HCCS V. STO. TOMAS, ET AL. (G.R. NO.
179146; JULY 23, 2013) Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence,
CASE DIGEST: HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Petitioner, v. HON. PATRICIA
STO. TOMAS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG
ANAKPAWIS – HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS), Respondents.
FACTS: On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private
respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis Holy Child Catholic School Teachers
and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). In its Comment and Position Paper,
petitioner raised that the members of the union are a mixture of managerial, supervisory,
and rank-and-file employees as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department
head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators. It is likewise a mixture of teaching and
non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the
Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality
to file a petition for certification election, as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union and in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The med arbiter denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the
bargaining unit is inappropriate. Private respondent appealed to the SOLE and the latter
reversed the ruling of the med arbiter and ordered two certification elections, one among
teaching personnel and another for non- teaching personnel. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the vice-principals, coordinators
and department heads are not managerial nor supervisory employees. Anent the alleged
mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel, the CA agreed with petitioner that the
nature of the formers work does not coincide with that of the latter.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition
before the SC.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in allowing the conduct of certification election?
HELD: When the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in Toyota, the
Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, it was held:
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose,
be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture
of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was
one for supervisory employees, but in which the membership included rank-and-file
employees, the Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a
certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as
it counted rank-and-file employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and
the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by
Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules).
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees
Union-PTGWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a
labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given
the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted
to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does
not provide for the effects thereof.
Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all
the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was
brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products
Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-
FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a
local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to
deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its
individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court
therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is
due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as
interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had
already set the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered
state of the law and the rules.
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for
an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the unions
certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which
the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicated to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law."
Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of membership in a bargaining unit and
membership in a union. In emphasizing the phrase "to the exclusion of academic
employees" stated in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, petitioner believed that the petitioning union
could not admit academic employees of the university to its membership. But such was
not the intention of the Supreme Court.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a petitioning union.
Such employees need not be members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification
election. A union certified as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its
members but also other employees who are not union members.
In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner school must
form separate bargaining units. Thus, the order for the conduct of two separate
certification elections, one involving teaching personnel and the other involving non-
teaching personnel. It should be stressed that in the subject petition, private respondent
union sought the conduct of a certification election among all the rank-and-file personnel
of petitioner school. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us
from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining unit, they have
to be separated into two separate bargaining units with two separate certification elections
to determine whether the employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be
represented by private respondent. DENIED.
Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF
EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS
G.R. No. 141471.              September 18, 2000
Facts:
During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with
the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union.
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin
Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the
union members rejected the said CBA.  Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of
bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the
petitioner.  This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.
The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new
five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that
her work schedule was being changed.  Ambas protested and requested management to
submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.  union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike.   After meeting
with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter
dismissing her for alleged insubordination.  The petitioner then ceased negotiations when
it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.
The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to
return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.  The Secretary of Labor and
Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor
practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.
Issue(s):
1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with
the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of
the employees’ right to self-organization.
Held:
The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.
1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-
day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing
procedure of collective bargaining.  As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the
company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication
of bad faith.  Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had
merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA.  Moreover, in
order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a
valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.  Hence, the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension
of negotiation by the employer.
2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other
conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight
for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table.  While the Court recognizes the
right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized
cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of
aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.  Even assuming arguendo that
Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to
terminate her employment.  When the exercise of the management to discipline its
employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to
G.R. No.
L-67485 April 10, 1992NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THEPHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner,vs.DIR.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Laborand
Employment, Manila, FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL (FUR)-TUCP,
andCALINOG REFINERY CORPORATION (NASUREFCO), respondents.
Principle:Labor Law; Labor Unions; Cerification Election; A representation question may
not beentertained if a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining
agentis a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration before filing of a petition
forcertification election - The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition
forcertification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a collective
bargainingagreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for
certificationelection in the following cases:(1) during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedomperiod;(2) within one (1) year from the
date of issuance of declaration of a final certificationelection result; or(3) during the
existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certifiedbargaining agent is a
party and which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitrationor had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a
petition for certification election can onlybe entertained if there is no pending bargaining
deadlock submitted to conciliation orarbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice
of strike or lockout. The principalpurpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the management.FACTS:Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar
Industry of the Philippines(NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank andfile workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation.Private
respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organizationduly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment while private respondent
Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusivebargaining
representative of the rank and file workers of the private respondent CalinogRefinery
Corporation by virtue of the certification election held on March 30, 1981.On June 21,
1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective bargainingwith the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor andEmployment).On July 21, 1982,
private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional Office No. VI,MOLE (now DOLE),
Iloilo City a petition for certification election among the rank and fileemployees of private
respondent company, alleging that: (1) about forty-five percent(45%) of private
respondent company's employees had disaffiliated from petitionerunion and joined private
respondent union; (2) no election had been held for the pasttwelve (12) months.Med-
Arbiter ruled in favor of Petitioner dismissing the petition for certification for lack ofmerit
since the petition is barred by bargaining deadlock.ISSUEWhether or not a petition for
certification election may be filed during the pendency of abargaining deadlock submitted
to arbitration or conciliation.RULING:The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementingthe Labor Code, to wit:Sec. 3. When to file. In the
absence of a collective bargainingagreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231
of the Code, apetition for certification election may be filed at any time. However,
nocertification election may be held within one year from the date ofissuance of a final
certification election result. Neither may arepresentation question be entertained if, before
the filing of a petition forcertification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an
incumbent orcertified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation
orarbitration or had become the subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.If a collective
bargaining agreement has been duly registered inaccordance with Article 231 of the Code,
a petition for certification electionor a motion for intervention can only be entertained
within sixty (60) daysprior to the expiry date of such agreement.
The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementingthe
Labor Code, to wit:Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective
bargainingagreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, apetition
for certification election may be filed at any time. However, nocertification election may be
held within one year from the date ofissuance of a final certification election result. Neither
may arepresentation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition
forcertification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent orcertified
bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation orarbitration or had become
the subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.If a collective bargaining agreement has
been duly registered inaccordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
electionor a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) daysprior to
the expiry date of such agreement.The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a
petition for certification electionmay be filed at any time, in the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement.Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for
certification election in thefollowing cases:(1) during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedomperiod;(2) within one (1) year from the
date of issuance of declaration of a final certificationelection result; or(3) during the
existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certifiedbargaining agent is a
party and which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitrationor had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a
petition for certification election can onlybe entertained if there is no pending bargaining
deadlock submitted to conciliation orarbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice
of strike or lockout. The principalpurpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the management.In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already
submitted to arbitration whenprivate respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification
election. The samepetition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an
order dated July
23, 1982 on the sole ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargainingdeadlock.
However, respondent Director set aside the same order and subsequentlyaffirmed an
order giving due course to the petition for certification election and orderingthat an
election be held.The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in
the presence ofa then pending bargaining deadlock.A director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, by the nature of his functions, acts in aquasi-judicial capacity. We find no
reason why his decision should be beyond thisCourt's review. Administrative officials, like
the director of the Bureau of Labor Relationsare presumed to act in accordance with law
but this Court will not hesitate to pass upontheir work where there is a showing of abuse
of authority or discretion in their officialacts or when their decisions or orders are tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness.
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN vs SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU
Topic: Deadlock Bar Rule Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion
seeking to enjoin Milado from further acting on the matter of the certification election.

FACTS:
The Divine Word University Independent Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which
was registered earlier that day, filed a motion for intervention alleging that it had “at least
20% of the rank and file employees” of the University.
Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. Subsequently, the Divine Union submitted
its collective bargaining proposals March 7, 1985
The Secretary of Labor dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor
practice on the   ground of the union’s failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor
practice acts specifically complained of but also the complaint filed by the University for
The University replied and requested a preliminary conference. However, two days before
unfair labor practices and illegal strike for “obvious lack of merit brought about by its utter
the scheduled conference the DWUEU’s resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita wrote
failure to submit evidence”
a letter addressed to the University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals.
Consequently, the preliminary conference was cancelled.

The DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with violation
of the return-to-work order which was previously ordered by the Secretary of Labor and
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988, the DWUEU, which had by then affiliated
unfair labor practices such as dismissal of union officers, coercion of employees and illegal
with the Associated Labor Union (ALU), requested a conference with the University for the
suspension
purpose of continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. A follow-up letter was sent
regarding their request but to no avail.

Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and
for its “reluctance and subscription to legal delay,” the University should be “declared in
DWUEU -ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department
default.” He also maintained that since under the circumstances the University cannot
of Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
claim deprivation of due process, the Office of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully
unfair labor practice acts, specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on
impose the Union’s May 19, 1988 collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio.
employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a deadlock or an impasse in the collective bargaining

process
 After the filing of the notice of strike, a conference was held which led to the conclusion
of an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU on May 10, 1888

However, it turned out that an hour before the May 10, 1988 agreement was concluded,
the University had filed a petition for certification election
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement,
submitted its collective bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University.
RULING: YES. A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no “reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining” especially on the part of the University. Its indifferent
attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to
arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken
only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no “counteraction” of forces or an impasse to speak
of. While collective bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding
responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts.

However, the Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not entirely blameless in
the matter of the delay in the bargaining process. While it is true that as early as March 7,
Med-Arbiter Milado, acting on the University’s petition for certification election, issued an
1985, said union had submitted its collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent
Order directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU
withdrawal by the DWUEU Vice President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the
and “no union,” after he found the petition to be “well-supported in fact and in law.
same proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that said union
remained passive for three years. The records do not show that during this three-year
period, it exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better
terms of employment.
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union, through the ALU Director
for Operations, requested an “initial conference” for the purpose of collective bargaining.
That the DWUEU abandoned its collective bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation with
ALU is further confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May 10, 1988 agreement with
the University, said Union bound itself to submit a new set of proposals on May 13, 1988.
Under the circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988 may as well be considered the
written notice to bargain referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code,
which thereby set into motion the machinery for collective bargaining, as in fact, on May
19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective bargaining proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an
impasse in the collective bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed, there has not
been a “reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” on the part of the University. While
DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the
record is replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal
to bargain with the duly certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is
that the University evidently had no intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court
recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the petition for certification
election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the
herein assailed Orders be annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith
bargaining. Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an
hour before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition
for certification election. And yet during said conference, it committed itself to “sit down”
with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which would
have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification election. In so doing, the
University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the
meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as “the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith.” Moreover, by filing the
petition for certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the
University violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that “(e)very person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts therein have
also been indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly
certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and submitted its
collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter proposal
whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy, “[a] company’s refusal to make counter proposal if
considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is
especially true where the Union’s request for a counter proposal is left unanswered.”
NUWHRAIN- Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter vs Secretary of Labor
2/26/2022
0 COMMENTS
 
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER vs SEC. OF LABOR
 
Facts:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following
results:
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST=353
TOTAL VOTES CAST=346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC=151
HIMPHLU=169
NO UNION=1
SPOILED=3
SEGREGATED=22
 
In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner,
NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union
(HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to decide which among those votes
would be opened and tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were cast
by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the
Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them
were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other
votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and,
pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot
vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton),
a probationary employee, was counted.
Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes,
especially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly
supervisory employees of the Hotel.
Petitioner, who garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened
considering that probationary employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner
averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately
certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push
the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which
HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become
169.
Secretary affirmed the decision of the med-arbiter. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the
certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
Issue: 
Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should
be allowed to vote.
 
Held:
Yes. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but
because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The
votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As
Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit,
whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in
Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the “labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining.” Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the
resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining
unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial
interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction
as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election. The law refers to “all” the employees in the bargaining unit. All they
need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the “bargaining unit.” 
For purposes of this section (Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of
2003), any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on
the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed,
rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for
their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override
the Constitutionally protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and
jurisprudence thereon.
A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, GR No. 172132, 2014-07-
23
Facts:
On October 11, 1995, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition
for certification election,[3] seeking to represent all the supervisory employees... of
Heritage Hotel Manila. The petitioner filed its opposition, but the opposition was deemed
denied on February 14, 1996 when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for
the conduct of the certification election.
On January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the pre-election
conference. The petitioner primarily filed its comment on the list of employees submitted
by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and simultaneously sought the exclusion of some from the list of
employees for occupying... either confidential or managerial positions.[5] The petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on April 17, 2000,[6] raising the prolonged lack of interest of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue its petition for certification election.
On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC's registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual financial reports and
an updated list of members as required by Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code,
docketed... as Case No. NCR-OD-0005-004-IRD entitled The Heritage Hotel Manila, acting
through its owner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation v. National Union of Workers in the
Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter
(NUWHRAIN-HHSMC).[7] It filed another motion on June 1, 2000 to seek either the
dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its pending petition for the
cancellation of union registration.[8]
In denying the motion on October 21, 2002, the DOLE Secretary declared that the mixture
or co-mingling of employees in a union was not a ground for dismissing a petition for the
certification election under Section 11, par. II, Rule XI of Department Order No. 9; that
the... appropriate remedy was to exclude the ineligible employees from the bargaining unit
during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings;[20] that the dismissal of the petition for the
certification election based on the legitimacy of the petitioning union would be...
inappropriate because it would effectively allow a collateral attack against the union's legal
personality; and that a collateral attack against the personality of the labor organization
was prohibited under Section 5, Rule V of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.[21]
More than four years after Dunlop Slazenger, the Court clarified in Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Inc vs Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO that... while
Article 245 prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not
provide what the effect is if a rank-and-file union takes in supervisory employees as
members, or vice versa. Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger jump into an... unnecessary
conclusion when they foster the notion that Article 245 carries with it the authorization to
inquire collaterally into the issue wherever it rears its ugly head
Tagaytay Highlands proclaims, in the light of Department Order 9, that after a certificate
of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral
attack.  It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation. In... fine,
Toyota and Dunlop Slazenger are a spent force. Since Tagaytay Highlands was handed
down after these two cases, it constitutes the latest expression of the will of the Supreme
Court and supersedes or overturns previous rulings inconsistent with... it.  From this
perspective, it is needless to discuss whether SPI Technologies as a mere resolution of the
Court may prevail over a full-blown decision that Toyota Motor or Dunlop Slazenger was. 
The ruling in SPI Technologies has been... echoed in Tagaytay Highlands, for which reason
it is with Tagaytay Highlands, not SPI Technologies, that the petitioner must joust.
Issues:
The petitioner maintains that the ruling in Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Inc
v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO[26] (Tagaytay Highlands) was
inapplicable because it involved the co-mingling of supervisory and... rank-and-file
employees in one labor organization, while the issue here related to the mixture of
membership between two employee groups one vested with the right to self-organization
(i.e., the rank-and-file and supervisory employees), and the other deprived of such... right
(i.e., managerial and confidential employees); that suspension of the certification election
was appropriate because a finding of "illegal mixture" of membership during a petition for
the cancellation of union registration determined whether or not the union had met... the
20% representation requirement under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code; [27] and that in
holding that mixed membership was not a ground for canceling the union registration,
except when such was done through misrepresentation, false representation... or fraud
under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239(a) and (c) of the Labor Code, the CA
completely ignored the 20% requirement under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code.
The remaining issue to be resolved is which among Toyota Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and
Tagaytay Highlands applied in resolving the dispute arising from the mixed membership in
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.
Ruling:
We deny the petition for review on certiorari.
Principles:
Under the long established rule, too, the filing of the petition for the cancellation of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC's registration should not bar the conduct of the certification election.
[35] In that respect, only a final order for the cancellation of the registration... would have
prevented NUWHRAIN-HHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a
legitimate labor union, including the right to the petition for the certification election.[36]
This rule is now enshrined in Article 238-A of the Labor Code,... as amended by Republic
Act No. 9481,[37] which reads:
Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. A petition for cancellation
of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it
prevent the filing of a petition for certification election.
This is not a novel matter. In Kawashima,[39] we have reconciled our rulings in Toyota
Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and Tagaytay Highlands by emphasizing on the laws prevailing at
the time of filing of the petition for the certification... election.
Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger involved petitions for certification election filed on
November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively. In both cases, we applied the
Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (also known as the 1989 Amended
Omnibus Rules), the prevailing rule then.
The 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was amended on June 21, 1997 by Department Order
No. 9, Series of 1997. Among the amendments was the removal of the requirement of
indicating in the petition for the certification election that there was no co-mingling of
rank-and-file and... supervisory employees in the membership of the labor union. This was
the prevailing rule when the Court promulgated Tagaytay Highlands, declaring therein that
mixed membership should have no bearing on the legitimacy of a registered labor
organization, unless the... co-mingling was due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud as provided in Article 239 of the Labor Code.[40]
Presently, then, the mixed membership does not result in the illegitimacy of the registered
labor union unless the same was done through misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
according to Article 239 of the Labor Code. In Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of
Labor
Relations,[41] we categorically explained that
Clearly, then, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that
the rank-and-file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article
239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was... misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the
election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of... voters, or failure to
submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and
their postal addresses to the BLR.
We note that NUWHRAIN-HHMSC filed its petition for the certification election on October
11, 1995. Conformably with Kawashima, the applicable law was the 1989 Amended
Omnibus Rules, and the prevailing rule was the pronouncement in Toyota Motor and
Dunlop
Slazenger to the effect that a labor union of mixed membership was not possessed with
the requisite personality to file a petition for the certification election.
Nonetheless, we still rule in favor of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. We expound.
In both Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger, the Court was convinced that the concerned
labor unions were comprised by mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees. In Toyota
Motor, the employer submitted the job descriptions of the concerned employees to...
prove that there were supervisors in the petitioning union for rank-and-file employees. In
Dunlop Slazenger, the Court observed that the labor union of supervisors included
employees occupying positions that apparently belonged to the rank-and-file. In both
Toyota
Motor and Dunlop Slazenger, the employers were able to adduce substantial evidence to
prove the existence of the mixed membership. Based on the records herein, however, the
petitioner failed in that respect. To recall, it raised the issue of the mixed membership in...
its comment on the list of members submitted by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and in its protest.
In the comment, it merely identified the positions that were either confidential or
managerial, but did not present any supporting evidence to prove or explain the
identification. In the protest,... it only enumerated the positions that were allegedly
confidential and managerial, and identified two employees that belonged to the rank-and-
file, but did not offer any description to show that the positions belonged to different
employee groups.
Worth reiterating is that the actual functions of an employee, not his job designation,
determined whether the employee occupied a managerial, supervisory or rank-and-file
position.[42] As to confidential employees who were excluded from the right to... self-
organization, they must (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons
who formulated, determined, and effectuated management policies in the field of labor
relations.[43] In that regard, mere allegations sans substance would... not be enough,
most especially because the constitutional right of workers to self-organization would be
compromised.
At any rate, the members of NUWHRAIN-HHSMC had already spoken, and elected it as the
bargaining agent. As between the rigid application of Toyota Motors and Dunlop
Slazenger, and the right of the workers to self-organization, we prefer the latter. For us,
the... choice is clear and settled. "What is important is that there is an unmistakeable
intent of the members of [the] union to exercise their right to organize. We cannot impose
rigorous restraints on such right if we are to give meaning to the protection to labor and
social justice... clauses of the Constitution." [44]
SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO vs. CONFESOR
OCTOBER 25, 2012  ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 111262 September 19, 1996
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO, represented by its
President RAYMUNDO HIPOLITO, JR. vs. HON. MA. NIEVES D. CONFESOR,
Secretary of Labor, Dept. of Labor & Employment, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
MAGNOLIA CORPORATION (Formerly, Magnolia Plant) and SAN MIGUEL
FOODS, INC. (Formerly, B-Meg Plant)
FACTS: On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union —
PTGWO entered into a CBA with private respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to take
effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989.
This CBA provided, among others, that:
ARTICLE XIV
DURATION OF AGREEMENT
Sec. 1. This Agreement which shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective
successors-in-interest, shall become effective and shall remain in force and effect until
June 30, 1992.
Sec. 2. In accordance with Article 253-A of the Labor Code as amended, the term of this
Agreement insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, shall be for five (5) years
from July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. Hence, the freedom period for purposes of such
representation shall be sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1994 .
Sec. 3. Sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1992 either party may initiate negotiations of all
provisions of this Agreement, except insofar as the representation aspect is concerned . If
no agreement is reached in such negotiations, this Agreement shall nevertheless remain in
force up to the time a subsequent agreement is reached by the parties .
Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were
spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia Corporation
(Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA
remained in force and effect.
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the CBA
and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations started sometime in July, 1992 with the
two parties submitting their respective proposals and counterproposals.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC
should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and
that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of
two years or until June 30, 1994.
SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had moved to
Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC.
Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of
the Labor Code.
Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the
CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29, 1990.
(Notice of strike…Secretary assumed jurisdiction)
Secretary’s decision: the CBA shall be effective for the period of 3 years from June 30,
1992; and that such CBA shall cover only the employees of SMC and not of Magnolia and
SMFI.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be
effective for three years of for only two years; and 2) Whether or not the bargaining unit
of SMC includes also the employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.
HELD: We agree with the Secretary of Labor.
Pertinent to the first issue is Art. 253-A of the Labor Code as amended which reads:
Art. 253-A. Terms of a CBA. — Any CBA that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as
the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of 5 years . No petition questioning
the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no
certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year
term of the CBA. All other provisions of the CBA shall be renegotiated not later than 3
years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the CBA entered into
within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in
such CBA, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such
agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of
retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the CBA, the parties may
exercise their rights under this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
The “representation aspect” refers to the identity and majority status of the union that
negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate
bargaining unit concerned. “All other provisions” simply refers to the rest of the CBA,
economic as well as non-economic provisions, except representation.
The law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA insofar as the representation
aspect is concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms of the other provisions of the
CBA. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that the Court must ascertain the
legislative intent for the purpose of giving effect to any statute.
(as usual mahabang conversation ng mga framers)
Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and stability by
having both management and labor work harmoniously together without any disturbance.
Thus, no outside union can enter the establishment within 5 years and challenge the
status of the incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining agent. Likewise, the terms and
conditions of employment (economic and non-economic) can not be questioned by the
employers or employees during the period of effectivity of the CBA. The CBA is a contract
between the parties and the parties must respect the terms and conditions of the
agreement.  Notably, the framers of the law did not give a fixed term as to the
effectivity of the terms and conditions of employment. It can be gleaned from
their discussions that it was left to the parties to fix the period.
The issue as to the term of the non-representation provisions of the CBA need not
belaboured. The parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated
contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the
said 5-year term, and said agreement is ratified by majority of the members in
the bargaining unit, the subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds
the contracting parties.
Thus, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in
ruling that the effectivity of the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be for 3 years.
II. Undeniably, the transformation of the companies was a management prerogative and
business judgment which the courts can not look into unless it is contrary to law, public
policy or morals. Neither can we impute any bad faith on the part of SMC so as to justify
the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 18 Ever mindful of the
employees’ interests, management has assured the concerned employees that they will be
absorbed by the new corporations without loss of tenure and retaining their present pay
and benefits according to the existing CBAs. 19 They were advised that upon the
expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated between the
management of the new corporations and the bargaining representatives of the
employees concerned.
Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical
personalities. Thus, they can not belong to a single bargaining unit.
Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality
or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective
bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and
working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed. 22 Considering the
spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their respective and distinctive
concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of
employment. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce
differ. The nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills
which must necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages. The
different companies may have different volumes of work and different working conditions.
For such reason, the employees of the different companies see the need to group
themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive and different groups. It
would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies where
the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their own
working conditions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
From Atty. Bayani^^
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. VS. TORRES
FACTS: Sec. Torres, the Secretary of Labor issued an Order requiring St. Luke medical
Center and St. Luke Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers
(SLMCEA-AFW) to execute and finalize their 1990-1993 CBA. And he further instructed the
parties to incorporate in the new CBA the disposition on economic and non-economic
issues spelled out in said Order. This new CBA (1990-1993 CBA) will retroact to the date of
expiration of the previous CBA (19871990 CBA). Before 1987-1990 CBA expired, there is
an internal squabble in AFW resulted to splitting of leadership, and later on the filing of
case in the Dept. of Labor as to that internal conflict (whether who among De Prado and
Diwa is the leader and authorized to collect federation dues). (This however, later ruled in
favor of Del Prado). Pending resolution of the above case, SLMCEA-AFW brought to the
attention of St. Luke Medical Center manifesting that they wanted to renew the CBA
before it expire. This triggered a round table talks on which St. Lukes Medical Center
proposed a maximum across the board monthly salary increase of P375 per employee. On
the other hand SLMCEA-AFW proposed a P1500 hike or 50% increase based on thelatest
salary rate of each employee, whichever is higher. That talks that then ensued between
petitioner and private respondent were disturbed anew when the other wing in the AFW
headed by Purita Ramirez, expressed its objections to the on-going negotiations, and
when a petition for certification election was filed by the Association of Democratic Labor
Organization of petitioner. However, private respondent emerged victorious after the
elections and was thus certified as the exclusive bargaining entity of petitioner's rank and
file employees.However, SLMCEA-AFW wrote St. Lukes Medical Center to resume their
negotiations concerning union’s proposed CBA. St. Lukes Medical Center express
willingness to negotiate a new CBA for the rank and file employees. Negotiations thus
resumed. However, there is a deadlock on issue especially the issue on the across-the-
board monthly and meal allowances. Because of the impending strike, petitioner lodged a
petition to Secretary of Labor: Secretary of Labor issued the Order containing the decisions
both in the economic and noneconomic issues: First year — P1,140.00 broken down as
follows: P510.00 in compliance with the government mandated daily salary increase of
P17.00; and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase. Second year —
P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase. Third year — P700.00 across the board
monthly salary increase.
It is understood that the second and third year salary increases shall not be chargeable to
future government mandated wage increases. (p. 47, Rollo.) St. Lukes contended that the
above amount will grossly inflated St. Luke’s net income. That if it is sustained, the total
wage increases and benefits will be excessive and unreasonable, considering the
aggregate amount is more than its projected income for the next 3 years. Also, the
granting of retroactive effect to the enforceability of the CBA is violative of Section 253-A
of the Labor Code which states that: Any agreement on such other provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry
of the term of such other provisions as fixed in the collective bargaining agreement, shall
retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case
of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may
exercise their rights under this Code.
Petitioners pointing out that the questioned order from Secretary of Labor was issued
beyond the 6 month period period requirement. Here are the contention of SLMCEA-AFW:
a. The amount thus ordered are well within the means of the St. Lukes because the
reported net income for the past 3 years are actually understated. b. The aggregate
amount of more than a 190 million as computed by petitioner is excessive c. That the base
of computing aggregate amount should be for qualified 1000 employee only and not 1264
employee (as the basis of computation of St. Lukes Medical Center). Thus, petitioner's
version that it will have to pay P194,403,000.00 is not true because this will be drastically
reduced by 40% to 60% in real terms due to a smaller number of employees covered d.
the government-decreed wage increases abovementioned already form part of the
P1,140.00 wage and meal allowance increases, not to mention the strict cost-cutting
measures and practices on overtime and expense items adopted by petitioner since 1990.
RULING:
With respect to public respondent's ruling that the CBA awards should be given retroactive
effect, private respondent agrees with the Labor Secretary's view that Article 253-A of the
Labor Code does not apply to arbitral awards such as those involved in the instant case.
According to private respondent, Article 253-A of the Labor Code is clear and plain on its
face as referring only to collective bargaining agreements entered into by management
and the certified exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees therein within
six (6) months from the expiry of the old CBA.
Petitioner assails the Order of January 28, 1991 on three grounds: (a) unreasonable and
baselessness; (b) prematurity; and (c) violation of Article 253-A of the Labor Code. The
Order, particularly in its disposition on the economic issues, was not arbitrarily imposed by
NLRC. A perusal of the Order shows that NLRC took into consideration the parties'
respective contentions, a clear indication that he was keenly aware of their contrary
positions. Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to present their respective
evidence. The due process requirement was thus clearly observed. Considering public
respondent's expertise on the subject and his observance of the cardinal principles of due
process, the assailed Order deserves to be accorded great respect by this Court. In
resolving the economic issues, NLRCmerely adopted in toto St. Lukes' proposals.
Consequently, St. Lukes cannot now claim that the awards are unreasonable and baseless.
Neither can it deny having made such proposals, as it attempted to do in its Motion for
Reconsideration of the challenged Order before public respondent and which it continues
to pursue in the instant petition. It is too late in the day for such pretense, especially so
because St. Lukes failed to controvert private respondent's allegation contained in its
Comment to the petition before the Labor Secretary that petitioner had offered as its last
proposal said salary and meal allowance increases. As correctly pointed out by public
respondent, petitioner failed, when it had the chance, to rebut the same in its Reply to
said Comment, considering that the resolution of the labor dispute at that was still
pending. Any objection on this point is thus deemed waived. We do not see merit in
petitioner's theory that the awards were granted prematurely. In its effort to persuade this
Court along this point, petitioner denies having negotiated with private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW. Petitioner collectively refers to all the talks conducted with private
respondent as mere informal negotiations due to the representation issue involving AFW.
Petitioner thus argues that in the absence of any formal negotiations, no collective
bargaining could have taken place. Public respondent, petitioner avers, should have
required the parties instead to negotiate rather than prematurely issuing his order. It is
immaterial whether the representation issue within AFW has been resolved with finality or
not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a bar to any collective bargaining since AFW
is not the real party-in-interest to the talks; rather, the negotiations were confined to
petitioner and the local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW. Only the collective
bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal standing to
negotiate with petitioner. A duly registered local union affiliated with a national union or
federation does not lose its legal personality or independence (T)he locals are separate
and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining
power between the employer and their employeemembers in the economic struggle for
the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the
locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These
associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common
enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the
terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free
to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the
Constitution
and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare
upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence. Appending
"AFW" to the local union's name does not mean that the federation absorbed the latter.
No such merger can be construed. Rather, what is conveyed is the idea of affiliation, with
the local union and the larger national federation retaining their separate personalities.
Petitioner cannot pretend to be unaware of these legal principles since they enjoy the
benefit of legal advice from their distinguished counsel. Thus, we are constrained to agree
with the position of the Solicitor General that petitioner conveniently used the
representation issue within AFW to skirt entering into bargaining negotiations with the
private respondent. It must be recalled that immediately after the deadlock in the talks, it
was petitioner which filed a petition with the Secretary of Labor for the latter to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the public
respondent's authority and recognized the latter's power to settle the labor dispute
pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code granting him the power and authority to
decide the dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said that public respondent's decision to grant
the awards is premature and pre-emptive of the parties' right to collectively bargain,
simply because the Order of January 28, 1991 was unfavorable to one or the other party,
It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991,
must retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of
petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be property applied
to herein case.
GMC vs. CA
OCTOBER 23, 2012  ~ VBDIAZ
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL
MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO
MANGUBAT
G.R. No. 146728           February 11, 2004
FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General
Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private
respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC
and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue
of representation effective for a term of three years. The day before the expiration of the
CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be
submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had received collective and individual
letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on
grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer
had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers, Rito Mangubat and
Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union
which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue
with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the
company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated
December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union
and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn
from the union.
NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP.
ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective bargaining with the
union
HELD: The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last
for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed
until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union
requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it
was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers,  because it was
seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of
the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s proposal was also submitted within
the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just
before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to
refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union.  For refusing to send a counter-
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the
company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. – Any Collective
Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained
and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such
five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution….
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer
to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented
proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original
CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy
excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to
prevent any negotiation.
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The following procedures shall be
observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon
the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply
thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative
of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no
longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals,
GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
From Atty. Renes^^
Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Teodoro Fernandez G.R. No. 197309; October 10, 2012 Brion, J.
Doctrine: It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure
forresolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that
procedureshould be strictly observed.
Facts: Respondent Teodorico Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife, Glenita
Fernandez,is a seaman who filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint fordisability benefits, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees, againstpetitioners Ace Navigation Co., Inc., Vela International Marine Ltd.,
and/or Rodolfo Pamintuan(petitioners). The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that theAMOSUP/TCC collective bargaining agreement (CBA) stipulates that a
dispute between aseafarer and the company shall be settled through the grievance
machinery and mandatoryvoluntary arbitration. Fernandez, on the other hand, averred
that his complaint involves a claimfor compensation and damages which is outside the
voluntary arbitrator’s jurisdiction underArticle 261 of the Labor Code, and that his
complaint does not involve any "unresolvedgrievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective BargainingAgreement [nor] from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies." Thelabor arbiter denied the motion to
dismiss, and ruled that under Section 10 of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 8042, the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the labor arbiter hasoriginal and exclusive
jurisdiction over money claims arising out of an employer-employeerelationship or by
virtue of any law or contract, notwithstanding any provision of law to thecontrary. The
petitioners appealed to the NLRC, but the latter denied the appeal.
Upon appeal to the CA, the latter ruled that the labor arbiter has the original and
exclusivejurisdiction to hear Fernandez’s money claims, and that the jurisdiction of
voluntary arbitrators islimited to the seafarers’ claims which do not fall within the labor
arbiter’s original and exclusivejurisdiction or even in cases where the labor arbiter has
jurisdiction, the parties have agreed inunmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit
the case to voluntary arbitration. In this case,the CA found that there was no unequivocal
language in the AMOSUP/TCC CBA that theparties agreed to submit money claims or,
more specifically, claims for disability benefits tovoluntary arbitration. The CA also took
note of Section 29 of the POEA-SEC  which that in casesof claims and disputes arising from
a Filipino seafarer’s employment, the parties covered by aCBA shall submit the claim or
dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntaryarbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for reviewon certiorari which
seeks to nullify the decision of the CA.
Issue: Does the labor arbiter have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
respondentFernandez’s disability claim under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended.
Ruling: No, the labor arbiter does not have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
therespondent’s disability claim under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended. It is the
voluntaryarbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction
overFernandez’s disability claim. There is no dispute that the claim arose out of
Fernandez’s employment with the petitioners andthat their relationship is covered by a
CBA — the AMOSUP/TCC or the AMOSUP-VELA CBA.The CBA provides for a grievance
procedure for the resolution of grievances or disputes whichoccur during the employment
relationship and, like the grievance machinery created underArticle 261 of the Labor Code,
it is a two-tiered mechanism, with voluntary arbitration as the laststep.1âwphi1Contrary to
the CA’s reading of the CBA’s Article 14, there is unequivocal orunmistakable language in
the agreement which mandatorily requires the parties to submit to thegrievance procedure
any dispute or cause of action they may have against each other. Read inits entirety, the
CBA’s Article 14 (Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the parties’agreement to
submit any unresolved dispute at the grievance resolution stage to mandatoryvoluntary
arbitration under Article 14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it should be added that, incompliance
with Section 29 of the POEA-SEC which requires that in cases of claims anddisputes arising
from a seafarer’s employment, the parties covered by a CBA shall submit theclaim or
dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
ofvoluntary arbitrators. Since the parties used unequivocal language in their CBA for
thesubmission of their disputes to voluntary arbitration (a condition laid down in Vivero for
therecognition of the submission to voluntary arbitration of matters within the original and
exclusivejurisdiction of labor arbiters), we find that the CA committed a reversible error in
its ruling; itdisregarded the clear mandate of the CBA between the parties and the POEA-
SEC forsubmission of the present dispute to voluntary arbitration.
What might have caused the CA to miss the clear intent of the parties in prescribing a
grievanceprocedure in their CBA is the use of the auxiliary verb "may" in Article 14.7(a) of
the CBA which,to reiterate, provides that "if by reason of the nature of the Dispute, the
parties are unableto amicably settle the dispute, either party may refer the case to a
MANDATORYARBITRATION COMMITTEE." While the CA did not qualify its reading of the
subject provisionof the CBA, it is reasonable to conclude that it viewed as optional the
referral of a dispute to themandatory arbitration committee when the parties are unable to
amicably settle the dispute.
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC) vs.
COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014
Facts:  From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) and
its rank-and-file employees were governed by collective bargaining agreements providing
for the step increases in an employee’s basic salary in case of promotion.
 On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining agreement already
expired , PHILEC selected Eleordo Lipio for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII
to Foreman I under Pay Grade B. PHILEC served Lipio a memorandum, instructing him to
undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on August 25, 1997. PHILEC
undertook to pay Lipio training allowance.
 Ignacio, Sr., then DT-Assembler with Pay Grade VII, was likewise selected for training
for the position of Foreman I. On August 21, 1997, PHILEC served Ignacio, Sr. a
memorandum, instructing him to undergo training with a schedule of allowance.
 On September 17, 1997, PHILEC and PHILEC Workers’ Union (PWU) entered into a new
CBA, effective retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999. Under Article
X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 CBA, a rank-and-file employee promoted shall be entitled
to the step increases in his or her basic salary.
 To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or observation and
shall receive training allowance as provided in the June 1, 1997 CBA. Section 1. JOB
POSTING AND BIDDING: (f) Allowance for employees under Training or Observation shall
be on a graduated basis as follows: For the first month of training, the allowance should
be equivalent to one step increase of the next higher grade. Every month thereafter the
corresponding increase shall be equivalent to the next higher grade until the allowance for
the grade applied for is attained. E.g., if a Grade I employee qualifies for a Grade III
position, he will receive the training allowance for Grade I to Grade II for the first month.
On the second month, he will receive the training allowance for Grade I to Grade II plus
the allowance for Grade II to Grade III. He will then continue to receive this amount until
he finishes his training or observation period.
 Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on
Lipio and Ignacio,Sr. did not conform to Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance machinery,
however, PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. The parties filed a
submission agreement with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, submitting the
following issues to voluntary arbitration: i. Whether PHILEC violated Section 4 Article X of
the existing collective bargaining agreement in implementing the step increases relative to
the promotion of individual complaints ii. Whether PHILEC’s manner of implementing the
step increases in connection with the promotion of individual complaints in relation to the
provisions of Section 4, Article X of the CBA constitutes unfair labor practice
 Voluntary Arbitrator Ramon T. Jimenez: i. Held that PHILEC violated its collective
bargaining agreement with PWU, that the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement
governed when PHILEC selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for promotion on August 18 and 21,
1997. PHILEC should have computed Lipio’s and Ignacio, Sr.’s training allowance based on
Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 CBA ii. As to PHILEC’s claim that applying Article X,
Section 4 would result in salary distortion within PHILEC’s enterprise, Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez ruled that this was "a concern that PHILEC could have anticipated and could have
taken corrective action" before signing the collective bargaining agreement. iii. Dismissed
PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice. According to him, PHILEC’s acts "cannot be
considered a gross violation of the collective bargaining agreement nor . . . a flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of the agreement." iv.
Ordered PHILEC to pay Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. training allowance based on Article X,
Section 4 and Article IX, Section 1 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in directing PHILEC
to pay Lipio’s and Ignacio, Sr.’s training allowance based on Article X, Section 4 of the
June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement – NO 2. Whether PHILEC must
pay training allowance based on the step increases provided in the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement – YES
Held:
1.
 PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision. This was not the proper
remedy. Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before
the Court of Appeals.
 A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties’ other labor disputes, including unfair
labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide:
o ART. 261. JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS OR PANEL OF VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATORS. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in
the immediately preceding article…xxxx o ART. 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR
DISPUTES. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of
the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor
practices and bargaining deadlocks.
 In Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, this
court ruled that the proper remedy against the award or decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator is an appeal before the Court of Appeals. This court first characterized the office
of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as a quasi-judicial agency.
 In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the settled premise that the
judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights
of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that "a voluntary
arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these
rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys
in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC
since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.
 This court then stated that the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is not strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be
considered an instrumentality.
 Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators
may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both
he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. The terms
governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions in the Labor Code and he
falls, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality".
 Since the office is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court concluded that a decision
or award rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals.
Under Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over decisions or awards of quasi-judicial agencies and
instrumentalities.
 Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise: o 3. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of…quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities….in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines…xxx
 Luzon Development Bank was decided in 1995 but remains "good law." In the 2002 case
of Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this court rejected petitioner Alcantara, Jr.’s argument
that the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 43, Section 2, superseded the Luzon Development
Bank ruling. The provision reads: SEC. 2. Cases not covered. -This Rule shall not apply to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
 The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but, held that the
decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its
ambit: o The fact that the voluntary arbitrator’s functions and powers are provided for in
the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
 Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision by the parties": o Art. 262-A. PROCEDURES. (last paragraph
of 262-A): The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
by the parties. It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-
day reglementary period for filing an appeal: o Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed
in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion
for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. The 15-day reglementary period has
been upheld by this court in a long line of cases. In AMA Computer College-Santiago City,
Inc. v. Nacino, Nippon Paint Employees Union-OLALIA v. Court of Appeals, Manila Midtown
Hotel v. Borromeo, and Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, this court denied petitioners’
petitions for review on certiorari since petitioners failed to appeal the Voluntary Arbitrator’s
decision within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 43. In these cases, the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal assailing the Voluntary Arbitrator’s
decision. Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the
Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10
calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. Appeal is a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much
less to entertain the appeal.  Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution, this court "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in
promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor
Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified
through the Rules of Court.  The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or
decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the
award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration
with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period
since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal."  A
petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari may be filed only if appeal is not
available. If appeal is available, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon is
grave abuse of discretion.  As an exception to the rule, this court has allowed petitions
for certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal (a) when the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require;
(c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.  In Unicraft Industries International Corporation,
et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against the
Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision. Finding that the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered an award
without giving petitioners an opportunity to present evidence, this court allowed
petitioners’ petition for certiorari despite being the wrong remedy. The Voluntary
Arbitrator’s award, this court said, was null and void for violation of petitioners’ right to
due process.  In Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-
ALU,petitioner likewise filed a petition for certiorari against the Voluntary Arbitrator’s
decision, alleging that the decision lacked basis in fact and in law. Ruling that the petition
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, this court
allowed petitioner’s petition for certiorari in "the broader interests of justice."  In Mora v.
Avesco Marketing Corporation, this court held that petitioner Noel E. Mora erred in filing a
petition for certiorari against the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision. Nevertheless, this court
decided the case on the merits "in the interest of substantial justice to arrive at the proper
conclusion that is conformable to the evidentiary facts."  None of the circumstances
similar to Unicraft, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, and Moraare present in this case. PHILEC
received Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s resolution denying its motion for partial
reconsideration on August 11, 2000. PHILEC filed its petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals on August 29, 2000, which was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary
period for filing an appeal. We cannot consider PHILEC’s petition for certiorari as an
appeal.  There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s decision became final and executory after 10 calendar days from PHILEC’s
receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s decision is already "beyond the purview of this Court to act upon."
2.
 VA Jimenez correctly awarded both Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. training allowances based on
the amounts and formula provided in the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.
PHILEC, as employer, and PWU, as the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s
rank-and-file employees, entered into a CBA, which the parties agreed to make effective
from June 1, 1997 to May 31, 1999. Being the law between the parties, the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement must govern PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees
within the agreed period. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were rank-and-file employees when
PHILEC selected them for training for the position of Foreman I beginning August 25,
1997. They were selected for training during the effectivity ofthe June 1, 1997 rank-and-
file CBA. Therefore, their training allowance must be computed based on Article X, Section
4 and Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.
Contrary to PHILEC’s claim, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were not transferred out of the
bargaining unit when they were selected for training. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. remained rank-
and-file employees while they trained for the position of Foreman I. Under Article IX,
Section 1(e) of the June 1, 1997 CBA, a trainee who is unable to demonstrate his ability to
perform the work shall be reverted to his previous assignment. According to the same
provision, the trainee shall hold that job on a trial or observation basis and subject to prior
approval of the authorized management official, be appointed to the position in a regular
capacity. Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for training does
not mean automatic transfer out of the bargaining unit of rank and-file employees.
Moreover, the June 1, 1997 CBA states that the training allowance of a rank-and-file
employee whose application for a posted job is accepted shall be computed in accordance
with Section (f) of Article IX. Since they were rank-and-file employees when they applied
for training for the position of Foreman I, their training allowance must be computed
based on the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file CBA PHILEC allegedly applied the "Modified SGV"
pay grade scale to prevent any salary distortion within PHILEC’s enterprise. This, however,
does not justify PHILEC’s non-compliance with the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement. This pay grade scale is not provided in the collective bargaining agreement. In
Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines
(SMTFM-UWP) v. NLRC,this court ruled that "only provisions embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal
raised by a contracting party does not find print in the collective bargaining agreement, it
is not part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.”
Had PHILEC wanted the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale applied within its enterprise, it
could have requested or demanded that the ‘Modified SGV’ scale be incorporated in the
CBA. PHILEC did not dispute PWU’s contention that it selected several rank-and-file
employees for training and paid them training allowance based on the schedule provided
in the collective bargaining agreement effective at the time of the trainees’ selection.
PHILEC cannot choose when and to whom to apply the provisions of its collective
bargaining agreement. The provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must be
applied uniformly and complied with in good faith. Given the foregoing, Lipio’s and
Ignacio, Sr.’s training allowance should be computed based on Article X, Section 4 in
relation to Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining
agreement.
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. COURT OF APPEALS, GNC FACULTY AND LABOR UNION
AND GNC NON-TEACHING MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION [G.R. No. 188492, August 28,
2018] FACTS: Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 6728, otherwise known as “Government
Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act”, so provides that 70% of
the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and
other benefits of the teaching and nonteaching personnel. Therefore, the petitioner
imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees for school year 2006-2007. Subsequently, the
petitioner’s Board of Trustees approved instead the funding of the retirement program out
of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases for the purpose
of saving the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan. Consequently,
respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union
challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. Thereafter, the parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration
after failing to settle the controversy by themselves. The Voluntary Arbiter, after hearing
the parties, rendered his decision dated June 16, 2008 in favor of the petitioner, holding
that retirement benefits fell within the category of "other benefits" that could be charged
against the 70% net incremental proceeds pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. The
respondents, after receiving a copy of the decision on June 16, 2008, filed an Urgent
Motion for Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of 15 days from July 1,
2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for review. On July 2, 2008,
the CA granted the Urgent Motion for Extension. Hence, the respondents filed the petition
for review on July 16, 2008. Subsequently, the petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss,
asserting that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and
executory pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code. However, the CA denied the Motion
to Dismiss on December 15, 2008. ISSUE: Which governs between the two periods found
in Article 276 of the Labor Code and Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court the appeal
from the decision or award by the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators? RULING:
The Supreme court held that the 10-day period under Article 276 of the Labor Code refers
to the filing of a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or
award. On the other hand, the petition for review shall be filed within 15 days pursuant to
Section 4, Rules 43 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court cited the case of Teng v.
Pagahac, a 2010 ruling, in which the Court clarified that the 10-day period set in Article
276 of the Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their motion for
reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, holding thusly: In the exercise of its power to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of
Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it
should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and
guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature. By
allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article
262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA's decision to
seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more
appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion. of administrative remedies. For
this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition
under that Rule. The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on
the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every
opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all
opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or
resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion,
sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent. By disallowing
reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the
2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A
of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the
courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency
entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge,
training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of
facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before
a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood
as the period within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary
Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by
filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from
notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. Furthermore, the Court notes that despite the
clarification made in Teng v. Pagahac, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) have not revised or amended
the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings
insofar as its Section 7 of Rule VII is concerned. This inaction has obviously sown
confusion, particularly in regard to the filing of the motion for reconsideration as a
condition precedent to the filing of the petition for review in the CA. Consequently, we
need to direct the DOLE and the NCMB to cause the revision or amendment of Section 7 of
Rule VII of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions for reconsideration in line with Article
276 of the Labor Code.