Vincent Lynell B.

Walo
AS 256
August 19, 2021

Japan’s Role with ASEAN in South China Sea Disputes

*Introduction:
The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan
both faced regional security threat in the South China Sea and East China Sea with
China. China’s attempt to aggressively claim territories in the East and South China Sea
made them both a rising power in the East and Southeast Asia, as well as a threat to
regional security on the part of all the member states in ASEAN (especially the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei), as well as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and other powers/states , that has vested interests in the region, especially
the United States.

*Research Questions
1.) How will Japan influence ASEAN in dealing with the South China Sea Disputes?

2.) Can Japan counter and balance China’s rising hegemony and aggressive
territorial claims in the South China Sea?

3.) What is Japan’s interests in ASEAN and in the South China Sea?

*Research Methods
The researcher shall review news articles, policy papers and research journal articles
about the security partnership between the ASEAN and its member states, and Japan
and relate it to the different  issues concerning military matters that are written therein.

*Background of the South China Sea Disputes

The South China Sea has long been considered a high conflict zone for regional
tensions in East and Southeast Asia. Tensions are intense that the maritime territories
are “at risk of becoming Asia’s Palestine” according to Surin Pitsuwan, the outgoing
Secretary-General of the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). China has led to new international controversies by allowing a revised map in
its new passports showing the disputed territories to be under Chinese sovereignty.
More recently, on December 4, 2012, Vietnam confronted a Chinese vessel of cutting a
seismic cable connected to a Vietnamese vessel that is exploring oil and gas near the
Gulf of Tonkin, the said act seems to be designed to forestall Vietnam from pursuing oil
and gas deposits. (Vagg, 2012)

At the center of the South China Sea dispute is that the question of who owns many
small islands, atolls and reefs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) —and the
Republic of China or Taiwan— they claim sovereignty over virtually all of those
geographical features supported discovery and historical usage dating back to the
2nd century BC. China’s historical claims are shown on official maps by a discontinuous
nine-dash line which covers over 80 percent of the ocean. There are two major
archipelagos within that line: the Paracel Islands and therefore the Spratly Islands. In
1974 China evicted South Vietnamese troops from the Paracels, but Vietnam still
maintains a sovereignty claim. In the south, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and
Vietnam all claim ownership and sovereignty of all the Spratly Islands while Malaysia,
the Philippines and Brunei claim parts of the group of islands in the area. Since the
World War 2, all of the claimants except Brunei have occupied atolls within the Spratlys:
Taiwan occupies one island, China eight, Malaysia five, the Philippines nine and
Vietnam quite 20. Thankfully, because of their small size, neither the Paracels nor the
Spratlys have any intrinsic value in themselves. Indeed in step with the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), many of the Spratlys features
are rocks instead of islands, and thus restricted to a 12 nautical miles territorial sea.
Islands, however, can generate 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zones (EEZs),
and this permits their owners to exploit and reap the lucrative bounty of the seas, like
fisheries, hydrocarbons and minerals. (Storey, 2014)

According to the official statements of China, in their position to the problems, all islands
and reefs within the official Ten-dash line (formerly referred to as Nine-dash line) still as
“the surrounding sea” belong historically to China. However, this position is in conflict
with the UN Convention on Law of the ocean (UNCLOS) which doesn't acknowledge
any “historic rights” in such a context, the term “the surrounding sea” is vague and not  a
part of the UNCLOS vocabulary, and also the Ten-dash line don't even have any exact
location, coordinates and interpretation. the opposite claimant states to parts of the
South China Sea don't agree and have also overlapping claims with other littoral
claimant states. However, there's no unified stance and position of the
opposite claimants against China and also the claimant states' stances ranges from
officially even denying any territorial conflict with China (Malaysia, Indonesia) to actively
pursuing their claims (Philippines, Vietnam). other than that, the littoral states of the
South China Sea are divided on how strongly they require to confront China’s territorial
position and its aggressive behavior towards a number of the claimants due to domestic
and policy considerations and China’s growing economic importance. China rejects any
multilateral talks on territorial issues despite the overlapping claims, thus increasing its
negotiation power. Finally China also disagrees with the involvement of any non-littoral
state, notably of the US and Japan. This difficult situation makes it very hard for any
outside country to play a constructive role and to guard its political, economic and
security interests. (Drifte, 2016)

The potential for the South China Sea dispute to intensify regional instability, military
conflict and Great Power rivalry means that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has made it a high priority since the issue first began as a major security
concern in the early 1990s. However, ASEAN has no laws and mandates to resolve the
territorial disputes, for that can only be solved and achieved using legal arbitration or
among the claimants themselves. Instead, ASEAN has tried to make a neutral position
on the merits of competing and overlapping claims —both those of its members and
China’s— and has focused its efforts on managing the conflict. Over the past two
decades ASEAN has communicated and dealt with China on the South China Sea
dispute with a view to reduce the tensions, discourage the claimants from occupying
uninhabited atolls, and to build trust among the parties. However, because of China’s
hardline stance, and the lack of a strong consensus and agreement within the
organization on how best to deal with China, ASEAN’s efforts have produced
disappointing results. (Storey, 2014)

Lack of progress in the way to improve the management of the South China Sea conflict
can’t be attributed only to China— ASEAN must share a part of the responsibility.
thanks to history, geography and their relations with the Superpower States, each of the
ten members have different perceptions of, and thus the policies towards, the dispute
and, as result, ASEAN’s consensus relies on the lowest common denominator i.e. the
Manila Declaration. Vietnam and also the Philippines think that China’s aggressiveness
may be a national security threat. Malaysia and Brunei, whose claims are farthest
faraway from China, tend to downplay tensions. Indonesia and Singapore are non-
claimants but have significant economic and strategic interests within the South China
Sea and have called on China to clarify its claims and find serious about the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties within the South China Sea and Code of Conduct
process. Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia are non-claimants but don't perceive
a right away stake within the dispute and are careful to not upset the close economic,
political and security ties they need forged with China over the past twenty years by
taking positions that are inimical to Beijing’s interests. But while Thailand, Laos and
Myanmar have remained low voiced, Cambodia has put its relations with China
previous its membership of ASEAN. Thus during its chairmanship of the organization in
2012, Cambodia refused to permit Vietnamese and Philippine concerns at recent
developments to be reflected within the joint statement at a summit of ASEAN’s foreign
ministers in July. As a result, consensus broke down and for the primary time in its
history, ASEAN was unable to issue a final communique. This embarrassing failure put
a severe dent in ASEAN’s credibility because the ultimate arbiter of regional security.
(Storey 2014)

*Importance of the South China Sea to Southeast Asia/ASEAN

The South China Sea is one amongst the foremost important economic and
environmental regions within the world. Over half of the world’s fishing boats are in the
South China Sea, and many different people depend upon these disputed seawaters for
the people's food and livelihoods. But the South China Sea has been dangerously
overfished beyond its available resources. Total fish stocks are depleted by 70 to 95
percent since the 1950s. Coral reefs, which are vital to marine habitats, have
been declining by 16 percent per decade, in keeping with a report from The Center for
Strategic and International Studies. The region is also the topic of over a dozen
overlapping and interconnected disputes over who is responsible of the many different
islands, rocks, shoals and reefs scattered throughout the South China Sea waters. as
an example, the Spratly Islands are claimed in entirety by China, Taiwan and Vietnam
and partially by Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia; each except Brunei occupies a
number of the islands. (Hartman, 2019)

Located in the middle of South, Southeast and Northeast Asia, the South China Sea
occupies a critical and highly contested geographical position. The sea routes that pass
through it provide the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and
function as vital sea lanes of world trade and energy shipments. As a result, any
geopolitical instability and/or territorial disputes and conflict in the area could threaten
the free flow of maritime trade with serious repercussions and effect for the global
economy and international trade. While all countries in the region have a strongly
vested interest in maintaining stability and secure sea lanes, as noted later, any
accidental military conflict at the disputed waters could put that collective interest at risk.
(Storey, 2014)
According to research made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in the Philippines, the South China Sea contains one third of the entire world’s marine
biodiversity and provides about ten percent of the world’s fisheries resources. Most
aquatic resources available include hairtail, chub mackerel, black scraper, anchovy,
shrimps, crabs and smaller fishes. According to some estimates however, 40% of the
fisheries supply are reduced or overfished and 70% of the coral reefs are heavily
damaged. Overfishing and other practices that destroy marine ecosystem such as
dynamite and cyanide fishing mainly contribute to the damage. In spite of the focus on
hydrocarbon reserves, some scholars believe that the issues and conflict over fishing
rights have emerged as a larger driver of the disputes. Indeed, reducing and decreasing
supplies have caused conflict and tensions in the past, and annual Chinese fishing
bans under the supervision of environmental protection are seen as simply another way
of claiming sovereignty. The South China Sea is filled with fishing vessels; China alone
dispatched 23,000 fishing vessels in August of this year after the yearly ban was lifted.
(Vagg, 2012)

Natural gas is also the foremost abundant and sought-after hydrocarbon resource within
the South China Sea. fuel reserves are estimated to total around 266 trillion cubic feet
and frame about 60-70 percent of the region’s hydrocarbon resources. Indeed, majority
of the hydrocarbon fields found within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and so the Philippines contain gas, not oil. like
oil, estimates of the region’s gas resources vary widely. One Chinese estimate for the
full South China Sea estimates gas reserves to be 2 quadrillion cubic feet,  with the
hope that Beijing can produce 15 billion cubic meters of Liquid fuel a year. Yet another
Chinese intelligence report estimates 225 billion barrels of oil equivalent within the
Spratly Islands alone. it's hypothetically possible therefore, that total gas resources (as
against proved reserves) within the South China Sea would be almost 900 trillion cubic
feet (Tcf). This might be equivalent to the quantity of gas in Qatar, which sits on the
world’s third largest reserves. (Vagg, 2012)

Though total estimates vary, the region is assumed to contain oil reserves of at least 7.7
billion proven barrels, with more optimistic estimates reaching as high as 213 billion
barrels. this is often a large sum, and if true, would be the equivalent of about 80
percent of the oil reserves of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. the numerous estimates
demonstrate that no consensus has been formed on the numbers. Though Beijing has
suggested the Spratly and Paracel Islands can also contain oil reserves, no reliable
estimates are on these areas  either. However, many believe there to be a major
hydrocarbon prize within the region. (Vagg, 2012)

Few observers can foresee a serious war within the South China Sea involving large-
scale naval battles, air strikes and amphibious landings. As noted earlier, all of the
parties to the dispute, and indeed all members of the international community, have a
standard interest within the maintenance of peace and stability within the South China
Sea and ensuring the free flow of maritime trade. because the Vietnamese Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung forewarned in 2013 “A single irresponsible action or
instigation of conflict could well cause the interruption of those huge trade flows, with
unforeseeable consequences not only to regional economies but also to the
whole world.” Among the claimants, China currently possesses the strongest militia and
will, in theory, “resolve” the matter by force. The costs to China's reputations would,
however, be very costly: cutting the Gordian Knot would completely undermine China’s
“peaceful development” thesis, cause irreparable damage to its relations with Southeast
Asian countries, and push them into closer alignment with the us. None of
those outcomes would be in China’s interests, and would outweigh any gains to
be made of access to resources. (Storey, 2014)

Moreover, without a resolution of the dispute, or a breakthrough within the conflict

management process, tensions will still cause instability and strategic uncertainty and
might fuel regional arms build-ups. It will also provide a long standing test of ASEAN
unity and negatively impact China’s relations with the United States of America,
Japan, the European Union and other countries. The subsequent incoming ten years
will likely be a crucial part the long-running saga of the South China Sea dispute. If the
claimants design and implement an efficient set of conflict prevention and crisis
management mechanisms, give legal clarification to their claims, and eventually gain
the political will to pursue a settled agreement that resolves the sovereignty question
and divides maritime resources in an equal manner, a good future might come. But if
the current established order continues, and disputes are allowed to increase, the
tensions will almost certainly be sucked into the vortex of US-China rivalry, giving it
utterly irreversible for a minimum of some more generations. (Storey, 2014)

The United States' Energy Information Agency estimates that the South China Sea
holds about 190 trillion cubic feet of gas and 11 billion barrels of oil in proved and
probable reserves, most of which lie along the borders of the South China Sea  instead
of under disputed islets and reefs. The United States' Geological Survey in 2012
estimated that there might be another 160 trillion cubic feet of fossil fuel and 12 billion
barrels of oil undiscovered within the South China Sea's territory. China's estimates for
hydrocarbon resources under the ocean are very much higher but still few in respect
to China’s overall demand—the country’s oil consumption in 2018 is predicted to top
12.8 million barrels per day. (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2021)

*Importance of the South China Sea to Japan

Japan’s policy towards the South China Sea is perhaps visiting own a
considerable pertaining to the long term shape of the regional order during this region
although ultimately US-China competition and thus the reaction of the
opposite countries round the South China Sea will have a more decisive bearing.  As
China is strengthening its claims to most of the South China Sea through political,
economic, military and legal means, Japan has become more involved united of the
very best world trading nations with considerable political, economic and strategic
interests in nation-state, as a security alliance partner of the US, and as a country which
has territorial furthermore as Exclusive Economic Zone border conflict with China within
the East China Sea. This involvement must be seen against the background of the
ultimate deterioration within the Japanese-Chinese relations and lack of mutual trust
and understanding which is thanks to not only the disputes within the East China Sea,
but also to mutual distrust generated by quickly diverging perceptions of military
developments within the opposite country, the way Japan deals with its past aggression,
and competitive if not antagonistic regional roles. China’s South China Sea policies
therefore fit into Japan’s narrative of the “China Threat”, whereas Japan’s South China
Sea policies fit into China’s narrative of Japan as a troublemaker at the side of the
United States.

The ultimate issue which this report attempts to handle is whether or not or not Japan’ s
policies, as an element of Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive peace diplomacy”, can
contribute to a reduction of tensions and to regional stability, or whether it'll only
exacerbate true because the Chinese government is adamantly asserting. within the
primary part, this report analyses the various interests of Japan within the South China
Sea region.

Through trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Japan has established
in geographic area a so-called network economy. in step with the U.S. Department of
Energy, 85%–90% of Japan’s oil imports (roughly 75% of China’s oil imports), and 33%
of Japan’s LNG imports undergo the ocean lanes of communication (SLOC) of the
South China Sea. the foremost natural resources of interest to Japan are fishing and
energy resources. Most major economic interests are connected to Japan getting
involved within the off-shore (as well as on-shore) exploration and exploitation of oil and
gas resources within the South China Sea region so on pursue the goal of
diversification of supply of hydrocarbon still because the marketing of Japan’s
engineering services within the energy sector. Almost no attention has been given
within the media or academic literature to the present reasonably Japanese involvement
Japan and ASEAN Relations. (Drifte, 2016; Herberg, 2016)

The main natural resources in the South China Sea of interest to Japan are fishing and
energy resources. As a top consumer of fisheries and aquatic resources, the South
China Sea’s fisheries and aquatic resources are a considered a great economic interest
for Japan. Aside from that, the government of Japan is very well aware of the
importance of fisheries and aquatic resources for the countries around the South China
Sea. Majority of Japan’s fisheries and aquatic resources from the South China Sea
seem to be imported from the coastal countries, including from Chinese fishing
companies conducting economic activities in the South China Sea , instead of acquiring
through its own fleet of fishing vessels. When China enforced fishing rules in the South
China Sea on their own through the prefectural government of Hainan (according to
official position Hainan is in charge of administering the South China Sea), the
Japanese government complained in January 2014. More important economic interests
are connected to Japan’s involvement in the off-shore (as well as on-shore) prospecting
and extracting of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea region in order to pursue
the goal of diversifying the supply of oil and gas as well as the marketing of Japan’s
high technology services in the energy sector. (Drifte, 2016; Gang 2016)

The South China Sea is very rich in Rare-earth Element Metals. As defined by
the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, rare-earth element metals are a
group of seventeen chemical elements within the periodic table, specifically the fifteen
lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium. The metals are important because they supply
critical components in next generation technology; everything from hybrid cars to flat
screen TVs to top-of-the-line smart phones have rare-earth element metals. Though the
supply of rare-earth element Metals within the South China Sea remains being
determined, large deposits have recently been found just off Japan’s east coast,
and China has used back then its virtual monopoly on the minerals to sanction Japan in
the Senkaku/Diaoyu island conflict. (Vagg, 2012)
*Japan and ASEAN Relations
From 1960 to 2011 Japan provided 35% of global Official Development Assistance
going to the ASEAN countries. In the case of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Indonesia, Japan is the no. 1 Official Development Assistance donor among all the
member states of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. The Philippines as an important coastal state
is very much benefiting from Japan's donations: In 2015, Japan gave the Philippines a
loan of roughly $2 billion to build a railway line which is the single largest Official
Development Assistance commitment by Japan to an overseas development partner.
Moreover, this railway project was originally to be funded by China but the Senate of the
Philippines cancelled it in the middle of charges of corruption. (Nonato, 2015; Drifte,
2016)

Even though Japan is not among the claimants within the South China Sea, this may
not be the first time it get involved in those disputed waters. Japan has made security
cooperation with many of the Southeast Asian claimant nations in recent years, and in
October 2020 dispensed anti-submarine exercises within the South China Sea.
Companies in Japan have signed and made an agreement to go to a joint offshore oil
and gas projects with Vietnam, and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan recently
made a defense export agreement with Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam.
Also, the Philippines has purchased coast guard vessels and radar systems from
Japan. And the maritime vessels of Japan have joined and participated in maritime
exercises within the South China Sea with forces from the United States and also the
Philippines. Japan’s decision to contest China’s position within the South China Sea is
also most likely related to its conflict with China over the Japanese-occupied Senkaku
Islands within the East China Sea. (Radio Free Asia, 2021)

Japan also tried to have its defense relations in Southeast Asia. Conducted by Japan
with a number of ASEAN countries, a dialogue was made that aims to promote
confidence building-measures between Japan and its Southeast Asian neighbors. And
in the light of 9/11, the dialogue is designed to enhance joint efforts in addressing
international terrorism. An interesting feature is the participation of military in these
bilateral exchanges. In these annual bilateral dialogues, Philippine and Japanese
defense officials exchanged views on defense and security policies, situation, and
challenges such as regional security, North Korea, the Spratlys, and non-nuclear
proliferation in East Asia. In addition, they looked into the prospects of cooperation in
counter-terrorism and maritime security. (De Castro, 2017)
The Enhancement of Philippines-Japan defense relations might be seen as strategically
important and essential for both respective additionally as shared reasons. “The
Philippines has got to leverage its alliances and defense engagements with foreign
militaries to rectify the deplorable state of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines)
and its inadequacy to reply to security threats, while Japan has to assist Southeast
Asian countries in active dispute with China over the South China Sea since China
would adopt an identical assertive attitude and actions against Japan within the East
China Sea”. Both the Philippines and Japan must confront with the
identical geostrategic challenge within the sort of China, and this has been the important
feature of their defense diplomacy and security cooperation. (Castillo, 2020)

The Philippines’ local defense industry and production of military goods and equipment
continues to be within the process of further developing its own technological base and
capacity, particularly when it involves producing its own advanced weapon systems. it's
for that reason that while the Philippines can produce good quality Small Arms and light-
weight Weapons and potentially decent ships and other naval vessels, its local military
and defense companies are still not fully capable of manufacturing more state of the art
and complicated weapons platforms and systems like submarines, modern armored
fighting/fire support vehicles, and missile systems. The following gaps may probably
function an opportunity for Japan and its military and defense industries because they're
also considering exporting to their allies and friendly nations within the region. The close
and cordial diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan function an avenue
for further deepening defense partnerships. together with Prime Minister Abe’s promises
for more grants and investment, the lease of the TC-90 reconnaissance aircraft to the
Philippine Navy was a part of Japan’s efforts in helping the Philippines economically
and militarily to counter China’s growing influence of Duterte’s administration. Japan’s
transfer of those reconnaissance planes to the Philippine Navy also showed that
maritime security cooperation between Japan and therefore the Philippines is
developing smoothly despite this relations between the Philippines and China. (Castillo,
2020)

*Japan’s Involvement in the South China Sea Disputes

Japan has since in the past aided and supported the coastal states of the South China
Sea as part of its policy to strengthen the political and economic resilience and
cooperation of ASEAN. As major trade markets, sources for raw materials and
resources, and destination of Foreign Direct Investments of Japan, the coastal states of
the South China Sea and the members of ASEAN in general have always been and
continue to be major recipients of the Official Development Assistance from Japan,
whether those are loans, grants or technical aid. Especially under Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe of Japan, the ASEAN members have become an important part of Japan’s new
“minilateral” security partnerships. (Drifte, 2016)

So far Japan has mostly tried to contribute to stability of the region through economic
means, i.e. trade and Official Development Assistance , and through supporting
ASEAN’s economic and political resilience and cohesion. In the face of China’s more
assertive policies in Asia, doubts among many Asian leaders about the reliability of the
United States' commitment to balance these Chinese policies, and ASEAN’s
fragmented position concerning the South China Sea, the gradual strengthening of
Japan’s security policy is now also extending to Southeast Asia, particularly under
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “proactive peace diplomacy”. (Drifte, 2016)

The law-makers in Japan insisted through the ability of constitutional artifices to resist
and hedge against the exercise of collective self defense has come under increasing
pressure in the post–cold war period. Japan constantly faced pressure and security
threat in the Asia-Pacific because of North Korea’s threat of nuclear weapons, the rise
to power of China as well as its aggressive territorial claims in the Northeast Asian
Region, and globally by the challenges of the Gulf War of 1990–91 and the conflicts
ensuing from 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s— has pressured the
Japanese Government as to how should they support the United States in the exercise
of collective self-defense. (Hughes, 2017)

In order to stop possible threats, Japan must clearly show display both to potential rivals
such as China and North Korea and to its U.S. military ally and other potential security
allies its degree of vigilance and the restrictions for its use of military force. If Japan
continues to be vague in its resolve to prevent and stop an enemy from a specific
course of action through force and retaliation, then conflict cannot be prevented through
the threat of deterrence.

The development of U.S.-Japan defense agreement cooperation supported by collective

self-defense and the amended Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation is
considered by some as only increasing general security issues and regional conflicts
and also the high probability of leading Japan into a regional conflict with the United
States and China or North Korea. (Hughes, 2017)

Between 1997 and 2014, Japan’s military and defense expenditure compared to
China’s decreased from four times the size to roughly one-third. Due to the increasing
capabilities of its military and geographical closeness to crises on Japan’s boundary,
China had come to be perceived in Japan as posing irregular and gradually symmetric
possible threats.

China is revealed in its “maritime advance” and increased their interest and activities
near Japan’s islands as China’s navy seeks greater access to the western Pacific.
Worsening concerns, the political relations between China and Japan had been very
tense, with high-level political and military negotiations seldom and uncommon.

Since September 2012, Japan’s interests had increased over what many policymakers
consider as Beijing’s assertive policies and gray-zone activities proposed to state its
claim to the Japan-governed Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China).
(Liff, 2017)

*Conclusion
Given the fact that the ASEAN member states and Japan faced a common security
threat, that is China, it is necessary that the ASEAN, as a whole, and Japan have a
security and defense agreement to counter China’s aggressive claim in the South China
and East China Seas.

Also, the ASEAN member states and Japan should have military alliances with the
United States, India, Australia and other superpower states that have superpower
rivalries with China. Courtesy of Military Alliances with the United States, the ASEAN,
as a whole, and Japan must forge alliances as well as over to counterbalance China for
its rising power as well as for its aggressive claims in the South China Sea.

In order for the ASEAN and Japan to have a more effective Military Alliance, Japan
should rearm itself and amend the Article 9 of their Constitution. As for the ASEAN
member states, they should have a more stable military and defense cooperation as
well as they should continue to modernize in its weaponry and equipment by procuring
more equipments from all possible sources (namely from India, Russia, Europe, etc.) as
well as the ASEAN member states should also develop their own equipment from their
local industries.

Forging a stronger Military Alliance among the ASEAN member states can make all
member states to be less dependent on the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and
other powerful states in terms of Military capabilities. If ASEAN member states have a
more stable Military Alliance, ASEAN as a whole have a huge potential of being a
maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region, all of the ASEAN member states should learn
from each other’s background, share each other’s strategic geopolitical location in order
to challenge, control and balance China’s rising hegemony in the region.

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