101-0617-02L HS2022

101-0617-02L HS2022
Micro-project: phase 1
Filip Stenström,
Minneapolis I-35W Bridge Collapse 2007
02.11.2022, ETH Hönggerberg
Short description of Minneapolis I-35W Bridge

• The 581-meter-long steel

truss arch bridge.

• Opened for traffic in 1967

• Each slab had four approx.

3.6-meter-wide traffic
lanes and two approx. 0.6-
meter edge slabs

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Short description of Minneapolis I-35W Bridge

• Two parallel warren-type

trusses

• The main trusses

connected to the rest of
the structure with riveted
steel gusset plates

• Fixed, sliding and roller

bearings.

• 16.5 cm thick cast-in-place

concrete slab, later
increased with about 5
cm.

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Failure investigation by US National Transportation Safety Board

• Documented deformations, fractures, and damage patterns.

• Video surveillance footage.

• Post-accident finite element model.

FEM ilustration of the amount of lateral displacement

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Description of collapse

• Equipment and aggregates were placed at the southern end of the center section in the two closed inside
southbound lane at the day of collapse due to roadway work.

• At 18:05 on August 1, 2007, the hole bridge has collapsed, and 13 victims have been killed.

• The south and west part remains leveled, but the southern end remained lower than the northern end during
the collapse.

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Probable cause

• The gusset plate at node U10 that failed, in

combination with increased weight from
previous bridge modifications and loads from
ongoing construction.

• Inadequately designed by Sverdrup & Parcel and

Associates Inc.

• Both the internal quality control procedure and

the design review by Federal and State
transportation officials contributed to the design
error.

Fracture patterns in blue in node U10W.

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Lessons learned

• Load rating calculations according to “Manual for Bridge” should include all structural elements, incl. gussets
plats, for all non-load-path redundant steel truss bridges.

• Quality assurance/quality control program should be revisited so that it is possible to detect design errors before
plans are made final, and not only include “significant” changes that occur after plans are made final.

• Gusset plates should be included in “commonly recognized structural elements” (CoRe).

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Conclusion

• The U10 node were the failure initiated had inadequate

load caring capacity.

• I-35W bridge was not load-path-redundant structure =>

once the gusset plate at U10 node hade failed, hole
structure collapsed.

• The design firm did not perform the calculations necessary

for the gussets.

• Nor the internal design process reviews or external

managed to detect the design errors

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Interesting topics to study with computational tools:

• FEM fracture model of gusset plate in node U10W.

• FEM fracture model of floor truss.

• FEM fracture model of gusset plate at L11 node.

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