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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 203
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204 THE JOUIRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 205
obvious that the speaker will do the act that fulfills the promise in the
normal course of events. Another rule, again on a par, says that the
promisee wants the speaker to fulfill the promise. These conditions
can be shown not to be a part of the grammar of 'promise', but merely
aspects of contexts that speakers normally take into consideration in
their use of language. Note that such conditions, in contrast to the
obligation and future-act conditions, need not be satisfied in straight-
forward literal uses of 'promise'. Typically, pledges and oaths (which
are promises) are given when it is obvious that the speaker will do the
act(s)-e.g., honest Abe's oath-and a promise can be made when the
last thing in the world that the promisee wants is to see it fulfilled-
e.g., a student promises to finish a three-hundred-page paper by the
end of the semester, so that the professor can read it over the vacation
(PSIF 34-36, 150-152).
If these considerations are right, Searle's speech act theory can be
divided up in this way and its rules parceled out, on the one hand, to a
theory of the grammatical structure of the language and, on the other,
to a theory of how speakers use sentences in different contexts. Given
such a challenge to the speech act tradition and to Searle's own theory
in particular, it is clear why Searle would be bothered about the pros-
pect of sentences having a purely compositional meaning. Such a
prospect underlies the dismemberment of Searle's treatment of mean-
ing and speech acts.
Why should other philosophers bother about the issue? There is the
trivial answer that a large number of philosophers accept something
like Searle's treatment of meaning and speech acts. But there are
deeper reasons for interest in the issue, reasons which apply more
generally.
Underlying speech act theory is the assumption that meaning is
use, that the explanation of the meaning of a word is fundamentally
like an explanation of how we make the proper moves in games or
social practices. This assumption has been adopted, in one form or
another, by a large and influential number of philosophers in con-
temporary Anglo-American philosophy, including Wittgenstein,
Ryle, Strawson, and Dummett, and it has been exploited by them in
areas as diverse as the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of
mathematics.
To take one recent illustration, Michael Dummett uses the equa-
tion of meaning with use to ground his constructivist philosophy of
mathematics.5 The use theory provides the general semantic under-
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206 THE JOUIRNAL OF PHIIOSOPHY
'For example, Searle says that the preparatory ruLle for assertion is that the
speaker has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of the assertion (Speech Acts, 64);
and H. P. Grice ["Logic and Conversation," in P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, eds., Syn-
tax and Semantics 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 46] introduces the "su-
permaxim" under the category quality: "Try to make your contribution one that is
true," and, more specifically, "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not
say that for which you lack adequate evidence."
'Paul Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," this JOURNAL, LXX, 19 (Nov. 8, 1973):
661-677.
8"What Is a Theory of Meaning?", in Mind and Language (New York: Oxford,
1975), pp. 100/1. Dummett writes, "Any theory of meaning which was not, or did not
immediately yield, a theory of understanding, would not satisfy the purpose for which,
philosophically, we require a theory of meaning. For I have argued that a theory of
meaning is required to make the workings of language open to view. To know a lan-
guage is to be able to employ a language." See also his sequel, "What Is a Theory of
Meaning (II)," in G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (New York:
Oxford, 1976), pp. 67-137.
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 207
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208 THE JOUJRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 209
. . .to say "I promise to . . ." -to issue, as we say, this performative
utterance-just is the act of making a promise; not, as we see, at all a mys-
terious act. And it may seem at once quite obvious that an utterance of
this kind can't be true or false (23).
The problem that has been inherited from Wittgenstein's and Austin's
criticism of the Fregean tradition in logical theory is whether this tra-
dition with all its obvious advantages has to be abandoned as an ap-
proach to the logical structure of natural language because its too
limited conception of logical form cannot shed light on the logic of
promising, asking, requesting, advising, and the other performative
aspects of natural language.
There have been two responses to this problem, one from those in-
fluenced by Frege and Russell and the other from those influenced by
Wittgenstein and Austin. The former, as might be expected, holds on
to the constative conception of logical form, either maintaining
Frege's theory without fundamental revision or adopting an exten-
sionalist theory like that of Quine or Davidson, and tries to solve the
problem by squeezing promise-sentences, question-sentences, re-
quest-sentences, and other performatives into some constative mold
within its traditional conception of logical form. Sometimes these
philosophers claim that performative sentences are really constatives
in grammar and use; sometimes they claim that such sentences are
constative in grammar but performative in use. Also, as might be ex-
pected, the response of those influenced by Wittgenstein and Aus-
tin-what might be called the solution of "ordinary language philos-
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210 THE JOIJRNAI OF PHILOSOPHY
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 211
for both constative sentences like "I promised to go" and performa-
tive sentences like "I promise to go" (see PSIF, 25-36).
The Fregean tradition's solution sacrifices the insights of Wittgen-
stein and Austin about the kinds of sentences in natural language
and, in consequence, makes false claims about natural language. Witt-
genstein and Austin were simply right about natural languages. It is
false to claim that sentences like "I hereby apologize for not phoning
you," "I wish you a happy birthday," "I congratulate you on your
elegant solution," etc. are true or false on their standard, literal uses.
The falsehood of such claims is reflected in the fact that sentences like
"Bernard's apology for not phoning is true" are quite absurd-un-
less, of course, they are taken, as they are not intended to be taken, to
mean ". . . rings true" (false apologies are not false in the truth-value
sense, but are simply insincere apologies, like false promises).
Furthermore, the attempt on the part of some philosophers to pre-
serve a uniform constative treatment of all sentences and still do jus-
tice to performativeness by consigning performativeness to pragmat-
ics suffers from the same implausibility as the attempt to squeeze
performatives into constative logical forms. In a typical attempt of
this kind, Kent Bach'" argues that, although performative sentences
are grammatically assertions, they can be used performatively on the
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212 THE JOI'RNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
But how can (2) be used as an assumption of the argument? The ques-
tion at issue is whether it is true to claim that what a speaker is doing
in ordering (apologizing, congratulating, etc.) is makinga statement.
One can hardly show, contrary to the strong Austinian intuition cited
above, that performatives are constatives, too, using an argument
with a premise that is implausible on the basis of these very intuitions
[e.g., "Virginia's request for you to go is true (false)"]. (For further
arguments, see PSIF, 75-77 and 170-177.)
My aim has been to show that neither of the two widely accepted
solutions is optimal and to indicate where there is room for im-
provement. In a nutshell, a better solution would avoid the vices of
both the Fregean and the ordinary language solutions while incorpo-
rating their virtues. Unlike the former, it would not ignore the logical
features of performatives, but would try to find a way of exploiting
Wittgenstein's and Austin's insights to get at the grammatical basis of
speech acts in the use of natural languages. Unlike the latter, it would
not abandon formalization and theory or adopt a questionable use
theory of meaning, but would try to find a way of extending the for-
mal explication of how laws of logic apply to sentences in natural
language which succeeds in accounting for the logical features of per-
formative sentences.
The last of my reasons for claiming that the issue of the existence of
context-free sentence meaning has general philosophical interest is,
then, that its existence makes possible a better solution. Starting with
the notion of sentence meaning, independent of context and compo-
sitionally determined, we can build a rich enough conception of the
semantics of natural language to allow us to place the blame for the
logical fallacies Frege cites in his doctrine of the imperfection of natu-
ral languages where the blame rightly belongs, namely, on the imper-
fection of language users. Thus, for example, we do not blame the
English language for fallacious inferences like that from "Sam likes
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 213
old wine and women" to "Sam likes old women," any more than we
blame a wrong turn on the fork in the road. We can reject Frege's doc-
trine and program of constructing a logically perfect language, and
in their place we can put Wittgenstein's doctrine that natural lan-
guages need no subliming and our own program of constructing a
scientific theory of compositional sentence meaning. Therefore, a
kind of conceptual notation may be developed as the representation
system for meaning in such a theory. But the notation would be em-
ployed not to reform or perfect a natural language, only to state the
compositional meaning of sentences just as it is in the language.
Now, since the meaning of performative sentences has special fea-
tures and since such a notation has to state them just as they are in the
language, an adequate notation has to represent both the semantic
connections between performative and constative sentences, e.g.,
those discussed above in connection with (a)-(c), and the logical fea-
tures of performative sentences, such as the analyticity of (6):
16I have argued extensively elsewhere for the elimination of the standard distinction
between logical and extralogical vocabulary. See, for example, "Where Things Now
Stand with the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction," Synthese, xxviii, 3 (November 1974):
283-319.
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214 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 215
" Since writing PSIF, I have changed my view of what the grammar of a language,
and hence the semantic component, is a theory of. I no longer think it is a theory of the
ideal speaker-hearer's knowledge of the language, but of the language itself. See my
Language and Other Abstract Ob jects. I have maintained the original framework be-
cause, from the point of view of the present controversy, this change is an unnecessary
complica tLion.
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216 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
18 This theory is compatible with a wide range of views about the true pragmat
principles. In particular, it is easy to see how, for example, principles like those of H. P.
Grice and other perlocutionary theorists can be adapted as principles for determining
utterance meaning in the above sense. See Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in P. Cole
and J. Morgan, eds., Syntax and Semantics 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp.
41-58. Note, however, that the adaptation is not without difficulties; see Katz and D.
T. Langendoen, "Pragmatics and Presupposition," Language, Lll (1976): 1-17.
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 217
9There have been some unnecessary confusions about this notion which can be
cleared up here. The notion, adapted from the anonymous-letter situation that Jerry
Fodor and I introduced in our "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," Language, xxxIx
(1963): 170-210, is also formulated as an idealization. It was defined as a context whose
features provide no relevant information for choosing a compositional meaning as the
utterance meaning different from the compositional meaning of the sentence used. The
notion of a null context generalizes the anonymous-letter situation in the form of an
idealized context containing no basis for a departure from sentence-meaning, in which
semantic competence fully determines utterance meaning. Thus, Harnish's criticism
in "Meaning and Speech Acts," Lingua, IL (1979): 349-350, is based on a confusion.
Harnish says that my conditions for performativeness "cannot be satisfied in the null
context because in such a context there is nothing but the sentence itself" (350). This is
an unwarranted construal of my term 'null'. 'Null' was used to mean not void, but
merely lacking in information on which to base a departure from sentence-meaning.
Harnish's criticism is like saying that the conditions for Salviati's test of Galileo's hy-
pothesis about free-falling bodies cannot be satisfied because in an idealized experi-
ment there is no surface for a ball to roll down.
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218 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 219
of the matter, "The cat is on the mat" is simply false in the case at
hand; the cat is not on the mat if there is no up-and-down orientation.
Searle, though he doesn't consider this response, would, I suspect,
reject it because he takes falsehood to depend on orientation. I take it
that he thinks that truth consists in the cat's position being over the
mat, so that the bottom of a rightside-up cat touches the top of the
mat, and falsehood consists in the cat's position being under the mat
so that the bottom of the mat touches the bottom of an upside-down
cat (or in some other similar setup). Since I have some sympathy for
this conception of falsehood, I have no inclination to press the afore-
mentioned criticism. Rather, I wish to challenge the supposition that
these examples undermine the thesis that sentences have a composi-
tional meaning independent of context. As Searle puts it:
These examples are designed to cast doubt on the following thesis: Every
unambiguous sentence, such as "The cat is on the mat" has a literal
meaning which determines for every context whether or not an utterance
of that sentence in that context is literally true or false (214).
22 Ithink that, by not sticking closely to the real position, Searle fails to see certain of
its features and in their place reads in claims that it is natural to make on his own use
theory. We will see further examples of this interpolation below.
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220 THE JOtJRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in one place23 that this sharp distinction between sense and reference
is what enables my account of proper names to escape the criticisms
Kripke uses so successfully against Searle, and in another,24 that this
conception of meaningfulness, coupled with Frege's account of the
conditions under which a sentence bears a truth value, provides the
best treatment of statementhood.
The meaningfulness of a constative sentence is, on my view, its hav-
ing at least one sense,25 whereas its statementhood is its having a
sense whose referring terms succeed in referring. This guarantees
that meaningful senses have truth conditions, but allows them to
be unsatisfied without the sentence being ipso facto false: it will
have no truth value in the case in which the objects it is about do
not exist. Therefore, Searle has no right to saddle all positions that
claim the existence of context-free compositional meaning (and in
particular the position that makes use of a zero or null context)
with the further claim that compositional meaning "determines for
every context whether or not an utterance of that sentence in that
context is literally true or false."
The sentence "The cat is on the mat" has a literal compositional
meaning. Unlike "Itches drink theorems," its selectional relations are
in order. Its meaning is, roughly, that some (contextually specified)
cat is vertically positioned over some (contextually specified) mat and
that the aforementioned cat is also positioned so that its bottom is in
contact with the top of the mat. Thus, a use of "The cat is on the mat"
is true if and only if such is the case with respect to cat and mat. In
Searle's examples, uses of the sentence are neither true nor false be-
cause, given the absence of up and down in outer space, neither the
sentence-world relation required for truth nor the sentence-world re-
lation required for falsehood obtains. But there is nothing wrong
with this, providing one is not committed to thinking of meanings
as fully determining use-in particular, the statementhood, of
sentences.26
As a use theorist, Searle is committed to this way of thinking; his
mistake here is to read it into the positions he is criticizing. When he
considers the possibility of his opponent's distinguishing the "de-
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 221
. we could treat this condition as a further stage direction for the ap-
plication of the sentence, but still the stage direction would be part of the
literal meaning, at least in the sense that they would be made completely
explicit in the semantic analysis of the sentence (212).
. it has not been fulfilled or obeyed because that is not what I meant in
my literal utterance of the sentence (though again it is easy to imagine
variations in our background assumptions where we would say that the
order had been obeyed) (211).
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222 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
does not require him to specify that the hamburger not be encased in
lucite, etc. but only to use 'hamburger' nonfiguratively (more on
this below) and in accord with the obvious expectations of all con-
cerned. The supporter of absolutely context-free sentence meaning
does not deny that background assumptions reflecting such expecta-
tions and other contextual information shape the meaning of sen-
tence uses in actual speech; such shaping is an essential part of the
notion of a non-null context. The supporter denies only that such
background assumptions are relevant to the meaning of sentences in
the language. Only if Searle is conflating what the language user's
utterance of a sentence means in speech with the quite distinct matter
of what the sentence used means in the language could he think that
such examples cast doubt on the notion of an absolutely context-free
sentence meaning. Searle's phraseology in the above quote, viz.,
"what I meant in my literal utterance of the sentence" (italics mine) is
a dead give-away.
Searle's mistake is particularly clear in his claim that
. it is hard to see how the sentence [(8)] could have quite the same obe-
dience conditions if these institutions [restaurants, money, etc.] did not
exist (215).
. . one and the same semantic content, expressed by the word 'cut', oc-
curs in each sentence; and yet it seems to make a different contribution to
the truth conditions of the sentence in each case (223).
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 223
Why does Searle think the semantic content of 'cut' makes different
contributions to the truth conditions of (10) and ( 11)? Because, as he
puts it,
The sort of thing that constitutes cutting the grass is quite different from,
e.g., the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a cake. One way to see this is
to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to cut something. If some-
one tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it with a knife, or if I
am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a lawn mower, in each
case I will have failed to obey the order. That is not what the speaker
meant by his literal and serious utterance of the sentence (223, italics
mine).
28 Searle considers three possible replies: 'cut' is ambiguous; like a variable function
in mathematics; and vague (BM, 224/5). My view of the semantic contribution of 'cut'
is different from all three. I agree with Searle that 'cut' occurs unambiguously in the
sentences (10) and (11). I do not think that 'cut' is like a variable function in the sense
"the word 'cut' has different interpretations in 1-5. . . determined by the different ar-
guments-grass, hair, cake, skin and cloth" (BM, 224). I think it has, throughout, the
one sense mentioned in the text, but that, as with compositionality in general, who and
what performs the action expressed in the verb and what it is performed on derive from
the meanings of subjects and objects. [Thus the fact that in (10) the action is performed
on the individual grass plants, but the success is specified in terms of effect on the area
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224 THE JOIJRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
for which they collectively constitute ground cover is a consequence of the meaning of
the object "grass."] Finally, I see no reason to say that 'cut' is vague, but I agree with the
third reply's emphasis on the divergence of what a speaker means in a certain context
from what the sentence means in the language. Searle's objections to this reply seem to
me without force. The first simply ignores the fact that all theories of compositionality
employ selectional restrictions to weed out anomalous combinations of senses. A sen-
tence like "Max cut the sun" (BM, 225) is semantically anomalous because the selec-
tional restriction on the object of 'cut' requires that there be a solid object for the opera-
tion to be performed on. (Note that, accordingly, there is no reason to say that "Sam cut
the coffee" is anomalous, since the object can refer to a cube of frozen coffee; it is hard to
see why Searle thinks there is any problem about "Bill cut the mountain.") The second
objection rests on the language/language use confusion. So what if "cut the cake" lit-
erally applies to the use of a lawnmower to produce cake slices? Such applications are
only "crazy misunderstandings" if someone takes them to be the proper way to inter-
pret the speaker in context, which in our view is another matter. The third objection is
irrelevant. The view being criticized does not claim that, in actual performance, the
speaker always follows a strict ordering from sentence meaning to speaker's utterance
meaning. No doubt the speaker sometimes short-cuts the process. But even if we did
make this claim, Searle gives no reason to show that it is implausible.
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 225
There are certain jobs that we want the notion of meaning to do for us; it
connects in all sorts of systematic ways with our theory of language and
with our pretheoretical beliefs about language. Meaning is tied to our
notions of truth conditions, entailment, inconsistency, understanding,
and a host of other semantic and mental notions (220).
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226 THE JOUJRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
3 I do not wish to give the impression that Searle is unaware of this tighter notion of
meaning or that he has not previously criticized it or that these criticisms were left tin-
answered. The reader is referred to his "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," The
New York Review of Books, 1972; reprinted in G. Harman, ed., On Noam Chomsky
(New York: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 27-30. One needs only to be informed that
Searle's circumlocution "the semantic theory of Chomsky's grammar" and similar
phrases refer to the theory of meaning that I have developed over the years. For my re-
plies to Searle's criticisms in this article, see my "Logic and Language: An Examilna-
tion of Recent Criticisms of Intensionalism," pp. 107-120 and PSIF, 25-28. These re-
joinders remain unanswered.
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 227
(12) That's a fine way to treat your devoted parents, letting them go
without food and shelter and laughing at their plight.
He writes:
Even here, however, it appears that certain assumptions about the nature
of mathematical operations such as addition must be made in order to
apply the literal meaning of the sentence (219).
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228 THE JOIJRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
. one might reply. . that these assumptions are in a sense part of the
meaning of the sentence (219).
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 229
32Searle's discussion (BM, 230/1) of "Snow is white" adds nothing to the controversy.
His new example is merely a variant on Hilary Putnam's original set of examples in "Is
Semantics Possible?" Metaphilosophy, i, 3 (July 1970): 212-218. Searle seems com-
pletely unaware of the problems that have been raised about such examples in the re-
sponse to Putnam, for example, "The Neoclassical Theory of Reference" and earlier
studies such as "Logic and Language: An Examination of Recent Criticisms of Inten-
sionalism" and my "A Proper Theory of Names," Philosophical Studies, XXXI, 1 (Jan-
uary 1977): 1-80.
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230 THE JOLTRNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
saying
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 231
His target at that time was Grice's original formulation of the perlo-
cutionary notion of meaning. Searle introduced a clever counterex-
ample to show that Grice's claim that non-natural meaning is
"always a derived form of intentionality" does not account for the
meaning of sentences determined in their grammatical structure,
Searle's example was that of an American soldier in the Second World
War who addresses his Italian captors with an utterance of (15):
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232 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
land where the lemon trees bloom?", but the utterance can mean
this only by virtue of its being a use of a sentence with this com-
positional meaning.
It is hardly credible that the conventions that pair the German sen-
tence (15) with the meaning "Knowest thou the land where the lemon
trees bloom?" depend on background assumptions common to con-
texts such as the situation of the American soldier in Searle's ex-
ample, the high school German class that he attended, various cir-
cumstances where sentimental German poetry is read, etc. There
are no background assumptions common to such contexts that can
explain the literal meaning of (15) and its utterances. Moreover, it
seems quite straightforward that the literal meaning of (15) and its
utterances is to be accounted for compositionally as a function of
the meanings of the German words 'kennst', 'du', etc., their posi-
tions in the sentence, and its interrogative form. Hence, talk about
intentions and background assumptions expressing information
about context is idle, and, accordingly, it is to be excluded by Oc-
cam's razor from a scientific account of meaning in natural
language.
III
I have dealt at length with Searle's arguments, first, because they are
the only explicit defense in the literature of the central semantic as-
sumptions of the Wittgensteinian/Austinian approach to performa-
tiveness which comes to grips with a more serious challenge to these
assumptions than the artificial-language approach, and, second, be-
cause they are, from my experience, an accurate expression of what
ordinary language philosophers and many outside this tradition take
to be knock-down arguments against the notion of context-free sen-
tence meaning.
Wittgenstein thought that his critique of Frege's and Russell's the-
ories of meaning and logical form had eliminated all competing the-
ories, leaving only one or another form of the use theory. Supposing
Wittgenstein to be correct, and further that the principal grounds on
which such competition was eliminated is, as the quotes from the
Philosophical Investigations above suggest, that other theories do
not account for the full range and diversity of what natural languages
have the potential to do, the obvious moral is that the exclusion of use
from "conceptual notation" theories is precisely their mistake.
Hence, from the perspective of Wittgenstein's trenchant critique of
Frege and Russell, the use conception of meaning appears a great phil-
osophical breakthrough. Philosophizing about natural language
need no longer be hamstrung by a primitive picture of language that
reflects only a small part of what enables natural languages to func-
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LITERAL MEANING AND LOGICAL THEORY 233
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