-core group 5-core group

In the Ecuadorian network there are no groups with a k greater than 4, and
there is only one 4-core group composed by 10 nodes, implying that each of
the 10 nodes is linked to at least 4 others. The core is made up of government
(6) and academia (4) nodes. The core excludes the nodes of the private sec-
tor, as well as international entities. The fundamental difference in relation to
the core in Colombia is its influence in relation to the intermediation coeffi-
cient. High-influence nodes such as private companies do not belong to the
core, which weakens their degree of influence in the decision-making process.

Degree of openness
At the global level, the cohesion indicator also makes it possible to assess the
openness of networks. The Colombian network has a lower coefficient of co-
hesion than the Ecuadorian network, making it more open. This characteristic
is also seen in the density indicator of each network: 0.064 in the case of Co-
lombia and 0.140 in Ecuador. The policy network in Ecuador is more closed
because it is denser (figure 8). This has implications for the possibility of new
players being involved in decision-making. The more closed a larger subgroup
becomes the higher the possibility is of sharing programmatic ideas, political
preferences and reaching a consensus. More open subgroups must deal with
greater controversy and more complex decision-making environments (Knoke
& Song, 2008).

The lower cohesion and lower density of the Colombian network also implies
a lesser degree of consensus in the decision-making process in relation to the
case of Ecuador, since as proposed by Rhodes (2008), there is less integra-
tion in terms of consensus, continuity and frequency of interaction in groups.
The network with less cohesion has greater difficulties in reaching a consen-
sus because, although there are general agreements, conflict is always pre-

26
sent, which is not always resolved without domination schemes. Moreover, as
Rhodes shows, it is very likely that greater cohesion will imply unequal powers
in decision-making, which explains why in the case of Colombia there is a
more hierarchical network than in the case of Ecuador.

Intermediation

Intermediation evaluates the strength of a group and its nodes based on their
immediate interactions. The intermediation has to do with the degree of influ-
ence of a node at the meso level, that is, with becoming an “obligatory pas-
sage point” (Latour, 1987) in the path between two nodes. The way in which
this meso level links itself to a large-scale macro level constitutes a second
dimension of influence, what Latour calls "action at a distance" (1987). This
second level is qualified through the centrality coefficient of intermediation of
each node that measures the number of times that appears in the shortest
path between two other nodes. When comparing this coefficient in relation to
all the nodes of the network we can observe how the power is distributed with-
in the network, which translates into the form of government of the network.
The distribution pattern that makes up the nodes organized from highest to
lowest can be understood as an indication of how the political capacities are
distributed among the actors of the network. Therefore, a pattern that ac-
counts for its management model: governability when it is hierarchical and
governance when a horizontal pattern is formed.

Figure ten presents the coefficients for each node of the actors of Ecuador
and Colombia. In the Ecuadorian case the network is less hierarchical than in
its neighboring country. In Colombia, the power of intermediaries is highly
concentrated in the National Commission for Competitiveness and Innovation
(CNCI), an obligatory passage point (Latour, 1987) that also belongs to the 5-
core. This also shows its direct influence on decision-making. Moreover, it al-
so implies that it is very likely that all nodes that were excluded from the core,
namely the academia, will be excluded from decision-making altogether.

27
This is less so the case in Ecuador. The power of intermediation is distributed
more evenly and several actors like the private sector are shown to be highly
relevant even though they don’t belong to the 4-core. It is clear that power is
not only concentrated in the group of greater cohesion. That is a reason why it
is possible to assume less exclusion in the Ecuadorian network at the moment
of implementing a policy change.

Figure 10: actors with higher intermediation

Conclusions

Policy networks function as an independent variable enabling us to explain

collective processes in decision-making. This is because they allow us to ana-
lyze the context of policy change, the regrouping of actors and the displace-
ment of alliances in the processes of influence and domination that are estab-
lished between groups. As we have seen, there are triggers that contribute to
changing the nature of relationships between actors over time.

In both Ecuador and Colombia, the policy window of the change of govern-
ment in 2006 allowed the opening and closing of policy networks and the cre-
ation of exclusionary patterns that explain how academia ended up outside
the decision-making space in Colombia, and how the private sector remained
in the periphery of Ecuadorian networks. These are exclusions which are
manifested through political discourses, but mainly through the selection of

28
instruments and strategies chosen by the actors in power (Bressers and
O'toole, 1998).

The structure of networks is the reflection of a management model and reso-

lution of the controversies that is institutionalized. This also shows the strong
political impact that the nature of the relations between the actors can have. In
both countries, STI policy is fundamental to legitimize the notion that econom-
ic development and social welfare can be achieved through science, technol-
ogy, and innovation (Jasanoff, 2015). However, it can be seen that the policy
track in Colombia is older. We can observe the change from the linear model
with which the STI policy was born to the strong institutionalization of the
Sábato triangle since 2006. The most recent STI policy in Ecuador still focus-
es on the linear model, which without achieving its change, is institutionalized
through the centralization of policy in the State.

The quantitative analysis we have used has allowed us to explain that struc-
tural differences in policy networks can be measured empirically. To this end,
we have given priority to the measures of cohesion, openness, and intermedi-
ation to study how power works within networks the moment a policy change
occurs. The behavior of the more closed networks shows us that power is
centralized in the actors and that these actors do not need to be internally ver-
tical to reach a consensus. Such is the case in Ecuador, where the network of
State actors is rather closed, reducing the influence of actors of the academia
and the private sector. On the other hand, in more open networks there is a
greater diversity of actors, which means that more negotiations must be car-
ried out to maintain power and achieve consensus. This difficulty in maintain-
ing power forces the stronger actors to be more internally vertical to close the
controversies. In Colombia, although there are many State actors, they have
to deal with more complex decision-making environments. This is due to the
high capacity of influence that businesses achieve at the moment of establish-
ing consensus and permeates the network with their programmatic ideas and
political preferences.

29
By focusing on the associations and not on the characteristics of the nodes
we can observe the dynamics of influence and domination of some actors
over others. By measuring the degree of influence of a node through its inter-
mediation capacity, we see which actors become obligatory passage points
and which can act at a distance in the decision-making process (Latour,
1987). In other words, actors who become obligatory passage points for deci-
sion-making have a greater chance of selecting the instruments that allow
them to retain power (Bressers and O'toole, 1998). Once the instrument is
implemented, it begins to function to consolidate the power of the actors.

Why is this analysis important? First, because, as we have pointed out from
the beginning, networks can explain a change in public policy. A central find-
ing in formal network analysis is that the network structure emerges in differ-
ent cases because they are governed by the same organizational principles
(Barabási & Réka, 1999), which we see in the cases of Ecuador and Colom-
bia. Secondly, because this type of quantitative analysis contributes to com-
parative public policy studies. If networks are governed by the same organiza-
tional principles, structural differences can be understood as variations of the
universal characteristics of the whole network, which can be measured empir-
ically and allows a comparison.

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