Recent Leadership

Change in Vietnam:
A Critique
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Discussion Paper No. 3

March 2023
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Recent Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Critique

Carlyle A. Thayer

Table of Contents

Table of Contents................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
Assertion 1 – Vietnam’s Party Leader is Emulating China’s Xi Jinping .............................. 1
Assertion 2 – Vietnam Will Become a System of One-Man Rule ........................................ 2
Assertion 3 –Pro-Western and Pro-Business Leaders Dismissed ......................................... 3
Assertion 4 – Greater Party Control Over the Economy ....................................................... 4
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 5
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ................................................................................................ 7

Introduction
Tomoya Onishi’s “New Vietnam president moves party chief Trong closer to one-man rule,”
(Nikkei Asia, March 3, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/New-Vietnam-president-moves-
party-chief-Trong-closer-to-one-man-rule) makes four highly contestable assertions about
recent leadership change in Vietnam:
• General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is emulating China’s Xi Jinping by using an anti-
corruption campaign to oust his political rivals.
• General Secretary Trong, by consolidating power, is moving Vietnam towards a system
of one-man rule.
• The victims of General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign are mainly pro-
Western and pro-business, while Trong and his supporters lean towards China.
• General Secretary Trong’s consolidation of power will lead to the party’s greater
control over the economy.
Assertion 1 – Vietnam’s Party Leader is Emulating China’s Xi Jinping
The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are both in
agreement that widespread corruption in their country is a major threat to the legitimacy of
one-party rule.
Vietnam’s formal efforts to combat corruption on a national basis predate China’s. In August
2006, Vietnam’s National Assembly established the Central Steering Committee for Anti-
Corruption headed by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
In January 2011, at the VCP’s eleventh national congress, Nguyen Phu Trong was elected
General Secretary. In 2012, Trong succeeded in gaining approval from the Central Committee
to transfer responsibility for the anti-corruption campaign from the Prime Minister to the
Central Steering Committee on Corruption Prevention and Control under the direction of the
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Politburo. The reason for this is that the anti-corruption campaign under Prime Minister Dung
was lacklustre.
When Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign there were allegations that he was
specifically targeting allies and supporters of Prime Minister Dung, particularly after Dung’s
retirement in 2016. In retrospect, however, it appears there was very little distinction
between corrupt officials who supported Prime Minister Dung because they benefitted and
other corrupt officials who took advantage of lax law enforcement.
Recently, some analysts and journalists have inaccurately characterized President Nguyen
Xuan Phuc as a political rival of General Secretary Trong. The basis for this allegation is that
Phuc challenged/stood against Trong for election as party secretary after the Central
Committee unexpectedly failed to ratify Tran Quoc Vuong, Trong’s chosen successor, as party
leader at a plenum on the eve of the thirteenth party congress.
The full account of what happened at this time is not known. Trong picked a successor and
showed every sign that he would retire at the expiration of his second term as General
Secretary. The Central Committee’s action at the eleventh hour produced an unprecedented
situation on the eve of the national party congress. There appears to have been no Plan B and
Central Committee members were left to identify a suitable candidate. Did members of the
Central Committee insist on a choice? Was Trong persuaded to seek a third term by his
supporters or did he throw his hat into the ring on his ow volition? Was Phuc drafted in order
to satisfy the call for a choice or did he actually try to block Trong from a third term? Where
is the evidence Phuc’s nomination was in fact a “hostile” act to oppose Trong?
Finally, General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign has been so wide-ranging as to
defy being classed as simply aimed at alleged political opponents. In 2022, for example,
investigations were caried out against 2,474 cases involving at least 4,646 persons for alleged
corruption, abuse of power and economic misconduct. An estimated seventy party officials,
including five ministers or former ministers were disciplined since 2021.
Assertion 2 – Vietnam Will Become a System of One-Man Rule
Xi Jinping was elected CCP General Secretary in November 2012 and President of the People’s
Republic of China in 2013. After Xi’s election to both positions in 2018, he changed the rules
to lift all restrictions on his term in office. Xi is sometimes referred to as the “General
Secretary of Everything” and the General Secretary for Life.”
Vietnam has a long political tradition of collective leadership and power sharing among its
most senior party leaders. Nguyen Phu Trong was elected as VCP General Secretary in 2011
and again in 2016. In October 2018, on the death in office President Tran Dai Quang, Trong
became concurrently the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Trong made no
official move to amend the state Constitution to merge the positions of General Secretary
and President. Trong, to all intents and purposes, was expected to retire as party leader at
the thirteenth party congress. When he was given an unprecedented third term as General
Secretary, he stepped down as state president at the expiration his term in office in April
2021.
The assertion that General Secretary Trong is seeking to consolidate his power needs to be
unpacked and examined critically. VCP regulations stipulate that one of the duties of the
General Secretary is to groom a successor; but the party leader isn’t given a free pass. As
noted above, the Central Committee can override decisions made by the Secretary General.
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General Secretary Trong was dealt his hand in February 2011 when the Central Committee
elected at the thirteenth party congress selected an eighteen member Politburo, instead of
nineteen as planned, out of some twenty to twenty-three candidates.
The General Secretary needs a majority of members to support his initiatives. The resignation
of Phuc as president and the election of Vo Van Thuong does not change the electoral
calculus. Trong still needs a majority of the current sixteen member Politburo.
The President of Vietnam is not just a ceremonial role. The President is vested with
considerable power under the state Constitution to appoint and dismiss government officials.
But all of these powers are subject to ratification by the National Assembly.
The President does not have any special powers as a member of the Politburo, even though
he may be one of the “four pillars.” In sum, the elevation of Vo Van Thuong to state president
does not ipso facto enhance the powers of the General Secretary. Assuming Thuong was a
protégé of the General Secretary prior to March 2023, he still remains a protégé with only
one vote.
In sum, the evidence just isn’t there to make the assertion that Nguyen Phu Trong is seeking
to stay on in power like Xi Jinping. Vietnam’s system of collective leadership, in which the
General Secretary is primus inter pares. is not about to be replaced with a system of one man
rule.
The best perspective to evaluate General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’ motivations is if he
retires at the next national party congress (or as some analysts claim at a mid-term party
congress) in early 2026. Trong’s drive against anti-corruption and negative phenomena will
then be viewed as his legacy to his life-long commitment to party-building.
Assertion 3 –Pro-Western and Pro-Business Leaders Dismissed
The basis for the claim that the victims of General Secretary’s anti-corruption campaign are
pro-western and pro-business is spurious. This claim is based on two major cases involving
Deputy Prime Ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vo Duc Dam who were educated in the United
States and Belgium, respectively.
Vietnam has seventeen strategic partners, including seven western countries (United
Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Australia. New Zealand) and two close U.S. allies,
Japan and South Korea.1 Minh served two terms as Foreign Minister, while Dam’s portfolio
included science, technology, information, and communication. In sum, the two Deputy Prime
Ministers were only doing their jobs by interacting with “western countries” that collectively
make up over half of Vietnam’s strategic partners. In addition, these countries also include
major world economies and are members of the G7 and G20.
The argument that the victims of Trong’s so-called “consolidation of power” are pro-business
may be dismissed out of hand. In 2022, investigative officials attached to the anti-corruption
campaign that uncovered evidence of alleged fraud by executives involved in corporate bond
issuance, equity trading and stock price manipulation. In sum, Vietnam’s weak regulatory
system over the economic sector, including the private sector, created an environment for
corruption and evasion of the law and legal regulations. The fact that Vietnam, under General

1
The other strategic partners include: Russia, China, India,Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
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Secretary Trong, is tackling corruption of all varieties in including corporate crime should not
be read as anti-business. Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on
Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index; but Vietnam still has a long way
to go as it is currently ranked 87th out of 180 countries ranked in 2021.
The high-profile resignations of two Deputy Prime Ministers were not because they were pro-
business but because they failed to supervise subordinates who were heavily involved in
highly emotive COVID-related corrupt practices.
The assertion that General Secretary Trong and his supporters lean towards China is equally
spurious. Vietnam consistently pursues a foreign policy of diversifying and multilateralizing
its external relations through a network of seventeen strategic partnerships and an additional
number of comprehensive partnerships.
Vietnam, with a population of nearly 100 million, is comparable to a middle size province in
China. The two countries share land and maritime borders. China is Vietnam’s largest trade
partner. Both are one-party states led by their respective communist parties. Both follow their
own brand of socialist ideology. The latter two factors provide a special conduit for bilateral
relations that are not available in Vietnam’s other foreign relations. Xi Jinping is both General
Secretary of the party and President of state and this factor largely explains the role of
Vietnam’s party General Secretary Trong in relations with China. Trong outranks Vietnam’s
state president and this gives him unique access to Xi.
Vietnam’s leaders are committed to pursuing relations with China (and other countries) on
the basis of their national interests and protecting Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea are the main irritant in bilateral relations
and both party leaders appear to be in agreement that South China Sea disputes should not
hold hostage the development of their broader bilateral relationship.
The fact that Vietnam’s leaders continually engage with their northern neighbour should not
be taken as an indication they are leaning towards China at the expense of their relations with
the United States and other western countries. In sum, Vietnam’s engagement with China
should not be viewed as leaning towards China but practical everyday realpolitik.
Assertion 4 – Greater Party Control Over the Economy
This assertion begs the question what is meant by “control”? And, who is in control of the
economy if not the Vietnam Communist Party itself?
The key day-to-day locus of decision-making on economic matters rests with the Prime
Minister and relevant ministers in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is invariably a member of
the Politburo and several ministers are members of the Central Committee. There are party
committees in all of Vietnam’s ministries or equivalent organisations as well as state-owned
enterprises and private sector businesses.
In March 2019, the VCP Secretariat issued Instruction No. 33-CT/TW that underscored the
importance of party and government policies “to make private economic entities into a
driving force for the country’s socialist-oriented market economy.”2 Instruction No. 33-CT/TW

2
“Về tăng cường xây dựng tổ chức đảng trong các đơn vị kinh tế tư nhân.”
https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/he-thong-van-ban/van-ban-cua-dang/chi-thi-so-33-cttw-ngay-1832019-
cua-ban-bi-thu-ve-tang-cuong-xay-dung-to-chuc-dang-trong-cac-don-vi-kinh-te-tu-5313
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called for the creation of party cells and mass organisations in all economic entities operating
in Vietnam.
Instruction No 33-CT/TW decreed that “party cells in private economic entities should adopt
their own operational agenda in line with the conditions and characteristics of each type of
enterprise. They must co-ordinate closely with the enterprises’ management boards and
follow their day to day activities to ensure workers’ rights, obligations and interests are
protected.”
The thirteenth national party congress set the long-term objectives of the VCP. Subsequent
Politburo meetings and Central Committee executive sessions or plenums operationalize this
guidance by developing annual and five-year socio-economic development plans. The Central
Committee is advised by the Central Economic Commission and other bodies. The National
Assembly revises or adopts new legislation to enact these plans according to directions from
the VCP.
The VCP has long been committed to developing a socialist market economy by domestic
reform (privatisation of state-owned enterprises), attracting foreign direct investment, and
proactive international economic integration. In sum, it is difficult to see how the VCP could
assume more power over the economy than it already has.
Conclusion
The sudden and unexpected resignations of three high-level Vietnamese government leaders
– two Deputy Prime Ministers and the state President – has given rise to all sort of speculation
about a power struggle among Vietnam’s top leaders. This Discussion Paper has critically
examined and rejected four tendentious assertions:
1. General Secretary Trong is emulating China’s Xi Jinping by eliminating his political rivals
under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign
2. General Secretary Trong is consolidating his power to convert Vietnam into a one-man
political system.
3. The victims of General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign are pro-Western and
pro-business.
4. General Secretary Trong is consolidating his power so the Vietnam Communist Party can
exert greater control over the economy.
Vietnam has a collective system of leadership that is forged from below not above. At the 13th
national party congress in early 2011, 1,587 delegates from all provinces, municipalities, the
military and central bloc organisations elected a Central Committee composed of 180 full
members (entitled to vote) and 20 alternate (non-voting) members from a larger list of
candidates approved by the outgoing Central Committee. The new Central Committee
elected the current Politburo from its ranks, and then elected the General Secretary from
among the newly elected Politburo members. All Central Committee members, including
members of the Politburo, serve for five years.
The General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party has considerable power as the
party’s leader but this power is not unlimited. The General Secretary is primus inter pares
among members of the Politburo but to attain his objectives he needs majority support. The
Politburo is answerable to the Central Committee.
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General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign has two lines of effort, the first is aimed
at punishing party and non-party officials who have committed criminal offensives under the
law, the second line of effort is to discipline party member for violating party ethics and to
hold party members accountable for dereliction of duty. The three high-level officials who
resigned were held accountable for not supervising subordinates who were involved in
COVID-related corruption scandals.
There is scant evidence that any of three officials could be considered a serious political rival
of General Secretary Trong. Trong, who suffered as stroke in 2018, will be 81 years old in early
2026 when the national congress is likely to be held. He will turn 82 in April 2026. All three
of the officials who resigned would have reached the mandatory retirement age of 65 by the
time of the next national party congress. They would need to secure an exemption for
“exceptional service” from the Central Committee.
The Vietnam Communist Party comprises two broad wings – party members serving in the
party bureaucracy and party members who serve in the government. At the highest levels
virtually all high-level officials in the government are members of the Central Committee. The
Prime Minister, state President and Chairman of the National Assembly are all members of
the Politburo. All of the three officials who resigned belonged to the government wing of the
party and in that role interacted extensively with Western states in encouraging trade and
investment. In other words, they lack a firm base in the party apparatus to mount a bid to
become the next party leader.
The VCP has institutional and policy control over Vietnam’s economy. General Secretary
Trong’s goal in his campaign against corruption and negative phenomena is to make the
party’s control more efficacious by eliminating corruption and instilling accountability. There
will be no change to Vietnam policy of encouraging the private sector to be the “driving force”
of Vietnam’s “socialist-oriented market economy.” And Vietnam will continue to pursue its
“active, proactive international integration” through trade and foreign investment.
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Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra.
He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered
in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.

Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in Political Science (B.A.
1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971) and a PhD in International
Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He studied Thai language at
The University of Missouri at Columbia (1965), Vietnamese language at Yale and Cornell
(1969-71), and Lao and Vietnamese languages at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
(1971). Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political
Science, Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
ANU to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of
Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii. He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original
contributor to the Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic Co-
ordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
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During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School flag bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and in Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
Source: https://research.unsw.edu.au/people/emeritus-professor-carlyle-alan-thayer