TOPIC: CERTIFICATION ELECTION

DOCTRINE:

Rule V. Sec. 3, Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code provides in

effect that if a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a
petition for certification election can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of said agreement.

TITLE:

UNITED ALUMINUM FABRICATORS v. FRANKLIN M. DRILON

GR No. 93016, Jul 03, 1992

FACTS:

United Aluminum Fabricators Workers' Union (UAFWU) is the exclusive

bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of the United
Aluminum Fabricators (United Aluminum). They entered into a CBA. The
said CBA is for a period of 3 years beginning April 1, 1986 to April 29,
1989. This agreement was registered with the DOLE.

Before the expiration of the CBA and considering that no petition for
certification election had been filed nor a similar petition was likely to be
filed within the remaining 26 days of the freedom period and no petition
questioning the majority status of UAFWU was filed with the DOLE within
the freedom period, United Aluminum and UAFWU renegotiated a new
CBA

United Aluminum and UAFWU executed a new CBA for 5 years in

accordance with R.A. 6715 to take effect upon the expiration of the old
CBA.

The 5 year CBA was filed, registered and recorded in the log book of the
docket section of the NCR office of the DOLE on the same date it was
executed.

69 days or more than two (2) months after the expiry date of the so-
called freedom period and after the conclusion and registration of the CBA
between United Aluminum and UAFWU, Kaisahan ng Manggagawanag
Pilipino (KAMPIL) filed a petition for direct certification/certification
election with the DOLE.

It alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the

DOLE; that there are more or less 170 regular rank-and-file employees in
the company and that to its knowledge there is no existing union and
more than 25% of the workers have joined or are directly affiliated with
it.

Accordingly, United Aluminum filed a motion to dismiss KAMPIL's petition

for certification election on the grounds that it has an existing and duly
registered CBA with UAFWU which is a bar to any petition for certification
election and that said petition is not supported by the employees
bargaining unit.

UAFWU having learned of the pendency of the above petition filed by

KAMPIL, immediately filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging that it
has an interest in the outcome of the case so that any order, ruling
decision or resolution that may be issued or promulgated in the case will
inevitably affect the movant union and its members who constitute the
majority of the workers within the appropriate collective bargaining unity
of the rank-and-file workers; and that any encroachment or pendency of
case/s similar to the case will hamper, impair or affect the smooth
implementation of the existing CBA.

In August, 1989, the Med-Arbiter issued an order dismissing the petition

for direct certification/certification election.

KAMPIL appealed from the order of Med-Arbiter.

In November 1989, the then Sec. of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, rendered a

decision setting-aside the Order of the Med-Arbiter and ordering a
certification election to be conducted among the rank-and-file workers of
the United Aluminum Fabricators with the option of choosing:

'1. KAMPIL
'2. UAFWU; and
'3. NO UNION.'

The company's payroll 3 months prior to the filing of the petition is the
basis of the list of eligible voters.

UAFWU filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid

decision as well as a supplement to motion for reconsideration. United
Aluminum also filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplement for
reconsideration

In February, 1990, Sec. Ruben D. Torres, the new Sec. of Labor, issued
an order denying the motions for reconsideration and the Decision sought
to be reconsidered sustained. Thereby the conduct of the certification
election must proceed immediately.
Again, United Aluminum's and UAFWU's second motions for
reconsideration filed separately, were again denied by Sec. Torres. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion in ordering the conduct of a certification election
notwithstanding the existence of a valid CBA?

RULING:

In the ruling of this case, the Supreme Court said that KAMPIL's petition
for certification election was filed 69 days after the expiration of the
Freedom Period.
The rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during
the existence of a CBA except within the freedom period of sixty (60)
days. In the case at bar, while the sixty (60) day freedom period was in
operation, there was no other labor organization questioning nor
challenging the majority status of herein UAFWU so much so that it had
no impediment under the law to enter into a new CBA with the United
Aluminum with a life span of five (5) years in accordance with law (R.A.
6715).
The CBA with all the requirements attached to it were submitted and
registered with the DOLE for record purposes. The submission and
registration were attested to and certified to by the Chief of the
Industrial Relations Division and the Record Officer. The required
document was also written and reflected in the log book of the docket
section for the April 3, 1989 period.
Undoubtedly, therefore, when KAMPIL filed a petition for certification
election, there was a valid and existing CBA between UAFWU and
United Aluminum effective until 1994, which constituted a bar to the
holding of the certification election in question.
Furthermore, the records show that KAMPIL's petition was not
supported by the written consent of at least 20% of the rank-and-file
employees of the company, to make it mandatory for the Bureau to order
a certification election (Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180
SCRA 749; 1989). In fact failure to determine with legal certainty
whether the union enjoyed majority representation may be ground to
nullify the certification election (Associated Labor Union [ALU] v.
Ferrer-Calleja, 173 SCRA 178; 1989).
Under the circumstances, it is evident that public respondent gravely
abused his discretion in setting aside the Orders of Med-Arbiter and
ordering the conduct of certification election among the rank-and-file
employees notwithstanding the existence of a duly ratified and collective
bargaining agreement between the petitioners UAF and UAFWU.