Law 426- Problem Areas in Legal Ethics (PALE)

A.M. NO. 19-03-24-SC

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Section 1. Coverage. – This rule shall cover the limited practice of law by students certified herein. The
limited practice of law covers appearances, drafting, and submission of pleadings and documents before
trial and appellate courts and quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, assistance in mediation and other
alternative modes of dispute resolution, legal counselling and advice, and such other activities that may
be covered by the Clinical Legal Education Program of the law school as herein provided.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. –

(a) Clinical Legal Education Program is an experiential, interactive and reflective credit-earning
teaching course with the objectives of providing law students with practical knowledge, skills and values
necessary for the application of the law, delivery of legal services and promotion of social justice and
public interest, especially to the marginalized, while inculcating in the students the values of ethical
lawyering and public service.

It consists of learning activities covered by this Rule undertaken in either a

1. law clinic or an
2. externship, which shall incorporate the teaching of legal theory and doctrines, practical skills, as
well as legal ethics.

(b) Externship is part of the clinical legal educational program if:

A. it allows students to engage in legal work for the marginalized sectors or for the promotion of
social justice and public interest, and
B. it is undertaken with any of the following:
i. the courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), government offices; and
ii. law school-recognized non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

(c) Law Clinic refers to an office or center which is a component of the law school’s clinical legal
education program that renders legal assistance and services as herein provided to eligible persons,
groups, and/or communities.
(d) Law Student Practitioner is a law student certified under Section 3 of this Rule.
(e) Supervising Lawyer refers to a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing who is authorized by
the law school to supervise the law student practitioner under this Rule.

Section 3. Eligibility Requirements of Law Student Practitioners. – No law student shall be permitted to
engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal Education Program of a law school unless the law
student has applied for and secured the following certifications:
(a) Level 1 certification, for law students who have successfully completed their first-year law courses;
and/or
(b) Level 2 certification, for law students currently enrolled for the second semester of their third-year
law courses,
Provided however, where a student fails to complete all their third-year law courses, the Level 2
certification shall be deemed automatically revoked.

The certification issued shall be valid until the student has completed the required number of courses in
the clinical legal education program to complete the law degree, unless sooner revoked for grounds
stated herein.

Section 4. Practice Areas of Law Student Practitioners. – Subject to the supervision and approval, of a
supervising lawyer, a certified law student practitioner may:

For Level 1 certification

(1) Interview prospective clients;
(2) Give legal advice to the client;
(3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client;
(4) Draft legal documents such as affidavits, compromise agreements, contracts, demand letter, position
papers, and the like;
(5) Represent eligible parties before quasi-judicial or administrative bodies;
(6) Provide public legal orientation; and
(7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy formulation and implementation.

For Level 2 certification

(1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification;
(2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing judicial affidavits of witnesses;
(3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the proceedings or trial, before any court, quasi-judicial
or administrative body;
(4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to appear on
behalf of a government agency in the prosecution of criminal actions; and
(5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings required in the case.

Section 5. Certification Application Requirements. – The law student must submit a duly-accomplished
application form under oath in three (3) copies, accompanied by proof of payment of the necessary legal
and filing fees.

The law school, through the dean or the authorized representative, shall submit to the Office of the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) having jurisdiction over the territory where the law
school is located, the duly accomplished application form together with an endorsement under oath.

Level 1 Certification
The Executive Judge of the RTC shall evaluate, approve, and issue the certification within ten (10) days
from receipt of the application.

The Level 1 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies within the judicial region where the school is located.

Level 2 Certification
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the application, the Executive Judge of the RTC shall (a) evaluate the
application together with its attachments, and (b) recommend to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) the approval and issuance of the certification. If the Executive Judge finds the application to be
incomplete, the law school shall be notified and required to comply with the requirements within five
(5) days from receipt of notice.

The Level 2 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial, and
administrative bodies.

Section 6. Duties of Law Student Practitioners. – Acting under a certification, the law student shall:
(a) Observe the provisions of Section 24(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;
(b) Be prohibited from using information acquired in one’s capacity as a law student practitioner for
personal or commercial gain;
(c) Perform the duties and responsibilities to the best of one’s abilities as a law student practitioner; and
(d) Strictly observe the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 7. Use of Law Student Practitioner’s Name. – A law student practitioner may sign briefs,
pleadings, letters, and other similar documents which the student has produced under the direction of
the supervising lawyer, indicating the law student practitioner’s certificate number as required under
this Rule.

Section 8. Law Student Practitioner’s Oath/Affirmation. – A law student who has been issued a
certificate under this Rule must, before performing the activities allowed herein, take an oath in the
following form:

"I, (name), having been granted a certificate of law student practice by the Supreme court under Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a certified law student
practitioner according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to the parties I represent; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."

Section 9. Duties of Law Schools. – The law school, through its dean or authorized representative, must:
(a) Develop and adopt a Clinical Legal Education Program;
(b) Develop and establish at least one law clinic in its school;
(c) Endorse qualified students for certification as law student practitioner under this Rule. Such
endorsement shall constitute as a certification that the dean or authorized representative knows that
the applicant is a student enrolled in the Clinical Legal Education Course, possesses good moral
character, and has met the requirements of Section 3 of this Rule; and
(d) Ensure compliance by law student practitioners and supervising lawyers with the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Section 10. Qualification of Supervising Lawyers. – A supervising lawyer under this Rule shall be a
member of the bar in good standing.

Section 11. Duties of Supervising Lawyers. – The following are the duties of a supervising lawyer:

(a) Supervise such number of certified law student practitioners as far as practicable;
(b) Personally appear with the law student practitioner in all cases pending before
the second-level courts and in all other cases the supervising lawyer determines that his or her presence
is required;
(c) Assume personal responsibility for any work performed by the certified law student practitioner
while under his or her supervision;
(d) Assist and advise the certified law student practitioner in the activities authorized by these rules and
review such activities with the certified law student practitioner, all to the extent required for the proper
practical training of the certified law student practitioner and the protection of the client;

(e) Read, approve, and personally sign any pleadings, briefs or other similar documents prepared by the
certified law student practitioner prior to the filing thereof, and read and approve any documents which
shall be prepared by the certified law student practitioner for execution by the eligible party; and

(f) Provide the level of supervision to the certified law student practitioner required by these rules.

Section 12. Clinical Faculty. – Law schools shall have such number of faculty members to teach clinical
legal education courses as may be necessary to comply with this Rule.

Section 13. Sanctions. – (a) Without prejudice to existing laws, rules, regulations, and circulars, the
following shall be considered as unauthorized practice of law by a certified law student practitioner –

i. Engaging in any of the acts provided in Section 4 of this Rule without the necessary
certification or without the consent and supervision of the supervising lawyer;
ii. Making false representations in the application for certification;
iii. Using an expired certification to engage in the limited practice of law under this
Rule;
iv. Rendering legal services outside the scope of practice areas allowed under
Section 4 of this Rule;
v. Asking for or receiving payment or compensation for services rendered under the
Clinical Legal Education Program as provided in this Rule; and
vi. Such other analogous circumstances.
Unauthorized practice of law shall be ground for revocation of the law student practitioner’s
certification and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar examination for a
period to be determined by the Supreme Court.
(b) The above provisions notwithstanding, any act constituting a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility shall subject the supervising lawyer, Clinical Legal Education
Program head, and/or law school dean to disciplinary action, as the circumstances may
warrant.

Section 14. Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect at the start of Academic year 2020-2021 following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The requirements under second paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 138 as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC dated June 25, 2019 shall apply to bar
examination applicants commencing the 2023 bar examinations.

Alawi vs. Alauya (268 SCRA 628, February 24, 1997)

DOCTRINES:
 1. Judicial Ethics; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Service (R.A. 6713); enunciates
the conduct required of a public servant. — The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA 6713) enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that
“(p)ublic officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest.”

The conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
of the public for the judiciary.

2. Attorney; when use of such title can be considered proper. — Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. The title of “Attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully take the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

FACTS: Complainant Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of a real estate and housing company in
Davao City named E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. (Villarosa & Co.). On the other hand, Respondent
Ashari Alauya was the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City.

With Alawi acting as the sales agent, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to Villarosa & Co.; and in connection therewith, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Later, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company, on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi; making the said contract void ab initio.
Alauya claimed he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, who was his classmate and friend.
He further alleged that:

1. He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi’s assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
2. Despite numerous letters and follow-ups, he still did not know the location of the property
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi’s principal, Villarosa & Co.;
3. Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the
next day, she did not do so until after several months; and
4. In connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the
house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. He asked that Villarosa & Co. agree to the
mutual rescission of the contract.
Alauya also wrote to the Vice-President of the Credit & Collection Group of NHMFC, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions.

Finally, Alauya wrote to the Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, of the Supreme Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts
by Alawi.

In those letters, he also called Alawi an “unscrupulous and swindling sales agent”.

Alawi’s Complaint: On learning of Alauya’s letter to Villarosa & Co., Alawi filed with the Supreme Court a
verified complaint—to which she appended a copy of the letter. In that complaint, Alawi accused Alauya
of:

1. Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;
2. Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation; and
3. Usurpation of the title of “Attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. The notice of resolution was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.

Alauya’s Letters to Atty. Marasigan: Alauya first submitted a “Preliminary Comment”, in which he
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to a “mere Assistant Division Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of
Court”, but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice. He voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a “strong link” between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan’s
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only “the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar” but also “a
scion of a Royal Family”.

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much a less aggressive tone, Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated that
his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law.

Alauya’s Comment: In contrast to his previous letters which he signed as “Atty. Ashary M. Alauya” — he
did not use the title “Attorney” in his Comment, but referred to himself as “Datu Ashary M. Alauya.”

Essentially, Alauya’s defense was that in making those statements against Alawi, he was merely acting
“in defense of his rights”, and doing only what “was expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured” who had suffered “mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering”, considering that in six months, over P26,000 had been deducted from his salary.

Alauya justified his use of the title “Attorney” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of “Attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal”, or the Maranao
term “consial,” connoting a local legislator. However, he declared that he did not consider himself a
lawyer.

The Court then referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Alauya violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees by using excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language in making malicious and
libelous charges against Alawi – YES
2. Whether Alauya’s use of the title “Attorney” was proper – NO [issue discussed in class]

RULING:

1. Whether Alauya violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees by using excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language in making malicious
and libelous charges against Alawi

YES. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4 of the Code commands that “(p)ublic officials and employees at all times respect the rights of
others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest.”

The conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration
of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.

In this case, although Alauya was evidently convinced that he had a right of action against Sophia Alawi,
the law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order; or
otherwise stated, that he “act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”

Righteous indignation, or vindication of right, cannot justify resort to insulting language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari’a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alauya is subject to a standard
of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and
that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

2. Whether Alauya’s use of the title “Attorney” was proper

NO. Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, and hence
may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only one who is admitted to the Philippine
Bar an “attorney.”

The title of “Attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya’s disinclination to use the title of “counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title of “Attorney”.

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, respondent Ashari Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping
the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future
will be dealt with more severely. So ordered.

Mercuria So vs. Ma. Lucille Lee (Bar Matter No. 3288, April 10,
2019)
DOCTRINES: The pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions which had been
previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without
prejudice to the filing of any administrative action against would-be lawyers who fail to continue to
possess the required moral fitness of members of the legal profession.

FACTS: The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from petitioner So alleging that
respondent Lee is a defendant in a Civil Case for collection of sum of money that So had filed against Lee
and Lee is therefore not fit for admission to the Bar considering her irresponsible attitude towards her
monetary obligations.

Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of the case as she learned of it only when she
registered for the oath taking. She admitted that she obtained a loan from So but due to business losses,
she failed to pay the subsequent monthly payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade
her obligation to So, but had asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.

The OBC noted that in Lee’s application for the Bar Examination, she declared that a different civil case
was filed against her titled "Bolos v. Lee" for collection of sums of money which pertained to the several
loans Lee had incurred with Bolos.

The Court held in abeyance Lee's request to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in view of the
pendency of the civil cases and required her to manifest the status of the cases. Lee manifested that the
Civil Case filed by So was dismissed in view of a Compromise Agreement entered into and that she had
already satisfied her obligations. In addition, she noted that a Judgment by Compromise had been issued
dismissing the civil case filed by Bolos in view of a Compromise Agreement where it was agreed upon
that Lee would pay Bolos at least 15k a month starting one month after she signs the Roll of Attorneys.

The OBC recommended that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
subject to the condition that she inform the Court within one month from the time she has made her
first payment to Bolos and to inform the Court upon full payment of the debt.

ISSUE/S: Whether Lee should be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:YES. Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the minimum requirements
applicants for the admission to the Bar must possess, to wit:
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and
social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.

The determination whether there is moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances. It is for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes
moral turpitude. In the same vein, not all civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude. As defined,
acts tainted with moral turpitude are of such gravity that manifests an individual's depravity or lack of
moral fiber.

As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to
take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve
acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to
establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it
were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously
jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character.

Thus, the pendency of the civil cases against Lee is not enough reason to prevent her from taking her
Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil cases alone does not
establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude. It is equally important to note that all
civil cases filed against Lee had already been dismissed; thus, there is no longer any obstacle which may
hinder her in officially becoming a member of the Bar. Nevertheless, Lee must still satisfactorily exhibit
that she would not renege on her monetary obligations to Bolos.

It must be remembered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year suspension from the practice of law. After taking her
Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys, Lee would be a full-fledged member of the legal
profession and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court. This is true even if there would be no
complainants, as the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings. She is bound to act in a
manner consistent with the high standards imposed on lawyers — otherwise, she could be subjected to
administrative sanctions. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, but a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession.

In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions which had been
previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without
prejudice to the filing of any administrative action against would-be lawyers who fail to continue to
possess the required moral fitness of members of the legal profession.

The Court adopts the recommendation of the OBC to ALLOW Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from
making her first monthly payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her
monetary obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29, 2019 Judgment by
Compromise.

In Re: Suspension from Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of

Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Bar Matter No. 793, July 30, 2004)

FACTS: In a letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the
Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in a disciplinary case filed by the
Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.

In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, Bar Confidant Atty. Versoza recommended that the Court
obtain copies of the record of Maquera’s case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District
Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera’s suspension and are thus insufficient to
enable her to determine whether Maquera’s acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam
are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution,
indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he
updates and pay his IBP membership dues in full.

The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18,
1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s
case.

The Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain
Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said
case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in
satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the
property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the
judgment debt within the aforesaid period.

At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00),
the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of
Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera
exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment
debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. On December 31, 1988,
Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S.
Dollars (US$320,000.00).

On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, “there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed
a breach of ethics in the Philippines.” However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A
of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in
a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign Jurisdiction?

RULING: The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a
foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied). The Court must therefore
determine whether Maquera’s acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castro’s right of redemption over
the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right
of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the
standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his
suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.

Maquera’s acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2) year suspension from the practice of law in that
jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such
acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act with fidelity towards his clients. They are also violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that “a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;” and Rule
1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine
Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession.

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court’s judgment ordering Maquera’s suspension from the
practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam
are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of theforeign
court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the
judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera’s unethical
acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend
himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be
conducted in accordance with Rule 139- B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable
notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation
that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.

The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the
charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of
Hearing earlier sent by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
Maquera’s current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically
informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended
or disbarred on those grounds, may be sent to him.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law
for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A
of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Wherefore, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the
disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in
said jurisdiction.

A.C. No. 7986, July 27, 2021: IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED 05 AUGUST 2008 IN A.M. No. 07-4-11-SC

ATTY. JAIME V. LOPEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

When a foreign court renders a judgment imposing disciplinary penalty against a Filipino lawyer
admitted in its jurisdiction, such Filipino lawyer may be imposed a similar judgment in the Philippines
provided that the basis of the foreign court's judgment includes grounds for the imposition of
disciplinary penalty in the Philippines.

The Case
The present disposition stems from Resolution No. XX1-2015-292 1 dated 18 April 2015 issued by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation 2 dated 09 January 2014 of the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) in CBD Case No. 13-3874.

The CBD found that respondent Atty. Jaime V. Lopez (respondent) violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02,
and 16.03; Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). It recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
maximum period of three years. The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommended penalty to
disbarment.3

Antecedents

The facts of the present administrative case spans two jurisdictions: first, in the United States of
America, and second, in our country. From the records, it appears that respondent was disbarred from
the practice of law in the state of California in 2000.

The California disbarment proceedings began with a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) 4 sent to
respondent by the Hearing Department of the Los Angeles, California State Bar Court on 06 August
1999. The details of these charges against respondent are as follows:

1. Count One, Case No. 96-O-04592, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-100(B)(1): Failure to promptly
notify client of funds received;5

2. Count Two, Case No. 96-O-04592, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-100(A): Failure to maintain
client funds in trust account;6

Counts One and Two prescind from a case in 1995 where respondent negotiated a bodily injury
settlement with Viking Insurance Company (Viking) on behalf of his client, Jemuel C. Monte-Alegre
(Monte-Alegre). In July 1995, respondent received the USD$25,000.00 settlement from Viking, but failed
to promptly notify his client of his receipt of said amount. 7

In August 1995, respondent deposited the USD 25,000.00 settlement into his client's trust account at
Wells Fargo Bank. However, respondent did not disburse any portion of this money to Monte-Alegre or
to a lienholder on his behalf. Thus, the balance in the trust account fell below USD 25,000.00, such that
on 6 March 1996, the balance was overdrawn by USD 2,047.53 and remained overdrawn until it was
closed on 10 May 1996.8

3. Count Three: Case No. 96-O-04592, Business and Professions Code §6106: Moral turpitude –
Misappropriation;9

In connection with Counts One and Two, respondent dishonestly misappropriated the settlement funds
received on behalf of Monte-Alegre.10

4. Count Four: Case No. 96-O-06201, Business and Professions Code §6106: Moral turpitude --
Misappropriation ;11 and
Respondent repeatedly issued checks from the Wells Fargo trust account even when he knew or should
have known that there were insufficient funds in the account. These checks were issued to various
medical providers in behalf of respondent's clients. Respondent committed acts involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption when he misappropriated the funds intended to pay his clients'
medical liens.12

5. Count Five: Case No. 96-O-04592, Case No. 96-O-06201, Business and Professions Code §6068(j):
Failure to comply with Section 6002.1.13

On 08 October 1996, investigator William O. Armantrout sent two letters by first class mail to
respondent at the address stated in his official membership records at State Bar of California. The letters
requested respondent to provide a written explanation regarding the allegations in Case No. 96-O-04592
and Case No. 96-O-06201. On 3 January 1997, both letters were returned by the United States Postal
Service to the State Bar of California with a note that they were sent to a forwarding address and, thus,
not deliverable. Respondent failed to comply with §6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code when
he failed to maintain a current address with the official membership records division of the State Bar of
California.14

The charges were served through certified mail on 06 August 1999 at respondent's official membership
records address. On 18 August 1999, the State Bar Court Clerk's Office filed a notice setting a telephonic
status conference. This was also served at respondent's official address. Respondent did not file a
response to the NDC; hence the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC)
filed a motion for the entry of respondent's default. A copy of the motion was again served at
respondent's official address. The State Bar of California filed an Order of Entry of Default and an Order
of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment on 20 September 1999. These orders were also served at
respondent's official address.15

The State Bar of California held a status conference on 05 October 1999. The matter was submitted for
decision on 25 October 1999 after the OCTC waived the hearing and submitted its brief on 20 October
1999. The OCTC was represented by Deputy Trial Counsel William Cox, while respondent did not appear
at any point of the proceedings.16

On 23 December 1999, the California State Bar Court issued a Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive
Enrollment,17 recommending respondent's disbarment from the practice of law and compliance with
Rule 955 of the California Rules of Court. On 02 June 2000, the Supreme Court of the State of California
ordered respondent's disbarment in S087012, In re Jaime V. Lopez on Discipline. The Order18 read:

It is hereby ordered that Jaime V. Lopez, State Bar No. 134226, be disbarred from the practice of law and
that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. He is also ordered to comply with rule 955,
California Rules of Court, and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of the rule within
30 and 40 days, respectively, after the date this order is effective. Costs are awarded to the State Bar. 19

Here in the Philippines, respondents predicament started when Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno received
on 03 April 2007 a Letter20 informing the Court of the proceedings against respondent before the
California State Bar. The Investigating Commissioner summarized the ensuing events in this manner:

xxx
Initially docketed as A.M. No. 07-4-11-SC entitled "Re: Information on Atty. Jaime Velasco Lopez," the
Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated November 13, 2007 referring the matter to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for recommendation and appropriate action. In compliance with said
Resolution, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa submitted a Report and
Recommendation dated July 14, 2008 stating that the decision of the State Bar Court of California
disbarring Atty. Lopez could be used as a ground for disciplinary action but disbarment proceedings must
first be instituted. Taking into consideration the Report and Recommendation, the Supreme Court En
Banc issued a Resolution dated 5 August 2008 converting the report of Atty. Feliciano into
Administrative Case No. 7986 entitled "Re: Resolution dated August 5, 2008 in A.M. No. 07-4-11-SC vs.
Atty. Jaime V. Lopez" and ordering Atty. Lopez to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order why he should not be suspended or disbarred. The Resolution further required Atty. Lopez to
submit a certified true copy of the decision in Case No. 96-0-4592 [and Case No. 96-O-06201] of the
State Bar of California.

On September 16, 2008, Atty. Lopez filed a Motion for Extension of Time requesting to be given until
December 18, 2008 within which to submit his Comment. The Supreme Court granted said Motion in a
Resolution dated October 7, 2008.

Thereafter, on November 24, 2008, the OBC filed a 2nd Report and Recommendation stating that the
Resolution dated August 5, 2008, which ordered Atty. Lopez to show cause within fifteen (15) days why
he should not be suspended or disbarred, was returned unserved with the notation "ATTEMPTED NOT
KNOWN." The Resolution was sent to Atty. Lopez at 3600 Wilshire Blvd. 910 Los Angeles, CA 90010.
Nevertheless, the report pointed out that Atty. Lopez was able to file his Motion for Extension of Time
on September 16, 2008. Furthermore, the OBC stated that, aside from the Los Angeles CA address, there
are two addresses of Atty. Lopez on record, namely:

Mr. Jim Lopez

Assistance [sic] Dean, College of Law
109 Leviste Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City

Atty. Jaime Velasco Lopez

Block 2, Lot 1, Saint Agustine Street
Maricaban, Pasay City
Metro Manila

(The Investigative Commissioner notes that the Pasay City address was indicated in Atty. Lopez's Motion
for Extension of Time.)

The OBC, accordingly, recommended to the Supreme Court to require Atty. Lopez to use only one
address to avoid confusion as to where court processes should be mailed. In addition, the report noted
that Atty. Lopez filed his Motion under the previous docket number A.M. No. 07-4-11-SC, even though
the case has been re-docketed as a regular administrative case. The OBC, accordingly, further
recommended that Atty. Lopez be required to file his pleadings under Administrative Case No. 7986.

Subsequent to the filing of the 2nd Report and Recommendation, Atty. Lopez filed on December 16,
2008 a 2nd Motion for Extension requesting to be given until April 28, 2009 to submit his Comment. The
2nd Motion for Extension again indicated Block 2, Lot 1, Saint Agustine Street, Maricaban, Pasay City as
Atty. Lopez's address.

On January 20, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc considered both the OBC's 2nd Report and
Recommendation and Atty. Lopez's 2nd Motion for Extension and issued a Resolution requiring Atty.
Lopez to submit within five (5) days from notice one (1) permanent address to which all court processes
intended for him will be sent and to file his pleadings under Administrative Case No. 7986. The
Resolution likewise granted him up to 28 April 2009 to file his comment.

The January 20, 2009 Resolution was mailed to Blk. 2, Lot 1, St. Augustine St., Maricaban, Pasay City but
was returned unserved with the notation "RTS Moved Out"

On April 28, 2009, Atty. Lopez filed his Comment. In the Comment, Atty. Lopez indicted Blk. 2, Lot 1, St.
Augustine St., Maricaban, Pasay City as his addresses [sic].

In a Resolution dated June 2, 2009, the Supreme Court noted the Comment filed by Atty. Lopez and
considered as served on Atty. Lopez the Resolution dated January 20, 2009.

On June 14, 2009, the OBC filed a 3rd Report and Recommendation stating that Atty. Lopez never fully
complied with the directives of the Supreme Court in: 1) the Resolution dated August 5, 2008, which
required him to submit a certified true copy of the Decision of the State Bar of California; and 2) the
Resolution dated January 20, 2009, requiring him to submit one permanent address to which all court
processes intended for him will be sent and to file his pleadings under Administrative Case No. 7986.
The report also stated that while the August 5, 2008 Resolution of the Supreme Court requiring Atty.
Lopez to show cause why he should not be suspended or disbarred was returned unserved, Atty. Lopez
was able to file his 1st Motion for Extension. The OBC likewise noted that the Resolutions of the
Supreme Court dated January 20, 2009 and June 2, 2009 sent to Blk. 2, Lot 1, St. Augustine St.,
Maricaban, Pasay City, the address Atty. Lopez indicated in his pleadings, were returned unserved as the
addressee has moved out. In view of the foregoing findings and as recommended by the OBC, the
Supreme Court issued a Resolution dated August 4, 2009 ordering the following:

1. Requiring Atty. Lopez to Show Cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to submit the
required certified true copy of the Decision dated 2 July 2000 of the State Bar of California;

2. Requiring Atty. Lopez to explain why the resolutions sent to his given address were returned unserved
with the notation that the addressee has moved out;

3. Requiring Atty. Lopez to file his pleadings under the proper title; and

4. Requiring the OBC to officially request the Supreme Court of California for an official copy of the
Decision dated 2 July 2000 in Case No. 96-0-4592 [and Case No. 96-O-06201].

On October 7, 2009, the OBC officially requested the Supreme Court of California for an official copy of
the Decision dated July 2, 2000 in Case No. 96-0-4592 [and Case No. 96-O-06201] and was furnished the
same on November 5, 2009. On November 19, 2009, the OBC issued a 4th Report and Recommendation
submitting the aforesaid Decision in Case No. 96-0-4592 [and Case No. 96-O-06201]. The report further
stated that all processes of the Supreme Court sent to Atty. Lopez were returned unserved. As
recommended by the OBC, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution dated December 1, 2009 stating the
following:

1. Noting the official copy of the Decision dated July 2, 2000 in Case No. 96-0-4592 [and Case No. 96-O-
06201];

2. Reiterating the directives on Atty. Lopez in the Resolution dated 4 August 2009 and directing him to
comply with the same; and

3. Directing the National Bureau of Investigation to locate Atty. Lopez, serve him with the August 4, 2009
Resolution and make a report.

On March 10, 2011, Agent Frayn M. Banawa of the NBI [(Agent Banawa)] submitted a report stating that
he learned that Atty. Lopez teaches at Lyceum of the Philippines-Makati, College of Law, No. 109 L.P.
Leviste St. Salcedo Village, Makati City [(Lyceum Makati – College of Law)] and left a copy of the
Resolutions dated August 4, 2009 and December 1, 2009 with Ms. Ellen C. Bengil, Executive Secretary to
the College of Law [(Ms. Bengil)]. Agent Banawa later called Ms. Bengil to inquire if Atty. Lopez had
received the resolutions to which Ms. Bengil replied in the affirmative.

On June 4, 2013, the Supreme Court issued the aforesaid Resolution referring the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.21

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP set the case for mandatory conference on 06 September
2013. However, respondent failed to appear despite due notice. A second mandatory conference was
set on 11 October 2013. Still, respondent did not appear. 22

The mandatory conference was terminated, and the Investigating Commissioner issued an Order
directing respondent to submit his verified position paper within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from the receipt of the order.23 Again, respondent did not ignored the Order. 24

In his Evaluation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that based on the official copy of the Decision of
the California State Bar Court in Case No. 96-0-4592 and Case No. 96-O-06201, the California Supreme
Court sanctioned respondent with disbarment for misconduct committed through the following acts: (1)
failure to notify a client of his receipt of funds; (2) failure to maintain the funds in his client's trust
account; (3) misappropriating the funds in his client's trust account; and (4) issuing bad checks. 25

Consistent with the rule on disciplinary actions under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the
Investigating Commissioner held that respondent's acts in 1, 2, and 3 violate Canon 16 and Rules 16.01,
16.02, and 16.03 of the CPR; respondent's acts in 3 and 4 violate Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR; and
respondent's acts in 1, 2, 3, and 4 violate Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR. 26

As for respondent's conduct in the proceedings before the CBD, the Investigating Commissioner found
that respondent violated Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the CPR for his failure to comply with this Court's
directives despite due notice.27
Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for a maximum period of three years. 28

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty. In its Resolution dated 18 April 2015, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to disbar respondent from the practice of law and order his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted the Notice of Resolution and
the records of the case to this Court in a Letter29 dated 08 March 2016.

When the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) reported the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution on 12 April
2016, it noted that no motion for reconsideration nor petition for review was filed by either party. 30 This
Court noted the 18 April 2015 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution 31 dated 01 June
2016.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the 18 April 2015 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent's Membership in the

Philippine Bar and in the California State
Bar

Records reveal that respondent has been admitted to both the Philippine Bar and the State Bar of
California.

Only one lawyer bears the name "Jaime V. Lopez" in the Roll of Attorneys. 32 Respondent finished his
Bachelor of Laws degree at the University of the Philippines. He took and passed the 1979 Bar
Examinations but was admitted to the Philippine Bar only on 01 July 1981 due to the pendency of a
criminal case filed against him.33 As of 01 April 2008, respondent is a bona fide lifetime member of the
IBP, having paid the required lifetime dues and building contribution, and had no pending administrative
nor disbarment case filed against him.34

Respondent was likewise admitted to practice law in the state of California, United States of
America35 with Bar No. 134226 on 14 June 1988. 36 Prior to 2 July 2000, the effectivity date of the
California Supreme Court's Order to disbar respondent, respondent has been ineligible to practice law in
California since 12 August 1996. He was suspended for his failure to file fees. 37

Reciprocal Discipline

When a lawyer is sanctioned for violating a bar's disciplinary rules or code of conduct, other jurisdictions
where he or she is admitted must conduct separate adjudications in order to invoke disciplinary
sanctions for the same violation. Generally, the initial finding of wrongdoing in the first jurisdiction is
treated as conclusive evidence that the violation occurred. Where the second jurisdiction finds that a
sanction in its own jurisdiction is appropriate, it decides on the proper sanction independently even as
the first jurisdiction's findings are given great deference. In many jurisdictions, the second sanction is
identical to the first, unless circumstances are shown that such identical discipline is
inappropriate.38 Reciprocal discipline is part of the protocols being developed for international
cooperation on lawyer discipline, especially for lawyers engaged in transnational legal practice. 39

Decision of foreign court as prima facie

evidence of ground for disciplinary action

In our jurisdiction, the authority of this Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 February 1992, which reads:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. (Emphases supplied)

That the decision of the California Supreme Court constitutes prima facie evidence of grounds for
disciplinary action in the Philippines is "consistent with Section 48, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provide that the judgment of a foreign court cannot be enforced by execution in the Philippines,
but only creates a right of action. Section 48 further states that a foreign judgment against a person is
only presumptive evidence of a right against that person. Hence, the same may be repelled by evidence
of clear mistake of law."40

Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection
of party expectations,41 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 42

In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 43 Recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment. In the present case, the official copy of the decision from the Supreme Court of
California is sufficient proof of the judgment.

At this juncture, the Court rejects respondent's contention that the California Supreme Court's decision
is void and cannot serve as prima facie case against him in the Philippines. In his second motion for
extension, respondent claimed that he had no actual knowledge of the California State Bar Court's
decision and that his basic constitutional rights were trampled upon. Respondent's insistence that due
process was not observed in the California disbarment proceedings due to constitutionally deficient
notices is not supported by the records. Respondent paid no mind to the fact that the California State
Bar Court sent notices to his official address upon taking judicial notice of respondent's official
membership records address at 3600 Wilshire Blvd. #910, Los Angeles, CA 90010. 44 Notably, aside from
the charges for mishandling of his client's funds, the California State Bar Court also sanctioned
respondent for failure to "maintain current State Bar membership records as required by Business and
Professions Code section 6002.1"45 Respondent failed to rebut the same with his bare and
unsubstantiated allegations that he sent written notice of his Philippine address to the California State
Bar46 and that he has stayed put in the Philippines continuously for over 13 years without going abroad
after his return in the country in 1995 to bury his mother and to take care of his two siblings. 47

Respondent's acts in the foreign

jurisdiction constitute grounds for the
imposition of disciplinary penalty in this
jurisdiction

Having established the existence and evidentiary weight of the foreign judgment against respondent,
We proceed to determine if the imposition of disciplinary penalty in the foreign jurisdiction is grounded
on "any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so." 48 If the answer is in the affirmative, then there is a ground
for the imposition of disciplinary penalty in the Philippines against respondent.

Stated differently, a foreign court's judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer admitted in its
jurisdiction may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of
the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds of disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction.49 This, however, is not automatic. Due process demands that a lawyer disciplined in a
foreign jurisdiction must be "given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and
documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified
of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent
lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted  ex parte."50

Upon meticulous review of the records, the Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent's acts as charged in Case Nos. 96-O-04592 and 96-O-06201 violate the
standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine bar and thus constitute grounds for the
imposition of disciplinary penalty in this jurisdiction.

The Investigating Commissioner found that counts one (failure to notify client of funds received), two
(failure to maintain client funds in trust account), and three (misappropriation) were equivalent to
violations of Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02, and 16.03.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

In his Comment51 filed before the Court, respondent admitted that he "opened a separate trust account
to hold the funds belonging to his clients and other providers." 52 Respondent merely gave a general
description of his methods without specifically addressing the circumstances concerning Monte-Alegre:

Settlement disbursement sheets were required in all files. Once settled, all funds are properly accounted
for the review of clients. Once the settlement checks arrive, the clients are contacted to indorse the
checks for deposit and distribution. Once properly indorsed, the settlement checks are then deposited in
the Client Trust Account. Clients are shown the contents of the file and the disbursement sheet is fully
explained to them. From there, the checks for the client, health care providers and the law firm are
drawn and set to other payees, a process that is closely monitored to prevent errors. 53

In Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano (Del Mundo),54 We held that when a client entrusts money to his or her
lawyer for a specific purpose, such money, if not utilized, should be immediately returned upon demand
and failure to do so gives rise to the presumption that the money has been misappropriated.
Respondent's actions in Case No. 96-O-04592 glaringly failed to overcome this presumption, reminding
Us of Our ruling in Lemoine v. Atty. Balon, Jr. (Lemoine),55 where it was decreed that failure to promptly
account for funds received and held for the client's benefit amounts to professional misconduct. Monte-
Alegre's funds, as held in trust by respondent, were overdrawn without any disbursement made to
Monte-Alegre's account.

The Investigating Commissioner likewise properly considered Counts Three (misappropriation) and Four
(misappropriation through issuance of bad checks) as violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent addressed this accusation against him with his characteristic lack of specificity:

Respondent has no prior record of returned checks from his trust account. He exercised utmost care in
issuing trust account checks to clients and other payees.

Respondent never had any check bounced from his trust account. Respondent's trust account has no
history of returned checks due to insufficient funds from his trust account. He closely monitored his
trust account because of its sensitive and sacrosanct nature. He made sure that there were more than
enough buffer funds to cover all issued checks. He hired accountants and bought computer accounting
software to help him manage his trust account. x x x 56

Respondent markedly displayed awareness of the lack of evidence to support his claims. He further
stated:

x x x Key witnesses who could corroborate the innocence of Respondent, such as Atty. Domingo Lopez,
Presentacion Alandy and Berardo Perez-Fraga, have died, or could no longer be located in the United
States due to the long passage of time. U.S. banks keep customers' records for a maximum period of ten
(10) years. The office and bank records of Respondent could no longer be reconstituted. Documents are
delicately susceptible to spoilage and permanent damage due to mildew, termites, water, and other
fierce elements of nature.57

In Wilkie v. Atty. Limos (Wilkie),58 We held that the issuance of checks that were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy
of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.

Finally, Counts One (failure to notify client of funds received), Two (failure to maintain client funds in
trust account), Three (misappropriation), and Four (misappropriation through issuance of bad checks)
were correctly made to correspond to violations of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 by the Investigating
Commissioner.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

We add Our observation of respondent's behavior towards disciplinary measures taken against him.
Respondent's behavior before the California State Bar Court parallels his behavior towards this Court,
the OBC, the NBI, and the IBP. The common thread that binds the various proceedings in this case was
respondent's ability to make himself unreachable.

In the two motions for extension filed by respondent on 16 September 2008 59 and 16 December
2008,60 he indicated his IBP lifetime member number (402962), his roll number (31382), and his address
(Block 2, Lot 1, Saint Augustine St., Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila). However, notices sent to the
address provided in said pleadings were returned unserved prompting Us to obtain assistance from the
NBI. In the course of investigation, Agent Banawa of the NBI was informed by one Zeny Nebrija and
Elmer Tordisillas, the occupants of respondent's address in Pasay City, that respondent already passed
away.61 They directed Agent Banawa to respondent's secretary, Nina Tordisillas, who gave the
information that Atty. Lopez died on 23 July 2005. Curiously, however, Atty. Lopez was able to file his
Comment62 on 28 April 2009, or almost four years after his alleged death in 2005, as noted in our 02
March 2010 Resolution. On 09 March 2011, Agent Banawa reported that he found two more addresses
for respondent, one in Manila and another in Makati. Thus, despite respondent's unforthcoming
behavior towards this disciplinary proceeding, this Court's Resolutions were successfully served to
respondent in the Makati address.63

Indeed, respondent was less than candid in his dealings with this Court. When he filed his motions for
extension and his Comment, he was already aware that there were court proceedings that required his
participation. However, respondent chose to not participate and not notify the Court of his updated
address, notwithstanding repeated directives from this Court. Unfortunately for respondent, ignoring
the proceedings do not make them go away. Respondent's version of ghosting does not work in his
favor. If at all, respondent displayed contumacious conduct and a contempt for court processes.
Respondent's lack of respect for court processes can likewise be gleaned from his refusal to file his
pleadings under the correct docket number. Despite this Court's directive, he still referred to his case as
A.M. No. 07-4-11-SC.

We find that respondent's behavior violates Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and 10.03; Canon 11; and Canon 12,
Rule 12.03:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.

In Spouses Cuña v. Elona (Cuña),64 We stated that respondent's attitude of disobeying the orders of the
IBP manifests his clear lack of respect to the institution and its established rules and regulations.
In Lapitan v. Salgado (Lapitan),65 where respondent repeatedly disregarded lawful orders of the Court,
We characterized his behavior as lacking respect for the Court and the Court's lawful procedures. Such
behaviors should not be tolerated.

Disbarment as Sanction Against

Respondent

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.66

In determining the penalty in administrative cases against lawyers, the Court may take into
consideration the gravity of the offenses committed and prior penalties imposed in similar cases. Thus,
We examine the sanctions meted out in the previously cited administrative cases.

In Wilkie, the lighter penalty of three-month suspension was found sufficient considering that
respondent therein fully paid her obligations against the complainant, the criminal cases instituted
against her have been dismissed, and it was the first time a complaint of such nature has been filed
against the respondent. In Del Mundo, the Court found the CBD's recommended penalty of one-year
suspension sufficient for respondent's failure to account and return the funds entrusted to him by his
client. In these cases, the Court tempered the penalty in view of circumstances considered in favor of
respondents therein.

On the other hand, the Court found disbarment the proper penalty in Lemoine for respondent's refusal
to turn over to his client the proceeds of the insurance claim of the latter despite repeated demands.
We likewise ordered the disbarment of respondents in Cuña and Lapitan. In Cuña, respondent failed to
promptly deliver to his client funds received by him on the latter's behalf, disobeyed orders of the IBP,
and engaged in unauthorized practice of law. In Lapitan, respondent repeatedly disregarded the lawful
orders of the Court being a fugitive from justice and employed deceitful conduct to complainant therein.

Considering the gravity of the offenses committed by respondent which merited his disbarment in the
state of California, exacerbated by his non-compliance with the directives from this Court, the Court
finds proper the recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent would be well reminded that the practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege that is
clothed with public interest. To enjoy the privilege of practicing law as officers of the Court, lawyers
must adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness and maintain the highest degree of morality. 67 As
we stated in Sitaca v. Palomares, Jr.:68

The Court has invariably emphasized that membership in the bar is only bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Thus, to preserve the
nobility and honor of the legal profession, disbarment, no matter how harsh it may be, is a remedy
resorted to by the Court in order to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. 69

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jaime V. Lopez, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing unlawful, dishonest, deceitful conduct, and by willfully disregarding the lawful processes
of courts is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.

A copy of this Decision should be entered in the records of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Lopez. Further,
other copies should be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court of
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
In Re: Petition for Voluntary Delisting in the Roll of Attorneys of Atty.
Dionisio Cañete (Supreme Court Resolution dated January 31, 2017)
FACTS: [Caveat: There’s no full text huhu but I will try to integrate the articles and digest found online]

Atty. Dionisio Cañete, a Cebuano lawyer and the IBP President Cebu Province Chapter from 1983-1985,
filed a Petition for Voluntary Delisting in the Roll of Attorneys, requesting the Supreme Court to strip him
off his title and functions of being an attorney-at-law in order to protest the alleged corruption in the
profession, particularly in the prosecution service and the judiciary.

He expressed his dismay over the unspeakable injustices he suffered while practicing the profession for
56 years. He said he was extremely disappointed when 9 of the 10 cases he filed before the prosecutors’
office from 2014 to 2016 were “maliciously dismissed” despite having presented strong evidence. 3
Three of the 9 nine dismissed cases were overturned by the Regional State Prosecutor. When he
returned to the prosecutors’ office, Cañete said the case folders of these cases could no longer be
found.

The actions of prosecutors and judges convinced him that the criminal justice system in the Philippines is
“like a spider’s web, wherein only the mosquitoes and flies are caught, but the wealthy and government
officials simply go through it.” With all the cruel and brutal injustices heaped on him, he feels that being
a lawyer does not anymore deserve respect and courtesy from his own brothers in the legal profession;
that there is no more logical and cogent reason for him to remain as a lawyer.

He hoped that his voluntary resignation would lead to a meaningful reform and reorientation in the
prosecution service and the judiciary in order to minimize corruption. He said lawyers are very much
aware of the ongoing corruption in the prosecution service and the judiciary but have been silent or
indifferent toward it. Cañete cited an example wherein a lawyer loses a case because the opposing party
had all the money to “buy” the prosecutor or the judge.

The court en banc issued a resolution dated January 31, 2017, resolving to grant the petition.

Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe on the Prohibition from

Engaging in the Private Practice of Law (A.M. No. 08-6-352-
RTC, August 19, 2009)
DOCTRINES: It is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way
of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no
conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of their profession.

FACTS: Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 81 in Romblon. She resigned from
her position and within the one-year period of prohibition, she engaged in the private practice of law by
appearing as private counsel in several cases before the same branch. Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 puts a
limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from
government employment for a period of 1 year after separation from engaging in the private practice of
their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tent to conflict with their official functions. These prohibitions shall apply for a period of 1
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the 1 year prohibition shall apply.

Atty. Buffe argued that she could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former
duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch. The matter was referred to the deputy court
administrator and he observed that the general intent of the law is to uphold the time-honored principle
of public office being a public trust. In a minute resolution, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) took
the view that the premise of Atty. Buffe is erroneous for interpreting Section 7 as a blanket authority.
OCAT further observed that the policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time
public service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take
precedence over the former.

In an en banc resolution by the court, it directed the court administrator to draft and submit to the court
a circular on the practice of profession during employment and within one year from resignation,
retirement form or cessation of employment in the judiciary. It was proven that in several civil cases,
Atty. Buffe made appearances before the court within the 1 year prohibition period. Atty. Buffe was
furnished with a copy of the resolution and she made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of her
case to the Supreme Court so it may put a rest to her legal query. Her legal query: " Why may an
incumbent engage in private practice under (b) (2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the
last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that
he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself — who is no longer in a position of possible
abuse/exploitation — cannot?"

ISSUE/S: WON she violated the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.

RULING: YES. Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and
immediately after her resignation, is a violation of the code. Atty. The petition for declaratory relief filed
by Atty. Buffe as well as her letter query cannot serve as mitigating circumstance for violating the CPR.
Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees. The Section
7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former
government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a
blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained
above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b) (2) is to bar public officials and employees from the
practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their
profession. By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law
allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of
their profession. A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as"unlawful", Atty. Buffe
contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of
criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it. Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the
part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when
it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. She also committed a violation of her
lawyer’s oath. Atty. Buffe had been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter because
as stated in the existing jurisprudence, under the principle of res ipsa loquitur, no further inquiry into
the matter is needed; there is no need for any further investigation before may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record. Under the circumstances, we find
that her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter her from
repeating her transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct.

Olazo vs. Tinga (A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010)

DOCTRINES: Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 9 He may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their
private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. 29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his
or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings.
FACTS:
1. Complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Lower Bicutan in the
Municipality of Taguig. The subject land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476 & Proclamation No. 172.
2. To implement Proclamation No. 172, Exec Secretary Catalino Macaraig issued Memorandum No.
119, creating a Committee on Awards who was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation
on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The respondent (Justice
Dante Tinga (Ret.) was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (1987- 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas
covered by the proclamations

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.022

Claims:
● that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his
personal interest over the subject land
● That the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father,
Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application
● That the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as
payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land.
● that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant's brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo
to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent's promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas
and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent's actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct —
First, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on
Awards; and
Second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before
the office he was previously connected with.

RULING: The Court resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as
a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct
to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard
of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government
service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their
private activities should not interfere with the
discharge of their official functions.

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes
the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.

The Court cited cases that defined what is private interest. 1 In Vitriolo v. Dasig, 16 we found the act of
the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from persons
with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The Court finds the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant's sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaint's own account, the complainant filed a sales application in
March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000
that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
respondent's elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in
1997.

1 In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her
office. In Ali v. Bubong, we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing
the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the
office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
Since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was
still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal
benefits. The denial of the complainant's sales application over the subject land was made by the
DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant's allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. In the absence of any specific charge,
Olazo's disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent's alleged participation, and we
find it to be in the respondent's favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father 2, do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Manuel and the
document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was
a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or
her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution
or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. 30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings.

In any event, even granting that respondent's act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters
for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
2 (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR; 21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
July 12, 1996; 22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996 23)
respondent's favor.

In any event, even granting that respondent's act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters
for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondent's favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainant's allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant's claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4 (1) 33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez's qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by
the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision
when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point,
bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals 35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R.
No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.

The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to
him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven,
nothing has to be rebutted in defense. With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case
against the respondent for the complainant's failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
former committed unethical infractions warranting the
exercise of the Court's disciplinary power.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of
Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ramos vs. Imbang (A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007)

DOCTRINES: Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service.
For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Thus, lawyers in government service
cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

FACTS: The complainant sought the assistance of respondent in filing civil and criminal actions against
the Sps. Jovellanos. She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
₱5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would
then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.
This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed
any case against the Sps. Jovellanos and that he was in fact employed in the PAO. According to the
respondent, the complainant knew that he was in government service from the very start.

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) noted that the receipt was issued when the respondent was still
with the PAO. It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and
that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have
accepted a spurious receipt nor would the respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's
claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility that should
result to his disbarment. (YES)

RULING: Yes, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which should warrant his
disbarment. Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to
devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited under Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private
cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
PAO lawyers are prohibited from accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not
have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.
Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Lawyers are bound to uphold the Constitution and all laws of the land.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This undertaking includes
the observance of the prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting
as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against
the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant
to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases
were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took
place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a
keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.

Abella vs. Atty. Cruzabra (A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009)

DOCTRINES: Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the
private practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by
reprimand.

FACTS: Complainant Felipe E. Abella filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against respondent Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra. In his
affidavit-complaint, complainant charged respondent with engaging in private practice of law while
employed in the government service.

Respondent was appointed at the Register of Deeds of General Santos City. During her term of office,
she applied for a notarial commission and notarized 3,000 documents. These acts were performed by
respondent, without obtaining a permission from the Secretary of Justice.
Respondent invoke good faith as her defense. Respondent insists that she cannot be punish because she
was given permission by her senior officer to notarize. In fact, one of the agreement in her appointment
letter was that she will not imposed charges on papers from their office that needs notarization.
Moreover, respondent argued that she is new in the legal profession and she does know the intricacies
thereof.

ISSUE: WON respondent's act merits disciplinary action.

RULING: Yes, as per Civil Service rules, the authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall
be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules, which provides:

"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors."

Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular
case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.

It is clear in this case that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did
not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent’s superior, the Register of
Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even
assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that
written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her
petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986. Thus,
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of
profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand.

Cruz vs. Mijares (G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008)

DOCTRINES: Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to
which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of
an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the
Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his
litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law,
petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance.
FACTS: Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC
in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct
his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant.
Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief
to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the
Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes.
Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing.

Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct
of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It
asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which
engenders the belief that justice will not be served.

In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it
was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a MR of the said order. Judge Mijares denied
the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to
submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In MR, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule
138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but
the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A. Petitioner filed this case with SC.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court may issue.
2. WON respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case

RULING:
1. YES (It should be filed with CA, but SC took cognizance because it involves interpretation of
procedural rules).
● This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court
where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be
filed with the Court of Appeals.

● The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
 issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. Considering,
however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

2. NO (But it erred in denying petitioner’s appearance).

● Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he
is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an
attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the
Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting
his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his
own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself.

● The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule
138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides
for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance
of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

● No GAD on the part of Judge

i. Petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s
findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

ii. In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.
The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.

iii. Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court
will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Villahermosa vs. Atty. Caracol (A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015)

DOCTRINES:
● While a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that
he show such authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act.
● If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority,
he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved
in his official transaction
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment is filed by Dr. Villahermosa Sr. against Atty. Caracol for deceit, gross
misconduct of oath under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of ROC. The case ensued when:
○ Dr. Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases where the counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty.
Fidel Aquino. The 2 cases involved the cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer
certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and
recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from OCT No. 433 (a homestead
patent which was then issued with TCT in favor of Efren).

○ When the agrarian reform law was enacted emancipation patents and titles were issued to
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of
land to Dr. Villahermosa’s spouse.

○ Consequently, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the wife.

○ However, the DARAB later on issued a 1994 Decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation
patents and TCTs stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was then
affirmed by CA.

○ Later, Atty. Caracol as additional Counsel for Plaintiff filed a motion for execution with DAARAB
praying full implementation of the 1994 Decision.

Dr. Villahermosa now files the present complaint alleging that:

○ Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs
and the counsel of record.
○ Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already
been dead for more than a year.
○ Atty. Caracol's real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same
parcel of land.
○ the signature in the waiver of rights allegedly executed by Efren was different from Efren’s usual
signature.
○ Hence, Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct

In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It also found that:
○ Respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not
authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record.
○ Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead.
○ Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the
authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for falsification.
○ Thus, recommend that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years.
IBP Board of Governors: adopted the report but modified the penalty to 1 year suspension.

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB that he was counsel of
Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer.

RULING: YES, Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB that he was counsel of Efren
to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer's appearance on
behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave
of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being
retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court.
If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be
disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.
In this case, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for
Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious
lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client's passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client's successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.
Furthermore, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We
also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant
disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced.
In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of
law for a period of one year.

Patrick A. Caronan vs. Richard A. Caronan (A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016)

DOCTRINES: Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major
or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in
1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.
Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

FACTS: Complainant PATRICK and respondent RICHARD are siblings. Complainant PATRICK obtained a
degree in Business Administration in the University of Makati in 1997. He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. Then,
in 2009, complainant became a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent RICHARD enrolled at the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for a year before transferring to the Philippines Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.

In 1999, Richard enrolled in law school in Nueva Vizcaya. Patrick later found out that Richard passed the
bar and RICHARD USED PATRICK’s NAME AND RECORD from the University of Makati to enroll in St.
Mary’s University’s College of and take the Bar Examinations.

Patrick brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.

In 2009, Patrick was invited by the NBI to be interviewed and asked to identify documents which
belonged to him and Richard. Patrick also found out Richard was using the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Coronan”. Realizing that Richard was involved in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by one Joseph
G. Agtarap (Agtarap).

In 2013, Patrick learned of the many schemes and crimes Richard was involved in by the use of his
name. Further, he learned that Richard was arrested for (1) gun-running activities, (2) illegal possession
of explosives, and (3) violation of BP 22. Because of this Patrick developed a fear for his own safety and
security. He was also forced to resign from his job at PSC. Hence, complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent RICHARD alleged use of former’s name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.

Richard answered and denied all allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD
Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the administrative case filed by Agtarap
against him, and which had already been declared closed and terminated by this court A.C. no. 10074.

In 2015 the IBP scheduled mandatory conferences where both parties failed to appear twice. The IBP-
CBD prompted to issue an order directing both parties to file their respective position papers. However,
neither of the parties submitted any.

IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be dropped and
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted
as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the name “Patrick A. Caronan” stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

2) Whether the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the IBP. Respondent Richard exhibited his
dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name,
identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
eventually caused him to fear for his own safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for
years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative in the nature
of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which SC adopted the IBP findings, where complainant
Patrick has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan":

1) NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.

2) photograph taken of respondent RICHARD when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on

2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."

Complainant Patrick submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan,"
among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;53
(b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under
it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.

The Court confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain
admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A.
Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar.

Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, “No applicant for admission to the Bar Examination
shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course” respondent
never completed his college degree. Respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree. The
Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and
earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity,
and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not
a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a
lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

Teresita P. Fajardo vs. Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016)
DOCTRINES:
● Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
● Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
● Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of
1986, government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the
practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the
government official or employee.
● There is a basic conflict of interest here. The Respondent is a public officer, an employee of the
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of the government. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, the respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.
● A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or
her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This act of influence peddling
is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession.
● Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
● Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession."
● Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

FACTS: Complainant Teresita was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired
respondent Atty. Alvarez to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.

According to Teresita, Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for
Mental Health He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the
amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to
have the cases against Teresita dismissed.

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her
dismissal from service, respectively.

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez returned at least a portion of the amount she gave. Atty.
Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise. Teresita
sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
However, Atty. Alvarez claims that he has authority to engage in private practice of the profession. He
represented Teresita in several cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a
case was filed against her. Atty. Alvarez would then advise Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint
and its attachments through courier. Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would evaluate the case and call Teresita
to discuss his fees in accepting and handling the case. A 50% down payment would be deposited to Atty.
Alvarez's or his secretary's bank account. The balance would then be paid in installments. The success
fee was voluntary on Teresita's part.

Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision
and resolution she received from the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. Atty.
Alvarez accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as acceptance fee. According to Atty. Alvarez, he
arrived at the amount after considering the difficulty of the case and the workload that would be
involved, which would include appeals before the Court of Appeals and this Court. However, the fee is
exclusive of filing fees, appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying
and mailing.

On the last day of filing the petition for review of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita
informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had
hired Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the cases against
Teresita.

Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of
Atty. Alvarez. This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file his comment on the complaint within 10 days from
notice.

The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. Atty. Alvarez was also
ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest from the time of demand
until its full payment.

On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez
claimed that he was authorized by his superior to privately practice law; the pleadings he allegedly
prepared and filed did not bear his name and signature. Hence, the Investigating Commissioner stated
that:

The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in the Office of the
Ombudsman is a time lost to the government which could have been used in the service of
many taxpayers[.]

In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his profession, the
Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to handle cases involving
malversation of funds by government officials such as a municipal treasurer.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
MR was filed but was denied.

ISSUE/S: WON a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the
Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law.

RULING: No, the respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.

Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession as shown in the letter of National
Center for Mental Health Chief Vicente. It held that he is, “authorized to teach or engage in the practice
of your profession provided it will not run in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine
government as a whole.”

Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his
surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show
badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of]
legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law. (Citations omitted)

By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to the complainant, the respondent practiced law.

Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,
government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession
unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession
must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government official or employee.

In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental
Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21,
series of 1999.

However, by assisting and representing the complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against
the government in general, the respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.

Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that
his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a
whole."
There is a basic conflict of interest here. The Respondent is a public officer, an employee of the
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of the government. By appearing against the Office of
the Ombudsman, the respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.

The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift
the People's trust in government and to ensure excellent public service.

In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her
allegations through substantial evidence. Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or
penalized unless it is shown that they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which
reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the bar.

Likewise, we find that the respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to the complainant that
he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in the
complainant's case.

Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.
Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's
case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending.

Thus, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02
prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Respondent's act
of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or
employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."

In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her
client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This act of influence peddling is
highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession.

In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in secret and often
only between the two parties concerned." Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner
and as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold the respondent guilty of
influence peddling.

We agree with the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of
influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension of one
(1) year from the practice of law. To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that is
tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about the respondent's character and his attitude towards
the courts and the bar.

Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators,
judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even as they
claim to be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have
illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen
through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent
reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to
temper, with its own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only
for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or public officials.

RATIO: WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to
return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Pro Se Practice of Law or Self-Representation or Appearance in Propria Persona

Judges and lawyers typically refer to defendants who represent themselves with the terms pro se or pro
per, the latter being taken from “in propria persona.” Both pro se and pro per come from Latin and
essentially mean “for one’s own person.” A party to a lawsuit, who represents himself, is appearing in
the case "pro se".

NOTE: When there is prohibition to practice law, it refers to all other cases except where such person
would appear in court to defend himself (Pro Se).

Appearance of Non-Lawyers in Courts and Administrative Tribunals

GR: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court.
XPNs:
1. Law student practice;
2. Non lawyers (agent or friends of party-litigant) in court can appear for a party in MTC for criminal or
civil cases;
3. Non lawyers can represent parties in administrative tribunals such as NLRC, DARAB, and Cadastral
Courts.
4. Party-litigant in any administrative or judicial bodies
5. In areas where there are no lawyers

NOTE: Section 34, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly allows pro se practice or the right of a
non-member of the bar to engage in limited practice of law (Antiquiera, 1992).

Law student practice Rule: A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school (Sec. 1, Rule 138-A).

The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic (Sec. 2, Rule 138-A).

NOTE: The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of
the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action (Circular No.19, dated December 19, 1986).

The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar.
Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action (Circular No.19, dated December 19, 1986).

Non-lawyers in court:
The following are the instances whereby non-lawyers may appear in court:
1. Cases before the MTC: A party to the litigation, may conduct his own case or litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC);
2. Before any other court: A party may conduct his litigation personally but if he gets someone to aid
him, that someone must be authorized member of the Bar (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC);

NOTE: A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by the same rules in conducting the trial
case. He cannot after judgment, claim that he was not properly represented.

3. Criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available,
the judge may appoint a non- lawyer who is a:
a. Resident of the province; and
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Sec. 7, Rule 116, RRC).

4. Any official or other person appointed or designated to appear for the Government of the Philippines
in accordance with law (Sec. 33, Rule 138, RRC).

NOTE: Such person shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the Bar to appear in any case
in which said government has a direct or indirect interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, RRC).

Party’s Right to Self-Representation

A party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered to be a practice of law as "one does not
practice law by acting for himself, any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself”
(Maderada v. Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ- 02-1459, October 14, 2003).

Therefore, a person can conduct the litigation of the cases personally. He is not engaged in the practice
of law if he represents himself in cases in which he is a party. By conducting the litigation of his own
cases, he acts not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
Certainly, he does not become a counsel or lawyer by exercising such right ( Santos v. Judge Lacurom,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006).

Party-Litigant representing himself/herself

In civil cases, an individual litigant has the right to conduct his litigation personally.
In criminal cases, in grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always appear by
counsel; he cannot conduct his own defense without violating his right to due process of law. In light
offenses a party-litigant can represent himself/herself.

NOTE: Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Bar during trial, the judgment
should be set aside, and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial (People v. Santocildes, Jr.,
G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999). With regard to a juridical person, it must always appear in court
through a duly licensed member of the bar, except before MTC where it may be represented by its
agent or officer who need not be a lawyer.

Limits on the appearance of non-lawyers

1. He should confine his work to non-adversary contentions;
2. He should not undertake purely legal work, such as the examination or crossexamination of
witnesses,
or the presentation of evidence; and
3. His services should not be habitually rendered. He should not charge or collect attorney’s fees ( PAFLU
v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971).

NON-LAWYERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

1. Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if:
a. They represent themselves; or
b. They represent their organization or members thereof (Art. 222, PD 442, as amended) (2002 Bar); or
c. If they are duly accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.

NOTE: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees under Article 222 of the Labor Code for not being a
lawyer (Five J. Taxi v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994).

2. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 9, Act
No. 2259)

Public Officials and Practice of Law

a) Republic Act No. 910 Under Sec. 1, R.A. 910, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension
from the government, cannot act as counsel:
a. In any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party; or
b. In a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense in
relation to his office; nor
c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse
to the government, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers (Sec. 1, R.A. 910).

b) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by
their office unless expressly allowed by law;
 (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

c) Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
 shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
 hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
 They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
 They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

d) Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
 personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasijudicial and other administrative bodies.
 Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office.
 He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

e) Rule 138, Section 35 of the Rules of Court

No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
 engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

f) Section 90, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
All governors, city and municipal mayors are
 prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
 Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours:
- Provided, That Sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
 2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
4. Use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.

g) Article IX-A, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

h) Article XI, Section 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of
their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of
the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.

Prohibited acts or omissions of public officers

1. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has
pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after termination.
(Sec. 3[d], RA 3019);
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law (Sec. 7[b], RA 6713);
3. A lawyer shall not, after leaving a government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service (Rule 6.03, CPR); and
4. A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity (Canon 36, CPE).

NOTE: These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of 1 year after resignation, or separation
from public office. The 1-year prohibition shall also apply in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with.
Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service (Canon 6, Rule 6.03, CPR). The evil
sought to be avoided by this provision is the possibility of a lawyer who just retired, resigned or
separated from the government of using his influence for his own private benefit (Antiquiera, 1992).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CANNOT PRACTICE LAW OR WITH RESTRICTIONS

GR: The appointment or election of an attorney to a government office disqualifies him from engaging in
the private practice of law.

Reason: A public office is a public trust, and a public officer or employee is obliged not only to perform
his duties with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency but also with
exclusive fidelity. This disqualification is intended to:
a. Preserve public trust in a public office;
b. Avoid conflict of interests or a possibility thereof; and
c. Assure the people of impartiality in the performance of public functions and thereby promote the
public welfare.

Public officials not allowed to engage in law practice (Absolute Prohibition) [JOPPC2OMS]:
1. Judges and other officials and employees of the Supreme Court (Sec. 35, Rule 148, RRC);
2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.);
3. Government Prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965);
4. President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
(Sec. 13, Art VII, 1987 Constitution);
5. Members of the Constitutional Commission (Sec. 2, Art IX-A, 1987 Constitution);
6. Civil Service Officers or employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the government (Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. 202, July 22, 1975);
7. Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 8 [second par.], Art. IX, 1987 Constitution);
8. All governors, city and municipal Mayors (Sec. 90, R.A. No. 7160); and
9. Those prohibited by Special laws.

Restrictions on the Practice of Law on Certain individuals (Relative Prohibition)

1. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally “appear” as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other administration bodies
(Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

NOTE: What is prohibited is to “personally appear” in court and other bodies. The word “appearance”
includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading on behalf of a client as
“by simply filing a formal motion, plea, or answer.”

2. Under the Local Government Code (Sec. 91, RA 7160), Sanggunian members may practice their
professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not [violate the specific restrictions
imposed].
3. Under Sec. 1, R.A. 910, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government,
cannot act as counsel:
a. In any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party; or
b. In a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense in
relation to his office; nor
c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse
to the government, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers (Sec. 1, R.A. 910).
4. Civil service officers and employees without permit from their respective department heads (Noriega
v. Sison, A.M. No. 2266, October 27, 1983).
5. A former government attorney cannot, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service (Rule
6.03, CPR).