L’AMBIANCE

PLAZA COLLAPSE
Group # 06
19L-2611 Ali Hassan
19L-1770 Mirza Sajjad Hussain
 Table of Content
• Background

• Design and Construction

• Collapse

• Causes of Failure

• Technical Aspects

• Professional and Procedural Aspects

• Ethical Aspects

• Educational Aspects

• Conclusion

• References
 BACKGROUND

• In April 23, 1987, L’Ambiance Plaza building in Bridgeport,

Connecticut collapsed during construction.

• The incident claimed life of 28 workers, and triggered a massive

rescue effort and several investigations.

• Unfortunately, the true cause of the collapse remains in dispute

because a settlement ended all investigations.

• This was a lift-slab project, 16-story building with 13 apartment

and 3 parking levels.
 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
• 16-story building with 13 apartment and 3 parking levels.

• Two offset rectangular towers, (East and West tower), 19.2 x 34.1
m (63 x 112 ft) each, connected by an elevator (Fig. 1)

• Steel columns made up its structural frame

• Concrete slabs 178 mm (7 in.) thick, Post-tensioned

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Fig .1 Floor plan of L’Ambiance Plaza

Martin and J. Delatte (2000)
 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
• Post-tensioning, concrete slabs for all 16 levels were constructed
on the ground

• Using the lift-slab method, packages of two or three slabs were

lifted into temporary position by a hydraulic lifting apparatus and
held in place by steel wedges.

• The lifting apparatus was a hydraulic jack on top of each

column, with a pair of lifting rods extending down to lifting collars
cast in the slab.

• Once the slabs were positioned, they were permanently

attached to the steel columns.

• .
 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
• Two shear walls in each tower were meant to provide the lateral
resistance for the completed building on all but the top two
floors

• These two floors depended on the rigid joints between the steel
columns and the concrete slabs for their stability.

• Shear wall played such an indispensable role in the lateral

stability of the building, the structural drawings specified that
during construction the shear walls should be within three floors
of the lifted slabs
 COLLAPSE
• The building was more than halfway completed At the time of
the collapse

• In the west tower, the 9th, 10th, and 11th floor slab package was
• parked in stage IV directly under the 12th floor and roof
package (Fig. 2 & Fig. 3).

• The shear walls were about five levels below the lifted slabs.

• The workers were tack-welding wedges under the 9th-to-11th

floor package to temporarily hold them in position

• A loud metallic sound followed by rumbling was heard.

• the slab fell onto the slab below it, which was unable to support
this added weight and fell in turn.

• The entire structure collapsed, first the west tower and then the
east tower, in 5 s, only 2.5 s longer than it would have taken an
object to free fall from that height
 COLLAPSE

Fig .2 Elevation of L’Ambiance Plaza just before collapse

Cuoco et al. (1992).
 COLLAPSE

Fig .3 Isometric View just before collapse

Levy and Salvadori (1992).
 COLLAPSE

The collapsed structure of L’Ambiance

Plaza.
Courtesy National Institute of
Standards and Technology
 CAUSES OF FAILURE
Test Hypothesis 1:
An overloaded steel angle welded to a shear head arm-channel
deformed, causing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip out and the
collapse to begin
Test Hypothesis 2:
The instability of the wedges holding the 12th floor–roof package
caused the collapse
Test Hypothesis 3:
The improper design of the post-tensioning tendons caused the
collapse
 CAUSES OF FAILURE
Test Hypothesis 1:
An overloaded steel angle welded to a shear head arm-channel
deformed, causing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip out and the
collapse to begin

Fig .4 Lifting assembly. Fig .5 Typical Shear Head arrangment

Martin and Delatte (2000). Levy and Salvadori (1992).
 CAUSES OF FAILURE
Test Hypothesis 1:

• The shear head reinforces the concrete slab at each column, transfers
vertical loads from the slabs to the columns, and provides a place of
attachment for the lifting assembly.

• It consists of channel-shaped steel channels cast in the concrete slab

leaving a space for the lifting angle.

• The lifting angle has holes to pass the lifting rods through. These rods
are raised by the hydraulic jacks on the columns above them

• The lifting capacities of the two types of jacks used were too small for
Package of three 320-ton slabs, total 960-tons.

• Jacks have a capacity of 89 tons to 150 tons.

 CAUSES OF FAILURE
Test Hypothesis 1:

• The force deformed the lifting angle,

allowing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip
out of the lifting angle and hit the column
with 333 kN (75,000 lb) of force.

• This load accounted for the loud noise that

was heard and the indentation found in that
column.

• After this initial slip, the jack rods and lifting

nuts in the entire E line progressively slipped,
causing the 9th floor slab to collapse,
initiating the collapse of the entire building.

Fig .6 Failure Sequence

Levy and Salvadori (1992)
 CAUSES OF FAILURE
Test Hypothesis 2:
The instability of the wedges holding the 12th floor–
roof package caused the collapse

• The lateral load from the hydraulic jack was

exerted on the heavily loaded wedges, causing
the west wedge to roll.

• Then the local adjustments to slab elevations

caused the remaining wedge to rollout, initiating
the collapse of the 12th floor–roof package and
the west tower (Fig. 6).

• Forces transmitted through the pour strips or the

horizontal jack, or the impact of the debris from
the west tower, triggered the east tower’s
collapse

Fig .6 Wedges and wedge

roll-out mechanism.
Cuoco et al. (1992).
 CAUSES OF FAILURE

Test Hypothesis 3:
The improper design of the post-tensioning tendons caused the
collapse

• The collapse was triggered by failure of slab in west tower due to

incorrect drape of post-tensioning tendons in north-south
direction.

• The design details of the post-tensioned floor slabs (Fig. 7) do not

show the location of the shear walls or the openings for the walls
and did not take these openings into account.

• the analysis demonstrated that column 2H would have high

compressive and punching shear stresses leading to crack and
further to collapse of structure.
 CAUSES OF FAILURE

Fig. 7 Post-tensioning tendon layout

Zallen and Peraza (2004)
 CAUSES OF FAILURE

There are many competing theories

as to why the L’Ambiance Plaza
Towers collapsed while under
construction, but each theory is
based on a break in the load path
 LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS

• A two-judge panel mediated a universal

settlement among 100 parties, closing the
L’Ambiance Plaza case.

• It also ended all investigations prematurely,

leaving the cause of collapse undetermined
(Korman 1988).

• Fortunately, many of the investigators

subsequently published their findings
 TECHNICAL ASPECTS

Buildings constructed by the lift-slab method are stable once they

are completed, if great care is not taken during construction they
can be dangerous.

• During all stages of construction, temporary lateral bracing

should be provided, unless the lateral stability of the structure is
provided through another mechanism.

• Concrete punching shear resistance and connection

redundancies should be provided in the structure

• Sway bracing (cables that keep the stack of floors from shifting
sideways) should be used. This bracing was required but not
used in L’Ambiance Plaza
PROFESSIONAL AND PROCEDURAL
TECHNICAL ASPECTS ASPECTS

Responsibility for design was fragmented among so many

subcontractors that several design deficiencies went undetected.

• If the engineer of record had taken responsibility for the overall

design of the building or a second engineer had reviewed the
design plans, these defects probably would have been
detected.

• Standardized step-by-step procedures for lift-slab construction

should be established to ensure the safety of the construction
workers.

• A licensed professional engineer should be present during

construction to ensure that these guidelines are followed
 PROFESSIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

• Three structural engineers should have been involved in the

design and construction of a lift-slab building. These are the
structural engineer of record, the lift-slab engineer, and the post-
tensioning engineer.

• The structural engineer of record is responsible for the integrity of

the building in its completed state.

• The lift-slab engineer, hired by the lift-slab contractor, designs the

lift-slab process, including structural stability during lifting
operations.

• The post-tensioning engineer details the tendons and related

details and must coordinate carefully with the lift-slab engineer
 ETHICAL ASPECTS

• During construction, structure did not have an adequate level of

stability and safety for workers.

• ASCE Code of Ethics states, “Engineers shall hold paramount the

safety, health and welfare of the public and shall strive to
comply with the principles of sustainable development in the
performance of their professional duties” (ASCE 2006)
 EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS
• Failure plays an important role in engineering practice, through failure
analysis, engineers can learn to avoid similar technical errors, which
allows them to build stronger, safer structures.

• Engineering students should be taught how to analyze engineering

failures as well as it’s importance to any engineer’s professional life.

• For engineering students, the legal ramifications of the case may be of

even greater interest.

• Two additional important points

i. The importance of fixing overall responsibility on a project before

difficulties are encountered and the need to read the literature of
the profession to keep up with technical and procedural
advances.

ii. The ambiguity of the outcome of this case can be used to

advantage when teaching students by emphasizing how much
they still have to learn about the technical challenges of the
profession
 CONCLUSIONS

• The L’Ambiance Plaza collapse killed 28 workers and had serious

ramifications for all the people involved with the project, as well
as for the civil engineering profession as a whole.

• The triggering mechanism of the collapse can not be

determined due to settlement.

• This failure severely reduced the use of the lift-slab system and
almost eliminated it from use
 REFERENCES
• Cuoco, Daniel (1992), “Investigation of L’Ambiance Plaza Building Collapse.”
Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, November 1992.

• Levy, Matthys and Salvadori, Mario (1992), Why Buildings Fall Down: How
Structures Fail. W. W. Norton, New York, NY.

• Poston, Randall, Feldmann Gerard, and Suarez, Mario (1991), “Evaluation of

L’Ambiance Plaza Posttensioned Floor Slabs.” Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, May, 1991

• Rachel Martin, Norbert J. Delatte, (2000), “Another Look at the L'Ambiance

Plaza Collapse”, J. Perf. Constr. Fac., ASCE

• Norbert J. Delatte Jr., Ph.D., P.E, (2009), “Beyond Failure - Forensic Case
Studies for Civil Engineers” ASCE

• Rubin M. Zallen and David B. Peraza, (2004), “Engineering Considerations for

Lift Slab Constructions” ASCE