G.R. No. 120506. October 28, 1996.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO
LINSANGAN, UNICORN SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and FRED BAUTISTA,
et al., respondents.
Facts:
In 1987, Private respondent Unicorn Security Services, Inc. (USSI) and petitioner
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) executed a security service agreement. USSI was
designated therein as the CONTRACTOR where in USSI shall assign 86 security guards
to PAL.
In 1988, PAL requested 16 additional security guards. USSI provided what was
requested; however, PAL insisted that what USSI did was merely to pick out 16 guards
from the 86 already assigned by it and directed them to render overtime duty.
In 1990, PAL terminated the security service agreement with USSI and paid each of the
security guards actually assigned at the time of the termination of the agreement an
amount equivalent to their one month salary to compensate for the lack of notice.
USSI filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch, a complaint against PAL for the recovery
of P75,600.00 and representing termination pay benefit due the alleged 16 additional
guards.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of USSI and ordered PAL to pay the sum of P75,000.00 and
other fees.
PAL appealed however it was filed late, hence, the LA issued a writ of execution.
In 1991, PAL appealed to the NLRC.
In 1994, he Second Division of the NLRC dismissed PAL's appeal for having been filed
out of time.
PAL then filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
PAL argued that the LA had no jurisdiction over the case and NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in declaring PAL's appeal to have been filed out of time.
Issue:
Whether the rules on perfection of appeals in labor cases may be relaxed in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. The record does indeed show that on the original copy of the Notice of
Judgment/Final Order, there is stamped by the PAL Legal Department the date of its
receipt of the decision, viz., "AUG. 23, 1991."
It is not also denied by respondents that on the right upper hand corner of PAL's copy of
the Notice of Judgment/Final Orders, there is stamped the date of receipt thereof by
PAL Legal Department, viz., "AUG. 16, 1991." PAL explained how this discrepancy
occurred and how its counsel was misled into believing that PAL received a copy of the
decision only on 26 August 1991. This belief in good faith rendered excusable any
negligence it might have committed. Besides, the delay in the perfection of the appeal
was only one day. Considering that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-06008-90 and that the 16 security guards
are not in fact entitled to separation pay under the security service agreement, the
higher interest of justice favors a relaxation of the rule on perfection of appeals in labor
cases.
While it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory, it is
equally settled that the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an
acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Among the acceptable
reasons recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on the footnote of the notice
of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the aggrieved party may appeal. . . within ten
(10) working days" ; 26 (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c)
prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is
from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final
decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the
amount and the issue involved.
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter's lack of jurisdiction — so palpably clear on the
face of the complaint — and the perpetuation of unjust enrichment if the appeal is
disallowed are enough combination of reasons that warrant a relaxation of the rules on
perfection of appeals in labor cases.
G.R. No. 122078. April 21, 1999
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PROCOPIO EVANGELISTA, respondents.
Facts:
In 1975, Procopio Evangelista sued for illegal dismissal against petitioner Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines (PRBL). In 1976, the Labor Arbiter declared his dismissal illegal and
ordered his reinstatement with payment of backwages. Petitioner's appeal was
dismissed by the NLRC for failure to file it within the reglementary period. Acting on
petitioner's appeal, the Office of the President held that there was just cause for
terminating the employment of Evangelista but the dismissal was nonetheless illegal
due to the failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory procedural requirements for
termination of employment under the rules implementing the Labor Code. It directed
petitioner to reinstate Evangelista and pay him six months backwages of which the
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Evangelista was paid backwages in 1979 but
was not reinstated, so that in 1985 or seven years thereafter, he moved for the issuance
of a second alias writ of execution for his reinstatement and additional payment of
backwages. Petitioner opposed the motion asserting that the inaction of private
respondent for seven years to pursue his reinstatement has rendered that portion of the
decision dormant and therefore could no longer be executed by a mere motion. The
Labor Arbiter issued an alias writ of execution, which was affirmed by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in enforcing by mere
motion the final judgment of the Office of the President despite the lapse of seven (7)
years
Ruling:
No. Petitioner cannot legally invoke in this case the strict application of the rule limiting
execution of judgment by mere motion within a period of five (5) years only. There have
been cases where on meritorious grounds this Court allowed execution by mere motion
even after the lapse of five (5) years. Their common denominator in those instances was
the delay caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or incurred for
his benefit or advantage. Here, petitioner had unduly delayed the full implementation of
the final decision of the Office of the President since 1978 by filing numerous dilatory
appeals and persistently failing and refusing to immediately reinstate private
respondent. Technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are
applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor
Code, and not to defeat them. The law bends over backwards, under the policy of social
justice, to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privileges in life should have more in law.
G.R. No. 189871. August 13, 2013
DARIO NACAR, petitioner, vs. GALLERY FRAMES and/or FELIPE
BORDEY, JR., respondents.
Facts:
G.R. Nos. 76579-82. August 31, 1988
BENEDICTO RODRIGUEZ, etc., petitioner, vs. HON. DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, CARLOS GALVADORES and LIVI MARQUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 80504. August 31, 1988
REY C. SUMANGIL, VIRGILIO V. HERNANDEZ, et al. , petitioners, vs. MANOLITO
PARAN, ROSALINDA DE GUZMAN, FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION,
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., and HON. PURA
FERRERCALLEJA, respondent
Facts: G.R. Nos. 76579-82.
The above entitled special civil actions of certiorari were separately instituted but have
been consolidated because they involve disputes among employees of the Philippines
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), who are members of the same union, the
Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU). The disputes concern the validity of the
general elections for union officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues adopted and
put into effect by the incumbent officers subsequent to said elections.
Petitioners in these cases question the increase of the fees for the filing of Cert of
candidacy; petitioners also challenge validity of the elections on the ground of lack of (1)
due notice and (2) adequate ground rules; that the COMELEC be declared in Contempt
defying the temporary restraining order when it proceeded with the general elections in
all the PLDT branches in Metro Manila on July 25, 1986.
The Mid Arbiter denied the petitions to nullify the elections, as well as the motion for
contempt, but invalidated the increase in rates of filing fees for certificates of
candidacies.
On appeal, the OIC-Labor Relation nullified the general elections in the provinces and
Metro Manila on the ground of (1) lack of notice to the candidates and voters, (2) failure
to disseminate the election ground rules to all parties concerned, and (3) disregard of
the temporary restraining order of the Med-Arbiter.
Petitioner Benedicto Rodriguez, the chairman of the Union COMELEC, claimed the
decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion considering that (a) the Med-
Arbiter had found no fraud or irregularity in the elections; (b) the election was
participated in by more than 73% of the entire union membership; and (c) the petition
for nullity was not supported by 30% of the general membership.
Facts: G G.R. No. 80504
Legislative Council of the union passed a resolution which generated another
controversy. That resolution increased the amount of the union dues from P21.00 to
P50.00 a month.
Rey Sumangil and his followers filed a petition before BLR challenging the resolution for
the increase in union dues. Mid-Arbiter denied their petition on the ground of lack of
support of at least 30% of all members of the union, citing Article 242.
LA rendered a decision reversing that of the Med-Arbiter but later on set aside its
decision and entered a new one dismissing the petition of Sumangil and company, in
effect affirming the Med-Arbiter's order.
Issue:
Whether or not 30%-membership support is indispensable for acquisition of jurisdiction
by the Bureau of Labor Relations of a complaint for alleged violation of rights and
conditions of union members
Ruling:
No. Article 242 states that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership
in a labor organization may be made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the
members of a union or any member or members specially concerned. "
The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the notion that the
assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the
provision expressly declares that the report may be made, alternatively by "any
member or members specially concerned." And further confirmation that the
assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of
jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of
the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the
Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and
all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor
management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support
requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-
union and intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well as (2)
"at their own initiative." There can thus be no question about the capacity of Rey
Sumangil and his group of more than eight hundred, to report and seek redress in an
intra-union conflict involving a matter they are specially concerned, i.e., the rates of
union dues being imposed on them.
G.R. No. 140753. April 30, 2003
BENJAMIN S. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. ELENA VELARDE, TERESITA
GUTIERREZ, LAURA FIGUEROA, CONCHITA TRINIDAD, CARMEN
BALIDOY, GINA RAZ, ENGRACIA AMPONIN, JESUSA BUDIONGAN,
MAGDALENA CONDESA, NADIA OJANO and EMILY MACAYAON,
respondents.
(Santos vs Velarde)
Facts:
Complainants Elena Velarde and 39 other persons were employed by Respondent
company Fordien Garments Ltd.. However, when they arrived for work on October 15,
1995, they were not allowed to enter the premises anymore since the business had
already closed down and thus, it was forced to terminate the services of the
Complainants.
Complainants filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC alleging that
they were illegally dismissed and pray for reinstatement or separation pay.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering the reinstate the complainants with full
backwages.
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision and filed his Appeal Memorandum with
the NLRC within the reglementary period but did not pay the bond on the ground
that "[T]he appeal is made by one who is not an employer, hence there is no need for
the posting of a cash or surety bond.”
The NLRC gave due course to the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s appeal was perfected.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal by the non-payment of
the appeal bond within the 10-day period provided by law. Thus, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter became final and executory upon the expiration of the reglementary
period.
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders… In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is a
requirement sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal from the labor arbiter's
monetary award. The posting of a bond within the period provided by law is not merely
mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.
There have been instances when this Court allowed the belated filing of the appeal bond
such as when the delayed payment was allowed because the failure to pay was due to the
excusable oversight or error of a third party, that is, the failure of the labor arbiter to
state in the notice of decision the amount of award and the inclusion of the bond as
among the requirements for perfecting an appeal. In the case at bar, petitioner's failure
to post a bond was due to his own negligent and mistaken belief that he was exempt. The
Labor Arbiter's decision stated the exact award of backwages to be paid by petitioner
Santos. There was nothing in the decision which could have given petitioner the
impression that the bond was not necessary or that he was excused from paying it.
In view of the foregoing, the NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the
non-payment of the appeal bond within the reglementary period.
The Court is aware that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is
allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of rules in deciding labor cases. However, such
liberality should not be applied in the instant case as it would render futile the very
purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. The liberal interpretation in
favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
G.R. No. 93381. September 28, 1990
YBL (YOUR BUS LINE) AND PRUDENCIO JARING, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUFINO C. LAMBINO,
ALEJANDRO BASBAS, CRESENCIANO BELTRAN, NANCY MARCAIDA,
YOLANDA MENDOZA, RODELIO TAPIA, REYNALDO RAMILO,
FRANCISCO BALINGIT, PURITA GUPIT, M. DIONADA, and NOEL
DEOCAREZA, respondent
(your bus line vs NLRC)
Facts:
Private respondents were drivers and conductors of petitioner- corporation which was
operating buses it leased from the Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC). Due to
serious business losses and failed to pay rentals to the MMTC, MMTC instituted a civil
action on which MMTC was able to repossess all the buses operated by petitioner
corporation. Since it had no more buses to operate and was severely financially
distressed, it stopped its operations and the employment of private respondents was
discontinued.
Private respondents thus filed a case for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which was subsequently amended to a complaint for payment of
separation pay.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring private respondents entitled to
separation pay.
Petitioner filed its notice of appeal within the reglementary period. However, an order
was issued by the NLRC stating that as the petitioners failed to post the required bond,
their appeal was rendered imperfect making the decision appealed from final and
executory.
Issue:
Whether NLRC erred in not giving due course to the appeal for failure to satisfy a purely
technical requirement when issues involving substantial rights were raised in the
appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. The appeal interposed by petitioners to the NLRC was made on September 11, 1989,
or just after six (6) days from the effectivity of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals
which states that the appeal is perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 7 of these rules. In undertaking the appeal, the counsel of
petitioners relied on the notice of the decision in the case which stated the requirements
of an appeal without any mention that a bond must be filed. Apparently said
counsel did not know as yet of said new law and Interim Rules requiring the posting of a
bond on appeal.
Moreover, in the appealed decision of the labor arbiter the does not state the exact total
amount due to the private respondents as separation pay that would be the basis of the
bond.
In this case, the circumstances of the non-filing of the bond are understandable and
could be attributed to excusable oversight. The Court holds that petitioners should
be given the opportunity to file the required bond and avail of the remedy of appeal.

G.R. Nos. 113666-68. January 19, 2000

GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. and LEOPOLDO PRIETO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, AGAPITO MACANDOG, LEONISA M. HONTIVEROS, ROSITA D. TAMARGO, LUCITA TEGIO
and ALMA MAGTARAYO , respondents.

Facts:

Complainants were members of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Dunkin Donut-CFW (KMDD-CFW, for
short) whose collective bargaining agreement with the corporation expired.

A Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction was filed by Golden Donuts, Inc., seeking to declare
the strike illegal and to dismiss all officers of the union and members who participated in the
commission of illegal acts.

There was a compromise agreement entered into by the KMDD-CFW (union) and Golden Donuts
whereby parties agree to withdraw/dismiss with prejudice any and all cases, whether criminal, civil or
labor filed against each other and upon execution of this Agreement, the parties undertake not to file
any other charges/complaints against each other. Hence, a separation pay was paid to the strikers.
However, out of 262 strikers, 5 members (complainants) disagree (sic) and did not receive the amount
due, arguing that the compromise agreement was entered into by their counsel and the President of the
Union without their individual consent and/or authority and that the same was not approved nor
ratified by the majority of the union membership. Complaints were filed.

Issue:
Whether the union is authorized to waive and compromise even the claims of those who did not
consent to the terms of such compromise agreement.

Ruling:

No. The union has no authority to compromise the individual claims of members who did not consent to
such settlement. Rule 138 Section 23 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court requires a special authority
before an attorney may compromise his client's litigation. "The authority to compromise cannot lightly
be presumed and should be duly established by evidence.”

In the case at bar, minority union members did not authorize the union to compromise their individual
claims. Absent a showing of the union's special authority to compromise the individual claims of private
respondents for reinstatement and back wages, there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. As
private respondents did not authorize the union to represent them in the compromise settlement, they
are not bound by the terms thereof.

G.R. No. 143542. June 8, 2006

SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. and LARRY C. DUBBERLY, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO ARGUILLA and HENRY C.
PEDRAJAS, respondents

Facts: