Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Vietnam’s South China Sea
Interests Now Tangled in Geo-
Politics of the Ukraine War
April 13, 2023

We request your assistance in preparing a report on how the geo-politics resulting

from the war in Ukraine affect Vietnam’s interests in the South China Seas.
Q1. Do Japan and China stand on opposite sides in the Ukraine war? What foreign
policy strategy do Japan and China pursue as a result of war in the Ukraine. ?
ANSWER: Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida has often stated that today’s Ukraine war
could be tomorrow’s war in East Asia. Japan’s policy towards the war in Ukraine is
framed by Japan’s strategic assessment that China is the main
threat and that Chinashould not be emboldened by Russia’s aggressiveness.
Japan has firmly aligned itself with the Western/NATO/Group of 7 coalition led by the
United States, while China has entered into a “partnership without
limits” with Russia.
Japan’s strategy is framed to create a strong deterrent posture to dissuade China from
using force to retake Taiwan. Japan pursues this strategy by an unprecedented change
in defence policy including raising defence spending from 1 percent of GDP to 2
percent of GDP over the next five years. Japan’s defence policy also includes lifting
restrictions on arms sales abroad and acquiring long-range missile strike capabilities.
Japan is providing Ukraine considerable financial and economic support including
grant aid and debt forgiveness, accepting Ukraine evacuees, and providing non-lethal
military support in the form of drones, body armour (vests and helmets), binoculars,
winter battle dress, tents, medical supplies, civilian vans, and emergency rations.
Japan has also imposed a robust and comprehensive range of economic, financial and
related sanctions on Russia.
Japan’s strategy is intended to convey to Beijing that China would face strong
opposition if it decided to use force against Taiwan.
China’s strategy is to prevent Russia from capitulating so as to weaken the western
coalition’s resolve to provide every-increasing support to the Ukraine. China does not
want to be isolated and cut off from Europe so it has floated a so-called peace initiative
to undermine domestic support for the Ukraine in Europe and the United States.
 2

China continues to trade with Russia, including dual use technology, and i provide a
market for Russian energy exports in particular. China also offers political-diplomatic
support for Russia at the United Nations and other multilateral forums.
Q2. After Russia’s invasion the Ukraine still supports Vietnam and other Southeast
Asian claimants on maritime disputes in the South China Sea, for example the recent
Ukraine-Japan joint statement. Vietnam has abstained five times from voting on UN
resolutions condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. So how does Vietnam calculate
its national interests on the Russian war against Ukraine?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s national interests have been clearly articulated for a number of
years and have not changed. Vietnam seeks to retain strategic autonomy by not taking
sides in major power rivalry. Vietnam does this by its policy of diversification
and multilateralization of relations among its network seventeen strategic and
thirteen comprehensive partners. It is not in Vietnam’s long-term interests to see
Russia weakened, isolated and dependent on China.
Reportedly, the Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations told his
Vietnamese counterpart that a vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights
Council would be viewed as a hostile act. Vietnam abstains in UN General Assembly
votes, or votes against some resolutions critical of Russia, to prevent Russian
retaliation.
Q3. Japan and China are in sharp opposition on the war in Ukraine and security issues
in Asia, while Vietnam maintains friendly relations with both Japan and China. What
are the calculations behind Vietnam's strategy?
ANSWER: Vietnam has taken a middle of the road position on the war In Ukraine,
supporting international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the UN Charter all
in the abstract. In other words, Vietnam’s declaratory policy is equally acceptable to
China and Japan. Vietnam seeks to maintain the benefits of its comprehensive
strategic partnership with China, its largest trading partner. This explains General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s October 2022 visit to Beijing to meet his counterpart Xi
Jinping.
At the same time, Vietnam seeks to leverage its strategic partnership with Japan to
ensure smooth trade, investment, development aid and maritime security assistance.
Both have a convergence of strategic interests in keeping China from becoming the
hegemonic power in the Indo-Pacific.
Q4. After Xi Jinping completed his visit to Russia (20 March), China deployed a marine
survey ship into the Tu Chinh Vung May area in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone in
the South China Sea. The survey ship harassed the gas and oil cooperation project
between Vietnam and the Russian company Zarubezhneft. In your assessment, are
these two events contingent or related?
ANSWER: These events are most likely contingent. Since January, the China Coast
Guard has made at least forty patrols in the Nam Con Son Basin. Several of these
patrols have passed through waters where Zarubezhneft operates or where Gazprom
is a shareholder. China has stepped up its patrols and Vietnam has responded
by dispatching Fishery Surveillance Force and Vietnam Coast Guard vessels to closely
monitor the Chinese. A local dynamic appears to be playing out.
 3

Q5. When Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh greeted Russian Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko on 6 April in Hanoi, he repeated his statement in 2022
when he visited the US that "Vietnam does not choose sides, but chooses justice and
right." At the same time, PM Chinh emphasized the importance of bilatersl
agreements on "economic cooperation". What are the implications of PM Chiinh’s
statements for oil and gas cooperation between Vietnam and Russia in the South
China Sea?
ANSWER: Prime Minister Chinh’s remark that "Vietnam does not choose sides, but
chooses justice and right” was most likely a reference to the war in Ukraine. On the
face of it Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshenko could take that statement at face value
as supporting Russia’s rationale for its “special military operation.” In other words,
Prime Minister Chinh was signalling that Vietnam was not going to change its middle
of the road stance on the war in Ukraine or take action that would harm relations with
Russia.
Deputy Prime Ministers Chinh and Chernyshenko held extensive talks at the 24thInter-
Governmental Committee on Bilateral Cooperation and the ancillary Vietnam-Russia
Business Forum. Both sides are looking to maximize the financial benefits they receive
from trade, investment and joint projects, including oil exploration.
Q6. If Russia decides to abandon the oil and gas project managed by Zarubezhneft (like
the withdrawal of Russian company Rosneft in 2018 because of Chinese pressure),
what are the implications for Vietnam’s security in terms of sovereign rights over the
continental shelf (or extended continental shelf) in the gas and oil cooperation project
between Vietnam and Russia in Tu Chinh and Vung May areas? Will there be an
increased risk of a violent military conflict as China gains the upper hand over Vietnam
after a Russian withdrawal from the area? How can Vietnam protect and maintain its
interests in this oil project?
ANSWER: Zarubezhneft holds a major interest in Indonesia’s Tuna block and has
revealed plans to pipe gas to Vietnam’s Nam Con Son project near Vanguard Bank
where it has interests in Block 06-1. At the present, Zarubezhneft does not appear to
be under Chinese pressure to abandon its project in Vietnam. Chinese patrols in the
area appear aimed at asserting Chinese territorial claims by regularly monitoring
activities in the area. Chinese pressure on Zarubezhneft at this stage would be
counter-productive because it would harm Russia’s financial interests and create
tension in the “partnership without limits.”
If Russia were pressured to withdraw, this would represent a significant setback in
Vietnam’s efforts to diversify oil exploration and exploitation in its Exclusive Economic
Zone. Vietnam would then be faced with trying to confront China’s Coast Guard whose
vessels are larger and more numerous than the Vietnam Coast Guard. Also, Vietnam
would be forced to suspend operations as it did in 2018.
Q7. Could the gas and oil cooperation project between Vietnam and Russia in Tu
Chinh and Vung May areas explain why Vietnam on the one hand declared that it
supports the territorial sovereignty and integrity of any nation but on the other hand
abstained from resolutions at the UN condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
 4

ANSWER: Vietnam abstained in voting in the UN General Assembly on resolutions that

were critical of Russia because it was not in Vietnam’s interests to see Russia, one of
its few comprehensive strategic partners, weakened. Vietnam is also highly
dependent on Russia for arms, military equipment and technology.
Vietnam’s declaratory support for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is
designed to stake out the middle ground between Russia and its supporters and the
U.S.-led western block that opposes Russia’s aggression. Russia views Ukraine as part
of its historic territory, whereas the western-block supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity. And, of course Vietnam wants the international community to
protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity against an aggressive China.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s South China Sea Interests Now
Tangled in Geo-Politics of the Ukraine War],” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
April 11, 2023. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To
remove yourself from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and
hit the Reply key.

Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.