Week one Individuality

1， Introduction to ontology
(1) The category problem: the dominance of object-property dualism (substance-attribute,
particular-universal)
(2) The population problem: how many entities are there in each of the categories?
(3) The relation problem (metaphysical explanation): fundamentality and dependence
(supervenience, composition, realization, emergence, etc.)
2， What is an individual?
(1) The commonsense view
(2) What it is not: modification, collection, stuff, universals, event or process
3， How many individuals are there?
(1) Nihilism: collection (untenable), modification (still untenable), stuff (ancient Greece 4
elements Earth, Water, Air, and Fire;; Chinese Yin-Yang 5 agents), Universal (Russell against
substance-attribute dualism in favor of universals), event or process (Whitehead, Marx,
Wittgenstein)
(2) Monism: Spinoza and Bradley, contemporary monism (Shaffer—no fundamental level,
entangled system)
(3) Pluralism: default view
4， Concluding remarks

Week two Properties

1. Introducing properties: the problem of One over Many

(1) Related terms: characteristics, attributes, qualities, kinds, types; instantiation,
exemplification; relations
(2) Why commit to properties? Two theoretical roles properties are supposed to play
(a) Grounding or explaining qualitative sameness or similarity between things
(b) Explaining satisfactions of predicates (given the referential theory of meaning)
2. Major positive accounts of properties
(1) Properties as universals: arguments for
(a) From natural kinds
(b) From science
(c) Sematic considerations
(d) From perceptual experiences
(e) From differences
(f) From modal intuitions
Problems:
(g) Bradley’s regress: the problem of instantiation
(h) Russellian paradox: non-self-instantiation
(i) The problem of location:
Two theories of universals
 (j) Abundant
(k) Sparse: Aristotelian, David Armstrong
(2) Properties as sets
(3) Properties as tropes
3. Austere (extreme) nominalism: no need to explain qualitative similarity and predicate-
satidfaction.
4. Reflections: natural properties—carving nature at its joints: joint-carving properties

Week three Time

1. Introduction: basic problems in philosophy of time

(1) Semantic problems—the meaning and logical features of tensed sentences.
(2) epistemological problems—confirmation and justification of tense judgments, the nature
of temporal experiences
(3) Metaphysical problems: the reality or unreality of time; the nature of time (dynamic or
static? Relational or absolute (substantial)?); ontology and time; the persistence of things
in time
(4) Topological problems: the structure of time (how many dimensions? Linear or circular; is
travel in time possible?)
2. A-theory and B-theory
(1) The commonsense view of time in contrast with space: directionality; movement;
ontological partiality
(2) A-properties and B-relations
(3) McTaggart’s argument:
(4) A-theorists’ response:
(5) B-theorists’ response:
(6) The passage of time:
(7) A-theory and special relativity
3. Existence and time
(1) Presentism
(2) Eternalism
(3) The Growing Block theory
4. Persistence
(1) 3-dimensionalism
(2) 4-dimensionalism
5. The possibility of time travel: David Lewis
6. Concluding remarks