CONTRERAS v.

MACARAIG
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99 – When may petition be filed

ELENA CONTRERAS v. CESAR MACARAIG

GR NO. L-29138 May 29, 1970

In the eyes of the law, the only time when the wife really became cognizant of the infidelity of
her husband as to start the one-year period to file the action for legal separation, is when the
husband admitted the relationship and could no longer return to their conjugal abode. The
period of one year should not be counted from the time when the wife received hearsay
information about the infidelity of her husband which she apparently thought it best to ignore for
the sake of family solidarity and in her desire not to anger or drive her husband away and no
reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Elena Contreras and defendant Cesar Macaraig were married on 16 March 1952 in the
Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their marriage, three children were born.

Before the 1961 elections, Macaraig was employed as manager of the printing establishment
owned by Contreras’ father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, Macaraig met and
came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who places orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for
Sergio Osmeña, who was then a Vice-Presidential Candidate. After the 1961 elections,
Macaraig resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be
away often and to come home very late. Upon Contreras’ inquiry, Macaraig explained that he
was out on a series of confidential missions.

In September 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told Contreras that Macaraig
was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When Macaraig returned to the conjugal
home the following month, Contreras refrained from verifying Lubos’ report because she
did not want to anger nor drive her husband away. Although Contreras also received
rumors in April 1963 that Macaraig was seen with a pregnant woman on Dasmariñas St.,
she was so happy that her husband again returned to the family home in May 1963 that
she once refrained from discussing the matter with him since she did not wish to
instigate a quarrel and drive him away. Whenever he returned to the family home, Macaraig
would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for one month.

After Contreras received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth, she sent Felicisima
Antioquia, her father’s employee, to verify the reports. Antioquia went to Macaraig’s house in
Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 that afternoon, she saw Macaraig carrying a baby in his
arms. She then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired about the child of
Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria
Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to Contreras in October 1963.
CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99 – When may petition be filed

Subsequently, Contreras pleaded with her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with her
husband and convince him to return to his family. Lucilo, after talking to his son, told Contreras
that he could not do anything.

In December 1963, Contreras, accompanied by her two children, and by Leticia Lagronio
went to talk to Macaraig at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon
Institute. They went to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where Contreras pleaded with
her husband to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him
that she was willing to forgive him. Macaraig told her that he could no longer leave Lily
Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

On 14 December 1963, Contreras filed an action for legal separation. Citing Art. 102 of the Civil
Code, the trial court dismissed her complaint on the ground that the same was filed more than
one year from and after the date on which she had been cognizant of the cause for legal
separation. The trial court believed that such one-year period should commence from the time
Contreras acquired hearsay information that her husband was living with another woman (i.e.,
from September 1962 when she received a report from Lubos that her husband was living in
Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala).

ISSUE: Whether the one-year prescriptive period to file an action for legal separation under Art.
102 of the Civil Code commences from the time the wife received hearsay information about the
infidelity of her husband (i.e., from September 1962).

RULING:

NO. It seems clear that in September 1962, whatever knowledge Contreras had acquired
regarding the infidelity of her husband (that is, of the fact that he was living in Singalong with Lily
Ann Alcala), was only through the information given to her by Lubos, driver of the family car.
Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it
best – and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it – not to go deeper into the
matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband’s
obvious neglect of his entire family, Contreras still cherished the hope – however forlorn – of his
coming back home to them.

Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home in October 1962, Contreras purposely
refrained from bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity in her desire not to anger nor drive
her husband away. She likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a
pregnant woman on Dasmariñas St. but failed again to verify the truth of said rumors because
she was so happy that her husband returned to the family home in May 1963 and she did not
wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. As a matter of fact, Contreras still made brave
and desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home, but to no avail.
CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99 – When may petition be filed

The only time when Contreras really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband, was in
December 1963 when Macaraig told her that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to
return to his legitimate family. It was only on such occasion that the legal period of one year to
sue for legal separation must be deemed to have commenced.