Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation

Author(s): NGUYEN VU TUNG

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia , December 2007, Vol. 29, No. 3 (December 2007),
pp. 483-505
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798849

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 Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 3 (2007), pp. 483-505 DOI: 10.1355/cs29-3f
? 2007 ISEAS ISSN 0219-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Vietnam's Membership of
ASEAN: A Constructivist
Interpretation
NGUYEN VU TUNG

Vietnam's membership of ASEAN was driven by pragmatic reasons

of economic growth, political independence and regime survival in a
post Cold War environment But in fact the learning process ? which
made Vietnamese decision-makers through their first-hand experiences
more aware of convergent domestic and foreign policy goals between
Vietnam and ASEAN? was instrumental in Vietnam's decision to seek
ASEAN membership as quickly as possible. The case of Vietnam joining
ASEAN then shows that the process of socialization and interactions
between Vietnam and ASEAN countries helped improve the awareness
of commonalities and promoted cooperative relations. And this is one
of the main arguments in the constructivist approach to international
cooperation based on the self-other internalization. In this connection,
Vietnam joining ASEAN was also part of a broader process in which
the country forged a new state identity in the post-Cold War era:
Vietnam opted for ASEAN membership to overcome an identity crisis
and political isolation. The ideational approach, therefore, offers an
additional and more plausible explanation for Vietnam's decision to
join ASEAN. Moreover, it helps explain Vietnam's continued satisfaction
with and commitment to membership of ASEAN.

Keywords: ASEAN membership, Vietnam, foreign policy, identity, constructivism.

It is widely accepted in Vietnam that the government's decision

to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was

Nguyen Vu Tung is a Researcher at the Institute of International

Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam.

483
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 484 Nguyen Vu Tung

both timely and wise (Nguyen Phuong Binh and Luan Thuy Duon
2001, p. 192).1 In the absence of a detailed understanding of th
organization's working procedures in Hanoi, and despite ASEAN's lac
of robust institutional arrangements to promote regional cooperation
(Nguyen Vu Tung 2007), the Vietnamese decision to join ASEAN
the mid-1990s reflected "the political will" of Vietnam to further
commit itself to the region. What then was the nature of this politic
will and to what extent was it guided by material and ideationa
considerations? Further, what aspects of membership have been mos
valued by Vietnam? By posing these questions, this article focuses o
the ideational logic related to the question of ASEAN membership.
The central argument is that in addition to fulfilling certain materia
considerations, ASEAN membership also helped Vietnam overcom
an identity crisis engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Unio
in 1991. Moreover, this rationale still holds for Vietnamese foreign
policy in the post-1995 period.

Vietnam's Decision to Join ASEAN

With the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia i
September 1989, and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords
in October 1991, the normalization of relations between ASEAN
and Vietnam could proceed. Detecting genuine changes in Hanoi'
domestic and international priorities, ASEAN became more proactiv
in engaging Vietnam with a view to admitting the country into th
ranks of the organization. In 1991, for example, Malaysian Prim
Minister Mahathir Mohamad stated that differences in socio-politica
systems between Vietnam and the ASEAN states would not prevent
it from joining the Association.2 ASEAN countries thought that it
was necessary to bring Vietnam into the organization in due course,
for a number of reasons. First, with the collapse of communism
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it seemed an appropriat
time to reach out to its erstwhile opponent and end the ideological
divisions engendered by the Cold War. Second, as ASEAN was eager
to enlarge the organization to enable it to speak for the whole o
Southeast Asia, Vietnam seemed to provide a good starting point
for the subsequent entry of Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. An
as a result, ASEAN would play a pivotal role in ensuring peace,
stability and, to a lesser extent, prosperity in Southeast Asia and a
larger role in the Asia-Pacific region. In short, Vietnam's membership
of ASEAN seemed natural given the end of the Cold War and th
resolution of the Cambodian problem. By July 1994, a consensus

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 485

had been reached among ASEAN foreign ministers that Vietnam

should be inducted into the organization as its sixth member before
the organization's summit in late 1995.
For its part, Vietnam had readily expressed its desire to join
ASEAN soon after the Cambodian issue had been resolved. Conscious
of the fact that it might take between five and ten years for Vietnam
to familiarize itself with the "ASEAN Way" of doing business, and
thus effectively participate in the organization's economic and political
affairs, Vietnam acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
in 1992. In February 1993 Hanoi announced that that it was desirous
of joining ASEAN "at an appropriate time". Fourteen months later
the Vietnamese Government expressed its intention to seek "early
membership". Then in July 1994 Vietnam formally took the decision
to join ASEAN (Nguyen Vu Tung, 2007, pp. 53-56). Vietnam officially
joined the Association in July 1995.
Since the late 1990s observers of Vietnamese foreign policy
have offered several explanations concerning Vietnam's motivations
for joining ASEAN. One explanation is that membership of the
organization was a means of implementing the overall objective of
having "more friends and fewer enemies" the task laid down in
the 13th Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) Politburo Resolution
adopted in May i988,3 and subsequently in the country's foreign
policy as "being a friend of all countries", which was adopted by
the VII CPV National Congress in June 1991.4 Further, as ASEAN had
established friendly and cooperative relations with the United States,
Japan, the European Union (EU) and, more recently, China, ASEAN
membership would facilitate Vietnam's efforts to improve relations
with the Great Powers. As a direct result, by acceding to the TAC and
joining ASEAN, Vietnam would be able to reduce defence spending
and strengthen national security by having peace and stability in its
immediate neighbourhood, thus allowing Hanoi to focus on economic
reconstruction. Moreover, Hanoi believed it could improve its economic
development by pursuing closer relations with the more advanced
ASEAN economies. More importantly perhaps, as ASEAN cooperation
is based on the free will of all its members, membership would in no
way negatively affect Vietnam's independence and sovereignty (Thayer
and Wurfel in Thayer 1999; Zagoria in Morley 1997, pp. 154-72). The
case for Vietnam improving relations with its erstwhile opponents in
Southeast Asia and joining ASEAN is an example of a foreign policy
designed to better serve national economic and security interests in
the post-Cold War context. Therefore, in light of these considerations,
Vietnam has reaped a great deal of benefit from ASEAN membership.

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 486 Nguyen Vu Tung

In his speech delivered at the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment

of ASEAN, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said,
"Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995 in order to ensure an environment
in the region favourable for the sake of national development and
prosperity. The record of membership over the last 12 years ha
confirmed that the decision by the Party and Government to joi
ASEAN is an entirely correct one" (Vu Duong Ninh 2005).5
The material approach to understanding Vietnam's membership
of ASEAN is not, however, sufficient for several reasons. In the firs
place, the projected benefits of membership had already been gained
through the process of improved ASEAN-Vietnam relations, started
in the late 1980s and continued into the first half of the 1990s. Hanoi's
withdrawal of troops from Cambodia in 1989, the UN-sponsore
political solution to the Cambodian problem in 1991, the accessio
of Vietnam and Laos to the TAC in 1992, and Vietnam's improved
relations with the Major Powers had removed the obstacles to th
improvement of Vietnam-ASEAN relations. In fact, relations between
Vietnam and individual ASEAN members, especially Thailand
Singapore, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Brunei had already been normalized before 1995. In addition,
from 1991 (the year the Soviet Union collapsed) to 1995 (the yea
Vietnam joined ASEAN), Vietnam managed to find new sources of
aid, trade and investment to replace that lost from the Soviet bloc,
thus facilitating a smooth transition to a market economy. Therefore,
even without formal membership, Vietnam had broken out of it
isolation, normalized relations with all countries in Southeast Asia,
and, as a result, ASEAN was no longer considered a threat by Hanoi.
In November 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan wrote, "With
the October 1991 Paris Agreement on the overall political solution to
the Cambodia problem, the key obstacles to Vietnam-ASEAN relations
over the last 10 years was [sic] removed. Relations between Vietnam
and ASEAN members could thus rapidly develop bilaterally and
multilaterally" (Vu Khoan 1995, p. 31). In other words, membership
of ASEAN did not radically alter the dynamics of Vietnam-ASEA
cooperation.
In the wider strategic context, there is little evidence to suggest
that Vietnam sought membership of ASEAN to balance against China.
Similarly, there is little evidence to show that the United States
wanted to take advantage of improved relations with Vietnam, or
Vietnam's membership of ASEAN, to balance China. Between 1991
and 1995, Vietnam ? in addition to joining ASEAN ? normalized
relations with both China and the United States. Therefore, Vietnam's

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 487

improved relations with the United States, China, and the AS

countries weaken the realist argument that Vietnam's membersh
of ASEAN was aimed at balancing China and checking its ambitio
in the area (Nguyen Vu Tung 2002, pp.106-20).
Even in economic terms, Vietnam-ASEAN relations had be
stabilized before Vietnam joined the organization. In 1994, AS
countries accounted for 30 per cent of Vietnam's total foreign tra
and 30 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI).6 Indeed the le
of economic interaction between Vietnam and its ASEAN partn
shrank after it had joined the organization with the onset of
1997 Asian financial crisis. In 2003, trade with ASEAN countries
dropped to 20 per cent of Vietnam's total trade (Nguyen Phuong B
and Luan Thuy Duong 2001, p. 192).7 Investments from ASEA
1997 accounted for 23.4 per cent of total foreign investment
Vietnam. This figure fell to 17.6 per cent in 1999 rising to ab
20 per cent by 2007.8 Moreover, membership of ASEAN posed ot
economic problems for Vietnam's, such as widening trade defi
as shown in Table 1, greater competition from the more advan

Table 1
Trade Turnover between Vietnam and other ASEAN countries

Exports Imports Total Balance of Trade

Year (US$ Billions) (US$ Billions) (US$ Billions) (US$ Billions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Turnover % Turnover % Turnover % Turnover %
1995 1,112 20.4 2,378 29,1 3,490 23.9 (-1,266) 46.7
1996 1,364 18.8 2,788 24 4,152 33.4 (-1,424) 36.6
1997 1,911 20.8 3,166 27,3 5,077 25.5 (-1,255) 52.1
1998 2,372 25.3 3,749 32,6 6,122 29.7 (-1,377) 64.3
1999 2,463 21.3 3,288 28 5,751 24.9 (-0,825) 411
2000 2,612 18 4,519 29 7,131 23.7 (-1,907) 165.2
2001 2,551 17 4,226 26,1 6,777 21.8 (-1,675) 147.5
2002 2,426 14.5 4,770 24.2 7,196 19.7 (-2,344) 77.8
2003 2,958 14.7 5,957 24 8,915 19.8 (-2,999) 62.5
2004 3,874 14.6 7,766 24.7 11,640 19.8 (-3,892) 81.1
Source: National Committee for International Economic Cooperation, at <http://ww
nciec.gov. vn/index.nciec?68>
(3): Vietnam's exports to ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total foreign
(5): Vietnam's imports from ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total imports.
(7): Vietnam's trade with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total foreign trade.
(9): Vietnam's trade balance with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total foreign tr

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 488 Nguyen Vu Tung

economies in ASEAN, and greater pressures for economic and

administrative reforms due to Vietnam's commitment to the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA). Vietnam believed that ASEAN membership
had brought about "new difficulties and challenges in the course of
economic development".9 Therefore, in economic terms, there was no
real pressing need for Vietnam to join ASEAN.

A Constructivist Interpretation of Vietnam's Membership

of ASEAN
As mentioned above, Vietnam opted for early membership of ASEAN.
As the process of joining ASEAN was not as long or as complicated
as had been predicted, it is more plausible to investigate the
Vietnamese decision to join ASEAN from another perspective, namely
from the way Vietnamese leaders changed their perceptions about
ASEAN, and specifically a greater willingness to see the similarities
between Vietnam and its ASEAN neighbours. Naturally, of course,
membership would have to serve Vietnam's specific economic and
security interests as well. However, as argued earlier, economic and
security benefits flowed from Vietnam's decision to withdraw its
troops from Cambodia and accede to the TAC, and not from ASEAN
membership per se. In other words, an ideational/constructivist
approach may provide an additional perspective on Vietnam's
decision to join ASEAN and its satisfaction as a member thereafter
(Nguyen Vu Tung 2002, pp. 106-20). This approach might be more
illuminating, since in the past ASEAN was perceived negatively by
Vietnam as being totally different in terms of the member states'
political structures and foreign policies. This was considered the
main reason behind Vietnam's missed opportunity in improving
relations with ASEAN in the mid-1970s (Nguyen Vu Tung 2006).10
In contrast, in the early 1990s, Vietnam's perceptions regarding
ASEAN became more positive, and Hanoi was more willing to join
the organization as a result.

Increased Interactions and Better Understanding about ASEAN

National interests, according to certain International Relations theories,
relate to the survival of states existing in an anarchic environment
(Jervis 1995, 1998; Keohane 1984; Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979,
1990). Yet, as has been argued, the nature of international politics in
the Third World has more to do with the survival of ruling regimes
that act in the name of their countries (Job 1992, p. 13; Collins 2000,

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 489

p.91; Ayoob 1992, p. 77). The case of Vietnam in this period is no

exception. By the late 1980s, when Vietnam faced severe economic
difficulties and resultant political challenges to regime legitimacy,
and when the ASEAN states' economic success stories had become
widely apparent, the Vietnamese leadership was more willing to
accept new thinking and learn from non-socialist developmental
models. According to Gareth Porter, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
Thach was among the first Vietnamese leaders to study the merits
of the market economy (Porter 1990, p. 1). Porter observed that the
foreign minister utilized this new knowledge to initiate debate in
Vietnam on the need for coexistence between capitalist and socialist
systems and participation in the global capitalist economy. This led
to the adoption of a resolution at the Sixth CPV Central Committee
Plenum in July 1984 which officially laid down the task of actively
participating in the global capitalist system. The resolution continued
to serve as one of the most important documents concerning the policy
of economic reform that was officially adopted by the CPV Sixth
National Congress in 1986. The CPV Political Report argued:
The scientific and technological revolution, the globalization of
production forces, and the emergence of a single world market
are the major characteristics of our era, forcing all the countries
to readjust their economies in order to seek and protect their
optimal niches in the international division of labour. And the
internationalization of production forces has led to the inevitable
need for economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence among
countries of different political systems (Porter 1990, p. 6).

These were acknowledgements of the ineffectiveness of the socialist

mode of economic development. What Vietnam desired was to integrate
into the global economy and enhance cooperation with countries
of different political systems and ideologies. This was a departure
from the traditional worldview of the Vietnamese leadership that had
divided the world into two mutually exclusive camps (Palmujoki
1997, p. 30; Nguyen Co Thach 1992).
The Thirteenth Politburo Resolution of May 1988 introduced a
new approach to security, laying greater emphasis on the internal
dimensions of national security, namely, regime security. It argued
that economic backwardness and political isolation represented major
threats to the security and independence of Vietnam and said in part:
"With a strong economy, just-enough national defence capability, and
expanded international relations, we will be more able to maintain
our independence and successfully construct socialism".11 In January

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490 Nguyen Vu Tung

1994, when the CPV held its mid-term Congress, a list of Four Th
to national security was introduced, namely lagging behind
countries in economic terms, loss of socialist orientations, corru
and red tape, and peaceful evolution.12 This list of threats sh
that by 1994, Vietnam no longer felt isolated and the leader
perceived that their regime was less vulnerable to challenges
outside. Poverty and economic backwardness, as well as corrupt
inefficiency and red tape directly challenged the legitimacy of
CPV leadership, not external threats. In addition, leaders in H
believed that the threat of peaceful evolution would be less dang
if the regime could improve the living conditions of the peopl
reduce corruption (Nguyen Vu Tung 2000).13 In other words, thr
from within were seen as more dangerous than threats from wit
Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan wrote:
Reality in many countries has shown that the threats to security,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of a country lie within the
national borders. Reality has also shown that in many cases,
even without the element of foreign aggression, security and
sovereignty were challenged and territories were divided because
of mistakes in economic, cultural, ethnic, and religious policies.
The developmental backwardness will reduce the people's belief,
cause social problems, and inevitably lead to threats to security,
public order, and even regime survival.14

The reforms that Vietnam started were, therefore, designed to e

economic growth and social stability to protect the regime and
ruling communist party from possible challenges from within.
Such an approach to international relations and regime surv
gave rise to a new eagerness to understand ASEAN states' m
of political and economic development. In late 1992, a m
CPV-commissioned comparative study of political systems
regimes in ASEAN countries was completed with the following m
findings:
ASEAN governments are pro-Western and anti-communist.
they are nationalist by nature, striving to defend their nati
independence and make their countries strong, especially in
economic field.
Their nation-building formula includes export-oriented mark
economy, limited democracy and even authoritarianism in so
countries. This formula is different from the parliamen
democratic systems in the West, but is suitable in the A
context. Thanks to this formula, most ASEAN countries have

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 491

the 1960s gained major economic achievements, stabilized their

internal situation and strengthened their ruling regimes.
The authors of the study emphasized, "The nation-building formula
of ASEAN is not totally different from ours, namely planned market
economy under the leadership of the Communist Party, with some
commonalities in political structures and practices. Therefore, our
formula, if correctly applied, will bring about positive socio-economic
and political results and would strengthen the position of the Party
vis-a-vis the people."15
Therefore, it was no coincidence that in 1993, the then Deputy
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai stressed, "In order to win the people's
hearts and their support, to strengthen and enhance the stability of the
political structure, we must adopt the developmental strategy of the
ASEAN models. The key task is economic growth and social progress,
and they become even more urgent as Vietnam is situated in the
region marked by most dynamic economic activities in the world."16
In other words, leaders in Hanoi understood that in spite of their
different political systems, the Vietnamese and ASEAN governments
shared a common goal: keeping the ruling regime in power.
Vietnam also had a new understanding of the ASEAN states'
foreign policy goals (which is a part of the nation-building formula
and is closely related to the goal of regime security). When leaders
in Vietnam understood that regime survival and sustainability was
an objective, they also became aware that the attainment of this goal
mainly depended on economic growth, which in turn, was dependent
on, among other things, peaceful relationships among regional states.
In addition, Vietnam believed that peace among Southeast Asian
countries was possible thanks to the common need to ensure a stable
regional environment conducive to economic growth, a derivative of
the regime survival objective. From that perspective, leaders in Vietnam
better understood ASEAN's efforts to promote regional cooperation
and peace. Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan wrote in 1994:

The ASEAN countries desire for peace, stability and expanded

cooperation is in keeping with our policy that tries to take
advantage of the favourable international conditions and the
emerging environment of peace and stability to construct and
defend our country, thus realizing the objectives of building a
strong country, a prosperous nation and an advanced society. The
ASEAN foreign policy, therefore, is compatible with the foreign
policy of diversification and multilateralization of our external
relations in which the primary focus is on cooperation with
countries in Southeast Asia.17

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 492 Nguyen Vu Tung

Further, Vietnam was also more appreciative of the ASE

norms of equality among members, mutual respect, non-interfere
in the internal affairs of member states, non-use of force in in
state relations, resolution of disputes by peaceful means,
decision-making by consensus. One senior researcher noted, "ASE
countries were motivated by a strong will of independence, w
is no less than Vietnam."18 Thus, understanding that equality
respect for state sovereignty were notions dear to both Viet
and the ASEAN countries, membership of the organization becam
possible for Hanoi. In making the final decision to join ASEAN, the
Politburo stressed, "We join ASEAN in order to preserve our natio
self-reliance and independence" (Vu Duong Ninh 2000, p. 45).
In short, by 1994, Vietnam had gained a better understandin
of ASEAN's behavioural and procedural norms, and this knowl
greatly influenced its decision to join the organization. At first gla
it seemed that the decision to join ASEAN was made for pur
pragmatic reasons of economic growth, political independence
regime survival. But facts show that the learning process ? w
made decision makers in Vietnam more aware of convergent dome
and foreign policy goals between Vietnam and ASEAN ? w
instrumental in Vietnam's decision to seek ASEAN membershi
quickly as possible.
This new awareness was gained through direct contacts a
interactions. During this time, ASEAN countries accelerated
process of reconciliation between Vietnam and ASEAN, thus mak
it easier for the learning process in Vietnam. From the late 1980
many ASEAN officials began visiting Vietnam. According to
account, in 1989, "all the ASEAN countries have sent delegati
of officials, ranking from Deputy Foreign Minister to Deputy Pri
Minister, to Hanoi. These visits have revived the political dialo
and exchanges, thus increasing the level of mutual understandin
narrowing down the knowledge gaps, building confidence, and lay
the foundation for relations in the future" (Vu Duong Ninh 2000
p. 42).
The visits by Vietnamese leaders to ASEAN capitals also had
an important impact on Hanoi's decision-making process. The CPV
Seventh National Congress in 1991 stated in its resolution, "We
should establish relations with ruling parties in the region."19 After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CPV expanded its external
relationships with the ruling parties of Malaysia (the United Malays
National Organisation), Singapore (the People's Action Party) and
Indonesia (Golkar). From 1993 to 1994, all the national leaders of

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 493

Vietnam, including the CPV General Secretary, the President, the

Chairman of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister visited
ASEAN countries. These high-level visits, as predicted, accelerated
the Vietnamese leadership's learning process and boosted relations
with ASEAN. For example, during a visit to Singapore in October
1993, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam stressed, "The visit is of
great political significance. It shows that ideological differences are no
longer obstacles to the development of Vietnam-ASEAH relations."20
In March 1994 CPV General Secretary Do Muoi visited Malaysia. The
CPV External Relations Commission report on the visit stressed:
The visit to Malaysia was successful. It contributed to enhancing
mutual understanding and confidence, thus further promoting
friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries
in many fields. In the official and private talks, Prime Minister
Mahathir and other national and provincial leaders were open,
sincere and showed respect to us. The two sides agreed to increase
cooperation in all fields.21

The May 1994 visit to Indonesia by President Le Due Anh was seen
in the same way. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) report on
the visit wrote, "more understanding about the political systems
was acquired, and together with the Vietnam's withdrawal of troops
from Cambodia and reforms at home, Vietnam-ASEAN relations are
becoming better and better".22
Between 1992 and 1993, in various memos making the case
for Vietnam joining ASEAN, MOFA officials stressed the following
points: "ASEAN basic documents do not have any point that is
openly or tacitly suggestive of the anti-communist, anti-socialist and
anti-Vietnamese nature of the organization. ASEAN is not aimed at
opposing any other country [and] are in principle in accordance with
the principles in our Party's and State's foreign policy."23 But when
Vietnam's leaders experienced these points firsthand, Vietnam-ASEAN
relations received a significant boost. MOFA's Southeast Asia and South
Pacific Affairs Department's 1994 report noted, "1994 is the turning
point year, because Vietnam-ASEAN relations changed qualitatively.
The relations of suspicion and hostility were transformed into all-sided
cooperation, bilateral and multilateral". The report especially linked
the improvement of relations with the visits to ASEAN countries by
Vietnam's national leaders: "1994 is the year in which the highest
leaders of Vietnam, including General Secretary Do Muoi and President
Le Due Anh, visited ASEAN countries and the CPV developed relations
with the ruling parties in Southeast Asia".24

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494 Nguyen Vu Tung

These visits had a significant impact on the Vietnamese leaders

perceptions. Speaking in private, a Cabinet Office official said that
Vietnamese leaders believed that their visits to the ASEAN capita
and interaction with ASEAN leaders helped to confirm what variou
reports had told them about the organization and its members. Th
even confided that "the ASEAN countries are more similar to us than we
had thought" and "ASEAN political documents and cooperative projec
have proved that ASEAN is not an anti-communist military alliance
and the ASEAN countries' objectives in terms of nation-building an
external relations are 80 per cent similar to ours."25 In short, only
when Vietnamese national leaders visited ASEAN countries, he
direct discussions with their counterparts and began to study ASEA
developmental models, did they become aware of the similarities an
commonalities that existed between Vietnam and ASEAN. As a result
Vietnam-ASEAN relations developed rapidly and the last remaining
obstacles, namely the perception about differences in political a
economic systems, were overcome. According to an External Relation
Commission official "the development of Vietnam ? ASEAN relation
through Party's channels has been instrumental in making full political
integration of Vietnam into the region possible".26
In sum, beginning in the mid-1980s, Vietnam started to see
the merits of the ASEAN model and became more receptive to the
ASEAN order of regional relations. Vietnamese leaders' first-han
experiences of ASEAN countries and interaction with their counterparts
further reinforced the decision to join ASEAN. Therefore, the earlie
Vietnamese perception of differences in the nature of economic an
political systems in Vietnam and ASEAN countries, which complicate
the process of Vietnam's improving relations with ASEAN in the 1970s,
was greatly diminished by 1994 while awareness of many similariti
between Vietnam and ASEAN countries increased. Vietnam, as a resul
was ready to join ASEAN. The ideational approach, therefore, offer
a more plausible rationale for Vietnam's decision to join ASEAN. Th
process of socialization and interactions helped improve the awarene
of commonalities and promoted cooperative relations. And this is on
of the main arguments in the constructivist approach to internation
cooperation based on the self-other internalization (Wendt 1992, 1994
Acharya 2000, 2001; Alagappa 1998; Busse 1999; Hopf 1998).

The Question of State Identity in Foreign Policy

According to a senior MOFA official, "As individuals need to b
members of associations, countries cannot stay away from internation

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 495

organizations and groupings."27 Therefore, the need to find a

substitute membership became critical when the Soviet bloc, of
which Vietnam had been a member for more than four decades,
disintegrated. When the Soviet Union collapsed, senior leaders in
Hanoi wondered what the world would look like without the Soviet
Union, and how Vietnam would cope without its socialist friends:
"political isolation", i.e. exclusion from international organizations
and associations, was deemed a major threat by the CPV Politburo's
Thirteenth Resolution. From this perspective, state identity was
closely linked with membership of international groupings.
Foreign scholars of Vietnam have pointed to the importance
Hanoi attached to a 'sense of belonging' and identity when discussing
its decision to joint the Soviet bloc (Palmujoki 1997, 1999; Yeong
1992; Westad 1998; Pike 1987). The collapse of the Soviet bloc led to
an identity crisis for Vietnam, as well as concern over international
political isolation.28 Vietnam then needed to find a new identity by
seeking membership in other communities of states. To join ASEAN,
therefore, was partly to satisfy the Vietnamese need for associa
tion. From this perspective, the decision to join ASEAN was also
influenced by the need to find a new state identity. ASEAN was a
logical choice, because it was geographically close and had proved
effective in providing a viable developmental ideology that had led
to strong socio-economic development that provided a firmer ground
for regime legitimacy and survival. In other words, the "association
need" was another important element behind the decision to join
ASEAN.
One could, however, argue that the association need was in
fact based on calculations about possible and actual political and
economic gains from the membership of international organizations.
Discussions on the linkage between Vietnam's ASEAN membership
and the benefits it brought about suggest that foreign countries seem
to be more ready to improve ties with Vietnam because of its
ASEAN status. Membership, therefore, became a necessary condition
for interests to be gained. According to an official, Vietnam thought
that if it wanted to reap "full interests, then wearing the ASEAN
hat was a must."29 In this case, there is a close connection between
identity and interest, and it would be difficult to gain the latter
without the former. The point, which was made earlier, is that even
in the absence of ASEAN membership, improvements in Vietnam
ASEAN relations had brought about substantial political and econ
omic benefits to Vietnam as well as additional pressures to further
reform the Vietnamese economy. But most importantly, the focus on

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496 Nguyen Vu Tung

interests would run into trouble as one has to answer the practic
question of why Vietnam decided to join ASEAN at an early date.
the need for association is taken into consideration, we can see th
the logic of states seeking identity may not be influenced entire
by the logic of states seeking material interests. Joining ASEA
therefore, helped Vietnam to cope with the identity crisis when
Soviet Union ceased to exist.
One can also argue that Vietnam's ASEAN membership did n
lead Hanoi to abandon communism, and that the communist/social
ideology continued to exert an important influence on the condu
of the country's foreign policy (Palmujoki 1997, pp. 30-40). Th
observation is accurate, but needs to be placed in a broader contex
First of all, an acceptance of the ASEAN identity did not me
Vietnam had to discard its communist identity. In fact, Vietnam
not have to reject socialist principles or its political system in or
to be accepted as an ASEAN member. It shows that a differentiat
between domestic and external politics could be made, as Viet
could stay socialist domestically while simultaneously cooperat
with countries of different regimes and ideologies. Indeed, AS
countries did not make it a condition that Vietnam had to change
political system to become an ASEAN member, unlike the chan
that countries in Eastern Europe had to make before joining t
EU, and this was consistent with ASEAN's core principle of n
interference in the domestic affairs of member states.30 Related
this is the fact that ASEAN itself consists of member states w
widely different political systems. The admission of Vietnam i
ASEAN, as well as the other new members later in the decad
only broadened the spectrum of domestic political systems in
organization (Funston 1999, pp. 217-18). In addition, members
of ASEAN does not prevent member states from engaging in oth
types of external relations, maintaining or gaining membersh
in other groupings. In other words, a country can enjoy multi
identities, but will attach greater importance to those that best se
its policy objectives. This corresponds well with Vietnam's policy
diversification of foreign relations since 1986; being a friend of a
but prioritizing relations with neighbouring countries and Gr
Powers.31 Last but not least, ASEAN membership reflects substant
changes in the new Vietnamese foreign policy in which ideolog
though important, plays a less important role as compared with nation
interests. In other words, a socialist Vietnam is pursuing a m
interest-based agenda, which is at the heart of the new think
in Vietnamese foreign policy.32 In June 1992, Foreign Minis

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 497

Nguyen Manh Cam wrote, "we hold peace and development as

pervasive objectives for all activities, including foreign affairs. These
objectives must be considered as the highest and long-term national
interests".33
The perception that ASEAN countries "were no different from
us" suggests that Vietnamese policy makers increasingly identified
with the other states in Southeast Asia, and were more influenced
by the association need and the perceived commonalities with its
ASEAN neighbours. The stage had thus been set for the identity
based process of Vietnam joining ASEAN. One observer has suggested
that for the first time, an association of small- and medium-sized
countries seems to have overcome the syndrome of being tied to
alliances with the Great Powers to ensure national security and
prosperity, and that:
The most noteworthy shift in Vietnam's conduct of external
relations and its views of security in the past decade has been
the reorientation from its intense preoccupation with big powers,
to a more balanced position in which regional cooperation with
other Southeast Asian states plays a significant role (Kim Ninh
in Alagapa 1998, p. 454).
The process of joining ASEAN was therefore part of a broader
process of forging a new state identity for Vietnam. Faced with an
identity crisis, Vietnam opted for ASEAN membership to supplement
the communist/socialist identity and to overcome the fear of being
politically isolated. Joining ASEAN at first glance would be seen as
the rational response to the changes in the post-Cold War period. Yet,
deeper analyses would suggest that it was a result of a process of
asserting a new state identity that subsequently materialized in the
decision to join ASEAN. ASEAN membership thus became optimal
to overcome the 'identity crisis/ The end of the Cold War was thus
a blessing in disguise, offering Vietnam the opportunity to rethink
its own identity in a new context of relaxed global tensions and
growing trends towards regional political and economic cooperation
(Frost 1993, p. 78).

Conclusion
It is not the intent of this article to refute the argument that material
interests played a role in Vietnam's decision to join ASEAN. Instead,
this article offers an additional explanation by suggesting that more
emphasis should be placed on the process that led to better cooperation

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498 Nguyen Vu Tung

between Vietnam and ASEAN. This process included major change

in Vietnam's view about itself as well as its ASEAN neighbours,
an increased awareness of shared interests between Vietnam and
ASEAN as a result of increased cooperation between them prior
to membership, friendly interactions and socialization (especially
between ruling elites), and the formation of a new state identity.34
In this connection, a constructivist approach is helpful in providing
a more rounded explanation for Vietnam's decision to join ASEAN.
ASEAN membership helped Vietnam overcome a residual mentality
which stressed the differences between it and its ASEAN neighbours
and has enabled it to look forward to the construction of a new
Vietnam-ASEAN relationship based on shared interests and outlooks.
The search for a new identity to satisfy the need for association
was successful in 1994 when the Vietnamese leadership became
aware of similarities between Vietnam and ASEAN member states.
Nonetheless, this new identity did not come without material gains.
By associating with ASEAN, Vietnam was able to find new sources
of aid, trade and investment which had dried up with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Besides, membership helped to consolidate
Vietnam's standing in the world community, especially by placing
Vietnam on an equal footing with other countries in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, membership has helped secure the legitimacy of the CPV
as it has been able to bring about peace, stability and prosperity
to Vietnam in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung said recently, "With the cooperation with ASEAN,
we can further consolidate an environment of peace and stability,
continuously expand multifaceted cooperation with regional countries,
especially in economic terms, and enhance Vietnam's international
standing, creating more conditions for Vietnam deeper integration into
the Asia Pacific and global economies."35 Taken together, Vietnam
has benefited immensely from joining ASEAN and derives a great
deal of satisfaction from being a member.
As this article has tried to demonstrate, however, part of the
reason for this satisfaction can be explained by adopting a con
structivist approach: Vietnam developed relations with ASEAN on
the basis of adopting the ASEAN identity, and thus overcame the
identity crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet bloc to which it
was a member. The urgent need to associate based on a new aware
ness of commonalities influenced the decision to join ASEAN. That
is to say, ASEAN membership has an ideational dimension, and this
helped give rise to a deeper sense of satisfaction felt in Vietnam
about ASEAN.

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 499

Regional cooperation is possible because of geopolitical (i.e.

realist) considerations. Yet, the constructivist approach suggests that
geographical proximity also promotes awareness of commonalities
and common identity that serves as an additional impetus to
cooperation. Therefore, although both conflict and cooperation can
be explained by the approach of state identity, constructivists tend
to be more optimistic in predicting the stability of identity-based
cooperation and cohesion especially at the regional level and among
small- and medium-sized states (Cronin 1999; Checkel 1998; Wendt
1992). With an emphasis on a corresponding shared sense of being and
a shared destiny, that is a social identity among states, international
relations seem to be more stable and enduring rather than ad hoc and
opportunistic as the materialistic approaches would suggest (Wendt
1994, pp. 386, 390). The case of ASEAN identity-based cooperation
then allows us to hope for prolonged regional unity. The longer
the period of cooperation, the more it will lead to a greater sense
of identity and stronger commitment to norms and rules informed
by that identity. Forty years of cooperation since the establishment
of ASEAN in 1967 have ensured an ASEAN identity, an ASEAN
Way and what may be described as an 'ASEAN peace* in Southeast
Asia. This fact will also ensure that ASEAN's regional identity and
cooperation will be enduring. ASEAN leaders can thus state with a
high degree of certainty, "We envision the entire Southeast Asia to
be, by 2020, an ASEAN community of caring societies, conscious
of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage, and bound by a
common regional identity."36
Vietnam has remained committed to ASEAN since it joined in
1995. Even during the 1997 financial crisis, during which ASEAN's
trade with and investment in Vietnam decreased, Hanoi never
questioned the wisdom of its decision to joint the organization.
Post-financial crisis, the decision has been validated even further. In
2000, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien said, "ASEAN
membership increasingly provides us with the feeling of being on
board (cung hoi cung thuyen) with other ASEAN countries, which
promotes better mutual understanding and sympathy."37 In addition,
the notions of "the ASEAN family" or "the ASEAN community"
have increasingly been accepted into Vietnam's political lexicon.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung has even referred to
ASEAN as "a great family" [dai gia dinh).38 Such words reflect a
positive attitude towards Vietnam's ASEAN identity. Today, as the
ASEAN countries endeavour to construct an ASEAN Community by
2015, the constructivist approach to regional cooperation seems even

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500 Nguyen Vu Tung

more appropriate for Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam finds it quite

comfortable in its support for and commitment to this grand project,
though fully aware of challenges and difficulties that are associated
with it. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem recently said:
"I want to stress that Vietnam has been doing its best to contribute in
a proactive manner to the construction of the ASEAN Community."39
In conclusion, when Vietnam found that membership of ASEAN could
enhance its state identity, it felt more secure and more confident to
act as a member of the regional community.

NOTES
The analyses and arguments presented in this article are the author's personal views
and might not reflect those held by institutions that the author is affiliated with.
The author is especially thankful to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
1 See also Nguyen Manh Cam, "Interview Given to Nhan Dan (People's) Daily,"
July 22, 2000.
2 Text of Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam's Speech at the 4th Vietnam
Fatherland Organization National Congress (Phat bieu tai Dai hoi lan thu Tu
Mat tran To quoc Vietnam) Mian Dan Daily, 15 October 1995, p. 1.
3 Nguyen Co Thach, "Interviews given to the World Weekly," (Phong van danh
cho Tuan bao Quoc te) December 1992, pp. 1-5.
4 The Communist Party of Vietnam, Documents of the VII CPV Congress (Van
kien dai hoi VII Dang Cong san Viet nam) (Hanoi: National Politics Publishing
House, 1991).
5 Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's Speech at the 40th Anniversary of the
Establishment of ASEAN (Dien van doc tai le ky niem 40 nam thanh lap
ASEAN) Nhan Dan (People's) Daily, 8 August 2007.
6 Institute of International Relations Study, Five Years after Vietnam Joined
ASEAN: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects (5 nam sau khi Vietnam
gia nhap ASEAN: Thanh tuu, Thach thuc, va Trien vong) (Hanoi, 2000),
p. 51.
7 Tran Uyen, "On Vietnam-ASEAN Relations" (Ve quan he Vietnam ? ASEAN)
Hanoi Moi, 27 August 2003.
8 Dang Due Long, "FDI from ASEAN to Vietnam," (Dau tu nuoc ngoai true tiep
tu <http://www.vienkinhte.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/xemtin.asp?idcha=1676&cap=
3&id=3323>. See also the MOFA official site at <http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/
nr040807104143/nr040807105039/ns070329091843>.
9 Document coded 3917/QHQT signed by Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai,
in Cong Bao (17 July 1995).
10 See also Trinh Xuan Lang, "Some Thoughts about Our Policy toward ASEAN
Countries and the United States between 1975 and 1979" (Mot vai suy nghi ve
chinh sach cua ta doi voi cac nuoc ASEAN va doi voi My tu nam 1975 den

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Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 501

nam 1979" in Institute of International Relations, Proceedings of the Conference

on 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, Hanoi, 22 August 1995).
11 Iran Quang Co, Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote in 1992, "At present, the enemies
of Vietnam are poverty, famine, and backwardness; and the friends of Vietnam
are all those who support us in the fight against these enemies". Tran Quang
Co, "The post-Cold War World and Asia-Pacific" (The gioi va chau A ? Thai
binh duong sau chien tranh lanh), IIR International Studies Review, (Tap chi
Nghien cuu quoc te) (December 1992), p. 7.
12 "Report of the Mid-Term Party Conference" (Bao cao Hoi nghi Giua nhiem ky
cua Dang) January 1994, in Party's Documents in the Renovation Period (Van
kien Dai hoi Dang Thoi ky Doi moi) (Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House,
2005), p. 404.
13 In 1996, the CPV stressed that red-tape and corruption could lead to loss of
socialist directions, which in turn could lead to "peaceful evolution". See
Communist Party of Vietnam, Documents of the VIII CPV Congress (Van kien
dai hoi VIII Dang Cong san Viet nam) (Hanoi: National Politics Publishing
House, 1996), p. 79.
14 Vu Khoan, "Security, Development, and Influence in Foreign Relations" (An ninh,
Phat trien va Anh huong trong Quan he Quoc te) in MOFA, Integrating into
the World and Preserving Our Characteristics, pp. 209-10. English translation
is provided by the author.
15 The Study Report on "ASEAN Political Structures and Systems," (He thong
va Cau true Chinh tri cua cac nuoc ASEAN) in the Nguyen Ai Quoc National
Political Academy Research Program coded KX 05.02 (December 1992).
16 Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, 20 August 1993 Report, "On the Prospects
of Vietnam's Economy for the Coming Years" (Ve Trien Vong Kinh Te Viet Nam
Trong Cac Nam Toi), p. 6.
17 Vu Khoan, "Vietnam and ASEAN", Institute of International Relations, Inter
national Integration and Keeping National Identity (Hoi nhap quoc te va giu
gin ban sac), (1995), p. 31.
18 Luu Doan Huynh, Remarks at the 3rd Asia-Europe Roundtable, "Peace and
Reconciliation: Success Stories and Lessons in Asia and Europe", Hanoi, 20-21
October 2003), pp. 23-25.
19 The CPV, Documents of the VII National Congress (Hanoi: Truth Publishing
House, 1991), p. 88. See also CPV, Documents of the VIII National Congress
(Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House, 1996), p. 62.
20 Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam's speech at the 4th Fatherland Organization
National Congress (Phat bieu tai Dai hoi lan thu Tu Mat tran To quoc Vietnam)
Nhan Dan Daily, 15 October 1995, p. 1.
21 The External Relations Commission Report dated 28 March 1994, pp. 3-7.
English translation provided by the author.
22 MOFA 5 May 1994 Report, "On the Outcomes of the Visit by President Le Due
Anh to Indonesia," (Bao cao ve ket qua chuyen di tham cua Chu tich Le Due
Anh sang Indonesia), p. 6.
23 The MOFA Report on ASEAN and Vietnam ? ASEAN Relations dated 16
January 1993 "On Vietnam-ASEAN Relations," p. 20. In November 1994, Vu

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 502 Nguyen Vu Tung

Khoan stressed in the "Vietnam and ASEAN" article, "I would like to reiterate
that so far, military cooperation in ASEAN is of bilateral nature." (p. 30).
24 MOFA Southeast Asia and South Pacific Affairs Department Annual Report for
1994, p. 6.
25 Interviews by the author with the External Relations Commission (Ban Doi
Ngoai Trung Uong) officials, January-February 1999.
26 Ibid. In the period between 1991 and 1994, relations with the CPV and ruling
parties in ASEAN countries developed strongly. The CPV established official
relations with the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore and the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia. After Vietnam joined
ASEAN, CPV-Golkar relations also improved. In October 1996, the External
Relations Commission Director was sent to observe the 32nd Anniversary of the
establishment of Golkar. This was the first time Golkar had invited foreign delega
tions to the anniversary. The CPV, PAP, UMNO, National Party of the Philippines
and Democratic Party of Thailand were the only parties invited by Golkar.
According to External Relations Commission officials, after 1996, Hanoi sought
to establish relations with ruling parties in Thailand and the Philippines.
27 Interviews by the author with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials,
Hanoi, between 1999 and 2003.
28 Interviews by the author with senior MOFA officials, Hanoi, between 1999 and
2003.
29 Interviews by the author with Senior MOFA officials, Hanoi, between 1999 and
2003. See Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam's Speech at the 4th Vietnam
Fatherland Organization National Congress, October 1995: "After considering all
aspects, we hold that once we became the ASEAN observer, it is natural and logi
cal that we will become an official ASEAN member", p. 1.
30 Ramses Amer, "Regional Integration and Conflict Management: The Case of
Vietnam" in the 3rd Asia-Europe Roundtable, "Peace and Reconciliation: Success
Stories and Lessons in Asia and Europe", (Hanoi, 20-21 October 2003).
31 See Nguyen Manh Cam, "On the Implementation of the New Foreign Policy"
(Tren duong Trien khai Chinh sach Doi ngoai Moi), Communist Review (Tap
chi Cong san) August 1992, p. 12.
32 Nguyen Co Thach, "Interviews given to the World Weekly," (Phong van danh
cho Tuan bao Quoc te) December 1992, pp. 1-5. See also Vu Duong Huan,
"On National and State Interest in International Relations" (Ve Loi ich Dan toe
va Loi ich Quoc gia trong Quan he Quoc te), Internatioal Studies 2, no. 69
(June 2007): 74-85.
33 Nguyen Manh Cam, "On the Implementation of the New Foreign Policy", (1992),
p. 12.
34 It should be noted that the process was by no means a smooth one. Leaders
in Vietnam had to settle internal differences in opinions and foreign policy
options, due to differences in policy priorities and worldviews. An analysis
of the internal debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
35 Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's Speech at the 40th Anniversary of the
Establishment of ASEAN, Mian Dan Daily, 8 August 2007.
36 ASEAN Basic Documents, at <http://www.aseansec.org>.

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 Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation 503

37 Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien's Interview on the Fifth Anniversary

of Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN, (Phong van Bo truong Ngoai giao Nguyen
Dy Nien nhan dip ky niem 5 nam Viet nam gia nhap ASEAN), at <http://www.
mofa.gov.vn:8080/tbqt/2000>(7 August 2000).
38 Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's Speech at the 40th Anniversary of the
Establishment of ASEAN, Nhan Dan (People's) Daily, 8 August 2007.
39 Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem's interview given to Vietnam News Agency
on the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN, (Ira loi phong van
cua Bo truong Ngoai giao Pham Gia Khiem cho Thong tan xa Vietnam nhan
dip ky niem 40 nam thanh lap ASEAN) at the official website of Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/
ns070807145035>.

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