Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mitchell Hammer
American University
A Simple Robbery?
On January 31, 2007 at 9:30pm, three men brandished a gun and robbed a man in
Northeast, Washington D.C. They then fled in a red Jeep. Later, police saw the vehicle
and gave chase. After cornering the three suspects, the officers were able to arrest two of
the men, but a third escaped and commandeered a black Tahoe SUV. A second chase
began, this time, however, the suspect hit and critically injured a bicyclist. The pursuit
continued to the Capital Hill area where the suspect abandoned the Tahoe and broke into a
home. The family inside was able to escape after which the suspect barricaded himself in
the house. The police hostage rescue and negotiation teams were called on-scene and
approximately two hours later, the tactical unit moved in on the house and was able to arrest
the suspect. In a matter of a few short hours, a robbery of a pedestrian turned into a life-
threatening car chase, an injured bicyclist, breaking and entering a home (miles from where
the initial robbery took place), a terrorized family fleeing their home, and ending up as a
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<EndNote><Cite><Author>Nbc4.com</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>296</
RecNum><record><rec-number>296</rec-number><ref-type name="Electronic
Source">12</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Nbc4.com</author></
title></titles><number>February 1</number><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
location>Washington D.C.</pub-location><publisher>nbc.4.com</publisher><urls></
urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Nbc4.com, 2007).
Critical Incidents
These are violent times we live in. Each and every day, internet sites, newspapers, and
television and radio stations report the gruesome details of violence run amok. The
majority of critical incidents reported by the media are human-made situations (although
critical incidents also arise from natural disasters as well). Such human-induced incidents
can range from a disgruntled employee barricaded in the lunchroom at work to a cult
confrontation such as the tragedy in Waco, Texas that resulted in the fiery deaths of 81
Branch Davidians. A critical incident can also include a single, suicidal individual with a
gun to mass casualty scenarios, such as the calculated and planned bombings on the
London mass transit system on July 7, 2006 in which fifty-six people were killed
(including four homicide bombers) and 700 injured and the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001 on the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington
Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
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D.C., resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 innocent victims. Critical incidents can be
planned to the smallest detail or impulsively ignited (e.g., road rage). They can arise from
restaurant, bar, or sporting event. A critical incident can involve a subject who is reported
to have a weapon and has barricaded him/herself in a room or building. An incident can
also be a “hostage” situation whereby individuals are held against their will in order to
attain some identified, instrumental goal or a “non-hostage” event in which individuals are
held against their will and are victims to the subject’s emotional state ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Noesner</Author><Year>1999</Year><RecNum>98</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Noesner, G.W.</author></authors></
pages><volume>68</volume><dates><year>1999</year></dates><urls></urls></
incident characteristics, however, is that these potentially deadly situations are often
When a crisis incident is resolved tactically, however, there is increased public scrutiny
as to whether a tactical assault was necessary to resolve the potentially violent event. With
Electronic
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availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1298603
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this scrutiny has come increased demands for law enforcement to employ the latest and
encounters that include prison riots, criminal actions, terrorist acts, suicide attempts, and
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
negotiation fails, hostages, bystanders, police officers and the subject him/her self are at
Specifically, I present, in summary form, the S.A.F.E. crisis negotiation model that is
Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</RecNum><record><rec-number>154</
Communication Research</secondary-title></titles><pages>216-231</
pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></dates><urls></urls></
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>279</
RecNum><record><rec-number>279</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>An
Psychology</secondary-title></titles><pages>449-464</pages><volume>17</
volume><number>4</number><dates><year>1998</year></dates><urls></urls></
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
they likely face a situation in which at least one subject has a weapon and has already used
it or is threatening to harm others. The subject’s stress level often dramatically increases
when police cars and incident response vehicles initially arrive, Special Weapons and
Tactical (SWAT) officers deploy in full tactical gear, and snipers take up strategic positions.
This overwhelming presence of law enforcement induces heightened stress and perceived
threat that can compromise the subject’s ability to cope with the situation. This can move a
subject to view the situation in win/lose terms and increase his/her commitment to violence
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
A Practical Theory
Kurt Lewin stated “there is nothing so practical as a good theory” ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hunt</Author><Year>1987</Year><RecNum>181</
RecNum><record><rec-number>181</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hunt, D.E.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>Hunt, D.E.</author></secondary-authors></
affairs</title></titles><dates><year>1987</year></dates><pub-location>Cambridge,
MA</pub-location><publisher>Brookline Books</publisher><urls></urls></record></
theory with practice. The “theory” extrapolated in the S.A.F.E. model is an applied
framework for critical incident response teams when lives are at stake and negotiation
strategy is employed to de-escalate such crisis events. This model is generated in practice
as well as from systematic analysis of actual discourse that emerged between the police
negotiator, Third Party Intermediaries (TPI’s), the subject and his/her hostages or victims
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
On the one hand, I have been fortunate to be part of hostage negotiation teams in the
Washington D.C. area where I helped develop negotiation strategies to de-escalate and
resolve these violent situations. Thus, every theoretical “concept” of the S.A.F.E. model
has had virtually instant “real world” application and testing of its usefulness to these types
of events. In addition, a core group of police crisis negotiators provided continual insights
from their own negotiation experiences in real world incidents that informed the
On the other hand, Dr. Rogan and I have conducted social-scientific analyses of audio
taped incidents to generate and refine specific S.A.F.E. concepts and to test in discourse
between the police negotiators and TPIs and subjects the viability and applicability of these
Year><RecNum>279</RecNum><record><rec-number>279</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>An
volume><number>4</number><dates><year>1998</year></dates><urls></urls></
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</
RecNum><record><rec-number>154</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
titles><pages>216-231</pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></
dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
In the 1990’s, Dr. Rogan and I identified four key “triggers” as a possible line of
research for assessing escalation and de-escalation patterns in critical incidents. We termed
subject), and Emotion (level of emotional upset experienced by the subject or hostages/
victims). We identified this emerging model as the F.I.R.E. approach ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>6</
RecNum><Prefix>e.g., </Prefix><record><rec-number>6</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
practice</title></titles><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</
pub-location><publisher>Praeger</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1999b</Year><RecNum>153</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</author></authors><secondary-
titles><pages>29-45</pages><dates><year>1999</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>63</RecNum><record><rec-number>63</rec-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors><secondary-
title></titles><pages>105-114</pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-
urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>1999</
Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><record><rec-number>145</rec-number><ref-type
name="Conference Proceedings">10</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
titles><dates><year>1999</year><pub-dates><date>February 16-17</date></pub-
dates></dates><pub-location>Baltimore, MD</pub-location><urls></urls></record></
discussed this F.I.R.E. model with police negotiators, we found the four triggers provided
crisis situations.
driven approach for resolving hostage/crisis events rather than the “negotiation-based”
approach advocated by Dr. Rogan and myself. As a result of this practitioner feedback, we
changed the acronym of the model to SA.F.E: Substantive demands, Attunement (relational
A Communication Approach
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R.G.</author><author>Hammer,
of conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
communication messages as they emerge during interaction between the subject and the
anchored in four key areas. First, micro-behavioral analyses of verbal and nonverbal
actions are the building blocks through which police negotiators and subjects coordinate
their actions and make sense of one another’s motivations, intentions and behavioral acts.
constructed. Third, discourse characteristics are core competencies for analyzing conflict
dynamics and identifying and implementing conflict resolution practices ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Folger</Author><Year>2004</Year><RecNum>238</
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Jones</Author><Year>2006</
Year><RecNum>240</RecNum><record><rec-number>240</rec-number><ref-type
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></secondary-
title></titles><pages>277-305</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
location>Malden, MA</pub-location><publisher>Blackwell</publisher><urls></urls></
negotiators and subjects construct meaning and enact behavior through core interpretive
frames. These frames allow individuals to make sense of and respond to others in situ.
Within these core interpretive frames are specific “conflict issues” that are “negotiated”
between the parties. The S.A.F.E. model posits that the police negotiator and the subject
“negotiate” conflictual issues (topics) that are “framed” in terms of Substantive demands,
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
There are identifiable features of how these conflict issues are understood by the subject
(and police negotiator) within each S.A.F.E. frame that allows for systematic tracking of
Substantive demand, Attunement, Face and Emotional distress issues. The S.A.F.E. model
is strategy focused and identifies specific Substantive demand, Attunement, Face and
Emotional distress communicative action plans police negotiators may employ to de-
escalate the situation when interacting with the subject in the identified S.A.F.E. frame of
Overall, the S.A.F.E. model is designed to aid critical incident management and crisis
negotiation. This is done by developing a crisis negotiation strategy to influence the subject
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</
RecNum><record><rec-number>212</rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
2005a). Having a well-developed S.A.F.E. crisis negotiation strategy can (1) increasing
influence strategies to de-escalate critical events, (3) assist incident command decision
making, and (4) support appropriate responses to various public and legal challenges
regarding specific decisions and actions taken toward the subject as an incident unfolds.
The S.A.F.E. model proposes three interactive steps for law enforcement negotiator’s to
engage. First, police negotiation teams need to identify the predominant S.A.F.E. frame of
the subject. Does the subject frame his/her interaction in terms of bargaining or problem
solving specific demands (Substantive demand frame), trust issues toward the negotiator or
TPIs (Attunement frame), how he/she is being perceived or judged by others (Face frame),
or how angry, frustrated, sad, etc. the subject is feeling in the situation (Emotional distress
frame)? Also, what is the predominant S.A.F.E. frame of the police negotiator? Second,
the police negotiator needs to match his/her communication to the S.A.F.E. frame of the
subject. This means the law enforcement negotiator should interact with the subject within
his/her primary S.A.F.E. frame around issues important to the subject. Third, after making
some “progress” interacting with the subject in his/her predominant S.A.F.E. frame and de-
escalating the situation, the police negotiator is more likely to be successful in shifting with
the subject to another S.A.F.E. frame. This frame-shifting permits the police negotiator to
gain influence with the subject and can further de-escalate the situation and increase the
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2001</Year><RecNum>164</RecNum><record><rec-number>164</
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors><secondary-
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</
RecNum><record><rec-number>212</rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2005b</Year><RecNum>213</RecNum><record><rec-number>213</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
The notion of an interpretive frame is central to the S.A.F.E. model. Frames are
interpretive structures of interaction that enable individuals to define or make sense of one
ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Bateson</Author><Year>1954/1972</
Year><RecNum>10</RecNum><record><rec-number>10</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Bateson, G.</author></
titles><dates><year>1954/1972</year></dates><pub-location>New York</pub-
location><publisher>Ballantine Books</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
ExcludeYear="1"><Author>Bateson</Author><Year>1954/1972</
Year><RecNum>10</RecNum><Pages>186</Pages><record><rec-number>10</rec-
number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Bateson,
titles><dates><year>1954/1972</year></dates><pub-location>New York</pub-
location><publisher>Ballantine Books</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(p. 186), which functions as a map providing cues about how the interaction is to
be defined and how to interpret the communicative acts within the specific context. Frames
are directly connected to how people act in situations. As Gray ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Gray</Author><Year>2006</
Year><RecNum>231</RecNum><record><rec-number>231</rec-number><ref-type
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></secondary-
mediation</title><secondary-title>Handbook of mediation</secondary-title></
titles><pages>193-216</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
Year><RecNum>231</RecNum><Pages>194</Pages><record><rec-number>231</rec-
type><contributors><authors><author>Gray, B.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></secondary-authors></
title><secondary-title>Handbook of mediation</secondary-title></
titles><pages>193-216</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
lenses or interpretive sets through which people perceive and respond to a particular
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
Further, frames are set in communicative interaction through which individuals co-
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Putnam</Author><Year>1992</Year><RecNum>105</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Putnam, L. L. </author><author>Holmer,
E. Roloff</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>Framing, reframing,
secondary-title></titles><pages>128-155</pages><dates><year>1992</year></
Because frames are interactively grounded, they are subject to modification based on the
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Putnam</Author><Year>1992</Year><RecNum>105</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Putnam, L. L. </author><author>Holmer,
E. Roloff</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>Framing, reframing,
secondary-title></titles><pages>128-155</pages><dates><year>1992</year></
Author><Year>2001</Year><RecNum>164</RecNum><record><rec-number>164</
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors><secondary-
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer, 2001; Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Research has shown that individuals
who are in conflict and operate from different frames are more likely to engage in win/lose
(competitive) behavior and are less likely to achieve resolution compared to parties who
Author><Year>1996</Year><RecNum>38</RecNum><record><rec-number>38</rec-
resolution.</title><secondary-title>Communication Research</secondary-title></
titles><pages>297-322</pages><volume>23</volume><number>3</
number><dates><year>1996</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
result of frame satisfaction during interaction. When applied to critical incident negotiation,
these findings suggest that subjects are able to shift frames more easily after some degree of
issue resolution has been achieved within the existing discourse frame. In contrast,
attempts to shift frames too early can result in conflict escalation ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2001</Year><RecNum>164</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></
secondary-title></titles><dates><year>2001</year></dates><pub-location>Thousand
Oaks, CA</pub-location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer, 2001).
In tense, potentially violent critical incidents, the police negotiator and the subject
interactively shape their negotiation process through the core interpretive frames of
Substantive demands, Attunement, Face, and Emotional distress. How issues within these
frames are negotiated functions to escalate or de-escalate the event. The S.A.F.E. model
identifies specific markers for tracking escalation and de-escalation and delineates
negotiation strategies within each of the four S.A.F.E. frames for de-escalating and
In critical incidents, the subject and the police negotiator will often interpret one
another’s behavior in terms of the substantive demands each other makes. This
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Roloff</Author><Year>1992</Year><RecNum>108</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Roloff,M.E.</author><author>Jordan,J.M.</
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>L. L. Putnam</author><author>M. E.
Roloff</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>Achieving negotiation
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Wilson</Author><Year>1990</Year><RecNum>136</
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>J. Anderson</author></secondary-
title>Communication Yearbook</secondary-title></titles><pages>374-406</
pages><volume>13</volume><dates><year>1990</year></dates><pub-
record></Cite></EndNote>(Roloff & Jordan, 1992; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). When the
subject and/or the police negotiator is operating within a Substantive demand frame, they
are focusing their attention and framing their understanding of one another in terms of
whether expressed wants and demands are being acknowledged and “negotiated.” Subjects
are operating in this frame when they consistently focus on or shift the topic of
conversation back to what they want or need. When the subject is operating within a
Substantive demand frame, the goal of the police negotiator is to enter into or “match” the
substantive frame of the subject and then address the specific “issues” (i.e., demands) made
by the subject as well as the claims made by the police negotiator ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</
RecNum><record><rec-number>212</rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
2005a). Demands refer to statements made by the subject and the police negotiator that
escalation and de-escalation around substantive demands that are important to track during a
critical incident.
The S.A.F.E. model posits two types of wants or demands. Central substantive
demands are those statements of want or need made by the subject that are considered most
relevant by the subject to his/her current situation. Peripheral substantive demands are
wants that are seen by the subject as secondary or less relevant to the situation. As a crisis
develops, some demands of the subject may move from being central substantive demands
to less important demands (peripheral substantive demands). By listening to the way the
demands are presented provides clues as to whether the demand is viewed, from the
subject’s perspective, as central or peripheral. For example, demands that have a deadline,
a threat attached, or increased emotional upset can be considered central at a particular time
In addition to tracking the type of demands, police negotiation teams are advised to
track how the demands are asserted by the subject. Demands should be tracked in terms of
whether they are hardening (becoming more positional) or softening and whether they are
Threats are also important to track within the Substantive demand frame. Threats are
messages designed to gain compliance from another party by indicating negative outcomes
Author><Year>1953</Year><RecNum>218</RecNum><record><rec-number>218</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author><author>Kelly, H.</author></authors></
EndNote>(Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953). Threats should be tracked in terms of whether
the threat is offensively asserted (expresses intent to harm if the demand is not met) or
defensive (intent to harm if the perceived threatening behavior of the other party continues
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
model suggests that any threat to do harm should be taken seriously. However, a defensive
For example, a subject issues a defensive threat when he/she says, “back up your tactical
guys, or I will start shooting!” To this threat, the incident commander has a number of
options, including having his tactical unit stop moving closer or moving slightly back, thus
How the subject responds (considering, accepting vs. ignoring, rejecting) to demands
made by the police negotiator should also be tracked. It is possible, for instance, that a
situation can de-escalate even when a subject does not soften his/her demands. This can
occur because the subject expresses more willingness to meet at least some of the demands
of the police negotiator while maintaining a more rigid posture regarding his/own demands.
Positively responding to the police negotiator’s demands can include, for example,
The S.A.F.E. model identifies a number of Substantive demand frame strategies for de-
escalating a crisis event. The first, and easiest strategy is to simply ignore the demands
made by the subject by re-focusing the discussion to another topic. This can be done when
the subject stops asserting his/her demands or is no longer committed to having his/her
demands met by the police negotiator. Police negotiators may respond to deadlines and
threats by either talking through the deadline or waiting through the deadline, depending on
whether the subject is able to re-focus away from the immediate demand and deadline (talk
deadline (wait through strategy). Both of these strategies are discussed in greater detail in
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>McMains</
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</RecNum><record><rec-number>189</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
Demands may also be downplayed through the strategy of “task breakdown analysis”
Year><RecNum>189</RecNum><record><rec-number>189</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Mullins, W.C.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
negotiations: Managing critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and
edition><dates><year>2006</year></dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
Mullins, 2006). This strategy involves identifying the key tasks that need to be done in
This strategy is used when a demand cannot easily be met or the police negotiator is unable
<EndNote><Cite><Author>McMains</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</
RecNum><record><rec-number>189</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
title></titles><edition>Third edition</edition><dates><year>2006</year></
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(McMains & Mullins, 2006) to typical responses of “we are working on it” or “I
will have to get my boss to agree to your request.” These types of responses communicate
stalling and lack of consideration and can therefore escalate the crisis ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
negotiator’s viewpoint) when the subject is willing to trade a central substantive demand of
the police (e.g., release of hostages, surrender) for a peripheral demand of the police (e.g.,
talking to an attorney once taken into custody). There may be times, however, when central
substantive demands of the subject (e.g., release of prisoners, safe passage out of the
country) are exchanged for central substantive demands of the authorities (e.g., release of
hostages, defusing a bomb). This may be applicable, for instance, to a terrorist incident that
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
A fourth strategy involves problem solving underlying interests and looking for
Author><Year>1991</Year><RecNum>44</RecNum><record><rec-number>44</rec-
number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Fisher,
R. </author><author>Ury, W.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Getting to
location><publisher>Penguin</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Folger</Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>45</
RecNum><record><rec-number>45</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author><author>Stutman, R.K.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Working
through conflict</title></titles><edition>fourth</edition><dates><year>2000</year></
Publishers</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Pruitt</
Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>102</RecNum><record><rec-number>102</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Pruitt,D.G. </author><author>Carnevale,P.J.</
location><publisher>Brooks/Cole</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Fisher & Ury, 1991; Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 2000; Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993). Problem solving can be effective if either the subject or the police negotiator is not
negotiation team identifying common goals and/or interests that underlie the substantive
demands made by the subject. For example, a hostage taker may demand a bulletproof vest
may be that the subject is fearful of being attached by the police and wants the bulletproof
vest for safety. While the police may not wish to bargain with the hostage taker for a
bulletproof vest, the police negotiator can negotiate the “safety” concerns (underlying
interest) of the subject. In this way, the substantive frame issue is being addressed. By
doing this, the situation can de-escalate, increasing the probability of a peaceful resolution.
The S.A.F.E. model identifies the following Substantive demand frame patterns. First,
the type of demands (central, peripheral), the number of demands and the relative changes
the event. Second, an increase in the number or positional commitments of the subject to
peripheral substantive demands often reflect contention between the subject and police
negotiator over issues of power and trust (Attunement). That is, peripheral substantive
demands often function as the relational battleground of power/trust between the subject
and police negotiator. This can arise when subjects are frustrated with the police negotiator
and therefore create additional, peripheral demands in order to re-assert power against the
police. When this happens, an escalatory pattern emerges. Finally, the Substantive demand
frame often stabilizes later in a critical incident in those events that end with a peaceful
resolution (e.g., surrender). In these cases, a stable and convergent Substantive demand
frame is very important insofar as explicit agreements are made by the subject and police
negotiator about how the situation can end without violence (i.e., the surrender ritual).
Attunement is the second core S.A.F.E. frame, and has been posited more generally to
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Fisher</Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>223</
RecNum><record><rec-number>223</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Getting together</title></
location><publisher>Penguin</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Fisher & Brown, 1988). Attunement or trust has been variously defined in
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Cupach</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>220</
RecNum><Prefix>e.g.,</Prefix><record><rec-number>220</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Cupach, W.R.</
author><author>Canary, D.J.</author></authors></
location><publisher>McGraw-Hill</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Rousseau</Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>221</
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rousseau, D.M.</
secondary-title></titles><pages>393-404</pages><volume>23</
volume><dates><year>1988</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(e.g.,Cupach & Canary, 1997; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1988) and an
“expectation that the other party will cooperate in the future” ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Pruitt</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>102</
RecNum><Pages>133</Pages><record><rec-number>102</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Pruitt,D.G. </
author><author>Carnevale,P.J.</author></authors></
location><publisher>Brooks/Cole</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>36</RecNum><record><rec-number>36</rec-
secondary-title></titles><pages>72-96</pages><volume>17</
volume><dates><year>1998</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(1998) as the degree of attraction, liking, respect, trust and a desire to cooperate
with the other party. Overall, attunement is concerned with the quality of the relationship
that involves a sense of vulnerability toward the other party, an expectation of cooperation,
and a liking toward and consideration for the well-being of the other party ADDIN
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</RecNum><record><rec-number>196</
conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
interaction, but future relations as well. As Folger, Poole, and Stutman ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Folger</Author><Year>2005</
Year><RecNum>224</RecNum><record><rec-number>224</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Folger, J.P.</
edition><dates><year>2005</year></dates><pub-location>Boston, MA</pub-
EndNote>(2005) point out, “relational communication has its most profound effects
through influencing future interaction. How people interact in conflicts is colored by their
ExcludeAuth="1" ExcludeYear="1"><Author>Folger</Author><Year>2005</
Year><RecNum>224</RecNum><Pages>35</Pages><record><rec-number>224</rec-
number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Folger,
titles><edition>Fifth</edition><dates><year>2005</year></dates><pub-location>Boston,
MA</pub-location><publisher>Pearson</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(p. 35). Research suggests that when attunement (trust, affiliation) is present in a
relationship, the parties: (1) are less critical of one another, (2) demand less information of
one another yet are willing to share more information, (3) engage in more personal
disclosure, (4) impute positive motives to the other party’s behavior in ambiguous
situations, and (5) are able to more easily reach agreements to end their disagreements or
Year><RecNum>225</RecNum><record><rec-number>225</rec-number><ref-type
title></periodical><pages>9-23</pages><volume>38</volume><dates><year>1980</
year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Lindskold</
Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>226</RecNum><record><rec-number>226</
secondary-title></titles><pages>335-345</pages><volume>14</
volume><dates><year>1988</year></dates><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Folger</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>224</
RecNum><record><rec-number>224</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author><author>Stutman, R.K.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Working
through conflict</title></titles><edition>Fifth</edition><dates><year>2005</year></
dates><pub-location>Boston, MA</pub-location><publisher>Pearson</
between the parties, and is concerned with the degree of interpersonal closeness and
distance between the subject and the police negotiator and/or Third Party Intermediaries
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</RecNum><record><rec-number>196</
conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
EndNote>(Hammer, 2005a; Rogan & Hammer, 2006). In a crisis event, attunement often
becomes a critical consideration for subjects when they are contemplating surrender. For
hostage takers to complete the surrender, they typically need to put their weapon away and
then leave their (often barricaded) location and walk to an open area where SWAT team
members, with weapons drawn, take the subject into custody. What propels a subject to
walk out unarmed into a group of armed police officers? Often, the degree of attunement
developed with the police negotiator enables a subject to trust that the action taken by the
police upon surrender will not be to harmful to him/herself; that is, the surrender will be
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
cooperation between the police negotiator and the parties ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Deutsch</Author><Year>1973</Year><RecNum>29</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Deutsch, M.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>F.E. Jandt</author></secondary-authors></
titles><dates><year>1973</year></dates><pub-location>New York</pub-
the police negotiator (and/or TPIs) and the subject, there is a often a pattern of movement
interaction. The primary feature of attunement is reciprocal cooperative behavior for de-
escalating violent situations. Cooperative actions are very influential in de-escalating crisis
situations and building attunement because of the rule of reciprocity. This rule states that
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</RecNum><record><rec-number>189</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
The S.A.F.E. model encourages police negotiators to frame actions and communication
messages with the subject in terms of “cooperative behavior.” In this way, the police
negotiator earns increased attunement “influence” with the subject. The goal, therefore, of
the police negotiator, when the subject is operating within an Attunement frame, is to
engage in cooperative behavior in order to gain increased relational closeness with the
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
typically high levels of mistrust the subject has toward the police negotiator. That is, the
subject perceives his/her relationship with the law enforcement negotiator in competitive,
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Donohue</
Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>142</RecNum><record><rec-number>142</
type><contributors><authors><author>Donohue, W. A.</author><author>Roberto, A.
titles><pages>175-198</pages><volume>20</volume><dates><year>1993</year></
dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1990</
Year><RecNum>150</RecNum><record><rec-number>150</rec-number><ref-type
name="Thesis">32</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</author></
authors><tertiary-authors><author>William A Donohue</author></tertiary-authors></
goal, relational-goal, and language intensity message behavior within hostage negotiations:
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1990</Year><RecNum>156</
RecNum><record><rec-number>156</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
Tensions</secondary-title></titles><pages>77-90</pages><volume>20</
volume><dates><year>1990</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Hammer, 2007; Rogan, 1990; Rogan, Donohue, &
Lyles, 1990).
The S.A.F.E. model recommends police negotiation teams track attunement issues by
identifying specific cooperative vs. uncooperative acts taken by the subject and by the
police SWAT and negotiation units. Cooperative acts can include both behavioral actions
(e.g., releasing hostages) and communicative messages (“I appreciate your picking up the
subject and the police negotiator (and Tactical actions) are important insofar as attunement
ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Johnson</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>222</
RecNum><record><rec-number>222</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Johnson, D.W.</author></authors></
contributors><titles><title>Reaching out</title></titles><edition>Sixth</
edition><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Boston, MA</pub-
EndNote>(1997) comments, “trust is hard to build and easy to destroy” ADDIN EN.CITE
Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>222</RecNum><Pages>75</
Pages><record><rec-number>222</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Johnson, D.W.</author></authors></
contributors><titles><title>Reaching out</title></titles><edition>Sixth</
edition><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Boston, MA</pub-
EndNote>(p. 75).
with the subject if Tactical actions contradict cooperative messages of the police negotiator.
tragic event was initiated when the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and explosives
(ATF) attempted to capture the cult leader of the Branch Davidians in their Mount Carmel
compound. Weapon fire was exchanged that resulted in the deaths of four ATF agents and
the wounding of sixteen others. Shortly thereafter, the FBI assumed control of the incident.
After 56 days, the standoff ended when the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) inserted
tear gas into Mount Carmel. Shortly thereafter, fire engulfed the building, resulting in the
Tactical actions during this siege consistently contradicted the negotiation strategy of the
FBI’s crisis negotiation unit. The tactical actions were “designed to tighten the perimeter
around the compound, to demonstrate to those inside that Koresh was not in full control, to
make the lives of those inside increasingly uncomfortable, and to provide greater safety for
Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>265</RecNum><Pages>139</
Pages><record><rec-number>265</rec-number><ref-type name="Government
Document">46</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Scruggs, R.</
1993b, p. 139). Various aggressive, psychological warfare tactics, such as the playing of
loud music, noises of dying animals, and Tibetan chants throughout the night were used to
create sleep deprivation among the cult members. In addition, the Special Agent in Charge
(SAC) of the situation shut off electricity to the compound in order to increase physical
discomfort. However, this was done without substantial consultation with the crisis
negotiators. The result was that the electricity was shut off right after at least two
Davidians voluntarily left the compound. Further, the Tactical unit towed the automobiles
belonging to Davidian members that were parked in front of the compound. Again, the
timing of this action was not fully coordinated with the negotiation team. The result was
that the removal of the cars took place right after seven more people exited.
These pressure tactics did not complement negotiation strategy nor were they
Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>287</RecNum><record><rec-
number>287</rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Scruggs, R.</author><author>Zipperstein,
year></dates><pub-location>Washington D.C.</pub-location><publisher>U.S.
Department of Justice</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
communication messages can range from noting whether specific actions (e.g., delivery of
food) increases relational trust of the subject toward the police negotiator to noting whether
expressions of trust/mistrust are made by the subject toward the police negotiator or TPIs.
Strategies to build attunement with the subject can include tactical “containment” actions
rather than actions that increase SWAT presence. Engaging the subject in less contentious
more formal to informal language, using the language of relational closeness vs. distance
(e.g., this/these rather than that/those) and use of active listening skills can also be effective
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>McMains</
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</RecNum><record><rec-number>189</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
title></titles><edition>Third edition</edition><dates><year>2006</year></
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Donohue</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>142</
RecNum><record><rec-number>142</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Donohue, W. A.</
author><author>Roberto, A. J.</author></authors></
titles><pages>175-198</pages><volume>20</volume><dates><year>1993</year></
consideration toward his/her concerns and therefore can escalate conflict between the
subject and police negotiator. The S.A.F.E. model suggests that this low attunement frame
can remain relatively stable unless specific cooperative actions and communication
messages are strategically initiated by the police negotiator and reciprocated by the subject.
As attunement increases, there is a greater likelihood that the volatile situation can de-
escalate. Further, as attunement is developed between the police negotiator and the subject,
substantive demands can become more negotiable and a peaceful resolution of event is
The S.A.F.E. model posits “face” as a third trigger of conflict escalation and de-
<EndNote><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Goffman</Author><Year>1967</
Year><RecNum>163</RecNum><record><rec-number>163</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Goffman, E.</author></
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Littlejohn</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>233</
RecNum><Pages>228</Pages><record><rec-number>233</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Domenici, K.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></secondary-authors></
title>Handbook of mediation</secondary-title></titles><pages>228-246</
pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-location>Malden, MA</pub-
location><publisher>Blackwell Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Littlejohn & Domenici, 2006, p. 228). In essence, face is about how individuals
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Donohue</Author><Year>1992</
Year><RecNum>141</RecNum><record><rec-number>141</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Kolt, R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Managing
interpersonal conflict</title></titles><dates><year>1992</year></dates><pub-
Year><RecNum>100</RecNum><record><rec-number>100</rec-number><ref-type
titles><pages>55-82</pages><dates><year>1989</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Ting-Toomey</
Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>157</RecNum><record><rec-number>157</
type><contributors><authors><author>Ting-Toomey, S.</author></authors><secondary-
titles><pages>213-235</pages><dates><year>1988</year></dates><pub-
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Ting-Toomey</Author><Year>1998</
Year><RecNum>232</RecNum><record><rec-number>232</rec-number><ref-type
S.</author><author>Kurogi, A.</author></authors></
Relations</full-title></periodical><pages>187-225</pages><volume>22</
volume><dates><year>1998</year></dates><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Littlejohn</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>233</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Littlejohn, S.</author><author>Domenici,
K.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></
title><secondary-title>Handbook of mediation</secondary-title></
titles><pages>228-246</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
& Domenici, 2006; Northrup, 1989; Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998).
Research suggests that individuals will sacrifice rewards in an effort to maintain face in the
Author><Year>1977</Year><RecNum>140</RecNum><record><rec-number>140</
type><contributors><authors><author>Brown, B.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>D. Druckman</author></secondary-authors></
titles><pages>275-299</pages><dates><year>1977</year></dates><pub-
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>in press</Year><RecNum>302</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R.G.</author></authors><secondary-
location><publisher>Hampton Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</
RecNum><record><rec-number>154</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
titles><pages>216-231</pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></
dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Miron</Author><Year>1979</
Year><RecNum>92</RecNum><record><rec-number>92</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Goldstein, A.P</author></authors></
contributors><titles><title>Hostage</title></titles><dates><year>1979</year></
dates><pub-location>New York</pub-location><publisher>Pergamon</
The S.A.F.E. model views face as the projected self image or reputation held by an
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>60</RecNum><record><rec-number>60</rec-
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>R.G. Rogan</author><author>M.R.
pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</
RecNum><record><rec-number>154</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
titles><pages>216-231</pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></
1997; Rogan & Hammer, 1994). Critical incidents, with the visible arrival and presence of
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1990</
Year><RecNum>150</RecNum><record><rec-number>150</rec-number><ref-type
name="Thesis">32</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</author></
authors><tertiary-authors><author>William A Donohue</author></tertiary-authors></
goal, relational-goal, and language intensity message behavior within hostage negotiations:
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>2002</Year><RecNum>172</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</author><author>Hammer, M.
R.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Giles, H.</author></secondary-
and community</secondary-title></titles><pages>229-254</pages><dates><year>2002</
during a crisis incident. Police negotiators not only need to manage their own face (e.g.,
self-image, reputation) concerns, but also validate or acknowledge the face needs of the
Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</RecNum><record><rec-number>154</
Communication Research</secondary-title></titles><pages>216-231</
pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></dates><urls></urls></
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R.G.</author><author>Hammer,
of conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Rogan
The goal for the police negotiator in the S.A.F.E. model is to validate the face concerns
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
2005a). The S.A.F.E. model posits that face threatening acts, when reciprocated, escalate
conflict, while face honoring acts de-escalate conflict. Further, face needs that are not
addressed (e.g., ignored) or are perceived to be rejected escalates conflict, while face needs
that are honored and are perceived to be validated de-escalates the situation. In addition,
consistent attack self face acts may be possible indicators of suicidal intentions ADDIN
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</
Year><RecNum>154</RecNum><record><rec-number>154</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
1994).
Consistent with social identity theory, two types of face are viewed as particularly
central to crisis negotiation: social/group identity and individual identity ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Tajfel</Author><Year>1978</Year><RecNum>122</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Tajfel, H.</author></authors><secondary-
authors><author>H. Tajfel</author></secondary-authors></
titles><dates><year>1978</year></dates><pub-location>London</pub-
location><publisher>Academic Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Tajfel</Author><Year>1981</Year><RecNum>123</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Tajfel, H.</author></authors><secondary-
title>Intergroup behavior</secondary-title></titles><dates><year>1981</year></
ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>60</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author><author>Rogan,
R.G.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>R.G. Rogan</
pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
her own attributes (e.g., strong, weak, intelligent) while social identity consists of those
ExcludeYear="1"><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>60</
RecNum><Pages>15-16</Pages><record><rec-number>60</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Rogan, R.G.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>R.G.
titles><pages>9-23</pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport,
CT</pub-location><publisher>Praeger Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite></EndNote>(p. 15-16).
These types of face can vary both within incidents as well as across incidents. Rogan
Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>154</RecNum><record><rec-number>154</
pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></dates><urls></urls></
involving a suicidal person while social identity characteristics may be more salient in
negotiations with certain social groups, cults, or particular national identity organizations
Year><RecNum>164</RecNum><record><rec-number>164</rec-number><ref-type
P.E.</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>Conflict negotiation
secondary-title></titles><dates><year>2001</year></dates><pub-location>Thousand
Oaks, CA</pub-location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer, 2001). Whether face concerns are more personal identity driven or
social identity based, communication that attacks or threatens face tends to escalate conflict,
while face honoring messages can de-escalate the situation ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
both individual and/or group face needs can be salient in a crisis situation and when not
A subject that is operating within a Face frame during a crisis event engages in behavior
that articulates those characteristics of his/her self image (e.g., an honest person, a drug
addict) that is salient to that person. When the subject “explains” his/her situation or
problem and highlights key personal or social identity characteristics important to him/her,
the subject is, in essence, pleading with the police negotiator to validate (i.e., to
acknowledge) that the negotiator understands how the subject sees his/her situation and
Face frame concerns of the subject should also be tracked in terms of the features
(positive or negative) of his/her self image. Further, four specific face behaviors of the
subject (and police negotiator) are tracked in the S.A.F.E model: (1) attack self face
behavior (e.g., I really ruined it with my family), (2) attack other face behavior (e.g., you
police are idiots if you think I am going to let one of these hostages go), (3) honor self face
behavior (e.g., I have had a responsible job for many years, until now), (4) honor other face
There are a number of strategies police negotiators can use to validate the face needs of
encourage subjects to explain their situation and present those qualities of their self image
that need acknowledgement from the police negotiator. Allowing subjects to elaborate
“how they got into this situation,” often takes the form of justifying or rationalizing their
use of verbal qualifiers, which linguistically function as markers of Face frame concerns.
Verbal qualifiers function for the subject as a way to present his/her self-image in as
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
from his job due, at least in part, to alcoholism, says, “I had a couple of drinks, people do
that. Nothing wrong with that”. The verbal qualifiers of “people do that” and “Nothing
wrong with that” attempt to present the subject’s self-image in a positive light—as someone
however. In these cases, they often engage in substantial self face attack behavior and are,
in effect, presenting a negative self-image for validation to the police negotiator. When this
<EndNote><Cite ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</
Year><RecNum>154</RecNum><record><rec-number>154</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
titles><pages>216-231</pages><volume>22</volume><dates><year>1994</year></
suicide. Encouraging subjects to talk about themselves is a powerful strategy for validating
face concerns. When face needs are validated, a sense of progress in the Face frame arises.
Face frame discourse may likely emerge during the surrender ritual. At this time,
subjects may be acutely aware of how they may be perceived by others when they are taken
into custody. As a result, they may demand a face-saving exit. For example, a hostage
taker may request that he/she not be handcuffed in of his children. When a subject is
focused in the Face frame, the police negotiation team should look to honor face-saving
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
The fourth S.A.F.E. frame is Emotional distress. Results from a national survey of
police crisis negotiators reveals that the two most important needs of negotiators were the
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>1994</
Year><RecNum>67</RecNum><record><rec-number>67</rec-number><ref-type
secondary-title></titles><pages>8-11</pages><volume>63</
Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>204</
RecNum><record><rec-number>204</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</
title>Police Chief</secondary-title></titles><pages>14-18</pages><volume>61</
volume><dates><year>1994</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer, Van Zandt, & Rogan, 1994; Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1994).
The high stress, potentially life threatening dynamics involved in hostage/crisis incidents
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
Communication is central in understanding emotion and conflict and crises are emotional
Emotions arise from an individual’s cognitive appraisal of their social situation ADDIN
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Jones</Author><Year>2001</
Year><RecNum>8</RecNum><record><rec-number>8</rec-number><ref-type
author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>Emotional communication in
Resolution</secondary-title></titles><pages> 81-104</pages><dates><year>2001</
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Jones</Author><Year>2006</
Year><RecNum>240</RecNum><record><rec-number>240</rec-number><ref-type
author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Herrman, M.S.</author></secondary-
title></titles><pages>277-305</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
location>Malden, MA</pub-location><publisher>Blackwell</publisher><urls></urls></
Critical incidents often involve levels of emotional intensity that is more accurately
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>151</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rogan, R. G.</author></authors><secondary-
pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Rogan, 1997)
Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>241</RecNum><record><rec-number>241</
type><contributors><authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</author><author>Guerrero,
L.K.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
between individuals that can either intensify or reduce emotional distress ADDIN
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Andersen</Author><Year>1998</
Year><RecNum>241</RecNum><record><rec-number>241</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></authors><secondary-
title></titles><pages>49-96</pages><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-
The S.A.F.E. model defines emotional distress as “intense, negative emotions that
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</
RecNum><Pages>11</Pages><record><rec-number>212</rec-number><ref-type
negative emotions dominate their behavior. The police negotiator’s goal, when subjects are
experiencing emotional distress, is to “help the subject cope with these negative feelings so
he/she can re-assess the situation and peacefully surrender” ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</
RecNum><Pages>11</Pages><record><rec-number>212</rec-number><ref-type
name="Generic">13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</
The following emotional distress states are identified in the S.A.F.E. model as
particularly salient in critical incidents: sadness, fear, disgust, anger and shame. In addition
to these negative emotions, the positive emotional state of joy or happiness is highlighted as
the affective alternative to a negatively distressed state. These emotions are posited as
central to how humans experience and interact in their social world. The S.A.F.E. model
ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Lazarus</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>247</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Lazarus, R. S.</author></
secondary-title></titles><pages>163-171</pages><dates><year>1994</year></
relational themes and the action tendencies of these negative emotional experiences
Year><RecNum>245</RecNum><record><rec-number>245</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Wallbot, H.G.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Evidence
periodical><pages>310-328</pages><volume>66</volume><dates><year>1994</
year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Shaver</
Psychology</full-title></periodical><pages>1061-1086</pages><volume>52</
volume><dates><year>1987</year></dates><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Andersen</Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>241</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</author><author>Guerrero,
L.K.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
titles><pages>49-96</pages><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-location>San
separate from the identified loss and more importantly, to seek help in coping more
effectively with the loss. A perceived threat that can psychologically or physically harm
oneself generates the emotional distressed state of fear. The action tendency of fear is to
avoid or escape from the perceived threat. The emotional meaning of disgust is a sense of
spoiled or deteriorated. The action tendency of disgust is to get “rid of” or “wash away”
or contained from pursuing or achieving an important goal generates the emotion of anger.
The action tendency of anger is to attack the person or persons who are perceived to be
interfering with one’s efforts at attaining the targeted goal. Shame is one of the most
painful feeling of dejection and of being rejected by others. A shame experience views self
as inadequate, inferior, and separated from core relationships in one’s life ADDIN
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Retzinger</Author><Year>1993</
Year><RecNum>250</RecNum><record><rec-number>250</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Retzinger, S.M.</author></
quarrels</title></titles><dates><year>1993</year></dates><pub-location>Thousand
with being with people with an action tendency to approach or embrace others who are
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
When subjects are in an emotionally distressed state, the S.A.F.E. model identifies
tracking protocols for the police crisis negotiation team to observe and confirm possible
behavioral patterns associated with the identified emotional distressed state. In critical
incident situations, sadness may be indicative of depression and possible suicide. Police
<EndNote><Cite><Author>McMains</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</
RecNum><record><rec-number>189</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
title></titles><edition>Third edition</edition><dates><year>2006</year></
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
Subjects who are in a disgust emotional distressed state may view themselves as
abuse problems. Metaphors often associated with substance abuse, for example, are those
that characterize the disgust emotional experience, including “getting clean” and ridding
oneself of the poison inside.” The emotional distress state of disgust may also be related to
other forms of abuse that is internalized as self-disgust (e.g., sexual abuse). Anger can
produce impulsive and explosive violent actions. Subjects may aggressively “take out”
their anger (and sense of injustice) by hitting wall, throwing a telephone, beating a hostage/
victim or shooting at the police. Yet anger often is short-lived (thus someone who has
anger problems is also described as operating on a “short fuse”). Once expressed in violent
behavior, the subject may regret his/her aggressive behavior. However, the damage may
Shame may be experienced as overt shame, where the pain of rejection is more directly felt
feeling state of shame is “bypassed” by thinking about “what I should have done or not
Year><RecNum>250</RecNum><record><rec-number>250</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Retzinger, S.M.</author></
quarrels</title></titles><dates><year>1993</year></dates><pub-location>Thousand
incident, it is possible the hostage taker may have previously been subjected to powerful
“shaming” experiences (e.g., sexual or physical abuse). In crisis situations, this sense of
shame can blend with a sense of anger and result in a tornado of emotional distress best
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Retzinger</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>250</
RecNum><record><rec-number>250</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Retzinger, S.M.</author></authors></
location><publisher>Sage Publications</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
against others or aggression against self in the form of suicide-by-cop ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Roberts</Author><Year>1991</Year><RecNum>167</
RecNum><record><rec-number>167</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Roberts, A. R.</author></authors></
prevention</title></titles><dates><year>1991</year></dates><pub-location>Englewood
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Noesner</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>97</
secondary-title></titles><pages>13-19</pages><volume>66</
volume><number>August</number><dates><year>1997</year></dates><urls></urls></
<EndNote><Cite><Author>McMains</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>189</
RecNum><record><rec-number>189</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, third edition</
title></titles><edition>Third edition</edition><dates><year>2006</year></
dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(McMains & Mullins, 2006), they may be inadequate in terms of influencing the
The Emotional distress frame, as conceptualized in the S.A.F.E. model, both values the
use of listening skills and also builds on these skill sets. That is, S.A.F.E. frame insights
around emotional distress focus on the emotional meaning, action tendencies, and appraisal
processes such that the police negotiator has a broader set of capabilities to strategically
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</
Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type
name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Andersen</
Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>241</RecNum><record><rec-number>241</
type><contributors><authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</author><author>Guerrero,
L.K.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
titles><pages>49-96</pages><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-location>San
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Burleson</Author><Year>1998</
Year><RecNum>252</RecNum><record><rec-number>252</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Goldsmith, D.J.</author></authors><secondary-
titles><pages>245-280</pages><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-location>San
record></Cite><Cite><Author>Lazarus</Author><Year>1991</Year><RecNum>249</
RecNum><record><rec-number>249</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Lazarus, R. S.</author></authors></
Guerrero, 1998; Burleson & Goldsmith, 1998; Hammer, 2007; Lazarus, 1991). Briefly,
the three key elements of supportive communication incorporated in the S.A.F.E. model are
as follows. First, the core feeling state of the subject needs to be attended to by the police
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
ExcludeAuth="1"><Author>Burleson</Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>252</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Burleson, B.R.</author><author>Goldsmith,
D.J.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
location><publisher>Academic Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(1998) state, “There is evidence that, across a wide variety of situations, focusing
Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>252</RecNum><Pages>248</
D.J.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
location><publisher>Academic Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(p. 248). Second, the police negotiator should help the subject describe or
explain his/her problem or situation. Encouraging the subject to tell “his/her story” should
be done by adapting a non-evaluative stance toward the subject’s behavior and feelings
Year><RecNum>252</RecNum><record><rec-number>252</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Goldsmith, D.J.</author></authors><secondary-
titles><pages>245-280</pages><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-location>San
(distressed state) of the subject can be identified and encouraging the subject to explain his/
her situation can be effectively accomplished by using crisis intervention skills and active
Author><Year>2005a</Year><RecNum>212</RecNum><record><rec-number>212</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Consulting, LLC</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer,
and offering an explanation of the subject’s thoughts, actions and/or feelings have been
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Burleson</Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>252</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Burleson, B.R.</author><author>Goldsmith,
D.J.</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Andersen, P.A.</
author><author>Guerrero, L.K.</author></secondary-authors></
location><publisher>Academic Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Elliott</Author><Year>1985</Year><RecNum>253</
RecNum><record><rec-number>253</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Elliott, R.</author></authors></
secondary-title></titles><pages>307-322</pages><volume>32</
volume><dates><year>1985</year></dates><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Hill</Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>254</
RecNum><record><rec-number>254</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hill, C.E.</
title></titles><pages>222-233</pages><volume>35</volume><dates><year>1988</
Third, after the subject is able to “tell his/her story” and how he/she feels, the S.A.F.E.
approach suggests that the police negotiator respond to the action tendency of the primary
emotion the subject is experiencing. For example, if subjects are experiencing intense
sadness, police negotiators can communicate to hostage takers that they are not alone and
they do not have to carry the burden of their perceived loss by themselves. Most
importantly, the police negotiator can emphasize that help is available. Because the action
tendency of sadness is to seek help, police negotiators are able to gain influence by
specifically framing their communication messages in terms of this action tendency of the
her situation, enabling more creative problem solving to emerge that can lead to a peaceful
resolution rather than suicide or violent aggression against others. A core aspect of
influencing the subject during this reappraisal process is for the police negotiator to frame
his/her responses to the subject in terms of the action tendencies of the subject’s core
A Musical Tragedy
Late on a Thursday afternoon, world renowned pianist Roger Williams telephoned his
Angeles, California. Carl was an internationally known composer of religious music and
recently had a CD “go platinum”. Williams became alarmed as Carl’s communication was
unintelligible. At one point Johnnie Carl said he was going to kill himself. Following this
phone call, Carl walked into the Cathedral and fired four shots from a gun he was carrying.
He then barricaded himself in his basement office. Nine hours later, Carl killed himself.
For many years, Johnnie Carl battled with bi-polar disorder and severe depression. He
had threatened suicide prior to this incident and been hospitalized for his mental disorder as
recently as a month earlier. While he seemed fine after returning home, he soon became
increasingly troubled. While remaining in his basement office, Carl called a number of
people, including his wife and psychiatrist. He said he would kill himself if his name was
broadcast on the media. Within 45 minutes, the police critical incident unit arrived on-
scene. Electricity was shut off in the building, which also prevented direct telephone
negotiation to take place. Negotiators had to yell to Carl through his office door. During
the incident, police negotiators played a taped message from a friend. Johnnie Carl did not
respond to this effort to convince him to surrender. Further, Carl consistently refused to
talk to the negotiators. After some time, the tactical unit attempted to open the door and
insert a “throw phone” so Carl could talk directly to the police negotiator. Upon seeing the
door open, however, Carl ran into the bathroom and locked the door. Shortly thereafter,
the incident that Carl is “cooped up and there’s no way out except to put himself in the
hands of officers. You could image the shame. He’d rather be dead” ADDIN EN.CITE
Year><RecNum>299</RecNum><record><rec-number>299</rec-number><ref-type
Cite></EndNote>(Gottlieb, Lin, & Hanley, 2004, December 18). As this tragic event
ended, Roger Williams recalled that “we always said we’d play for each other’s funeral”
18</Year><RecNum>299</RecNum><record><rec-number>299</rec-number><ref-type
alone and thought ending his internal pain was more important than to continue to live with
the anguish he was experiencing. It was a difficult situation to peacefully resolve. The
police negotiators were unable to initiate meaningful communication with Carl because the
electricity was cut off and Carl refused to talk to the negotiator through the door. When the
SWAT team entered the office, Carl may have experienced significant fear—fear that he
would be harmed by the police officers. While this is speculation, his “flight” behavior to
From the S.A.F.E. perspective, negotiating with Johnnie Carl likely would have
involved entering into this emotionally distressed state of profound sadness (and perhaps
shame), validating his feelings and encouraging him to “tell his story.” Appealing to the
action tendency to seek help, the police negotiator, and TPIs who could directly talk to Carl
may have given Johnnie Carl the opportunity to reappraise his situation and perhaps
consider the alternative of surrender in order to “live another day”. Ultimately, however,
whether anyone could have influenced Johnnie Carl is completely dependent on Carl’s
willingness to accept help. In the final analysis, the decision to kill himself rested solely
The crisis/hostage taking event (in which the threat of internalized (suicide) or
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>McMains</Author><Year>2006</
Year><RecNum>189</RecNum><record><rec-number>189</rec-number><ref-type
author><author>Mullins, W.C.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Crisis
negotiations: Managing critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and
edition><dates><year>2006</year></dates><publisher>Anderson Publishing</
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
Mullins, 2006; Rogan & Hammer, 1997). One question that arises with any “applied”
approach for resolving crisis situations is the degree to which the core precepts of the
approach generalize to other cultures. The S.A.F.E. model is proposed as an approach that
has a reasonable degree of cross-cultural applicability for tracking escalation and de-
contexts.
meta-theoretical stance (within which the S.A.F.E. model is situated) has a long history of
meaning in discourse: the report and command functions of messages ( ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Bateson</Author><Year>1954/1972</Year><RecNum>10</
RecNum><record><rec-number>10</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Bateson, G.</author></authors></
titles><dates><year>1954/1972</year></dates><pub-location>New York</pub-
location><publisher>Ballantine Books</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Watzlawick</Author><Year>1967</Year><RecNum>134</
RecNum><record><rec-number>134</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author><author>Jackson, D. D.</author></authors></
Company, Inc</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</RecNum><record><rec-number>297</
rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
2007; Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). Further, the identification of the S.A.F.E.
anchors of Substantive demands, Attunement and Face also have a long and extensive
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Putnam</Author><Year>1992</Year><RecNum>103</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Putnam, L. L. </author><author>Roloff,
author><author>M. E. Roloff</author></secondary-authors></
EndNote>(Putnam & Roloff, 1992). The fourth S.A.F.E. element of Emotion and its
conceptualization in the model concerning the core meaning, action tendencies and
functional role in appraisal processes also has an extensive literature that suggests a
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Lewis</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>84</
RecNum><record><rec-number>84</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Handbook of Emotions</title></
titles><dates><year>1993</year></dates><pub-location>New York</pub-
location><publisher>Guilford Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Lazarus</Author><Year>1994</Year><RecNum>247</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Lazarus, R. S.</author></
secondary-title></titles><pages>163-171</pages><dates><year>1994</year></
not contradict the main tenets proposed within the S.A.F.E. model ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Giebels</Author><Year>2004</Year><RecNum>192</
RecNum><record><rec-number>192</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
perspective</title></titles><dates><year>2004</year></dates><pub-location>Veenendaal,
While the S.A.F.E. framework is posited to be a useful “culture general” approach for
negotiating critical incidents, this is not to suggest that cultural differences do not “matter.”
In the converse, by stating that cultural differences can impact on how escalation and de-
escalation unfolds in a crisis is also not to imply that the S.A.F.E. approach is therefore,
culturally “biased.” To elaborate, there are likely to be specific areas where cultural
differences do impact how negotiator’s “track” escalation and de-escalation and how
negotiation strategies are developed. Suggesting that “culture matters” in using the
S.A.F.E. (or any other) framework does not imply that these types of culture general
approaches are somehow not applicable in other cultures. It only means that the main
precepts of the S.A.F.E. approach are not culturally “biased” in ways that would lead to
sufficiently interculturally robust such that patterns of cultural difference can be identified
and incorporated in both the tracking of S.A.F.E. issues and the development of negotiation
strategies. In short, the S.A.F.E. model represents a reasonable framework for developing
conditions of stress and threat, individuals tend to revert to their primary cultural
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</RecNum><record><rec-number>196</
conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></
Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>60</
ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author><author>Rogan,
pages><dates><year>1997</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer & Rogan, 1997; Rogan & Hammer, 2006). One area I have been
developing models and assessment tools concerns the conflict resolution style people from
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2005d</Year><RecNum>289</
RecNum><record><rec-number>289</rec-number><ref-type name="Journal
Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></
titles><pages>675-695</pages><volume>29</volume><dates><year>2005d</year></
dates><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Rogan</Author><Year>2006</
Year><RecNum>196</RecNum><record><rec-number>196</rec-number><ref-type
Oetzel, S. Ting-Toomey</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>The
titles><pages>451-478</pages><dates><year>2006</year></dates><pub-
general, cultural differences in conflict resolution styles have been shown to escalate
Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>303</RecNum><record><rec-number>303</
type><contributors><authors><author>Ting-Toomey, S.</author><author>Yee-Jung,
Relations</full-title></periodical><pages>47-82</pages><volume>24</
volume><dates><year>2000</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></
Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>196</RecNum><record><rec-number>196</
conflict communication</secondary-title></titles><pages>451-478</
location><publisher>Sage</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Rogan
The Intercultural Conflict Style (ICS) model and assessment inventory identifies ways
in which cultural differences influence “how” individuals communicate their concerns and
understanding of the other party’s concerns/needs. I have identified these different cultural
approaches in terms of more direct and more indirect patterns for negotiating substantive
termed emotionally expressive and emotionally restrained, for how individuals express the
EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2002b</
name="Generic">13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</
inventory</title></titles><dates><year>2002b</year></dates><pub-location>Ocean
urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2002c</
Year><RecNum>291</RecNum><record><rec-number>291</rec-number><ref-type
name="Generic">13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2003</Year><RecNum>290</RecNum><record><rec-number>290</
rec-number><ref-type name="Generic">13</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
Facilitator's Manual</title></titles><dates><year>2003</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Hammer</
Author><Year>2005d</Year><RecNum>289</RecNum><record><rec-number>289</
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</author></authors></
titles><pages>675-695</pages><volume>29</volume><dates><year>2005d</year></
disagreements and how they communicate emotion to one another. The dimensions of
direct/indirect patterns for negotiating substantive issues and the emotionally expressive/
research as central parameters of cultural differences within our global community (see
Year><RecNum>290</RecNum><record><rec-number>290</rec-number><ref-type
name="Generic">13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M. R.</
Engagement style uses more verbally direct strategies that are braided with a more
approach for dealing with emotional upset. Finally, the Dynamic style involves more
and contribute to misunderstandings between the police negotiator and the subject. For
example, the “level” of authentic and “in control” emotional expressiveness characteristic of
emotionally restrained Discussion approach. The more Discussion style police negotiator
may perceive the increased level of emotional “presence” being communicated by the
Engagement subject as indicative of the subject being emotionally “out of control.” For the
reasonable, and completely “in control.” This misunderstanding concerning the point in
discourse when someone may be getting emotionally out of control vs. in control of one’s
emotional experience can lead to a premature tactical intervention when it may not be
police negotiator can also fuel misinterpretation and lead to an inaccurate assessment of the
order to more accurately track S.A.F.E. concerns and identify negotiation strategies to
Summary
incidents occurs based on whether salient S.A.F.E. frames are addressed; that is, whether
transformed or intensified.
The subject and the police negotiator interact with one another through these interpretive
frames. As an incident unfolds, there is a fluid movement of the subject and police
negotiator into and out of these core interpretive frames. Subjects are more likely to shift
interpretive frames when police negotiators enter into or “match” the dominant frame of the
subjects. De-escalation is more likely to take place when the police negotiator and subject
communicate within the same frame as this allows shared meaning to arise. This shared
relevant issues within the dominant frame, the subject can become more willing to shift
interpretive frames, with the objective of moving into a Substantive demand frame now
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
crisis incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-
publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
The S.A.F.E. framework suggests that escalation can take place when the police
negotiator (or TPIs) and the subject interact with one another in divergent frames. When
this occurs, the hostage taker (and negotiator) will likely feel misunderstood and
manipulated, resulting in a sense of little “interactional progress”. This can stop movement
around the salient frame issues and decrease the probability of frame shifting. The situation
can also escalate if either the subject or the police negotiator attempts to shift frame before a
However, conflict can de-escalate when both the subject and the police negotiator move
“progress” is achieved within a frame. When this sense of progress is achieved, the police
negotiator is better positioned to influence the subject toward moving to the Substantive
communication and emotion (pp. 49-96). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Sage.
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Initial formulation of the S.A.F.E. framework was a joint effort with Dr. Randall Rogan. The current
S.A.F.E. model is presented in its most comprehensive form in ADDIN EN.CITE
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
contributors><titles><title>Saving lives: The S.A.F.E. model for negotiating hostage and crisis
incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
It should be noted that the specific information presented in this chapter on the S.A.F.E. model is not
sufficient for law enforcement or other negotiators or crisis interveners to competently implement when a
crisis or critical incident arises. Individuals or organizations desiring to learn more about how to use the
S.A.F.E. model should contact the author at: HYPERLINK "http://www.hammerconsulting.org"
www.hammerconsulting.org.
These individuals include Mr. Robert Beach, Mr. William Hogewood, Mr. William Kidd, Mr. Anthony
Hare, Mr. Chuck Paris, Mr. Fred Lanceley and Mr. James Cavenaugh among many other police officers
who worked with the emerging S.A.F.E. framework over a number of years.
The discussion of the S.A.F.E. model is presented from the perspective of the law enforcement negotiator
who confronts violent subjects. Nevertheless, the S.A.F.E. model equally applies the four frames to the
behavior of the police negotiator as well as the subject, although in this chapter, the focus is on
understanding the behavior of the subject, with less emphasis on the behavior of the police negotiator,
except insofar as tactical actions are more directly addressed in this chapter and the model’s description
ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Hammer</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>297</
RecNum><record><rec-number>297</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Hammer, M.R.</author></authors></
contributors><titles><title>Saving lives: The S.A.F.E. model for negotiating hostage and crisis
incidents</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><pub-location>Westport, CT</pub-
location><publisher>Praeger Publishing</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></
EndNote>(Hammer, 2007).
PAGE 32 Hammer