Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Philippines, Vietnam and the
South China Sea
April 5, 2023

We are writing again to seek your assistance we are researching some of the latest
developments in Vietnam’s ties with China and the U.S.
Recently the Philippines has agreed to open four more military bases to the American
military and two of them are in the northern part of the country (about 400 kilometres
from Taiwan) and one in the west (near the Spratly Islands).
And in the recent Vietnam-U.S. Political, Security and Defence Dialogue in Washington
D.C., the US “reaffirmed their commitments to continue assisting Vietnam in
improving its maritime capacity, law enforcement and identification of remains of
Vietnamese soldiers through training and equipment transfer.”
We request your analytic insights into the following issues:
Q1. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have contested claims over the South China Sea.
Given the fact that rivalry between China and the U.S. is getting unprecedentedly
bitter, do you think Manila’s decision to allow an expanded U.S. military presence in
the region may have any implications for Vietnam? Or how far do you think Vietnam’s
maritime security cooperation with the U.S. could go in the South China Sea dispute
with China?
ANSWER: The Philippines and Vietnam represent diametrically opposed cases. The
Philippines is a signatory to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, and
under this umbrella reached an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the
United States for the temporary rotation of U.S. military forces on Philippines soil.
Vietnam has a long-standing policy of three no’s dating to its first Defence White Paper
in 1998 that declared: “The national defence of Vietnam contributes to the policy of
openness, diversification, and multilateralization of external relations, without
aligning with one country against another, without confrontation and offensive [sic]
against any country… (emphasis added).”
Vietnam reiterated this policy in subsequent Defence White Papers in 2004 and 2009.
In the latest Defence White Paper, published in 2019, Vietnam expanded the three
no’s to four no’s”: “Viet Nam consistently advocates neither joining any military
alliances, siding with one country against another, giving any other countries
permission to set up military bases or use its territory to carry out military activities
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against other countries nor using force or threatening to use force in international
relations (emphasis added).”
Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper contained an important caveat which stated:
Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Viet Nam will consider
developing necessary, appropriate defence and military relations with other countries
on the basis of respecting each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial unity
and integrity as well as the fundamental principles of international law, cooperation
for mutual benefits and common interests of the region and international community.
Vietnam makes a distinction in the Vietnamese language between military exercises
with foreign countries involving preparations for war-fighting (tập trận) and military
exercises that involve practical training exercises (diễn tập). The former type of
exercise has a very negative connotation in Vietnamese, while the latter type of
exercise is viewed positively.
In sum, Vietnam will likely step up maritime security cooperation with the United
States, including the purchase of military equipment and technology. It has already
purchased fire control, laser, imaging, guidance equipment, military electronics, firearms,
six ScanEagle UAV’s and twelve T-6 jet trainers.
A port visit by a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier this year, suspended since 2020,
may well be on the cards. But Vietnam will steadfastly adhere to its four no’s and
refrain from participating in military exercises that are categorised as tập trận.
Q2. How do you assess Hanoi’s approach to China and the U.S. as the rivalry between
the two superpowers is getting unprecedentedly bitter? How much room does Hanoi
need to maintain its policy of not taking sides? Recently, we’ve seen active
engagement between Vietnamese officials and their U.S. and Chinese counterparts:
Xi Jinping hosted Nguyen Phu Trong in November and Biden called Trong last week.
The foreign ministers of China and Vietnam talked over the phone, while Vietnam’s
deputy foreign minister visited Washington for the security dialogue.
ANSWER: Vietnam pursues a policy of diversification and multilateralization of its
external relations, especially among its seventeen strategic partners. General
Secretary Trong’s visit to China last November laid the ground work for tacking (to use
a nautical term) back to the United States. President Biden and General Secretary
Trong are expected to exchange visits this year.
As a result of a recent telephone call between President Biden and General Secretary
Trong both agreed to appoint senior officials to begin discussions about raising
bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. The Vietnamese media quoted Trong as
including defence and security cooperation in his shopping list. Defence and security
cooperation is listed as the seventh of nine areas of cooperation in the 2013
comprehensive partnership (a rung below a strategic partnership).

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Philippines, Vietnam and the South China Sea,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, April 5, 2023. All background briefs are posted
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.