DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and ANGELINA SARMIENTO, respondents
[G.R. No. 68946. May 22, 1992.]
J. Davide, Jr.

Digest Author: Jude Fanila

Topic: Possession - Types

Case Summary: Respondent, Sarmiento filed for registration of a parcel of land that she allegedly
purchased from (4) other individuals who had been continuous, notorious, open and uninterrupted
possessors. Claim of registration was granted on the basis fo RA 8492 Sec. 48b which allowed
confirmation of imperfect titles provided that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of an agricultural land of the public domain for more than 30 years under bonified claim of
acquisition or ownership. Petitioner, Director of lands appealed this.

SC held that RA 8492 requisites not fulfilled, as Sarmiento failed to establish that her predecessors in
interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
portions of the land sold to her by them.

Petitioners: Director of Lands

Respondents: Angelina Sarmiento | Intermediate Appellate Court

Doctrines Involved: Possession is not synonymous with occupation. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. Thus, when a law speaks of occupation there is
intent to exclude constructive possession. In this case the Public Land Act, specifically states that there
must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation must be taken to mean actual, physical
possession not merely constructive possession.

FACTS:
1. August 13 1970 – Respondent, Sarmiento alongside the spouses Velasco filed an action before
the CFI of Bulacan – application for registration of Lot No. 1005 – Situated in San Jose, Del
Monte. Lot covered 376,397 sq.m
a. Jan 1971
i. Jan 18 – Private oppositors, Angeles and Cirilo Amador filed opposition to
registration, claiming that the land belonged to them.
ii. Jan 19 – RTC issued an order of special default against the whole world – except
for oppositors and the municipal mayor of San Jose Del Monte.
b. August 24 1971 – RTC granted motion to lift the special default order. Also admitted
oppositions filed by other oppositors (Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco Maningas and Simeon
Albarico).
i. Same time period, Sarmiento obtained a ruling from the RTC to drop co-
applicants spouses Velasco. Basis being that they were made co-applicants from
a contract of service, wherein the spouses agreed to shoulder all the litigation
expenses + costs of survey and attorney’s fees which they failed to do. 1
2. June 2 1982 – RTC – ruled in favor of Sarmiento, granting the registration of the lot as well as
improvements thereon. 2

1
Failure to comply with contract of service led to valid rescission.
 a. Basis – Respondent, Sarmiento acquired the subject land (4) prior occupants. That she
had declared the property for taxation as early as 1965.
i. Juan Reyes – Owned 168,000 sq.m – transferred share to Sarmiento on April 7
1969 for P42k
ii. Mariano Castillo – 14 hectare portion – transferred share to Sarmiento via two
separate contracts. One executed in August 16, 1965 (1/2 portion) for P1500.
Second was on November 15, 1965 (1/2 portion) for P21k.
iii. Macario Cruz– 73k sq.m – transferred share to Sarmiento on March 31 1969 –
consideration of P18, 750.
iv. Feliciano Santos – case didn’t say details of sale. Only that she acquired portion
of the property from Santos and that she didn’t present any deed of sale.
b. Sales were made by persons who had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of
the subject land for more than 30 years.
3. Director of Lands appealed from the decision before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
a. Argued that RTC erred in holding that Sarmiento and predecessors in interest had been in
open, continuous and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years.
4. October 12 1984 – IAC dismissed the appeal.
a. Despite absence of tax declarations from the vendors (3 prior occupants) it was clearly
established that Macario Cruz, Sps. Sarmiento and Sps. Castillo were in possession of the
land in 1928 and 1948 in the concept of owners.
i. Molina v. De Bacud – as held in this case, open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of certain lands in the concept of an owner
for more than 30 years grants a person the right to confirmation of their title to
the land.
b. Thus because predecessor-in-interest possessed in the concept of an owner, Sarmiento
continued to do the same.
5. Led to current appeal.

ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:

 Petitioner’s Argument related to Doctrine: That open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive
possession of Sarmiento and her predecessors-in-interest was not established in the application
proceedings. Thus, she could not have validly confirmed her title over the subject land.

ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N the registration of the land to Sarmiento is proper under RA 1942? – NO
a. RA 1942 – Sec. 48(b)3 governs the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. Here, the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that they are in
possession of an incomplete title and that they meet the requisites under the law.
i. Sec. 48b – requires that an applicant must prove the following in order to obtain
confirmation of title.
2
Improvements covered (3) houses owned and possessed by Sarmiento’s predecessors-in-interest who were tenants of the
property. Subject to payment of real property taxes in arrears since 1971.
3
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
 1. (a) he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an agricultural
land of the public domain;
2. (b) such possession and occupation must be for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of the application; and
3. (c) such possession and occupation must be under a bonafide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
b. Possession and Occupation – When the law speaks of possession and occupation, these
refer to different concepts. Possession is a broader, encompassing both constructive
possession4. However, the law requires possession and occupation. This must be taken to
mean as excluding constructive possession.
i. Jurisprudence
1. Lasam v. Director of Lands – constructive possession must be more than
a mere nominal claim. Insufficient that a person merely plants a sign or
symbol of possession over the property.
2. Ramirez v. Director of Lands - Mere declaration of uncultivated land for
taxation purposes and occasional visits does not constitute possession.
3. Director of Lands v. Reyes – casual cultivation of portions of land and
raising of cattle there does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership because it is not exclusive and notorious.
ii. Possession –
1. Open when it is patent, visible, apparent, and notorious. NOT
clandestine.
2. Continuous when it is uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional
3. Exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit
4. Notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known of and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
iii. Adverse Possession – when the land is used openly and notoriously. The only
mode of interruption that of possession that does not affect the continuity of
possession is by war or force majeure.
c. Application – Here, Sarmiento relied on the possession of her predecessors-in-interest.
None of her predecessors-in-interest declared the portions of the land that they
possessed/occupied for taxation. Never paid taxes. Only Sarmiento who declared
property for taxation once on Sept 18 1969. Per the declaration, property was 37.6
hectares.
i. Evidence – Sarmiento also failed to present the predecessors-in-interest during
the application hearings. They were best witnesses to identify the parcels of land
that they sold. She failed to do this, instead presented two other witnesses (Victor
Jarvina and Enrique Buco) who failed to establish continuous possession of
predecessors for more than 30 years.
1. Predecessors – none of the vendors could show any written document to
prove ownership of the land. Instead, only alleged possession of lands for
more than 10 years. Similarly, no deed of sale presented covering the
portion allegedly sold by Macario Cruz (7.3 hectares) and Feliciano
Santos.
2. Testimony – Enrique Buco testified that the land was in possession of
two more people in addition to the 4 listed above. These being Luis

4
Basically, possession of a thing via title (I think).
 Pascual and someone named Arsenio. This leads to the inference that
parents of Pascual and Arsenio also have claims on portions of the
property. Sarmiento failed to show that she acquired said portions or that
they were sold to any of her vendors.
ii. Tax Declaration – while tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. It serves as manifestation of sincere and honest desire to obtain
he title as well as announcement of the adverse claim against all other parties.
Here, predecessors never declared areas for taxation purposes. Sarmiento herself
only declared area for real estate taxes once on Sept 18 1969 and even then this
was for her application.
iii. Start of Possession – IAC held that start of possession was in 1932. This is
refuted by testimony of Buco. Found that possession of Castillo’s started in 1948,
thus 14-hectare portion has only been in possession for 17 years prior to being
sold to Sarmiento in 1965. Registration proceedings in 1970, so 14-hectare area
in possession for only 22 years total, insufficient for Sec. 48b.
iv. Cultivation – if Sarmiento had in fact been in actual possession, this conflicts
with the Land Classification Report issued in 1971. Report found that land was
pretty much empty, except for a couple of fruit trees. This conflicts with her tax
declaration on Sept 18 1966 – which stated that property was comprised of 9.4
hectares of Riceland. Existence of Riceland doubtful, not established via
evidence. Also, portions cultivated by her and vendors were scattered and at max,
(1) hectare each. Testimony of Buco was that the Riceland if any, only covered
(2) hectares, planted by Juan Reyes and parents.
v. Spouses Velasco – Sarmiento falsely claimed that her co-applicants were co-
owners of the property.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of 12
October 1984 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 is hereby REVERSED. The decision of the
trial
court of 2 June 1982 in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC Record No. N-
39192
is likewise REVERSED and said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.