The Russian

Revolution
FOURTH EDITION

Sheila Fitzpatrick

OXFORD
LINIVERSITY .PRESS
 Contents

Acknoztiedgements v
Introduction r

r The Setring t6
The society 17
The revolutionary tradition 24
The r9o5 Revolution and its aftermath;
the First \ùØorld SØar 32

2 r9r7. The Revolutions of Febrrary

and October 4r
The February Revolution and .dual power,
45
The Bolsheviks 50
The popular revolution
53
The political crises of the summer
5g
The October Revolution 6z

3 The Civil War 69

The Civil War, the Red Army, and the
Cheka 73
W'ar Communism 79
Visions of the new world g5
The Bolsheviks in power gg

4 NEP and the Future of the Revolution

94
The discipline of ret¡ear 97
Theproblemofbureaucracy ro3
The Ieadership struggle rog
Building socialism in one courìtry
rr2
vlll Contents

5 Stalin'sRevolution rzr Introduction

Stalin versus theRight r25
The industrial2ation drive r3r
Collectivization 86
Cultu¡al Revolution r4z
DunrNc US president Nixon,s r97z visit
to China, rhe conversation
6 Ending the Revolution r5o turned to the French Revolution, almost
two centuries earlier. I_eg_
accomplished' t1z end has it that premier Chou En_I_ai,
'Revolution o't.irrg asked to assess the
revolution,s impact, answered ttrat it
betrayed'
'Revolution r58 was too soon
out that he probably misunderstood the question to tell. It turns
The Terror t64 was being asked about trre paris
an¿ thought fre
events ofi96g, but it wourd have
been a good answer in any case. It i"
ot*og, too early to tell about
Noæs t75 the.impact of great historical events, b.ã"rrr.
that impact is not
sta¡ic but constantly clanging o*
Select Biblíography r87 o*r, pr.r..r, circumstances
and vantage-point on the past ", change. So it is with the Russian
Index rys Revolution, whose memory has aheãdy gone
through a series of
vicissitudes, and will undoubtedly g.
,h;"gh more in the future.
The second edition of The nurrni n oolutio,
the wake of dramatic svs¡¡s-ths çr99a1 appeared in
falr of the communist regime and
the dissolution of üre Soviet union
art. ."ã or r99r. Those events
",
had all sorts of consequences for historians
of the Russian Revolu_
tion. They opened archives that
-...
forth memoirs that were hidden i" ¿r"i"..r, f..rriorrsly closed, brought
and released a flood
of new marerial of every kind, especialy
oì'tne Stalin period and
the history of Soviet repression. As
a åsulq the r99os and early
2ooos were particularly productive
for historianr, ir.l"ai"g p..r1
Soviet Russians, newly reconnected
to the international scholarly
community. The expanded bibliography
of the third edition (t"õ
reflecred this avalanche of new i"fo.-åtio.r.
edition, we have reached rhe centenarv
ño* ** the fourth
orã.
It is an obvious time for .."rr.r.-arr, UrrtRussian Revorution.
"
oddly little eagerness to embark or, ,,r.i
in Russia there is
a project. post_Soviet
Russia needs a usable past as a basis
for a new national identity.
The problem is to work our how th. R;i";on f,ts in. Stalin can
be accommodated comparatively easily
as rrltiorr_U,rilder, leading
Russia (the Soviet Union) in its great " _ the
vioo.y Second world
War and presiding over its port*"i
starus. But
"r..rrrãi,rpelpower
 z Intoductinn
Introduction 3
it is not so easy for contemporary Russians to l<rrow how to ttrink towards the restoration of order and
about I-enin and the Bolsheviks. stability.3 The Russian Bolshe_
viks, bearing in mind the same French
For Russians and other former Soviet citizens, the collapse of n rrofrrtio., model that lies at
the basis of Brinton,s analysis, feared
the Soviet union meant a fundamentar reappraisal of the meaning a Thermidorian degeneradon
of their own Revolution, and half ,rrrp."al
of the Revolurion,l previously hailed as the foundational event of that one had occurred
at the end of the Civil W.ar, when .*rro*i"
the world's 'first socialist state, and now seen by many as a wrong collapse forced them
into the 'strategic ,.T31' marked UV tfr.-¡"t
turning that took Russia off course for seventy_four yea.s. Whilã oauction of ttre New
'western Economic policy (NEp) in r9zr.
historians had less of an adjustrnent to make, theirperspec- Yet at the end of the r9zos, Russia plunged
tive was subtly changed by rrre end of the cold war as *.il -at
upheavar-starin's 'revolution fróm above" into another
of the Soviet rJnion. The dust has yet to settle on these intellectual
"r "a associated with the
industrialization drive of the First Five-year pran,
reconfigurations. But one thing is clear: as far as the significance the collectiviza-
tion of agriculrure, and a .Cultu."l n rroi,rio.r,
of the Russian Revolution is concerned, it is still too early to
teil against the old intelligentsia-whot.
ai.....J f;;*,
definitively, and it always will be as long as the Revolution conrinues
even than that of the February and
i-p"lion society was grearer
to be taken seriously as a watershed in modern European Ocìober Revolutions ;i;rrj
and world and the Civil War of r9.rg_zo. it was
history. This book sers out to tell the story of the Revolution only afte. *ris upheaval ended
and in the early r93os that signs of a
clarifu the issues as they were seen by participants. But
the Russian "t"rri"
the waning of revolutionary fervour
ñ...idor can be discerned:
Revolution's meaning, rike that of the French Revolution, U.ììlg.r.rrce, new policies
will be aimed at restoring order and stabiliry"rrJ ..rir"r of traditional varues
endlessly debated.
and culrure, solidification of a new pottic"t
and sociar s.'ucn',e.
Yet even t'is Thermidor was q,ri* rrr. .i¿ or*r. revorutionary
Timespan of the reztolution upheaval. In a final internal "ot
.earlier surges of revolutionary
.rr.r, *or. devastating than
"orrrrolriorr,
Since revolutions are complex social and political upheavars, terror, afr. Cr."a purges of t937_g
his- swept away many of the surviving
Old Bolshevit ,.irol"¡ol#.r"
torians who write about them are bound to differ on
t}le most effected a wholesare turnover of personnel
basic questions--causes, revolutionary aims, impact
on the society, adminisuative, and military elites, and
wit¡in trre poritical,
political outcome, and even the timespan of the revolution
itself. In people to their dearhs or imprisonment
,.rri _o.. rhan a million
tåe case of the Russian Revolution, tt. ,t".tiog point presents in Gulag.a
problem: almost everyone takes it to be the .February
Revolution,2
no
. In deciding on a timespan for the Russian Revolution, the first
issue is the nature of the .srategic
of r9r7, which led to the abdication of Emperor Nicholas
II and
*o."J.f NEp in the r9zos.
lfas it the end of the Revolrrtion] or ..r".t
ttre formation of the provisional Government. But a as such? Although
when did the the Bolsheviks' avowed intention in
Russian Revolution end? \ü7as it all over by October
r9r7 when to gather strength for a late¡ r.ne*alif
,9r;;;, to use r'is interlude
the Bolsheviks took power? or did the end of the the revolutionary assault,
Revolution come there was always the possibility ttrat
with the Bolsheviks' victory in the civil \üØar in rgzo?'rüØas intentions would change as
Stalin,s revolutionary passions subsided. Some
'revolution from above'part of the Russian Revolution? scholars think that in the last
Or should years of his life, Lenin (who
died rn ry24) came ro believe that for
we take the view ttrat ttre Revolution continued
ttrroughout the Russia further progress rowards
lifetime of the Soviet state? soc¡atism could only be achieved
gradually, wittr the raising of trre
In curturar 1.".1 or úre popuration.
_ his Anatomy of Rez.tolution, Crane Brinton suggested that revo_ Nevertheless' Russian ro.Lry ..m"io.a iigrrtyil"ail.
lutions have a life cycre passing through phases and unstable
of increasing fervour during the NEp period, and .t. p"rf;r:*iod
and zeal for radical ûansformation until they reach remained agg¡es_
a climax of sive and revolutibnary. The Bohhåvirc
intensiry which is followed by the :Thermidtrian, phase
of dis_
f."-J cor¡nrer_revolurion,
from l.l"r, .rr.*i.s, at home
remained preoccupied with the threat
illusionment, declining revolutionary energy,
and gradual moves and abroad, and consrantly expressed
their dissatisfaction with
 4 Introduction

fE". To unwilringness
Revolution.
to accept it as the finar outcome of
the Introdurtion 5
tiTesran of the Russian Revotution
A second issue trrat must be considered runs from
'revolution from above, tt"t
is trre nature of starin,s
io at. late r9zos. Some
".*..ff,ïrï'r.it
rh.F.b;;;ãt"ffi".î"i',ilÏ:Tsrh.ãin;.;"'.;.ä;-
"na.JNËp
historians reject the idea that att...
*"r interludeorr.r¡p,Stalin,s.r;";ì;;;;;li'l;Så:,li,ff
Stalin's revolutionand r-enin's. "rrv
real continuiry berween
:*:
does not deserye the.name, ,i"".
otrr.* zul that stalin,s .revolurion,
,t.v l-.ì¡"rr. it was not a popular 3J,ffi.Ji.:i*J9,r,. c,.;;;;;;_are ûeated as discrere
uprising but something more like
on tfie society by a
twenryyears,**rïr-Jiillål::ä$":î."tåî"årl"*:n::äj;
"" "rr".rft In
ruling party aiming at radical o".rrfor*"ion.
this boo\ I trace
was exhauste4 andeven
,1. *;;g ð;ää,rrrirt p"rty6
continuity between f.":rrt f.i.l"rion
li*. "l
the inclusion of Stalin,s ..."olrraioo-tJ* and Stalin,s. As to
upheaval and sharedth.
*.".r"1
Normalcy, to be sur., was
lo?tt;;. a .rerurn rowas dred of
normalcv,.
above, in the Russian sdll unaãa¡ãJr., for German
Revolution, this is a question and
the beginning of Soviet."**ä.iä invasiån
on which Hrto.i".r, may legitimately
differ. But the issue here is the Second \Øorld sØar
*i.rfr.ïlnr,
"., ,"-Jo-".rr."nOr9z9 were alike,
but whether rhey w::e p"r, ot.ir.
came only a few years
,fr."Cr."i'pì
Napoleon,s revolu_
"n..
tu¡ther upheaval, i... ,ro,
more revolur;i,ï,*:Jï_t:.Jfli
tionary wals can be inàuded;.;;;ri;t pre_r939 territories of
concept of the French the Soviet U"i.;;.;
Revolurion, even if we_do rror
spirit of 1789; and' a similar
r.g".ã;h;;, an embodiment of the
beginning of a new, postrevorutior,".y.." rhe
niH::ffi:j:was
of the Russian Revolution. "po"to"J-r..ms tegidmate in the case
coterminous with the period
rrr;;;;;:Jàrrr. ..r_r, a revolution is Wrbings about the reoolution
of upheavalä¿ instaUility
fall of an old regime and the between
nt*^"ã"r.liJ"àon of a new one. the revolutions for provoking
f'ät.oä
the permanent contours rn rhe
of Russia's new regime had yet ffiî.ï #ffi-th:f . ideological con-
nuor.,til,,-i,i;;s!,.i:åiåif iff
The final issue of judgement
is whetåer the Great purges b.t t:*. ..rtorJ, lá publicists *'.'llenarvortheprencr,
attempt
ro end *. r.l^l,t_::lirited
1937-8 should be considerea
p".. oi*r-Jirssian Revolution. of
this revolutionary terror,
or "was it sØas
t¡pe-totalitari¿rn ter.or: perhaps, terror of a basically diferent
ff ,1,'J.f.ïi#-.the-Revorutioiää",ï_iäiïi1T;ïä';
historiograprw' u"tpttl"ît;
meaning a terror that serves because we have n"o"Ì illîter ö
systernic puqposes of a
firmly
åá."ü.ã,".gi_e? the
ther of these rwo characrerrã.ã"li¡ìiät.ito* rn my view, nei_
aboutit,"*.i.,'.J,i,i:,iH#i¡"lå'jjî:rîJi::_:i*:
concenûated on recenr
were a-unigue ph.rromenon,î.å"ärrnt the Great purges. rct otarlv ;*or-;J."ting
$¡v of SØestern scholarship the burgeonine
on the boundarv
between revolution and postre,rolul."äiåt*rsm. on_the nrrri*nälution
fifteen years. Ilere in the past tei
olutionary terror in its rhetoric, This *", ,.rr_ .t9 I *¡u ilJ;
.;r;.;;;ä rnowballing progress. historical perspecrive
gme
""mî;*
;;;;#::ii.rr"åîff:ri
terror in i''¿.,.,.ved-persons bui not works on the Russian lver
'"JJå:::ii:iii '¡"t Before the Second 1;;,.1yi."
"od *ñ;;ï;".o.
*u,,t"tl ä;îïË.ä!r"ffi
tr,,t it
being part of the Russian-n X:*.k*mï# worla war,;.; *uä was
Russian Revolution by professior¡i;;;;, wriüen on the
in the !7est. There
of r7e4 can be described r"i,irl"", "ïäI, dre Jacobin Terror were a number of fine
eye_witness
i', ;ilË;;;r3 Another important Jotrn Reed's Tèn Da'* that Shook "".o"oaräA memoirs, of which
similariry between *.
episodes i, t¡r"ì io uott well as some good "hirro.y th;-ü;;rî *. *or, famous, as
ryo
anes were among the priTay
**." À. åJrå".iorr. Forrevolurion_
cases Uv io,rrrr"lirt, ,*. fV
and I-ouis Fischer. whose H. Chamberlin
reasors alone, rhe storv
ortne_nuirr*äå"ìioon dramatic i"r¡å.rt friröofio.r¡.t rti'lomacy, The
just as the story needs the Great Vtor( Atrairs, remains
of the F..;ãi;;rän ly: : a rle works of interpre-
classic. Th
tation that rraa måst 1.""-t"îìj:'i:t-:
ä,m: needs trreJacobin
n",iaiin-;;:ä";:;::,ffi,iffi:îLT:îáiiä#:
olution Betayed. The
first, written . fr"arfV,s
"n expulsion from
 6 Iwroduction
ttre Sovier Union. but not
as a political polemic, gives
a vivid Introductian 7
descrþtion *o
a participant. The Tîï*,*"ly; ;i;ir"i ro* the perspecrive of larlness at Noon (on ttre Great purge trials of Old Bolsheviks
second, an in¿ictrnãni of
Stalin writren in 1936, in ttre late r93os), but in the scholaiþ lealm
it was American
describes Stalin,s regime f¡r*_i¿"iä'r.ra¡.rg political science that dominated. The
", on the support of toialitarian model, based on
bureaucratic class aná reflecting its essentiary a somewhar demonized conflation of Nazi
;:":i.ir:ï:.î* Germany S"Xrt
framework.""¿
Russia, was the most popular interpretative
Of histories wriren in the Soviet
Union before the war, pride of sized the oûìnipotence of the totiitarian
I;._;;:
place must be given to state and its .levers of
a work written unãer stalin,s conrrol', paid considerable atention to
sion, ttre nororious shorc course;;-;;;;;;"ro close supervi- ideology *¿ p.op"g"rraã,
and largely negrected the social realm (which
nist Party published in r93g. of the sooiet commu_
a, .¡.î.ä.r'*", *.rr, this was not *", ,."o
a scholarly work bur
fragmented by the totalitarian state). ¡uàri r¡ø.rt.* "r'pã;r;;
schorars agreed
one designed that the Bolshevik Revolution
line'-that is, the orrhod._r r"I. to hfao*o the correct .party -",
lacking any kind of popular supporr or" "orrp
by a minori.f, ;;;
taughr in all schools___on "Ur".iü:O
,, all Communists and legiåmary. The Revolution,
all questions oi Solri., history, ranging and for rhat mafter the prerèvolutionaf,
from the class naru¡e history of the Bolshe_
t]r. ää. and the reasons for vik Party, were studied mainly to etuci¿ate
the Red Army's victory îf !;* rùø";-äL.
i" úr. Ciril the origins of Soviet
.oorpir"cies against totalitarianism.
Jj,iå:ffi }ïü"t:-*i"'t."'".tä,o¡poi..á-lf ;"",.ä Before the r97os, few Western historians
ventured into the study
of Soviet history, including the Russian Revolution,
nor reave
period. st
;"*;.;ff ff:il":rït ilïl
rike the sn",, i"i,u-
aia
the subject was so politically charged, and partly
p".tty U.."rrrå
r.. ..*á.,hio because access
day in the Soviet histori""t_";il;Êä1'#ii.i..L*:
p.of.rriorr.
-' "^'.
- ïäî to archives and primary sources was very
works by British historians deserve rro,.r-8.
difficult. f*. pi."..ri"g
The interpretation of rh. FI. carr,s The Botsheaik
established in the sov¡et
Bol;elk Revotution that became Reaolurion, rgrz-r923, the beginning
of his Ãulti-volum. uir*i'"¡
enth¡oned ar reasr un¡r
Uniã;ìî Saoiet Russia, of which the first volùne
appeared. in r95z,and Isaac
t¡re rnia_r;;åä;
laic Man<ist' The key poino J::].#å ;:ä:i:l Deutscher,s classic biography of frotsþ,
åf *ni"f, t¡.-n rt
a üue prorerarian ¡evoluti""
*.rJ-a", äiä..ob.. Revolurion was The hophet Armed, appeared n ""1"-.,
ry54.
as the vanguard of the
i" -iri.Àãr.Ëolshevik party served In ttre Soviet lJnion, Khrushchevis denunciation
of Stalin at the
proletari"r, ä"i. rt was neither prema- Party Congress in 1956 and the partial de_Stalinization
rure nor accr¿enrar_its';;;"::
:ï ïli "rrã T.ld:ú
that followed opened trre door fãr some hisiorical
ui,to,i."iuJ;"ä;-:;"iffi,:;:ï:,î¿:n:.å:1tr'iî_i:il:i: a raising of the level of scholarship.
revaluarion and
determined everything ln
Sorrier'frisö *il*n meanr in pracdce and the rgzos began to appear, atthougtr
Archive_based studies ,jr7
of
that every major poritiàal rhere were still constraints
¿r"irior *ã, äir. ,i" rear poritical and dogmas that had to be observed, fãr example,
revolutionary räi.,, except historv on the Bolshevik
i,iåî'åi;ïî:,:I". r-enin, Stalin, L"rat" status as vanguard of the working ctass.
ble to mention non-persons like TrotsÇ
tt became possi_
and Zinoviev, b"i ;"ly
mt*,*;:::J:i:"T:.,'"ï1,.å'":1::tr#î:."îf .* in a pejorative contexr. The great oppoi*lay
that Khrushchev,s
'ilï::i¿:"ïï"l.li;"öiij,:::X
;*ï,ff.:f #il:ff
Secret Speech offered historians *"rìå
decouple I_enin and Stalin.
Reform-minded Soviet historians produced
áany Uooks and arti_
cles on the rgzos arguing that .Leninisa
In the West, Soviet history ,roÃr, in different areas
became a matter of strong were more democradc and tolerant of diversity
only after the Second interest and less .o.r.i*
yrrfã
of knowing the enemy..Th.
W".,-ffir, in a cold war conrexr and arbitary than the practices of the Stalin
era.
tron, George orwell,s
;;îää'ilri'., the rone were fic_ For'Western readers, the ,Leninist, trend
of the r96os and r97os
Nineteen E;;;;F;;'"rro **,r. Koesder,s
was exemplified by Roy A. Medvedev,
aurhor of Ler n;story fu;;;
The Origins and Consequences of Stalinisrz,
published in the West in
 8 Introduction
rgTf' But Medvedev's work was too sharpry
and overtry criticar of
Stalin for the climate of the Brezhn.r, y.åi
and he was unable ro
publish it in the Soviet Union. ttris
was rhe era of the blossoming
of samizdat (unofficial ci¡culation of manuscripts
within the Soviet
union) and' tamizdat ('legal pubrication oi*ort
The
famous of the dissident authors emerging most
"u.oad).
at this time was Aleksand¡
Solzhenitsyn, the great novelist arrã
histo.icar polemicist whose
Gulag Archipelago was published in
English in ,973.
!Øhile the works of some dissident SÃiet
'Western scholars srarred to reach
audiences in ttre r97os, \?.estern-scholarly
Russian Revolution was still treate¿
work on the
as 'bãrrrgeors farsification, and
effectively banned fr.-*
(*roughio_e works, including
Robert Conquesr,s The Greatt. USSRfrnoì c¡llat.a
with Solzhenitslm's Gølag). All the ,"rrr.,.o.r¿¡alons "larrd.rtloely
along
had improved
for'western scholars. They were
the Soviet lJnion, albeit with rimited
il. à conducr research in
"o*anJstrictty
con*olled access
ro archives, whereas in earlier times
conditions_ had been so diffcult
t''at many w'estern Soviet scholatr
the Soviet union
at all, and others were summarily "."..irited
expelled as spies or subjected
to various kinds of harassment. As access
to archives and primary
sources in the Sovier lJnion improved
in the late ,gZo, *å ,;ior,
increasing numbers of young W.ra.*
t irì*¡ans chose to study
the Russian Revolution and its
social history, started to displace "t.rmatfri
histor¡ especially
"rrd
political ,.i.rr..
as the dominant
discipline in American Sovieìology.
A new chapter in the schola..t t"g"r,
¡ in the early r99os, when
most resüictions on access to archives
in Russia were lifted and
the first works drawing on previously
classified Soviet documents
began to appear. lüØith the passing
.t.-"àf¿ war, rhe field of
Soviet history became less politicl.¿ "f n at. ,Ofr.rr,
advantage. Russian and other port_Sorri.t to its great
iri.tori"rr, *.r. no longer
isolated from their \üTesrern counrerparrs,
and tåe old distinctions
'Soviet,, .émigré,, and .\üTeltern; ,.t
P:*..."
ished: among the schorars whose
ot"rrfrip largely van_
work h"¿ *ãrt influence in Russia
and outside were rhe Moscow_basea .Russiai;
çactually, Ukrainian_
born) Oleg Khtevnyuk, a pioneer in
archive_based study of the
Politburo, and yuri Slezkine,
Mor"o*_Uoï
ident in ttre United States since " tfre rg8or,-;1,former émigré, res_
reinterpretation of the
ose Jewish Century
:1i:1: T",^*
ûon and the Soviet intelligentsia i1"". oiJ._. in the Revotu_
Introduction 9
New archive-based biographies of I_enin and
Stalin appeared,
and topics like Gulag and popular resistance,
previously inacces_
sible to archival work, attracted many
historians. R.rórdir;1;
ttre break-up of the Soviet Unio" *¿
the emergence of inde_
pendent states on the basis of the
old lJnion ..p,fbli"., ,"froU*
like Ronald Suny and rbrry Martin develofed
Soviet nationalities
and borderlands as a field. Regiånal studies fl."Ã;;;;
ry:.?.i"d
including Stephen Kotkin,s Magneric Miuntain
on Magnitogorsk
in rhe Urals, which
fo¡ the emergence in the r93os of a
distinctive "rglr:q
Soviet culture ('starinist civilizaãon') that was iåoltà,
the product of the Revolution. Social
histo¡às discovered a wealtrr
of ordinary cidzens, letters to auúrority (complaints,
¿..rr,,"i"tiorrl,
appeals) in the archives, contributing to a rapidly aevetopmeni
of scholarship on everyday life that Ë", ,o.,.f,
in common with
historical anthropolory. In contrast to tfr.
rggos (and reflecting
general developments the historicar profession), ttre current
_within
selelation of young historians has been atawn as much
to culrural
and intellectual history as social, using
diaries and autobiographies
to illuminate the subiective and indivicíuar
side of soviet experience.
Inærpreting the reaolution
All revolutions have libené, égalité,
fraærníté, and other noble slo_
gans inscribed on their banners. All
revoíutionaries are enthu_
siasts, zealots; all are utopians, with
dreams of creating a new
world in which the injustice, cornrpdon,
and apathy of the old
world are banished forever. They are intolerant
of disagreemenq
incapable of compromir.; *.r*L.i"ea
by big, distant goals; vio_
lent' suspicious, and destrucdve. Revolutionaries
are unrearistic and
inexperienced in governmenq their institutions
and procedures are
extemporized. They have intoxicating
illusion of p..rorrifyirrg
ú. Tll, of the peopl.,- yh1.h
-the
means tfrãy
monolithic. They are Manicheans, dividLg"rrrr*.
the people is
the world into two
camps: light and darkness, the revolutior,
ÿ la, .r._i.r- T't.y
despise all traditions, received wisdom,
icoir, supersdtion.
They believe society can b e a taburaroro "rr¿revolution
o. -hi.'the will
write.
It is in the nature of revorutions to end in disilrusionment
disappointrnent. Zeal wanes; enthusiasm and
becomes forced. The
moment of madnessT and euphoria passes.
The relationship of the
 ro Introduæion
people and the revolutionaries
becomes complicated: Introduction tr
the will of the people it appears trrat
rhe temptati*l .r
i,
"o,
i."-.rl;J;,iì In theory'industrialization and economic
Fi.l';ö;îäTïffi
recognition that one.doe,
rou.-oïäeighuour
î:ff îiå...î:; only means to an eng ror
But the more clearty *a
nussian ù;;; the
modernization were
end being sociatism.
.i"gt._;;frå; the Bolsheviks
*"* whose oneself,
"o, as
å::ï:å îä:lä3' ::";i;x ;."'d and
ross i,,oo.,
on the means, *.
roggy-¿ir-.-*î"1å focused
)y creare
the revolutionari;;"*;ä, To.:.
Vhen the term .buitding the end became.
and different.
is less than
õátü'l;;;;r. "*."r co,,rmon in the
Beyond the generic similarity,
rg30s' its meaning was-hard
.o oirri"*tli from the actuaruse
of new factories and industriJ;rå;:;entty buildins
.:T:ï'tå::::' *l;'; ä iäÉ::i ff 'î::îH'i
however.
Communists of that-generadon, in progr.rr. d
:ffi the.r.* rirot.rracks puffng awav
e*o..rh.-iä'1i;:Ë5iË",iffi on the steppe were r,.e
a.*.;;;."
'the proletariar, for .th. p.ãp'tJääri nxr*:iim,:; had been vicrorious. As"rri*"æ
industrialization,
a¿am tll;.iri;
that ttre Revolution
it, Stalin,s forced_pace
that revolution however painfrrl and cor
historically
lo,".y
t.".r."*.*r,"^i::::,,:i:_clat1ed
ú.l.;u, if:#'.ffi:'1il.'iî;:"*.revorurion;
rhe moment came, in
r¡,... *... ;i; was

and when
t'""fråäï"$,T,"*'-"i*"r""."äinì:iÏ"ä::#:P,i"î]
*id;;;;. rh.
å:"
thesupportorreád¡madGil';ïrîïTï:,ir.."Jå:,,..L:: ,"åT'i.lirîi:i rheme,. was important in.trre Russian Revo_
anaryricar""*;-.Ji.:.ii:,î::ä1..ïf
åj '.:::lltfÌ:
ure p'troerJå iJåJn.,r, not
:?'lïi,ir:-:;:#*"' rhe
rn,his ffi;;.:iLiililXî1?.ï1î. "ir.gi";; gentsia; and the Bolsheviks
** ;;;.;;tional,
.
the modernization ¡mportance. The
the-.-^i.;:r"^T:*' fi¡st is
tive of a much broader
soci;;;;;"; ää úrey bur represenra_
Revotution in rerms,of class..;i";:;;lsstnea interpreted the
a speciat role
f:Xim:"ä.ï:äh',.J:lï:,:,ïåï*",or..."pioeîà,i
and j;;-ü;;äTffiï:i:iî ä"hijåffi iå*"t "r"*' r" o'äi]the Bolsheviks assumed
*;
rhe third **.Jitat
ne of revolutionary violence i"å,: ;;;ä:ï,:iffi;å.J":Jff i,,:å.fi
"i.äff H*iljï,"ffi I
t̡e Revolution dealt and terror_how
r.,.i,."iï äî,î ;î'ri* J :ien
emi es, and what o" 1."", ï, äi mernobre,*."*.X,T',ff :ä.,i::,,ïi,..ffiilï,åï.å?j
term .modernizati.rì;
begun
to s peasants),
^The
port rrodern. But passé in an age !n13¡erou¡
rntelligentsia_were tl
and even l"'r;;^
l1_:l_-0.r.*o.a
subject, since the ", ,."ï1
that rs appropriate for our
"-l':^:J'. ï-:
i"a""*;"i .o.,ii1-iË;tïläå-,ffi:L ny":iæ
,rt.'s"irlliir-îo:';"":t"landtechnologicalüe'ii;;;rä
smokestacks.;;;il.ï.,i.ìiäj:åi:ii,J,;älï*i{*åî
peopre,.r",,
lutionary rerror was primarily
r ne aspecr of rhe class
¿i..o?ã.'"'
*^-' *
issue that has been most
hïd
ffi,"ff:.ff""å:ïJ|1revolutionary over rhe years is wheth.e^r hotly debated
r"ll.o a ñ.-;ä..ü."
"r;i;ä;;;.,"".s
dream.
werer in rheir
Russian,;;;rïä working ctass was
o. s.lri."ilriä* to represent rhe
,":ll-.g. ,"r;--;;';rr*"s a simple enough
ind'rstrializatig" It";;ä; quesdon if we look only
revolution; r. *", *,.i.tÏÏvlt
uÑ¡r ¡nsrstence on the ä: at th. s,rrom.rã"J"'.r**"
inevitability .i'.""ìi"rr- the working class of peggerad of r9r7 when
(which o;;;t" ¡vfo."orv were radical ized
clearly prefemed the Bolslievit, "rra and.
t. *räå political party. After
Hil*Hiffi ä,-î11'_qJ!.îiäî'"1"ru1*lîl"::,i# thar, however, it is not so
simple. Th.ä;rlr". the
power with working_class-supporr Bolsheviks took
did not mean that they kept
*tr*.Tï.1ïïä-'ä:ii:ä,:**ffiïîä..'*ä:# :ä:å:tffî:ä;l:i:::""'*'"'ä'ì"..e*¿edtheirpartv,
that
e sevure of power,
as a mere morrtrrpiåce
indusuial workers. åi
 12 Introduction
Ttre accusation that tåe Bolsheviks
class, first heard by
had betrayed the working Introduction 13
t¡e outsi¿ewä;á;;;"r."tion or regimes that intimidates
stadt revolt of rgzt,was with the Kron_ and terrifies the
one tåat was Uorrrrà
rrue. Bur what kind of betraval_¡row
,o.ì,
to come and likely to be
*iA whom, with
alsobeen .h"."-.-tã,i,ti"
Revolutìon seming
.r _;;* .:;iiå:i::"JrirH:ïiff
*: Ti.Alili;;;"rpose
consequences? In the
NEp period, trre s;Lheviilpæ;il what revolutionaries, eves, is to of terror, in rrre
,i; desüoy ,h.;;;ori., ofthe revolution and
ffiiäni# i.,!n, "ì"r,
.r,", ¡,-"ãi..*.¿
"ior.
"p
to di*.il_
the impedim..rrr ro change;
of maintaining the purity,,a.ra
b";;.r.ì;î
r¡,ati.on1,;;;;"ifJËl,Yä-",,ff å:n#"1';il:*'Ï,r:l; revorutionaries rhemselve..r
,."oilo"r.^"T ïffi*y"iii:
n".-i.r ääliorroa.r-r..rolutionaries,
standards and the regime,s
irrirr.* ãl;;üo, ror rrrr¡er productivi
ity.an effective senararion û..*.h;;;;;g
are extremely important
in aII revolutiã"r. ffr. .";;;;r;J;;
ctass, if not a formal stealth as well .o:TI ,h.y f";;;;;i,
divorce, occurred irr,t. ,93or. "t of revolutionaries.
otten wear the mask *a .orr*piracies; tåey
But this is not the whoie story.
workers under Soviei
The situation of workers qua
*::i"ffitffi":t"it1v,*,.n"r^rr,.viksconceptuarizedtheene-
abreto*..*,-,;;åo.:ä:Jåì"î."T"?5i:trri:."*: t"ri,t,o,lui"ü,ä,äiäï:..i1ï,n*å,r,:i:ï:.ïî
workers) was anorher. ny
r..rrritirrg
the working class for frft*"-;;;;äl;:
p-öä._u.rs
primarily from sympathies. Like m<
the Bolsheviks did a good
a workers'party. They
october
deal to ,,rUr,Jrti"t their
Revolution.
ctaim to be
::,.: *i".'" "* ;;il'!ilT.i.Tllji
zaron and conspiracy), the
Èolshevik,
$:l#ffi.;"tr4#
*..Jàur..red with counrer_
¡ro .r."r.a revolutionary prors; b-ut
i:ilTffit#:'i',*.since the ;.;;;;, "*r"rrrrel
"*1.ää for workine_ their.Marxisä'Lî". *,
or yorkers .o p"fr there were classes thal
y¡re innately i"î*¡"A
a speciar ¡¡¡ist. rf
whole social class co,,lcr ro the revolution,
crasscomå;;;î*rï.1trå,ïLi:,å:.i:1010f *ã,ãirl Individual members of that
b. ,.g;à;ä lîîlorr.o""cy of enemies.
a
:oi¡ecti
positi ons. During the
the regime cur open
currurar il;.ËilîiiJ..,i:rif ïî]] revolutionary conspirators, "ñ;;;
even if subj-ectiveþ (úrat
rety, be counter_
is, in their own
mobility by send_ minds) they knew nothing
T:rh.rworkers
ing Iarge numbers of vo'ng "rr""".iiàîi**o of the
supporters ofthe revolution.";;ü; ¡ --J ;dq thought themselves
and *åL.rr, children to
educadon. White the poticy higher
of htrh_;;;;; .protetarian The Bolsheviks used tw.o
tion'was dropped in promo_ kinds of terror in ttre Russian
the eLIy r;"r:Ë""i tion: terror against er Revolu_
enemies.'t.hr",rh.;:"i.i;å*j*hiï*¿ jiÍ";.iî,":;äï
Revolution, died downjn
*¿. J.;;ì î,:j:i:,jff f:":iåîî;*l A. ,gror, äîrrräo"..¿
p,ãr.
working-class upward :mru{*i
*"rìì.n"oîor rrr. interesr. For
end of the decade wittr-
The larer fi¡st flickered
collec-tivizå*i
up again at the
i"ä a"rturar Revorution.
T:bliry
the beneficiaries, however,
tt.ir r.*..1iæî"*, was likely fights at tt¡e end of the "",_"
oì.riJiä.rär" the party faction
to seem Civil røalr, ;;;;;:
örn.o until rezT when
ä:H: i"::oorthat the Revolution n* ilìäi.o its promises to the a small-scale renor was
airect.a-againräiîft opposition.
From then on, rhe remptation
ao *rr¿*itll_scale terror
..#å:ï:.ffiä#t':"' througri tåis book is rhe
theme or
enemies within the oarty
was palpable. O.r..."ron
t:tt:. *", .r.irg tenor on a considerable for this was.class
against
that
revolution; t uol,rriorr"jli-ttT.:'.. Popular violence it i"il;.;; i' 1.^
enemies, scale against
,r,.."¡v,i,e.',î;.äffi ïi":iä.l"::ä:fl outside the narty. Another
periodic purging .."r-ori-*", that the party,s
after. Terror, meaning ä;:.*_ïiï:"å,J,ï
..**¿.à'Iäi.i:.i;ï:r.rutionary @n¡stp¡, literally creansings) of
an effect simila¡ to scrat, its own ranks had
sroups .n*r an itch. These purges, fi¡st conducted
on a nadonal scale ,,, r92r,
were reviews of party *.*U.rrüp
 T4 Introduction
in which all Communisrs were summoned Intoductian r5
individualty for public number of small changes reflecting my response
appraisals of their
pva]tf, comperence, ia.tigro.rna, and connec_ to new information
tions; and those judged unwol]rf and new scholarry interpretations. r have
demoted to candidate status. There
*.r. .¡p.U.d from the parry or used rhe footrotes to call
attention to important r.ec?t EnglishJanguage
was a'national party purge in scholarship, as well
1929, anott¡e, n ry33_!,.and as Russian scholarship in English t
then_as purging A.^p"ó-U..""'_î and kept citation of
an almost obsessive Russianlanguage work and documenrs "o.l"ão.r]
ro a áirri*o_. The Select
in rapid,".";i;;
expulsion miehr bring
iiËi#i ;::'düf#ïi:itr ::îi: Bibliography provides a brief guide to
furtfrer LaOing.
such as arresr or edle,
was still comparatively Fú.1
low,
9""iJir*.*,
¡vYv' wirtr
vv¡qr ç4u'
each (rr
of tnese
the party purges it crept
. upwards.
Terror and party nyrslns (yú
small .p,)
on a massive scale in the Great" purges finally came together
not a purge in the usual sense, of r937_g.lo Td-;;;
sin"ã no systemadc review of
pcrty membership was involved;
but it was directed in the first
lnstance against party members,
particularly those in higl, oftcial
positions, although aresrs
party intelligenrsia and, to "."d
fË";;;i;kly ,p.."a into the non_
a lesser dd;;;ä. broader
In the Great purges, which would population.
b.;;;.;""*"tely described as
.i:.Î:ï:tr:i;r lï:oi"'o"
*"'
"ï;;.;;ivarent ;. ;;;;;;;
counrer_revo,"o.",;:::Jå'ffi ::äïlJ,:Í*::äiH::::a
The anatogy to the ie.ro, .f ,Ir.
to many historians, and it clearly
F;;;;^i"ïr,roo. has occurred
the Great purges as well, since
o..,r.rJ to the organizers of
the ,..*ä._ies of rhe people,,
which was applied to hose judged
.;;;;.;_;.".lutionaries during
the Great purges, wa, borrá*.ã
significance of that suggestive
t.* ä.'¡"cobin terrorists. The
historical Uo*o_irrg is explored
rhe last chapter. in

Note on the founh edùion

Like the earlier edidons, this
fourrh edition is essentially
of the Russian Revolution
."p;;;";;;irr'n.rr.i", nor in athehistory
Russian territories that.were", part non_
of the old Russian Empire
Soviet lJnion. This limitario., and the
*rr.t t;;rJ"I the more strongly
now rhar a livelv and valuable
""hol;;;;ä. .ror_R,rrsian areas
has developed. Sr/iù *ro.".'r" üJ.ore subjecr, this edi_
l,i1l_.:ft*
uon ulcorporares new material
that h"s æ"ãã. available since
as well as recenr international r99r
..hoh.;iþ.-r;Âììe rhe¡e are no
changes in the argument major
or organizatioì of the booþ rhere
are a
 I The Setting The Sening 17
aurocracy. After the
r9o5 Revolution, Nicholas
lished a national electedparli"Á-räöuma, gave in and estab_
legalizing poritical oarties ar the same time
and But the ord arbitrarv
habits of autocratiå rule ";il;;;.
police undermined
and ,h.;;rä;.: activity of the secret
Ar the beginning of ttretwentieth these concessions.
After dre Bolshevik n *l"iã"
century, Russia was one
great powers of Europe.
But it of the ,f b"tob.. rgr7, manyRussian
was ;;; émigrés looked back on
th. pr...rrol.rãJnäì
åY;:ff:::å":":::Y'l':-'il#ff iåii"iå:ä'Htr; ;;i:Ë:.-#:l¿hl*u..";i;#;îäl:äi::,?:i,'ï:å:å;
;:"trkilJiJ.i'}iþ:ffi #:ff:ï.iå;:årunffi; 3.r..y;;"'''**üüi!,.ö,i#i#å?'.:l.X"ti::l*l
arizing.rrã,".;i',.',*.iï1.îfil:nÌ,îli[.ii:å:î; nstabitity and the likelihood
.rr.-ui"äiiäaval: the more.apiãly
legal political parties.
and no
parliament, and the :".:å:.-J|ïä(H:i:: ,*"' *ö ii"i'.,".i,.a as progressive
aurocracy survived
*i,t, ".rro"iã.Jed
no.traditionorporiticar.;;""#äJ."[i:;.i::H:"ïi:rî:
""¿i*i"iri.iiä g'..",n,.,"*..;i;;:.iïiï.ijå'ffi,Jïîå:Ë.î:#-;L1:
are those of displacement
nobitity had similarly
strong enough to for""
au.¿iã-ã.rö a corporate sense -alienatiã";;Jîä or conrrol over one,s
destiny. To the nineteenrh_ce".r;;;ñroor",
"jj " ofidentity Gogot, Russia
";;;::::i was a troika careerins
in. darkness t.';;k""*,
'i"rJi¿.",ioñoîåirloî::',"rT,'.3",îr]erhrone.t*-ur,;ü::
peasanr, ctergy, the Duma politician
at.rc¡"a, c";;;,*j;"""cing destination. To
social
even though oã .r,"r.-rylä
::9t?,groups ä**, provision a¡d
like professio""l, å"ã^ïJ¡;ît "o for new
and his Ministers in 1216, was ,å*O
Nicholas II
.it along
"-.".,.äned passeiger,the edøe
ctergyretain.a"r,yirri.,g,i,..*..î].*r".äff
ïî,.:rîl.î,J# ;:r1ffiî::,it;,|"9 d'i*',*h:o' *r'l* ;;;
rn ryr7 the risk was taken,
and Russia's_ n.""orr*'Au--t:
--:swvuË movement forward became
th¡ee decades before a ptunge into
the ryrTRevolu . revolution.
ishment but an increase
that Russia experienced
in natiorã;.iä;#i tr å'ili:ä;
it, n rt r-p*t;îä;
The society
å:ä:ff :ffi t,;.-få'flîiffi f .irÏhii"iJäTî,äî*: The Russian Empire covered
est development of t:cture, and a mod- a vast expanse of territory,
n: entepreneurial activity. trom poland in the west suetching
w¡rich stn_conrl;;#*. úe.|.eää to the pacific õ;;;; rn
into the Arctic north. and the easr, extendins
of Turkey and Afghanirt"r,
reachin",t.-"ìä Sea and the borderi
i., tn.'r;;:,il. hub of the Empire,
therehaã;Ëä:."*i,î,,iïiåîî:ff ,,l"i'"ïiiiä:l:îT"otg 'o*.;i,il'#" *", is now urrainej
- ".."*, ïi#::ï""ï*.åi
':.î**i*'"iï::::,'.ï..ä::::î*_::îi;ï:åri:åii
peasanúy,s economic
siruation .irrr... .r,n.Ë,iotJ;il,:::_i:#,i.:3i:åtf
As Russia,s Iast Ts¿
j:;tri,,ff lîi;.*i,îiJ: even European Russia."á ,n. ,á"uì.li
:ïiilljJitiï
:î:täJä:"åå j"i'"i'i,!:j,ï direltion of political change-towards
of the Empire remained. Iargery
were a handful
"ää.r".a wesreur regions
;;';;";.n_urbanized. There
something ti¡s ¿ of big urban-inäustrãrîåir.r,
sr/.rr.Te product of recent and mosr of them ttre
g""er'iã"yi.''î.,:":i;:ï,Jff rapid .*p".rriorr,-iï*l
tr|ff:î ;'ffïîi}.;.*:d il;; ;. ;i:i'iä:,äï"ïåî
å11i::i::l=._..*J;'ä
srownessorchangeandthe,*;;";i;;;J;:ffi,itrå.iïålH:
ri.",-xr,".r.."1"iå'är.å,ï:å:ïiiî?:?Jifi
Ërlîï
 r8 The Setting
meallurgical centr¡1gf the Donbass,
in what is now Ukraine;
sØarsaw, r-ndz, and in ,h.
*.;;;'R;tov
Baku in the South. $sa
and the oil city of
But Russian Orolrio.i"f towns were sdll
sleepy backwarers at the -most
beginning oiãi-*rr.¡eth century-local
administrative cenües with a ._-"n
schools, a peasanr marker, and
*...frant population, a few
perhapsil"ru"v sration.
In thevillages, much of at. o"¿i.¡.""ì
way
The peasants still held rheir land of life remained.
;;;;"r"1
renure, dividing
the village fierds into narrow strips
by the various peasanr households;
which were dned separately
(village counc') wourd stin p.¡"ai""'v "naã many village s, the mír
that each household had an åq""f
roiroiurr..
^ùoo¿.r, the strips so
.fr"rã.
ploughs were in
common use, modern flqmS techniques
villages, and peasant agriculture
were unknown in the
level. The peasants'lutl,were
*", ,råi *.t above subsistence
d";J;;;ther along the viilage
sueet, peasants slept o:.ù.
stove and kept ireir animaË;.h.h.;
in ttre house, and the old patriarchJ;;;;.
survived. The peasants were not
of the peasant familv
much *... ;;;;.i;"i;:i#
from serfdom: a peasant who
a", ,i*ry tfre turn of tfre century was
alrgldr a yor.¡ng adult at the time
Of cou¡se the Emancip"tio" frrJ.fräËd
,i""tE;;.rpation of 186r.
"f
peasant life, but it
had been framed with great caudon
J;ì; minimize the change
and spread it over time. Before
E;õ;;;, the peasants worked
their strips of the village. lan4 and
land or paid him the equivalent
.n;;;; worked rhe masters,
ortrr.ìr'rJåL ir, *o.r.r. After the
continued.o ,"ort r¡.i. own land,
_":T.tP1oo1r,^ú:ï and some_
trmes worked for hhe on their
former *"*r, 1""d, ;hiL;;il;g
'redempdon' payments to the state
ao orr.i the lump sums that
had been given the randowne¡s
redempdon payments were scheduled
iÃ.ãìî.. compensadon. The
"r to last for forty_nine years
(although in fact the state
cancelled them a few years earlÐ,
the village communitv was.collelively and
responsible for the debts of
all members. This måant that
individu;i;';*,, were still bound
to.the.village, though th¡v wele b.;J-í;;e
collective responsibility instead debt and rhe mir,s
.f br;.rfd;.
Emancipation were iniended ro The terms of the
into the rowns and the creadon
p..,r.rri"iar, ¡rrn.r* of peasants
.f f""åì.* prll.t"¡ut *t ¡ch would
represent a danger to,public- " e¡perience showed up suikingly in
order. They also had the effect of
reinforcing the mir and the
ol¿ ,yrt.* oí"Jirrrr.o"r land
and making it almost impossible renure,
fo. p."r*i, to consolidate their
The Setting
19
strips, e¡pand or improve their hordings,
or make the transition to
independent small-farming
While permanent departure from the
villages was difficult in
the post-Emancipation decades, it
*", ."ry
temporarily to work for hire in agricurture,
ro reave the v'rages
construction, or mining,
or in the towns. In fact such work
*",
for many peasant
taxes",r...rrity
families: the money was needed for
and redemption payments.
The peasants who worked as seasonaf
l"l*.r, (otkhodrzikfi were
11.: y"V for many months of rhe year, tea'rring thei¡ families to
till their land in the villages. If th"
,;;;.y, were long_as in the
case of peâsants from central Russian
villåges
in rhe Donbass mines-ttre otkhodniki *ig;, who went to work
harvest and perhaps the spring ,o*irrg.
,.*rn only for the
Th". pr""ti". of departing
fo¡ seasonal work was tong_estãbhn.a]
.rp."i"fly in the less fertile
areas of European Russia where
the landloids haá e*actea
in money rather than labour from their...g. grra f"r_;
increasingly common in the late
it was becoming
.rrt¡, and earry twentieth
century' pardy because more work was "i".tava'able in the towns. In the
years immediately before the
First !(/orld s'ar, about nine million
p.easants took out passports
for seasonal work outside .lr.i.;;;;;
village each year, and of these almost
t *... working outside
agriculture.2 "ii
one in every rwo peasant households
. Ytt| in European Russia
including a family member who left ¿r. ,riil"g.
higher proportion in the petersbu.g
for work_and a
Industrial Regions
""Jé.rr*l
and the western provinces-the impression
ttrat old Russia survived
almost unchanged in the villages may
*.fl fr"lr. been deceptive.
Many peasants were in fact rivin! witrr
å". ià". i" the t¡aditionar v'-
lage world and the other in the quite
diflerent world of the modern
industrial town. The degree to which peasants
remained within úre
t¡aditional world varied not only
ao geographical location
but also according ,o """oùirrg
Tg sex. The yã,rrg were more likely to
go away to work, and 1c.in addition the young men c¿rme in contact
wittr a more modern world when they we-re
catted up for army
service. W'omen and úre aged were
mãre likely to know only the
village and the old peasant way of life.
These differences in peasanr
the literacy figures of ti.
census. The young were very much
more literate than the old, men
Ç
were more literate than women, and
literacy was higher in the less
fertile areas of European Russia-that
i., trr. *", where seasonar
 20 The Sedng
migration was most
common_rhan in tl¡e ferdle Black Earth
region.3
production.a Enterprises
The urban working class
was still verv c machine_buildine B. ú. famous pr¡titov
number orp..-*.rrt
industrial worke.*
the peasantry. The r:
ytan^t ^"T"ii:;^_
th. t""g.ty "i
å::: ";ãöäå
ptants of ,rr..oã"ï""îr"åriroy.a roreign_oivned
i"..i:ä"" many thousands of
.üË-î"å:1lJï#î','i,*i"f'"ffi
was armost i*po,iiur..to ltr:ïä:i:Jî'iäit
;;ü''o:*äiiJrt
According to Marxist
tåeory, a hiehlv
L.ä:lîi ä3::ï
perm¿rnenr urban_dwelling
of the yearin the towns.
*o.L.räfrì who worked most
fli:f 'ffi: äHr.ï.'o ""' ìí' "ä"åi:å :äïiT fi .îff i'i
t;*äî"ä.iasants
,1äî'å.'äti.I'"1'"*'";-l;ãä"ffHiT:.-i:':iliäi
;i::äiiiyn*!"*åt
revorutionary;:;i]..+å.ä,::Hlf;"^y:*il;ä;di,
in yillages ,L.*t;;;'ä;ä;
tivga
that was o-o.ru.,.Ill!tÏ eudence of the period
from the r89os to r.r"-
o., ¿"i,îî _..Yiö:,i
" äni"ffi æ{tl ;.ru;: "ì,1-]-.=^"ïjlt|l
**; j*[*ji",,'i"*:Ë-i"t.-;:"i-3în""i"'".*ãitiig
::ü:.iii'Jilïïå*ä*:J.;'dffiäi"bourrorce,t;;'.;ïî workers,il*. jr"i,",äH;^¿:3,:,;f;
The main reasofr ror
*rrão^iîrerconnection ïi$:,:.-.ää::;-î::lTl
working class and
ûr¡ nealantrv _", ã"ì-n berween the urban
rrsia,s rapid industrial_
:::i#f åïiÍ.*:.a.-""ä,*J#;,ïi,i"ïi:ïi.îïî:
_ïauon.was
more
a very recent
orr*"-.,,ã*î.rt *ì
w¿s not until the Moscow o.g".r¿.¿¿llRevolution' the workers
"rt, o.,.*î*,
than half a ce.,n,,i.
l*e.-r.-"Ë g'ääi ::Î*y aft er i'li':
"o^- Britain-that Russia .*;;;; r89os- ""i
*¿"o.,.i,,i.ãî;ffi:_il"å:îi:î:i,,1'åHåî::î,.änJ:
#:,f*1î,:iff;i::Y*ffi :i-*;ui,"tr#tr;.ri; ä"ï,î.îJ:îtå:ij.1;9rùì,."i*äå"._crassribe¡ars,drive
movement i' p.r..r¡!1.3
the su¡nmer of r9r4,
the workers, strike
3_._ llã ; ä. ffi ,:,: ;Tîï.î::",,ä,ini:*:ïmï.ii ¿i*.,*io,,ìä;ffi :ä,äï'äîffi:ffi i:.,".*,o,.",."ä,
.ïi *JäT¿ rormed ." i*r. oä Jr ,n. n,r.i"n worr.i.,g nor rake the risk ordecraring
il;ilffi;ïffi:lH:t
a
courd
*u* ¿*.r.i; Ää:"ä, :..*îr:ï:,*r.::trf*n*îi The strength of
may be explained i"
working_ä;;;äffi; sendment in Russia
r
ffi::T:::.î:ïii'.;1":'"*ì'"iii,ilFhstvorrdw",*.-,. "ìåi-î:;',:i-"""""ry
and peas"nt
this calculation
*ui"årrí"t"'
-o;:::":u:,:nose clearly *o"*r'ärî.r, ::::*ätffi_ïi:iiå.i*ï"ii;;1il,ï,1,i.*j,ift ä
fathers had been otþhodnikí.
o.rpi,.
of underdevelop*aoar-
ïlIl."T.",n"o",".ui.T"f.T".Tl,,îi;:H:,il;:tîffi
protecdon of foreign investment, *T:
rndustry was in ,o-uo"ttnttics Russian ,r"t.lrrthorities
respecrs quite advanc"a to provide
eir" #"riä"#;ri"ffi a._ä;;.ffj u, srgns of
roops *n:l ,lF, ;*,"r;;;";te
getdng out of hand.
".r¿ were quick
enterprise showed
rh* *.ä i*r",,
::xi'l;L.f :r#Ëi.ii.tïË1"1.,::nä:Jff f H $:"äi'J;:loî:"ï:f "'"¿i'i""lr**.äil$,iiifi'.;i'å:;
::::::,Ë; ïï.ij:iii: ï: :i"ilîäï:#i
t¡erschenkron has point.d.
manasers*i,;ùi;;iiïJåi:ï'î*äîi:ä.ïîilfi
,^.r ;";;;;":
:.,i "ï*ååä
backwardness
rt was rænin, a Russian,M"ïr*; :î,ä
;;-;Jä;, by its own etroits
:*n advantages: industriahzú,tl;;;*,i"[e had th; wor_kins class coutd
investrnent and energeti.-;;;;¿
l:i"tgtto skip
aid of large_scate
rather than a revorutionr"., ãr, ä.ii
develop
able over ro-" ;;;i
mvolvement, Russia ;;: ;::_l^" i*e-u¡uon consciousness,
^i-,i*^":::
advanceddn".;;;Ti,"'.1'.1î,.r11r,;:":;:,,*ï,.J.;*äËi:
was o1,.,.o"*"ioo*1.î"^Ht"iiï'rå":'j:;.'Ji*".".".;iil;-
.In rhe second prace, theo.*';ä;;ï:nT orRussia,s
class probably made working
it mo¡e revorutionaþ.räL
*"" ress. Russian
 IBEoI eqr r(c¿¡corne eqr roJ uoddns
qtry ãûrgruoc or tlncgiJp
Á¡.rer¡ncad eJâÂr uopcco^B letor
¡"oor.rr¡orã ¡o se&f¡ .r"no.ro¡n¡ l -rr¡Brlceu¡, ir"Uo"11o:1) ruaurzto¡drua go edÁ¡ pue
"*o, su¡¡êl ur sâ^Jesruerp
p"" .p¡io^ &reu erp
uorsse¡o.rd
¡o
e¡â,n¡osercr¡odsîi:_.j:,".i.#ä:1i:äiffi:,ïi;:îî,îï: Á¡:ee¡c srãqro 'ct.lt::î.r-.r"rs,
_peqlÐsep ...räã or peãuo¡eg
pernouorJ, ..p¡rng
'eu¡Ee¡ eqt ¡oJ Áwlo*¡, Jo ìcel p*'.rJr"".ronnlo,rer pe¡nûu¡oc Ðqr Jo lrreqcrâru,
rr"r¡pärq,¡ '¡L" p.r" elelsa lsrrg
ãrIr roJ Ðadso¡
O* j1:l*. ¡"r¡or.roori"o ersrue8r¡¡erur plo ãqr ::r::" ,*roi
se^lêsuretlt pÐgpuapl_pr¡B Flcos ,(g
¡""oí¡u_*Jo eç or
3o q8noua pat.rJãqq sselc JeuorssâJo¡d ,ueu
s<BrssnìI 6J¡pg .eEueqc
eu¡os 'seprJ s<erssnìf-Jo
or"po*rro* p'* ir.ur"¡ eçlda¡ srãgrrcsgns
.Erngs:eta¿
¡ecpqod or tuer¡Bru¡¡uoc ,fueuoqnfu.., .rror"
uer.Ir ¡êqr¿J sepnrFre Jo sa¡roÞerrp ,fiIr.:I ,r"qFrq.r, fi pe.rego suoFergEuepr lg
l'rãqrJ ã^rss'd i{¡enne¡ar par¡dun ua1¿o tua*zpat
i "" :;;;;I.il;
-JIes Jo zÞaue¡ :,
sq1l1*"q ãqr /çg p"."*n¡,
-Jles s<lenpv\rpul uB t"ï". pãlsrxã pBrI uet¡r ãrrorlr -Euã^u Á¡rea eqr lle¿\ sl Ámruoc
rpa
e8ue.r :apeo.rg qrî suBrssnu prr"".rp" pep¡aord peq ¡euooedncco¡o 'emlJmr¡Ee î__f:-r"". ;rr;Ju;;'.rrueu pJoz.nlrs ârLL
par¡euo_leìreru
sn¡ers-qãlq "
Jo tuerudolezrep êql orq^ .f"*..r ãtp
suorssagord -
¿rJJryssârJnsp'r¡ srÐr*roprrËl elqou
fs¡]eirae"
ol uonrs¡¡eÐ erp Ðperu
'uoprêJes¡p pue eç z{g
Jo ¡å'rrrro
lecn{od pue Á8o¡oepr l""rp", s.Ersluâãrllelûr
-pord e i(¡eE:e¡ sen reJdoed,.p et¡JJo ron
uo.rroq' a¡.,Ë
esnprsq ".p,"s"êrr, ol
a"rál*ïiffi ii,j, ii;itr# j:
Áce¡colne eqr tqEg '{r¡¡¡qou lr¡Bl¡oa"rl .;- eqr
or uonezrueEro "r"i.qriin{rprre ecþres 'sselr âclÂres eran'
IIB saape'o.rerd
"¡""r_¡[L, iq p"^"r"e¡eqc l(¡n¡uac
ler¡oter¡dsuo, ,i¡¡e.ronrp"rr .,ir¡¡¡qou a¡¡r
rl¡ueãletrlu erp -Fr¡op peqe-u¡Ðr s>¡ua_r.:t"l: ,(q pareu
Jo JlBq puorês .ç 3ó a,r.*._ur Á:euopn¡oaêr ",{,
reddn ,r¡ .f"""""J.o
-snu ê.1L .e¡qneduocur erâ^\ errares r¡Ers
-uorssa¡ord rursea.rcl
cp'rrn'Ðmg
Blsrueqllêlq ((ecncad * t"ç"åor¡" lou qEnotp) 0"";*:ä.åî
.t¡eep¡
-E¡erue ue¡o st6¡s reqro11osac n:nrrrr"Ç:lt,iJ.ll åT,#.
pue .súone¡cossB .suorsse¡o.rd äi]jj
etll â.¿\res, or uopeE¡¡qo q8noç
¡o sorl¡e *"or"ri" ue pedo¡aaep s..eldoad
.pe4¡nn
z(Iozrne¡eduo"
o"*"1î__r."¡, ¡"irrr__o" p* sseursnq slr leaa
-reprm uopBJnpê {e{r_ãu¡pug_t.g p"t"".rpa .srãqureu¡ pãepûr
Erssnìr l'tp pIBs
pue (erers ãrlr or acra-¡os r.ros¡nauroc
,roi"a¡1qo
¡o
slr Jo ãruos
*oS ;"."""*
å::ììli":jf;î"î:fo ,"^ r¡ 'era¡durocur
",ro
'r""ú- qt"'"""{ãIJ"-'!r' "*
ued rene¡ er¡r ur
,"^..,q",'o,"*;,ño;'::io;.1."Tä:îä1,:;l:îîl;l^"Jå_
;'.iflåt;åi.:;11 .slln{s pue
uop'cnp_â e.oos rr¡r^1åroç -r.go sepeÞos u'qm
Joerpp¡ru"*0.-o,"ïij:ffiliü:11"T],:#.:'¿,åï:fi urãpo..' reç Árrrqoru p.rumdn
ro,,.o**roia. írf
ol epnrnfe tsruoprsoddo_.ruras .¡ecp¡.rc .¡epcn¡ed.q
e Ip* .."rr;ü; pue 'supã¡.u zfueuotrnlo¿er_uou ilil;;;H
rfq ,r."rrl* sr¡ Srrncafo¡dgo
JBJpFc, ro¡ Álrcedec aç_.rearcos¡or.r.*rarrrq 'leuele¡ord Jel'rsnpur pâpres B a¡qedec
Áq perrrm dnorE ssa¡sselJ
ãrI¡ JoJ uJâJuoJ eu¡orãq oi_"ror^ uru{I gc¡qru
e_sg reqleJ lnq 6âtrJâ uB
IEJou¡ .sseusnorJsuoc uo¡un_epBÐ, aç arrnbce Jo
sBJJãslr ees tou prp ot
etstua8rJ¡elur r¡B¡ssnìJ <re.rê¿\o¡¡ .fg"l"å;¡ êsn'req rsnr ,r:euónnl-o,re.r ."^
:Tt
r¡r'rcorn' s<BrssnìJ *11 IBJrpe¡ slr Áq eurr5a¡
.ropã".,p"' rri ;å Áï;';;H,ffi o¿ s-]uâumorr ûe rBrlnuBJ:rm
.."p ,.,rro^"Tf,rlJJ lï.ïåJj
¡""
lsa¡ etf¡ rr¡og perEuelÏ^::ïp p"r"".rp.
på4¡rr"æ"¿x B pãqrrcsâp
lï"r
p'" .o,r"iolsrp qr!$ *,i-
uB ol uc
r"ä;;;;-;;ïtffH"::i:i;i
pro/$ erl¡ srr¡relpeorq oi
,.i .låecuoc Á"reddr¡s l(rorcey eç¡o:r au¡¡d¡cslpãqr o.
::Isruãq[êtu!,
seÀl slr¡t 'Á¡¡eclão¡orcog 'erslueãr¡arq erpJ;
Áraa e ;:-",::l*
uro.g pee.g .Brmo¡( o"go .rr^ i...rtr., lIBs rnq slurersuor
âqrJrsep uãlalo ppoÂr su'rssnìf
*q*.* sE se^lâsruerp ^J[rr¿J
pererãnu
,r"jro^ prru su/nor o]
p.r"".rp" iro"r.ro" o¡{zn sluesead_eqr .reaoaro¡4¡ :oì.** "*"".q
IBruroJ ssâI uI aç or rqã¡: nêrl¡ pÐuãss"_ .^or.1n*ì uÐãq peq reqr puel
tr'u¡elqou, se ÁFurenbresu1*l perslJ oq/$ râqucsq* -r¡EIuÐ etenbepe.lo
i¡åä"""r"* .pue uonedrc
rsnl^e se n-r"ari roå pro n"ç êsngceq llo^ârJo
#it:ï: r¡1trs .srueseed aç 1t
Ëi'::iiii:ijfii:y't uana ¡o''rxeu * ".o
'ç "o""¡ora iq pue
peua¡alnb ip""**J'ro
,(.,{,pu;;ï;;;öi,:1j,i j:äiii:*.E,ffiï:il:*r'ffj:: _l"**a ar¡r :9oei po soår go ra.rrrrrã
lsoJrrrElu sem 6sol,l,l arItJo
r.r";åå:itffiåJ:ïi
prllp V '(..rorJop **11,- tlon:¡ aeqcu8n¿ tea:ã eç ur peg¡durexe
SGBISSnì¡
Jo e^oeluesСde¡ sBl":pedrcuerue
6¡0 .,JOlJe{p
.¡"_.¡ IrI sluêu¡Ð^eJqcE jiåi,'^f ir::'ä',:rîf rsurse*¡¡pq"*"¡qr'u'.ruelorJouo'
rt,rA*o", ..r.";;;i;;
;,
Ez îu.nag aq¿
"uiË;;ü;ä *LÌ :H"Ë:*iffi åii* l:,i ;,jffi;
8uulas aql zz
 24 7he Sening
profession, for example,
blossomed as
The Setting
25
,i:":.,:fi ,,,#liî,-;h.',;;;;;;;å:",.L*:i.i.å.ffï.ï,
t" extending the rule.ru*
acdon to üanslate them
tutu¡e was .Western into reality. The yardstick
for Russia,s
*d
sociery *l"rrl'* r*.oJ, or.ää. i"rrr* inreltectuals
,i,",rã,,o*.Jt;;i:ï:,ilh:ijiîti.î#:":::nn_;
"d-i:,::-^t-t1* mishr
of revolutionary terrorisrs
i. ,sii-äärs whose education Ëï':iîåïîiï:'å:,"*iï1,ff,.,#:ï:"b:.*Jä;.;ä.,
"r"*.:l'ff 'äî
led them to believe i,
,t.
or arbitrary aaministrative
.,r1.-å;ì#i had
ro disapprove ;1i:r:î:ï the pun J ro. n",,,"ì, trl äï:T:
and governm."."l i^"äl^":
*T"mmelled police power, ;*iläïii;:1ffå;iJ;"1:"":îî",1J:::::,*åïiå"î
"..ìr"ì* ";;;;;.r;îjl1lt*tt
,y,..t.n"Jä'*"ffiåi,,:.T::ï.,ff"î::ffi-årg:,ål,H
was associared wirh capitalist industrialization
the zemstvos, .-läJio""l-government r*:: äääi:"*at had produced
thar were institutionalþ
and frequentlv in conflict
q;. *o;;;ä* uoa¡es
*r. stare bureaucracy
*rh ï.ï",hïearly
tion or ;;.'*;i;;i.'iî*;.ï, li.,nm:: :l*..låi
-rr,.,?oiå,.
twentietrr centurv o, n",,i".
ff.r:.î'ä:iiïl:"o
sts, and";;;;
ä;.i: pr.oressionars r¿o".o.,, ili*åî#. î:,.ï r*uecruars lr,o r,.ra

***:il1:lï"ï*iïä:ff ï:î:å:ii:ä.iîi:î:H*¡
so on), whose radical
notorious. .^r;.Ë;:;.
Engineers and od
¡vr"oi,,, io ffi ;ï:i.
- oo,î*. ."åänïäif;:H'#i:îl:::*"'$'*
sun to feel
ror the srare ol
gentsiagroups
äLî:i:: ï:îiï i:.åi*j1f,.:,,il
the regime, especiaity from alienated that disagreea Jrr*trö'nop.'ir*
ci"." ,il:;;.*
modernization*dT1::ddr"il-il'.å:i:'jä..milä; of n"ri"rr."äää.1_ri was essendallv
Finance under Se¡sei,W¡n. ;x;#"tro.am from the r86os ro thå
i"-tt.l;ä"å subsequently from the The Russian intelligentsia
#il:Hr:lÏ::' äa roa"'or' ñ;, ;ä.:., made every enort ro
gelerally accepted socialism
stood. by Europe,s p.._¡ur"äri,.är# (as under_

n"*i"ti..i_j.¿:;:ä:i.,.,"ifi 'utopians') ttt. *or, ¿.ri*ùìãi*ää.Tå, especiallv the French

:,'å'.i*î,ffiî:friï*ï:: "r seen
this was not
that Wifte,s enthusìasm
for economic and
i,î:,'"t#$'i,î...J1ï*by."il;;;;;:,:i*,ilî'f*.:::î:ï
.

:ls ¡ ; ffi; älîj",j:'Ï..ffi.1åîïritî:"ffi

ar

reaced to its social isolation

.."æ**,.Ji berween i ts erf an d rrre
Uv f.äi,"A.-]ll:ï:,i
peopre, r,"o ro al .-
.

n.
^^.a.."1",i;rfff :iï,iLffi åîffi thought described
.

nåprriirr.,
åT:.:,Ë:"#j
ä;;* ; objection to capitat_
3otobiect in principle to the .;;;ä;;
idea ist industriarization",with
in fact many of ttèm
¿i¿, (though an ra."ll"ãil"ärî. n rrrian peasanrrv-
|.tld.:
difficult
",
as studenß ortn.Þorvt.Ãää;i expos're to radical
"L.Jiär'ä:-:_**--ent
itwas very iïiåi:i:ï,ìîli,T", capitarism n"J i"i a destructive i*p""i
for them to see the Tsariçt",r.o"r""JItl
of modernization: its record an "Teffective agent rom*,.r"-Jä'.'*äHi';i"ft ï,î.,"r":ïtrjj*fl;
*", ;;;;;;*t_as exploited industrial proletariat.
ideology too clearlv reflected and its politicat
;;;"ï;;'srstent,: past radrer than peasanrs, uaditional
TI;; ;rh.a ro save the Russian
coherent vision ofthe
turure. any folm of viltas. ãrr*Jão.n,
mir, from rhe ravages or rhe commune or
capitamå, ;::;;;;.,
m* was an egalitarian instirution_periapîa believed that the
The revolutionary tadition survival of primitive
,iffiH:r--througtr which Russií*ìd'. åo a separate path to
ftî:i:åÏi"r$.,äïïtT inteìrigentsia had taken
on irsetf was
*i*ïilT"rlä,;|. intelþntsia,sandidealization
br".p,i,;;;;ï,n:'::"äT'* j::ä'.i.îïî::Íf reform led to the ,ooo:Ï:i*ation
of the peasantry
the prospects for political
f.:{,ffid
om.,-p"i"ri,""',"äTliläJ":'ä".îäî;iffJif
h:l
 26 The Setting
The Sening 27
Thousands of students and members of the intenigentsia
left the and its state-imposed responsibilities for trre coflection
of taxes and
cities to go to the villages, somedmes envisaging
themselves as redemption pa)¡ments. They asserted that capitarism constituted
enlighteners of the peasantry, somedmes more
humbly seeking to the only possible pattr towards socialism, and that the industrial
acquire the simple wisdom of the people, and
somerimes with*the proletariat produced by capitarist deveropment was
hope of conducting revolutionary organization the only class
prop"g"rrã". capable of bringing about true socialist revolution. These premises,
The movement had no central direction and no "rra
cleãrly ¿-enne¿ they claimed, could be scientifically proven by the objective
political intent as far as most of the participants laws
were concerned: historical development that Marx and Engels had explained
its spirit was less ùlj gf a politicai campaign than 9f in
a religious their writings. The Marxists scoffed at those who chose socialism
pilgrimage. But the distinction was hard får as
either *r. p.".äof an ideology because it was ethically superior (it was,
or the Tsarist police ro grasp. The autrrorities were greatly of course, but
ararmed, that was beside the point). The point about socialism was
and made mass arrests. The peasants were suspiciousr- *rat, lite
regarding capitalism, it was a predictable stage in the development
bei¡ uninvited guests as offspring of the nobiiity of human
ana piotaUiã society.
class enemies, and often handing them over
to the police. This To Karl Marx, an old European revolutionary who instinc_
debacle produced deep disappointrnent among
the populists. They tively applauded the struggle of 'people's r7ill' against tJre
did not waver in their determination to serve Russian
the people, but some autocracy, the early Russian Man<ists clustered around
concluded that it was their tragic fate to serve Georgü
them olrt""rrr, Plel¡tranov in emþation seemed too passive and pedanticl_
would ",
revolutionary desperadoes whose heroic actions
be appreci_ revolutionaries who were content to write articles about
ated only after their deaths. There was an the his-
upsurge of revolution_ torical inevitability of revolurion while others were ûghting and
ary terrorism in the late rg7os, motivated partly
by the populists, dying for the cause. But trre impact on the Russian inteligenrsia
desire to avenge their imprisoned comrades
and partty ty thË rather was different, because one of the Marxists, scientific predìctions
desperate hope that a well-placed blow
might destoy tlre whole was quickly realized: they said ttrat Russia zzs¿ industri
superstructure of autocratic Russia, leaving arize, and
the Russian peopte tee in the r89os, under'Witte,s energetic direction, it did. True, the
to find its own destiny. In rggr, the .peoplÃ
ÏØill, group of poprlisi indusuialization was as much a product of state sponsorship
rerrorists succeeded in assassinating Emperor and
Alexander Ir. The foreign investment as of spontaneous capitalist development,
eflecr was not to destroy the autoc¡aãg
buì rather to tlght.r, it irrì;
* ,t
more repressive poricies, greater arbitrariness
in a sense Russia did take a separare patrr from the ivest.lí But to ",
and circumvention of contemporaries, Russia's rapid industrialization seemed dramatic
law, and the creation of something close
to a modern police
state.lo proof that the Manrists' predictions were right, and that
The popular response to ttre assassination i""ilà;å Man<ism
pogroms in the IJkraine, and rumours
*;_;;;. had at least some of the answers to the Russian intelligentsia,s .great
in Russia,s .,rittages úrai quesdons'.
n:3 murdered the Tsar because he had freed the
::1* sertctom.
rrom i."r*., Marxism in Russia-as in China, India, and other developing
countries-had a meaning rather different from that which it had i;
It was in the rggos, in the wake of the two populist
_ disasters, ttre industrialized countries of western Europe. It was an ideology
that ttre Marxists emerged as a distinct group
within the Rus_ of modernization as well as an ideology of revolution. Even r-enir,
sian intelligentsia, repudiating the utopian"idealism,
terrorist rac- who could scarcely be accused of revolutionary passivity, made
tics, and peasant orientation that had
i.errrousty characterized the his name as a Marxist with a weighty sntdy, The Dezteloptment of
revolutionary movement. Because of the u¡favourable
political cli_ Capitalism in Russia, that was both analysis and advocacy of th. pr*
mate in Russia and their own repudiation
of terrorism, the Marx_ cess of economic modernization; and virtually all the otl¡e¡
ists made their initial impact in intellectual teaàing
debate ,"arr.. .rr"o iv Maxists of his generation in Russia produced similar works. Thã
revolutionary action. They argued that capitalist
industrializatioå advocacy, to be sure, is presented in the Marxist manner (,I told
was inevitable in Russia, and that tlre peasant
mir was already in you so' rather than 'I support. .. '), and it may surprise modern
a stare of internal disintegration, profped up
only by the siate
 28 The Sening

readers who know I-enin only as an anti_capitalist revolutionary.

Setting
The 29
Agitators, seeking to realize trreir goals,
But capitalism was a .progressive, phenomenon to Manrists in have achieved some success, unfor-
in organizing the workers to fight against the government.
late-nineteenth-cenrury Russia, a backward society that by 1un1telv, sØithin
Marxist the last three or four y9ars, ttre easygJing
i rssiarr young man has been
definition was still semi-feudal. In ideological rerms, they were
in transformed into a special type of semi_literate
inæiligen, úro f"a, oUfìg.ã
favour of capitalism because it was a necessary stage on the to spurn family and religion, to disregard
way to the law, and to deny *¿ ,.oã
socialism. But in emotional terrns, the commitrn*, *.rrt aeeper constituted authoriry. Fortunately su.h yo,r.rg
*.o are not numerous in the"i
the Russian Marxists admired the modern, industrial,,rrba'woìld,
¡nd were offended by the backwardness of old rural Russia. l""to:.rj'but this negrigible haninrr....o.irà Ã. i.r.., majority of workers
intofollowing it.
It has
often been pointed our rtrar I-enin-an activist revolurionary
wilting Clearly Man<ists had an advantage over
to give history a push in the right direction-was an unorthodox earlier groups of revolution_
ary intellectuars seeking contacr with ttre
Man<ist with some of the revorutionary voluntarism of the masses: they had found a
old pop- section of tåe masses wilting to risten.
ulist tradition. That is rrue, but it is rerevant mainly to his Arthough Russian workers
behaviour were not far removed from the peasantry,
in times of actual revolurion, around r9o5 and rn they were a much more
ryr7.In the rg9os, literate grouÞ¡ and at least somã or tnelna¿
he chose Marxism rather than populism because he was acquired
of modernization; and that basic choice explains a grear
o'tfr. .iaé
trremselves,. "Education
urban sense of the possibility of 'bettering -"¿.*,
deal about was a means of upward social mobility
the course of the Russian revolution after Lnin as well as the path ,o*"rd,
nt party took rev_olution envisaged by both revolutionary
power in r9r7. ".rã intellectuals and the
police' The Marxisr teachers, unrike
The Marxists made another important choice in the early the eãrrier populist mission-
con- aries to the peasantry, had something
troversy with the populists over capitalism: they chose more than the ¡.t of poù".
the urban harassment to ofer their students.
working class as their base of support and Russia,s main potential
force for revolurion. This distinguished them from the From workers' education, the Marxists_illegally
old tradition organized from
1898 as the Russian Social-Democratic
of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia (upheld by I_abour party_progr.r..ã
the populists to an involvement in more directry political laboui
and larer, from its formation in the early ,9oor, by the o.g"ni""rio.r,
Socialist_ strikes, and, in r9o5, revolution. The match
Revolutionary (sR) Party), with its orr.-ri¿.a rove affaa berween party_political
with the organization and actual working_class protest
peasantry. It distinguished them also was never an exact
from the liberals (some of one, and in r9o5 the socialist parties had great
them former Marxists), whose Liberation movement
was to emerge
difficutty k*pir;;;
as a political force shortly before r9o5, since
with the working-class revolutionary
the liberals hoped foå -ouã-.oa. Between rggg and
r9r4, neverttreless, the Russian Social_Democratic
'bourgeois' revolution and won support from the new proiessional I_abou. p"ray
ceased to be a preserve of the intelligentsia
class and the liberal zemstvo nobility. and became in th;
literal sense a workers, movement. Its'íeade¡s
Initially, the Man<ists, choice did not look particularly promising: still came from the
intelligentsia, and spenr most of their time
the working class was tiny in comparison *irtr at. p."r".roy, tiving outside Russia in
in comparison with the u¡ban upper classes, lacked status, "rrã, European emigration. But in Russia, the majority
.¿,r."_ of members and
tion, and financial resources. The Marxists' early contacts activists were workers (or, in trre case ofproiessionar
with the revolutionar-
ies, former workers). la
workers were essentially educational, consisting of circles
and study In terms of their theory, the Russian Marxists started
groups in which intellectuals offered the workers off with
.o*. g.o.á what seemed to be a major revolutionary disadvantage,
education plus the elements of Marxism. Historians
differ in their obliged to work not for the coming rerrolution,
tt.y *.r.
assessmenr of trre contribution that this made but for the revolution
to the development after next. According to orthodox Marxist práictiorr,
of a revolutionary labour movement.l2 But the Tsarist
authorities R rrri",, .üf
took the political trrreat fairly seriously. According into the capitalist phase (which took place only
to a police report at the end of the
in r9or,13 nineteenth century) would inevitably iead ro
rhe overrhrow of the
autocracy by a bourgeois liberal revolution. The proletari"a
rrrigh,
 30 The Sening
supporr this revol rtion, but it
seemed unlikely to have more
than
a secondary role. Russia w.ould
be .ip. fo, proletarian socialisr
revolution only after capitalism
t a¿ rea'ciea its maturity, and
time might be far in the future. that
This problem did not seem very
pressing before r9o5, since
revolution was in progress and no
the Marxists were having some
success in organizing the
working .1".r. ¡f.
the.regar
M;*i,r,i headed b,
strongly with the obiectives.oi
p;¡;;Jiïi: i"'i:ilffih
*r. ntr,ìiu.."u revorurion on the
Marxist agenda, and to lose interest
revolution. It was not surprising
ir *r. iai-"te goal of socialist
that modernization_minded
nents of the autocracy like oppo_
Surive ttto"l¿ i"rr.
in the r89os, since rhere ,"", ioined the Marxists
them to join; and it was equally
; .h;;l;: io liberal movement for
natural that arounA the turn
century úrey left the Man<ists of the
,o p"rti"ip"te in the establishment
of the liberal Liberation rnorr._.or.
1-t. t.r.ry of legal Marxism
was nevertheless roundly
denounced by Ruìsian social-Democratic
leaders, especiallv bv I_enin.
I*;i;;äåostility ro .bourgeois
liberalism' *", *rr.*hat illogicait" ú;* rerms, and caused
some perplexity to his colleagues.
lr, ..voil onary terms, however,
Lenin,s anitudå was enremely
At a¡ound rhe same time, the
rationar.
repudiated the heresy
R"r;; Social_Democratic leaders
of A"orro*irr.r,- Jr""i ,r, that the workers,
movement should stress economic
rather than political goals.
were in fact few articurate There
s.o"o.lri, i;äe Russian movemenr,
partly because Russian workers,
pror.ra,
quickly from purely eco-no-i" -rAed to progress very
i.r.rå, ft ,""J.,
the émigré leaders, often to pol¡tical ones. But
mo¡e sensidve to Lends wiùin
Social Democracy thal to European
the situatio.r-i.rria. Russia, feared
revisionist and reformirt the
t od.rr"ì.J ttr"i'i"o developed in the
German movemenr. I" rlr.
1.Íri;;l-;;äå'ou., E.orromism and
Iegal Marxism, the Russian.M;*.
that they were revoluti
_:;:iìr"nirrg.t.".ty on record
w_asthesociari,r_.,r.',liä:,ïï.iä:i,#i#,,"i.î#ä:
liberal bourgeoisie.
In r9o3, when the Russian Social_Democratic
party held irs
Second Congress, trr" re"ggrs
te| ,". G;î over an apparentlv
minor issue-the composition
of ,h. J;;;;- board of the parry
newspaper Isþra.r5 No ¡eal ,"Ur,*ri". ìrr.J,
though to the exrenr rhat
,hJ;Ë;*'äì:::rifi: ilJr.i;
mighr be said that he himself
wa,.t. il;;lrtrrg irrrr., and that his
The Setting
3r
colleagues considered that he
was too aggressively seeking a position
of dominance. I_enin! manner
at tå.
was overbearing; and
he had recendy been laying
¿o*r, "o-io..,
tn.l"*îry decisively
theoretical questions, notably rhe on various
organization and functions of
the party. There was tension betw.ei
Lenin an¿ plekhanov, the
senior Russian Marxisq and the
conremporary yulii Martov wlson
ti."arñp.u.rween r_enin and his
the point of breaking.
The outcome of the Second Co"gr.J,
*"s a split in the Russian
Social-Democratic I-abour party
betive.., lSolrt .rriL, and .Menshe_
vik'factions' The Bolsheviks were
arr"r. r"n-. folrowed r-enin,s lead
and the Mensheviks (including pl.f.*r""å",
¡vfarrov, and Trotsþ)
constituted a larger and more ¿irr*r.
grorrp of p"rty members who
ttought r-enin had overreached trimseir
rire sptit made ritrle sense
to Marxists inside Russia, and at
trt. tir". Jits occurrence was nor
regarded as irrevocable even by
the émigrés. It prolr.¿,,r.rr.rrfr.l.ri,
to be permanenq and as dme p"rr.i
rfr. * factions acquired
more clearly distinct identities than
rhey had had in rgo3. In rater
years, I-enin was somedmes
to express-pria. i., t.i"g
meaning by this that he considerediarge,ioosely_kni, "".rp1¡¡"r,,
prfit"åiã.g"]
nizations to be less effective-than
.*"1Ëi ãi..¡plined radical groups
demanding_a high degree of commitrne;;;
ideological unity. But
some people also attributed this
trait to his difrcul;,;
disagreement-that'maricious suspiciousnlss, ;Ë;d";
rrrar totsþ caned
'a caricaru¡e ofJacobin intoleranceiin"
o*är"aionary polemic. ló
In the years after r9o3, the Mensheviks
orthodox in their Marxism
emerged as the more
lrrot
until mid-r9r7 but always a mavericþ,
"orrrrtirrg
totsþ, a Menshevik
lÃs inclined to force the
pace of events towards revolution
interested in creating
a tighdy organized and disciplin.¿ "rrá-1.r,
.."orulorrâry pafty. They had
more success than the Bolsheviks in
Russian areas of the Empire, rvhil.
attracting support in the non_
tlr;;;;heviks had the edge
among Russian workers..(In both parties,
non-Russians were prominent in the
ho*err.r, Jews and other
irrt.úig.rrtrl"_dominated
ershþ.) In the last prewar years, rgro-r4, ttre Menshevikslead_
working-class support to the Botsheviks lost
became more militant: they rv... p.r.airr.a
* an. workers, mood
party
l', *or. .respectable,
with closer links to the bourgeoisie, whereas
"
the Bolsheviks
wete seen as more working class as
well as more revolutionary.rz
The Bolsheviks, unlike the Menshevito,
t*ir r_defti!¡ was in large part defined Uy i"ã a single leader, and
Lrrirr,, ideas and person_
ality' Lenin's fi¡st distinctive uait as
¡,r"Jti rrreoretician was his
"
 32 The Settìng

emphasis on pa¡ty organization. FIe

saw the party not only as the
The Sening 33
vanguard ofproletarian revorution but s*ength vis-à-vis the outside world
arso in a sense as its creator, was a source of pride, an
since he argued trrat the proretariat achievement that could be set againsa
alone could achieve .;ry;;;; *rã
union consciousness and not a ¡evolutionaf ical and social problems. fn .ñ. rv;.-d, "orroor,s internal polit_
o.r.. itrr¡Urrt.A to an early_
I-enin believed that the. core of t¡. p"rét twendeth-century Minister of Interior, .a
membership shoutd small victorious war, was
consist of full-rime professional revolrrdåoaries, the best remedy for Russia,s ¿o_.rj.
recruired both from lrirr.st. Historically, how_
the inteligentsia and the working ever, this was a rather dubious propositiãn.
b"ì concentraring on the century, Russia's wars had tended
Over the past halÊ
political organization of workers "r"æ,
ãrrr.r neither to be successful nor
aí"., any other sociar group. to str- engthen society,s confidence in the
rn wat Is To Be Done? (r9oz),¡r. rrrrr.t.Jã., govemment. The mili_
the importance of cen_ tary humiliation of the Crimean
tralization, strict discipline,. and ideologicai \Øar had precipitated the radical
unity within the party. domestic reforms of,the r86os.
These, of course, were logical pr.r".ii.iorn
foi" p".ry ;Ë;;; Th. d;ì;;atic defeat that Russia
clandestinery in a police state. Nerrerth.l.rr, suffered after its military involvementï
i, seemed to many of the Balkans in üre late
r87os produced an internal political
Tiht conremporaries (and later ro m"oy'r.totars)
that I-enin,s Alexander II,s assassinatigl. fn .fr.
Jri. ,fr", ended only with
dislike of looser mass organizations ."dyìgoos,
spontaneity was not purely expedient
anowúg grearer diversity and in the Far East was pushing it towaräs -a Russian expansion
but refl-ected a naturar author- expansionist power in the region, with another
itarian bent. Japan. Though "orrfli"t
some of Nicholas
I-enin differed from many other Russian II's- ministers urged cautior¡ tt ã pr..r"iliog
Marxists in seeming sendment in court
to desire a proletarian ,.rrotl;tio.r l"ther and high bureaucratic circles was
lgtiptV than simply pre_ *r", *r"
to be made i,t th. F"r.fast, a1d ,rr".
dicting that one would ultimaa.ty o."rrì.
that would surely have endeared him
rrrì, was a character trait European power, after all-would r"olitiÏtrt"Jr:"*i
to Karl Man<, despite the not ¡Jä ro¡mi¿able adversary.
facr rhat it required some revision Initiated by Japan, but provoked almost
of orthodox Marxism. The idea .q,r"tty
*.. Iiberar bourgeoisie must u. .t. in the Far Easr, the Russo_Japan.* Iø;;;..keby Russian policy
+1, reader of Rus_ rgo4. out in January
sia's andaurocratic revoluti:l
y", ""a*al
acceptable to I_enin;
in Two Tactics of ".rr.*."ff, For Russia, ttre war turned out to
be a series of disasters and
1d tngt Revolution, -Soc.iat Dr*orrory,-
-.h.i*itten in t}re midst of humiliations on land an$ at ,.". ffr.
S. he insisted ,h", p;retariat_allied wirlr ."rÇ patriotic enrhusiasm
Russiat rebellious of respectable society quickly soured,
peasanrry_çould and sÀould play
a dominant during the r89r famine-attempts
;;_", had also happened
role' clearly it was necessary for any by pubric organizations rike the
Russian Marxist with serious zemstvos to heþ the government
revolutionary intentions to find in an emergency only led to
*"v .orrrrJ the doctrine of bour_ confl.icts with the bureaucracy
geoìs revolutionary leader._hip, "
and perhaps more successfui effort
*a r.otrLvù, to make a similar and frusuation. This fuelled the
liberal movement, since autocracy always
with hL *r.o.y of .permanent when it was most clearly perc.irreã
seemed least tolerable
revolution'. In l_enin,s writing from irr.o_p.a.rrt and ineffcienq
'insurrecrion,, ¿nd .civil
r9o5, t¡*ora, .dictatorship,,
-i"".."rlogly ",
and the zemsrvo nobitity and professiorJ.-.äri.¿
-"r; "pp."iáã
was^in these harsh, violent, an¿ frequently. It gal Liberation movemenr, directed behind the ille_
realistic ,..ã, aU", he conceived from Europe by petr Struve
the future and other liberal activists. In the last
revolutionary transfer of power.
war still in progress, the liberals in
;.;.lu of t9o4, with the
Russia organized a banquet
campaign (modeled on that used
against the French King, I_ouis
Philippe, rn ß47), through whichLe
The ryo5 Reztolution and i* aftermath; ,oli"r .tr. demonsrrated
supporr for the idea of constitutionar
the First World IVar reform. At the same dme, rhe
goveûrmenr was under. othe¡
kinds of pressure, including a.*"Jri
I-ate Tsarist Russia attacks on officials, student demonst¡atio.rr,
w¡ workers, strikes. In
..*o;;""',* :i ir'#ä:T:Jiilî:1,':äüi
rargest
i: January r9o5, petersburg workers tt.ta péa"efirl
"
organized not by militants and revolutionaries,
"rrd
demonstration-
but by a renegade
 34 The Setting

priest with police connections, Father Gapon_to The Setting 35

bring their eco_ For a few monrhs, the Tsarist authorities
nomic grievances to rhe aftendon of the Tsar. handred the soviet in a
On BloJdy Sunday grngerly manner' and similar
(g January), troops fired on the demonstrators bodies emerged in Moscow and other
outside the sØinter cities. But early in December it was
Palace, and the r9o5 Revolution had begun. i8 disperied by a ,rr"".rrn t poi".
operation' The news of the attack o'
The spirit of national solidarity the aurocracy was very th. petersburg Soviet led to
an armed uprising by the Moscow
súong during ttre fi¡st nine months"g"irrrt
of r9o5. The liberals' claim tå Soviet, in which trr. solrt.rrik,
had gained considerable influence. fnis
leadership of tre revolutionary movemenr;s
nor seriously chat- ías put down by troops,
but the workers fought back and there
lenged; and their bargaining position with the were many casualties.
regime was based nor The urban revolution of r9o5 stimulated
only on support from the zemstvos and the new unions the most serious peasant
of middle_ uprisings since the pugachev revolt in
class professionals but also on the heterogeneous
pressures coming
the late eighteenth ;";;
But the urban and rural revolutiorr,
from student demonstrations, workers, úikes, peasant -.r..roì simultaneous. peasant
disorders, rioting-consisting of the sacking and
mutinies in the armed forces, and unrest in the
non_Russian regions
burning of manor houses and
attacks on landowners_and officials_began
of the Empire. The autocracy, for its part, was
consistently on the in the surnmer
defensive, seized by panic and .orrfuriorr, and
apparently unable
and rose to a peak in the late aururìn, "i,;;;
,,ìbrid.d, and then r.rrrl.ã
on a large scale in 19o6. But even in
to restore order. Its prospects for survival improved markedÇ late r9o5 the regime *", ,*oìg
enough to begin rrhg.Tooo, lr, ."mp"l!,
when \7itte managed to negotiate peace with of village_by_"ih;;
Japan (the liJé pacification. By the middle " all tire Loop,
of 19o6,
of Portsmouth) on remarkably advantageous were back from
terms in late August the Far East, and discipline had been ..raor.d
r9o5. But the regime still had a million of it, in the armed forces.
t oop, in Manchriria, In the winter of t9o6_7, much of rural Russia
and they could not be brought home on the was under martial
tans-Siberian Railway law, and summary justice (including
until the striking railwalnnen were brought back orr., thousand .".;;;;J
under control.
The culmination of the liberal ,.rrol,raio' was Nicholas was dispensed by field courts martial. "
II,s Russia's landowning nobility learnt a lesson
October Manifesto (r9o5), in which he conceded from the events of
the principle oi 19o5-6, namely that its-interests lay
a constitution and promised to create a national
elected parlia_
with the aurocracy fr"frlJ
menr, could perhaps shield it from a vengeful peasantry)
råe Duma. The Manifesto divided the and not with
liberals: *re OctåU;sis the liberals.le But in urban terms, tfrã
accepted it, while the Constitutional Democrats
(Cadets) formally
,9oj Revolution did not pro_
withheld acceptance and hoped for further duce such clear consciousness of crass po-ta.ization:
concessions. In prac_ even for most
tice, however, the liberals withdrew from revolutiorrary socialists, this was not a Russian rg4g,
revealing the treacherous
activiìy at nature ofliberalism and the essential antagonism
this time, and concentrated their energies ofbourgeoisie and
on organizing the new proletariar' The liberals-representing
Cadet parties and preparing for the ro.-.rr.o*irrg a professionar rather than
R::T: :ll
uuma electrons. capitalist middle class-had stood asiãe
in Octobe., but they had
llowever, t}le workers remained actively revolutionary not joined the regime in an onslaught on
the workers, revolution.
end of the year, achieving g¡eater visibilirythan
until the Thei¡ atdtude to the workers, andlocialist
before and becom_ movements remained
ing increasingly m'itant. In october, the workers much more benigrr than that of liberals in
most European counrries.
organized a 'soviet' or council of workers'
of petersburg The workers, for trreir part, seem to have perceived
fepresentadves elected the liberals
in the factories' The practicar function of rather as a dmorous ally than a t¡eacherorrs
the Ëetersburg Soviet was oir..
to provide trre city with a kind of emergency The political outcome of the r9o5 Revolution
municipal goveürment was ambiguous,
at a time when other institutions *... and in some ways unsadsfactory io concerned. In the Funda_
f"r"lyr.d
was in progress. But it arso became pårti.i
and a general strike "tt came
mental I-aws of r9o6-the closest Russia
forum for the workers, to a constitution_
and to a lesser extent for socialists" from Nicholas made known his belief that Russia
the revolutionary parties was still an autocracy.
(Trotsþ, then a Menshevik, became one True, the autocrat now consulted with an elected
of the Soviet,s leaders). parliament, and
political parries had been legalized. But
the Duma had limited
 36 The Sening

powers; Ministers remained responsible solely to

the autocrat; and,
The Setting 37
after the first rwo Dumas proved insubordinate and were of legal political institutions and a
arbitrarily 3:._1-**0..
rmportant, chanering liberar politicians (to
new breed of self_
dissolved, a new erectoral system which virtually disfranchised summarize Lenin,s view
some of them, which did not greatly
social groups and heavily over-represented the landed differ from Nicholas II,s). It was also
nobility was deeply almost unbearably disappointin,
introduced. The Duma,s main importance, perhaps, lay får rrr. revolutionary lead_
in pro_ ers ro rerurn ro the fam'iar
viding a public forum for political d.ebate and a trainin! ground dreariness ãt emigre nre. r¡e ¿mìgã
forpoliticians. The political reforms of r9o5_7 bred parliãnientary were never more prickly and
contentious than in the years b;-.;;
politicians just as the legal reforms of the r-g6os had r9o5 and r9r7; indeed, rhe Russians,
bred l"wye..; conrinual pã..y biJ..i";
and both groups had an inherent tendency to develop became one of the scandals of
values-and European iocial Democracy, and
aspirations that the autocracy could not abide. I-enin was one of the very worst
offenders.
One thing that the r9o5 Revolution did not changewas Among the bad news of the p..*", y."r,
the police was that the regime was
regime that had come to maturity in the rggos. Due procàss emb-arkin€ on a major programme
of of agrarian reform. The peasant
law was still suspended (as in rhe case of the field revolrs of r9o5-7 had persuaded
courts mardal the Ëorr.rrr_.rra to abandon its
dealing with the rebellious peasanrry tn earlier premise that the-mir was
ryo6_7) for much of the the o.r,"f"r".raee of rural stability.
population much of the time. of course there were Its hopes now lay in rhe creation
undersrandable of a .j"., of small independent
fa-rmers-a wager on .råe sober
reâsons for this: the fact that in r9og, a comparatively
quiet year, th. ;;;g,, as Nicholas,s chief
r,8oo offcials were killed and z,og3 were wounded in potiticalti Minister,letr Stolypin, described""¿ it. peasÃts were now encouraged
motivated aftacks2' indicates how tumultuous the .ociety to consolidate their holdings and
ÀmairreO, separate from the mir, and. land.
and how much the regime remained on ttre defensive. commissions were established
But it meant in *re pro"inc.s to facilitate the pro_
that in many respects the political reforms were only cess. The assumption was that
a facade. Trade th. poo. _oJO ,.ll up and go to the
unions, for example, had been made legal in principle, towns, while the more
but indi_
vidual unions were frequently closed down by the police. political hordings;.;.ó;,f.:::i::i"J:i..ru:Un:ff#if:i
parties were legal, and even the revolutionary
socialist parties could .."v:
ú. French peasanr farmer. By r jr5, t*.r, a quarrer
half of all Russia,s peasant f"r*.r, and a
contest the Duma elections and win a few seats_yet he-lA-t}reir lan¿ in some form of
the members individual renr¡re, although, given
of revolutionary socialist parties were no less liable the f.g"i*¿ p."ctical complexity
to arrest than in of the process, only about a_tenth
the past, and rhe party leaders (most of whom had completed the process and
rerurned to Russia enclosed their land.21 The Stolypin
during the r9o5 Revolution) were forced back into ,.for_i *.r. .progressive, in
emigration to Marxist rerms, since they laid ,rtà u"rir
avoid imprisonment and exile. r.ì laprtalist development
lü'ith hindsight, it might seem that in agriculture. But, in contrast to the
the Marxist revolurionaries, development of urban cap_
with r9o5 under their behs and r9r7 akeady looming italism, their short- and- medium-.""g.-i-olrcarions
on the hori_ revoludon were highly depressing. for Russian
zon, should have been congratulating themselves nLsiajs't aaitional peasantry
on the workers, was prone to revolt. If the Stollpin
spectacular revolutionary debut and looking confidently reforms worked C", f."i", f".
towards one, feared that they might), the
the future. But in fact their mood was quìte different. Russian proletariat would have lost
Neither an important revolutionary ally.
Bolsheviks nor Mensheviks had got more than
a toehold in the In
workers' revolution of r9o5: the workers had not 19o6, the Russian economy was
so much rejected bolstered by an enormous
as ouçaced them, and this was a very sobering b.": (*g and a quarter billio¡r francs) *il.i,
thought, particularly
with an internadonal banking Wi.,. negotiated
for Lenin. Revolution had come, but the ..!irrr. and both narive and
had fought back foreign-owned industry expanded"o.rro.Jí_r-
and survived- !Øithin the inteiligentsia, trrerJwas rapidly in the prewar years. This
much talk about meant, of course, that the industriaiworking
abandoning the revolutionary dream and the
old illusions of social class
perfectibility. From the revolutionary standpoint, But labour unresr dropped down sharpÇ-fo. "tro-."p"oJ.ã.
it was no gain to the savage crushing of the workers,
,o*. years after
..Toirraiorr"rv movement in
38 The Seting
The Setting 39
the winter of 19o5-6, picking up again only around r9ro. I-arge- defeats and losses (a total of five million casualties for r9r4_r7),
scale strikes became increasingly cofirmon in the immediate prewar and the German Army penetrated deep into
the wesrern a.*iil¡á,
years, culminating in the Petrograd general strike of the summer of the Empire, causing a chaotic o,rtfloo, of refugees
irrto
of r9r4, which was sufficiently serious for some observers to doubt Russia.23 Defeats bred suspicion of ûeason in high places, "l
".rrtand
that Russia could risk mobilizing its army for war. The workers' one of the main targers was Nicholas's wife,
EmpÃss Ale*an¿ra,
demands were poliúcal as well as economic; and their grievances yh9 was a German princess by birth. Scandal surrounded Alexarr_
against the regime included its responsibility for foreign domination dra's relationship with Rasputin, a shady but
charismatic character
of many sectors of Russian industry as well as its use of coercion whom she trusted as a true man of God who could
control her
against the workers themselves. In Russia, the Mensheviks were son's haemophilia. When Nicholas assumed
the responsibilities of
conscious of losing support as the workers became more violent commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, which
iook hir"
and belligerent, and the Bolsheviks were conscious of gaining it. from the capital for long periods, Alexandra and "*ay
Rasputin begai
But this did not noticeably raise the spirits of the Bolshevik leaders to exercise a disastrous influence over ministerial appointrneãts.
in emigration: because of poor communications wittr Russia, they Relations between the government and úre Fou¡th
ó,,*" detrio-
were probably not fully aware of it, and their own position in the rated drastically: the mood in the Duma and
among the educated
émigré Russian and socialist community in Europe was increasingly public as a whole was caprured in the phrase
with which the
weak and isolated.22 Cadet Pavel Milyukov punctuated ,p...h on
'$?hen war the goverrrment,s
broke out in Europe in August r9r4, with Russia "
shortcomings-.Is this stupidity or is it treason?, I-ate
in 1916,
allied with France and England against Germany and Austria- Rasputin was murdered by some young nobles
close to *r" .á*t
Hungarg the political émigrés became almost completely cut off and a right-wing Duma deputy, whose motives
were to save tr¡e
from Russia, as well as experiencing the normal problems of alien honour ofRussia and the autocracy.
residents in wartime. In the European socialist movement as a The pressures of the First IØorld IØar_and no doubt,
the per_
whole, large numbers of former internationalists became patriots sonalities of Nicholas an{ his wife, and the family
tragedy of Àeir
overnight when war was declared. The Russians were less inclined young son's haemophilia2a-threw the anachronistic
traits of the
than others to outright patriotism, but most took the 'defensist' Russian autocracy into sharp relief, and made
Nicholas seem less
position of supporting Russia's war effort as long as it was in defence like an upholder of the autocratic tradition than
an unwitting satirist
of Russian territory. Lenin, however, belonged to the smaller group of it' The 'ministeriar reapfrog' of incompetent favourires in úre
of 'defeatists' who repudiated their country's cause entirely: it was the illiterate peasanr faith_healer ia the intrigues of
fab_rnet,
an imperialist war, as far as I-enin \¡/as concerned, and the best the high nobility leading to Rasputin's murder, "o*a,
and even tie epic
prospect was a Russian defeat which might provoke civil war and story of Rasputin's stubborn resisrance to dearh
by poison, bdlËts,
revolution. This was a very conüoversial stand, even in the social- and drowning-all ttrese seemed to belong to an
earlier age, to b.
ist movement, and the Bolsheviks found themselves very much a bizarre and irrelevant accompaniment to the
t*.rr¡.*rl".ot ry
cold-shouldered. In Russia, all known Bolsheviks-including Duma realities of troop-trains, úerich warfare, and mass
mobilization.
deputies-were arrested for the duration of ttre war. Russia not only had an educated public to perceive
this, but also
As in r9o4, Russia's declaration of war produced a public surge possessed institutions like the Duma,
ttre poritical parties, rhe zem-
of patriotic enfhusiasm, much jingoistic flag-waving, a temporary stvos, and the industrialists'r7ar Industries
committee which were
moratorium on internal strife, and earnest attempts by respectable potential agents of transition from the old regime
to the modern
society and non-governmental organizations to assist the govern- world.
ment's war effort. But once again, the mood quickly turned sou¡. The autocracy's situation was precarious on the eve of
ttre First
\7hile the Russian Army's performance and morale now look less !7orld War. The society was deeply divided and the political
and
dismal than they once did to scholars, the Army suffered cnrshing bureaucratic strudure was fragile and overstrained.
The regime
40 The Sening

was so vulnerable ro any kind of jolt or setback ttrat it is hard

imagine that it could have survived long, even without the SØar,
to 2 l9l7: The Revolutions of February
although clearly change might in other circumstances have come
less violendy and with less radical consequences ttran
and October
was the case
in rgr7.
The First \Øorld \üØar both exposed. and increased trre vulnera-
bility of Russia's old regime. The public applauded victories, but
IN February r9r7 the autocracy collapsed
would not tolerate defeats. Vhen defeats occurred, the society
ular demonstrarions and the *iti¿t"-"i
in the face of pop_
did not rally behind its government (a relativery normar reactior¡ of erite suppãit ro, trr.
regime. In the euphoria of revolurion,
especially if rhe enemy becomes an invader of the homeland,
aná
political ,.1;l;; seemed
easy. Russia,s-future form of government
the reaction of Russian society in rgrz and again in r94r_z), would, of course, be
but democradc' The- exact meaninf of
instead turned sharply against it, denouncing its incompetence
and narure of Russia's new constitution
ûrat ambiguous i..ü
*r.
backwardness in rones of contempt and moral superioriry.
This sug_ would t. ¿."i¿.Jiv "r¿a con_
sriruent Assembly, to be elected by
gests that the regime's legitimacy had become
exrremely shaþ, and the Russian p.opË as soon
as circumstances permifted. In
that its survival was very closely related to visible the meantime, *r. .lit. and popu_
o., lar revolurions_liberal politicians, th. p.op.rt.ã-".rJ
failing thar, sheer luck. The old regime had been ""hi.rr.*.rri,
lucþ in 19o4_6-, oäLrriorr"l
crasses' and the officer corps in tr¡e first caregory; sociarist
an earlier occasion when war defeats had plunged it rrrtå : politi-
,.rroirrdo.r, cians, the urban working crass, and
because it got out of the war relatively quicHylnd honourably, rank-and.-file soldiers and sa'ors
aná in the second-would coexist, as they
was able to obtain a very large posrwar loan from Europe, had done in the grorious days
lhich of national reygtutigr¡av solidarity in
was rhen ar peace. It was not so lucþ in r9r4_t7. The
war lasted r9o5. I" i"r;;;;;;ì rerms,
too long, draining not only Russia but the whole of Europe. the new provisional Government íourd
More represenr the erite revolu-
tion, while the newly revived peuograd
than a year before the A¡mistice in Europe, Russia,s old regime Soviet woulj ,p."t ø, th.
dead.
was ' revolution of trre people. Their rerÃon.rrip
*oJãï
tary rarher than competitive, and .dual "-oö1.*.rr-
pàwer, terÅ-appnea
lt}le
ro the coexisrence of the provisional
Governme; Soviet)
would be a source of strength, not of ""J,h: liU.r"lr,
weakness. R.rrri".,
after all' had traditionalty tended ro
see the socialists whose
special interest in social reform was
comparable to and "r;ilr,
compatible
with the liberals' own special interest in poritical
democratization.
Most Russian sociarists, similarly, were prepared
to see the liberars
as allies, since they accepred the
¡vtarxist view that th. ùou.g.ois
liberar revolution had first place on
trre agenda and the socialists
were bound ro. supporr it in the struggle
Yet within eight-monrhs the hopeJ and"gãi.rrt ",rao"r".y.-"
expectation. of F.b.rr"ry
i lay in ruins. .Dual power'pro;.ä;;
iilusion, masking something
very like a power vacuum. The popular
revolution t".a"*. p.o_
gressively more radical, wh'e
tne eûte revolution moved rowards
I an anxious conservative stance in defence
.f pr.;r;*o
l"*
i and order. The provisional Government
barery survived Generar
i Kornilov's atrempted coup from the right
before succumbing
i in October to the Bolsheviks, successful coup from the left,
I
 42 rgr7: The Reztolutions of February and Ocmber
t9r7: The Revolutions of Februarg
popularly associated with the slogan of 'Ail power ro the sovi- and Ocøber 43
ets'. The long-awaited Constituent Assembly met but accom_ successful prot to take Russia
out of the war. Historians, of course,
rend to be sceptical of conspiracy
plished nothing, being unceremoniously dispersed by the
Bolshe_ rh;rie;. n"i ,rr.
enabred such theories to flourish ""ì*1.îî*
viks in January r9r8. On the peripheries of Russia, oftcers of *"y
scholarly approaches ro the problem."lto
i"rr. influenced .w.estern
the old Tsarist Army were mustering their forces to fight the úrril q,rit. recendy, mosr
historical explanations of the Bolsherrit
Bolsheviks, some under the monarchist banner that had seemed
illegitimacy in one way or rhe orher,
n rrof.rtion emphasized its
banished forever tn r9r7. The Revolution had not brought lib_ if r..ti.rg to absolve the Rus_
eral democracy to Russia. Instead, it had brought anarchy and sian people of any responsibility ". .rr..rt
for ¡r. and its consequences.
civil war. rn the classic w'estern interpretatio*
subsequenr evolution of Soviet po_;r;-,;
.; alt. Borshevik victory and
The headlong passage from democratic February to Red October deus ex møchina was
astonished victors and vanquished alike. For Russian liberals, the Bolsheviks, secrer we3pan
the of party árganization and discipline.
shock was rraumaric. The revolution-their revolution by right, I-enin's pamphlet tØhy Is.Ib Br'D;*;ilJå
out the prerequisites for the successful p. 32),setdng
as the history of western Europe demonstrated and even "uorr.,
àÇnization
riltrt- conspiratorial party, was usually of an illegal,
thinking Marxists agreed-had finally occurred, only to be snatcired cited as th"e basic texq and it was
from rheir grasp by sinister and incomprehensible forces. Menshe- argued that the ideas of Wat
Is To n, Oonri-^o¡¡lded the Bolshevik
viks and other non-Bolshevik Marxists were similarly outraged: Parry in irs formative years and
trre conrinued to determine Bolshevik
behaviour even after the final
time was nor yet ripe for proletarian socialist revolution, it *", February r9r7. The open, democ.".ii
.*.rg.ìå'tom underground in
inexcusable that a Marxisr party should break rhe rules"rrà and seize pluralist politics of the
post-February months in "rã ,ibverted,
power. The Allies, Russia,s partners in the war in Europe, Russia *.r. ,t.r, .J;;;;
were in the Botsheviks, unla,*û¡l ,.ir";;;;;;
aghast at the debacle and refused to recognize the new government, by a conspiratoria'y
which was preparing to pull Russia out of the war-unilaterally. organized coup in October. The
Bolshåvit o"airior, of centralized
The diplomats barely even knew organization and strict party
tJre names of Russia's new rul.rl, discipline led the new Soviet regime
but suspected the worst and prayed for a speedy resrrrrection oi towards repressive autrroritarianism
and i"i¿ *r. foundations for
the democratic hopes they had welcomed L F.b*".y. .Western Stalin's later totalitarian dictatorship
newspaper readers learned with horror of Russia,s descent Yet there have always been problems
from in applying rhis general con_
civilization into the barbarous depths of atheistic Communism- cept of the origins of Soviet totalitarianis*î'.n.
situation unfolding between February specific historical
The scars left by the October Revolution were deep, and made and OctoUer ryr7.Inthe first
more painful and visible to the outside world by the emigration place, the old underground
of Bolshevit n"rty'*", swamped by
influx of new members, outstripping an
large numbers of educated Russians during and immediately all otírer political parties in
after recruitrnenr, especiallv in the factori-e,
the Civil'S7ar that followed the Bolshevik victory. To the émigrés,
the Bolshevik Revolution was not so much a tragedy in
the Greek
the middle of r9r7, ii had becom; "rrJà.-"._.¿ fãr..r."gî
;;"
mass pafiy, bearing
little resemblance ro the-disciplin.d ";
sense as an unexpected, undeserved, and essentially
unfair disaster. revolutionaries described n lyhat
.ñ.;;;;nization of tull_time
To the ìØestern and especially the American public, it seemed
that place, neither the party as a
t, m n)'-oone? rn the second
the Russian people had been cheated of the liberar democracy whole nor its leadership were united
for the most basic policy qrrestions on
which it had so long and nobly struggled. Conspiracy theãries in ryr7. ir, õ.toU.., for example,
explaining rhe Bolshevik victory gained widespread credence: disagreements within the party Ì."áJr-hip ãr, tt. desirability
rhe insurrection were so acute that of
most popular of these was that of international the issue ivas publicly debated by
Jewish conspiracy, Bolsheviks in the daily press.
since Trotsþ, Zinoviev, and a number of other Borshevik
Ë"¿.., It may well be that rhe.Bolsheviks, greatesr strength
were Jewish; but another theory, revived in Solzhenits5m,s
in Zurich, pictured the Bolsheviks as pawns of the Germans
Lenin was nor strict party organization in ryr7
in a and discipline lwhiä;*ä;
existed at this time) but rather
the p"rayt io.r.e of intransigent
 44 t9r7: The Reaolutions of February and
October
radicalism on tfie exrreme left of the political t9r7: The Reoolutions
specûum. while other of February and Ouober
socialist and liberal groups jostled that Russia's political
io, poriaiå., in the provisional problems could be ,""-r,J,.1.1"^""*
Governmenr and petrograd Soviet,
ûrË solsheviks refused to be
co-opted and denounced the politics
\ü7hile other formerly
of coalition and compromise. ;::'i"ö.?:ïïi.î:åï".å*';li*Jr11"å'ö*ffi ,'"""'.:Tiï
radicai politicians ."i.a ro, resraint Assemblv sotution, lik.,il. model? The constituent
responsible, statesman_like leadership, and of political .o"r.or,r.-1,ìi"
;;.;; ä"i' power', required a degree
tfr. Sotr¡.viks stayed out ":'.::Ï:_:"r
on the süeers with the irresponsible'"trã
crowd. As the .dual power, sÍl¡crure
u.ttig...nt revorutionary
¿i.i"Ãg."r.A,
mise. rne ;;;;J.i
were dictatorship
and civil war.;;
*
#jilî:î:î ;.å :.*,ì,, .i ..äi,"_
and
compromise
coalition parties represenred in the p¡ovisiãnal discrediting the alternadves
*..å fik.ly ,. b. -;;*"'-cd'
;;.:tt"sus
nevertheless,
thar rhese
Petrograd Soviet leadership, only Government and porarizedsociety*r,i.ú¡,"a*,,ãiäää.i.i:T::ï.*:iîï,
tion to benefit. Among tnl sociäfst
tt. g"hi""iks were in a posi_
had overcome Marxisi^ scruples, .",rg¡ao-aJ.J only the Bolsheviks
the mood of the crowd, The Februarg Reoolution
and declared their willingn.r. to
,.ir". p;; in the name of the and ,dual power,
proletarian revolution. In the last week of February,
The 'dual power'relationship of the provisionar bread shortaq

ff i:,",:, j.#:äi"ïäïJjt¡:i,:þi:alH"î,';:.j:iî,;ïi
Petrograd Soviet was usuaily seen Government and
in t.rms as an alriance
"ra* Its survival
.' lîï::ff
berween
that the aurhorities ?.oT*, ..owd on tà
the bourgeoisie and the
or.L;";;;. the súeers of petroerad a
on continued cooperadon between depended Fourth Duma,',oUãi, could not disperse.
claiming ro represenr them; but i,
these classes and the politicians n"iî:.r.^iïr".,oes The
*", ;L;;y tre summe r of r9r7 :T'..*
session i;.J
ää'# 1 lr'å*;r: äiåiTi :
that the shaþ consensus, of February
mined. As urban
ir"å'U..r, seriously under_
society became i""r."Çy polarized
law-and-order right and a revolu,t;;õË;the between a
rn

f
u,3ffiäïî*ïi#*f
for the du

the.cadet party and it;.å:i:iËîrË,î

by tiberars or
democraric coalition srarted to crumblel middle ground of tr,. nrogr..l;;;;il::**ated
olo *. fact remain rn
soldiers, and sailors came on to
,"J;o crowds of workers, :tt:i":'
and
The Emperor,s Minisrers
held one i indecisive meeting
the peuograd sûeets demanding then took to m.i, t..rs,-tiï;;ä."i?:,,
that ttre Soviet take power in the
name oith. *orking class and
repudiate.the 'ren capitalist ministers'
or *r. provisional Govern- ä'J,',î:Ttr*:."qi,"r.Níd;ì;ìî;åi:Ïi":1ffiîrçtrt
ment. In Augusr, tt,e month of
General Kor*lou,.
åîiï,"î:ff
"b";;;;";;;
p.";;;; ii1",i:i.#ruîiu.åï"iJ,flî#*ïä:å
leading industrialist urged the liberals
ao U. Áo.. decisive in defence
of their class interests: ,h. äff"äl:iJ,ï,T.ä:.iå*g, and,.oop, ro,i
'we
ought to say ' ' ' that the present revolution
is a bourgeois revolution,
that the bourgeois order which .*rr"
since
a" pl...i, .i-. is inevitable, and
",
it is inevitabre' one musr draw the
:ii,?",ä*,ï:ïäî*'h:*.i.*i.ïi+":rå.d?:lîî:
ary crowd had taken
over all .di*;;;ri.";
*."pl.i.li rogical conclusion and and, as far as he k";;" a^lt artilery suppries
insist that those who rule tåe,r"..,ti.rt
i.rî'í;;;:"" manner and act in a remained at his ¿ispo.T
,::;i:"^::".ns,
the.whore city; ver
bourgeois manner.2
working. -sal' and^ *t" r'j"räå;'JJ:i;:lt:i:,i:::;
The 'dual power, was conceived The Army Hieh Co
as an interim arrangement pend_ _
ing the summoning of a Constitu.",
tion under atrack from left and ,igt
À;;;;iy. But its disintegra_ ,T:1 T" :o
l' ,'h;î'ätri#t":"ïrî,'JH" " either to s end in
t Áî r-*_* polarization
of Russian politics raised djsrurbñ, "rrã
*.1"."s
,Tå:::1,i:'.i;:i#ï1'rp.r;.;;;;-'i.åi;::i:,:ï:
;r; ;ä ä. _i::å
abour the future as
weil as rhe present in mid-r9r7.
ür"; ;;;ìï *
reasonabre to hope and"hthe
",
;,îö,r$il
Duma who respectfirllv *:î,äT '":f
rrgg.ri.¿*äî,,rt. Emperorffi
should
46 rgrT: The Reoolutions of February and October
r9r7: Ihe Revolutions of February and October
47
abdicate. After some discussion, Nicholas mildly agreed. Bur, hav- industrialists as Ministers of Finance
ing initially accepted ¿¡s s,ggestion that he should abdicate in and tade and Industry, and
the socialist lawyer Aleksandr Kerensþ
favour of his son, he thought further about Tsarevich Aleksei's as Minister ofJustice.
The Provisional Government had no electoral
delicate health and decided instead to abdicate on his own behalf m"nd-ate, deriving
its auttrority from the¡row defunct Duma,
and that of Aleksei in favour of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. the consent of the Army
High Command, and informal
Always a family man, he spent the remainder of ttre journey thinking with public organiza_
tions like the Zemstvo l-eague "gr..rrr.rr*
ah. Wa. fn¿rrst ies Commirtee.
with remarkable calm and political innocence about his furure as a "rrã
The old Tsarist bureaucracy provided
private citizen: its execudve machinery but,
as rhe result of the earlier dissolution
of the Duma, it had ,";
and lack of f**"f";i.gi;_
porting legislative body. Given its fragility
He said he would go abroad for the duration of hostilities [in the war
against Germany] and then retu¡n to Russia, settle in the Crimea and macy, the new government's assumptionof
power seemed remark-
devote himself completely to ttre education of his son. Some of his advisors ably easy. The Altied powers recognled
it imLediatery. Monarchist
doubted whether he would be allowed to do this, but Nicholas replied that sendment seemed to have disappeared
overnight in Russia: in the
nowhere were parents denied the right to care for their children.3 entire Tenth Army, only two officers
refused to swear allegiance to
the Provisionar Governmenr. As a liberar
(After reaching the capital, Nicholas was senr to join his family politician later recailed,
outside Petrograd, and thereafter remained quietly under house Individuals and organizations expressed
their loyalty to the new power. The
arrest while the Provisional Government and the Allies tried to stavka [Army Headquarters] as a whole,
ronowJ uy the entire command_
decide what to do with him. No solution was reached. I-ater, ing staff, recognized the provisional
cÁ"..o-"*. The Tsarist Ministers
the whole family was senr to Siberia and then to the lJrals, still and some of the assistant Ministers *... i*pri.o.red, but all the other
under house arrest but in increasingly difficult cftcumstances which officials remained at their posts. Ministries,
ofûces, banks, in fact the entire
Nicholas bore with fortitude. In July r9r8, after the outbreak of political mechanism of Russia o.u.,
*o.É.rg.
the Civil \üar, Nicholas and his family were executed on orders of
"."r.d afr"i .*n In that respecr, rÌre
Bebruary] coup d'état passed off so ,,'oo*rty then one felt a vague
presentiment that this was not the
the Bolshevik Urals Soviet.a From the time of his abdication to his end, thaisuch a crisis could not pass off
so peacefully.5
death, Nicholas did indeed behave as a private citizen, playing no
active political role whatsoever.) Indeed, from the very beginning there were
In the days following Nicholas's abdication, rhe politicians of reasons to doubt
the effectiveness of rhe transfer oi po-...
Petrograd were in a state of high excirement and frenetic activity. The most important
reason was that the provisional Government
Their original intention had been ro ger rid of Nicholas rather had a competitor: the
February Revolution had produced not
than the monarchy. But Nicholas's abdication on behalf of his son one but two serf-constituted
authorides aspiring to a national role. The
had removed the possibility of a regency during Aleksei's minority; second was the p.t ogr"J
Soviet, formed on the paftern of the
and Grand Duke Michael, being a prudent man, declined the r9o5 petersburg ñ;
;;
workers, soldiers, and socialist politicians.
invitation to succeed his brother. De facto, therefore, Russia was Tie Soviet wà afe"ayi'
session in the Täuride parace when
no longer a monarchy. It was decided ttrat the country's future the formation of the provisionar
Government was announced on z March.
form of government would be determined in due course by a The dual power relationship of the provisionar
Constituent Assembly, and that in the meantime a self-appointed Government and
the Petrograd Soviet emerged spontaneously,
'Provisional Government'would take over úre responsibilities of the and the government
accepted it largely because it had no
former imperial Council of Ministers. Prince Georgii Lvov, head of choice. i' th. mosi immediate
practical terms, a dozen Ministers with
the Zemstvo I-eague and a moderate liberal, became head of the no force at their disposal
could scarcely have cleared the palace (the
new government. His cabinet included Pavel Milyukov, historian initial meeting ptace
of both the governmenr and the Soviet) of
and Cadet Party theoretician, as Foreign Minister, two prominent Ãe scrufr throng of
workers, soldiers, and sailors who werá
tramping in and out to
48 rgrT: The Revolutions of February and Ocmber
r9t7: The Reztolutions of February and October
make speeches, eat, sleep, argue, and write proclamations; and 49
soldiers' commiftees, reduction
the mood of the crowd, intermittently bursting into the Soviet of officers, discþIinary powers,
and, most importantlg ,."ogni;o;oiäi
Chamber with a captive policeman or former Tsarist Minister to sorri.r,, authority on all
policy questions involving
leave at the deputies' feet, must have discouraged ttre attempt. In .h".
broader terms, as War Minister Guchkov explained to the Army,s
ernmentarorderto*._ar.r'""r;ñ;;:ä::.'jï,Li:hîîrr:J;
";Ji;;;
counter-signature of ttre
Commander-in-Chief early in March, Soviet. wrr¡le ó¡a.r
No. r did nor acru_
J.J;;,ì'
The Provisional Government does not possess any real power; and its ;Ïläi:::'"f;.ï,'9* "r "."u'* offi "..;- ; ;";,
di¡ectives are carried out only to t}le extent thar it is permitted by the Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which enjoys all the essential elements
.uo*ry"",,,,""J.;:.:ï;:i.ä.1"t?:înää";."i"ï#:t
had been arresred killed Uv ,fr.;"il of Kronstadt and the
of real power, since tlle troops, the railroads, the post and telegraph are all 9r
Baldc Freet during tt.
in its hands. one can say flatly that ttre provisional Government exists onlv
r.ui rãry;;;'ö;;.. No. r therefo¡e had
strong overtones ofclass
war, and ,or¿ivi"il.¿ ro offer
so long as it is permitted by the Soviet.6 about the prospecrs ør-"l"rrlooi.äoi. reassurance
unwo¡kabte form of dual.n9wer, ,, or.r"*ed the most
In the fi¡st mondrs, the Provisional Government consisted mainly
enlisted men in *"
å;; ;; situation in which the
of liberals, while ttre Soviet's Executive Committee was dominated ro."., ,.**irld only the authority
the Petrograd Soviet,:r"r..g
while the .fñ;;r-;;;ps recognized of
by socialist intellectuals, mainly Mensheviks and SRs by party authorityãf ¿,e provisional only ¿.re
affiliation. Kerensþ, a Provisional Government member but also Government.
The Executive Commir..
a socialist, who had been active in setting up both institutions, of tn.-Áåviet aid its besr to reúeat
from rhe radical oosition t
served as liaison between rhem. The socialists of the Soviet intended
Sukhanov .omment"d orr "pÊñ;ö.å.. *.. r. But in April
to act as watchdogs over the Provisional Government, protecting trreìlsolatiî";;; rhe masses, produced
by the Execudve Committee,s
the interests of the working class until such time as the bourgeois de f".;Ji;". with the provisional
Government. rr was, or.orrr*,
revolution had run its course. This deference to the bourgeoisie
recurrent conflicts between
oJ;; ;;;ä, a[iance. T]rere were
was partly the result of rhe socialists, good Marxist education and the Soviet E"..rtir. Committee
the Provisional Govr and
pardy a product of caurion and uncertainty. As Nikolai Sukhanov,
one of the Soviet's Menshevik leaders, noted, there was likely to
orpeasant,"*"';;::HT."å jlïT;,iiîlå1..*?::îr];i
about Russia's participado".-
be trouble ahead, and better ttrat the liberals take tl'e responsibility
Governmenr remained- n
rh;;;;;;:;i *"r. The provisionar
and, if necessary, tÌre blame:
Foreign Minister Milyukov,s
*ry .orn-Jläî *. war efforq and
Nor. oils Ài¡i even implied a
ued interesr in extenåing contin_
The Soviet democracy had to entrust the power ro the propertied elements, R;;rt"" ;åå;i;;'.. constantinopre
the Suaits (as agreed.T_,ir. and
its class enemy, without whose participation it could not now master the
government and the Allies),
S..;.;-t:;;;s stgrrea by the Tsarist
technique of administration in the desperate conditions of disintegration,
fgfore p;;ii" ourcf,y and renewed
nor deal with the forces of rsarism and the bourgeoisie, united against it.
But the condition of this transfer had to assure the democracy of a complete
srreer demonsrrarions,fo^-.1
Committee took the .defensisr,T*
a "Ër*:-*. Soviet Executive
victory over the class enemy in tåe near future.7 the war as long as Russian ;.rto;;;;uring continuation of
rng annexationist war aims
,...i,.r, *å-;;., attack bur oppos_
But the workers, soldiers, and sailors who made up the Soviet's and *r. S."r.t f..aties. But
floor of rtre Soviet_and i" on the
rank and fi.le were not so cautious. On r March, before the formal rh. ,;;;;,ãîi".ron.s, and especia'v
the garrisons-the attitude
establishment of the Provisional Government or tlle emergence of ro rhe *l-,ì"ãä to be simpler
stop fightin8, pdl ."i .f ,î.-*ar, and
'responsible leadership' in ttre Soviet, the notorious Order No. r was bring the troops
issued in the name of the Petrograd Soviet. Order No. r was a
ili...d."rd.:
The relationship drat developed
revolutionary document and an assertion of the Soviet's power. It between the petograd Soviet
the p-"iri.;;iõ;;;
Executive Committee and
called for democratization of the Army by the creation of elected
and summer .r,;;t;, inrense, il;äåî,'"T,irff i.tfr 3
 50 rgr7: The Reztolutions of February and October
t9t7: The Reoolutions of February
Executive Committee guarded its separate identity jealously, but and Ocøber 5r
also argued that a Russian
ultimately rhe two institutions were too closely bound to be-indiÊ defeat wourd be in ûre interests
revolurion' The Bolshevik readers of the
ferent to each other's fate, or to dissociate themselves in the
event including Stalin and Molotov,
*i.-i"a been exiled in Siberia,
of disaster. The link was strengthened in May, when the p¡ovisionar
the capitats. But those
we;;;u rhe first ro rerurn ro
Government ceased to be a riberal preserve and became a coalition
more diffcuk ro return, -for
.,,ui;l;rî,i'u,rroo. found it much
of liberals and socialists, drawing in representatives of the major thJsimple,."roo that Europe was
war. To reruftr at
socialist parties (Mensheviks and SRs) whose influence *", p..- Baltic was ;;;*;", and required Allied
dominant in ttre Soviet Executive committee. The sociarists were "",*:
cooperadon, while rhe land routes ,"" enemy
not eager to enter the government, but concluded trrat it was thei¡
errheless, I_enin and orher
memb;-;;. "iros émigré territory. Nev_
neutral Swi¿erland were very community in
duty to strengttren a totering regime at a time of national crisis. anxious to return; and, after
negotia_
tions conducted by intermediaries,
They continued to regard the Soviet as their more natural sphere the German government offered
them the chance to cross
of political action, especially when it became clear that the new C_.r**y Uy,."i.a o"ir. It was clearly
Germany,s inrerest ro let Russian ,.rãliär*ies in
socialist Ministers of Agriculture and I-abour would be unabre opposed ro rhe
to war return to Russia, but the
implement their policies because of liberal opposition. Neverthe- revolutionari., ,fr.rrrålrr.,
weigfi the desirabilirv of returnlng ùî
less, a symbolic choice had been made: in associating
themselves a;;r;ä. risk of compromising
more closely with the provisional Governmenr, the ¿responsible'
themselves potiticaliy.. ú,h;;;.h a smau contingent of
mainly Botshevik émjerés, á*iã.J-i.
socialists were separating themselves (and, by extension,
the Soviet towards the end of March- (A
ï"i. *. risk, and ser off
Execudve Commitee) from the .irresponsible' popular revolution. much iarger group of Russian
olutionaries
in Switzerrana, L"r"ái"g;li;" rev_
Popular hostility to the 'bourgeois' p¡ovisional Government alr the Mensheviks,
decided that it was more prudent
mounted in the late spring, as war weariness increased and to wait_a sh¡ewd move, since
the they avoided all the controversy
economic situation in the towns deteriorated.s During trre street and accusations that r-enin,s
provoked. This group followed trip
demonstrations that occurred inJuly (theJuly Days), demonstrators in ,..á"il."led uain, by similar
anangement with the Germans, "
carried banners calling for 'AI power to ttre soviets,, which a month later.¡
in effect Before l_enin,s rerurn to petrograd
meant the removal of power from the p¡ovisional Government.
Siberian exiles had already
.".tf in April, the former
Paradoxically-though rogically in terms of its commitment ro
trre
u.Ãri,"
nization and publish a newspaper.
,.t"iïd the Bolshevik orga_
Government-the Executive committee of the pet¡ograd Soviet
like.other sociatist groups,
At this point the Bolsheviks.
rejected the slogan of 'Ar power to the soviets'; and in
fact the
,h;;; ,;;,
coalition around trre petrograd ; drifting into the loose
demonstration was directed as much against the existing
Soviet leaders of the Soviet had
s;.;:Ë"; àe Menshevik and SR
leadership as against the Government itself. .Take power, yor, nãt fo.gott.r, ;;; troublemaker Lenin
,o., could be, and awaited his arrjval"with
of a bitch, when it's given you!, shouted one demonstrator, shaking ft rurned out
to be justified. on a April,
his fist at a socialist politician.e But this was an appeal (or perhaps
ã
r.t.r, r.oio"ooi.ir."ri.n.
i-.oi.o off the train at the
Finland Station in'petrograd,
threat?) to which those who had pledged themselves to .dual po*.r,
welcoming comminee, addressed
t. ,.rpoiã.ïcurtly to rhe Soviet,s
could not respond. r.* ìãå*s to the crowd in
always"u*a.jä his opponenrs,
the rather harsh voice that
departed abruptly for_a private and
.AãUr"aiorr-and conference
The Bolsheoiks his Borshevik partv coileagu.r. with
secrarian habim. He
cr;;;ly;;- n"o not losr his old
At the time of the February Revolurion, virtually all leading Bol_
h
showed no signs tf rn.ì
sheviks were in emigration abroad or in exile in remore p.': ."rly mo,,thr, .r."].å""iöffi;i
regiãns of
the Russian Empire, arrested en masse after trre outbreak
of war
as brorhers in honou¡ of rhe revolu;;;;;;;rr. "1,,ä:ili:å':i#::
Lenin's appraisat of t,,e.politic"i.t#;;:'known
because the Bolsheviks not only opposed Russia's participation to history
but the April Theses, was as
beliiere"., ;;*o;;;ising, and distinctly
 52 rgr7: The Reaolutions of February and Ocøber
t9t7: The Reztolutions of February and
disconcerting to the petrograd Bolsheviks who had tentatively Ouober 53
submerging their ord.sectarian disagreements.
accepted the Soviet line of socialist unity and critical support rn June, at the First
f; Nationar congress of Soviets, rËk
the new government. Scarcely pausing to acknowledge
the achieve_ any political party was prepared " to take
;;;Ëd rhetoricatv whether
ments of February, r-enin was already looking forwarã to
the second on the responsibilities of
power alone, assuming úrat the
stage of revolution, the overth¡ow of ttre bourgeoisie by answer was negadve. .There is
the prole_ such a party!' r-enin interjected.
tariat. No support should be given to the provisional Governlent, But ,. *." of trre delegares, ir
sounded more like bravado than
I-enin stated. Socialist ilusions of unity and trre .naive confidencei a seriou, It was a serious
challenge, however, because úle "h"'.rrg..
of the masses in the new regime must be desuoyed. The present Bolsheviks were gaining popular
support and the coalition socialists
Soviet leadership, having succumbed to bourgeois influence, losing it.
was The Bolsheviks were still in *ir.ri;-;
useless (in one speech, I_enin borrowed Rosa Luxemburg,s
acterization of German Social Democracy and called it ,a-stinking
char_ Soviets' and they had yct to win " a ma;å, the June Congress of
city erection. But their
growing strength was already
corpse'). evident át tfr. gr".._roots level_in
tfie workers, factory commiftees,
Nevertheless, I-enin predicted that the soviets-under revitalized in the committees of soldiers and
sailors in the armed forces, and
revolutionary leadership-wourd be the key institutions
in transfer-
in local district soviets in the big
towns. Bolshevik party membership
ring power from the bourgeoisie to the proietariat. 'Ail power was also increasing spectac_
to the ularly, althoueh rhe Bolsheviks
soviets!', one of the slogans of l_enin,s April Theses, was
in effect a
call for class war. 'Peace, land, and bread,, anofher of Lenin,s
to launch a mass recruitment drive, ";. anã;;;r.*.A any formal decision
almost surprised
April by the influx. The party,s.-.*b..r'hip;;;;r,
slogans, had similar revolutionary implications. .peace,, shaþ and perhaps
in I_enin,s exaggerated as they are, give rorn.
usåge, meant not only withdrawal from the imperialist
war but
,.rrr. ãrits ¿imensio.rrirarãäo
Bolshevik Party members ar rhe time
also recognition that such withdrawa|is impossibre...without
the
of the February Revolution
(though this figure is particularly
overth¡ow of capital'. 'r-and' meant confiscation of the landown_ rrrrp.",, J.. tt petrograd party
organization could actually identify "
ers' estates and their redistribution by the peasants themserves- ã.ly z,ooo members in
February, and the Moscow organization "Uo,r.
something very close to spontaneous peasant land 6oo);
more than roo,ooo
seizures. No members by the end of Ap.il;
wonder that a critic accused r-enin of 'prant[ing] the
banner of civir i., O.iãu., rgrT a total of
war in the midst of revolutionary democracv,.lo
"rr¿ in petrograd
35o,ooo members, including 60,o0o
rounding province and and the sur_
7o,ooo in Moscow
- The Bolsheviks, respectful as they were of Lenin,s vision and
leadership, were shocked by his Aprit rheses: some
Industrial Region.ll "rrJan.
adjacent Central
were inclined
to think that he had lost touch with the realities of Russian
life
guriry his years in emigration. But in the following monrhs, under The popular reaolution
I-enin's exhortations and reproaches, rhe Bolsheviks
did move into Seven million men were under arms
a more intransigent position, isorating themselves
from the sociarist ar the beginning of r9t7,
coalition. ÉIowever, without a Bolshevik majority in
with two million in the reserve. fn.
the petrograd forces had suffered
tremendous losses, and war weariness "r*.à
Soviet, I-enin's slogan of 'Alr power to the soviets!'
did not p.oìra. was evident i, th. il;;"r-*g
desertion rate and the_ soldiers, ,.rporrri
the Bolsheviks with a practical guide to action. ft
remained op.r, nization at the front. To rhe soldieri
r*.rs to German frater_
question whether rænin's strategy was that "r,
of a master poritician or an implicit promise that the ,".
.h;F;;"".y Revolution was
simpþ that of a cranþ extremist-a left-wing counrerpart *orrld ,oon.rrd, and they waited
of the old impatiently for the provisional cou.r.,-.ìiìà
socialist Plekhanov, whose unreserved patriotism a.iri.u. trris-if not
on the war issue on its own initiative, then underpressure
had taken him out of the mainstream oiRussian
socialist politics. from the petrograd Soviet.
The need for socialist unity seemed self-evident
In the earþ spring of r9r7, the Army, with
to most of the its new democratic
politicians associated with the soviet, structure of elected commiftees, its
who prided themserves on ol¿ problems .f i""ã;;;;;
supplies, and its resdess and uncertain
*oã¿,-'.^,", at best a doubt-
 54 rgr7: The Reoolutions of February and October
t9r7: The Revolutions of February and
fully effective fighring force. At the front, morale had not October 55
rotally skilled male workershad been exempred
disintegrated. But the situation in the garrisons around from military conscripdon,
the country, retained a comparadv^ely large propoaio'of
where reserve troops were stationed, was much ir, p..ro". male work_
uglier. ing class
taditionally, Russia's soldiers and sailors of r9r7 have in the factories. Despite trr. poti". .ound-up
been of Bolsheviks
categorized as .proletarians,, at the beginning of the war, and theìubsequenr
regardless of their occupation out of arresr or military
uniform. In fact most of the enlisted men were peasants, drafting of large numbers of other poriticar
although troublemakers in the
workers were disproportionately represented in the factories, Petrograd,s major metall*gi""i
BalticFteet aãd defence plants were
of""a
employing a surprisingly large .r,r*t
the armies of the Nortlern and western Fronts,
since their recruit- to the Bolshevik and-other revolutionary
, workers who belonged
ment area was relatively industrialized. It can be argued parties, and even Bolshe_
in Marxist vik professional revolutionaries who
terms that the men in the armed forces were proletarian n"å iorrr. to the capital from
by virtue
of.their cur¡ent occupation, but the more important
thing is that YY"h. and other parts of the Empire after the ourbreak of war.
Other revolutionary worke¡s ..*rrr.d to
tìis is evidently how they regarded themselves. As $Øildmari,s tfr.i. factories after the
study February Revolution, increasing the potential
indicates,l2 front-line soldiers in the spring of r9r7_even for further f.lì¡""ì
wtren rürrest.
prepared to cooperate with officers who accepted
the Revolution The February
and úre new norms of behaviour_saw the officers Revolution had given birth to a formidable
and the provi_ of workers' organizations in all Russia,s array
sional Government as belonging to one class,
that of ttre .masters,, cially in Petrograd and Moscow. \ü'orkers,
industrial centres, b";..-p;
and identified their own interesrs as trrose oi the *.ri.r, were created not
workers and thé only at the city level, like the petrograd
Petrograd Soviet. By May, as the Commander_in_Chief Soviet, but also at the
reported lower level of rhe urban disuict, w¡reËtne
with alarm, 'class antagonism'between officers and leadership usually came
men had made from the workers themserves rarrrer than
deep inroads on the Army,s spirit of pauiotic the socialist intetigentsia
solidarity. and the mood was often more radical.
The Petrograd workers had already demonstrated New trade unions were
a ievolutionary
spirit in February, although they had not then established; and at the plant level, workers
ueen sumlreJi began ro set up factory
militant or psychologically prepared to resist commiftees (which were not part of the
the creation of a trade_union sûucture, and
'bourgeois' Provisional Government. In the fi¡st months sometimes coexisted witå local trade-union
after the branches) to dear with
February Revolution, the main grievances expressed management. The factory commiftees,
by workers in closest to the grass roots,
Petrograd and elsewhere were economic, focusing tended to be the most radical of all
on bread_and_ wárkers, organizations. In the
butter issues like the eight-hour day (which trre provisional factory commiftees of petrograd, tt e gotsheviks
Govern- had assumed a
ment. rejected on the grounds of the wartime dorninant position by the enJo f ly'ray
emergency), wages, r9r7.---
overtime, and protection against unemployme.r..rr "nrri",í... The factory committees, originat n
no guarantee that this situation would. continue, given
;;; ""tio"
y"r"lgoq over rhe plant,s capitalist managemenr.
was to be the workers,
the tradition The rerm used
of political militancy in the Russian working for this function was .workers, conrrol,
class. It was üue thar õ"lorn¡; kontrol), which
the war had changed the composition of thã implied supervision rather than control ir,
working class, greatly in practice the factory commiftees often
à" **"g.rial sense. But
increasing the percentage of women as well as went further and started
somewhat increasing t-o take over managerial fi¡nctions.
the total number of workers; and it was usually Sometimes t'is was related to
believed that women
workers were less revolutionary than men. yet disputes over conrrol of hiring and
it was women work_ the kind of class hostility t¡rai le¿ *o.kÃ
_", the product of
firing, o,
ers whose strike on fnternadonal W.omen's
Day had precipitated unpopular foremen and managers into
i, ,o*. plants ro put
the February Revolution; and those who had wheerbarrows
husbands at r¡e front
them in the river. In other instances, the ã,r-p-
were particularly likely to object strongly to
continuation of the war. "rr¿
facÀry commiftees
over to save the workers from unemployment, took
Petrograd, as a cenrre of the munitions industry when the owner or
in which manv manager abandoned the plant or threatlned
to close it because it
56 rgr7: 'fhe Reoolutions of February and Ocmber r9t7: The Revolutions of February and October 57
was losing money. As such events became more coÍtmon, the defi- in a quite different way. It seems to
have been assumed througtr_
nition of 'workers' control'moved closer to somettring like workers' out peasant Russia that this new revolution
self-management. me¿rnt_or should be
made to mean-rhat the nobles,
old illegitimate title to the land
This change took place as the workers' political mood was was revoked. I_and should belong
becoming more militant, and as the Bolsheviks were gaining influ-
to thoJe who tilled ir, p."r*i,
wrote in their numerous petitions to
ence in the factory commitrees. Militancy meanr hostility to the
the provisional Government
in the spring.la !øhat thai seems to t*.
bourgeoisie and assertion of the workers' primacy in the revolu- conc¡ere rerms was that_ they should
å."rr, to trre peasants in
ger rhe land whicir ,h.ñ;
tion: just as the revised meaning of 'workers' control' was that tilled as serfs for the nobles, *ruãf, fr"¿ been retained by the
workers should be masters in their own plants, so the¡e was an ".ra
noble landowners in the Fmancipatio.r-r.aA.*".r..
emerging sense in the working class ttrat 'soviet power' meant that (Much of rhis
land was currently leased from tfr.
f".rao*rr.rs by peasants; in other
the workers should be sole masters in the district, the city, and cases, the landowners cultivated
it, using ttre locat pear""a, frir.ä
perhaps tåe country as a whole. As political theory, this was closer labour.) ",
to anarchism or anarcho-slmdicalism than to Bolshevism, and the If the peasants st'l herd assumptions about the
Bolshevik leaders did not in fact share the view that direct workers' back more than harf a cenrury to the
land that went
time of serfdom, it is scarcely
democracy through the factory committees and the soviets was a surpr1in-g that the agrarian reforms
plausible or desirable alternative to their own concept of a party- carried out by Stolypin in the
years before the First world
sØar had made littre impact on peasant
led 'proletarian dictatorship'. Never*reless, the Bolsheviks were consciousness. Still, the evident
vitality of th. p."r"r, t mir in r9r7
realists, and the political reality in Petrograd in the summer of r9r7 came as a shock ro many peopre. The
was that their party had strong support in the factory committees
MarxisÀ ¡rad been
since the r88os that tlte mir had "-;ñ;;
essentially ãirirrt.gr"t a internally,
and did not want to lose it. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks were in surviving only because the state found
favour of 'workers' control', without defining too closely what they it a useful instrument. On
paper, the effect of Stolypin,s
reforms had been to dissolve t,,e mir
meanr by it. in a high proportion of the village, of
Rising working-class militancy alarmed the employers: a num- this, the mir was clearly a basic fã...,
E;;o;"n Russia. yet for all
ber of plants were closed down, and one prominent industrialist i" p."iant thinking about the
land in r9r7. In their peritionr, .ir. p."årris
ast<e¿ for an egalitar_
cautiously expressed his opinion that 'the bony hand of hunger' ian redisuibution of lands held Uy
tfre the stare, and the
might ultimately be the means of bringing the urban workers back Church-that is, tfie same kind of equat ".Uiji V,
to order. But in the countryside, the landowners' alarm and fear among village
households that the mir had. t "'o""tio' with
.r*""¿.¿ regard to
of the peasantry was much greater. The villages were quiet in "a;tio""iÇ
the village fields' \ù'hen unauthorized
land selures began on a large
February, and many of the young peasant men were absent because scale in *re summer of r9r7, tfie
seizures *.r. .orra,r.ted on behalf
of conscription for military service. But by May, it was clear that of village communities, not individu"t p."r-i
the countryside was sliding into rurmoil as it had done in r9o5 in households, and the
general paftern was that the
mir subsequently divided up the new
response to urban revolution. As in 19o5-6, manor houses were lands among the villagers as it had
being sacked and burned. In addition, the peasants were seizing
n"aitio.r"ity divided up the old
ones. Moreover, tåe mir often reasserted
private and state land for their own use. During úre summer, as the its authority over former
members in r9r7-rg: the Stolypin .r.p"r"rorr;,
disturbances mounted, many landowners abandoned their estates who had leftthe mir
to set ûtemselves up as independeni small
and fled from the countryside. farmers in the prewar
years, 'üere in many cases forced
to return and merge their holdings
Although Nicholas II had clung even after the 19o5-6 revohs ro once again in the common village
lands.
ttre idea that Russian peasants loved the Tsar, whatever their opin- Despite the seriousness_ of the land problem
ion of local offcials and landed nobles, many peasants responded to and the reports of
land seizures from the early summe.
news of the downfall of the monarchy and ttre February Revolution errunent procrastinared on the issue "f
;;;;;;. provisional Gov_
of lanã reform. The riberals
58 rgrT: The Reztolutions of February and Ocmber
were not on principle against expropriation of private lands, and
generally seem to have regarded the peasants' demands as just. But
any radical land reform would clearþ pose formidable problems. In
the fi¡st place, the Government would have to set up a complicated
official mechanism of expropriation and transfer of lands, which
was almost certainly beyond its current administrative capacities. In
the second place, it could not afford to pay the large compensation
to ttre landowners that most liberals considered necessary. The
Provisional Government's conclusion was that it would be best to
shelve the problems until they could be properþ resolved by the
Constituent Assembly. In the meantime, it warned the peasantry
(though to little avail) not on any accounr to take rhe law into its
own hands.
The political crises of the summer
In mid-June, Kerensþ, now the Provisional Government's Minister
of W'ar, encouraged the Russian Army to morürt a major ofensive
on the Galician Front. It was the first serious military undertaking
since the February Revolution, as the Germans had been content
to watch the disintegration of the Russian forces without engaging
themselves further in fhe east, and the Russian High Command,
fearing disaster, had earlier resisted Allied pressure to take the
iniúative. The Russians' Galician offensive, conducted in June and
early July, failed with an estimated 2oo,ooo casualties. It was a
disaster in every sense. Morale in the armed forces disintegrated
further, and the Germans began a successful counter-attack dtat
continued throughout the summer and autumn. Russian deser-
tions, already rising as peasant soldiers responded to news of the
land seizures, grew to epidemic proportions. The Provisional Gov-
ernment's credit was undermined, and tension between govern-
ment and military leaders increased. At the beginning of Jul¡ a
governmental crisis was precipitated by the withdrawal of all the
Cadet (liberal) ministers and the resignation of the head of rhe
Provisional Government, Prince Lvov.
In the midst of t}lis crisis, Petrograd erupted once again with ttre
mass demonstrations, street violence, and popular disorder of 3-5
July known as the July Days.15 The crowd, which contemporary
witnesses put as high as half a million, included large organized
contingents of K¡onstadt sailors, soldiers, and workers from the
t9t7: The Revolutions of February and October Sg
Petrograd plants. To the provisional Govemmenr, it looked like a
Bolshevik attempt at insurrection. The Kronstadt sailors,
whose
arrival in Petrograd set off the disorders, had Bolsheviks
among
their leaders, carried banners with the Bolshevik slogan .Ail poweî
to the soviets', and made Bolshevik party headquarters it tt e
Kseshinskaya Palace their fi¡st destination. yet whèn the
demon-
strators reached the Kseshinskaya palace, I_enin,s greeting
was
subdued, almost curt. He did not enco'rage them to
take ùot.rrt
action against the provisional Governm.ri o. the present
Soviet
Ieadership; and, although trre crowd moved on to the
Soviet and
milled a¡ound in a th¡eatening manner, no such action was
taken.
Confused and lacking leadership and specific plans, the
demon_
strators roamed the city, fell to drinking and looting,
and finally
dispersed.
In one sense, the July Days were a vindicarion of r-enin's intransi-
gent stand since April, for trrey indicated strong popular
sentiment
against the Provisional Government and the dual power,
impatience
with the coalition socialists, and eagerness on ttre part of the
Kro-
nstadt sailors and others for violent confrontation and probably
insurrecdon. But in another sense, the
July Days were a disaster for
the Bolsheviks. clearþ Lenin and the Bolshevik centrar
committee
had been caught offbalance. They had talked insurrection,
in a gen_
eral way, but not planned it. The Kronstadt Bolsheviks,
..rporrãirrg
to the sailors' revolurionary mood, had taken an initiative whictr,
in effect, ttre Bolshevik Central Committee had disowned. The
whole affair damaged Bolshevik morale and I_enin,s credibility
as
a revolutionary leader.
The damage was all rhe greater because the Bolsheviks, despite
the leaders'hesitant and uncertain response, were blamed
for the
July Days by the Provisional Government and the moderate social_
ists of the Soviet. The provisional Government decid.ed
to crack
down, withdrawing the 'parriamenta¡y immunity' that politicians
of all parties had enioyed since the February Revolution. Several
prominent Bolsheviks were arrested, along with totsþ,
who had
taken a position close to r-enin's on the extreme left since
his return
to Russia in May and was ro become an official Bolshevik parry
member in August. orders were issued for the arrest of l-enin
and
one of his closest associares in the Bolshevik leaderships,
Grigorii
Zinoviev. During the July Days, moreover, the provisional Govlrn_
ment had intimated ttrat it had evidence to support the rumou¡s
6o r9t7: The Revolutions of February and October t9t7: Ocøber 6t
The Revolutinns of February and
that I-enin was a German agent, and the Bolsheviks were battered He may, in fact, have berieved thar Kerensþ wourd
by a wave of patriotic denunciations in the press that temporarily wercome
an Army intervention to create a strong goverriment
eroded their popularity in the armed forces and the factories. The and deal
with left-wing troublemakers, since Xerensty, partially
Bolshevik Central Committee (and no doubt I-enin himself) feared apprised of
Kornilov's intenrions, dealt with him in a peculiarly
for I-enin's life. He went inro hiding, and earþ in August, disguised d.ùã,l, *"y.
Mis.nde¡standings between the two principal actors
as a workman, crossed the border and took refuge in Finland. confused the
situation, and the Germans' ,rnexpected ."p*.
If the Bolsheviks were in trouble, however, this was also true of of Riga on the
eve of Kornilov's move added to the mood
the Provisional Government, heâded from early July by Kerensþ. of panic, ãuspicior¡
and despair that was spreading among Russia,s
The liberal-socialist coalition was in consrant turmoil, wittr the leaders. rn the rast week ofAugust, baffied
ci.itian and núli;;
socialists pushed to the left by their Soviet constituency and the
but determine4 General
Kornilov dispatched üoops from the front to petrograd,
liberals moving to the right under pressure from the industrialists, oste.rsiUÇ
to quell disorders in the capital and save the Repubtic.
landowners, and military commanders, who were all increasingly The attempted coup failed largely because of m. unreliability
alarmed by the collapse of authority and the popular disorders. of the troops and the energetic actions of the petrograd
Kerensþ, despite an exalted sense of his mission to save Russia, was workl
ers. Railwa¡rmen diverted and obstructed the
essentially a go-between and negotiator of political compromises, troop_*ains; printers
stopped publication of newspapers supporting
not greatly trusted or respecred, and lacking a political base in any Koroilo.r,, .rro.,r.;
metalworkers rushed out to meet the oncoming
of the major parties. As he sadly complained, 'I struggle with the üoops and explain
that Petograd was calm and their officers had
Bolsheviks of the left and the Bolshevil¡s of the right, but people diceive¿ tirem.
Under this pressure, the troops, morale disintegrated,
demand that I lean on one or the other. . . .I want to take a middle was aborred outside peüograd without any
,fr. ãrrp
road, but nobody will help me.'16 serious militáry engagel
ment, and General Krymov, the commanding officer
It seemed increasingly likely that the Provisional Government Kornilov's orders, surrendered to the provisional "",irrg
r;ã.,
would fall one way or rhe other, but the question was, which? The Government and
then commited suicide. Kornilov himself was
threat from the left was a popular uprising in Petrograd and/or ar¡ested at Army
Head_quarters, offering no resistance and taking
Bolshevik coup. Such a challenge had failed in July, but German full responsibility.
In Petrograd, politicians ofthe centre and right rushed
activity on the norrh-western fronts was heightening tension in the _ ao ..áÊ
ûrm their loyalty to the provisional Government,
armed forces surrounding Petrograd in a most ominous way, and which Kerensþ
continued to head. But Kerensþ,s standing had
the influx of deserters who were aggrieved, armed, and unemployed been further dam_
aged by his handling of the Kornilov affair, and the govemment
presumably increased the danger of street violence in the city itself. weakened' The Executive committee of the petrograJsoviet
The other threat to the Provisional Governmenr was ttre possibility also
emerged with little credit, since the resistance
of a coup from the right to establish a law-and-order dictatorship. to Kornilov had been
organized largery at the locar union and factory
By the surilner, this course was being discussed in high military level; and this con-
tributed to an upsurge of support for ttre Bolsheviks
circles and had support from some of the industrialists. There were which almost
immediately enabled rhem ro displace the Soviet,s
signs that even ttre Cadets, who would obviously have to oppose old Menshevik_
SR leadership. The Army High command was
such a move before the fact and in public statements, might accept hit hardest of all,
since the arrest of the commander-in-chief
a fait accompli with considerable relief.
and failu¡e of trre coup
left it demoralized and confused; relations between
In August, the coup from the right was finally attempted by officers and men
deteriorated sharply; and, as if this were not enough,
General I-aw Kornilov, whom Kerensþ had recently appointed the German
adv¿nce was continuing, with petrograd the
Commander-in-Chief with a mandate to restore order and disci- apparent objective. In
mid-September, General Alekseev, kornilov,s successor,
pline in the Russian Army. Kornilov was evidently not morivated abruptly
resigned as Commander-in-Chief, prefacing
by personal ambition but by his sense of the national interest. his statement *i*,
emodonal tribute to Kornilov's high motives. Arekseev ""
felt he could
6z r9r7: The Revolutions of February and Ocnber
no longer take responsibility for an army in which discipline had
collapsed and'our officers are martyrs'.
Practically speaking, in this hour of terrible danger, f can state with horror
that we have no army (at these words the General's voice trembled and he
shed a few tears), while the Germans are prepared, at any moment, to strike
the last and most powerfrrl blow against us.17
The left gained most from the Kornilov affair, since it gave sub-
stance to the previously abstract notion of a counter-revolutionary
threat from ttre right, demonstrated working-class strength, and
at the same time convinced many workers that only their armed
vigilance could save the revolution from its enemies. The Bolshe-
viks, with many of their leaders still gaoled or in hiding, played
no special role in the actual resistance to Kornilov. But the new
swing of popular opinion towards them, already discernible earþ in
August, greatly accelerated after Kornilov's aborted coup; and ful a
practical sense they were to reap future benefit from the creation
of workers' militia units or 'Red Guards' which began in response
to the Kornilov threat. The Bolsheviks' strength was that they were
the only party uncompromised by association wittr the bourgeoisie
and the February regime, and the patty mosr firmly identified with
ideas of workers'power and armed uprising.
The October Rez;olution
From April to August, the Bolsheviks' slogan'All power to the sovi-
ets' was essentially provocative-a taunt directed at the moderates
who controlled the Petrograd Soviet and did nor wanr ro take all
power. But the situation changed after the Kornilov affair, when
the moderates lost control. The Bolsheviks gained a majoriry in
the Petrograd Soviet on 3r August and a majority in the Moscow
Soviet on 5 September. If the second national Congress of Soviets,
scheduled to meet in October, followed tåe same political trend
as the capitals, what were rhe implications? Did the Bolsheviks
wânt a quasi-legal transfer of power to the soviets, based on a
decision by the Congress that the Provisional Government had no
fu¡ther mandate to rule? Or was their old slogan really a call for
insurrection, or an affirmation that the Bolsheviks (unlike the rest)
had the courage to take power?
t9r7: The Revolutions of February and October 63
In September, I-enin w¡ore from his hiding place in Finland
urging the Bolshevik party to prepâre for an armed insurrection.
The revolutionary moment had come, he said, and must be seized
before it was too late. Delay would be fatal. The Bolsheviks musr act
before the meeting of the Second Congress of Soviets, pre_empting
any decision that the Congress might make.
I-enin's advocacy of immediate armed uprising was passionate,
but not entirely convincing to his colleagues in the leadership. rù7hy
should the Bolsheviks take a desperate gamble, when the tide was
so clearly running their way? Moreover, I_enin himself did not
return and take charge: surely he would have done this if he were
really serious? No doubt the accusations against him in rhe summer
had left him overwrought. possibly he had been brooding about
his and the Central Committee,s hesitation during the
July Days,
convincing himself that a rare chance to seize power had been lost.
In any case, I-enin was temperamental, like all great leaders. This
mood might pass.
I-enin's behaviour at this time was certainly contradictory. On
the one hand, he insisted on a Bolshevik insurrection. On the
other, he remained for some weeks in Finland., despite the fact
that the Provisional Government had released the left politicians
imprisoned in July, the Bolsheviks now controlled the Sãviet, and
the time of acute danger to I-enin had surely passed. When he
did return to Petrograd, probably at the end of the first week of
October, he stayed in hiding, isolated even from the Bolsheviks,
and communicated with his central committee through a series of
angry, exhortatory letters.
On ro October, the Bolshevik Central Committee agreed that
an uprising was desirable in principle. But clearly many of the
Bolsheviks were inclined to use their position in the Sovier to
achieve a quasi-legal, non-violent üansfer of power. According to
the later recollections of a member of the petrograd gohhevik
Committee,
Hardly any of us thought of the beginning as an armed seizure of all the
institutions of governmeni at a specific hour . . . we thought of the uprising
as the simple seizure of power by the petrograd soviet. The Soviet would
cease complying with the orders of the provisional Government, declare
itself to be the power, and remove anyone who tried to prevent it from
doing this. rs
64 t9t7: The Revolutions of February and October
Trotsþ, recently released from prison and admitted to Bolshevik
Party membership, was now the leader of the Bolshevik majority in
the Petrograd Soviet. He had also been one of the Soviet's leaders
in r9o5. Although he did not openly disagree with lænin (and later
claimed ttrat ttreir views had been identical), it seems probable that
he too had doubts about insurrection, and thought that the Soviet
could and should handle the problem of dislodging the Provisional
Government.l9
Strong objections to a Bolshevik-led insurrection came from
two of I-enin's old Bolshevik comrades, Grigorii Zinoviev and I-ev
Kamenev. They thought it irresponsible for the Bolsheviks to seize
power by a coup, and unrealistic to think that they could hold power
alone. 'When Zinoviev and Kamenev published these arguments
under thei¡ own names in a non-Bolshevik daily newspaper (Maxim
Gorþ's NooaSta zhizn')r I-enin's anger and frustration rose to new
heights. This was understandable, since it was not only an act of
defiance but also a public arìnouncement that the Bolsheviks were
secredy planning an insurrection.
It may seem remarkable, in these circumstances, that the Bol-
sheviks' October coup actually came off. But in fact the advance
publicity probably helped I-enin's cause rather ttran hindered it.
It put the Bolsheviks in a position where it would have been
difficult not ro act, unless they had been arrested beforehand, or
received strong indications that the workers, soldiers, and sailors
of the Petrograd area would repudiate any revolutionary âction.
But Kerensþ did not take decisive cor¡ntermeasures against the
Bolsheviks, and their control of the Petrograd Soviet's Military-
Revolutionary Committee made it comparatively easy to organize
a coup. The Military-Revolutionary Committee's basic purpose
was to organize the workers' resistance to counter-revolution à
la Kornilov, and Kerensþ was clearly not in a position to inter-
fere with that. The war situation was also an important factor:
the Germans were advancing, and Petrograd was threatened. The
workers had already rejected a Provisional Government order to
evacuate ttre major industrial plants from ttre city: they did not
trust the Government's intentions towards the revolution, and for
that matter they did not trust its will to fight the Germans. (Para-
doxically, given the workers' approval of the Bolshevik 'peace' slo-
gan both they and the Bolsheviks reacted belligerently when the
German th¡eat was immediate and actual: the old peace slogans
t9r7: The Reaolutions of February and October 65
were scarcely heard in the autumn and winter of t9t7, after the
fall
of Riga.) Had Kerensþ tried to disarm rrre workers as the Germans
approached, he would probably have been lynched as a ûaitor
and
capitulationist.
Tfre insurrection began on z4 October, the eve of ttre meet_
ing of the Second congress of Soviets, when the forces of trre
soviet's Military-Revorutionary committee began to occupy key
govenìmental institutions, taking over tåe telegraph offices
trr.
railway starions, setring up roadblocks on the -ity,s bridges"ra and
surrounding the \Øinter palace, where the provisionar Goveinment
was in session,
They encountered almost no violent resistance. Ttre streets
remained calm, and citizens continued to go about their everyday
business. On the night of z4-5 October, I_enin came out
of hiãing
and joined his comrades at rhe Smolny Institute, a former
schooi
for young ladies which wâs now the headquarters of the Sovieq
he
too was calm, having apparently recovered from his bout of nervous
anxiety, and he resumed his old position of leadership as a
matrer
of course.
Bythe afternoon of the z5th, fhe coup was all but accomplished_
excepr, provokingly, for the taking of ttre \Tinter palace,
which was
still under siege with the provisional Governmenr members inside.
The Palace fell late in the evening, in a ratrrer confused assault
against a dwindling body of defenders. rt was a less heroic
occasion
than later Soviet accounts suggest: the battleship Aurora, moored
opposite rhe Palace in the River Neva, did not fi¡e a single live
shot,
and the occupying forces let Kerensþ slip out a side entrance
and
successfully flee the ciry by car. k was also slightly unsatisfactory
in terms of political drama, since the congress of Soviets-having
delayed its first session for some hours, on Bolshevik insistence-
finally began proceedings before the palace fell, thus frustrating the
Bolsheviks'wish to make a dramatic opening announcement. stilr,
the basic fact remained: the February regime had been ov.rthro*n,
and power had passed to the victors of October.
Of course, this did leave one question unanswered. -W]'o were the
victors of october? In urging the Bolsheviks towards insurrection
before the congress of Soviets, r-enin had evidentry wanted this
titre
to go to the Bolsheviks. But rhe Borsheviks had in fact organized
the uprising through the Military-Revolurionary committee
of trre
Petrograd Sovieq and, by accident or design, the Committee
had
66 rgr7: The Reztolutions of February and October
r9r7: The Reaolutions of February and Ocøber
67
procrastinated until the eve of the meeting of the national Congress even want to use the soviets as camouflage,
of Soviets. (Trotsþ later described this as a brilliant srraregy- but would apparently
have preferred to stage an unambiguo,r,
presumably his own, since it was clearly not I-enin's-of using the Bolrh.rrit k ah:
provinces, certainly, the immediat.,.rrrtt "orli]
soviets to legitimate a Bolshevik seizure of power.2o) As the news was that the soviets took power; and
of the Octob., n.,rolrti*
went out to the provinces, tJre most coûtmon version was ttrat the the local soviets *..;;;;
alwlys dominated by Bolsheviks. Although
soviets had taken power. the Bolsheviks, atritude
to the soviets after october is open to- different
The question was not wholly clarified ar rhe Congress of Soviets it is perhaps fair to say that tfrey t aa no objection i"r..p..i"ai."l,
which opened in Petrograd on z5 October. As ir turned out, a to the soviets exercising power at a local level, in principle
clear majority of the Congress delegates had come with a mandate as n"ä afr.
soviets were reriably Bolshevik. But this "r-
to support transfer of all power to the soviets. But this was not requiremenr was difficult
ro square with democratic erections contested
an exclusively Bolshevik group (3oo of the 67o delegates were by other poli,i.i
parties.
Bolsheviks, which gave the party a dominant position but not a Certainly I_enin was quite firm on the issue
majority), and such a mandate did not necessarily imply approval of coalition in the
new central government, the council of people,s
of the Bolsheviks' pre-emptive action. That action was violently November r9r7 when the Bolshevik c..rr."t
commissars.l
criticized at the fi¡st session by a large group of Mensheviks and committee discussed
the possibility of moving from an ail-BolJevik
SRs, who then quit the Congress in protest. It was questioned goveürment ro a
broader socialist coalidon, I_enin was adamantty
in a more conciliatory manner by a Menshevik group headed by against it, even
though severar Bolsheviks resigned from
Martov, I-enin's old friend; but Trotsþ consigned these critics, in .left the government in protest.
I-ater a few SRs, (members of ,fiirrr., group of
a memorable phrase, to 'the dust-heap of history'. Party that had accepted the Ocrober " the SR
At the Congress, the Bolsheviks called for the transfer of power .o,rlf
Council of people's Commissars, t,rt tt.y
*... admitted to the
to workers', soldiers', and peasants' soviets throughout the country. iá.. politicians without a
strong party base. They were dropped
As far as central power was concerned, the logical implication was from the govemment in mid_
r9r8, when the left SRs staged ãn uprising
surely that the place of the old Provisional Governmenr would be in protest
peace üeary recenrly signed with "g"i.rrt-th.
taken by the standing Central Executive Committee of the soviets, Germany. The Bolsheãrc
no further effort to form a coalition golr..rr_.rra *J.
elected by the Congress and including representatives from a num- with other parties.
Had the Bolsheviks a popular mandate ro
ber of political parties. But this'was not so. To the surprise of many rule alone, or did
they believe that they had onl? In the
delegates, it was announced that central governmentâl functions elections ror the constiruent
Assembly (held as scheduled before the
would be assumed by a new Council of People's Commissars, octouer coup, in Novem_
ber r9r7), the Borsheviks won 25 pû cent-of
whose all-Bolshevik membership was read out to rhe Congress on the popurar vote.
This put them second to the SRs, who
z6 October by a spokesman for the Bolshevik Parry. The head of the won 40 per cent of the
vote (left SRs, who supported the Bolsheviks
new government was I-enin, and Trotsþ was People's Commissar on rhe issue of the
coup' were not differentiated in the voting
(Minister) of Foreign Affairs. rists). The Borsheviks
had expected to do better, and is perhaps explicable if one
Some historians have suggested that the Bolsheviks' one-party -this
examines the vore in more detail.22
rule emerged as the result of historical accident rather than The Êolsheviks iook f.t ogr"ã
and Moscow, and probably won in urban
intention2l-that is, ttrat the Bolsheviks did not mean ro rake Russia as a whole. In the
armed forces, whose five million votes
power for themselves alone. But if ttre intention in question is were counted separately, the
Bolsheviks had an absolure majority in
I-enin's, the argument seems dubious; and I-enin overrode ûre the Armies of the Northern
and rTestem Fronts and the Baltic Freet-úre
objections of other leading members of the parry. In Septem- consdtuencies they
knew best, and where trrey were best known.
ber and October, I-enin seems clearly to have wanted the Bol- on trre southern fronts
and in the Black Sea Freet, ttrey lost to
sheviks to take power, not ttre multi-party soviets. He did not the sRs and ukrainian
parties. The SRs' overall victory
was the result of *irroirrg dr;
 68 rgr7: The Rez¡olutions of February and Ocmber
peasant vote in the villages. But there was a certain ambiguity
this. The peasants were probably single-issue voters, and the SR
in 3 The Civit \Mar
and Bolshevik programmes on rhe land were virtually identical.
The SRs, however, were much better known to the peasantry, ttreir
traditional constituency. 'where the peasants knew the Bolshevik
prograrnme (usually as a result of proximity to towns, garrisons,
or
railways, where the Bolsheviks had done more campaigrring), their
T¡rs October seizure of power was nor the
votes were split between the Bolsheviks and the SRs. end of the Bolshevik
Revolution but the beginning. The
In democratic electoral politics, nevertheless, a loss is a loss. The Bolsheviis had taken control in
Petrograd and, after a week of street_fighalrrg,
Bolsheviks did not take that view of the elections to the constituent in Moscow. But the
soviets that had sprung up in most prãrrio"i"t
Assembly: rhey did not abdicate because they had failed to win centres still had to
follow the capitals' lead in orr.r*rro*i.rg
(and, when the Assembly met and proved hostile, they unceremoni_ at. Uorr.g.oisie (often, at
local level, this meant ousting a .Commi"nee
ously dispersed it). However, in rerms of the mandate to rule, they of public Safety, set up
by the solid citizenry of th. ao*rr¡;
could and did argue that it was not the population as a whole that if io."l soviet was roo weak
to ".ra, "
they claimed ro represenr. They had taken power in the name of 1ak¡ power, supporr was unlikely to be forthcoming fr"; ,lr;
capitals'l Bolsheviks in trre provin..r,
the working class. The conclusion to be d¡awn from the elections * ãu at rhe centre, had
which ",
to work out their atdtude to local soviets
to the Second congress of Soviets and the constituent Assembly succesrt Uy
their authority but happened to be dominated "rr.a.J
was that, as of Octobe¡ to November r9r7 they were drawing more by Mensheviks and
SRs. Rural Russia, moreover, had
working-class votes than any other party. largely thrown off the yoke of
authority imposed from the rowns. r¡rã
But what if at some later time the workers should withdraw o"Jy-g and non_Russian
areas of the old Empire were in
their support? The Bolsheviks, claim to represenr the will of the various conditions of .o;;le*
proletariat was based on faith as well as observation: it was quite
turmoil' rf the Bolsheviks had taken power
with the intention of
possible, in I-enin's terms, that at some time in the future qg:.Ti"g the country in any convenåonal sense, some long and
the work- diffcult struggles against anàrchic, a...rr,r"føirrg,
ers' proletarian consciousness might prove inferior to that of the and separatist
tendencies lay ahead.
Bolshevik Party, without necessarily removing the parry,s rnandate
to rule. Probably the Bolsheviks did not expect this to happen. But
In fact, Russia,s futu¡eform of government remained an open
question. Judging by the october
many of their opponents of t9r7 did, and they assumed that l_enin,s coup in petrograd, the Bolshe_
viks had reservations about their o*tt
party would not give up power even if it lost working_class
support. soviers'. On the other hand, the slogan
ilog* of 'AIl power to the
Engels had warned that a socialisr party taking power premarurely í.._.A
of the provinces in rhe winter of r9"r7_rg_but to fit the mood
might find itself isolated and forced into repressi re åict"torship. this, perhaps, is
only another way of sayl.ng_ *r"t governmenral
clearly the Bolshevik leaders, and l-enin in particular, were willing authority
"Át
to take t}lat risk. laf .telgorarily collapsed. It remained"t,o-L. ,..r, just what the
Bolsheviks meanr by their other slogan
oii¿i.t"torrt ip of the pro_
letariat'. If, as I-enin had strongly-r"gg.;;
in his recent writ_
ings, it meanr crushing the counier_.ãîolrrriorr"ry efforts
old possessing crasses, the new o.t"to.rrrif of rhe
iourd have ro estab_
lish coercive organs comparable in
function to the Tsarist secret
police; if it meant a dictatorship
of the Bolshevik party, as many
of r-enint political opponenrs suspected,
the continued
of other political parties raised åajor proul.*r. yer existence
new regime a'ow itself to âcr as represìively could the
as the old Tsarist
7o The Ciail Vl'ar
The Civil lyar 7r
autocracy, and could it retain popular supPort ifit did? A dictator- national minorities, and support for
national languages and cultures
ship of the proletariat, moreover' appeared to imply broad powers and the formadon of na¡onal elites.2
and independence for all proletarian institutions, including trade There were limits to national self_determination,
unions and factory committees. \7hat happened if the trade unions became clea¡ with rlsard to the io.o.poì"tion however, as
and factory committees had diferent concepts of ttre workers' the former Russian Empire in the ,r.ríiolri., of territories of
interests? If 'workers' control' in the factories meant worker selÊ as natural for the Bolsheviks in petrograd
republic. Ir was
to hope for a revolu_
management, was this compatible with the centralized planning of tionary victory of soviet pgw:r i" t;;;iÞ" as to hope for it in
economic development that the Bolsheviks saw as a basic socialist Hungary-though the Azerbaijanis,
objective? Petersburg, were not v_ery likely io",
fo#., subjects of Imperial
Russia's revolutionary regime had also to consider its position natural for the Bolsheviks to ,,rpport "ppr..i"ae
this. It was also
in the wider world. The Bolsheviks considered themselves to be and .bourgeois, *årt.rr, soviers in Ukraine
oppose the Uk¡airiian rr"tiorr"tirtr, regard.less of
part of an international proletarian revolutionâry movement, and fact-that the soviets (reflecting *r..ari.-.o*position the
hoped that their success in Russia would spark similar revolutions working class) tended ro bq dominated of uk¡aine,s
by Russians, Jews, and
ttroughout Europe; they did not originally think of the new Soviet Poles who were .foreigners' not
orrty to th'e nationalists but also
Republic as a nation state which would have to have conventional to the Ukrainian peasantry. The Bolsheviks,
dilemma_most dra_
diplomatic relations with other states. When Trotsþ was appointed matically illustrated
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he ex¡rected to issue a few revolu-
-h:1g. Red A.rmy marctred into poland in
r9zo and rhe workers of Warsaw resisteå
the .Russian invasion,_
tionary proclamations and ttren 'close up shop'; as Soviet represen- was.that policies of proletarian internationalism
tative in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with Germany earþ in a disconcerting similarity to the policies of in practice had
old_style Russian
r9r8, he attempted (unsuccessfully) to subvert the whole diplomatic imperialism.3
process by speaking past Germany's official representatives to the But the Borsheviks' behaviour and policies
German people, particularþ the German soldiers on the Eastern
after the october
Revolution were nor formed i" u"*,iÃllnd
the factor of civil
Front. Recognition of the need for conventional diplomâcy \¡/as war is almost always crucial in "explaining
delayed by the Bolshevik leaders' deep belief in the early years ttrat broke out in the middle of r9rg, o"lv
th.*. 1-h" Civil lùZar
Russia's Revolution could not survive long without the support of
i.-ïonûrs after rhe formal
conclusion "
of the Brest-Litovsk peace b.*.;;
Russia and Germany
workers' revolutions in ttre more advanced capitalist countries of and Russia's definitive withdrawal
Europe. Only as the fact of revolutionary Russia's isolation gradu-
to_ tt. Brrropean war. It was
ally became clear did they begin to reassess ttreir position vis-à-vis
lolebt on many fronrs,_against a variety oiWtir. (that is, and_
Bolshevik) Armies, wh¡*
the outside world, and by that time the habit of combining revolu- lrad ,¡. ,"ppo.. of a number of foreign
powers including Russia,s former
Allies in the European war. The
tionary appeals with more conventional state-to-state contacts was Bolsheviks saw it as a class war, in ¡orr,
firmly entrenched. terms: Russian proletariat against
io-iarc and internadonar
Russian bourgeoisie; interna_
The territorial boundaries of the new Soviet Republic and policy tional revolution (as exemplified by
the Soviet Republic) against
towards non-Russian nationalities constituted another major prob- international capitalism. Red f"g.kh;k) victory in rgzo was
lem. Although for Marxists nationalism was a form of false con- ]he
therefore a proletarian triumph, butthe uittá.rr.r, of the snrrggle
sciousness, Lenin had cautiously endorsed a principle of national had indicated the strength and determin"aià,
self-determination before the war. The pragmatic sense ttrat nation- class.enemies' Arthough the interven,i."irt
of the proletariat,s
powers had
alism had to be accommodated if it were not to become a threat withdrawn, the Bolsheviks did not u.tierre
m"i""pi,"list
this withdrawal was
remained. The policy adopted in t923, when the form of the future permanent. They expected that
at a more opportune moment the
Soviet Union was decided, was to disarm nationalism by 'granting forces of international capitalism
worrl¿ .enirit, and seek to crush
the forms of nationhood': separate national republics, protection of the international workers, revolution
i,, ,olr."..
",
72 The Cioil lYar
The Civil lVar 73
The Civil Var undoubtedly had arì enormous impact on the was almost bound to be authoritarian,
and those who served as its
Bolsheviks and the young Soviet Republic. It polarized the sociery execut¿rnts were extremely likely to
develop the habits U"rri"g
leaving lasting resenünents and scars; and foreigrr intervention cre- and bullying ttrat l_enin often criticizea
ated a permanent Soviet fear of 'capitalist encirclement' which had In rhe
n tne y."r, "f igif
second place, rhe Bolshevik party o*.¿ "t..j" í;r:;
ir, success
elements of paranoia and xenophobia. The Civil rü(/ar devastated to the support of Russia,s workers, soldiers,
and sailors; and such
the economy, bringing industry almost to a standstill and empry- people were much less inclined than
the oldBotshevit intere.toars
ing ttre towns. This had politicat as well as economic and social to worry about crushing-opposition or imposing
implications, since it meant at least a temporary disintegration and
rh.i,
force rathèr than by tactfi.rl persuasion. ""dr;ltf;;
dispersal of the industrial proletariat-the class in whose name the Finallg in considering ttre link between the .war
civil and aurhor_
Bolsheviks had taken power. itarianrule, it must be remembered ttrat rhe¡e *",
It was in the context of civil war that the Bolsheviks had their *ã_*"v
relationship between the Bolsheviks and "
the political environment
first experience of ruling, and this undoubtedly shaped the party's of r9r8-zo' The civil war was nor an unforeåeable
act of God for-
subsequent development in many important respects.4 Over half a which the Bolsheviks were in no way responsible.
On the
million Communists served in the Red Army at some time during the Bolsheviks had associated themselve, "orro".
_itf, con_frontation
the Civil \ûar (and, of ttris group, roughly half joined the Red Army and violence in the months between February"r*.¿
and October r9r7;
before joining the Bolshevik Party). Of all members of the Bolshevik and, as the Bolshevik leaders_ knew perfectly
well before rhe evenr,
Party in 1927, 33 per cent had joined in the years r9r7-zo, while their October coup was seen by many as
an outright provocation to
only r per cent had joined before r9r7.5 Thus the underground civil war. The Civil War certainly gave rhe
new regime a baptism
life of the prerevolutionary party-the formative experience of the
9t lT, and thereby influenced its iutore dwelopment. But it was
'old guard' of Bolshevik leaders-was known to most party mem- the kind of baptism the Bolsheviks had
risked, and may even have
bers in the rgzos only tÏrough hearsay. For ttre cohort that had sought.T
joined the parry during the Civil War, the party was a fighting
brotherhood in the most literal sense. The Communists who had
served in the Red Army brought military jargon into ttre language
The Ciail War, Army, and the Cheþa
the Red
of party politics, and made the army tunic and boots-worn even In the immediate aftermarh of the Bolsheviks,
October coup, Cadet
by those who had stayed in civilian posts or been too young to newspapers issued a call to arms for
the salvation of tir. ..uo_
fight-almost a uniform for party members in ttre rgzos and early lution, General K¡asnov,s Joyalist troops unsuccessfully
engaged
r93os. pro-Bolshevik forces and Red Guards
in the battle of pulkovo
In the judgement of one historian, the Civil War experience Heights outside petrograd, and rhere *", t."rry
nghting in Moscow.
'militarized the revolutionary political culture of the Bolshevik In this preliminary round, the Bolsheviks were the victors. But
movement', leaving a heritage that included 'readiness to resort to almost certainly t}rey were going to have
ro fight again. In the
coercion, rule by administrative fiat (administriroaanie), centralized large Russian armies on the ,o,rtlr.ro
fronts of the war against
administration [and] suûrmary justice'.6 This view of the origins of Germany and Ausuia-Hungar5 the Solsie,.lks
we¡e much less
Soviet (and Stalinist) authoritarianism is in many ways more satis- popular than in trre north-west. Germany
remained at war witrr
factory than the traditional W'estern interpretation, which stressed
the party's prerevolutionary heritage and Lænin's advocacy of cen-
l".rt" and, despite the advantages to thá Germans of peace on
the Eastern Front, Russia,s new regime
could no more co'nt on
tralized party organization and strict discipline. Nevertheless, other German benevolence than it coulJ on ,y-p"*ry
from the allied
factors reinforcing the party's authoritarian tendencies must also powers. As the commander of German
forces on the Eastern Front
be taken into account. In the first place, a minority dictatorship wrote in his diary early in February r9rg,
on the eve of a renewed
 74 The Civil War
German ofensive after the breakdown of peace negotiarions at The Ciaíl lyar 75
offered in January. (But the
Brest-Litovsk, Bolsheviks were lucþ: Germany sub_
the European war'
No other way out is possible, ottrerwise these brutes
[the Bolsheviks] will
iü:itJrlît ""¿ "t " "s"tt I'ost its
".d.;
wipe up the Ukrainians, the Finns and the Balæ, and then quietly
get
The peace of Brest_Litovsk provided
together a new revolutionary army and turn the whole of Euråpe military tlueat. Officers of the only a brief respite from
pig-sry. . . The whole of Russia is no more rhan a vasr
intà- a old Rrrr¡"., Army were gattrering
forces in rhe sourh, in rhe
squalid, swarming mass.8
heap of mággots_a Cossack-;;r;o of the Don and the
Kuban, while Admiral Kolchak
government in Siberia-
*", .*"iìini"g an anti_Bolshevik
During the peace negotiations ar Bresr in January, Trotsþ had The British had landed úoops
two nofthern ports, Arkhangelsk at Russia,s
refused rhe rerms offered by the Germans and attemfted
,o"a.gy the Germans but in fact
*¿ ¡vf"rrn"rrsþ ostensibly to figtrt
of 'No war, no peace,, meaning that ttre Russians would
" neithãr
"lsã
opposition to the new Soviet
*¡tirì¡.1;;;r" of supporting local
continue the war nor sigrr a peace on r¡nacceptable terms. This regime.
was By a strange fluke of **, ,li.r.
pure bravado, since tåe Russian Army at the front were even non_Russian troops
was melting away, passing through Russian
while the German Army, despite Bolshevik appeals to workin!_ te*itory_¡¡. ör*r, I-egion, number_
ing about 3orooo men, which
class brotherhood, was not. The Germans cailed rrotsþ,s
bluffa¡id Front before the Eur,
** rtão-*'ro get to the sØestern
advanced, occupying large areas of Ukraine.
Lenin regarded it as imperative that a peace should be conclud.ed.
theircraim.;;r;ilïä;i;i:;oú;îääi:1îii,îffîîi
against their old Austrian
This was very rational, given the srate of Russia,s fighting forces masters. urr"¡lã ro cross rrre
and *.Russian side, the C".;;.-;;;;"å"rurg battlelines
the likelihood that ttre Bolsheviks wourd soon be fiehrinJa *T an improbable
civil war; ,onrney ea$ on the Trans_siberian
and, in addition, the Bolsheviks had repeatedly ,t"t.d before Railway, planning to reach
thé Vladivostok and rerurn .1p1rroP.
october Revolution that Russia should withd¡aw immediately by rhi;ä. Bolsheviks had
from tioned the trip, but this did sanc_
tl'e European imperialist war. lrowever, it wourd be rather misread- ,roì pr.,r.rra-iol""l ,orri.r, from
with hostility to the arrival .f reacdng
ing to see the Bolsheviks as a .peace party, in any meaningfirl
sense railway starions atonø,the..wly.
.;;;;;;iJã, foreigners at
by October. The Petrograd workers who had been readl, to r" &r"ilTisl the "._.a
Czechs had their
fight ûrst clash with a eoñh.rrit_¿tmirr"t.á
forthe Bolsheviks against Kerensþ in October had also Uå.r, ,.äy
Cheþbinsk. Other Czech *itr
,;;.'. * rhe Urals town of
to fight for Petrograd against the Germans. This bellþ..,r.
*ooå rrrpp*i.å n rrr* SRs in Samara
when thev rose uD aøainst.h.
was strongly reflected in the Bolshevik party in the eariy
months of votga Republic. .irrJcze.h,
B.rtl-;iJìo^ìrt"ul¡t a short-lived
r9r8, and was subsequently to be a great asset to the new regime
way out of Russia, and_it was
.;;;-;;;;;. .. tess fighting their
in ûghting rhe civil war. At ttre time of the Brest negotiati-ons, only after iany monts that they
were alt evacuared from Vl{rv.o¡.i
I-enin had the greatest difficulty in persuading even trre Bolshevik back to Europe.
Central Commitee of the need to sign a peace with Germany. .i.ãJåg"-st
The civil w'ar proper-Bolshevik ""d.h;;ed
Russian anti_
Bolshevik .rüfhites'_began
The Party's'left Communis¡s'-¿ group which included the yoÇ in the ,rr*ro.. oi r9rS. At ttrat time,
the Bolsheviks moved ttr-eir capital
Nikolai Bukharin, later ro earn a place in history as Stalin,s
last had escaped the threat of captur.
,;;";;.* since petrograd
major opponent in the leadership-advocated a revolutionary Uy ,t.^C.._ans only ro
war come
of guerrilla resisrance to the German invaders; and trre left SRs,
who were currently in alliance with the Bolsheviks, took ä::..i"åi j.rjg.army.,nde,C;.;";y,,ae.,icñ¡ìrìö
position. I-enin finally forced ttre decision through
a similar
the Borshevik
r,¡,.,.-är"¿.äîä:å1'rd;;i.ii",.,ii,i:îff ï,îî'Lilf;:l
and even much of the,Urals
Central Committee by threatening to resign, but it was
a hard_ sheviks
*d t;g;.;;n, where local Bol_
fought battle. The terms which the Germans imposed intermirentlv dominated **;;;,il
after their SØhite urban soviets), and
Armies threaiened *r^. Sorri.i-Ë.p,rtli.
successful offensive were considerabry harsher than those
they had north-wesr, and the sourh. Of t * rhe easr, rhe
ttre AltiJ p;;;;;, Britain and France
76 The Cioil lVar
were extremely hostile to the new regime in Russia and supported
The Ciail lyar 77
or'S'hites on a given front rarely
the $7hites, though their direct military involvement was on a fairly exceeded roo,ooo), while the
were in supply, t¡¿rnsport, or rest
small scale. Both the USA and Japan sent troops to Siberia-the administ¡ative work. To a considerable
exrenr, the Red Arml ha{ to
Japanese hoping for territorial gains, the Americans in a muddled
fill the gap Ieft by the breakdown
of civilian administration: i1 was .lt;
effort to restrain the Japanese, police the tans-Siberian Railway, ,å;-.r, and best-functioning
bureaucracy the Soviet regime
and perhaps support Kolchak's Siberian government if it measured o";;;å;
fi¡st claim on all availabt. Ãror.r...r.- the early years, with
up to American democratic standards. Although many Bolsheviks had
Although the Bolsheviks' situation seemed desperate indeed in an ideological preference for
militia-type units like-ttre Red Guards,
r9r9, when ttre territory firmly under their control was roughly that from úre first on regular
t¡r.êa ar*y was organized
of Muscovite Russia in r}le sixteenth century their opponents also tirr.r, _itt ir.'rolAl"rs subject to mil_
"r*y
itary discipline and the officers
had formidable problems. In the first place, tJre White Armies oper- not elected. Because
of the shortage of trained "ppoi.i.oãd
ated largely independently of each other, without central direction "úrird;;;i;;liåî"r,
insisted on using offcers from rotsþ and r_enin
or coordination. In the second place, the $Thites' control over their the old fr"¡1a Arm¡ although
policy was much criticized in this
territorial bases was even more tenuous than the Bolsheviks'. Where the gof.fr.,.ik p"rty, and the Military
opposition faction tried to g., r,
they set up regional governments, the administrative machinery had t *. successive party
to be created almost from scratch, and the results were extremely
congresses. By the end the Civil ".ì..J'".
\W.ar,
rhe Red Army h"d-;;;;
1f
5o,ooo former Tsarist officers,
unsatisfactory. Russia's transport and communications systems, most of áa* and ttre
great majority of its senior "o.rr"ripted;
historically highly centralized on Moscow and Petersburg, did not military commanders came from this
group. To ensr¡re that the old
facilitate \White operations around the periphery. The \ü7hite forces officers ,..rr"irr.¿ loyal, tåey were
paired with political commissars,
were harassed not only by the Reds but also the so-called .Green ,r..r"if- ðo*unists, who had
to countersign all orders and shared n,,l ,.rpo.rribility
Armies'-peasant and Cossack bands that gave allegiance to neittrer military commanders. with the
side but were most acrive in the oudying areas in which the'SThites In addition to its military forces, the
were based. The White Armies, well supplied with officers from the Soviet regime quickly cre_
ated a security force_the al_n"rri"r,
old Tsarist Army, had difficulty keeping up the numbers of recruits for Struggle against Counter_Revolutior,
¡ã"orAh*v Commission
and conscripts for them to command. tion, known as the Cheka. When
ìli.."r., and Specula_
The Bolsheviks' fighting force was the Red Army, organized l)ecember r9r7 its immediate
,fri, irrrãition was founded in
under the direction of Trotsþ, who became Commissar for $Øar task was to ol the outbreak
:f blaiw looting, and raiding liã"* "orrt
in the spring of r9r8. The Red Army had to be built up from the october seizure of power. "r stores ttrat folowed
the beginning, since the disintegrarion of the old Russian Army B;,;;;;;^assumed the broader
functions. of a security police,
had gone too far to be halted (the Bolsheviks announced its total dealing *iaf, *ai_..gime conspiracies
and keeping watch on
demobilization shortly after taking power). The nucleus of the Red qo"pj whose loyalty *, ,rrrp."r, including
bourgeois 'class enemies', offciars
Army, formed at the beginning of r9r8, consisted of Red Guards of the old regime and p¡ovisional
Government, and membe.rs_of
from the factories and pro-Bolshevik units from the old Army and the
the outbreak of the Civil SØar, ";;ril;;;ofitical parties. After
Fleet. This was expanded by voluntary recruimrent and, from the ,ir.'Ci.f." L.""*. an organ of
terror, dispensing summary justice
summer of r9r8, selective conscription. Workers and Communists incl"aing executions, making
mass arrests, and taking hostages
were the first to be drafted, and throughour rÌre Civil \Øar provided at randoä in areas that had
come under White conrrol¡1
a high proportion of the combat rroops. But by the end of the Civil were ,rrrp."r.ã of leaning towa¡ds
the VØhites. Accordino to Bolshevik
W'ar, the Red Army was a massive institution with an enlistrnent of European Russia ii rgrS
fic"r;;-;r,
-first rwenry provinces
of over five million, mainly peasanr conscripts. Only about a tenth and the half of r9r9, ar leasr
were shot without t i"l
of these were fighting üoops (the forces deployed by either Reds ljj:,.o.ïr""s Uv tfr.-Cheka, á¿ Sz,Àãä
78 The Ctuil War
The Civil lyar 79
The Bolsheviks' Red terror had its equivalent in the I7hite ter-
ror practised by the anti-Bolshevik forces in ttre areas under thei¡ I.9: h{
Bolshevik
acdve support from the urban working
party providinU class, with the
o.u*J"aø.ral nucleus. The \üThites
control, and the same kind of atrocities were attributed to each had acdve support from the "r,
ot¿ mia¿te
side by the other. Flowever, the Bolsheviks were forthright about of the Tsarist offcer corps serving as "iã,rpp.. classes, with part
their own use of terror (which implies not only summary justice the main organizing agent.
But it was surely the peasantry, constituting
but also random punishment, unrelated to individual guilt, whose the great majority of
the population, rhat tipped tn.l"Uoc..
purpose is ttre intimidation of a speciûc group or the population Both the Red Army and the SThite
as a whole); and they took pride in being tough-minded about Armies conscripted peas_
ants in the territories they controrte4 anã
violence, avoiding the mealy mouthed hlpocrisy of the bourgeoisie both had a substantial
desertion rate. As the Civil W* p.ogr.r..d,
and admitting that the rule of any class, including the proletariat, however, the \7hites,
difficulties with the peasant conscripts
involves coercion of other classes. Lenin and Trotsþ expressed became markedly grearer
than the Reds,. The peasants resented
contempt for socialists who could not understand the necessity of the Bolsheviks, policy of
grain requisitioning (see berow, pp.
terror. 'If we are not ready to shoot a saboteur and \lhite Guardist,
sz-¡), ï,rt the whites were no
different in this respect. The peasant, *Já'fr"O
what sort of revolution is that?' Lenin admonished his colleagues in no grear enthusiasm
for serving in anyone,s army, as
the experience of the Russian Army
the new government.lo n ryr7 had amply demonstated. Ilowever, the mass
\?hen the Bolsheviks looked for historical parallels for the activi- peasanrs in ryt7 had been desertions of
closely related to the land ,.i"*o
ties of the Cheka, they normally referred to the revolutionary terror redistribution by the villages. ffri, pro"o.ts tä
of 1794 in France. They did not see any parallel to the Tsarist by the end of rgrg (which gready
hrgely completed
secret police, though Western historians have often drawn one. Ttre
..¿"".JAe peasanrs, objection
to rirmy service), and the Bolsheviks
had approved it. The \ù7hites,
Cheka, in fact, operated much more openly and violently than the on tåe other hand, did nor approve
of UrrJåi"o..s and supported
old police: its style had more in common with the'class vengeance' the former landowners, claims.
of Baltic sailors dealing with their officers in t9r7, on the one hand,
Tlr", ;; ;; crucial issue of land,
the Bolsheviks were rhe lesser evil.ll
or Stolypin's armed pacifrcation of the countryside in 19o6-7, on
the other. The parallel with ttre Tsarist secret police became more
appropriate after the Civil \lar, when the Cheka was replaced by the lL/ar Communism
GPU (Chief Political Administration)-a move associated with ttre The Bolsheviks took ove¡ a war
economy in a state of near collapse,
abandonment of terror and the extension of legality-and the secu- and their firsr and overwhelming proUf.;**
rity organs became more routine, bureaucratic, and discreet in their to keep it running.12
methods of operation. In this longer perspective, there clearly were ]fús yas úre pragmatic conrexr of the economic poricies of the civil
!'ar that were larer labelled .lü(/ar Communirå,.
strong elements of continuity (though apparently not continuity of Srr, there was also
an ideological
personnel) between the Tsarist and Soviet secret police; and the
contexr. In the loog
abolish private prope¡ty and trre
r.r*, tt. Bolsheviks aimed to
clearer they became, the more evasive and hypocritical were Soviet
fr.. *"rL.t *d distribute products
according to need, and in the short a..*, *r.y might be e¡pected
discussions of the security function. to choose policies that wourd bring
these iâeats ctoser to fi¡rfilment.
The Red Army and the Cheka both made importanr contribu- The balance between pragmatism
tions to the Bolshevik victory in the Civil W'ar. However, it would and ideolory in SØa¡ Commu_
nism has long been a sub¡ect of d.t;;J"-irä
be inadequate to explain that victory simply in terms of military prout.¡¡ being that
policies like nationalization and
state ¿ist ¡u.rtro' can plausibly be
strength and terror, especially as no one has yet found a way of e4plained either as a pragmatic
response to the exigencies of war
measuring the balance of force between Reds and \ühites. Active as an ideorogical imperative or
of communism. It is a debate in which
support and passive accept¿rnce by the society must also be taken scholars on both sides can quote
the pronouncements of Lenin and
into account, and indeed tfiese factors were probably crucial. The other leading Bolsheviks, since the
Stlrfr..rit, tt emselves were nor
8o The Civil War
The Cioil War gr
sure of the answer. From a Bolshevik perspective of r9zt, when W'ar Some plants were abandoned by their
owners and managers; others
Communism was jettisoned in favour of the New Economic Policg were narionalized on the petition
of rheir workers, *t o-rr"i driveì
the pragmatic interpretation was clearly preferable: once W'ar Com- out t¡e old management, or even on the
munism had failed, the less said about its ideological underpinnings
petition of rn"rr;;.;;
who wanted protection against unruly
the better. But from an earlier Bolshevik perspective-for example, of r9r8, the government issued a d.cree
*ort.rr. In the s'mmer
nationalizing all large_
that of Bukharin and Preobrazhensþ in their classic ABC of Com- scale industry, and by-the autumn
of r9r9 it was estimated that
munism (rgrg)-the opposite was true. While \üØar Communism over 8o per cent of such enterprises
policies were in force, it was natural for Bolsheviks to give them
hadlfact U.en n"tiorrallzJ.
This far exceeded the organizaãonal capacities
of the new Supreme
an ideological justification-to asserr that the party, armed with the Economic council: in practice, if the
workers themserves could not
scientific ideology of Marxism, was in full control of events rather plants going by organizing trr. ,,rfpry
than simply struggling to keep up. \:.0.-ú.
disuibution of finished proárr"tr, tl. pt".rt'åften
of raw marerials and
The question lying behind the debate is how quickly the Bolshe- Yet, having gone so far, the golst ¡.ust closed down.
erriks i.it i*p.ll.¿ to go further.
viks thought they could move towards communism; and the answer In November r92o, the governm.r.a ,r"aiorr"fized
even small_scale
depends on whether we are talking about r9r8 or rg2o. The Bol- industry, at least on paper. In practice,
of course, the Bolsheviks
sheviks' first steps were cautious, and so were their pronouncements were hard put to name or identifz
their new acquisitions, let alone
about the future. Flowever, from the outbreak of the Civil W'ar in direct them. But in theory tlre
mid-r9r8 the Bolsheviks' earlier caurion began to disappear. To
it ole ,pt... of production
was
now in the hands of Soviet power, arrd
erren ardsarworkrt op.
cope wittr a desperate situation, they turned to more radical policies windmills were part of a centrally directed
economy. "oa
and, in the process, tried to extend the sphere of cenualized gov- A similar sequence led the gãlshevits towards
ernment control much further and faster than they had originally -
plete
an almosr com_
prohibirion on free uade and a virtually
intended. In r9zo, as the Bolsheviks headed towards victory in the moneyless economy
by the end of the civil $Øar- From ,rr.i-pt
ãå..ssors they inherited
Civil Var and disaster in the economy, a mood of euphoria and des- rationing in the towns (introduced in
rõrOj anA a srare monopoly
peration took hold. ¡üØith the old world disappearing in the flames of on grain which in theory required thé pá"r"ot,
Revolution and Civil W'ar, it seemed ro mâny Bolsheviks rhat a new whole surplus (introduced in the spring
to deliver their
world was about to arise, phoenix-like, from the ashes. This hope, Government). But the towns were still
it ,grZ by the provisional
perhaps, owed more to anarchist ideology than to Marxism, but
short of bread and other
foodstuffs because the peasants were
unwining to sen when trrere
it was nevertheless expressed in Marxist terms: with the triumph of were almosr no manufacrured goods
on tfie market to buy. St o.Jf
proletarian revolution, the transition to communism was imminent, after the October Revolution, tfre Solslrerriks-tried
possibly only weeks or months away. to increase grain
deliveries by offering the peasants
This sequence is clearly illustrated in one of the key areas of
*".r,rf".*..d goods instead of
money in exchange. They also nationalized
wholãsale o"¿.
economic policy, nationalization. As good Marxists, the Bolsheviks after rhe outbreak of the Civil S'ar, prohibireA "rrã,
free retail trade in
nationalized banking and credit very quickly after the October most basic foodstuffs and manufactured
products and tied to con_
Revolution. But they did not imrnediately embark upon whole- vert the consumer cooperatives into
a staìe distribution network.14
sale nationalization of industry: ttre fi¡st nationalization decrees These were emergency measures to
cope with the food crisis in
concerned only individual large concerns like the Putilov \üüorks and rhe pro?]:*: of Army ,"OOr, But
that were already closely involved with the state through defence P.. lo*y
Bolsheviks could-and did_justify ,fr.- i" iá.otogical
obviously the
production and government contracts. rerms.
As the food crisis in the towns worsened,
barter became a basic
A variety of circumstances, however, were to extend the scope form of exchange, and money lost its value.
of nationalization far beyond the Bolsheviks' original short-term By r9zo, wages and
salaries were being paid partly in
kind (foo¿anA goods), and rhere
intentions. I-ocal soviets expropriated plants on their own authority. was even an aftempt to construd
a budget on a commod.ity rather
8z The Ciztil War
than a money basis. IJrban services, in so far as they still functioned
in the decaying cities, no longer had to be paid for by the individual
user. Some Bolsheviks hailed this as an ideological triumph-the
'withering away of money' that indicated how close the society had
already come to communism. To less optimistic observers, however,
it looked like runaway inflation.
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, ideology and practical impera-
tives did not always converge so neatly. The divergences (together
with some Bolshevik uncertainties about what their ideology actu-
ally meant in concrete terms) were particularþ evident in policies
affecting the working class. In regard to wages, for example, the
Bolsheviks had egalitarian instincts rather than a strictly egali-
tarian policy in practice. In the interests of maximizing produc-
tion, tley tried to retain piecework in industry, though the work-
ers regarded this basis of pa]'rnent as essentially inegalitarian and
unfair. Shortages and rationing probably tended to reduce urban
inequalities during the Civil \Øar period, but this could scarcely
be counted as a Bolshevik achievement. In fact, the rationing sys-
tem under 'War Communism favoured certain categories of the
population, including Red Army personnel, skilled workers in key
industries, Communist administrators, and some groups of the
intelligentsia.
Factory organization was anodler touchy question. Were the
factories to be run by the workers themselves (as the Bolsheviks'
r917 endorsement of 'workers' control' seemed to suggest), or by
managers appointed by the state, following the directions of central
planning and coordinating agencies? The Bolsheviks favoured the
second, but the effective outcome during \7ar Communism was
a compromise, with considerable variation from place to place.
Some factories continued to be run by elected workers' committees.
Others were rr.rn by an appointed director, often a Communist but
sometimes the former manager, chief engineerr or even owner of
the plant. In yet other cases, a worker or group of workers from
the factory committee or local trade union was appointed to man-
age the plant, and this transitional arrangement-halfivay between
workers' control and appointed management-was often the most
successful.
In dealing with the peâsanûy, the Bolsheviks' flrst problem was
the practical one of getting food. State procurements of grain were
not improved either by outlawing private grain trading or by offering
The Ciz.¡il War 83
manufactured goods instead of money in payment: the state still
had too few goods ro offer, and the peasants remained unwilling
to deliver their produce. Given the urgent necessity of feeding the
towns and the Red Army, the state had little choice but to take
the peasants' produce by persuasion, cunning, threats, or force.
The Bolsheviks adopted a policy of grain requisitioning, sending
workers' and soldiers' brigades-usually armed, and if possible
provided witå some goods for barter-to ger rhe hoarded grain out
of the peasants'barns.l5 obviously tJris produced strained relations
between the Soviet regime and the peasanrry. But the rùThites did
the same thing, as had occupying armies throughout the ages. The
Bolsheviks' need to live off the land probably surprised themselves
more than it surprised the peasants.
But there were other aspecrs of Bolshevik policy that evidently
did surprise and alarm the peasantry. In the fi¡st place, they tried to
facilitate grain procurements by splitting the village into opposing
groups. Believing that the growth of rural capitalism had already
produced significant class differentiation among the peasants, the
Bolsheviks expected to receive instinctive support from the poor
and landless peasants and instinctive opposition from the richer
ones. They therefore began to organize village Committees of the
Poor, and encouraged them to cooperate with Soviet authorities
in exuacting grain from the barns of richer peasants. The attempt
proved a dismal failure, partly because of the normal village sol-
idarity against outsiders and partly because many formerly land.-
less and poor peas¿ats had improved their position as a result
of the land seizures and redistributions of r9r7_rg. Vorse still, it
demonstrated to the peasants tJ'at the Bolsheviks, understanding
of revolution in the countryside was quite different from thei¡
own.
For the Bolsheviks, still thinking in rerms of the old Marxist
debate with the Populists, the mir was a decaying institution, cor-
rupted by the Tsarist state and undermined by emergent rural cap-
italism, lacking any porential for socialist development. Moreover,
the Bolsheviks believed, the 'first revolution' in the countryside-
land seizures and egalitarian redistribution-was already being fol-
lowed by a 'second revolution', a class war of poor peasants against
rich peasants, which was destroying ttre unity of the village com-
munity and must ultimately break the authority of the mir.16 For
tlre peasants, on the other hand, ttre mir was perceived as a true
84 The Cittil lVar
peasant institution, historically abused and exploited by the state,
which had finally thrown off state auttrority and accomplished a
peasant revolution.
Though the Bolsheviks had let the peasants have their way in
t9r7-r8, their long-term plans for the countryside were quite as
disruptive as Stolypin's hadbeen. They disapproved of almost every
aspect of the traditional ru¡al order, from the mir and the strip
system of dividing the land to the patriarchal family (The ABC of
Communßm even looked forward to the time when peasant families
would give up tJle 'barbaric' and wasteful custom of eating supper
at home, and join their neighbours at a communal village dining
rooml7). They were meddlers in village affairs, like Stolypin; and
although they could not in principle share his enttrusiasm for a
small-farming petty bourgeoisie, they still had enough ingrained
dislike of peasant backwardness to continue ttre Stolypin policy
of consolidating ttre households' scattered strips into solid blocks
suitable for modern small farming.ls
But the Bolsheviks' real interest was large-scale agriculture, and
only ttre political imperative of winning over the peasanûy had led
them to condone the breaking up of large estates that took place
in r9r7-r8. On some of the remaining state lands, they set up
state farms (scukhozy)-tn effect, the socialist equivalent of large-
scale capitalist agriculture, with appointed managers supervising
the work of agricultural labourers who wo¡ked for wages. The Bol-
sheviks also believed that collective fatms (kolkhoey) were preferable
in political terms to traditional or individual small-holding peasant
farming; and some collective farms were established in the Civil
W'ar period, usually by demobilized soldiers or workers fleeing
hunger in the towns. The collective farms did not divide their land
into strips, tike the traditional peas¿¡nt village, but worked the land
and marketed produce collectively. Often, the earþ collective farm-
ers had an ideology similar to that of t}re founders of utopian agri-
cultural communities in the United States and elsewhere, pooling
almost all their resources and possessions; and, like the utopians,
they rarely made a success of farming or even survived long as
harmonious communities. The peasants regarded both state and
collective farms with suspicion. They were too few and weak to
constitute a serious challenge to traditional peasânt farming. But
their very existence reminded ttre peasants that the Bolsheviks had
süange ideas and were not to be trusted too far.
The Ciail W'ar 85
Visions of the new world
There was a wildly impractical and utopian streak in a great deal of
Bolshevik ttrinking during the civil'war.le No doubt all successful
revolutions have ttris characteristic: the revolutionaries must always
be d¡iven by enthusiasm and irrational hope, since they wojd
otherwise make the common-sense judgement that ttre risks and
costs of revolution outweigh the possible benefits. The Bolsheviks
thought they were immune from utopianism because ttreir social-
ism was scientific. But, whether or not they were right about ttre
inherently scientific nature of Marxism, even science needs human
interpreters, who make subjective judgements and have their own
emotional biases. The Bolsheviks were revolutionary enrhusiasts,
not laboratory assistants.
It was a subjective judgement that Russia was ready for prole_
tarian revolution in rgrz even though the Bolsheviks cited ¡vtarxist
social-science theory to support it. It was a maüer of faith rather
than scienrific prediction that world revolution was imminent (in
Marxist terms, after all, the Bolsheviks might have made a mis_
take and taken power too soon). The belief, underlying the later
economic policies of \üüar Communism, that Russia was on the
brink of the definitive transition to communism had scarcely any
justiûcation in Marxist tÌreory. The Bolsheviks, perceptio"
ãf *r.
real world had become almost comically distorted. in many respecrs
by t9zo. They sent the Red Army to advance on Wa¡saw b."",r.., to
many Bolsheviks, it seemed obvious ttrat ttre poles would recognize
the troops as proletarian brothers rather trran Russian Ãor..
At home, they confused rampant inflation and currenry "ggt
devalua_
tion with the withering away of money under communism. When
wa¡ and famine produced bands of homeless children during the
civil lü7ar, some Bolsheviks saw even ttris as a blessing in disguise,
since the state could give the children a true collectivist upbringing
(in_ orphanages) and they would nor be exposed to
úre Èoorgeois
influence of rhe old family.
The same spirit was noticeable in the Bolsheviks, early approach
to the tasks of government and administration. The utopian texrs
here were Man< and Engels's dictum that under communism the
state would wither away, and the passages in I_enin,s Smæ and
Reuohttion (r9r7) where he suggested that administration would
ultimately cease to be the business of full-time professionals and
86 The Ctuil War
The Civil War 87
would become a rotating duty of the whole citizenry. In prac- Avant-garde artists like trre poet vladimir
Mayakovsþ and the ttre-
tice, however, I-enin always kept a ha¡d-headed realism about atre director Vsevolod Meyerhold saw
revolutionary art and revolu_
government: he was not among ttrose Bolsheviks who, seeing tionarypolitics as part of trre same p.ot.rt
the old, b;;;g;;;
the old administrative machinery collapsing in the years rgrT-zo, world. They were among the first memberl "g"irrrt
of the irrt.tiig.rrtj; ìã
concluded ttrat the state was already withering away as Russia accept rhe october Revolution and offer
their services tJ trr. o.*
approached communism. government, producing p.opaganaa posters
But the Bolshevik authors of The ABC of Communism (r9r9), l"ü.1
Futurist styre, painting revolutionart Jot""r
in Cubist and
on the wats of former
Bukharin and Preobraztrensþ, got much more carried away. They palaces, staging mass reenactments
of revolutionary victories in the
had the kind of vision of a depersonalized, scientifically regulated streets, bringing acrobatics as well
as politically r.l.rr*, *.;;;;
world that the contemporary Russian writer Evgenii Zamyatin sat- into the conventional theatre, a.rigrrirrg non_representational
irized in We (wrinen in rgzo) and George Orwell later described monuments to revolutionary-heroes ""a of the past.
in Nineteen Eighty-four. This world was the antithesis of any actual
ff tf,.
artists had had their way, traditional bourgeois
a¡t would"v"nt_gard.
have been
Russia, past, present, or future; and in the chaos of the Civil War liquidated even more quickly than the
bãurgeois political parties.
that must have made it particularly appealing. In explaining how The Bolshevik leaders, however, *... ,oa quite
it would be possible to run a centrally planned economy after tlle convinced that
artistic Futurism and Bolshevism were
inseparabre natural allies,
withering away of the state, Bukharin and Preobrazhensþ wrote: and took a more cautious position on
tfie classics.
The ethos of revolutioniry riberation *"r--o..
The main direction will be entrusted to various kinds of book-keeping whoreheartedry
accepted by the Bolsheviks (or at least
offices or statistical bureaux. There, from day to day, account will be kept by the Botshevik irr.ll;;:
-.o.r..r.red.
of production and all its needs; there also it will be decided whither workers tuals) where women and the family *.r.
The Bolshe_
must be sent, whence they must be taken, and how much work there is viks supported the emancipation of *o*.rr,
as most members of
to be done. And inasmuch as, from childhood onwards, all will have been the Russian radical intelligentsia rraa ¿one
since rhe rg6os. Like
accustomed to social labour, and since all will understand that this work Friedrich Engels, who had written that in
the modern family the
is necessary and that life goes easier when ever¡hing is done according husband is the 'bourgeois, and the wife
the frotetarian,, rhey saw
to a pre-ananged plan and when the social order is like a well-ordered women as an exploited group. By the end
machine, all will work in accordance with the indications of the statistical of the Civil ,Oø"r, f"*,
had been enacted that made divorce easily
bureaux. There will be no need for special ministers of State, for police or attainable, removed the
formal stigma from iilegitimacy, permitteã
prisons, for laws and decrees-nothing of the sort. Just as in an orches- and mandated
equal rights and equal pay for women. "bortlorr,
tra all the performers watch ttre conductor's baton and act accordingly,
so here all will consult the statistical reports and will direct tleir work
While only the most radical Bolshevik thinkers
talked about
destroying the famil¡ there was a general
accordingly.2o ass,rmption thar women
and child¡en were potential victims of
oppression within the f""Ub;
This may have sinister overtones to us, thanks to Orwell's N¿ze- and that the family tended to inculcateiìurgeois
values. The Bol_
teen Eighty-four, but in contemporary rerms it was bold, revolu- shevik Party established special women,s
tionary thinking that was as excitingly modern (and remote from
d.f"rt rr.rrt, (zhenodely)
to organize and educate women, protect thlir
interestr, fr.-fp
mundane reality) as Futurist art. The Civil \Var was a time when them to play an independent role. young "rra
Communists had their
intellectual and cultural experimentation flourished, and an icon- own separate organizations_the Komsomol
oclastic attitude to the pasr was de rigueur among young radi-
for adolesceor,
young adults, the young pioneers (established "rrã
a few years later) for
cal intellectuals. Machines-including the'well-ordered machine' the ten to fourteen age group-which
encouraged their members to
of future society-fascinated artists and intellectuals. Sentiment, watch out for bourgeois tendencies at home
school, and
spirituality, human drama, and undue interest in individual psy- to re-educate parenrs and teachers who
looked"ìr¿
back", nostalgi."ilytry
chology lwere out of fashion, often denounced as 'petry-bourgeois'. the old days, disliked the Bolsheviks and tå
the revolution, or clung
88 The Cioil lVar
to 'religious superstitions'. If one slogan reported during the Civil
'W'ar,
'Down with the capitalist tyranny of parents!', was a bit on
ttre exuberant side for the older Bolsheviks, ttre spirit of youthful
rebellion was generally prized and respected in ttre party in the early
yeals.
Sexual liberation, however, was a young-Communist cause that
rather embarrassed the Bolshevik leadership. Because of the party's
position on abortion and divorce, it was widely assumed rhat ttre
Bolsheviks advocated'free love', meaning promiscuous sex. I-enin
certainly did noc his generation was against the philistine moraliry
of the bourgeoisie, but emphasized comradely relations between
ttre sexes and thought promiscuþ showed a frivolous nature. Even
Aleksandra Kollontai, the Bolshevik leader who wrote most about
sexual questions and was somettring of a feminist, was a believer
in love rattrer than the 'glass of water' theory of sex that was often
attributed to her.
But the glass of water approach was popular among young Com-
munists, especially the men who had learnt thei¡ ideology in the
Red Army and regarded casual sex almost as a Communist rite
of-passage. Their anitude reflected a general wartime and postwar
relaxation of morals even more marked in Russia than in other
European countries. The older Communists had to put up with
it-they assumed ttrat sex was a private matter and, after all, ttrey
were revolutionaries and not bourgeois philistines-as they had to
put up wittr Cubists, advocates of Esperanto, and the nudists who,
âs an act of ideological affirmation, occasionally leapt naked on to
crowded Moscow trams. But they felt that such ttrings detracted
from the high seriousness of the revolution.
The Bolsheoiks in power
Having taken power, the Bolsheviks had to learn to govern. Hardly
any of them had administrative experience: by previous occupa-
tion, most were professional revolutionaries, or workers, or free-
lance journalists (I-enin listed his own profession as 'man of letters'
fliæramrf). They despised bureaucracies and knew very litde about
how they worked. They knew nothing about budgets. As Anatolii
Lunacharsþ, head of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment,
wrote of his first finance officer:
The Civil War 8g
þis] face always bore a mark of deepest astonishment when he brought us
money from the bank. It still seemed to him that the Revolution and
the
organization of the new power were a sort of magical pla¡ and that
in a
magical play it is impossible ro receive real money.2r
During the civil war, most of the Bolsheviks' organizational
talents went into the Red Army, the Food Commissariat, and the
cheka. capable organizers from trre local party committees and
soviets were continually being mobilized for the Red Army or senr
on trouble-shooting missions elsewhere. The old centraL govern-
ment ministries (now People,s Commissariats) were run by a small
group of Bolsheviks, mainly intellectuals, and staffed largely by
offcials who had earlier worked for the Tsarist and provisional Gov-
ernmenrs. Authority at rhe cenrre was confusingty divided between
the government (Council of people,s Commissars), the soviets,
cenual Executive commiftee, and rhe Bolshevik party's central
commiftee, with its Secretariat and bureaux for organizational and
political affairs, the Orgburo and the politburo.
The Bolsheviks described their rule as a 'dicratorship of the
proletariat', a concept which in operational terms had much in
common with a dictatorship of trre Bolshevik party. It was clear
from the first ttrat this left little room for other political parties:
those that were not outlawed for supporting the whites or (in the
case of the left SRs) staging a revolt were harassed and intimidated
by arresrs during the civil war and forced into selÊliquidarion in
the early r9zos. But it was much less clear what the dictatorship
meânt in terms of the form of government. The Bolsheviks dià
not initially think of trreir own pany organization as a potential
instrument of government. They seem to have assumed that the
party organization would remain separate from government and
free of administrative functions, iust as it would have done if the
Bolsheviks had become the governing party in a muld_party politi_
cal system.
The Bolsheviks also described their rule as .soviet power,. Bur
this was never a very accurate description, in the first place because
the October Revolution was essentially a party coup) not a soviet
one, and in ttre second place because the new cent¡al government
(chosen by the Bolshevik Central Committee) had nothing
to do
with the soviets. The new goveürment took over contror of the