Annurev Energy 32 041006 101434

ANRV325-EG32-08 ARI 14 September 2007 20:9
Shared Waters: Conflict

and Cooperation
Aaron T. Wolf
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University, Corvallis,
Oregon 97331-5506; email: wolfa@geo.oregonstate.edu
“Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of

conflict and wars in the future.”
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2007.32:241-269. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Kofi Annan, March 2001
“But the water problems of our world need not be only a cause of
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tension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation . . . If we work

together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours.”
Kofi Annan, February 2002
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2007. 32:241–69 Key Words

First published online as a Review in Advance on hydropolitics, transboundary water resources, water conflict, water
July 31, 2007
management, water resources development
The Annual Review of Environment and Resources
is online at http://environ.annualreviews.org Abstract
This article’s doi: This review examines the state of conflict and cooperation over trans-
10.1146/annurev.energy.32.041006.101434
boundary water resources from an environmental, political, and hu-
Copyright c 2007 by Annual Reviews. man development perspective. Although the potential for outright
All rights reserved
war between countries over water is low, cooperation is often missing
1543-5938/07/1121-0241$20.00 in disputes over transboundary resources. This background chapter
will
Provide a brief overview of the nature of conflict and experi-
ences of cooperation over transboundary resources.
Provide a conceptual basis for understanding cooperation and
the costs of noncooperation over water.
Indicate the possible triggers for conflict over water sharing
and the implications on the livelihoods of ordinary commu-
nities.
Offer evidence on the potential costs of noncooperation or
even conflict over water resources.
Analyze power asymmetries between riparian states and how
they affect the outcomes of negotiations.
Analyze different examples of cases that countries have used
to manage the competition for water resources.
Propose general principles and conclusions on conflict and
cooperation.
241
Contents
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE Indicators of Hydropolitical
NATURE OF CONFLICT Resilience and Vulnerability . . . . 252
AND EXPERIENCES OF Intranational Impacts of
COOPERATION OVER International Tensions . . . . . . . . . 253
TRANSBOUNDARY Regional Instability: Political
RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Dynamics of Loss of Irrigation
Water Conflict and Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 WATER AND INSTITUTIONS . . . 255
POLITICAL TENSIONS AND Institutional Development:
COSTS OF Contributions from the

NONCOOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . 247 International Community . . . . . . 255
Tensions and Time Lags: Causes Conventions, Declarations, and
for Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 Organizational Developments . . 256

Overcoming the Costs of Legal Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Noncooperation: From Institutional Lessons for the
Rights to Needs to International Community . . . . . . 259
Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 WATER CONFLICT AND
From Rights and Needs to COOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Interests: Baskets of GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
VULNERABILITY, RESILIENCE, Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
AND THE IMPACTS Why Might the Future Look
OF TENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Nothing Like the Past? . . . . . . . . 262
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE that contributes to the world’s 263 trans-

NATURE OF CONFLICT boundary waterways.
AND EXPERIENCES OF Both water quantity and water quality have
COOPERATION OVER been neglected to the point of catastrophe (2).
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES More than a billion people lack access
As human populations and economies grow, to safe water supplies.
the amount of freshwater in the world remains Almost three billion people do not have
roughly the same as it has been throughout access to adequate sanitation.
history. The total quantity of water in the Five to ten million people die each year
world is immense, but most is either saltwa- from water-related diseases or inade-
ter (97.5%) or locked in ice caps (1.75%). quate sanitation.
The amount economically available for hu- Twenty percent of the world’s irrigated
man use is only 0.007% of the total, or about lands are salt laden, affecting crop pro-
13,500 km3 , which is about 2300 m3 per duction.
person—a 37% drop since 1970 (1). This in- The pressures on water resources develop-
creasing scarcity is made more complex be- ment leads to intense political pressures, of-
cause almost half the globe’s land surface ten referred to as water stress, a term coined by
lies within international watersheds—the land Falkenmark (3), or water poverty as suggested
242 Wolf
by Feitelson & Chenoweth (4). Furthermore, that water scarcity can and will lead directly
water ignores political boundaries, evades in- to warfare between nations; this lends itself to
stitutional classification, and eludes legal gen- diversion of a potentially huge amount of re-
eralizations. Water demands are increasing, sources in attempts to arrest these processes
groundwater levels are dropping, surface- at the highest levels. If the processes are actu-
water supplies are increasingly contaminated, ally both more subtle and more local in nature
and delivery and treatment infrastructure is (as suggested by, among others References 8,
aging (5). Collectively, these issues provide 24–27), then so too are the potential solutions.
compelling arguments for considering the se- Throughout this review, we will note that
curity implications of water resources man- shared water does lead to tensions, threats,
agement (6–8). and even to some localized violence—and we
A huge and growing literature speaks to the will offer strategies for preventing and miti-
human and ecological disasters attendant on gating these tensions—but not to war. More-
the global water crisis—essentially an ongo- over, these tense “flashpoints” generally in-
ing deployment of a hydrological weapon of duce the parties to enter negotiations, often
mass destruction [see especially the works of resulting in dialogue and, occasionally, to es-
Gleick, e.g., his biennial World’s Water Series pecially creative and resilient working arrang-
(9–13); Postel (5, 14); the UN Environmental ments. We note also that shared water pro-
Program (15–18); the UN Educational, Sci- vides compelling inducements to dialogue and
entific and Cultural Organization, which has cooperation, even while hostilities rage over
produced dozens of papers under the auspices other issues.
of its PCCP Program (http://www.unesco. But let’s look at the evolution of the “water
org/water/wwap/pccp/); and others]. leads to war” thesis. Although the extreme wa-
In conjunction with this crisis, though, ter wars literature mostly began to fade in the
come the political stresses that result as the late 1990s, a number of articles dating back
people who have built their lives and liveli- decades argue quite persuasively for some
hoods on a reliable source of freshwater are degree of causality between environmental
seeing the shortage of this vital resource im- stress—reaching up against relative resource
pinge on all aspects of the tenuous rela- limits—and political decision making. One
tions that have developed over the years— cannot discuss water institutions, for example,
between nations, between economic sectors, without invoking Wittfogel (28) and his clas-
and between individuals and their environ- sic argument that the drive to manage water in
ment. This review speaks to how people have, semiarid environments led both to the dawn
and have not, dealt with hydropolitics and of institutional civilization—described by
their impacts. Delli Priscoli (29) as the “training ground for
civilization”—and to particularly autocratic,
despotic forms of government. This latter
Water Conflict and Cooperation argument, and the generally enthusiastic
It is quite clear that people affect their envi- reception he received, needs to be under-
ronment, but to what extent is the opposite stood in the Cold War setting from which it
true? Just how deep is the causal relationship sprang and was quite effectively challenged
between environmental stresses and the struc- by Toynbee (30), among others. Toynbee’s
ture of human politics? This relationship is vehemence in his review (he calls Wittfogel’s
at the heart of understanding the processes of book a “menace”) is particularly interesting
environmental conflict prevention and resolu- because many of Wittfogel’s theories can
tion. If, as the large and growing “water wars” be seen as extensions of a sort of Toynbee’s
literature would have it (see, for example, 19– “challenge-response” thesis (31) in which he
23), the greatest threat for water conflicts is argues that the impetus toward civilization
www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 243

becomes stronger with greater environmental other scarce, consumable resources, is used
stress. Toynbee’s objections are primarily with to fuel all facets of society, from biologies to
Wittfogel’s “tribalistic” lens to history, aimed, economies to aesthetics and religious practice.
Environmental
security: the as Toynbee charges, at demonizing the Soviet As such, there is no such thing as managing
securitization or Union. Wittfogel (28) in turn, distinguishing water for a single purpose—all water manage-
conflict potential of himself from Toynbee, writes of his own posi- ment is multiobjective and is therefore, by def-
environmental issues tion, “causality yes, determinism no” (p. 504). inition, based on conflicting interests. Within
However, the premise that there is a critical a nation, these interests include domestic use,
link between how society manages water agriculture, hydropower generation, recre-
and its social structure and political culture ation, and environment—any two of which are
remains as an important and valid insight. regularly at odds—and the chances of find-
This thread of causality between the envi- ing mutually acceptable solutions drop pre-
ronment and politics has been taken up reg- cipitously as more actors are involved.
ularly over the years. When Sprout & Sprout As described conceptually and with case
(32) describe the environmental factors inher- studies by Trolldalen (38), these conflicting
ent in international politics, it becomes the interests within a nation represent both a
direct intellectual precursor to today’s blos- microcosm of the international setting and
soming “environmental security” literature, as a direct influence upon it. Trolldalen’s work
spearheaded by Homer-Dixon (33). Homer- is particularly useful in that he sidesteps the
Dixon, like Wittfogel, was initially greeted common trap of treating nations as homo-
enthusiastically by the defense establishment, geneous, rational entities and explicitly links
this time in the setting of the post–Cold internal with external interests. Bangladesh
War redefinition of relevance, and, again like is not just the national government of
Wittfogel, has been taken to task for the de- Bangladesh when it negotiates a treaty with
gree of causality in his arguments. (A summary India over Ganges flow; it is its coastal pop-
of Homer-Dixon’s findings, along with a de- ulation, inundated with saltwater intrusion;
bate on the topic is presented in Reference 34.) its farmers dealing with decreasing quantities
In his defense, Homer-Dixon’s arguments, of water and increasing fluctuations; and its
along with those of much of the water wars fishermen competing for dwindling stocks.
crowd, have become more muted over the last This link between the internal and exter-
few years: In 1994, he wrote, “The renewable nal is critical when we look at violent interna-
resource most likely to stimulate interstate tional conflicts (39). Gleick (6) is widely cited
resource war is river water” (35), which he re- as providing what appears to be a history re-
peats in his 1996 article (36). He modifies the plete with violence over water resources. But a
claim, elaborated in his 1999 book (37), “In re- close read of his article reveals greater subtlety
ality, wars over river water between upstream and depth to the argument. Wolf (40) points
and downstream neighbors are likely only in a out that what Gleick and others have actually
narrow set of circumstances . . . [and]. . . there provided is a history rife with tensions, ex-
are, in fact very few river basins around the acerbated relations, and conflicting interests
world where all these conditions hold now or over water, but not State level violence, at least
might hold in the future.” not between nations or over water as a scarce
In water systems, the dichotomy of causal- resource. It is worth noting Gleick’s careful
ity is manifested as whether water stress lends categorization because the violence he de-
itself more readily to conflict or cooperation. scribes actually turns out to be water as a tool,
Both arguments are powerful and have been target, or victim of warfare—not the cause.
supported by a rich, if mostly anecdotal, his- Wolf (40) contrasts the results of a system-
tory. Postel (5) describes the roots of the prob- atic search for interstate violence—one true
lem at the subnational level. Water, unlike water war in history, 4500 years ago—with the
244 Wolf
much richer record of explicit, legal coopera- tem of surface and underground waters con-
tion with 3600 water-related treaties. In fact, stituting by virtue of their physical relation-
a scan of the most vociferous enmities around ship a unitary whole and flowing into a com-
International
the world reveals that almost all the sets of mon terminus.” An international watercourse is watercourse: a
nations with the greatest degree of animos- a watercourse with parts situated in different watercourse, parts of
ity between them, whether Arabs and Israelis, States (nations). which are situated in
Indians and Pakistanis, or Azeris and Armeni- Surface and groundwater that cross in- different States
(nations)
ans, either have a water-related agreement in ternational boundaries present increased
place or are in the process of negotiating one. challenges to regional stability because hy- Watercourse: a
system of surface and
Although wars over water have not oc- drologic needs can often be overwhelmed by
underground waters
curred, there is ample evidence showing that political considerations. Although the poten- constituting by
water issues have led to intense political in- tial for paralyzing disputes is especially high virtue of their
stability and that acute violence has occasion- in these basins, history shows that water can physical relationship
ally been the result. Conflicts over shared wa- catalyze dialogue and cooperation, even be- a unitary whole and
flowing into a
ter resources occur at multiple scales, from tween especially contentious riparians. There
common terminus
sets of individual irrigators, to urban versus are 263 rivers around the world that cross
rural uses, to nations that straddle interna- the boundaries of two or more nations and
tional waterways. Transboundary waters share an untold number of international groundwa-
certain characteristics that make their man- ter aquifers. The basin areas that contribute
agement especially complicated, notably that to these rivers (Figure 1) comprise approxi-
these basins require a more complete appre- mately 47% of the land surface of the earth, in-
ciation of the political, cultural, and social as- clude 40% of the world’s population, and con-
pects of water and that the tendency is for tribute almost 60% of freshwater flow (42).
regional politics to regularly exacerbate the al- Within each international basin, demands
ready difficult task of understanding and man- from environmental, domestic, and economic
aging complex natural systems. Within this users increase annually, while the amount of
framework, water resources leads to intense freshwater in the world remains roughly the
political pressures, while threatening the pro- same as it has been throughout history. Given
cesses of sustainable development and envi- the scope of the problems and the resources
ronmental protection. available to address them, avoiding water con-
The Register of International Rivers of the flict is vital. Conflict is expensive, disruptive,
world (41) defines a river basin as the area that and interferes with efforts to relieve human
contributes hydrologically (including both suffering, reduce environmental degradation,
surface- and groundwater) to a first order and achieve economic growth. Developing
stream, which, in turn, is defined by its outlet the capacity to monitor, predict, and preempt
to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or transboundary water conflicts, particularly in
inland sea. Thus, river basin is synonymous developing countries, is key to promoting hu-
with what is referred to in the United States man and environmental security in interna-
as a watershed and in the United Kingdom as a tional river basins, regardless of the scale at
catchment, and includes lakes and shallow, un- which they occur.
confined groundwater units (confined or fossil A closer look at the world’s international
groundwater is not included). We define such basins gives a greater sense of the magnitude
a basin as international if any perennial tribu- of the issues: First, the problem is growing.
tary crosses the political boundaries of two or There were 214 international basins listed in
more nations. a 1978 United Nations study (41), the last time
Similarly, the 1997 UN Convention any official body attempted to delineate them,
on Non-Navigational Uses of International and there are 263 today (42). The growth is
Watercourses defines a watercourse as “a sys- largely the result of the internationalization

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ARI
246
Wolf
14 September 2007
20:9
International river basin
0 1,500 3,000 4,500

km
Figure 1
International basins of the world.
of national basins through political changes, eral scholars underscore that current interna-
such as the break up of the Soviet Union and tional law does not adequately define ground-
the Balkan states, as well as access to today’s water, much less the spatial flow of ground-
better mapping sources and technology. water (43–46).
Even more striking than the total number Disparities between riparian nations—
of basins is a breakdown of each nation’s land whether in economic development, infras-
surface that falls within these watersheds. A tructural capacity, or political orientation—
total of 145 nations include territory within add further complications to water resources
international basins. Twenty-one nations lie development, institutions, and management.
in their entirety within international basins, As a consequence, development, treaties, and
and a total of 33 countries have greater than institutions are regularly seen as, at best, inef-
95% of their territory within these basins. ficient, often ineffective, and, occasionally, as
These nations are not limited to smaller coun- a new source of tensions themselves.
tries, such as Liechtenstein and Andorra, but There is room for optimism, though, no-
include such sizable countries as Hungary, tably in the global community’s record of
Bangladesh, Belarus, and Zambia (42). resolving water-related disputes along inter-
A final way to visualize the dilemmas national waterways. For example, the record
posed by international water resources is to of acute conflict over international water re-
look at the number of countries that share sources is overwhelmed by the record of
each international basin. Nineteen basins are cooperation. Despite the tensions inherent
shared by five or more riparian countries: one in the international setting, riparians have
basin—the Danube—has 17 riparian nations; shown tremendous creativity in approaching
five basins—the Congo, Niger, Nile, Rhine, regional development, often through preven-
and Zambezi—are shared by between 9 and tive diplomacy, and the creation of “baskets
11 countries; and the remaining 13 basins— of benefits,” which allow for positive-sum, in-
the Amazon, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, tegrative allocations of joint gains. Moreover,
Lake Chad, Tarim, Aral Sea, Jordan, Kura- the most vehement enemies around the world
Araks, Mekong, Tigris-Euphrates, Volga, either have negotiated water sharing agree-
La Plata, Neman, and Vistula (Wista)—have ments, or are in the process of doing so as
between 5 and 8 riparian countries (42). of this writing, and once cooperative water
Although lakes and shallow, unconfined regimes are established through treaty, they
groundwater are included in these basins, the turn out to be impressively resilient over time,
important hydrologic link between ground- even between otherwise hostile riparians and
water and surface water is recognized but un- even as conflict is waged over other issues.
derstood only at a reconnaissance level even Violence over water does not seem strategi-
in the most studied basins in the world. The cally rational, hydrographically effective, or
effects of groundwater use may be contained economically viable. Shared interests along a
within national boundaries; however, the wa- waterway seem to consistently outweigh wa-
ter laws of few states or provinces address ter’s conflict-inducing characteristics.
groundwater management owing to the in-
visible nature of the resource or the technical
challenges in predicting spatial and tempo- POLITICAL TENSIONS AND
ral changes in the groundwater system with COSTS OF NONCOOPERATION
increased use. Part of the problem is asso- So if there is little violence between nations
ciated with recognizing the different types over their shared waters, what is the problem?
of aquifers; sand and gravel transmit and Is water actually a security concern at all? In
store groundwater differently than ground- fact, there are a number of issues where water
water stored in fractured rocks or in karst. Sev- causes or exacerbates tensions, and it is worth

understanding these processes to know both the ecosystems of the lower Nile, the lower
how complications arise and how they are Jordan, or the tributaries of the Aral Sea; they
eventually resolved. Noncooperation costs re- have effectively been written off to the va-
GAP: Turkish
acronym for sult primarily in inefficient water manage- garies of human intractability. During such
Southeast Anatolia ment, leading to decreasing water quantity, periods of low-level tensions, threats and dis-
Project quality, and environmental health. But polit- putes rage across boundaries with relations as
ical tensions can also be impacted, leading to diverse as those between Indians and Pakista-
years or even decades of efficient, cooperative nis and between Americans and Canadians.
futures lost. (See also the section on Regional Water was the last and most contentious is-
Instability in this review for related impacts.) sue resolved in negotiations over a 1994 peace
treaty between Israel and Jordan and was rel-
egated to “final status” negotiations—along

Tensions and Time Lags: Causes with other of the most difficult issues such as
for Concern Jerusalem and refugees—between Israel and
The first complicating factor is the time lag the Palestinians (52, 53).
between when nations first start to impinge on The timing of water flow is also impor-
each other’s water planning and when agree- tant; thus, the operation of dams is also con-
ments are finally, arduously reached. A gen- tested. For example, upstream users might
eral pattern has emerged for international release water from reservoirs in the winter
basins over time. Riparians of an international for hydropower production, whereas down-
basin implement water development projects stream users might need it for irrigation in
unilaterally—first on water within their own the summer. In addition, water quantity and
territory, in attempts to avoid the political water flow patterns are crucial to maintain-
intricacies of the shared resource. At some ing freshwater ecosystems that depend on sea-
point, one of the riparians, generally the re- sonal flooding. Freshwater ecosystems per-
gional power, will implement a project that form a variety of ecological and economical
impacts at least one of its neighbors. This functions and often play an important role in
might be to continue to meet existing uses in sustaining livelihoods, especially in develop-
the face of decreasing relative water availabil- ing countries. As awareness of environmental
ity [as, for example, Egypt’s plans for a high issues and the economic value of ecosystems
dam on the Nile (47, 48) or Indian diversions increases, claims for the environment’s water
of the Ganges to protect the port of Calcutta requirements are growing. For example, in the
(49, 50)] or to meet new needs reflecting Okavango basin, Botswana’s claims for water
new agricultural policy, such as Turkey’s GAP to sustain the Okavango Delta and its lucra-
(Turkish acronym for Southeast Anatolia tive ecotourism industry have contributed to a
Project) project on the Euphrates and Tigris dispute with upstream Namibia, which wants
(51). In the absence of relations or institutions to use the water passing through the Caprivi
conducive to conflict resolution, the project Strip on its way to the delta for irrigation
can become a flashpoint, heightening tensions (54, 55).
and regional instability, and requiring years or, Water quality problems include excessive
more commonly, decades to resolve—the In- levels of salt, nutrients, or suspended solids.
dus treaty took 10 years of negotiations, the Salt intrusion can be caused by groundwater
Ganges 30, and the Jordan 40—and, all the overuse or insufficient freshwater flows into
while, water quality and quantity degrades to estuaries. For example, dams in the South
where the health of dependent populations African part of the Incomati River basin re-
and ecosystems are damaged or destroyed. duced freshwater flows into the Incomati es-
This problem gets worse as the dispute tuary in Mozambique and led to increased
gains in intensity; one rarely hears talk about salt levels (56). This altered the estuary’s
248 Wolf
ecosystem and led to the disappearance of because of entrenched and contradictory

salt-intolerant flora and fauna important for opening positions. Generally, parties base
people’s livelihoods (the links between loss of their initial positions in terms of rights—the
livelihoods and the threat of conflict are de- sense that a riparian is entitled to a certain al-
scribed below). location based on hydrography or chronology
Excessive amounts of nutrients or sus- of use. Upstream riparians often invoke some
pended solids can result from unsustainable variation of the Harmon Doctrine, claiming
agricultural practices, eventually leading to that water rights originate where the water
erosion. Nutrients and suspended solids pose falls. India claimed absolute sovereignty in
a threat to freshwater ecosystems and their use the early phases of negotiations over the
by downstream riparians, as they can cause eu- Indus Waters Treaty, as did France in the Lac
trophication and siltation, respectively, which, Lanoux case, and Palestine over the West
in turn, can lead to loss of fishing grounds or Bank aquifer. Downstream riparians often
arable land. Suspended solids can also cause claim absolute river integrity, claiming rights
the siltation of reservoirs and harbors; for ex- to an undisturbed system or, if on an exotic
ample, Rotterdam’s harbor had to be dredged stream, historic rights on the basis of their
frequently to remove contaminated sludge de- history of use. Spain insisted on absolute
posited by the Rhine River. The cost was enor- sovereignty regarding the Lac Lanoux project
mous and consequently led to conflict over (58), whereas Egypt claimed historic rights
compensation and responsibility among the against first Sudan, and later Ethiopia, on the
river’s users. Although negotiations led to a Nile (59).
peaceful solution in this case, without such In almost all of the disputes that have
a framework for dispute resolution, siltation been resolved, however, particularly on arid
problems can lead to upstream/downstream or exotic streams, the paradigms used for
disputes such as those in the Lempa River negotiations have not been rights based at
basin in Central America (57). all—neither on relative hydrography nor
specifically on chronology of use, but rather
needs based. Needs are defined by irrigable
Overcoming the Costs of land, population, or the requirements of a
Noncooperation: From Rights specific project. (See Table 1 for examples of
to Needs to Interests needs-based criteria.) In agreements between
Most of the international negotiations sur- Egypt and Sudan signed in 1929 and in 1959,
veyed are hamstrung for so long primarily for example, allocations were arrived at on
Table 1 Examples of needs-based criteria

Treaty Criteria for allocations
Egypt/Sudan (1929, 1959, Nile) Acquired rights from existing uses, plus even division of
any additional water resulting from development projects
Johnston Accord (1956, Jordan) Amount of irrigable land within the watershed in each
country
India/Pakistan (1960, Indus) Historic and planned use (for Pakistan) plus geographic
allocations (western versus eastern rivers)
South Africa (southwest Allocations for human and animal needs as well as initial
Africa)/Portugal (Angola) (1969, irrigation
Kunene)
Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement Population patterns and irrigation needs
(1995, shared aquifers)

the basis of local needs, primarily those of estimates of needs are still disputed and
agriculture. Egypt argued for a greater share changing, particularly in these latter two
of the Nile because of its larger population examples) (63).
and extensive irrigation works. In 1959, Sudan From the global experience in determining
and Egypt then divided future water from needs, it is not apparent that any criterion is
development equally between the two. Cur- necessarily more effective than any other—a
rent allocations of 55.5 billion cubic meters measure that is determined in dialog between
(BCM)/year for Egypt and 18.5 BCM/year riparians by definition generates more buy
for Sudan reflect these relative needs (59). in than one imposed from outside (although
Likewise along the Jordan River, the only neutral third parties have often provided the
water agreement for that basin ever negoti- technology to help quantify needs). Moreover,
ated (although not ratified) until very recently, once the needs-based allocations are deter-
the Johnston Accord, emphasized the needs mined, not only is it not generally required
rather than the inherent rights of each of the that water actually be applied to those needs,
riparians. Johnston’s approach, on the basis but specific allocations are generally not re-
of a report performed under the direction of adjusted, despite the fact that needs change
the Tennessee Valley Authority, was to esti- drastically over time. For example, the
mate, without regard to political boundaries, Johnston Accord determined allocations on
the water needs for all irrigable land within the basis of potential gravity-fed irrigated
the Jordan Valley basin that could be irrigated agriculture within the Jordan basin. Once the
by gravity flow (60, 61). National allocations numbers were derived, and Jordan and Israel
were then based on these in-basin agricul- implicitly agreed, Israel applied most of its al-
tural needs, with the understanding that each location to other uses entirely, many of them
country could then use the water as it wished, outside of the basin. Jordan and Israel ad-
including to divert it out of basin. This was here to the Johnston allocations to this day, in
not only an acceptable formula to the parties spite all of the dramatic changes to all water-
at the time, but it also allowed for a break- related parameters within the basin over the
through in negotiations when a land survey of past 50 years.
Jordan concluded that its future water needs One might speculate as to why nego-
were lower than previously thought. Years tiations move from rights-based to needs-
later, Israel and Palestine came back to needs based criteria for allocation. The first reason
in the Interim Agreement of 1995, whereby may have something to do with the psychol-
Israel first recognized Palestinian water rights ogy of negotiations. Rothman (64), among
on the West Bank—a formula for agricul- others, points out that negotiations ideally
ture and per capita consumption that deter- move along three stages: the adversarial stage,
mined future Palestinian water needs at 70– where each side defines its positions, or rights;
80 million cubic meters (MCM)/year, and the reflexive stage, where the needs of each
Israel agreed to provide 28.6 MCM/year to- side bringing them to their positions is ad-
ward those needs (62). dressed; and finally, to the integrative stage,
Needs are the most prevalent criteria for where negotiators brainstorm together to ad-
allocations along arid or exotic streams out- dress each side’s underlying interests. The ne-
side of the Middle East as well. Allocations of gotiations here seem to follow this pattern
the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo and the Colorado from rights to needs and, occasionally, to in-
between Mexico and the United States are terests. Although each negotiator may initially
based on Mexican irrigation requirements; see him- or herself as Egyptian or Israeli or
Bangladeshi requirements determined the Indian and the rights of one’s own country
allocations of the Ganges, and Indus negotia- are paramount, over time one must empathize
tions deferred to Pakistani projects (although to some degree and to notice that even one’s
250 Wolf
enemy (be he or she Sudanese, Palestinian, or was granted rights to divert water between
Pakistani) requires the same amount of water the Columbia and Kootenai rivers for hy-
for the same use with the same methods as dropower. Likewise, the 1975 Mekong accord
oneself. defines equality of right not as equal shares
The second reason for the shift from rights of water but as equal rights to use water on
to needs may simply be that rights are not the basis of each riparian’s economic and so-
quantifiable and needs are. We have seen the cial needs. The relative nature of beneficial
vague guidance that the 1997 Convention (65) uses is exhibited in a 1950 agreement on the
provides for allocations—a series of occasion- Niagara, flowing between the United States
ally conflicting parameters—that are to be and Canada, which provides a greater flow
considered as a whole. If two nations insist over the famous falls during “show times”
on their respective rights of upstream versus of summer daylight hours, when tourist dol-
down, for example, there is no spectrum along lars are worth more per cubic meter than
which to bargain; no common frame of refer- the alternate use in hydropower generation
ence. One can much more readily determine a (68).

needs-based criterion—irrigable land or pop- In many water-related treaties, water is-
ulation, for example—and quantify each na- sues are dealt with alone, separate from any
tion’s needs. Even with differing interpreta- other political or resource issues between
tions, once both sides feel comfortable that countries—water qua water. By separating the
their minimum quantitative needs are being two realms of “high” (political) and “low” (re-
met, talks eventually turn to straightforward source economical) politics or by ignoring
bargaining over numbers along a common other resources that might be included in an
spectrum (66, 67). agreement, some have argued, the process is
either likely to fail, as in the case of the 1956
Johnston Accord on the Jordan, or more of-
From Rights and Needs to Interests: ten to achieve a suboptimum development ar-
Baskets of Benefits rangement, as is currently the case on the In-
One productive approach to the development dus agreement, signed in 1960. Increasingly,
of transboundary waters has been to move past however, linkages are being made between
rights and needs entirely and to examine the water and politics as well as between water and
benefits in the basin from a regional approach. other resources. These multiresource linkages
This has regularly required the riparians may offer more opportunities for the genera-
to go beyond looking at water as a com- tion of creative solutions, allowing for greater
modity to be divided—a zero-sum, rights- economic efficiency through a basket of
based approach—and to develop an approach benefits (69).
that equitably allocates not the water but
the benefits derived therefrom—a positive-
sum, integrative approach. The boundary wa- VULNERABILITY, RESILIENCE,
ters agreement between the United States AND THE IMPACTS
and Canada, for example, allocates water ac- OF TENSIONS
cording to equal benefits, usually defined by Understanding the indicators of conflict and
hydropower generation. This results in the cooperation is a critical prerequisite both to
seemingly odd arrangement that power may designing resilient institutions and to de-
be exported out of basin for gain, but the veloping monitoring mechanisms to identify
water itself may not. In the 1964 treaty on future tensions. Vulnerable basins are at par-
the Columbia, an arrangement was worked ticular risk of tensions, but programs of in-
out whereby the United States paid Canada stitutional capacity building can help mitigate
for the benefits of flood control, and Canada the potential impacts of rapid change.

Indicators of Hydropolitical that very rapid changes, either on the institu-

Resilience and Vulnerability tional side or in the physical system, that out-
pace the institutional capacity to absorb those
Hydropolitical In general, concepts of resilience and vulner-
resilience: the changes are at the root of most water conflicts.
ability as related to water resources are often
complex human- For example, the rapid institutional change in
assessed within the framework of sustainabil-
environmental internationalized basins, i.e., basins that in-
ity (e.g., 70) and relate to the ability of bio-
system’s ability clude the management structures of newly
to adapt to physical systems to adapt to change (e.g., 71).
independent states, has resulted in disputes
permutations and As the sustainability discourse has broadened
change within these in areas formerly under British administra-
to include human systems in recent years, so
systems tion (e.g., the Nile, Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates,
too has work been increasingly geared toward
Hydropolitical Indus, and Ganges-Brahmaputra) as well as in
identifying indicators of resilience and vul-
vulnerability: the the former Soviet Union (e.g., the Aral trib-
nerability within this broader context (e.g.,
risk of political utaries and the Kura-Araks). On the physical
72–74). In parallel, dialog on security has
dispute over shared side, rapid change most outpaces institutional
migrated from traditional issues of war and
water systems
capacity in basins that include unilateral de-
peace to also begin incorporating the human-
RBO: River Basin velopment projects and the absence of coop-
Organization environment relationship in the relatively new
erative regimes [such as treaties, river basin
field of environmental security (see 75, 76).
organizations (RBOs), or technical working
The term hydropolitics (coined in Reference
groups] or when relations are especially ten-
59) is the result of substantial attention to the
uous over other issues (27).
potential for conflict and violence to erupt
The general assumption, then, is that
over international waters and relates to the
rapid change tends to indicate vulnerability,
ability of geopolitical institutions to manage
whereas institutional capacity tends to indi-
shared water resources in a politically sustain-
cate resilience, and the two sides need to be
able manner, i.e., without tensions or con-
assessed in conjunction with each other for a
flict between political entities. Hydropolitical
more accurate gauge of hydropolitical sustain-
resilience is defined as the complex human-
ability. Building on these relationships, the
environmental system’s ability to adapt to per-
characteristics of a basin that would tend to
mutations and change within these systems,
enhance resilience to change include
and hydropolitical vulnerability is defined by the
risk of political dispute over shared water sys- International agreements and institu-
tems. Wolf et al. (27) suggested the following tions, such as RBOs
relationship between change, institutions, and A history of collaborative projects
hydropolitical vulnerability, “The likelihood Generally positive political relations
of conflict rises as the rate of change within Higher levels of economic develop-
the basin exceeds the institutional capacity to ment1
absorb that change.”
In contrast, facets that would tend toward
This suggests that there are two sides to
vulnerability would include
the dispute setting: the rate of change in the
system and the institutional capacity. In gen-
Rapid environmental change
eral, most of the parameters regularly identi-
fied as indicators of water conflict are actually
1
only weakly linked to the dispute. Institutional Higher levels of economic development enhance re-
silience because these countries can afford alternatives as
capacity within a basin, however, whether de- water becomes relatively more scarce or degraded. In con-
fined as water management bodies or treaties trasting developing and developed countries, for example,
or generally positive international relations, is whereas the former may struggle for a safe, stable supply of
basic water resources, the latter might utilize greenhouses,
as important, if not more so, than the phys- expensive drip irrigation systems, bioengineered crops, or
ical aspects of a system. It turns out, then, desalination.
252 Wolf
Rapid population growth or asymmetric between Maasai herdsmen and Kikuyu farm-
economic growth ers in Kenya (86). The inland desert state of
Major unilateral development projects Arizona even commissioned a navy (made up
The absence of institutional capacity of one ferryboat) and sent its state militia to
Generally hostile relations stop a dam and diversion on the Colorado
River in 1934 (87). (See Table 2 for examples
of water-related disputes.)
Intranational Impacts of Another contentious issue is water quality,
International Tensions which is also closely linked to water quantity.
The subset of security issues of interna- Decreasing water quality can make it inap-
tional tensions occur at the subnational level, propriate for some uses, thereby aggravating
with direct impact on ordinary communi- its scarcity. In turn, decreasing water quan-
ties (77). Much literature on transbound- tity concentrates pollution, and excessive wa-
ary waters treats political entities as homo- ter quantity, such as flooding, can lead to con-
geneous monoliths—“Canada feels . . . ” or tamination by sewage. Low water quality can

“Jordan wants . . . ” Analysts are only recently pose serious threats to human and environ-
highlighting the pitfalls of this approach, of- mental health. Water quality degradation is
ten by showing how different subsets of ac- often a source of dispute between those who
tors relate very different meanings to water. cause degradation and the groups affected by
Rather than being simply another environ- it. As pollution increasingly impacts liveli-
mental input, water is regularly treated as a se- hoods and the environment, water quality is-
curity issue, a gift of nature, or a focal point for sues may lead to public protests.
local society. Disputes, therefore, need to be One of the main reasons for decreasing wa-
understood as more than simply over a quan- ter quality is pollution, e.g., through indus-
tity of a resources, but also over conflicting at- trial and domestic wastewater or agricultural
titudes, meanings, and contexts. Throughout pesticides. In Tajikistan, for example, where
the world, local water issues revolve around environmental stress has been linked to civil
core values, which often date back genera- war (1992–1997), high levels of water pollu-
tions. Irrigators, indigenous populations, and tion have been identified as one of the key
environmentalists, for example, can see water environmental issues threatening human de-
as tied to their very ways of life that are in- velopment and security (8). Water pollution
creasingly threatened by newer uses for cities from the tanning industry in the Palar basin
and hydropower (78, 79). Moreover, the local of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu makes the
setting strongly influences international dy- water within the basin unfit for irrigation and
namics and vice versa (39, 77, 80, 81). consumption. The pollution contributed to
If there is a history of water-related vio- an acute drinking water crisis, which led to
lence, and there is, it is a history of incidents protests by the local community and activist
at the subnational level, generally between organizations as well as to disputes and court
tribes, water-use sectors, or states/provinces. cases between tanners and farmers (8).
In fact, our recent research at Oregon State
University suggests that, as the scale drops,
the likelihood and intensity of violence goes Regional Instability: Political
up (82). There are many examples of inter- Dynamics of Loss of Irrigation Water
nal water conflicts ranging from interstate vi- As water quality degrades—or quantity
olence and death along the Cauvery River in diminishes—over time, its effect on the
India (83, 84); to the United States, where stability of a region can be unsettling.
California farmers blew up a pipeline meant For example, for 30 years the Gaza Strip
for Los Angeles (85); to intertribal bloodshed was under Israeli occupation. Water quality

Table 2 Selected examples of water-related disputesa

Main issue
Location Observation
Quantity
Cauvery River, South Asia The dispute on India’s Cauvery River sprang from the allocation of water
between the downstream state of Tamil Nadu, which had been using the
river’s water for irrigation, and upstream Karnataka, which wanted to
increase irrigated agriculture. The parties did not accept a tribunal’s
adjudication of the water dispute; this led to violence and death along the
river.
Mekong basin, Southeast Following construction of Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam, more than 25,000
Asia people were affected by drastic reductions in upstream fisheries and

other livelihood problems. Affected communities have struggled for
reparations since the dam was completed in 1994.
Okavango basin, southern In the Okavango River basin, Botswana’s claims for water to sustain the
Africa delta and its lucrative ecotourism industry contribute to a dispute with
upstream Namibia, which wants to pipe water passing through the
Caprivi Strip to supply its capital city with drinking water.
Quality
Rhine River, Western Rotterdam’s harbor had to be dredged frequently to remove contaminated
Europe sludge deposited by the Rhine River. The cost was enormous and
consequently led to controversy over compensation and responsibility
among Rhine River users. Although the negotiations led to a peaceful
solution, in areas that lack the Rhine’s dispute resolution framework,
siltation problems could lead to upstream/downstream arguments.
Quantity and quality
Incomati River, southern Dams in the South African part of the Incomati River basin reduced
Africa freshwater flows and increased salt levels in Mozambique’s Incomati
estuary. This altered the estuary’s ecosystem and led to the disappearance
of salt-intolerant plants and animals that are important for people’s
livelihoods.
Timing
Syr Dar’ya, Central Asia Relations between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—all riparians
of the Syr Dar’ya, a major tributary of the disappearing Aral
Sea—exemplify the problems caused by water flow timing. Under the
Soviet Union’s central management, spring and summer irrigation in
downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan balanced upstream Kyrgyzstan’s
use of hydropower to generate heat in the winter. But the parties are
barely adhering to recent agreements that exchange upstream flows of
alternate heating sources (natural gas, coal, and fuel oil) for downstream
irrigation and sporadically breach the agreements.
a
Reference 63.
deteriorated steadily, saltwater intrusion de- ity the cause? It would be simplistic to claim
graded local wells, and water-related diseases direct causality. Was it an irritant exacerbat-
took a rising toll on the people living there. ing an already tenuous situation? Undoubt-
In 1987, the intifada, or Palestinian uprising, edly (88).
broke out in the Gaza Strip and quickly spread An examination of relations between
throughout the West Bank. Was water qual- India and Bangladesh demonstrate that these
254 Wolf
internal instabilities can be both caused and for private gain or when water-use rights are
exacerbated by international water disputes. assigned in a secretive and possibly corrupt
In the 1960s, India built a barrage at Farakka, manner, as demonstrated by the violent con-
diverting a portion of the Ganges flow away frontations in 2000 following the privatization
from its course into Bangladesh in an effort to of Cochabamba, Bolivia’s water utility.
flush silt away from Calcutta’s seaport, some Finally, there is the human security issue of
100 miles to the south. In Bangladesh, the re- water-related disease. It is estimated that be-
duced flow from upstream resulted in a num- tween 5 and 10 million people die each year
ber of adverse effects: degraded surface and from water-related diseases or inadequate san-
groundwater, impeded navigation, increased itation. More than half the people in the world
salinity, degraded fisheries, and endangered lack adequate sanitation. Eighty percent of
both water supplies and public health. Migra- disease in the developing world is related to
tion from affected areas further compounded water. This is a crisis of epidemic proportions,
the problem. Ironically, many of those dis- and the threats to human security are self-
placed in Bangladesh have found refuge in evident (2).

India (89).
Two thirds of the world’s water use is for
agriculture, so when access to irrigation wa- WATER AND INSTITUTIONS
ter is threatened, one result can be movement The international community has long grap-
of huge populations of out-of-work, disgrun- pled with effective institutional arrangements
tled men from the countryside to the cities— for managing shared water resources. From
an invariable recipe for political instability. the international to the local, grappling with
In pioneering work, S. Postel (unpublished) the institutional implications of shared waters
identified those countries that rely heavily on has taken many forms, from international dec-
irrigation and whose agricultural water sup- larations to guiding principles to treaties and
plies are threatened either by a decline in local management.
quality or quantity. The list coincides pre-
cisely with the world community’s current se-
Institutional Development:
curity concerns: India, China, Pakistan, Iran,
Contributions from the International
Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Egypt.
Community2
Water management in many countries is
also characterized by overlapping and com- Acknowledging the benefits of cooperative
peting responsibilities among government water management, the international com-
bodies. Disaggregated decision making often munity has long advocated institutional de-
produces divergent management approaches velopment in the world’s international water-
that serve contradictory objectives and lead to ways and has focused considerable attention
competing claims from different sectors. And in the twentieth century on developing and
such claims are even more likely to contribute refining principles of shared management. In
to disputes in countries where there is no 1911, the Institute of International Law pub-
formal system of water-use permits or where lished the Madrid Declaration on the Inter-
enforcement and monitoring are inadequate. national Regulation regarding the Use of In-
Controversy also often arises when manage- ternational Watercourses for Purposes other
ment decisions are formulated without suffi- than Navigation. The Madrid Declaration
cient participation by local communities and outlined certain basic principles of shared
water users, thus failing to take into account water management, recommending that
local rights and practices. Protests are espe- coriparian states establish permanent joint
cially likely when the public suspects that wa-
ter allocations are diverting public resources 2
This section draws from Reference 90.

commissions and discouraging unilateral recommendations outlined in the Confer-

basin alterations and harmful modifications ence’s Dublin Statement on Water and Sus-
of international rivers. Expanding on these tainable Development, which the drafters en-
UNCED: UN
Conference on guidelines, the International Law Association trusted to the world leaders gathering in Rio
Environment and developed the Helsinki Rules of 1966 on the for translation into a plan of action. Although
Development Uses of Waters of International Rivers. Since covering a range of water resource manage-
then, international freshwater law has ma- ment issues, the Dublin Statement specifi-
tured through the work of these two organiza- cally highlights the growing importance of in-
tions as well as the United Nations and other ternational transboundary water management
governmental and nongovernmental bodies and encourages greater attention to the cre-
(66, 67). ation and implementation of integrated wa-
The past decade, however, has witnessed ter management institutions endorsed by all
a perhaps unprecedented number of declara- affected basin states. Moreover, the drafters
tions as well as organizational and legal devel- outlined certain essential functions of inter-
opments to further the international commu- national water institutions including “recon-
nity’s objective of promoting cooperative river ciling and harmonizing the interests of ripar-
basin management. The decade began with ian countries, monitoring water quantity and
the International Conference on Water and quality, development of concerted action pro-
the Environment in the lead-up to the 1992 grammes, exchange of information, and en-
UN Conference on Environment and Devel- forcing agreements” (91).
opment (UNCED) in Rio. Subsequently, ac- At the Rio Conference, water resource
tions taken by the international community management was specifically addressed in
have included the pronouncement of non- Chapter 18 of Agenda 21, a nonbinding ac-
binding conventions and declarations, the cre- tion plan for improving the state of the globe’s
ation of global water institutions, and the natural resources in the twenty-first century
codification of international water principles. adopted by UNCED participants. The over-
Although clearly more work is required, these all goal of Chapter 18 is to ensure that the
initiatives have not only raised awareness of supply and quality of water is sufficient to
the myriad issues related to international wa- meet both human and ecological needs world-
ter resource management, but also have led to wide, and measures to implement this objec-
the creation of frameworks in which the issues tive are detailed in the Chapter’s ambitious
can be addressed. seven-part action plan. Although transbound-
ary water resource management is mentioned
in Chapter 18, few specific and substantive
Conventions, Declarations, and references are made to water resource issues at
Organizational Developments the international scale. The Rio Conference
The 1992 UNCED served as a forum for did, however, generate a number of activities
world policy makers to discuss problems concerning freshwater management in gen-
of the environment and development. As eral, with implications for international trans-
such, management of the world’s water re- boundary water management (92).
sources was only one of several topics ad- One result of the Rio Conference and
dressed. Water was, however, the primary fo- Agenda 21 has been an expansion of inter-
cus of the International Conference on Water national freshwater resource institutions and
and the Environment (ICWE), a prepara- programs. The World Water Council, a self-
tory conference held in advance of the Rio described “think tank” for world water re-
Earth Summit. The ICWE participants, rep- source issues, for example, was created in
resenting governmental and nongovernmen- 1996 in response to recommendations from
tal organizations, developed a set of policy the Rio Conference. Since its inception, the
256 Wolf
World Water Council has hosted three World are also applicable to waters in an interna-
Water Forums—gatherings of government, tional setting. Furthermore, policy measures
nongovernment, and private agency repre- prescribed by the international community
sentatives to discuss and collectively deter- to build greater institutional capacity, such
mine a vision for the management of water as integrated water resource management,
resources over the next quarter century. These expanded stakeholder participation, and im-
forums have led to the creation of the World proved monitoring and evaluation schemes,
Water Vision, a forward-looking declaration are likewise important components of inter-
of philosophical and institutional water man- national watercourse management.
agement needs, as well as the creation of co- The large meetings are also spawning cri-
ordinating and implementing agencies such as tiques, mainly by some donors and selected
the World Commission on Water for the 21st international nongovernmental organizations
Century and the Global Water Partnership. (NGOs), of becoming too large and numer-
The Second World Water Forum also served ous (for example, 93, 94). At the same time
as the venue for a ministerial conference in many local NGOs, although also criticizing
which the leaders of participating countries the meetings, are quick to add that it may be
signed a declaration concerning water secu- better to err on the side of too many than
rity in the twenty-first century. The recent too few meetings because they have become
World Summit on Sustainable Development places where local NGOs have been able to
(WWSD) has helped to sustain the momen- interact with the so-called “world water elite”
tum of these recent global water initiatives. and vice versa. Indeed, the meetings seem to
In the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustain- echo what has been happening within coun-
able Development, delegates at the WWSD tries. There is increasing awareness that “wa-
reaffirmed a commitment to the principles ter people” alone will not deal with these
contained in Agenda 21 and called upon the problems and that more and different types
United Nations to review, evaluate, and pro- of stakeholders must be involved. In addition,
mote further implementation of this global politicians interact more with professionals.
action plan (92). Indeed, for many years, the world water meet-
Through these meetings, the international ings were mostly run and attended by water
community has reinforced its commitment to professionals. The large meetings have begun
satisfy the water quality and quantity require- to change this to reflect the broader trends oc-
ments of the global population and its sur- curring within countries. The Fourth World
rounding environment and has identified at- Water Forum emphasized implementing local
tendant tasks and policy measures needed to actions and spawned a movement to identify
fulfill its pledge. Although many of strate- and monitor these actions. It remains to be
gies in Agenda 21 and subsequent state- seen whether the professional water commu-
ments are directed primarily at national water nity can accept this.
resources, their relevance extends to inter- Like Agenda 21, however, none of
national transboundary waters. In fact, the these post-Rio statements or declarations
Ministerial Declaration at the Second World focuses exclusively on international freshwa-
Water Forum included “sharing water” (be- ter sources. Additionally, despite the efforts
tween different users and states) as one of over the past decade to expand global insti-
its seven major challenges to achieving wa- tutional capacity over freshwater resources,
ter security in the twenty-first century. Many no supranational agency exists to man-
of the other six challenges, which include age transboundary resources globally. Thus,
meeting basic needs, securing the food sup- although many of the principles of national
ply, protecting the ecosystem, managing risks, water management apply to international
valuing water, and governing water wisely, waters, the political, social, and economic

dynamics associated with waters shared be- by the international community for the man-
tween sovereign states can require special agement of shared water resources, such as
consideration. equitable and reasonable utilization of waters
with specific attention to vital human needs,
protection of the aquatic environment, and
Legal Principles the promotion of cooperative management
There is a vast and growing literature on mechanisms. The document also incorporates
international water law (see, for example, the provisions concerning data and information
excellent summaries in References 66, 67, exchange and mechanisms for conflict res-
95–97). Wouters and her team (98) at the olution. Once ratified, the UN Convention
University of Dundee have created a Legal will provide a legally binding framework, at
Assessment Model to help countries develop least upon its signatories, for managing in-
transboundary institutions. According to ternational watercourses. Even without rati-
Cano (99), international water law was not fication, its guidelines are being increasingly
substantially formulated until after World invoked in international forums.

War I. Since that time, organs of international The UN’s approval of the Convention,
law have tried to provide a framework for however, does not entirely resolve many le-
increasingly intensive water use, focusing gal questions concerning the management of
on general guidelines that could be applied internationally shared waters. First, the Con-
to the world’s watersheds. These general vention would technically only be binding on
principles of customary law, codified and those nations that have ratified or consented
progressively developed by advisory bodies to be bound by the agreement. To date, five
and private organizations, are not intended to years after its adoption by the UN General
be legally binding in and of themselves, but Assembly, only 14 countries are party to the
they can provide evidence of customary law UN Convention, well below the requisite 35
and may help crystallize that law. Wouters instruments of ratification, acceptance, acces-
(P. Wouters, personal communication, 2003) sion, or approval needed to bring the Con-
notes that, “Customary law is not ‘soft law,’ vention into force (100).
even though it might be found in codification Second, international law only guides
efforts of NGOs or even the ILC rules. conduct between sovereign nations. Thus,
Customary laws are rules of international law grievances of political units or ethnic groups
and considered as sources.” It is tempting to within nations over the domestic manage-
look to these principles for clear and binding ment of international waterways would not be
rules, but it is more accurate to think in addressed. Third, although the Convention
terms of guidelines for the process of conflict offers general guidance to coriparian states,
resolution: “(T)he principles (of customary its vague, and occasionally contradictory, lan-
law) themselves derive from the process and guage can result in varied, and indeed con-
the outcomes of the process rather than pre- flictive, interpretations of the principles con-
scribe either the process or its outcome” ( J. tained therein. As stated by Biswas (101), the
Dellapenna, personal communication, 1997). “vague, broad, and general terms” incorpo-
The UN Convention on the Law of rated in the UN Convention “can be de-
the Non-Navigational Uses of International fined, and in certain cases quantified, in a va-
Watercourses (UN Convention), adopted in riety of different ways.” Fourth, there is no
1997 by the UN General Assembly, is one practical enforcement mechanism to back up
post-Rio accomplishment that specifically fo- the Convention’s guidance. The International
cuses on international transboundary water Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, hears
resources (65). The UN Convention codi- cases only with the consent of the parties in-
fies many of the principles deemed essential volved and only on very specific legal points.
258 Wolf
Moreover, in its 55-year history, the Court deed apparent, the past 50 years of treaty writ-
has decided only one case, apart from those ing suggests that capacity-building opportu-
related to boundary definitional disputes, nities still remain. Many international basins
pertinent to international waters—that of are without any type of cooperative manage-
the Gabçı́kovo-Nagymaros Project on the ment framework, and even where institutions
Danube between Hungary and Slovakia in do exist, the post-Rio treaty record highlights
1997.3 Finally, the Convention only addresses a number of remaining weaknesses. Thus, in
those groundwater bodies that are connected combination with its existing efforts, the in-
to surface water systems, i.e., unconfined ternational community might consider focus-
aquifers, yet several nations are already being more attention on the specific institu-
ginning to tap into confined groundwater tional needs of individual basin communities
systems, many of which are shared across by assisting riparian states in the develop-
international boundaries. Nevertheless, and ment of cooperative management networks
despite the fact that the process of ratification that take into account the following key
is moving extremely slowly, the Convention’s factors:

common acceptance, and the fact that the ICJ 1. Adaptable management structure.
referred to it in its decision on the 1997 case Effective institutional management
on the Gabcikovo Dam, gives the Conven- structures incorporate a certain level
tion increasing standing as an instrument of of flexibility, allowing for public input,
customary law (102). changing basin priorities, and adding
new information and monitoring
technologies. The adaptability of man-
Institutional Lessons for the
agement structures must also extend to
International Community
nonsignatory riparians, by incorporat-
A review of international water relations and ing provisions addressing their needs,
institutional development over the past 50 rights, and potential accession.
years provides important insights into water 2. Clear and flexible criteria for water allo-
conflict and the role of institutions. The his- cations and water quality management.
torical record of water conflict and coopera- Allocations, which are at the heart of
tion suggests that international watercourses most water disputes, are a function of
can cause tensions between coriparian states, water quantity and quality, as well as
but acute violence is the exception rather than political fiat. Thus, effective institutions
the rule. A much more likely scenario is that a must identify clear allocation schedules
gradual decline in water quantity or quality, or and water quality standards that simul-
both, affects the internal stability of a nation taneously provide for extreme hydro-
or region, which may in turn impact the in- logical events; new understanding of
ternational arena. Early coordination among basin dynamics, including groundwater
riparian states, however, can serve to amelio- reserves; and changing societal values.
rate these sources of friction. Additionally, riparian states may con-
The centrality of institutions both in sider prioritizing uses throughout the
preventive hydrodiplomacy and in effective basin. Establishing catchment-wide wa-
transboundary water management cannot be ter precedents may not only help to
overemphasized. Yet, although progress is in- avert interriparian conflicts over water
use, but also protect the environmental
health of the basin as a whole.
3
The ICJ was established in 1946 with the dissolution of its 3. Equitable distribution of benefits. Dis-
predecessor agency, the Permanent Court of International
Justice. This earlier body did rule on four international tributing water benefits, a concept that
water disputes during its existence from 1922–1946. is subtly yet powerfully different than

pure water allocation, is at the root Also excluded were events where water is not
of some of the world’s most successful the driver, such as those where water is a tool,
institutions. The idea concerns the dis- target, or victim of armed conflict. (Please see
tribution of benefits from water use— Figure 2 for instances of conflict and cooper-
whether from hydropower, agriculture, ation.) The study documented a total of 1831
economic development, aesthetics, or interactions, both conflictive and cooperative,
the preservation of healthy aquatic between two or more nations over water dur-
ecosystems—not the water itself. Dis- ing the past five decades and found the fol-
tributing benefits allows for positive- lowing:
sum agreements, occasionally including First, despite the potential for dispute in
even nonwater-related gains in a basket international basins, the record of acute con-
of benefits, whereas dividing the water flict over international water resources is his-
itself only allows for winners and losers. torically overwhelmed by the record of co-
4. Concrete mechanisms to enforce treaty operation. During those 50 years, there were
provisions. Once a treaty is signed, only 37 acute disputes (those involving vio-
successful implementation is dependent lence); of those, 30 were between Israel and
not only on the actual terms of the one or another of its neighbors, and the vio-
agreement but also on an ability to lence ended in 1970. Non-Mideast cases ac-
enforce those terms. Appointing over- counted for only five acute events, and during
sight bodies with decision making and the same period, 157 treaties were negotiated
enforcement authority is one impor- and signed. In fact, the only water war be-
tant step toward maintaining coopera- tween nations on record occurred over 4500
tive management institutions. years ago between the city-states of Lagash
5. Detailed conflict resolution mecha- and Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin
nisms. Many basins continue to experi- (40, 103).
ence disputes even after a treaty is nego- The total number of water-related events
tiated and signed. Thus, incorporating between nations of any magnitude are
clear mechanisms for resolving conflicts likewise weighted toward cooperation—507
is a prerequisite for effective, long-term conflict-related events, versus 1228 coopera-
basin management. tive events—implying that violence over wa-
ter is neither strategically rational, hydro-
graphically effective, nor economically viable.
WATER CONFLICT AND Second, despite the occasional fiery
COOPERATION rhetoric of politicians—perhaps aimed more
In order to cut through the prevailing anecdo- often at their own constituencies than at the
tal approach to the history of water conflicts, enemy—most actions taken over water are
researchers at Oregon State University un- mild. Of all the events, some 43% fell between
dertook a three-year research project, which mild verbal support and mild verbal hostility.
attempted to compile a dataset of every re- If the next level on either side—official verbal
ported interaction between two or more na- support and official verbal hostility—is added
tions, whether conflictive or cooperative, that in, the share of verbal events reaches 62% of
involved water as a scarce and/or consum- the total. Thus, almost two thirds of all events
able resource or as a quantity to be managed, were only verbal, and more than two thirds of
i.e., where water was the driver of the events, those had no official sanction (27).
over the past 50 years (27). Excluded were Third, there were more issues of co-
events where water is incidental to the dispute, operation than of conflict. The distribu-
such as those concerning fishing rights, access tion of cooperative events covered a broad
to ports, transportation, or river boundaries. spectrum, including water quantity, quality,
260 Wolf
Figure 2
Number of events by BAR scale.
economic development, hydropower, and ments or are in the process of doing so,
joint management. In contrast, almost 90% and the institutions they have created often
of the conflict-laden events related to quan- prove to be resilient, even when relations are
tity and infrastructure. Furthermore, almost strained.
all extensive military acts (the most extreme The Mekong Committee, for example, es-
cases of conflict) fell within these two tablished by the governments of Cambodia,
categories. Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam as an intergov-
Fourth, despite the lack of violence, water ernmental agency in 1957, exchanged data
acted as both an irritant and a unifier. As an and information on water resources devel-
irritant, water can make good relations bad opment throughout the Vietnam War (24,
and bad relations worse. Despite the com- 104). Israel and Jordan have held secret “pic-
plexity, however, international waters can act nic table” talks on managing the Jordan
as a unifier in basins with relatively strong River since the unsuccessful Johnston ne-
institutions. gotiations of 1953–1955, even though they
This historical record suggests that inter- were technically at war from Israel’s in-
national water disputes do get resolved, even dependence in 1948 until the 1994 treaty
among enemies, and even as conflicts erupt (105). The Indus River Commission sur-
over other issues. Some of the world’s most vo- vived two major wars between India and
ciferous enemies have negotiated water agree- Pakistan (106). And all 10 Nile basin riparian

countries are currently involved in senior tity or quality, or both, which over time
government-level negotiations to develop the can affect the internal stability of a na-
basin cooperatively (107), despite water wars tion or region, and act as an irritant be-
rhetoric between upstream and downstream tween ethnic groups, water sectors, or
states. states/provinces. The resulting instabil-
ity may have effects in the international
arena.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 4. The greatest threat of the global water
CONCLUSIONS crisis to human security comes from the
The vast experience of the international com- fact that millions of people lack access
munity and its shared water resources around to sufficient quantities of water at suffi-
the world offers lessons for effective, efficient, cient quality for their well-being.
and equitable water resources management
and strategies for resolving disputes or, bet-
Why Might the Future Look
ter, in helping to avoid them altogether.

Nothing Like the Past?
Lessons Learned Much of the work presented here is based
partly on the assumption that we can tell
The most critical security lessons learned something about the future by looking at the
from the global experience in water security past. It is worth stopping at this point, then,
are as follows: and challenging the very foundation of that as-
1. Water crossing international bound- sumption: Why might the future look nothing
aries can cause tensions between nations at all like the past? What new approaches or
that share the basin. Although the ten- technologies are on the horizon to change or
sion is not likely to lead to warfare, early ameliorate the risk to the basins we have iden-
coordination between riparians can help tified, or even to change the whole approach
ameliorate the issue. Furthermore, wa- to basins at risk?
ter is a useful inducement to dialog and By definition, a discussion of the future can
collaboration, even in settings of intense not have the same empirical backing as a his-
political tension. torical study—the data just do not yet exist.
2. Successful agreements move generally Yet there are cutting edge developments and
from thinking in terms of rights to recent trends, which, if one examined them
needs and finally to interests, allowing within the context of this study, might sug-
for an equitable distribution of ben- gest some possible changes in store for trans-
efits. Whereas focusing on allocating boundary waters in the near future. What fol-
water mires negotiators in a zero-sum lows are four possibly fundamental changes in
game, thinking in terms of benefits al- the way we approach transboundary waters.
lows riparians to move beyond the river,
(and even beyond water) with new pos- New technologies for negotiation and
sibilities for the basket of benefits to management. Most analysis of international
be enhanced. Once international insti- waters dates from the mid-1960s onward. In
tutions are in place, they are tremen- some ways, water management is very sim-
dously resilient over time, even between ilar now as it was then (or, for that mat-
otherwise hostile riparian nations, and ter, as it was 5000 years ago). But some fun-
even when there is conflict over other damental aspects are profoundly different.
issues. Although global water stresses are increasing,
3. More likely than violent conflict occur- institutions are getting better and more re-
ring is a gradual decrease in water quan- silient, management and understanding are
262 Wolf
improving, and these issues are increasingly proceeding through the studied avoidance of
on the “radar screen” of global and lo- development banks and their mores.
cal decision makers. But most importantly, There is a more subtle effect of globaliza-
WTO: World Trade
the twenty-first century has access to new tion, which has to do with the WTO and its Organization
technology—including remote sensing and emphasis on privatization and full cost recov-
modeling capabilities and technologies as well ery of investments. Local and national gov-
as management practices that increase water- ernments have traditionally implemented and
use efficiency, which could not be dreamed of subsidized water development systems to keep
in 1948 and adds substantially to the ability water prices down but are under increasing
both to negotiate and to manage transbound- pressure from the forces of globalization to
ary waters more effectively (108). Although develop these systems through private com-
new technologies and data cannot replace the panies. These large multinational water com-
political goodwill necessary for creative solu- panies manage for profit and, if they use de-
tions, nor are they widely available outside the velopment capital, both push and are pushed
developed world, they can if appropriately de- to recover the full cost of their investment.
ployed allow for more robust negotiations and This situation can translate not only into im-
greater flexibility in joint management. mediate and substantial rises in the cost of
water, disproportionately affecting the poor,
Globalization: private capital, World but also to greater eradication of local and in-
Trade Organization, and circumvented digenous management systems and cultures.
ethics. Very little of the recent attention on If there is to be water-related violence in the
globalization and the World Trade Organiza- future, it is much more liable to be like the
tion (WTO) has centered on water resources, “water riots” against a Bechtel development in
but there is a definite water component to Bolivia in 1999 than water wars across national
these trends. One of the most profound is boundaries.
the shift of development funds from global As WTO rules are elaborated and negoti-
and regional development banks such as the ated, real questions remain as to how much
World Bank and the Asia Development Bank of this process will be required of nations
to private multinationals, such as Bechtel, in the future, simply to retain membership
Vivendi, and Ondeo (formally Lyonnaise des in the organization. The commodification of
Eux) (for example, 109, 110). Development water as a result of these forces is a case
banks have, over the years, been susceptible in point. Over the past 20 years, no global
to public pressures and ethics and, as such, water policy meeting has neglected to pass
have developed procedures for evaluating a resolution, which, among other issues, de-
social and environmental impacts of projects fined water as an “economic good,” setting
and incorporating them in decision making. the stage at the 2000 World Water Forum for
On international waters, each development an unresolved showdown against those who
bank has guidelines that generally prohibit would define water as a human or ecosystem
development unless all riparians agree to the right. The debate looms large over the future
project, which in and of itself has promoted of water resources: If water is a commodity,
successful negotiations in the past. Private and if WTO rules disallow obstacles to the
enterprises have no such restrictions, and na- trade of commodities, will nations be forced
tions eager to develop controversial projects to sell their water? Although far-fetched now
have been increasingly turning to private (even as a California company is challenging
capital to circumvent public ethics. The most British Columbia over precisely such an is-
controversial projects of the day—Turkey’s sue under North American Free Trade Agree-
GAP project, India’s Narmada River project, ment rules), the globalization debate between
and China’s Three Gorges Dam—are all market forces and social forces continues to

play out in microcosm in the world of water Currently, there is inherent political power in
resources. being an upstream riparian, controlling the
headwaters. In the scenario for cheap desali-
The geopolitics of desalination. Twice in nation above, that spatial position of power
the past 50 years—during the 1960s nuclear would shift from mountains to the valleys and
energy fervor and in the late 1980s, with from the headwaters to the sea. Many nations,
discoveries in cold fusion—much of the world such as Israel, Egypt, and Iraq, currently de-
briefly thought it was on the verge of having pendent on upstream neighbors for their wa-
access to close-to-free energy supplies. “Too ter supply would, by virtue of their coastlines,
cheap to meter” was the phrase during the suddenly find roles reversed—again unlikely,
Atoms for Peace Conference. Although nei- but plausible.
ther the economics nor the technology finally

supported these claims, it is not far-fetched to The changing sources of water and the
picture changes that could profoundly alter changing nature of conflict. Both the
the economics of desalination. worlds of water and of conflict are undergo-

The marginal cost of desalinated water ing slow but steady changes that may obviate
(between US$0.55 and US$0.80/m3 ) makes much of the thinking in this report. Lack of ac-
it currently cost-effective only in the devel- cess to a safe, stable supply of water is reaching
oped world where (a) the water will be used unprecedented proportions. Furthermore, as
for drinking water; and (b) the population to surface water supplies and easy groundwater
whom the water will be delivered lives along sources are increasingly exploited throughout
a coast and at low elevations; and (c) there the world, two major changes result: Qual-
are no alternatives. The only places not so ity is steadily becoming a more serious issue
restricted are where energy costs are espe- to many than quantity, and water use is shift-
cially low, notably the Arabian Peninsula. A ing to less traditional sources. Many of these
fundamental shift either in energy prices or in sources—such as deep fossil aquifers, waste-
membrane technology could bring costs down water reclamation, and interbasin transfers—
substantially. If either happened to the extent are not restricted by the confines of watershed
that the marginal cost allowed for agricultural boundaries, our fundamental unit of analysis
irrigation with sea water (around US$.08/m3 in this review.
on average), a large proportion of the world’s Conflict, too, is becoming less traditional,
water supplies would shift from rivers and increasingly being driven by internal or lo-
shallow aquifers to the sea (an unlikely, but cal pressures, or more subtle issues of poverty
plausible, scenario). and stability. The combination of changes, in
In addition to the fundamental economic water resources and in conflict, suggest that
changes that would result, geopolitical think- tomorrow’s water disputes may look very dif-
ing of water systems would also need to shift. ferent from today’s.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of
this review.
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AR325-FM ARI 21 September 2007 16:39
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Environment
and Resources
Contents Volume 32, 2007

I. Earth’s Life Support Systems

Feedbacks of Terrestrial Ecosystems to Climate Change

Christopher B. Field, David B. Lobell, Halton A. Peters, and Nona R. Chiariello p p p p p p1
Carbon and Climate System Coupling on Timescales from the
Precambrian to the Anthropocene
Scott C. Doney and David S. Schimel p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 31
The Nature and Value of Ecosystem Services: An Overview
Highlighting Hydrologic Services
Kate A. Brauman, Gretchen C. Daily, T. Ka’eo Duarte, and Harold A. Mooney p p p p p 67
Soils: A Contemporary Perspective
Cheryl Palm, Pedro Sanchez, Sonya Ahamed, and Alex Awiti p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 99
II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

Bioenergy and Sustainable Development?
Ambuj D. Sagar and Sivan Kartha p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p131
Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use
Charlie Wilson and Hadi Dowlatabadi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p169
Renewable Energy Futures: Targets, Scenarios, and Pathways
Eric Martinot, Carmen Dienst, Liu Weiliang, and Chai Qimin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p205
Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation
Aaron T. Wolf p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p241
The Role of Livestock Production in Carbon and Nitrogen Cycles
Henning Steinfeld and Tom Wassenaar p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p271
Global Environmental Standards for Industry
David P. Angel, Trina Hamilton, and Matthew T. Huber p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p295
Industry, Environmental Policy, and Environmental Outcomes
Daniel Press p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p317
vii
AR325-FM ARI 21 September 2007 16:39
Population and Environment

Alex de Sherbinin, David Carr, Susan Cassels, and Leiwen Jiang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p345
III. Management, Guidance, and Governance of Resources and Environment

Carbon Trading: A Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms
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Adaptation to Environmental Change: Contributions
of a Resilience Framework
Donald R. Nelson, W. Neil Adger, and Katrina Brown p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p395
IV. Integrative Themes

Women, Water, and Development
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Indexes
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Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 23–32 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p455
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Environment and Resources articles

may be found at http://environ.annualreviews.org
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ANRV325-EG32-08 ARI 14 September 2007 20:9

Shared Waters: Conﬂict

“Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of

Koﬁ Annan, March 2001

tension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation . . . If we work

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2007. 32:241–69 Key Words

COSTS OF Contributions from the

for Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 Organizational Developments . . 256

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE that contributes to the world’s 263 trans-

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 243

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 245

International river basin

0 1,500 3,000 4,500

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 247

egated to “ﬁnal status” negotiations—along

ecosystem and led to the disappearance of because of entrenched and contradictory

Table 1 Examples of needs-based criteria

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 249

ence. One can much more readily determine a (68).

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 251

Indicators of Hydropolitical that very rapid changes, either on the institu-

geneous monoliths—“Canada feels . . . ” or tamination by sewage. Low water quality can

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 253

Table 2 Selected examples of water-related disputesa

Asia people were affected by drastic reductions in upstream ﬁsheries and

placed in Bangladesh have found refuge in evident (2).

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 255

commissions and discouraging unilateral recommendations outlined in the Confer-

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 257

substantially formulated until after World invoked in international forums.

is moving extremely slowly, the Convention’s factors:

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 259

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 261

ter, in helping to avoid them altogether.

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 263

ther the economics nor the technology ﬁnally

the economics of desalination. worlds of water and of conﬂict are undergo-

Washington DC: Island

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 265

cases. Int. Secur. 19(1):5–40

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 267

and Mekong river basins. Water Int. 15(Dec. 4):200–5

www.annualreviews.org • Shared Waters 269

Contents Volume 32, 2007

I. Earth’s Life Support Systems

Feedbacks of Terrestrial Ecosystems to Climate Change

II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

Population and Environment

III. Management, Guidance, and Governance of Resources and Environment

IV. Integrative Themes

Isha Ray p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p421

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 23–32 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p451

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Environment and Resources articles

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