Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

South China Sea: Fathoming
Vietnam’s Response to Chinese
Intrusions
May 31, 2023

We would like to have your assessment of the recent deployment of China’s survey
ship Xiang Yang Hong 10 into Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone.
Q1. China has continuously deployed a survey ship and China Coast Guard escort
vessels in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in recent months. In November
2022, the Chinese and Vietnamese party leaders signed a Joint Statement on the
South China Sea issue. What does this reveal about China's ambitions and plans?
ANSWER: In November 2002, China signed the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea (DOC) and agreed, inter alia, “to exercise self-restraint in the
conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace
and stability including, among others… and to handle their differences in a
constructive manner.”
Twenty years later in November 2022, General Secretaries Xi Jinping and Nguyen
Phu Trong agreed in a Joint Statement “to properly handle issues at sea… to promote
the full and effective implementation of the [DOC]… and well control disagreements
at sea, without actions that complicate the situation and expand disputes…”
In sum, China will never step back from its ambit claims to the South China Sea,
whether based on its illegal nine-dash line or claims to sovereignty over the four shas.
China cannot be judged by its words but by its action. China’s deployment of the Xiang
Yang Hong 10 and its escort ships into in the waters near Vanguard Bank, which lie
within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, is an act of intimidation designed to
pressure Vietnam into halting current hydrocarbon exploitation.
Q 2. Vietnam has issued diplomatic protests and asked China to remove its ships from
Vietnam's EEZ, but China ignored these requests. What should Vietnam do to counter
China's provocations and aggression?
ANSWER: First, Vietnam must lodge diplomatic protests at China’s actions; failure to
do so in international law may be construed as Vietnam’s acquiescence to China’s
sovereign claims.
Second, as a matter of prudence, Vietnam should dispatch maritime law enforcement
vessels to establish a continuous presence in the waters near Vanguard Bank and
closely monitor China’s activities.
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Third, given the asymmetry of power between Vietnam’s and China’s coast guards,
Vietnam must refrain from actions that are provocative or that escalate tensions
leading to physical confrontations.
Fourth, Vietnam should lobby members of the international community for their
support and condemnation of China’s intimidation.
Q 3. On May 28, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh while working in Ha Giang visited
Vi Xuyen Cemetery. In your assessment, is this a coincidence or a calculated response
by Vietnam to China’s actions?
ANSWER: The 1979 Border War was fought during February and March. Vietnam’s
official War Invalids and Martyrs Day is 24 July. Prime Minister Chinh was obviously
sending a message to the Vietnamese public and China by visiting the newly upgraded
Vi Xuyen cemetery on 28 May during a confrontation at sea with China. PM was
signalling to both audiences that Vietnam would fight to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
Q4. Against this backdrop, Vietnamese media reports on Prime MInister Chinh's visit
only mention the war on the northern border without naming China. How do yiuy
assess Vietnam's position relative to China today?
ANSWER: Vietnam cannot pick its neighbours. I called this the “tyranny of geography”
in an academic article published some time ago. Vietnam, at nearly 100 million people,
is equivalent in population to a middle sized Chinese province. The asymmetry in
power between China and Vietnam is a fact of life. For example, China is Vietnam’s
largest trading partner and Vietnam runs a large trade deficit.
As long ago as 2003 and reaffirmed in 2013, Vietnam pursues a policy of “cooperation
and struggle” (vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh) with China. General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong made a landmark visit to Beijing in November 2022 as the first foreign visitor to
meet with Xi Jinping after his re-election as party leader. The two leaders set out a
framework for bilateral relations in their joint statement. Nonetheless, there are
irritants and disagreements in their relations that must be carefully managed. On this
occasion, Vietnam’s leaders have chosen to be circumspect and not identify China as
the aggressor in the 1979 border war.
Q 5. What do you predict about the future situation in the South China Sea? Will China
continue to be more aggressive in Vietnam’s EEZ and the energy exploration blocks
operated or owned by Vietnam and Russia?
ANSWER: China will continue to assert its sovereignty in the South
China Sea through so-called grey zone tactics by using its non-military forces to harass
and intimidate any action by a littoral state that challenges China’s claims. This applies
not only to Vietnam but the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Chinese vessels
operating in Vietnam’s EEZ often move on into Indonesian waters, for example.
If Vietnam persists in exploiting gas deposits in waters near Vanguard Bank, it is a
certainty that China will pick the right moment to deploy another survey ship and
escorts to harass Vietnamese operations. China will also apply political pressure on
Vietnamese leaders to stop these activities or face the consequences.
Q6. What is your evaluation of Russia’s role in current developments?
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ANSWER: It should be recalled that in 2017, 2018 and 2019 China harassed oil
exploration in the waters near Vanguard Bank and reportedly threatened force if
Vietnam did not comply. Vietnam’s leaders responded by ordering PetroVietnam to
stand down and cancel its contract with Repsol of Spain. Vietnam had to pay
compensation. When China asked Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov to order
Rosneft to cease operations, he declined. Nonetheless, Chinese pressures were
sufficient to cause Russia’s Rosneft to sell its shares to Zarubezhneft and leave
Vietnam.
The circumstances in 2023 are completely different. As a result of Putin’s invasion of
Ukraine, Russia and China have forged a partnership “without limits.” Russia is the
junior partner and dependent on China. China will undoubtedly pressure Moscow to
intervene with Zarubezhneft and Gazprom. This will create a dilemma for Russia
because Zarubezhneft has shares in gas exploration in Indonesia’s Tuna block and
plans to send the gas via an undersea cable to Vietnam’s Nam Con Son basin and from
there to Vietnam’s east coast. Russia will be reluctant to suspend the operations of its
money-making oil companies and damage relations with Vietnam.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: Fathoming Vietnam’s

Response to Chinese Intrusions,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 31, 2023.
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.