A.
Purpose of the Law cited by defendant is her mistake as to
• Ignoratia Legis non
Excusat
JOSE ZULUETA, vs. FRANCISCA
ZULUETA
G.R. No. 428 April 30, 1902
LADD, J.:
FACTS:
Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doña
Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under
the will of their father, Don Clemente
Zulueta, who died in Iloilo in 1900. In the
course of the voluntary testamentary
proceedings instituted in the CFI by Don
Jose, three auditors were appointed to
make a division of the estate under article
1053 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil,
of whom Don Jose and Doña Francisca
each nominated one, the third or auditor
umpire being chosen by common accord
of the parties. The two auditors
nominated by the parties respectively
failed to agree, and each rendered a
separate report.
The auditor umpire had his side with the
auditor of the plaintiff. The opposition
was filed by the defendant. The court
directed actions to be followed and
forwarded to Doña Francisca for her to
create her demands due to
disagreements of both parties.
On May 7, on plaintiff’s demand, to
change the 15 days to a 7 days within
which she must express her demands.
The defendant filed another petition to
suspend the proceedings until the new
Code of Procedure takes effect on June
5, citing it is more advantageous on her
rights. The court denied the petition as
the term for filing has expired. Reason
the term prescribed which prevented her
from filing an opposition for auto of June
22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Doña Francisca is entitled
to relief against the consequences of her
failure to interpose her appeal against the
auto of June 22 within the period fixed by
the law.
HELD:
No. The Court held that Doña
Francisca is not entitled to relief
against the consequences of her
failure to interpose her appeal against
the auto of June 22 within the fixed
period by the law. It is shown that the
party acted with mistake of law and
ignorance and misconception of the
provisions of the law regarding the time
within which the appeal should be
submitted. Ignoratia legis non excusat
The mistake in this instance was her own,
but it was a mistake of law, and while the
Court should be unwilling to say that
special cases might not occur in which
relief would be afforded in such a
proceeding as this against a mistake of
law made by a party, the Court are of
opinion that the present is not such a
case.
Hence, nothing is shown here except the
bare fact that the party acted under
ignorance or misconception of the
provisions of the law in regard to the time
within which the appeal could be taken,
and there is no reason why the general
principle, a principle "founded no only
on expediency and policy but on
necessity," that "ignorance of the law
does not excuse from compliance
therewith" (Civil Code, art. 2), should
be relaxed. The framers of Act No. 75
could not have intended to totally
abrogate this principle with reference to
the class of cases covered by the act. If
such were the effect of this legislation the
court "would be involved and perplexed
with questions incapable of any just
solution and embarrassed by inquiries
almost interminable."
DE LUNA, et. al. v. Linatoc (1942)
GR No. 48403
Topic: The contract is cleansed
retroactively of all its defects (Art. 1396).
FACTS:
Agustin de Luna’s wife sold a portion of
their conjugal property during the
subsistence of their marriage to Jose
Linatoc, which the former alleged was
done without his consent.
The said land was registered under the
name of Agustin de Luna but was already
partitioned. Under the law, however, a
conjugal property cannot be partitioned
during the subsistence of a marriage
unless there had been a judicial
separation of property. The spouses
claims ignorance of such prohibition .
The lower court dismissed the petition
based on Art. 2 (now Art. 3) of the Civil
Code which states that: “Ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.”
Aggrieved, Agustin appealed to the CA.
However, it found that no deceit had
been committed by appellee upon
appellants. Moreover, it appears that the
sale were made by de Luna’s wife with
both his knowledge and consent, as
evidenced by the deed (Exhibit I).
It is clear, therefore, that the requirement
of frauds in a sale of real property the
authority of the agent should be in writing
has been complied with. Hence, de
Luna’s wife was only acting as his agent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment of the sale
is valid due to mistake of law.
HELD:
No. The Court reiterated that mistake
of law does not make a contract
voidable, because ignorance of the
law does not excuse anyone from
compliance.
The fact that the spouses de Luna had no
knowledge of the prohibition against the
partition of the conjugal partnership
property during their marriage is not a
valid reason why they should ask for the
annulment of sales.
The Court stated that this instant case is
one of recognition because the husband
was not trying to cleanse the sales of all
taint, such as fraud, violence or mistake,
nor was it his purpose to confer authority
to his wife. Thus the requirement in the
statute of frauds that in a sale of real
property the authority of the agent should
be in writing, has been complied with.
Therefore, she was only acting as his
agent.
However, as such agent, the wife could
not sell her portions of those lands in the
name of her husband, because the
partition was illegal and void, as it was
made during the marriage and there was
no judicial order authorizing separation of
property between the husband and the
wife (art. 1432, Civil Code).
Consequently, the character of these
portions of lands as conjugal partnership
assests. And the wife may bind the
conjugal partnership with the consent of
the husband, according to article 1614 of
the Civil Code.
Since, the interpretation is that these
deeds have as their subject matter the
conjugal partnership property. It is not
only proper as already indicated but is
also warranted by the rules of
interpretation of contracts. Thus, this
construction is, therefore, adopted, which
recognizes the binding character of these
three deeds. The Civil Code in article
1284 provides: "If some clause of
contracts admits of various meanings, is
should be understood as that which is
most adequate to make it effective."
NOTES:
CONFIRMATION, RATIFICATION AND
RECOGNITION DISTINGUISHED;
AUTHORITY OF WIFE TO SELL
PROPERTY OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP. — A careful analysis of
Exhibit I reveals that the same is neither
a confirmation nor a ratification of the
sale made by the wife, but is what
Spanish jurists call a "reconocimiento" or
recognition. Confirmation tends to cure
a vice of nullity, and ratification is for
the purpose of giving authority to a
person who previously acted in the
name of another without authority.
Recognition, on the other hand, is merely
to cure a defect of proof. In recognition,
there is no vice to be remedied, such as
fraud, violence or mistake, as the case is
distinguished from confirmation. In
recognition, the person acting on behalf
of another is duly authorized to do so, so
the situation is different from ratification.
The instant case is one of recognition
because the husband was not trying to
cleanse the sales of all taint, such as
fraud, violence or mistake, nor was it his
purpose to confer authority to his wife,
because he stated in Exhibit I: "when my
wife sold said lands to J. L. she did so
with my knowledge and consent. Thus petitioners are setting up their own
the requirement in the statute of frauds wrongful act of partitioning their
that in a sale of real property the authority conjugal property, which violated
of the agent should be in writing, has article 1432 of the Civil Code. The
been complied with. Therefore, she was prohibition in said article affects public
only acting as his agent. policy, as it is designed to protect
creditors of the conjugal partnership and
3. ID.; ID.; ILLEGALITY OF PARTITION other third persons. Petitioners shall not,
BETWEEN SPOUSES MADE DURING therefore, be allowed thus to rest their
MARRIAGE. — However, as such agent, cause of action to recover the lands sold,
the wife could not sell her portions of upon the illegality of the partition which
those lands in the name of her husband, they attempted to make. Otherwise, they
because the partition was illegal and would profit by their own unlawful act.
void, as it was made during the marriage
and there was no judicial order
authorizing separation of property
between the husband and the wife (art.
1432, Civil Code). Consequently, the
character of these portions of lands as
conjugal partnership assests. And the
wife may bind the conjugal partnership
with the consent of the husband,
according to article 1614 of the Civil
Code.

4. ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW DOES

NOT RENDER CONTRACT VOIDABLE.
— Mistake of law does not make a
contract voidable, because ignorance
of the law does not excuse anyone
from its compliance (art. 2, Civil Code;
8 Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the
petitioners did not know the prohibition
against partition of the conjugal
partnership property during marriage (art.
1432, Civil Code) is no valid reason why
they should ask for the annulment of the
sales made Exhibits C and D and
recognized in Exhibit I.

5. ID.; ID.; NO MAN CAN TAKE

ADVANTAGE OF HIS WRONG. —
Moreover, there is the time-honored
legal maxim that no man can take
advantage of his own wrong. To
repudiate the sales in question,
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., v. JEROME
JAPSON
G.R. No. 191787 June 22, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Macario Catipon, Jr. is a holder of a
Bachelor’s Degree in Commerce despite
having a deficiency of 1.5 units.
He later found employment with SSS.
Sometime in 1993, the personnel head of
the SSS informed Catipon that the CSC
was conducting a Career Service
Professional Examination (CSPE), to
which Catipon applied to, believing that
the CSC still allowed applicants to
substitute the length of their government
service for any academic deficiency they
may have.
As it turns out, pursuant to a CSC
Memorandum Circular and Office Memo,
the policy has been discontinued.
Catipon, nevertheless, took the test, and
obtained a rating of 80.52%. He was
eventually promoted. In 1995, he finally
eliminated his deficiency.
In 2003, Jerome Japson, filed a letter-
complaint with the CSC-CAR alleging
that Catipon made deliberate false
entries in his CSPE application,
specifically, that he obtained his college
degree in 1993 when actually he
graduated in 1995 only, after removing
his deficiency. Catipon was therefore not
qualified to take the CSPE since he was
not a college graduate contrary to the
entry in his application form.
Catipon was then charged with
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
documents, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.
CSC-CAR’s RULING:
Revoked Catipon’s eligibility after
passing the CSPE in 1993 for being the
fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. He
was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial
and was meted out with suspension.
CA RULING:
The CA rendered the assailed Decision
denying the petition. It held that instead
of filing a petition for review directly with
it, petitioner should have interposed an
appeal with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1), 43
and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases; that by filing a
petition directly with it, petitioner
violated the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; that
petitioner's case is not exceptional as
would exempt it from the application of
the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca
v. Judge Ramos,the absence of
deliberate intent or willful desire to
defy or disregard established rules or
norms in the service does not
preclude a finding of guilt for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; and that petitioner did not act
with prudence and care, but instead
was negligent, in the filling up of his
CSPE application form and in failing
to verify beforehand the requirements
for the examination.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the CA stood its ground. Hence, the
instant recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was
negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the specific requirements for
the CSPE examination.
HELD:
Yes. The Court affirmed the CA's
pronouncement that petitioner was
negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the specific requirements
for the CSPE examination. Petitioner's
claim of good faith and absence of
deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or
disregard the rules relative to the CSPE
is not a defense as to exonerate him from
the charge of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service; under our
legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Moreover, petitioner - as mere applicant
for acceptance into the professional
service through the CSPE - cannot
expect to be served on a silver platter; the
obligation to know what is required for the
examination falls on him, and not the
CSC or his colleagues in office.
The corresponding penalty for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service may be imposed upon an erring
public officer as long as the questioned
act or conduct taints the image and
integrity of the office; and the act need
not be related to or connected with the
public officer's official functions.
In petitioner's case, his act of making
false entries in his CSPE application
undoubtedly constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; the absence of a willful or
deliberate intent to falsify or make
dishonest entries in his application is
immaterial, for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service "may or may not be characterized
by corruption or a willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules."
Finally, the Court cannot consider
petitioner's plea that "in the interest of
justice and in the spirit of the policy which
promotes and preserves civil service
eligibility," his career service professional
eligibility should not be revoked. The act
of using a fake or spurious civil service
eligibility for one's benefit not only
amounts to violation of the civil service
examinations or CSPE; it also results in
prejudice to the government and the
public in general. It is a transgression of
the law which has no place in the public
service. "Assumption of public office is
impressed with the paramount public
interest that requires the highest
standards of ethical conduct. A
person aspiring for public office must
observe honesty, candor, and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less
is expected."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
NOTES:
Under our civil service laws, there is no
concrete description of what specific acts
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, but the following
acts or omissions have been treated as
such:
• misappropriation of public
funds;
• abandonment of office;
• failure to report back to
work without prior notice;
failure to safekeep public
records and property;
• making false entries in
public documents;
• falsification of court orders;
• a judge's act of brandishing
a gun, and threatening the
complainants during a
traffic altercation;
• a court interpreter's
participation in the
execution of a document
conveying complainant's
property which resulted in a
quarrel in the latter's family;
• selling fake Unified
Vehicular Volume Program
exemption cards to his
officemates during office
hours;
• a CA employee's forging of
receipts to avoid her private
contractual obligations;
• a Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS)
employee's act of
repeatedly changing his IP
address, which caused
network problems within
his office and allowed him
to gain access to the entire
GSIS network, thus putting
the system in a vulnerable
state of security;
• a public prosecutor's act of
signing a motion to dismiss
that was not prepared by
him, but by a judge; and
• a teacher's act of directly
selling a book to her
students in violation of the
Code of Ethics for
Professional Teachers.
Silence of the Law
VIVENCIO CERRANO, v.. TAN CHUCO
G.R. No. 12907 August 1, 1918
NATURE:
An action by plaintiff for damages alleged
to have been caused by the breach of a
contract for the hiring of a casco.
FACTS:
During the month of January, 1916, Tan
(defendant), who was then the owner of
casco No. 1033, rented it to Cerrano
(plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70.
Delivery was made in Manila.
Sometime during the month of May,
1916, the Tan notified Cerrano that in the
following month it would be necessary to
send the casco to Malabon for repairs.
Cerrano then informed Tan that he would
like to rent the casco again after the
repairs had been completed. Defendant
indicated that he was willing to rent it, but
would expect P80 a month for it.
There was no agreement between the
parties concerning the length of time for
which the hire of the casco was to
continue. One week before the end of the
repair period Tan sold the casco to Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man
who had been employed by Cerrnao as
patron of the casco while it was in his
possession, upon hearing that it had
been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went
to the office of the latter in Manila, and
asked for employment in the same
capacity.
Thereafter, Cerrano, claiming that he
was entitled to the possession of the
casco under his contract with Tan
regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng
& Co. induced Santos to refuse to take
orders from the new owners. Siy Cong
Bieng & Co. was obliged to bring an
action of replevin against Santos for the
recovery of the possession of their casco.
After the casco had been in possession
of Santos for three months, the replevin
suit was submitted to the court for
decision upon a written stipulation in
which it was admitted that the casco was
the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at
the time of the suit was commenced, and
that the "illegal detention" of the casco by
Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong
Bieng & Co. in the sum of P457.98.-
Cerrano testified his average profit from
other cascos rented by him was P60 a
month for each casco (P600 for 10
months supposedly).
Petitioners Claim
It was agreed that he was to take the
casco at the increased rental.A contract
for the rental of a casco, when made by
the owner, is deemed in the absence of
an express stipulation to the contrary, to
run from the date of the contract until the
casco has to be docked for its annual
overhauling and repair (ten months).
Defendants Comments
His offer to lease it at the higher rate was
never accepted. In the absence of an
express stipulation regarding the
duration of the hire, duration is deemed
to be from month to month when a
monthly rental is agreed upon.
Cerranos claim of P60 profit does not
furnish the proper measure of damages,
and that plaintiff's right is limited to the
recovery of the difference between the
contract price at which the casco was
hired by him and such higher rate as he
might have been compelled to pay for the
hire of a similar casco in the open market
to take its place. It Cerranos
responsibility to rent another casco
seeing that the one owned by Tan was
already sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co.
(thus mitigating his liability to pay
damages).
ISSUES:
1. WON it was agreed between the
plaintiff and defendant that the casco was
to be leased to the former again after it
had been repaired
2. What is the duration of the term
3. WON there is liability for damages, and
to what extent (mitigation of liability)
HELD:
1. YES, there was an agreement for
the subsequent rental.Reasoning-
It was understood between the
parties that Cerrano was to have it
again at the increased rental as
soon as the contemplated repairs
had been completed. That such
was the understanding is shown
by the fact that plaintiff paid for the
towage of the casco to the dry
dock at Malabon; that he left his
equipment in it; and that his patron
stayed with the casco in Malabon
during the time it was on the dock.
The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co.
was a breach of contract between
the Cerrano and Tan.
2. The period was for a monthly
rental.
Ratio: The reasonable
presumption that one who agrees
to pay a monthly rent intends that
his tenancy is to endure for a like
 period, subject to indefinite tacit
renewals at the end of each month
as long as the arrangement is
agreeable to both parties.
Reasoning: When no definite
agreement has been made
regarding its duration, the lease of
a house is deemed to have been
made from day to day, from month
to month, or from year to year,
according to whether a daily,
monthly, or yearly rent is to be
paid.
3. YES, there is liability for damages,
and there is no mitigation of the
liability.Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to
recover, as damages for the
breach of the contract by the
defendant, the profit which he
would have been able to make
had the contract been performed.
HOWEVER, It is a well-
recognized principle of law that
damages resulting from avoidable
consequences of the breach of a
contract or other legal duty are not
recoverable. It is the duty of one
injured by the unlawful act of
another to take such measures as
prudent men usually take under
such circumstances to reduce the
damages as much as possible.
Reasoning: By selling the casco to
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan broke
his contract with Cerrano and is
responsible for the damages
caused by his failure to give
plaintiff possession of the casco
for the term of one month.
Article 1106 of the Civil Code
establishes the rule that
prospective profits may be
recovered as damages, while
article 1107 of the same Code
provides that the damages
recoverable for the breach of
obligations not originating in fraud
(dolo) are those which were or
might have been foreseen at the
time the contract was entered into.
The injured party must produce
the best evidence of which his
case is susceptible and if that
evidence warrants the inference
that he has been damaged by the
loss of profits which he might with
reasonable certainty have
anticipated but for the defendant's
wrongful act, he is entitled to
recover.
It is equally well-settled, however,
that the burden of proof rests upon
the defendant to show that the
plaintiff might have reduced the
damages. In this case the
defendant has made no effort
whatever to show that any other
similar cascos were in fact
available to plaintiff, or the price at
which he would have been able to
obtain the use of one. In the
absence of evidence it will not be
presumed that plaintiff could have
secured another casco at the
same price had he looked for one.
NOTE:
It is contended by appellant that
the trial court erred in holding him
liable for the money which plaintiff
expended in connection with the
litigation between Siy Cong Bieng
& Co. and J. Santos. We are of the
opinion that this point is well
taken. The contract of lease or
hiring does not create a right in
rem in favor of the lessee, except
in the case of a recorded lease of
real estate. It is admitted that the
casco was sold to Siy Cong Bieng
& Co. and that Santos’ attempt to
retain possession of it against the
lawful owners by whom he had
been placed in charge of it, was
unlawful. The present plaintiff was
not a party to that suit. In
becoming a surety upon Santos’
bond and in paying the attorney
employed to defend the latter he
acted voluntarily and officiously. If
he is unable to recover from
Santos the money paid by him
upon latter’s account — as to
which the record is silent — that
fact will not justify us in imposing
the burden of repaying this money
upon the defendant. The latter is
liable for the damages which he
might have foreseen as those
reasonably to be anticipated as
the natural and probable
consequence of the breach of the
contract, but the damages
suffered by plaintiff by reason of
his voluntary assumption of the
liability incurred by Santos by
reason of his unlawful attempt to
withhold possession of the casco
from its owners, by whom he was
put in charge of it, are not
attributable to defendant and he is
not responsible for them. The
proximate cause of the loss
incurred by plaintiff as a result of
his voluntary assumption of
liability for the unlawful acts of
Santos was not the breach of his
contract by defendant herein, but
plaintiff’s own imprudence.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE vs.
TOMAS DE VERA
G.R. No. L-18816 December 29,
1962
FACTS:
Respondent De Vera is indebted to the
plaintiff in the total amount of
P127,312.24, guaranteed by a real
estate mortgage of the land. Upon
maturity of the respondent De Vera’s
obligation on March 15, 1956, and
despite several demands, the defendant
failed to pay the outstanding balance of
his obligation in the amount of
P99,033.20 as of January 31, 1958
Philippine Bank filed a petition with the
Sheriff of Pasay City to sell the
properties, subject to the Real Estate
Mortgage executed and duly recorded in
the Registry of Deeds for the sum of
P150,000.00.
Another document, Assignment of Real
Estate Mortgage, was executed on the
same day, May 17, 1947, which two
documents, were later on consolidated.
The Sheriff sold at public auction the two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 1631
and No. 37641 to the highest bidder,
which was the creditor bank in this case,
Philippine Bank of Commerce, for the
amount of P86,700.00, and the
corresponding certificate of sale was
issued by the Sheriff Creditor bank seeks
to recover the balance of his obligation
after deducting the price of the land sold
at public auction, of which, together with
the interest up to January 31, 1958, there
remained an outstanding balance of
P99,033.20, as per the Statement of
Account
RTC: ruled in favor of creditor bank and
ordered private respondent to pay his
outstanding obligation. Appeal directly to
the SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creditor bank is
entitled to recover the deficiency arising
after an extrajudicial foreclosure
HELD:
Yes Respondent argues that since Act
No. 3135, as amended, is silent as to the
mortgagee’s right to recover deficiency
arising after an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of mortgage, he (mortgagee) may
not recover the same. A reading of the
provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended
(re extra-judicial foreclosure) discloses
nothing, it is true, as to the mortgagee’s
right to recover such deficiency. But
neither do we find any provision
thereunder which expressly or impliedly
prohibits such recovery.
Article 2131 of the new Civil Code, on the
contrary, expressly provides that: “The
form, extent and consequences of a
mortgage, both as to its constitution,
modification and extinguishment, and as
to other matters not included in this
Chapter, shall be governed by the
provisions of the Mortgage Law and of
the Land Registration Law.” Under the
Mortgage Law, which is still in force, the
mortgagee has the right to claim for the
deficiency
resulting from the price obtained in the
sale of the real property at public auction
and the outstanding obligation at the time
of the foreclosure proceedings.
Further, under the Rules of Court (Sec. 6,
Rule 70), upon the sale of any real
property, under an order for a sale to
satisfy a mortgage or other encumbrance
thereon, if there be a balance due to the
plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the
sale, the court, upon motion, should
render a judgment against the defendant
for any such balance for which, by the
record of the case, he may be personally
liable to the plaintiff.
It is true that this refers to a judicial
foreclosure, but the underlying principle
is the same, that the mortgage is but a
security and not a satisfaction of
indebtedness. The real estate mortgage
does not, in any way, limit nor minimize
the amount of the obligation. Its only
purpose is to guarantee the fulfillment of
said obligation and, in case of default on
the part of the debtor mortgagor, the
creditor mortgagee may execute the
obligation on the real property given as a
mortgage by way of judicial or extra-
judicial foreclosure, according to our
statutes and procedure. Therefore, by
analogy and applying the same
principle of equity, if after the sale of
the mortgaged property at public
auction, there is a resulting deficiency
in the application for the payment of
the obligation of the debtor mortgagor
to the creditor mortgagee, the latter
may proceed in a proper action
against the debtor mortgagor for the
deficiency of the former’s obligation.
It is of no importance whether the
buyer of the highest bidder in the
public auction is the creditor itself.
Extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No.
3135 is not waiver of right to payment for
whole debt. The step taken by the
mortgagee-bank in resorting to extra-
judicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135,
was merely to find a proceeding for the
sale, and its action can not be taken to
mean a waiver of its right to demand the
payment of the whole debt.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
error in the decision appealed from of the
court a quo, the same is hereby affirmed
with costs against the defendant-
appellant. So ordered.
Dura Lex Sed Lex
Ysidoro vs. People
(G.R. No. 192330)
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas accused Arnold James M.
Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal
use of public propertry (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,
Leyte, operated a Core Shelter
Assistance Program (CSAP) that
provided construction materials for the
indigent calamity victims with which to
rebuild their homes.
Lolita Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-
Charge sought the help pf Cristina
Polinio, an officer of the MSWDO in
charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP)
that rationed food to malnourished
children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP
still had sacks of rice and boxes of
sardines in its storeroom. And since she
had already distributed food to the
mother volunteers, what remained could
be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Polonio and Garcia went to petitioner
Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte
Municipal Mayor, to ask for his approval.
Petitioner approved the release and
signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks
of rice and two boxes of sardines worth
P3,396.00 to CSAP.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller,
former member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Leyte, filed a complaint against
Ysidoro for committing technical
malversation when he approved the
distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the
diversion of the subject goods to a project
also meant for the poor of the
municipality was valid since they came
from the savings of the SFP and the
Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good
faith, believing that the municipality’s
poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in
urgent need of food.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan
found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of technical malversation. But,
since his action caused no damage or
embarrassment to public service, it only
fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum
misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held
that Ysidoro applied public property to a
public purpose other than that for which it
has been appropriated by law or
ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the
Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion
for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010
Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan
Decision to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith is a valid
defense for technical malversation.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that good faith is
not a valid defense for technical
malversation. Petitioner insists that he
acted in good faith since, first, the idea of
using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but
from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he
consulted the accounting department if
the goods could be distributed to those
beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent,
he argues that he cannot be convicted of
the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of
technical malversation. The law punishes
the act of diverting public property
earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act
is not inherently immoral but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law
forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order,
and convenience. It is the commission of
an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Petitioner’s act, no
matter how noble or miniscule the
amount diverted, constitutes the
crime of technical malversation. The
law and the Sandiganbayan however,
recognize that his offense is not grave,
warranting a mere fine.
People vs. Pringas
(G.R. No. 175928)
FACTS:
Contention of the State: Appellant was
charged before the RTC of Pasig City
with Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002
• Appellant was charged with
violation of Section 5 for selling
0.03 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).
• Appellant was, likewise, charged
with possession of three sachets
of shabu with a total weight of 0.29
gram.
Officer-in-Charge of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station, designated PO1 Joselito
Esmallaner to act as a poseur-buyer in a
buy-bust operation to be conducted
against appellant along Beverly Street,
Barangay Buting, Pasig City.
Defense of the Accused: He denied the
buy-bust operations. He claimed that he
and his common-law wife Gina Dean
were with their three children in their
House in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig
City when somebody (later identified as
Esmanaller, Mapula, Espares and
Familiara) kicked the door of their house,
entered without any search warrant or
arrest warrant. The policemen
subsequently conducted a search in the
house but they neither recovered nor
took anything. The violent entry was even
witnessed by 3 of his neighbours who
were having a drinking session.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence against the
appellant was obtained in violation of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 because the buy-bust operation
was made without any involvement of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA).
HELD::
Section 86 is explicit only in saying that
the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in
the investigations and prosecutions of
drug-related cases. Therefore, other law
enforcement bodies still possess
authority to perform similar functions as
the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases
will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Additionally, the same provision states
that PDEA, serving as the implementing
arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board,
":shall be responsible for the efficient and
effective law enforcement of all the
provisions on any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided in the Act.
The elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs
are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and
consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
Also, In illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the elements are:
(1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
All these elements have been
established.
[Appellant was indeed the owner
of these items for they were found
in his house on top of the bangkito
following the buy-bust operation
and after his arrest. The
substance in the plastic sachets
was shabu as confirmed by
Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E.
Finally, the drug paraphernalia
seized are sufficient to prove that
appellant also violated Section 12
of Republic Act No. 9165.]
Notes:
In relation with dura lex sed dura
The Court fully realizes that the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense
committed by the accused is quite
severe. However, the Court will not
question the wisdom of the law and of
the legislators who passed it. Dura lex,
sed lex. The only thing that the Court can
do is to recommend that the accused be
pardoned after he shall have served the
minimum period of the penalty imposed
on him.