0

Vietnam People’s
Army, 2021-2023:
A Reader
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 3

April 12, 2023
 1

Vietnam People’s Army, 2021-2023: A Reader

Table of Contents

Vietnam People’s Army’s ‘Double Duty’ (nhiệm vụ kép) ...................................................... 1

Vietnam’s NaBonal Defence Industry ................................................................................... 4
The War in Ukraine and its Impact on Russian Military Engagement with Southeast Asia .. 6
Does Vietnam Risk U.S. SancBons for its Military Ties with Russia? .................................... 8
Vietnam to Stand Up UAV Reconnaissance Unit .................................................................. 9
Is Vietnam Going to Hold a Military Exercise with Russia? ................................................ 11
Force ModernisaBon in Vietnam: Reply to Queries Received ............................................ 13
Can Vietnam Diversify Its Arms Procurements to Lessen Dependency on Russia? ............ 18
U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam? .............................................................................................. 19
Vietnam’s Conundrum: How to Modernise its Military under the Shadow of the Ukraine
War ..................................................................................................................................... 20
Vietnam: Will Military Aircra_ Mishap Result in Turn to Non-Russian Suppliers? ............. 21
Impact of War in Ukraine on Vietnam’s Military ModernisaBon ....................................... 23
Whither Vietnam-U.S. Defence CooperaBon and the Role of South Korea ....................... 26
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ............................................................................................... 27

Vietnam People’s Army’s ‘Double Duty’ (nhiệm vụ kép)

The mobilisaBon of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) to combat the coronavirus pandemic
does not represent the “securiBzaBon” of Vietnam’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as
implied by the Btle of a recent commentary, “Double-Edge Sword: The SecuriBzaBon of COVID
Response in Vietnam” [see Appendix].
In the social sciences the term securiBzaBon refers to reclassifying a parBcular issue as a threat
to naBonal security in order to jusBfy the allocaBon of more resources – including the military
– to deal with the threat.
The outbreak of COVID-19 was no ordinary event. The World Health OrganizaBon declared it
a Public Health Emergency of InternaBonal Concern on 30 January 2020, and a pandemic on
11 March 2020. In other words, the COVID-19 pandemic was viewed by virtually every naBon
on the planet as a major non-tradiBonal security threat in its own right from the very
beginning. In Vietnam’s case, the response to COVID-19 was securiBzed long before the VPA
was mobilised in large numbers in August 2021.
The mobilisaBon of the VPA to combat COVID-19 did not result in the displacement civilian
authoriBes. The Ministry of Health and the NaBonal Steering Comminee for COVID-19
PrevenBon and Control remain the lead agencies in the fight against COVID-19, not the
Vietnam People’s Army.
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Civil-Military RelaBons
According to Abuza, “This [mobilisaBon of the VPA] was a stunning change in policy, and
reflects just how nervous the leaders in Hanoi are right now, as the pandemic deepens, and
the death toll conBnues to rise. It is a stark change in civil-military relaBons.”
The mobilisaBon of the VPA to deal with the coronavirus represented a major change of policy
from Zero-COVID to giving priority to boosBng the number of people inoculated with the
COVID vaccine. This policy change was not made out of apprehension but represented a
raBonal policy response to an emerging public health emergency. This decision to mobilise
the VPA to address this naBonal emergency reflected conBnuity in civil-military relaBons in
Vietnam not a “stark change.”
Abuza also underscored the VPA’s expanding role as “the lead agency for the provision of
food… We should expect addiBonal troops to be deployed, especially to some of the
surrounding ciBes. The Ministry of NaBonal Defense is acBvaBng 35,000 miliBa.”
The VPA was mobilised on 20 August to assist in combatng and controlling the outbreak of
the Delta variant of the COVID-19 pandemic because it spread so quickly and was much more
lethal than previous variants. A large pool of manpower was necessary to ensure than
stringent lockdown measures and limitaBons on movement in Ho Chi Minh City and southern
provinces were enforced. Because people were confined to home, the VPA was enlisted to
assist with populaBon control and deliver food.
[It should be noted, parentheBcally, that Australian Defence Force personnel were mobilised
to assist civil authoriBes in the states of Victoria and New South Wales in populaBon control
(cross border travel, restricBons on movement in hot spots, and assisBng in monitoring
arrivals from overseas who were placed in quaranBne, etc.) during an upsurge in the COVID-
19 pandemic in 2021.]
Abuza then went on to make two contestable asserBons. First, “State media made very clear
the VPA would be used to help put down any threat that emerges to take advantage of the
current situaBon, fears heightened by the arrival this week of US Vice President Kamala
Harris.” There is no evidence that the imposiBon of stringent public health measures
(confinement to home, restricBons on movement and travel) generated a hosBle response
from the general public, let alone the threat of an insurrecBon as Abuza alludes.1
Second, Abuza opined that the donaBon of 200,000 vaccines by China’s People’s LiberaBon
Army to the VPA reflects “the regime’s fear… [and] says a lot about the regime’s expectaBon
that more troops will be deployed as more of the country goes into extended lockdown.”
Nervous Nellies?
Abuza’s argument that Hanoi’s leaders were “nervous” because of the rising death toll and
feared an erupBon of public anger because of severe lockdowns and therefore needed to
inoculate VPA troops with Chinese vaccines is specious. In early 2020, Vietnamese Border

1
Zachary Abuza claims that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Vietnam Communist Party passed an
emergency decree (CP-89) “authorizing the VPA to put down peasant uprisings in the Red River Delta and in the
Central Highlands. It was a role and function that the VPA was clearly uncomfortable with and has eschewed
since, leaving most domestic security matters to the Ministry of Public Security.” This assertion is questionable
and needs further research. CP-89 is likely a fragment meaning Chính Phủ (Government or Cabinet) 1989.
 3

Guard troops and VPA units along the northern border donated face masks and medical
supplies to their Chinese counterparts. Later, when China donated vaccines to Vietnam, it
requested that priority be given to Chinese ciBzens in Vietnam, communiBes along the
northern border, and students and other persons who planned to travel to China. By the Bme
China donated 200,000 vaccines to the VPA, Vietnam had acquired 55 million doses (see
below).
The VPA’s “Double Duty”
According to LT GEN Vũ Hải Sản, the VPA responded to a direcBve from the Central Military
Comminee (chaired by the party Secretary General) and Ministry of NaBonal Defence that
designated “prevenBon and control of the COVID-19 pandemic is the army’s combat mission
in peaceBme.” 2
LT GEN Sản also stressed that the VPA “strictly implements the direcBves of the Party,
Government, Central Military Commission, the Ministry of NaBonal Defence, and the NaBonal
Steering Comminee for COVID-19 PrevenBon and Control, as well as regulaBons and
guidelines of the Ministry of Health… The units closely coordinate with the Party Comminees
and local authoriBes where they are staBoned.”
Vietnam’s decision to deploy the VPA to assist civilian authoriBes in combatng the fourth
wave of COVID-19 did not represent a “stark change in civil-military relaBons.” The VPA and
associated miliBa have long been involved in assisBng civilian authoriBes miBgate natural and
environmental disasters, such as floods and tropical storms, and other emergencies.
According to the 2019 Defence White Paper (p. 79):
The VPA’s units are to… acBvely take part in disaster preparedness and response,
search and rescue, and contribute to the protecBon of the environment. The VPA units
must conBnue to closely coordinate with local authoriBes, and acBvely parBcipate in
hunger eliminaBon and poverty reducBon, contribuBng to the improvement of the
people’s material and spiritual life.
In addiBon, VPA Economic-Defence Corps (and other military Corps and companies) are in
charge of twenty-eight Economic-Defence Zones in remote areas.
In August when the military was mobilised, the Government took the decision to end its policy
of Zero-Covid and to give priority to speeding up vaccinaBons. As a result of an internaBonal
diplomaBc offensive Vietnam acquired 55 million vaccine doses. This led to high vaccinaBon
rates in Ho Chi Minh City and the li_ing of strict lockdown public health measures.
The VPA was mobilised on 20 August 2021. COVID restricBons in Ho Chi Minh City were li_ed
on 1 October (and then other southern provinces) and the VPA returned to barracks. In sum,
the mobilisaBon of the VPA to support civilian-led efforts to combat COVID-19 represented
conBnuity in civil-military relaBons to deal with a naBonal emergency and did not represent
the securiBzaBon of Vietnam’s COVID response.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam People’s Army’s ‘Double Mission’ (nhiệm vụ kép),” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, November 8, 2021.

2
Vũ Hải Sản, “Toàn quân triển khai thực hiện thắng lợi ‘nhiệm vụ kép’,” Tạp chí Quốc phòng toàn dân, 10/2021,
pp. 4-7.
 4

Vietnam’s Na?onal Defence Industry

We request your assessment about Vietnam's achievements in defense industry. As you
know, Vietnam has a long history of buying Russian-made arms, but now the country is able
to produce some weapons on its own, reducing its dependence on foreign countries (see
bullet points below).
• Vietnam is believed to be the second Asia-Pacific nation to manufacture its own
variant of a missile based on the Russian Zvezda-Strela 3M24 Uran.
• Vietnam has built some ships domestically such as TT-400TP-class gunboats, Molniya-
class guided missile ships, DN-2000 patrol boats, submarine rescue ships.
• Vietnam Successfully made Medium-Range Radar RV-02, VMS-2DM.
What is your assessment of the following issues?
Q1. What are Vietnam's achievements in the defense sector in recent years?
ANSWER: In January 2011, the PoliBcal Report to the 11th naBonal congress of the Vietnam
Communist Party listed modernizaBon of the armed forces as one of five key naBonal
objecBves for the period 2011-16. Over the following years up to the present Vietnam’s
defence sector procured so-called “big Bcket” (expensive) military plazorms such as six
Molniya-class missile fast anack cra_, Gepard-class frigates, six Varshavyanka-class
convenBonal submarines, twenty Sukhoi Su30MKs mulBrole jet fighters, advanced radar,
modern air defence systems, coastal defence missiles and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance) systems.
Q2. What factors contribute to self-reliance in defence industry? Do you think Vietnam can
become self-reliant in this sector?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Book declared, “Viet Nam makes selecBve
investment in several advanced defence industrial establishments to move toward the
formaBon of self-reliant (tự chủ), high-tech, and dual-use defence industrial groups or
complexes. It also promotes internaBonal cooperaBon to meet the requirements of naBonal
defence and construcBon in the new situaBon.”
According to an assessment by Jane’s Vietnam – Defense ProducCon and R&D (August 31,
2021), “Vietnam’s indigenous defence industrial base… is, in the main, poorly equipped to
meet the increasingly sophisBcated requirements of the Vietnam People’s Army and its
affiliated air force, navy, and coast guard.”
Jane’s also offered this assessment, “[Vietnam’s] ability to absorb advanced Western defence
technologies is restricted. Accordingly, while Vietnam may increasingly purchase defence
technologies from Western contractors, a lack of indigenous capability is likely to present a
significant burden to contractors commined to integraBng their technologies into Vietnam’s
defence industrial complex.”
Vietnam is well aware of its shortcomings. In July 2021, the Ministry of NaBonal Defence’s
General Department of Defence Industry announced a plan to reform the naBonal defence
industrial base over the period 2021-30 with a focus on improving capability through civil-
military integraBon and dual-use technologies.
 5

Very few countries can develop a naBonal defence industry that is completely self-reliant. For
example, advanced economies like Japan, Australia and South Korea procure weapons and
military technology from the United States. India and Turkey purchase weapon systems, such
as air defence systems (S-400 and S-500), from Russia.
A naBonal defence industry is very expensive because there is only one customer in the
domesBc market the military. A naBonal defence industry also must compete with the private
sector to recruit, pay, train and retain highly qualified technicians and engineers. This adds
cost because the private sector is more compeBBve.
Major arms producing countries, such as the United States, Russia, France, Germany, China,
and the United Kingdom, offset these costs by exporBng and selling weapons and military
equipment on the internaBonal market.
Five factors are important in fostering self-reliance in a country’s naBonal defence industry.
First, a country has to develop a large and modern industrial base to support a naBonal
defence industry and this industrial base must be able to provide the special capabiliBes
needed by the military. Second, a country has to have a broad-based educaBonal system that
produces sufficient qualified engineers and technicians. Third, a country must be willing to
provide sufficient funds for defence industry from the naBonal budget. Fourth, a country must
appropriately fund research and development in emerging technologies. Fi_h, a country
needs to develop an export strategy to sell weapons and equipment on the internaBonal
market.
Q3. Which country do you think Vietnam can learn from in locally developing weapons? Why?
ANSWER: Vietnam already has experience in working with other countries to produce
weapons and military equipment through joint ventures and other arrangements – Russia,
India, Israel, Japan and the Netherlands, for example. Vietnam has also signed various
agreements or statements with other countries to develop naBonal defence industry such as
France, South Korea, United Kingdom and the United States.
In addiBon, Vietnam supported a Malaysian proposal for defence industry cooperaBon among
members of the AssociaBon of Southeast Asian NaBons. Vietnam and Indonesia have explored
co-producBon of fixed wing aircra_ and helicopters. And Vietnam has held discussions with
Singapore and the Philippines about cooperaBon in defence industry.
Vietnam is best served by not becoming too dependent on any one country. Vietnam should
focus on how to get the best value for money. This means working with a variety of countries
in specific areas that meet Vietnam’s needs.
Q4. Which of Vietnam's achievements in the defense industry do you find the most
impressive? Why?
ANSWER: Currently, Vietnam’s naBonal defence industry is capable of MRO (maintenance,
repair and overhaul) of exisBng stocks of naval and air plazorms and weapons; depot-level
reverse engineering of aircra_ spares; assembling patrol boats from kits; construcBng light
aircra_, unmanned aerial vehicles and patrol boats; and co-producing a variety of missiles
through technology transfer.
Three areas stand out: co-producBon of anB-ship missiles, ship-building, and emerging
technologies.
 6

The co-producBon of missiles is significant because if an armed conflict should break out,
there will be an urgent need to replenish aircra_ and ships that have expended their anB-ship
missiles. Now that Vietnam has the capacity to produce its own stocks of anB-ship missiles it
will no longer be dependent on an overseas supplier or the risk of delays in supply. Because
of technology transfer, Vietnam can build up suitable stockpiles of Yakhont (SS-N-26) and KCT-
15 (Kh-35) anB-ship missiles.
Vietnam has been gradually building up its capacity to construct patrol boats and naval ships
of increasing tonnage, either in co-partnership (Damen of the Netherlands) or domesBcally.
Vietnam’s shipbuilding program includes eight 1,500-ton TT-1500 Offshore Patrol Vessels, four
2,200-ton DN-2000-class cuners, and four 4,300 ton DN 4000-class mulBrole Patrol Vessels.
This is significant because safeguarding sovereignty in the East Sea is a high defence priority
and Vietnam will be able to build naval warships suitable to its needs.
The third area of naBonal defence industry is the most impressive, this is the use of 4th
Industrial RevoluBon technologies for the military. The best example is the Vienel High
Technology Industries CorporaBon (VHT), under the Vienel Military Industry and Telecoms
Group, established in May 2019. VHT is engaged in the military applicaBon of arBficial
intelligence, roboBcs, and quantum compuBng.
The aim of VHT is to support Vietnam’s drive to be self-sufficient in advanced military
technologies and to enter the export market. VHT focuses on developing C5ISR (command,
control, communicaBons, cyber, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), electronic
warfare, radars, automaBon, electro-opBcs and simulaBon. High-tech will be the determining
factor in future conflicts and Vietnam is posiBoning itself to keep abreast of current
developments.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s NaBonal Defence Industry,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, December 15, 2021.

The War in Ukraine and its Impact on Russian Military Engagement with Southeast
Asia
We request your assessment of the impact of the war in Ukraine on Russian arms sales and
defence engagement with Southeast Asia.
Q1. Do you think that Southeast Asian states will conBnue to purchase weapons from Russia
once the Ukraine war is over? None of the South East Asian states that have military
cooperaBon pacts with Russia have altered those military relaBons with Moscow.
ANSWER: It depends on how the war ends. Will it end a_er a protract period of contestaBon?
Will it end with a negoBated ceasefire? Will it end because PuBn is removed from office?
No maner how the war ends, resumpBon of arms procurements from Russia will also depend
on Western acBons. Will puniBve sancBons remain in effect, if so how long? Will sancBons
remain in place unBl Russia makes reparaBons to the Ukraine?
Four ASEAN states have not procured Russian weapons in the last six years – Brunei, Malaysia,
Philippines and Singapore. Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos and Myanmar have only
purchased comparaBvely small amounts of Russian arms compared to Vietnam. The
combined acquisiBons of these five countries are roughly one-sixth the value of Vietnam’s
 7

procurements. Vietnam, however, has not made any big Bcket procurements from Russia for
at least five years.
Table 1
Russian Arms Exports to Southeast Asia, 2015-2021

Russian Exports to Value (US $million)

Cambodia $5

Indonesia $9

Thailand $47

Laos $105

Myanmar $247

Vietnam $2,452

Source: Stockholm Internafonal Peace Research Insftute Arms Transfer Data Base, Trend Indicator Values.
Vietnam is likely to adopt a low profile for the foreseeable future. It has three opBons. First,
acquire spare parts and/or other equipment and plazorms from countries that are off-loading
Russian weapons. Second, Vietnam will conBnue to co-produce some Russian weapons and
equipment such as the Kh-35 anB-ship missile. Third, Vietnam is likely to turn to India for
assistance.
Q2. Will Russia's military cooperaBon, including joint exercises, be put on hold for the
foreseeable future or could they start up again quite quickly a_er the Ukraine war?
ANSWER: Arms procurements and bilateral exercises between Russia and ASEAN will remain
highly sensiBve even a_er the war in Ukraine ends. The poliBcal atmosphere will be poisoned
if the U.S. and its allies seek to punish PuBn’s Russia for war crimes and demand he_y
reparaBons to assist reconstrucBon in Ukraine. In short, Southeast Asian states will be
especially circumspect in reopening defence engagement with Russia.
Also, Russia will be constrained by the need to focus on its security closer to home in the face
of NATO unity over Ukraine. Russia will also face economic constraints for stepping up defence
engagement in Southeast Asia as well.
ASEAN is likely to adopt a very cauBous approach to defence engagement with Russia because
its members are divided on the war in Ukraine. Fox example, on the UN General Assembly
resoluBon calling on Russia to stop its offensive, eight ASEAN members voted in favour and
two abstained (Laos and Vietnam). On the UN General Assembly resoluBon to grant access to
Ukraine to deliver aid, seven ASEAN members voted in favour and three abstained (Brunei,
Laos and Vietnam). And on the UN General Assembly resoluBon to expel Russia from the
Human Rights Council, four ASEAN members voted in favour (Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand), two voted against (Laos and Vietnam), and four abstained (Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Malaysia).
 8

Most regional states and ASEAN itself will adopt a cauBous wait and see posture in order not
to raise tensions or incur puniBve sancBons by the United States and European Union
members.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “War in Ukraine and its Impact on Russian Military Engagement with
Southeast Asia,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, April 5, 2022.

Does Vietnam Risk U.S. Sanc?ons for its Military Ties with Russia?
We are preparing a report regarding the threat of sancBons under Countering America’s
Adversaries Through SancBons Act on Vietnam. We request your assessment of the following
issue: What are the chances that Vietnam could be sancBoned under CAATSA, and how much
of a threat do you think Hanoi takes this?
ANSWER: Countering America’s Adversaries Through SancBons Act (August 2017) has been
on the books for four years and eight months. The United States faces a dilemma because it
is pursuing contradictory objecBves. CAATSA aims at punishing Russian defence enBBes with
sancBons because of Russia’s annexaBon of the Crimea and disrupBng their arms sales by
threatening states who procure Russian arms, such as Vietnam. At the same Bme, the U.S.
seeks to enlist Vietnam as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific.
The then Secretary of Defense James Mats grasped this conundrum and sought waivers for
India, Vietnam and Indonesia. Waivers are not indefinite and can only be applied for a fixed
period of Bme. In order to qualify for a waiver Vietnam would have to demonstrate that it is
taking steps to reduce its dependency on Russian arms and military technology. Also, a
country that has connecBons with Russian enBBes implicated in hacking in the United States
cannot qualify for a waiver.
In 2018, reportedly, U.S. defence officials in the Trump AdministraBon pressured Vietnam to
cuts its dependence on Russian arms and military technology or face the possibility of
sancBons. Vietnam was urged to buy American weapons instead. In September 2018, at the
conclusion of the annual Defence Policy Dialogue held in Hanoi, Vietnam stunned U.S. officials
by cancelling fi_een military exercises planned for 2019. It is my assessment that Vietnam was
responding to American pressures by demonstraBng its independence.
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s expenditure on arms procurements peaked in 2018 at US $333
million and decreased to US $72 million in 2021. Also, Vietnam has not made any big Bcket
purchases from Russia since CAATSA was adopted, although it was rumoured to be in the
market for new ground anack aircra_ and fi_h generaBon fighters.
Vietnam’s vote against suspending Russia’s membership on the UN Human Rights Council and
the recent announcement that Russian and Vietnamese military planners agreed on a series
of military exercises involving combat training likely will dampen U.S. expectaBons that they
can enlist Vietnam as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific at present.
In sum, as long as Vietnam conBnues to restrict its arms procurements from Russia it is unlikely
to be sancBoned under CAATSA. However, the new ra_ of other U.S. sancBons against Russia
for its invasion of Ukraine raise complex new difficulBes for Vietnam in how to pay for arms
procurements and services from Russia without being penalised.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Does Vietnam Risk U.S. SancBons for its Military Ties with Russia?”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, April 20, 2022.
 9

Vietnam to Stand Up UAV Reconnaissance Unit

Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence is reportedly considering creating a specialised unit
to oversee the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAE) for intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance. We request your evaluation of this development.
Q1. What progress has Vietnam made in developing domestically produced UAVs for military
purposes?
ANSWER: DomesBc ProducBon3
In 1993, several Vietnam People’s Army research insBtuBons commenced research and
development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) targets for air defence training. It was only in
2001, however, that Vietnam began to produce a variety of small civilian and military UAVs
integrated with modern technology. Three insBtuBons were at the forefront of producing
locally built drones – Vienel Group, HT1 and Vietnam Aerospace AssociaBon (VASA).
In 2008, Vietnam began to research, design and build an indigenous UAV.
In 2011, Vietnam began producing a number of UAVs for civilian purposes, such as scienBfic
research, environmental survey, and forest fire prevenBon.
In 2012, the Vietnam Aerospace AssociaBon and the Swedish Unmanned Group collaborated
to build two Magic Eye 1 UAVs. The Vietnam Aerospace AssociaBon also teamed up with
Russia’s Irkut Engineering to develop a small 100 kg UAV for civilian purposes.
In May 2013, Vietnam flight-tested six indigenously built drones. These were mainly short-
and medium-range UAVs equipped with high-definiBon long-range infrared cameras and
target detecBon sensors. For the first Bme, UAVs were produced for military use such as air
defence training, surveillance and reconnaissance, search and rescue, and land border and
mariBme patrols.
It was only in November-December 2015, with design assistance from Belarus, that Vietnam
was able to successfully produce its first high-alBtude long-endurance UAV, the HS-6L. This
prototype was a joint project of Vietnam’s Academy of Science and Industry and the Ministry
of Public Security. The largest HS-6L is unarmed and equipped with opBcal and radar
surveillance systems. It has a range of 4,000 kilometres and endurance of up to thirty-five
hours. The HS-6L is designed and equipped for civilian use such as communicaBon, exploraBon
of natural resources, and mariBme search and rescue.
In 2020, it was reported that Vietnam was experimenBng with converBng its decommissioned
MiG-21 aircra_ into unmanned target drones. That same year, Vienel displayed a mock-up
medium-size single-engine twin-boom design military UAV at a defence exhibiBon. The mock-
up was fined with air-to-surface missiles providing a hint of future development. In the short-
term Vietnam’s UAVs will likely be equipped to carry out Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
Q2. What foreign countries have or are likely to assist Vietnam develop its own UAE unit?

3
This Background Brief borrows from Tran Viet Thai, “Proliferated Drones: A Perspec?ve on Vietnam,” Center for
a New American Security, Washington, D.C., June 2016. 1-8. hOp://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspec?ve-on-
vietnam/.
 10

ANSWER: Three countries have assisted Vietnam – Israel, Belarus and the United States.
Israel. In 2014-15, Vietnam placed an order with Israel’s AeronauBcs Defense Systems for the
for the procurement of Obiter-2 and Obiter-3 UAVs to assist in targeBng for its coastal arBllery
and missile defence systems. Vietnam also entered into discussions with prospecBve Israeli
partners to develop and produce military UAVs in Vietnam under a technology transfer
agreement.
In 2020, Vietnam placed an addiBonal order for the acquisiBon of Orbiter 2 and Orbiter 3 UAVs
to be used as forward observaBon plazorms for its ArBllery Corps. The Orbiter 3 can carry a
payload of 5.5 kg, fly at a speed of 55-130 km/h at an alBtude of 5,486 metres for seven hours.
In 2018, Vietnam ordered a suit of three Heron 1 TP UAVs and related ground staBon at a cost
of between $140-$160 million. The Heron 1 TP is a long-duraBon, medium alBtude
reconnaissance and surveillance plazorm. The Heron can carry a payload of 250 kg, fly at a
speed of 205 km/h at an alBtude of 10,700 metres for forty-five hours. Delivery has been
delayed to 2021 due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Belarus. In 2014-15, Vietnam took delivery of several Grif-K tacBcal drones from Belarus. The
Grif-K has a wingspan of 5.7 metres, a maximum take-off weight of 120 kg and a payload of
25 kg.
United States. In 2019, Vietnam ordered six ScanEagle UAVs under the U.S. MariBme Security
IniBaBve. The ScanEagle system comprises several remotely piloted aircra_ controlled from a
ground staBon. The ScanEagle is launched from a pneumaBc catapult either from land or sea
where it can be recovered with a Skyhook.
The ScanEagle carries one primary modular payload that can be quickly replaced with other
modules to suit the mission such as primary electro opBcal and infrared payloads. Other
payloads include Visual DetecBon and Ranging (VIDAR), mariBme AutomaBc IdenBficaBon
System (AIS), and IdenBficaBon Friend and Foe (IFF).
The six ScanEagles are expected to be delivered to the Vietnam Coast Guard in 2022.
Conclusion
The report that Vietnam’s Ministry of NaBonal Defence is mulling the creaBon of a UAV force
for ISR would appear to be a natural progression resulBng from domesBc research and
development combined with the import of foreign technology and assistance over the last
decade. The acquisiBon of the ScanEagle UAVs from the United States will be a major step
forward in technology.
Vietnam has an extended coastline facing the South China Sea that gives rise to a need to
monitor what is going on in its Exclusive Economic Zone. A dedicated UAV force would have
responsibility for training, maintenance, operaBons, and data collecBon, analysis and
disseminaBon by specialised ground staBons.
It remains to be seen if Vietnam will enter into cooperaBve agreements with Israeli or
American companies for the transfer of technology and co-producBon in Vietnam.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam to Stand Up UAV Reconnaissance Unit,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, May 15, 2021.
 11

Is Vietnam Going to Hold a Military Exercise with Russia?

Russia and Vietnam have released contradictory accounts of bilateral discussions on a possible
joint military exercise. Russian accounts are detailed and suggest planning is underway for a
bilateral exercise. Vietnamese accounts are ambiguous and refer to mulBlateral Army Games
hosted by Russia later in the year.
On 19 April, RIA NosvosB filed a dispatch from Vladivostok quoBng the press service of the
Eastern Military District (VVO), “For the first Bme, a conference on planning a Russian-
Vietnamese military exercise was organised and held at the headquarters of the Eastern
Military District. The meeBng of the delegaBons took place via video link.” No date was given
when this virtual meeBng was held.
According to RIA NovosB, the Russian side was represented by Major General Sergei Lagutkin,
the head of the Regional Control Centre and Colonel Ivan Taraev, the head of the InternaBonal
Military CooperaBon Department. The Vietnamese side was represented by Major General
Đỗ Đình Thanh, Commander of the Armoured Corps. Both sides agreed on the subject of the
military exercises, the dates and venue. The two sides also discussed medical and logisBcal
support, and cultural and sport programs.
According to Colonel Taraev the objecBve of the exercises was “to improve the pracBcal skills
of commanders and staffs in organizing combat training operaBons and managing units in a
difficult tacBcal environment, as well as developing non-standard soluBons when performing
tasks.” The two sides proposed “ConBnental Union-2022” as the name of the military
exercises.
Vietnam has yet to confirm or deny officially that this planning meeting took place. On 21
April, for example, at a press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Le Thi Thu
Hang responded to a direct question by Channel News Asia about the reported Russia-
Vietnam military exercises, in these words, “Việt Nam’s consistent policy is that all of its
defence cooperation with other countries – including delegation exchange, joint training and
military exercises, games and contests – are meant to bolster friendship, solidarity, mutual
trust and understanding, for the sake of peace, cooperation and development in the region
and in the world.”
Following the press conference, Vietnam’s English-language media (Hanoi Times, Viet Nam
News, VietnamNet, Vietnam Times, VnExpress) published stories under the headline
“Vietnam Responds to Reports of Planned Military Drills with Russia” by juxtaposing
references from the Russian media with Hang’s official response.
Vietnam’s army newspaper, Quân Đội Nhân Dân (24 April), provided further details of
discussions between Russian and Vietnamese military officials. According to correspondent
Việt Chung, on 15 April an online consultation between the two militaries took place. Major
General Đỗ Đình Thanh requested his Russian counterpart to assist Vietnam in preparing for
the International Military Games (Army Games 2022) by allowing Vietnamese tanks and their
crews to arrive before the start of the Games to familiarize themselves with the terrain prior
to the start of the tank competition.
Việt Chung also wrote that on 22 April, Major General Phạm Văn Tỵ, Deputy Director of the
Search and Rescue Department, represented Vietnam at the second online conference
between foreign parBcipants and the Russian Defense Ministry to discuss preparaBons for
Army Games 2022. General Tỵ advised that Vietnam would parCcipate in fourteen events.
 12

Russia’s InternaBonal Military Games, or Army Games, were inaugurated in August 2015 and
are an annual event held between July-September. Army Games 2021 involved 175 teams
from 43 countries and territories compeBng in 34 events. Vietnam was an observer at the first
Army Games 2015 and a regular parBcipant from 2018. In 2021, Vietnam parBcipated in 15
events and came in seventh place. For the first Bme, Vietnam hosted two compeBBons (sniper
and accident zone).
Vietnam is one of twelve co-organisers for Army Games 2022 scheduled to be held from 13-
27 August including 36 separate compeBBons, including ten compeBBons originally scheduled
to be held in the Southern Military District. Vietnamese military representaBves anended the
first organisaBonal meeBng on 2 September 2021. At that Bme, 45 countries had indicated
their intenBon to parBcipate. On 22 April 2022, Russia announced that 237 teams from 31
countries had confirmed their parBcipaBon in Army Games 2022.
Derek Grossman recently asserted on Twiner, “Another update on supposed Vietnam-Russia
military exercise. Turns out this is likely much ado about nothing. Event was planned as an
athleBc compeBBon between armies, i.e. not an actual joint exercise. Like I’ve said, Vietnam
as a rule doesn’t really do joint exercises.”
To the contrary, Russia’s Army Games 2022 is a “big deal” in its own right given the number of
parBcipants and scope of acBviBes. Army Games 2022 takes on added significance due to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and efforts by the United States and European countries to
sancBon Russia and isolate it diplomaBcally. Vietnam has already distanced itself from these
efforts by abstaining on two United NaBons General Assembly votes against Russia, and voBng
against suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. ParBcipaBng in Army Games
2022 could be taken as a further indicaBon that Vietnam is siding with Russia against U.S. and
European efforts to weaken and isolate it.
There are two expressions used by the Vietnamese military to describe what in English are
included in the term “military exercise.” Vietnam eschews the term tập trận that carries with
it the negaBve connotaBon of a military exercise involving war fighBng. Vietnam, however,
parBcipates in acBviBes covered by the term diễn tập that carries the posiBve connotaBon of
a training or pracBcal exercise. In other words, Vietnam parBcipates in joint exercises of the
laner kind.
Is it significant that Major General Đỗ Đình Thanh, Commander of the Armoured Corps, was
involved in discussions with Russian military officials in the Eastern Military District?
From 11-19 August 2021, for example, a detachment of Lao Armed Forces personnel took part
in Laros-21 (Laos-Russia) at the Sergeevsky training ground, Primorsky Territory, Eastern
Military District. Laros-21 was a counter-terrorism exercise aimed at eliminaBng an illegal
formaBon equipped with heavy armoured vehicles, anB-tank weapons and grenade
launchers.
Laros-21 involved a total of 500 Lao and Russian personnel, and 100 pieces of military
equipment including Su-25 anack aircra_ and Ka-52 assault helicopters. Part of the exercise
involved live firing by tank crews interacBng with the Eleron-3SV unmanned reconnaissance
vehicle. At the end of this serial, Russian officers demonstrated “the methodology for
organising training in firepower and other basic subjects of combat training.”
Given Vietnam’s procurement of Russian T-90 main banle tanks in 2017, is it possible that
Russia and Vietnam were planning something along the lines of Laros-21?
 13

As of this wriBng, detailed accounts in the Russian media and the discrepancies between
Russian and Vietnamese public versions of their meeBngs suggest two possibiliBes: (1) the
discussions were about two separate engagements, the Army Games and a bilateral military
training exercise or (2) the discussions were solely about Vietnam’s parBcipaBon in Army
Games 2022.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Is Vietnam Going to Hold a Military Exercise with Russia?” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, April 26, 2022.

Force Modernisa?on in Vietnam: Reply to Queries Received

The following queries were received in response to: “Force ModernizaBon in Vietnam:
Building a Streamlined and Strong Army by 2025 and a RevoluBonary, Regular, Highly Skilled
and Modern People’s Army by 2030,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, August 8, 2022.
Slide 5: How much of the $7.4 billion is direct imports and how much is it for licensed
producBon (as you note in slide 8)? Or is the laner a separate line item?

Top 6 of 27 Arms Sellers to Viet Nam,

1995-2021 (in US$ millions)
7402

263 550 120 273 108

BELARUS ISRAEL RUSSIA SOUTH KOREA UKRAINE UNITED STATES

RESPONSE: The data in Slide 5 is taken from the Stockholm InternaBonal Peace Research
InsBtute’s (SIPRI) arms transfer data base and includes direct imports only. The SIPRI data is
not official and likely understates the value of arms and weapons systems procured by
Vietnam. Vietnam and Russia someBme engage in barter trade, for example.
The United NaBons Register of ConvenBonal Arms (UNROCA) includes general details on only
seven categories of convenBonal weapons: banle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-
calibre arBllery systems; combat aircra_ and unmanned combat aerial vehicles; anack
helicopters; warships; and missiles and missile launchers.
Licensed producBon involves the transfer of technology. Vietnam’s naBonal defence industry
has the capacity to manufacture anB-air and anB-ship missiles. It is likely there are
circumstances where electronic components are provided by the supplier and are not
captured in the SIPRI data because they fall below SIPRI’s dollar threshold.
 14

Vietnam has imported kits to assemble one KBO 2000/BPS 500 missile patrol boat between
2013-14, eight Tarantul-5 Fast Anack Cra_ imported between 2008-16, and coast guard
vessels. These data are included in the SIPRI and UNROCA data bases.
• Slide 7: The U.S. has provided ScanEagles and a ground system, though not sure how
public that is.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

• Kolchuga passive early warning radar( Ukraine)
• Air search radar (France, Israel, Ukraine)
• Air defence SPYDER MR (Israel)
• Satellites: VNRED (France), satellite tracking (Israel),
Earth observation (Japan)
UAVs (Israel, Belarus and domestic) and UUV (Italy)
AEW&C (Airbus DS C-295)
7

RESPONSE: The sale of the ScanEagle is in the public domain; they have been ordered but not
yet received by Vietnam.4 The order for six ScanEagle UAVs also was noted in the SIPRI data
base. The ScanEagles were ordered in 2019 with the notation “‘Maritime Security Initiative’
aid; possibly for coast guard; delivery planned for 2022.”5
• Slide 11: The low level of Republic of Korea support is a head scratcher for me; I thought
Seoul had cracked open the market.
RESPONSE: SIPRI’s data base only records Vietnam’s acquisiBon of two Po Hang corvenes from
South Korea in 2016 and 2017 with delivery in 2017 and 2018, respecBvely. Both are second-
hand and were delivered as part of an aid package with some armament removed prior to
delivery.
There are no other recorded South Korean sales listed in the SIPRI data base. The SIPRI data
base, however, contains extensive details of South Korean arms sales to Indonesia, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.

4
See: Jon Gravatt, “LIMA 2019: Vietnam looks to procure Boeing’s ScanEagle UAV,” Jane’s, March 27, 2019 and
Gareth Jennings, “Vietnam to Receive ScanEagle unmanned aircraft,” Jane’s, June 3, 2019.
5
Also, see my “Vietnam to Stand Up UAV Reconnaissance Unit,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 15,
2021. https://www.scribd.com/document/508036818/Thayer-Vietnam-to-Stand-Up-UAV-Reconnaissance-Unit
that notes the ground station.
 15

Top Six Arms Suppliers to Viet Nam,

2014-21 (US$ million)
1200

1000

800

600

400

200

Belarus Israel Russia South Ukraine United

Korea States
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

11

• Slide 13: I think the Jane's capabilities assessment is very charitable, especially logistics
and ASW. I'm not seeing it.

July 28, 2022

RESPONSE: I have worked with Jane’s for many years and I put my confidence in their
experience to assess Vietnamese capabiliBes.
Note that Jane’s capability levels are judged by their ability to meet requirements and
provide military advantage/military parity/put the country at a disadvantage/leaving a
country vulnerable “against threats to this area.”
• Slide 15: The first two Kilo-class submarines are already at half their operational life,
though Vietnam doesn't use them very much. We'll be interesting to see how they
proceed.
 16

Selective Force Modernization

• By 2025 the VPA will be compact and strong, by 2030 several
services, corps and forces will have been modernised, and from
2030 the entire VPA will be modernised
• Air-Defence Air Force Service
• Navy
• Coast Guard
• Signal Force
• Electronic Warfare Force
• Technical Reconnaissance Force
• Cyber Warfare Force
• Cipher (cryptology) Force
15

RESPONSE: I gave a presentaBon in Ho Chi Minh City in June this year and noted with respect
to the sharp decline in Vietnam’s arms procurements a_er 2016, that one of the reasons was
the huge and mounBng maintenance costs of the Varshavyanka (Kilo) submarines and other
“big Bcket” arms procured from Russia. 6 In my presentaBon I quoted Australian Rear Admiral
James Goldrick as noBng with respect to Vietnam’s purchase of six Kilo-class submarines that
“the Vietnamese are trying to do something very quickly that no navy in recent Bmes has
managed successfully on such a scale from such a limited base.”
• Slide 21: Interesting to see what they do with 5th generation fighters. Existing air assets
are getting up there.

US $1.8 billion 2023-27, total defense expenditure by 2027 US $8.5 billion

February 7, 2022

Advanced Su-30s, Su-57 Russian 5th generation stealth fighter,

Yak-130 trainers, midget submarines 21

6
See: “Vietnam’s Security Environment in the New Era,” Keynote Presentafon to Emerging Vietnam 2022: A New
Tiger Arises, Ho Chi Minh City Securifes Corporafon, Le Meridien Saigon Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, June
15-16, 2022., hqps://www.scribd.com/document/578499837/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Security-Environment-in-the-
New-Era.
 17

RESPONSE: There are three opBons here.

First, Vietnam could upgrade its Su-30s as an interim measure.
Second, Vietnam could opt for the Russian Su-57s.
Third, Vietnam has already contracted to acquire three U.S. T-6 trainers by 2023, along with
spare parts and a maintenance package. Vietnam could opt to procure a package of twelve T-
6s including simulators, maintenance and parBcipaBon in an expanded aviaBon training
program. This would provide the basis for Vietnam to acquire F-15E Strike Eagles.
• Slide 14: The big issue is really the development (or not) of doctrine to support Vietnam’s
force modernization.

2. The VPA’s
short-term and Long-term goals?
• “build a streamlined and strong Army by 2025, and a
revolutionary, regular, advanced and modern People’s
Army by 2030”
• Resolution of the 13th National Congress of the Vietnam
Communist Party, February 2021
• Three Breakthroughs
• organisational structure; training; and military standards,
discipline and administrative reform
• Proactively prevent the risk of war and conflict from
afar
14

RESPONSE: Vietnam’s current priority on force modernisaBon involves a top to bonom

restructuring of its armed forces – cutng administraBon staff by ten percent; disbanding and
merging units and transferring equipment, property and weapons to other units; and creaBng
new units. Vietnam has already adopted a number of general strategies:
• Chiến lược Quốc phòng Việt Nam (Vietnam National Defence Strategy)
• Chiến lược Quân sự (Military Strategy)
• Chiến lược Bảo vệ Tổ quốc trên không gian mạng (Strategy for Protecting the Homeland
in Cyberspace)
• Chiến lược Bảo vệ biên giới quốc gia (National Border Protection Strategy)
It is clear that Vietnam will review and revise its current service doctrines to meet the
challenges in the “new situaBon” during the current force modernizaBon process. No doubt
they will draw on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and the efficacy of Russian military
equipment and weapons.
Although priority will be given to selecBve services, forces and units, the enBre process of
force modernisaBon will not be complete unBl 2030 and a_er.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Force ModernisaBon in Vietnam: Reply to Queries Received,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, August 19, 2022
 18

Can Vietnam Diversify Its Arms Procurements to Lessen Dependency on Russia?

Vietnam is currently hosBng its first internaBonal defence exhibiBon. Vietnam is seeking to
reduce its reliance on Russia in order to diversify and modernize its weaponry by imporBng
hi-tech weapons from other sources.
Q1. Will Vietnam’s poor human rights record make it difficult for it to purchase weapons from
the United State and other Western countries?
ANSWER: Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Vietnam allocated about two percent of its GDP
to the defence budget annually. Between 1995 and 2021, Vietnam procured weapons and
military technology from twenty-seven countries. The top six, as measured in U.S. millions of
dollars, were: Russia ($7,402m), Israel ($550m), Ukraine ($273), Belarus ($263), South Korea
($120m) and the United States ($108m).
During the period 2014 to 2021, that is from Russia’s annexaBon of Crimea unBl last year,
Vietnam’s arms procurements fell precipitously. Vietnam’s arms acquisiBons from Russia fell
from U.S. $1.056 billion in 2014 to U.S. $72 million in 2021. Vietnam’s GDP fell from 6.4% in
2014 to 2.6% in 2021 as a result of the COVID pandemic.
At the same Bme, the 13th NaBonal Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party set the
objecBve of building “a streamlined and strong Army by 2025, and a revoluBonary, regular,
advanced and modern People’s Army by 2030.” This is Vietnam’s most major effort to
modernise its armed forces. This was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In summary, Vietnam has been marking Bme and has not signed any major arms procurement
contracts since 2016. During this period, the costs of maintaining exisBng weaponry conBnue
to rise and cut into the defence budget, reducing the amount available for overseas
procurements.
Vietnam is overwhelmingly dependent on Russian legacy weapons and technology. Its enBre
service and maintenance system is orientated on Russian military weapons and technology.
Russia does not put condiBons on the sale of weapons to Vietnam such as human rights.
Vietnam cannot afford to abruptly shi_ from Russia to alternate sources for “big Bcket” items
such as next generaBon aircra_, warships and air defence systems. Also, Vietnam cannot
afford to alienate Russia to the extent that Russia retaliates by cutng off access.
Vietnam’s GDP is expected to exceed 7% in 2022 and thus present an opportunity to resume
arms procurements. Vietnam has shown it is capable of shopping around for weapons and
military technology from non-Russian sources, such as Israel, South Korea, and the United
States. But these are niche purchases to fill specific needs. Also, Vietnam is cognizant that the
U.S and states in the European Union could invoke human rights consideraBons to curtail or
block arms sales in response to egregious violaBons of human rights at any moment.
In summary, Vietnam is not likely to purchase “big Bcket” items from the United States or
Europe and is likely to wait and see how the conflict in Ukraine is resolved. Vietnam will,
however, be in market for niche technologies say for coastal radar, air defence, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), counter-UAV missiles, cyber etc.
Q2. How do you evaluate Vietnam's plan to sell its domesBcally produced weapons?
 19

ANSWER: In June, Lt. General Phung Si Tan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People’s
Army, said the Defence Expo would “showcase means of warfare, state of the art technologies
and equipment serving the different military forces.”
In addiBon to showcasing Vietnam’s military modernisaBon, Vietnam’s defence industry will
also display domesBcally produced weapons, equipment and technology such as ammuniBon,
explosives, detonators, opBcal devices, unmanned aerial vehicles, communicaBons
equipment, cyber security, firefighBng equipment, logisBcs support equipment, armoured
vehicles and small gun boats.
Vietnam has three main objecBves: (1) to showcase its naBonal defence industry, (2) to
idenBfy clients for its domesBc products and (3) to enter into co-producBon technology-
transfer arrangements to boost its naBonal defence industry.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Can Vietnam Diversify Its Arms Procurements to Lessen Dependency on
Russia?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, December 8, 2022.

U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam?

We are wriBng a report on the state of play of talks between the United States and Vietnam
a_er Vietnam’s InternaBonal Arms Expo on possible U.S. arms supplies. What is the
importance of discussions on the possible supply of more sophisBcated weapons than those
shipped so far to Vietnam?
ANSWER: According to U.S. defence sources, Vietnam’s Air Defence-Air Force (ADAF)
conducts more training exercises with the United States than with any other country,
including Russia. The bilateral defence relationship is particularly strong between the ADAF
and the United States Air Force (USAF) at the senior level.7
In June 2021, the U.S. agreed to sell Vietnam T-6 Texan trainer aircra_ and in December it was
officially announced that Vietnam would procure twelve T-6s, with five to six aircra_ delivered
in 2024 and the remaining aircra_ in 2027.8 This sale means that the USAF will become the
leading U.S. service engaged with the Vietnamese military.
The sale of the T-6s comes with a training and maintenance package for ADAF personnel as
well as training modules in logisBcs, flight safety, aviaBon medicine and English language.
In June 2019, U.S. Embassy officials in Hanoi were quoted as saying that the T-6 sale
“represented a strategic shi_ from Russia to the United States ‘under the nose’ of China and
would be a major part of helping Vietnam move away from dependence on Russian weapons
and corrupBon, as well as China’s influence.”9

7
This Background Brief draws on Stephen Burgess, “The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership and the Key
Role of Air Force Relations,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, December 2021,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870567/the-usvietnam-comprehensive-partnership-
and-the-key-role-of-air-force-relations/.
8
Viet Anh, “US to sell trainer aircraft to Vietnam,” VnExpress, June 6, 2021,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/us-to-sell-trainer-aircraft-to-vietnam-4288916.html and Viet Anh, “US to
send 12 military training aircraft to Vietnam,” VnExpress, December 9, 2022,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/us-to-send-12-military-training-aircraft-to-vietnam-4546311.html.
9
Burgess, “The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership and the Key Role of Air Force Relafons.”
 20

In anBcipaBon of the sale of the T-6 trainers, the U.S. began training the first Vietnamese Air
Force pilots in special purpose English language in 2016, followed by a fi_y-two week military
pilot training course. The first pilot graduated at the end of May 2019.10
Currently, the USAF admits two-three ADAF airmen annually in an aviaBon leadership program
that lasts for three years and takes two to three students at a Bme. This program will have to
be ramped up as it is esBmated that fi_y ADAF trainees wil be needed to produce thirty pilots
to fly the twelve T-6s.
The USAF AviaBon Leadership Program includes training in managing partnerships, aviaBon
culture and safety, air competence, risk management, maintenance and English -language
training to meet internaBonal standards.
Vietnam’s acquisiBon of the T-6s trainers and parBcipaBon in the USAF AviaBon Leadership
Program could lay the foundaBon for the sale of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle fighters at the end of
this decade.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
December, 15 2022. hnps://www.scribd.com/document/615043297/Thayer-U-S-Arms-Sales-
to-Vietnam/.

Vietnam’s Conundrum: How to Modernise its Military under the Shadow of the
Ukraine War
We request your input into the following two quesBons:
Q1. Vietnam's military forces are heavily dependent on Russia's supply. How does the ongoing
Russia-Ukraine war affect Vietnam's army and will Vietnam overcome it?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s arms procurements in general and from the Russian FederaBon, its
largest provider, in parBcular, have plummeted since 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimea.
Vietnamese arms acquisiBons from Russia fell from over a billion U.S. dollars in 2014 to under
U.S. 200 million in 2019-2021. Vietnam’s largest big Bcket purchase was in 2017 for sixty-four
T-90SK main banle tanks. The T-90 tank came to grief in the war in Ukraine.
One explanaBon for the rapid decline in Vietnamese arms acquisiBons from Russia a_er 2014
was the adopBon of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through SancBons Act (CAATSA)
in2017 by the U.S. Congress. CAATSA threatened sancBons against countries that purchased
Weapons from Russia.
The then U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mats argued in favour of waivers for India, Vietnam
and Indonesia on the grounds that they could not suddenly switch off their reliance on Russian
weapons and military technology. A country was ineligible for a waiver if any of its
government enBBes were involved in relaBons with Russian hackers who interfered in U.S.
elecBons. Also a waiver could only be granted for a limited period of Bme. It could only be

10
Vu Anh, “First Vietnam military pilots graduating US training course,” VnExpress, June 4, 2019,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/first-vietnam-military-pilots-graduating-us-training-course-3933647.html
and Nguyen Hoang, “Vietnamese air force pilot graduates from US aviation leadership program,” VnExpress,
June 7, 2019, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamese-air-force-pilot-graduates-from-us-aviation-
leadership-program-3935165.html.
 21

renewed if the recipient country could demonstrate that it was taking steps to end its
dependency on Russian weapons.
In 2018, senior members of the Trump AdministraBon reportedly lobbied Vietnam to reduce
its dependency on Russia and buy from America instead. In a linle publicized incident in
September 2018 at the end of the annual U.S.-Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue, Vietnam
informed its guests without explanaBon that it was cancelling fi_een defence engagement
acBviBes scheduled for 2019 involving army, navy and air force exchanges.
In the a_ermath of Russia’s February 2021 invasion of Ukraine, Vietnam risks sancBons if it
should resume large arms purchases from Russia. Also, circumstance have changed and
Russia may no longer be in a posiBon to sell big Bcket weapons to overseas buyers that are
needed for the war in Ukraine.
In sum, Vietnam has been marking Bme in modernizing its armed forces since 2014. In late
2020, on the eve of the thirteenth naBonal party congress, Vietnam announced its most major
military modernizaBon program in its history to “Build a Streamlined and Strong Army by 2025
and a RevoluBonary, Regular, Advanced and Modern People’s Army by 2030.”
This program appears to have been put on hold even though economic growth has begun to
recover from the downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Q2. Will Vietnam be capable of purchasing non-Russian weaponry in the near future?
ANSWER: Vietnam already purchases weapons and military technology from non-Russian
sources. Between 1995 and 2021, sixteen countries, excluding Russia, sold arms to Vietnam.
Among the top ten suppliers, Russia topped the list followed by
Israel, Ukraine, Belarus, South Korea, United States, Czech, Netherlands, North Korea and
Spain.
Since 2014, the top providers a_er Russia include Belarus, Ukraine, Israel, South Korea and
the United States. Ukraine, which provided the turbines for Russia’s Gepard-frigates, is no
longer an arms exporter.
There are two constraints on Vietnam’s purchases of non-Russian weaponry. The first is the
legacy of dependency on Russia for spare parts, servicing, maintenance support and language.
The second constraint is cost and Bme. U.S. and European weapons are expensive and
Vietnam would need to develop an appropriate logisBcs support network with technicians
trained in the appropriate language.
This process would take considerable Bme to develop. Vietnam has tradiBonally allocated
about two percent of its Gross DomesBc Product on its defence budget. As Vietnam’s
economy conBnues to resume pre-COVID growth Vietnam will have increased funds to
resume arms acquisiBons. If it moves in this direcBon, Vietnam will face a third constraint –
the cost of mixing and matching different weapon systems and technologies.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Conundrum: How to Modernise its Military under the Shadow
of the Ukraine War,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 1, 2023.

Vietnam: Will Military AircraW Mishap Result in Turn to Non-Russian Suppliers?

Q1. As you may know, on Jan 31, Vietnam's Air Force lost one Su-22 in an incident in Yen Bai
province. What are the possible reasons for this incident?
 22

ANSWER: There are two likely reasons for the crash of the Su-22, failure of the landing gear
and pilot error. According to Vietnamese press accounts, the Su-22 encountered a problem
while landing and the pilot was order to eject. The pilot then tried to correct the problem
manually, failed, and the plane crashed.
There have been at least five crashes involving Su-22 aircra_ in recent years: 2015 (over the
South China Sea), 2018 (Nghe An province), 2019 (Yen Bai province), 2000 (Khanh Hoa
province) and 2005 (Yen Bai province).
Three crashes by Vietnamese military aircra_ (CASA C-212, Su-22, and the Yak-52) in recent
years, indicates that pilot error was the likely caused due to limited flying hours and
dependence on flight simulators. According to one study, Vietnamese air force pilots use
“virtual flight rules or radar vector in perfect weather only and have no experience with
adverse weather condiBons.”
Q2. Can you evaluate Russian or Soviet aircra_s in Vietnam's Air Force, including Su-22 and
the need to replace them with Western-made ones? PerspecBve for that?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s Air Defence-Air Force is equipped with a range of seventy-one Soviet-
era/Russian combat aircra_ of various models including twenty-five Su-22s, eleven Su-27s,
and thirty-five Su-30s in addiBon to thirty Yak-52 trainers. In 2019, U.S. defence officials
serving in Hanoi reported that Vietnamese military officers had expressed their unhappiness
with Russian equipment and services.
Vietnam is in criBcal need to modernise its combat aircra_. Vietnam’s Su-22 fighter bombers
acquired in the 1980s are nearing obsolescence as they approach the end of their service life.
In late-2020, Vietnam moved to restructure its logisBcs support services to improve
maintenance, repair and overhaul of its legacy combat air fleet. Special priority has been
accorded to maintaining, repairing and overhauling Vietnam’s Su-30MK2 mulB-role jet
fighters.
Vietnam is also in need of modern jet trainers to replace the Yak-52s. In 2019, Vietnam placed
an order to procure twelve Russian Yak-130 trainers. And in February 2021, Vietnam signed a
contract to purchase twelve Aero Vodochody L-39NG jet trainers from the Czech Republic as
well training package for pilots, instructors, ground crew and mechanics, spare parts and other
support equipment. Later that year Vietnam placed an order for twelve T-6 jet trainers and
Vietnamese pilots commenced parBcipaBon in the U.S. Air Force AviaBon Leadership Program
in the United States. This would lay the foundaBon for the sale of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle
fighters at the end of this decade.
Vietnam’s thirteenth party congress in early 2021 approved a major military modernisaBon
program that gave priority to the Air Defence-Air Force. However, Russia’s subsequent
invasion of Ukraine, which has imposed limitaBons on arms exports, and the threat of western
sancBons, has scuppered any plans Vietnam may have had for acquiring advanced Su-30s and
Su-57 fi_h generaBon stealth aircra_.
Q3. Do you have updated informaBon about reports that Vietnam is discussion the purchase
of drones and helicopters from U.S. defence companies? See:
hnps://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-defence-companies-talks-sell-
vietnam-helicopters-drones-sources-2022-12-15/ ?
 23

ANSWER: It should be noted that in 2019, Vietnam placed an order for six Boeing Insitu
ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles for its Coast Guard under the U.S. MariBme Security
IniBaBve. Boeing was one five American defence companies that discussed sales with
Vietnamese government officials at a meeBng organised by the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.
The other companies included: IM Systems Group, Lockheed MarBn, Raytheon, and Textron.
The war in Ukraine has raised the salience of drones and other UAVs in armed combat. The
United States would be a definite market for Vietnam’s military.
According to the Stockholm InternaBonal Peace Research InsBtute (SIPRI), Vietnam’s Air
Defence-Air Force possesses a single American manufactured helicopter, the Light 11 Bell 205
(UH-1H Iroquois). The Vietnam People’s Army Naval Air Wing has two H225 transport
helicopters manufactured by Airbus (a European consorBum) on its inventory. In 2011,
Vietnam took delivery of two French EC725LP Super Cougar helicopters for search and rescue.
Otherwise, Vietnam’s Naval Air Wing and Air Defence-Air Force are equipped with
Soviet/Russian helicopters (ten Kamov-28 Helix A for anB-submarine warfare, two Ka-32 Helix
C transport, six Mi-17 Hip H, fourteen NMi-8 Hip and three Mi-171).
According to the Stockholm InternaBonal Peace Research InsBtute, the only helicopters
acquired by Vietnam between 1995-2021 were two French EC725LP Super Cougars.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Will Military Aircra_ Mishap Result in Turn to Non-Russian
Suppliers?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 3, 2023.

Impact of War in Ukraine on Vietnam’s Military Modernisa?on

On the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we request your analyBcal insights in
the impact of this war on Vietnam’s plans to modernise its military. We request your response
to the following quesBons:
Q1. Vietnam has announced plans to modernize its military forces by 2030 that will almost
certainly require it to procure foreign military equipment. As the majority of Vietnam’s big
Bcket and advanced military items are from Russia, what’s your evaluaBon about the impact
of the war in Ukraine and western sancBons against Russia on Vietnam’s ability to achieve
military modernizaBon within the next seven years?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s plans to modernize its military were drawn up well before the Russian
invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And the threat of sancBons was ever present since Russia’s
annexaBon of Crimea n 2014. In 2017, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through SancBons Act (CAATSA). If we look at data on Vietnam’s arms
procurements since 2014, it is noBceable that they plummeted from over a billion dollars in
2014 to under several hundred million in 2020.
In sum, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, coming a year a_er the 13th naBonal congress of the
Vietnam Communist Party approved a major program to modernize its military, has resulted
in Vietnam putng its procurement plans on hold. Two reasons explain this – threat of western
sancBons and Russia’s inability to provide weapons.
A forecast issued on 7 February 2022 by the Global Data Aerospace and Defense Intelligence
Center, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, esBmated that if Vietnam could achieve an
average growth rate of 7.48 percent over the next five years (2023-27), it would be able to
 24

spend an average of U.S. $1.5 billion annually, or U.S. $7.5 billion in total. Since the forecast
was issued, Vietnam’s economy has entered the post-COVID recovery period with GDP growth
rising to 8.02 percent in 2022.
Vietnam’s economic recovery means it will be in a posiBon to selecBvely modernize its armed
forces, parBcularly by acquiring military technology, weapons and plazorms from non-Russian
sources. But its plans to “Build a Streamlined and Strong Army by 2025 and a RevoluBonary,
Regular, Highly Skilled and Modern People’s Army by 2030” are unlikely to be met.
Q2. Vietnam reportedly operates three regiments of the Su-22. These are an older generaBon
of warplanes. How do you evaluate Vietnam’s need to modernize its combat aircra_?
ANSWER: In 2000, Vietnam idenBfied enhancing its MRO – maintenance, repair, overhaul –
capability as a priority. Vietnam upgraded its A32 factory in Da Nang to develop this capability
for its Soviet/Russian legacy air fleet.
Most defence analysts believe Vietnam’s Su-22s are obsolete and nearing the end of their
service life as witnessed by at least six Sui-22 crashes since 2015. While Vietnam may well
have contemplated replacing the Su-22 under its military modernizaBon program. As noted
above, under current condiBons these plans appear to have been put on hold as Vietnam
adopts a wait and see approach.
Q3. Your evaluaBon about the impact of the war in Ukraine on Vietnam’s efforts to maintain,
repair, and upgrade its advanced weapons from Russia?
ANSWER: Over the last decade prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine has played an
instrumental role in the development of Vietnam’s MRO capabiliBes to modernize its fleet of
Soviet/Russian combat aircra_. In 2013, for example, Ukraine assisted Vietnam in upgrading
the A32 factory to support MRO for the Saturn AL-31 engines for the Su-27SK and Su-30MKS.
In 2017, Vietnam received significant technical assistance from Ukraine that enabled the A32
factory to modernize Vietnam’s Su-22M3, Su22M4 and Su-27SK fighters. In late 2020, A32
began carrying out MRO on its Su-30MK2 fleet.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has altered Ukraine’s prioriBes and disrupted its ability if not
its poliBcal willingness to assist Vietnam because of Vietnam’s failure to condemn Russia for
aggression.
Q4. In March 2022, Russia bombed Ukraine’s Zorya-Mashproekt factory that manufactured
gas turbine engines for some of Vietnam’s top warships, including four Gepard 3.9 frigates.
How do you evaluate Vietnam’s difficulBes in maintaining and keeping those warships
operaBonal given the impact of the war?
ANSWER: First, Vietnam had to undertake quite a diplomaBc effort to acquire the Ukraine-
manufactured turbines to go with the Russian-constructed Gepard frigates in the a_ermath
of Russia’s annexaBon of Crimea in 2014.
Second, over the last decade and a half, Vietnam has made determined efforts to modernize
and upgrade its shipbuilding industry, including naval MRO. During this period Vietnam has
demonstrated the capacity to assemble missile patrol vessels from Russian kits, build TT400TP
patrol vessels, and construct Tarantul-V class guided missile corvenes under license at Ba Son
naval yard.
 25

In 2912, Vietnam established the X52 factory at Cam Ranh Bay to support Vietnam’s fleet of
Project 636 Varshavyanka convenBonal submarines. X-52 has also played a major role in
providing MRO to the Vietnam People’s Navy. In 2017, for example, it was reported that X52
provided MRO services to twenty naval ships.
In sum, Vietnam very likely has the capacity to maintain the turbines on its Gepard frigates. It
can look overseas for assistance from India, the Netherlands and elsewhere. But at the same
Bme, Vietnam may be forced to reduce the Bme spent by the Gepard frigates at sea to prolong
their life.
Q5. What is your evaluaBon of Vietnam’s domesBc naBonal defence industry?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s naBonal defence industry conBnues to develop and modernize. Vietnam
can maintain, repair, refurbish and upgrade Russian legacy and newly acquired weapons and
plazorms. Vietnam’s domesBc shipbuilding industry is able to build 1,500-ton, 2,200-ton and
4,300-ton vessels for the Vietnam Coast Guard.
As noted above, Vietnam has produced TT-400TP gunboats and assembled Molniya-class
(Tarantul) missile fast anack cra_ domesBcally.
Vietnam also co-produces anB-air and anB-ship missiles such as the Igla (SA-18), Yakhont (SS-
N-26), and Kh-35 Ural-E (SS-N-25).
Q6. What new iniBaBves can Vietnam pursue to modernize its armed forces?
ANSWER: Three points should be made:
First, Vietnam’s naBonal defence industries have worked with foreign companies to
manufacture military equipment in Vietnam. Vietnam has entered into agreement with a
Russian company to manufacture military transport vehicles in Vietnam. And Vietnam has
worked with an Israeli company to domesBcally manufacture assault rifles. Vietnam and
Indonesia have been considering the possibility of co-producBon of mariBme patrol aircra_.
Vietnam is currently mulling a law on Defence and Security Industries and Industrial
MobilisaBon that would enable foreign arms companies to invest in Vietnam.
Second, Vietnam is posiBoning its naBonal defence industry to enter the internaBonal arms
market with niche products such as ammuniBon, mines, small drones, communicaBons
equipment, and C5ISR technologies.
Third, Vietnam’s naBonal defence industry is not capable of manufacturing big Bcket weapons
and plazorms, such as follow on fighters to replace the Su-22s, advanced Su-30s or next
generaBon stealth aircra_. Vietnam must look abroad for procurements to modernize its
armed forces, parBcularly the Air-Defence Air Force.
If Vietnam does make a decision to acquire non-Russian weapons and plazorms this will take
some Bme to implement in order to create the logisBcs, maintenance and human resources
support services needed to keep modern equipment operaBonal.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Impact of War in Ukraine on Vietnam’s Military ModernisaBon,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, February 20, 2023.
 26

Whither Vietnam-U.S. Defence Coopera?on and the Role of South Korea

It was reported in the news that President Biden and General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong spoke on the phone this week about enhancing Bes. What does this signal for you and
do you think it could have any impact on the U.S. being a partner in Vietnam's efforts to
modernise its military?
ANSWER: The fact that President Biden spoke directly to the General Secretary of the Vietnam
Communist Party (VCP) Nguyen Phu Trong is significant because it acknowledges his central
role in Vietnam’s poliBcal system. The normal pracBce is for the U.S. president to speak to his
foreign counterpart, that is, the head of state or government.
Both leaders invited each other to visit their country, and both leaders accepted. These
exchange visits will commemorate the tenth anniversary of the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive
Partnership (2013-2023). Such high-level visits invariably result in solid deliverables.
In the meanBme, according to the VCP’s newspaper Nhân Dân, “The two leaders will assign
relevant authoriBes of the two sides to discuss details for further promoBng Bes.” It can be
assumed that if agreement is reached at these discussions, the two leaders will raise bilateral
relaBons to a higher level strategic partnership.
In December 2022, Vietnam hosted a major internaBonal arms exposiBon. Senior Vietnamese
military officials spoke publicly about the need to diversify Vietnam’s procurements. A_er the
exhibiBon ended U.S. defence firms Lockheed MarBn, Boeing, Raytheon, and Textron held
discussions with Vietnam’s defence officials about commercial sales of military equipment to
Vietnam.
It is significant that General Secretary Trong in his conversaBon with President Biden raised
defence-security cooperaBon in his list of areas the two sides could expand. Defence and
security are listed seventh of nine areas of cooperaBon contained in the 2013 Joint Statement
between Presidents Barrack Obama and Truong Tan Sang announcing their comprehensive
partnership.
While President Biden and General Secretary General Trong were talking, fi_y-two U.S.
business leaders were in Hanoi to discuss commercial and investment opportuniBes, the
largest U.S. delegaBon ever. Boeing representaBves were in the delegaBon.
Q2. We request your assessment of South Korea’s role in arms sales in Southeast Asia. Do you
think South Korea will play a growing role in Vietnam's military modernisaBon and in the
region more broadly?
ANSWER: Over the last decade, South Korea has sold weapons and military equipment to six
Southeast Asian states – Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
The big Bcket items include naval ships and submarines, trainer and combat aircra_, arBllery
and surface-to-air and anB-ship missiles.
South Korea ranked fourth among the top ten states selling weapons and military equipment
to Vietnam in the period 2016-2022. South Korean sales totalled US $120 million. This involved
the transfer of two Pohang-class corvenes in 2017 and 2018. No arms sales have been
recorded since.
South Korea is definitely among the states Vietnam is likely to turn to for its future weapons
procurements, possibly combat aircra_ (T-50 Golden Eagle or the KF-21 Boramae).
 27

Carlyle A. Thayer, “Whither Vietnam-U.S. Defence CooperaBon and the Role of South Korea,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 31, 2023.

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra.
He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered
in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.

Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in Political Science (B.A.
1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971) and a PhD in International
Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He studied Thai language at
The University of Missouri at Columbia (1965), Vietnamese language at Yale and Cornell
(1969-71), and Lao and Vietnamese languages at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
(1971). Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political
Science, Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
ANU to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of
Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii. He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original
contributor to the Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
 28

• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic Co-
ordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School flag bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and in Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
 29

In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
Source: hnps://research.unsw.edu.au/people/emeritus-professor-carlyle-alan-thayer