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 75- 14,061

POTASHNIK, Michael, 1940-

NACIS40; NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN CHILE,
1932-1538.
University o£ California, Los Angeles
Ph.D., 1974
History, modern

1 Xerox University Microfilms , Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles

Nacismo:
National Socialism in Chile, 1932-1938

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

Michael Potashnik

1974
The dissertation of Michael Potashnik is approved.

E. Bradford/Burn,

Q lAJ^U^Y
Susan Purcell

Robert N. Burr, Committee Chairman

University of California, Los Angeles

1974

11
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of charts vi
Vita and Publications v±i
Abstract viii

Chapter
I. Background to the Rise of National Socialism
in..........C h i l e ....... 1
A. The Social and Economic Foundations of
Chilean P o l i t i c s .......... 4
B. Chile Under the Parliamentary Regime*
1891-1920 11
1. The Political System of the Ruling Class
and the New O l i g a r c n s ................... 12
2. Economic and Social Changes Leading to
the Disruption of the Parliamentary
R e g i m e ............................. 16
C. Arturo Alessandri* The Unmaking of a
President, 1920-1925 .. ........... 20
1. The Failure of the Liberal Alliance . . . 21
2. The Intervention of the M i l i t a r y ........ 27
3. The Presidential Regime Under the
1925 Constitution ................... 31
D.Politics in the Interim* 1925-1927 36
1. The Tribunal of National Sanction . . . . 37
2. The New F o r c e .......................... 38
E. Carlos Ibanez* The Making of an Autocrat,
1927-1931 40
1. The Establishment of Authoritarian Rule. . 40
2. The Crisis and its A f t e r m a t h ............ 43
F. Movements for National Redemption.............. 47
1. The Left and the Right ........ 48
2. The Nacis and the New Politics . . . . . . 53
II. The Intellectual Origins of Chilean National
S o c i a l i s m .......... ............................ 58
A. Nicolas Palacios and Raza Chilena . . . . . . 60
1. The M e s t i z o ............................ 60

iii
 2. Patriotism and Prejudice................. 62
a. The Ethnography of the ChileanPeople 62
b. The Necessity of Natural Selection . . 65
c. The Threat of "Colonization".... 69
B. Francisco Antonio Encina and Nuestra
Inferioridad Economia . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1. The Aristocrat ................. 71
2. Encina and P a l a c i o s ..................... 72
3. Matter and M o r a l ......................... 77
a. Economics of the Foreigner ......... 79
b. Psychology of the Collective Will • • 82
c. Education of the Social Organism . . . 85
C. Alberto Edwards and La fronda aristocrattica • 90
1. The Sociology of Oswald S p engler......... 90
2. Anarchy or Authority.......... 94
a. The Spirit of the Aristocracy . . . . 94
b. The "State in F o r m " ........... . 96
c. The System S u p r e m e ............... 98
d. The Enemy of Tradition.......... 101
e. The Leader Supreme ............ 104
3. Edwards and Encina ........ . . . . . . . 107
D. Carlos Keller and La e t e m a crisis chilena . . Ill
1. The Chilean G e r m a n ....................... 112
2. Spengler and the Political-Cultural
Situation in Latin America .............. 114
3. Organization and A c t i o n ................. 117
a. What is Politics?. ............ 119
b. The Crisis of Capitalism............ 121
c. Decadence and Beyond 127
d. The New Politics .......... 130
e. The New E c o n o m i c s .............. 134
4. The "Philosopher" and the "Politician" . . 136
III. El Jefe* Jorge GonzSlez von Marees . . . . . . . 138
A. The "Leader" as the sin qua non of National
S o c i a l i s m .................................. 138
B. Germanic Ambience* The Formation of a
P e r s o n a l i t y ................................ 143
C. Chilean Ambience* The Education of a
N a t i o n a l i s t ................................ 146
D. Prelude to Politics ................. 156
E. Toward a Socio-Psychological Portrait of
El J e f e .................................... 158
IV. An "Ideology" Out of P o w e r ...................... 161
A. The Nature of Naci Thinking in C h i l e ........ 161
1. Ideology and U t o p i a .................... 161
2. Chilean or Foreign? .......... 165
3. The Ethos of N a c i s m o ............ 170
B. Nacism, Marxism, and the Crisis of Liberal
D e m o c r a c y .......... 172

iv
 1. The Alternatives of CollectiveExistence . 173
2. Chile and the W e s t ....................... 178
3* A Party or a Movement?................... 179
C. The Naci Conception of the S t a t e ......... 181
1. The Organization and Structure ofthe
Corporate S t a t e ........................ 183
2* The "Democracy" of the Aristocracy . . . . 189
D. Nacismo and E c o n o m y ..................... 192
E. Common Cause with the C h u r c h .......... 196
F. Anti-Imperialism......................... 200
6. Racism and the J e w s ..................... 202
H. The Politics of an Ideology Out ofPower . . . 206
V. The Structure and Organization of Nacismo. . . . 209
A. Nacismo as a Political Movement .......... 209
1. Authoritarianism in A c t i o n .............. 212
2. a. The Portalian P r i n c i p l e ............ 212
b. The Administrative A p p a r a t u s ........ 216
2. Meta-Political P r o p s ..................... 223
3. Meta-Political Theater......... . 225
B. Nacismo as a "National" M o v e m e n t ......... 232
1. Geographical D i s t r i b u t i o n .............. 232
2. Social Composition....................... 234
a. Classes ...................... 235
b. Youth .................... 240
c. W o m e n .............................. 242
d. L a b o r .............................. 245
e. G e r m a n s ............................ 246
3. Did Nacismo Become a National Movement?. • 248
VI. The Nacis in Politics* 1932-1938 250
A. The Nacis and the Politics of Opposition . . . 252
B. Theater Politics; Street P o l i t i c s .......... 262
C. Strange Alliance .......................... 270
1. The Birth of the Popular F r o n t ...... 271
2. The Nacis and the Fronts Phase I . . . . 273
3. The Nacis and the Fronts Phase II . . . . 278
D. The Fall of El J e f e ........................ 288
1. Ibctnez and the 1938 E l e c t i o n ............ 288
2. The 21st of M a y ..................... 294
3. The 5 th of September................. 301
VII. Epilogues The Metamorphosis of Nacismo . . . . . 318
A. The Aftermath of September the 5 t h ........... 318
B. Formation of the Vanquardia Nacional
Socialis ta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
C. The Folly of Juan B e m a l e s ................... 342

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 353

V
 LIST OF CHARTS

CHART PAGE
The Morphological Structure of N a c i s m o ............ 218
The Organizational Structure of N a c i s m o .......... 219

vi
 VITA

September 7, 1940 B om, Chicago, Illinois

1963 — B.A., University of California, Berkeley
1967-1968 — Field work, Chile, under a grant from the
Chile - California Convenio.
1969-1973 — Assistant Director, Latin America and Caribbean
program, Foreign Area Fellowship Program,
New York, N.Y.
1973 — Staff Associate, Social Science Research Council,
New York, N.Y.

PUBLICATIONS

Potashnik, Michael.
A Guide to Selected Fellowships and Grants for Research
on Latin America and the Caribbean. Foreign Area
Fellowship Program: New York, 1972.
and Wood, Bryce. "Government Funding for Research
on Latin America 1970-71," Latin American Research Review.
8, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 135-146.

vii
 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Nacismoi
National Socialism in Chile, 1932-1938
by
Michael Potashnik
Doctor of Philosophy in History
University of California, Los Angeles, 1974
Professor Robert N. Burr, Chairman

Nacismo — the national socialist movement that in

true Spenglerian fashion was born, lived and died in Chile
during the 1930s — was part of a worldwide phenomenon dur­
ing that fateful decade. But it was not part of either the
Italian Fascist or German Nazi internationals, as were other
similar movements throughout Latin America. To be sure, its
initial Inspiration was foreign, as was its name, but it
was nevertheless a Chilean movement sui generis with all that
that implies.
The political origins of national socialism in Chile
were in part due to the wealth and class structure of society,
in part to the disruption of liberal democracy, in part to
the world economic crisis — the crisis of capitalism — that
brought forth so many conflicting political solutions. The
obsolete oligarchical structure of governing the country
and the imbalance in the economic structure between agricul­
ture and industry -- the unhealthy dependency of the economy
viii
on the nitrate industry — were factors that spelled the
doom of the existing structure of economic, social and
political life, at least as it had been known.
The intellectual origins of national socialism in
Chile were also both indigenous and foreign. But again,
the indigenous roots were far more important and decisive.
The leaders of Nacismo found the ideas of Oswald Spengler
and certain aspects of the European fascist movements com­
pelling, but it was the ideas of Nicolas Palacios, Francisco
Antonio Encina and Alberto Edwards that shaped the histori­
cal consciousness, economic and political awareness and
political thinking of Carlos Keller — the "philosopher"
of Nacismo.
Keller synthesized these ideas in La eterna crisis
chilena: the survival of the superior and the threat of
foreign "colonization", the idea of the "collective will"
and the necessity to educate the social organism, the "state
in form" and the Portalian system. Moreover, he presented
these ideas in terms of the situation in the 1930s — in
terms of the problem of the "moral decadence" ensuing from
the credo of liberalism and of the "crisis of capitalism" —
and he proposed a new economics and a new politics which
could be effected only through the instrumentality of a new
"leader."
* \ _
For Keller, and for many others, Jorge Gonzalez Marees
became that new leader — the Jefe — when the Movimiento
Nacional Socialista de Chile was established on April 5, 1932.

ix
From that moment on the fate of Nacismo in Chile became in­
evitably tied to the fate of GonzSlez. For Nacismo. GonzSlez*
leadership proved both a blessing and a curse. Although ro­
mantic, his understanding of Chilean history was profound.
But his understanding of the forces that vere shaping Chile's
present and future were limited and even distorted by the
ideology which he espoused.
The ideology of Chilean Nacismo was fragmented rather
than systematic. It brought to the Chilean scene a given
truth rather than a developmental concept. Hence its ideas
changed little. Its argument against imperialism — and par­
ticularly United States imperialism — was national rather
than international. Its critique of the ruling class in Chile
was immanent rather than revolutionary, in spite of the social­
ist context of its nationalism. Nacismo was inextricably
linked to the idea that a modern expression of the Portalian
state was possible, but it failed to provide a workable
plan as to how this would be effected. In fact, the ideology
of Nacismo failed to provide even a structure of organization
that was politically viable. The Chilean Nacis disdained
becoming a party. Remaining outside the structure of Chilean
politics, they conducted what might be called guerrilla acti­
vity which had no chance of changing the political system.
Once opposition politics — opposition to the Arturo
Alessandri regime — became the central and overriding fact
of Chilean politics, the Nacis (together with the Ibanistas)
constituted a kind of third force, as distinguished from the

x
parties of the Left and the Right. When Alessandri "moved
to the Right", the Nacis "moved to the Left." In concrete
terms this meant that they had been forced to enter politics.
The 1937 election made it clear that the Nacis had in fact
become a national movement.
As the 1938 presidential election approached, GonzSlez
and his Nacis declared their support for General Carlos
Ib£fiez under the banner of a "Popular Liberation Alliance."
But with prospects of victory dim, and with his own personal
fate and the fate of the Naci movement in question, GonzSlez
conspired with Ibanez to overthrow the government by coup on
September 5th. IbSnez* failure to participate sealed the
fate of the Naci militants. Most of them were massacred by
Alessandri*s forces and GonzSlez was arrested forthwith.
The attempted coup and its brutal suppression by the
government proved to be the turning point in the electoral
campaign. Thus GonzSlez and his Nacis made their greatest
political impact at the time of their greatest defeat. And
although the remaining Nacis changed the name of their organ­
ization to the Vancruardia Nacional Socialista early in 1939
and continued for a time to maintain the fiction of a unified
movement, the 5th of September marked the end of Nacismo as a
political force in Chile.

xi
 I

BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF

NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN CHILE

Nuestra eterna crisis tiene su causa

mas profunda y verdadera en nuestro
cerebro. Es algo independiente, abso-
lutamente independiente de toda cuestion
doctrinaria. Podemos organizar nuestro
Estado sobre la base comunista, socia-
lista, liberal o conservadora: si no
logramos modificar nuestra organiza-
cion cerebral, la crisis no desaparecera.
Lo esencial es que esa nueva juventud se
haya compenetrado de que la causa de
nuestra eterna crisis no esta fuera de
nosotros, sino en lo mas profundo de
nuestro interior.
Carlos Keller

In the 1930s, a Fascist or National Socialist movement

was born, lived shortly, and died in Chile. If its inspira­
tion was foreign, its aspect was distinctly Chilean. If in
theory it was internationalist, in practice it was nationalist.
If in fiction it looked outward, in fact it looked inward.
Chilean National Socialism — or Nacismo. as it called
itself — was as much an invention of the mind as it was a
solution for society. But this might be said of any revolu­
tionary movement before it is tested in power. And Nacismo
never was. It remained a movement in search of power and was
ultimately destroyed by a desperate bid for it when it per­
ceived that its time was past.
Whatever else Chilean Fascism was or might have been,
it was first and foremost a political movement and must be
considered in the same way as other opposition parties that
developed in Chile in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The
fact that the fascist or National Socialist party, like
the Socialist and Communist parties, was as much a cause
as it was a political party did not change its role and
function in the political life of the period.
Chilean politics, like the geographical setting of
Chile, is insular. Fortunate among the new Latin American
Republics, Chile achieved independence with relative ease
and moved into m o d e m nationhood relatively quickly. Al­
though its growth after independence followed the economic
fluctuations of the more advanced Latin American countries,
Chile's insularity contributed to its differentiation from
its neighbors and its evolving sui generis development. It
has been said that the nearer each Latin American country
comes to modern nationhood, the more unlike its neighbors
it becomes. Whether this is true for all, it is particular­
ly true for Chile.1
Because of the homogeneity of Chile's geographic and
social situations, integration came earlier and was more
effective than in any other country in the region. But,
like its neighbors, after independence the advantage lay
with the conservatives and the post-independence period found
an essentially conservative solution. Wliat conservative

^ o r information on Chile's uniqueness among Latin

American countries, cf. K.H. Silvert, Chile (New York* 1965),
pp. 3, 14 f., 17 ff., 51 ff., 59, 88, 99, 117, 149, and 159.

2
meant in the Chilean context, some have preferred to call
oligarchic, but it meant specifically the Conservative
Party, which was reorganized and invigorated by Diego
Portales immediately after the revolution of 1829, which
elected General Joaquin Prieto as president of the republic
in 1831, and which enacted the political code that definitely
organized the State and governed the country almost without
interruption for the next 30 years (from 1831-1861). What
became known as the "Portalian system" was initiated between
April 1830 and August 1831 when Portales made himself the
interpreter and promoter of what was best for the country
and dictatorially imposed his will upon the ministries which
he personally filled. The system was codified in the
Constitution of 1833, which established a regime of authority
exercised at the discretion of the chief magistrate and,
with a minimum of fiscal supervision, rested all power in
his hands; even the direction of municipal and Congressional
elections and the appointment of judges for all tribunals.
The transition from the Conservative to the Liberal
republic that took place in 1860 was accomplished with less
violence than other Latin American countries and was marked
by a number of measures to restrict executive power. This
was largely due to the repressive policies of Manuel Montt
(1851-1861) who, in the latter years of his power, split
the Conservatives into a "reactionary" wing, which supported
him, and a "moderate" wing, which was ready to make common
cause with the Liberals. The principal distinction between

3
the Conservatives and the Liberals had been drawn after the
Constitution of 1828. The moderate group — which desired
a tolerant political organization with colonial institutions,
and which counted on aid from the clergy, was largely made
up of rich men, heirs of entailed estates, and family heads
of ancient nobility — was nicknamed by their opponents
pelucon (bigwig), but called itself conservative. The
reformist and democratic group — which aspired to change
the society in whatever way necessary in order to make it
republican — was nicknamed by the Conservatives pipiolo
(novice), but called itself Liberal. Montt's repressive
policies forced the pipolos and the pelucones to form a
coalition or fusion. And it was largely due to the "fusion-
ists" that Montt stepped down on September 18, 1861 and handed
over to Jose Joaquin Perez the presidential insignia. The
Liberals ruled until the beginning of the parliamentary
republic in 1891; and during this period Chile became a
wealthy and rapidly changing country.

A. The Social and Economic Foundations of

Chilean Politics
A review of the socio-economic and socio-political
background of the situation in Chile in the 1930s must begin
with the War of the Pacific in 1879.^ This conflict — the

2
Cf. on the historical trends of Chile to 1926, Alberto
Edwards Vives, La Fronda Aristocr5tica, 4th ed. (Santiago; 1952);
for the economic history of the period Guillermo Subercaseaux,
Historia de las doctrinas econ6micas en America v en especial
en Chile (Santiago: 1924)^ For reference, cf. Federico G.
Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: 1966), pp. 43 ff,

9
4
greatest in Chile's history — transformed not only the
geography of the country* but itseconomic, social and poli­
tical life. The direct result of Chile's victory overPeru
and Bolivia was its acquisition of rich nitrate and copper
territories* which had been the original source of the con­
flict. It was this newly acquired wealth that opened up an
era of economic development and expansion that transformed
both the structure of society and politics. The country
had increased its territory by one-third, and the increased
3
revenue began to augment both private and public wealth. It
was the unfulfilled promise of the War of the Pacific for
the majority of the people that laid the basis for the poli­
tical turmoil to come.
The era of prosperity after the War of the Pacific —
in ten years the income of the Chilean treasury was quadrupled
— was to some extent felt by all social classes, but it was
particularly concentrated in the upper classes of society.^
Although the government undertook a number of public work
projects, promoted immigration and increased the salaries of

and "A Political-Historical Sketch of Chilean History

from 1879" in Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society*
Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans* 1961),
pp. 50-75.
3
Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva,
Historia de los partidos poli ticos chilenos (Santiago * 1949),
pp. 80 ff.
4
For an excellent study of Chilean social structure, cf.
"On Social Structure" in Silvert, Conflict Society, pp. 230-241.

5
public employees, currency problems were aggravated by the
government's failure to redeem paper money. Although in­
flation was initially the result of economic crisis and war,
it became a weapon used against the people, and particularly
the lower classes. The dual situation of monetary deprecia­
tion and chronic inflation begun in this period became a
5
permanent feature of Chile's economic and social life.
The principle key to the solution of the problem of
inflation was the nitrate revenues, but they were applied
to everything but this problem.® The reason was that it
served the interests of the upper classes because they were
not compelled to levy taxes on themselves. Indeed, the syste
matic depreciation of the currency was willful and favored in
particular the interests of the commercial and industrial
elites and the large landowners.
Mining wealth insured the economic and thus political
dominance of Chile’s ruling class, but its foundation was
primarily in the agrarian sector. This sector was dominant
in Chilean life and it might be said that the agrarian ques­
tion was the key to the developing economic and social crisis
because it was the key to the class structure of Chilean
politics.
Not only was social life in Chile dominated by the
families with ancestral estates, but the government of the

e
Cf. Frank W. Fetter, La inflacti6n monetaria en Chile
(Santiago* 1942).
®Lloyd J. Hughlett, Industrialization of Latin America
(New York* 1946), p. 234. Cf. also Luis Galdames, A History
of Chile (Chapel Hill* 1941), p. 484.
oligarchs and beyond was composed of farm owners. Rural
property was thus the basis of urban elite status. By
1930, almost half of Chile's population was urban, but
almost half of these urban dwellers retained close connec­
tions with the land, either as owners, tenants or hired labor­
ers. But while agriculture was the basis of the social
order, mining wealth assured its continuance. And it is in

this peculiar duality of the socio-economic structure that

the roots of growing instability can be found. Agricultural
products never figured largely in foreign exports, but
mining exports created an exaggerated dependence upon
foreign markets which created an inbalance in Chile's inter­
nal economy — an imbalance which was further aggravated by
the arrival of large foreign investments.
A closer examination of the economic and social
structure of agrarian conditions in Chile sheds light on the
nature and structure of Chilean politics in the first decade
of the 20th century. Chile proper — the central section of
the country — was the center of agrarian life and thus also
of social and political life, containing as it did the
majority of the population. The typical form of rural pro­
perty in this region was the hacienda, operated with the use
of dependent tenant-farmers. In general terms, haciendas might
be called semi-feudal but in Latin America the tenure system
was unlike that in medieval Europe, and bore a closer simi­

7
George McCutchen McBride, Chilei Land and Society (New
York* 1941), pp. 15 f.
larity to the landed estates in Eastern Europe. It has been
estimated that in 1925, there were 5,396 hacienda estates
(counting only those with a minimum of 202 hectares or 494
acres) in the fourteen provinces that make up the central
region from Coguimbo to Bio-Bio, controlling 89% of all farm
land. The other 11% was made up of 76,688 different forms
of small farms and collectively held properties. In 1930,
there were 3,889 haciendas with land holdings of 201 to
1000 hectars, 1,132 with 1,001 to 5000 hectares and 375 with
more than 5000 hectares. But this latter 375 farms made up
nearly 60% of the total land area in all these estates.
Alone, these 375 haciendas controlled more than 52% of all
O
the land in the central valley.
Although the value of the land for those who worked
it was primarily economic, the value for those who owned it
was primarily social. The owners usually were absentee
landlords who not only lived elsewhere but worked elsewhere.
The hacienda was a sign of social status and insured the
owner a high position in the social stratum, but his economic
interests generally lay elsewhere. Thus those who controlled
the land were not concerned fundamentally with its economic
utilization and well-being, even though they realized a
certain economic value from it. Those who worked the land,
and for whom it was the core of their economic as well as
social life, were thus at the mercy of the social whim of
the upper classes. To be sure, had the economic as well as

8Ibid, p. 123.

8
the social interests of the lower and upper classes coincided
— in agriculture — the divergence between them might not
have been as great as it was. Here again, the duality of
socio-economic life was overriding, because the social
prestige of the upper classes was based on agriculture,
their economic well being on mineral wealth, commerce, or
industry.
The system of rural agricultural labor that survived
from colonial times in the hacienda system, and which
changed little with the changing governments, was based on
the inguilino — the typical agricultural laborer. Rooted
to the land by both heritage and custom, the inguilino,
unlike the bondage system, was free to leave a farm and go
elsewhere. But if he left one hacienda, he could rarely
find employment on another. Thus the turnover of labor on
an estate was not large and movement of the laboring popula­
tion was minimal. The inguilino was in a very real sense
the essential and sustaining unit of the Chilean social
system. His wages remained as low and as unchanging as the
religious and social life of the hacienda system of administra-
tion. 9
Not all rural labor was supplied by the inguilinos.
A class of laborers not attached to the farm called forasteros,
afuerinos or labriegos was transient and was drawn mainly
10
from the towns and cities. This migratory labor was matched

9Ibid., pp. 149 ff.

l0Ibid., p. 164.

9
by inquilinos who broke loose from the farms and migrated
to the cities, hoping to improve their economic position.
But breaking away from the hacienda system was complicated
by the fact that the social class to which one belonged
depended upon one’s relation to the landowning class. And
just as economic opportunity was determined by this relation­
ship, so was one’s place in the body politic because the
character of the latter was also based on it. Thus even in
the towns and cities, the hacienda system was the dominant
element in socio-economic and socio-political life.
Without attempting to oversimplify the complex contra­
dictions in the economic and social foundations of Chilean
politics, agriculture and mining were unquestionably the
two most dynamic sectors of the economy from the end of
the nineteenth century to the 1930s.11 When oligarchical
domination was shaken in 1920, change came quickly. Rapid
industrial growth and social upheaval followed directly
upon the heels of the almost simultaneous appearance of the
proletariat and the middle class. These new classes developed
out of and competed with the rigid two-class system that had
characterized Chilean society up to that time. It is against
this background that Chilean politics unfolded in the first
decades of the twentieth century. And it is out of the
crucible of Chilean politics during these first decades that
the National Socialist Party emerged.

11Hugo Zemelman, "El movimento popular chileno y el

sistema de alianzas en la decada de 1930," in Enzo Faletto,
Eduardo Ruiz, Hugo Zemelman, Genesis historica del proceso
politico chileno (Santiago* 1971), p. 4.

10
 B. Chile Under the Parliamentary Regime: 1891-1920

The ruling class of Chile was already split both by

ideological dissension and personal ambition by 1886 when
12
the ill-fated Jose Manuel Balmaceda became president. The
so-called period of parliamentarianism or the rule of the
oligarchs began when he was overthrown by certain members of
the Congress in 1891. Balmaceda*s suicide, which followed,
ushered in a short period of violence unusual in Chile's
history. The lootings and burnings caused the death of as
many as 10,000 persons. This fratricidal conflict was indi­
cative of the fact that the old order was no longer able to
function as it had in the past and that no new channels of
political expression had been found. Balmaceda*s fall caused
a rupture not only in the country’s development, but in the
body politic itself.
In truth, Balmaceda was neither able to save the old
order nor to bring in the new; neither able to remain completely
loyal to his own class, nor to shift his loyalties completely
to another. He attempted to use state funds for public work:
projects to aid the people, to build structures to facili­
tate production and generally to promote the economic vitality
of the country. But in doing so he deprived private banks
of the power to issue currency, parceled out land to small
holders, drew labor from the farms to work on public projects
and advocated state intervention to support copper prices.

12
Julio Cesar Jobet, Ensavo critico del desarrollo
econdmico social de Chile fSantiago: 1955), pp. 80-94.

11
Representing no socially or politically significant segment
of the population* his economics were as unclear and as
eclectic as his class position. Alberto Edwards saw well
Balmaceda*s predicament. He wrotei "The politics of Chile
from 1849 to 1891 are synthesized principally in the conflict
between two organic spiritual elements* both of which be­
longed to the past: the aristocracy and the monarchy . . .
When in the anguish of the final battle Balmaceda, like the
kings of ancient Europe in combat with feudalism, wished to
appeal to the people, to democratic sentiment, events proved
that the unfortunate President had asked aid of something
which did not exist."13

1. The Political System of the Ruling Class

and the New Oligarchs
The Revolution of 1891, ostensibly led by the Congress,
deposed not only a president, but a presidential system that
had been established by Portales and had remained essentially
intact under both the Conservatives and the Liberals. Under
the rule of the congressional oligarchs, presidential author-
14
ity all but disappeared and this remained the case until 1920.
Under the parliamentary system, presidential power was curbed,

13
Edwards, La fronda aristocrStica. p. 179..
14Gil, The Political System of Chile, pp. 47 ff. Cf.
Rene Olivares. Alessandri. precursor v revolucionario
(Valparaiso: 1942), pp. 55 ff. Edwards and Frei, Historia,
pp. 133 ff.i and Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin,
"Presidential Succession in Chile: 1817-1966," Journal of
Inter-American Studies 11 (January, 1969), pp. 144 ff.

12
although by practice rather than by law, so that the many
presidents of this period were virtually unable to govern
the country without the support of Congress* And this
support was not forthcoming because the parties lacked
sufficient cohesion and their members engaged in shifting
political alliances which were often formed for the sole
reason of blocking presidential initiatives. The president's
power was also weakened by the fact that the system gave
congress the powers of veto over the cabinet and these were
invoked over 135 times during the period. Thus, even with
the best intentions, it was impossible for presidents to
develop consistent programs of national development. Accord­
ing to one observer, acts of government were the result of
compromise among parties in accordance with the principle
"si hoy te avudo. manana me avudaras" .15
The growth and proliferation of political parties were
the result of the erosion of the traditional elite political
system**"® that was inherited from the nineteenth century and
shaken during the parliamentary period. It is a moot point
to argue whether it was the disintegration of the traditional
political structure that lead to the breakdown of the econo­
mic and social order or vice-versa. The stability (or rather

15Cf. Paul S. Reinsch, "Parliamentary Government in

Chile," American Political Science Review. 3 (November, 1909),
pp. 507-538.
**®Cf. Rene Leon Echaiz, Evoluci6n histfirica de los
partidos pfillticos chilenos (Santiagoi 1939).

13
the fragility) of the Parliamentary period resulted from the
limiting of the political participation of lower social groups.
But more important, prosperity rested on mining exports rather
than on internal development. And the system could not at
the same time preserve the social values and economic peroga-
tives of the upper class and accomodate the pressures from
the lower and middle classes, because the demands of these
classes inevitably challenged the upper classes' monopoly
of land and industry.
Because the parliament was the locus of elite politi­
cal power during this period, and because this power was most
directly wielded through party organizations, presidential
candidates came from the upper classes and were nominated by
elite families and the parties they controlled. 17 Indeed,
popular election campaigns were frowned upon by the candi­
dates and election was secured through the power of local
bosses. But once in office, the president was expected to
play his role by remaining inactive. And it is not too much
to say that the system could not have worked at all without
a compliant president, together with an apolitical army, and
the subordination of excluded segments and sectors of the
population.
Under the parliamentary system, votes were delivered

17
Paul Winter Drake, "The Leftward Movement of the
Chilean Electorate" (Ph. D. dissertation, Department of
History, Stanford University, 1972). Drake presents a
good review of the parliamentary period and a background to
the 1930s, pp. 11 ff.

14
 18
from the base to the top by the local bosses (or caciques).
They were the essential link with the centers of power which
encouraged the passivity of the populous in return for
material incentives. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Republic
fortified the tradition of party accountability and elections.
It also encouraged a certain amount of electoral competi­
tion which grew with the pressure of the middle classes.
These social strata — they still lacked class consciousness
— were made up of the wage earners of the new economy, the
lesser propertied elements of the wealthy artisans, profes­
sionals, employees, merchants, small scale industrialists,
and members of the education and public bureaucracies. Al­
though they were primarily located in the urban areas, they
could also be found in the provincial towns and agricultural
areas not dominated by latifundia.
Not bound by the rigid family structures which tied
the upper classes to the old order, the middle classes sought
their social positions through such avenues as education,
economic advance and politics. But valuing generational
mobility, they also sought connections with those in posi­
tions of social and political power. Lacking their own
distinct social and class identity, they were caught between
trying to be accepted by the elites, and supported by the

18
Cf. Arturo Arms Valenzuela, "Clientelistic Politics
in Chile, an Analysis of Center-Local Linkages" (Ph. D.
dissertation, Department of Government, Columbia University,
1971).

15
workers. And this was the main reason for the ambiguous
role they played in politics and society during the Parlia-
\

mentary period. This role was played against the economic

and social landscape of the rule of the oligarchs.

2. Economic and Social Changes Leading to the

Disruption of the Parliamentary Regime
The years of congressional rule in Chile were not years
19
of social stagnation, but of preparation for change. Some
of Balmaceda's reforms, particularly those with regard to
education and religion, were retained and the parliamentary
era offered an opportunity for the civil schooling of the
Chilean people. 20 After the short period of violence that
followed Balmaceda's fall, there was a new respect for civil
liberties which made possible political debates and the public
airing of new social doctrines.
The economic situation was also not static. Although
the redemption of paper money was rescinded and the chronic
inflation began again to spiral, commercial and urban indus­
trial development entered a period of uncontrolled expansion.
Agriculture and national manufacturing interests were stabi­
lized and energized by a systematic protective policy.
Prosperity was thus evident in virtually all phases of the
nation's economic life and this brought about a marked im-

19
"A Political-Economic Sketch," in Silvert, Conflict
Society, pp. 58 f.
Gil, Political System, p. 51

16
provement in the well-being of the population on all levels*
But these economic changes contained the seeds of
disruption precisely because of the impact they wrought on
the social and political structures. Indeed# this impact
affected all levels of the social structure. As the growing
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie began to be felt in
the political arena# the aristocratic oligarchy gradually
transformed itself into a plutocracy. New values and new
attitudes lead to a new politics. The economic ethos brought
about by the desire for increased nitrate and copper revenue
not only captured the new middle class but also caused the
aristocracy to lose its patriotic sense of social and civic
responsibility. But most significant was the integration
of new social elements into the middle class. 21 A segment of
middle class private employees was created by industrial and
commercial growth. Then too, the urban population increased
rapidly after 1890 further reinforcing this group. Lacking
as yet any class conscious element, they lacked also the
custom of submission to the oligarchy and thus became the
vanguard of the reform movement.
The political situation became increasingly complex
during this period and even before the conflict the economic
changes brought about by the new natural resources resulted
in some political restructuring. A populist trend appeared

21
Julio Heise GonzSlez, "La constitucion de 1925 y las
nuevas tendencias politico-sociales," in Anales de la
Universidad de Chile. No. 80# (1950)# pp. 124 ff.

17
with the opening of the northern mineral regions and the
southern coal mines. This, in turn, started a primitive
pattern of political unionism. Intensification of the social
problem was reflected in strikes and labor violence. The
first strike took place in 1887, but in the 1890s there were
few organized strikes or boycotts. Chile's first strike of
major significance began in December 1901 in Iquique. Although
its leaders were immediately jailed, it lasted sixty days.
Thereafter, and particularly in the north, severe labor
violence continued. In 1906, Luis Emilio Recabarren led a
strike of the workers in Antofagasta and in the following
year thousands of laborers abandoned their downtrodden life
in the nitrate pampa and converged on Iquique. 22
The initial economic disruption of the First World War
further increased labor tension and in August and September
1914, thousands of unemployed laborers and their families
marched on Santiago where numerous industries had also laid
off workers. Given the almost total exclusion of the inqui-
linos and other forms of rural labor from independent politi­
cal action, such action was taken primarily by the workers in
the mining and urban centers. But economic changes were
causing an increasing flow of labor from the countryside to

^Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States 1880-

1962 (South Bendi 1963), p. 107. Cf. Luis Vitale, Historia
del movimento obrero (Santiago: 1962), pp. 40 ff. and Julio
Cesar Jobet, "Movimento social obrero," Desarrollo de Chile
en la primera mitad del siqlo X X . 2 vols. (Santiago: 1953),
pp. 51-71.

18
the urban and mining areas and this created new political
possibilities . . . The masses of the urban and mining workers
did not yet form a proletariat because of the low level of
industrial development. They were dispersed and their pre­
carious economic situation was reflected in their lack of
social and political organization. 23
By contrast, the middle class in Chile itself became
proletarized, as Julio Cesar Jobet and other interpreters
have pointed out. 24 This proletarianization of the middle
class resulted from the prevailing land tenure system and
the individual and distinctive nature of the mineral regions.
The former prevented a consistent development of the economic
and social counterparts of the middle class; the latter, the
growth of a numerous class of small holders and small
industrial entrepreneurs. In addition, the systematic
depreciation of the currency by the oligarchy prevented the
emphasis on savings so indicative of the middle class in
Europe and elsewhere.
Alberto Edwards speaks of the growth of a large "intel­
lectual proletariat" formed by the widespread expansion of
the state-controlled education system. 25 It was these indi­
viduals, denied the privileges of birth, wealth or social

23Pike, Chile, p. 107.

24Cf. Jobet, Ensayo critico, pp. 147 f.
25
Edwards, La fronda. pp. 212 f.

19
status* who became the new leaders of the masses. As the
economic and social questions were intimately linked to the
political question, and as the middle class gradually acquired
the consciousness necessary for political action, it became
the center, for political agitation. It was thus the source
of political power behind the so-called "revolt of the
electorate" that shook the traditional political system.

C. Arturo Alessandris The Unmaking of a President,

1920-1925
The challenge to Chile’s traditional political system
was the direct result of the growth of the middle class,
supported by the new proletariat, together with the con­
comitant loss of the traditional political prestige of the
oligarchs. But more specific factors can be noted —
administrative chaos, the virtual bankruptcy of the govern­
ment and a pervasive decline in political morality character­
ized by bribery and fraud. The bankruptcy of the government
was directly connected with the economic crisis of 1920,
when the post-War of the Pacific nitrate boom collapsed due
to the development of synthetic products elsewhere. New
taxes were required to make up for the loss in nitrate
revenues to finance the government. But the mining workers
were hardest hit and unemployment was increasing rapidly. And
with less money, the north ceased to provide a market for

96
Ricardo Donoso, Desarrollo politico v social de
Chile (Santiagoi 1943), p. 181.

20
the agricultural products of the central valley. Change was
inevitable, and the successful social revolutions in Mexico
and Russia were not without influence. 27
The man who was to effect this change was Arturo
28
A^. ~sandri, the so-called "Lion of Tarapaca." Alessandri
29
had run the gamut of Chilean politics. He began his politi
cal career by subscribing to an oligarchical point of view
(while living in the central valley, where he was influenced
by Santiaguinos and other factors). But after practicing
law for some years in Santiago, he moved to the northern
nitrate region and it was there that his political beliefs
changed. The economic and social conditions of the nitrate
region obviously had a revolutionizing impact on him.
Whatever his motives, and they are a matter of some dispute*
Alessandri became the champion of the exploitated northern
proletariat by protesting against oligarchical domination
and calling for radical changes.

1. The Failure of the Liberal Alliance

Although somewhat feared for his radical views by the
upper traditional classes, Alessandri in 1920 became the
presidential candidate of a greatly modified Liberal Alliance

^Gil, Political System, p. 57. Cf. "A Political-

Economic Sketch," in Silvert, Conflict Society, p. 11
28
On Alessandri, cf. John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean
Popular Front (Philadelphia* 1942), pp. 30 ff.
2q
Cf. Arturo Alessandri Palma, Recuerdos de qobierno,
3 vols. (Santiago* 1952).
30
Echaiz, Evolucion, p. 142. Cf. Alessandri, Recuerdos,
I, p. 37.
It was different from the formal Liberal Alliance in that a
large portion of its Liberal party members had gone to the
opposition. Its new party base was made up of the Radicals
(who had opposed Montt during the "Liberal Republic",
represented strong parliamentary forces, and organized
throughout the country to spread their doctrines of consti­
tutional reform) and the Democrats (who had organized in
1887 to champion the rights of the laboring class in the
cities and to promote their greater participation in the
wealth and cultural life of the country)* Thus the electoral
strength of Alessandri's "Liberal Alliance” was made up of
the politically ambitious middle class and the emerging urban
proletariat.
The opposition to Alessandri's candidacy came from a
newly formed coalition called the National Union, headed by
Luis Barros BorgofTo, a politician of the traditional mold.
This group was composed mainly of the old Liberals that had
defected from the Alliance and the majority of the Conserva­
tives. In a sense, Borgono represented the last stand of
the old Chile — the old oligarchy. 31 In the election cam­
paign, he sat back expecting the votes to be bought and
delivered to him in the traditional oligarchical way, whereas
Alessandri toured the nation from one end to theother making
speeches. He openly declared war on "reactionary spirits"
and all the"formulas of the past". He thus preached rebel-

31Alberto Cabero, Chile v los chilenos, 2nd ed.

(Santiago! 1941), p. 323.

22
lion to the people and aroused hope and fanatical devotion
among his followers. He set forth a program of economic
reform and social security. He made himself, for the first
32
time in Chile's history, the champion of the common man.
Alessandri apparently won the election by a narrow
margin, but the final outcome was in contest. The Congress,
which had the Constitutional responsibility for declaring the
victor, favored Borgono, but Alessandri and his followers
threatened a general strike and, by mutual consent, a
"Tribunal of Honor" was established which awarded the victory
33
to Alessandri. From an electoral point of view, however,
Alessandri*s victory did not reflect any new major political
divisions, only an increase in voter participation. This
last, however, was in itself significant because it meant,
as Edwards notes, that "the passive obedience of the masses
of the people to the ancient oligarchical circles . . . had
ceased to exist." 34
In his first congressional message, delivered in June
1920, Alessandri proposed to decentralize the government,
abolish the parliamentary regime, separate church and state,
establish monetary stability, social security, governmental
control of banks and insurance companies and presidential
election by direct vote. The reason he failed to succeed

32
Edwards, La fronda. p. 185.
33Ibid., pp. 186 f.
34Ibid.

23
in almost all of his programs is also a matter of debate*
Some have argued that Alessandri was simply an egotistical
and foolish man, but this does not really answer the question.
Much more probable is that Alessandri's reforms were blocked
by bitter congressional opposition and the severe economic
depression.
During his term in office, Alessandri was completely
stifled in his attempts to win congressional approval of his
reform program. For four years a Conservative coalition in
the Senate and to some extent his own supporters in the
Liberal Alliance frustrated his initiatives by endless debate
and other delaying tactics. Asserting congressional preroga­
tives of the parliamentary system, the opposition regularly
censured Alessandri*s ministers, forcing him to reorganize
his cabinet 16 times between 1920 and 1 9 2 4 . ^
Already by 1920, Chile's nitrate sales had fallen off
to the point where they represented only 33.6% of the total
world sales, and the price on the world market was only a
fraction of what it had formerly been. In his second annual
presidential address, Alessandri noted that 47,108 men were
unemployed in the nitrate plants, 9,422 in the copper mines
and 1,200 in the coal mines. 37 And the government was virtually

35
Gil, Political System, p. 57.
qc
Stevenson, Popular Front, p. 36.
37Domingo Amunategui, El procrreso intelectual v
politico de Chile (Santiago! 1936), p. 154.

24
bankrupt* The national treasury was empty and even the
first income tax in Chile's history could not pay the rela­
tively small wages of public works employees and the military.
The peso dropped from 27$ in 1919 to 9$ by 1924* And
through all this the political obstructionism of the Congress
kept Alessandri from taking the decisive steps that were needed
to solve both the economic and the social crisis.
A third reason for Alessandri*s failure was the
principal differences between the rural "aristocrat" and the
urban nouveau riche.39 These differences were related to
the rigidity of the structure of social acceptance imposed
by the old aristocracy and the social barriers established
by Santiago high society. The advance of the "new men" of
the provinces into positions formerly held by the aristo­
cracy — i.e., in the administration, the professions and
the armed forces — was in large part dependent upon their
very acceptance of the values of the upper class. But the
conflict was always there and, as a recent commentator has
pointed out: "Unless one comprehends the extent to which
personal likes or dislikes divided the ruling class in Chile,
one is not likely to grasp the source of many of Alessandri's
problems in his first presidency. If manners make man,
between 1920 and 1924 in Chile they contributed to unmake a

38
Stevenson, Popular Front, p. 35.
39Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri* aqitador v demoledor.
2 vols. (Mexicoi 1952), I, p. 206.

25
 40
president."
It is not surprising that diatribes against the "old
men of the Senate" came to dominate Alessandri*s public
utterances between 1920 and 1924.^ The political deadlock
which the 1920 election represented was a continuing factor
all through his administration and Alessandri was further
encouraged to reject the system in toto. He placed the blame
for his inability to realize his programs on the Union Nacio-
nal, yet he also personally antagonized many of those who
might have helped him. In order to end the deadlock in the
Senate, and with his personal popularity declining because
of the continuing economic situation, Alessandri decided to
take drastic action in the congressional elections of 1924. 42
Although he had a tacit agreement with the Conservatives not
to intervene in the election in return for their passage of
some of his most vital legislation, Alessandri utilized the
police and the army to obstruct and break up the opposition’s
political meetings and to keep their supporters from the
polls. But even with these extraordinary measures, and even
though he won a strong victory at the polls, the Congress
nevertheless failed to pass the legislation and the common
people lost faith in their leaders in general and Alessandri

40
H.E. Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean
History: 1920-1970," Government and Opposition, 7:3 (Summer
1972), p. 355.
^ C f . chapter 4 on the parliament in Donoso, Alessandri, I.
^ C a r l o s Vicuna Fuentes, La tiranfa en Chile. 2 vols.
Santiago: 1938), I, pp. 114 ff.

26
 /

in particular.

2. The Intervention of the Military

The political deadlock between 1920 and 1924 had led
both the Alessandri faction and the Borgono faction of the
political spectrum in Chile to make advances to the military.
Thus, both factions tended to strengthen the one sector of
43
society which was capable of overthrowing the government.
Indeed, the situation seemed to invite such a takeover.
The Chilean army was the first modern military establish­
ment in South America, due in no small part to its reorgani­
zation, amplification and re-equipment begun in the late
nineteenth century and completed the direction of Emil K o m e r ' s
Prussian mission in 1910.44 Although the real power of the
army declined during the latter part of the parliamentary
period, this situation was faced and reevaluated in 1920
because of the immediate threat of the military re-organiza­
tion of Peru. Now it was realized that the equipment was poor,
ammunition scarce and organization weak. But revolt against
the decline of the military was already evident in 1912.
An abortive plot was discovered in that year, but it came to
nothing. In 1919, however, another plot was hatched by
General Armstrong and his supporters aiming at the creation
of a military junta to run the country with a figurehead
president. The officers thus sought a political solution to

4 ^Bicheno, “Anti-Parliamentary Themes,” Government and

Opposition, p. 358.
44Ibid., pp. 358 f.

27
the institutional problems of the army, and they further
believed that the politicians had proved themselves incapable
of finding a solution.
The aims of the 1919 army conspiracy provided the frame-
45
work for the 1924 revolt. The first, second, and fifth
points of the army's manifesto all dealt with professional
military consideration — the need to consolidate the unity
of the officer corps, the need to strengthen military disci­
pline frequently undermined by political influence, and the
need for Congress to solve the many problems of recruitment
and promotion. The third and fourth points, however, were
concerned with the vital institutional and national problems
of the day. Their recommendations were "to impel the industrial
development of the country in order to obtain our economic
independence and to ensure the national defense, supplying
ourselves from our own resources, creating factories for
military equipment and all kinds of industries to supply
abundant work for the populous," and that Congress be asked
to dispatch the laws demanded by the working class in order
to end their anguish which "affects the troops who should
not be brought into contact with popular agitation." 46 Thus,
these officers, already in 1919, saw the need for industriali-

45 -
Cf. on the revolt Juan Bennett, La revolucion del 5
septiembre 1924 (Santiago* 1926); and Emilio Bello Codesido,
Recuerdos politicos (Santiago* 1954).
4 fi
Galdames, Chile, p. 373.

28
zation and the social legislation that must of necessity
accompany it. They thus were prepared to strengthen the
executive both against the Congress and the people.
It is not without significance that Alessandri, in
December, 1923, chose the Cavalry School to make the first
of several political speeches in an attempt to appeal to
the middle ranking officers. His use of the army to aid in
the powerful governmental intervention in the congressional
elections of March 1924 had been carefully prepared. But
he was not prepared for the outcome. When the first real
business of the new Congress was to vote its members a yearly
financial increase, instead of considering any of the pressing
social legislation before it, the army decided to act on its
own.
Already in March 1924, at the time of the elections, a
conspiracy against Alessandri was developing with the aid of
certain senior army and naval officers more inclined to the
traditional regime.47 The group of conspirators, called the
TEA, was led by the conservative leader, Ladislao Errazuriz
and the leading anti-Alessandri liberal, Francisco Huneeus.
But after the Congress voted its members new salaries, this
conspiracy was upstaged by a group of 57 young army officers
led by General Luis Altamirano who, on September 5, 1924,
presented a petition to Alessandri urging him to veto the
congressional compensation bill and demanding immediate
reform legislation. Alessandri immediately asked Altamirano

47Cf. Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics 1920-31.

The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albequerguei 1970).

29
to join his cabinet and with the power of the army behind
him* Alessandri intimidated the recalcitrant Congress to pass
his complete reform bill. They did so in one hour.
But the TEA was not, in the final analysis, outdone.
Using the Navy as leverage, they forced Alessandri out of
office and into exile in Italy. And Pandora's box was
opened. General Altamirano first formed a governing junta
consisting of himself, another general and an admiral. This
military body dismissed the Congress and assumed the task of
governing the country until January 23, 1925, when it was
deposed by a coup d'etat carried out by a group of young army
officers under the leadership of Carlos Ibctnez, Marmaduke
Grove and some other leading Radicals. This new junta
justified its action on several grounds, not the least of
which was the failure of the Altamirano junta to carry out
their promised reforms and their increasing subservience to
the oligarchy. As alastditch effort, the traditional
forces had tried to impose one of its own members as
president and the Altamirano junta seemed to go a long way in
supporting the National Union's presidential candidate,
Ladislao Errazuriz.4 ®
Because of the widespread fear that the Altamirano
junta was in fact prepared to oversee a restoration of the
oligarchy, the IbSnez coup was virtually bloodless. But the
call for reform also threatened the new junta. And although

4 0
Cabero, Chile, pp. 270-272. Cf. Drake, "Leftward
Movement", pp. 41 ff.

30
these three consecutive revolts were all in a sense directed
at Alessandri, he was at the same time the immediate bene­
ficiary of them. With the governmental structure in disarray
and pro-Alessandri sentiment still strong throughout the
country, he was recalled to supervise the restoration of
order and the government.
This first intervention of the Chilean military in
politics in more than a century was extraordinary. It was
singularly unseccessful for a number of reasons, but most
important was the split between the older and younger officers
and the rank and file. The older officers and some of the
younger ones who aspired to status in terms of the oligar­
chical system, were bent on restoring the old order. But
most of the younger officers and the majority of the Chilean
armed forces were composed of middle class members and men
of proletarian origin. They were sympathetic to the national
cry for reform and duly suspicious of the original junta *s
•
subservience to the oligarchy. 49 The recall of Alessandri
was the only alternative open to all of them.

3. The Presidential Regime Under the

1925 Constitution
Alessandri returned to Chile in the latter part of
March, 1925 to great popular demonstrations. Momentarily,
he appeared the favorite of all the popular factions. His
first duty was to reform the Constitution and to this end

49
Donoso.Desarrollo. p. 124; Edwards, La fronda. p. 208.

31
he called together an assemblage of men drawn from each
political camp to discuss the proposed changes. This
assembly was known as the "Grand Consultative Commission"
and after long deliberation it issued in July its proposed
constitutional reforms for the sanction of a popular
plebiscite. It was approved in August. No opportunity was
given for voting on individual articles, so the new Consti­
tution had to be accepted or rejected in its entirety. The
only alternative to acceptance was to endure more of the same
kinds of disruptions that had held back economic and social
reforms for the past 35 years. And Alessandri put the force
of his official acceptance behind it. It became the law
of the land two months later.
The new Constitution restored the power of the
President and gave him ample administrative capabilities,
while at the same time it abolished parliamentary government
by depriving the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the
power to depose ministries by means of censure, even though
the Chamber of Deputies was allowed to bring impeachment
proceedings against a minister of the President himself for
abuses of power. But the Chief Executive was now allowed
to appoint provincial governors and ministers without parlia­
mentary interference. Congress's control of the President's
use of the nation's revenue was checked by abolishing the
necessity for periodic authorizations of tax collections
and payments for the armed forces and by setting a time limit

32
 50
on congressional reform of the President's budget.
The power of the President was also strengthened by
increasing the presidential term to six years. Further,
neither the presidential election, which was now by direct
vote of the people, nor parliamentary elections could be
reviewed by the houses of Congress. Instead, a permanent
"qualifying tribunal" was established and charged with the
impartial supervision of elections. But provisions not
directly related to the presidency were also significant.
The new Constitution made parliamentary and ministerial
offices incompatible, provided for the improvement of public
administration by entrusting it to special councils of
experts, and separated Church and State, guaranteeing
freedom of conscience and religious belief. Likewise, it
guaranteed public freedom and individual rights and recog­
nized property ownership as inviolable (although it tacked
on the provision that "the exercise of the right of owner­
ship is subject to the limitation or precepts necessary for
the maintenance and progress of social order"). And along
with many other provisions of lesser importance, the new
Constitution assured protection to labor and industry, works
of social development, and a minimum standard of living for
every citizen.51

50
A summary of the main points of the 1925 Constitution
are given in Gil, Political System, pp. 59 ff. and 84 ff.,
Cf. Jose Guillermo Guerra, La constitucidn de 1925 (Santiago*
1929); Mario Bernaschina, La constitucion chilena (Santiago*
1940) and Los constituventes de 1925 (Santiago* 1945).
51Ibid.
33
 It has been pointed out that the re-establishment of a
presidential regime was "purely a structural restoration; it
did not carry with it the restoration of the dominance of
a given socio-economic class." 5 2 And there is no doubt that
the 1925 Constitution did not end the alienation of those
sectors of Chilean society which felt unrepresented by the
existing parties. Moreover, even though the document came
to be used as an instrument for the maintenance of power of
the traditional parties, even many of them were critical of
it. The Conservatives opposed it overwhelmingly because of
the separation of Church and State. Realizing their inability
to change it, some began to disparage the idea of abiding
by it at all and began in turn to disparage the will of the
people. The Radical Party, opposed ratification on very
different grounds. They charged that the Constitution
contained the seeds of executive tyranny. Whether or not
these were the real or only reasons for their position (the
Radicals probably preferred the continuance of parliamentary
government), both the Conservatives and the Radicals stayed
away from the polls. Thus, the Constitution was approved by
less than half of the registered voters.
Having successfully seen his Constitution ratified,
Alessandri proceeded to rule the country in the same way as
he had previously. He was partisan, personalist, and he
attempted to use the military to further hisown ends.
Most important, he refused to cooperate with the Radicals —

52 Stevenson, Popular Front, p. 40,

 53
the largest party — on any other than his own terms.
Thus, through his own actions* his regime was ended three
months before the completion of his term in 1925* and by the
man who was to become his arch rival* Carlos IbSnez.
In 1919* Major Carlos IbSnez, under a cloud of suspicion*
was transferred from his post as the Director of the Calvary
54
School to the Prefect of Police in Iquique. In 1920, a
supporter of Alessandri, he was restored to his former post
in 1921. In 1923* he had sat beside Alessandri when the
56
latter had come to make his speech to the army. In 1924*
however, Ibcinez as noted above, overthrew the ruling trium­
virate together with Marmaduke Grove. In 1925, Ibanez
offered his resignation from his post as the Minister of
War. Alessandri refused it* because he hoped to use IbSnez
for his own purposes.
But, shortly thereafter* when Alessandri decided that
he wanted IbSnez* resignation* he found that he himself had
helped to consolidate the position of his protege. An open
letter by 200 businessmen invited Ib£nez to become a presi­
dential candidate. Although this group of men were not
prominent political figures, their letter stated correctly

^Gil, Political System, pp. 60 ff.

Wurth Rojas* Ib£nez. Caudillo Enigm^tico (Santiago:
1958), p. 18.
55
R. Boizard, Cuatro retratos en profundidad (Santiago:
1950), p. 12.
ec
Rojas* Ibanez. p. 24.

35
i
that the Alessandri administration had not been able to
solve the political crisis because it had proved incapable
of encouraging agreements between the diverse political
factions. They thought Ibanez might do what Alessandri had
failed to do. The letter caused Alessandri to ask for
Ibanez resignation. When Ibcinez refused, Alessandri himself
resigned. His last act as President was to appoint as his
Minister of the Interior the man whom he had defeated in the
revolution of 1920 — Barros Borgono. Thus Alessandri
ended this phase of his rule as ambiguously as he had begun
it. The economic, social and political future of Chile was
still an open question. 57

D. Politics in the Interim: 1925-1927

The period between 1925 and 1927 was in fact designed
by Chile's future strongman — Ibanez. Having led the mili­
tary group that had recalled Alessandri from Italy, having
been installed as Minister of War and then having become
an active candidate for the presidency, he chose not to
continue in the presidential race after Alessandri*s resig­
nation. He bided his time in his ministerial post while a
colorless and inept coalition candidate representing both
the rightest and the leftist parties assumed the presidency.
Emiliano Figueroa Larrain served Ib5nez* purpose well.
Figueroa was ineffectual and during his short term in office
he oversaw the restoration of some of the more unfortunate

57Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and

Opposition. pp. 364 f.

36
features of the parliamentarian system. In short, he served
to unite the officer corps and strengthen the position of
IbSnez.58
Ibanez, in his turn, maneuvered himself into the Mini­
stry of the Interior and proceeded to carry out a purge of
no small proportions. He drove some corrupt officials into
jail and others to suicide. He eliminated at one and the
same time his real political opponents as well as his pros­
pective opponents, especially in the Judiciary. He alone
decided who was an agitator, and who he could not jail he
59
had deported. He was preparing his road to power.

1. The Tribunal of National Sanction

The presence of a new third force in Chilean politics
was perhaps first felt during the interregnum between
Alessandri and Ibanez and it disturbed them as much as it
did the parliamentary oligarchy. A Tribunal of National
Sanction was formed late in 1925, allegedly by four army
officers, four naval officers and four civilians. The
findings of this Tribunal were published in a short-lived
newspaper edited by Vicente Huidobro and supported by Manuel
Hidalgo. Hidalgo was the successor to Recabarren,80 who,

88Edwards, La fronda. pp. 219, 221 f., and 311 ff.

59
Enrique Oyarzun, Unpublished Memoirs, referred to in
Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and Opposi­
tion. p. 366.
60
Fernando Alegria, Recabarren (Santiagot 1938), p. 155.

37
as noted above, had widespread support among the Chilean
working class. In 1912, Recabarren founded the Worker’s
Socialist Party. In 1921, this party joined the Third
International and Changed its name to the Communist Party.
Hidalgo headed a group of members of the Communist Party
in helping to draft the 1925 Constitution. The Party
opposed some of the measures in Alessandri's program, but
generally supported it.61
Now the Party inherited the TEA tactic of making
charges of corruption for political ends. The Tribunal
issued a list of 28 men who were said to be grave offenders
against public morality and the national interest. The list
spared no party — it included 14 Radicals, 7 Liberals, 3
Conservatives, 3 Democrats and one businessman. 6 2 In
addition to Alessandri’s closest friend and sometime Minister
of the Interior, Cornelio Saavedra, the list included many
aristocratic names. There was also an implicit attempt to
discredit the young officers.

2. The New Force

Manifestly, with the emergence of this new force, the
distinction between the defender of the status quo and the
reformer in 1920 had by 1925 disappeared.

^Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America

(New Brunswick* 1957), pp. 177 ff.
C O

Bicheno, ”Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and

Opposition, p. 363.

38
 The civilian component of this new force organized
itself into a new party called the Republican Social Union
of Wage Earners of Chile (USRACH) and put up their own candi-
date in the 1925 election. Although Figueroa won, Dr.
Jose Santos Salas, a close friend and later minister of
Ibanez and supported by Grove, won 28.496 of the vote. Having
formed only 18 days before the election, the party's showing
was remarkable. Its program was simply stated to fulfill
the promises of the revolution of 1924 and of the 1925 Consti­
tution. In addition to a minimum wage and inexpensive housing,
it called for the nationalization of the country's basic
resources. And having lost the election, USRACH called for
a general strike to protest the dishonesty of the election.
Salas was not a Communist, but the president of USRACH,
Carlos Contreras Labarca, was, as were many other of its
leaders, such as Manuel Hildago. Having lost the election
the party moved further to the left. On September 24, 1925,
they announced the main goal of their program to be the
fight against capitalism. And one of the major casualties
of their move leftward was that thefc lost a vital supporter —
Ibanez — who was to persecute the leaders of USRACH once
he became president. Ibanez' program was to prove as incom-
64
patible with Communism as populism is with socialism.

®3Vicuna, La tirania, II, pp. 82 f.

64
Drake, "Leftward Movement,” pp. 45 ff.

39
 E. Carlos Ibanez* The Making of an Autocrat, 1927-1931
If it might be said that economics brought Alessandri
to power and politics caused his fall, it might also be said
that politics brought Ibanez to power and economics caused
his fall. But for a short time, Ibanez appeared to be a
master of both.

1. The Establishment of Authoritarian Rule

When Ibanez came into office in 1927, having become
Vice-President when President Emiliano Figueroa resigned
and having dictated measures for his own election as President,
he had no well-defined program, although his views on certain
specific national issues were widely known. Like his fellow
officers, who had been involved in the plot to overthrow
Alessandri in 1924, he devoutly believed that the army should
have a role in the task of national regeneration. Sharing
the proud tradition of the army and of a heightened sense of
responsibility for the good of the nation, Ibanez assumed
the presidency with the purpose not only of restoring
economic and social stability but with a mission to develop
65
Chile’s national greatness.
Having begun a purge of his opponents already while he
was Minister of the Interior, Ibefnez continued his purge on
a national scale once he became President. Choosing to rule
dictatorially, IbSfTez supressed political unrest and enforced

65
Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes,” Government and
Opposition, p. 367.

40
order. He attacked the alleged corruption of political
parties and jailed or exiled his opponents — particularly
communist "agitators," but also several prominent conserva­
tives, liberals, and radicals. So vigorous was Ibanez'
assault, by 1930, the political parties had to declare them­
selves in recess because they lacked the necessary guaran­
tees to continue evolving. The fait accompli'of the dicta­
torship was signalled by the acceptance of political parties
of an agreement to permit Ibanez to handpick their candidates
for congressional seats, in 1930, thus obviating an election.^®
Ibanez used his personal magnetism and the machinery
of state to silence worker grievances and to replace individual
unions with government surrogates. He won labor support
through increasing the real buying power of day wages. His
union organization was centralized, paternalistic and built
on a semi-corporatist model. He felt that unions should
serve the state; and the workers should serve the state.
In short, he harnessed every social group to the activist
state in the first years of his administration. Because all
parties and social groups were divided over his harsh methods
and all were compromised in his policies by appointments, none
mounted a sustained and unified opposition.
But Ibanez did not abolish the Chilean Congress or
67
outlaw political parties. Nor did he destroy the basis of the

66
Lia Cortes and Jordi Fuentes, Diccionario politico
de Chile (Santiago! 1967), p. 106.
6^Rojas» Ibanez. p. 115.

41
political system with his dictatorship. And in light of
the recent past, his policy of increasing the power of the
central government and involving it in the economy of the
nation is looked upon in an increasingly favorable light.
F.B. Pike observes that IbSnez "knew how to co-ordinate the
seething forces of the era into an effective whole, and
how to dash down extremists of all types so as to prevent
disparate energies cancelling each other out. Because of
these abilities, Ibanez managed to preside over the four most
active and fruitful years of national existence that Chile
had enjoyed since the War of the Pacific. The institutional
structure that has governed Chile down to the present day
68
was fashioned by Ibanez between 1927 and 1931."
There is no doubt that Ibanez' regime reformed public
administration and that through state intervention a vast
plan of public works was completed. Perhaps most important,
he established administrative patterns and a technique of
dependence on foreign capital which set a precedent for
controlled development in Chile. This foreign investment
came mainly from the United States, and in 1928 alone
69
American investors put some $108 million into Chile. Impor­
tations for public works projects and for luxury items gave
the country a feeling of prosperity because foreign trade

68Pike, Chile, p. 188.

69
J . Gutierrez, Capitales extranieros en Chile
(Santiago! 1942), p. 17.

42
rose to levels even exceeding the heyday of the nitrate
exports. In addition, governmental credit agencies were
not only continued but new ones were added to take up the
70
overflow. However, the prosperity was in part real and
in part illusion.

2. The Crisis and its aftermath

H.E. Bicheno agrees with Pike that Chile was fortunate
to have Ibanez as president during the particular period of
1927 to 1931. He wrotei "Perhaps his greatest contribution
to Chilean development was that the nation felt the violent
effects of the economic depression while under overtly
authoritarian rule. In Brazil, Argentina and Germany, to
mention only three of many examples, the crisis discredited
formal liberal-democratic regimes. In Chile it discredited
dictatorship while leaving intact the apparatus of authori­
tarian rule which has played so large a role in later
71 M
Chilean history." There is no question that IbSnez,
favored by the general prosperity of the late 1920s, was
able for a time to accomplish much. But he was in the end
defeated by the very economy he created, because it was
peculiarly liable to international fluctuations. The
Marxist historian, Julio Cesar Jobet, recognizes that IbSnez

70
"A Political-Economic Sketch" in Silvert, Conflict
Society, p. 63.
71
Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and
Opposition, p. 369.

43
modernized the country, especially by the building of roads,
sewage systems, etc. But, in his view, IbSnez' government
was a police dictatorship at the service of North American
imperialism. Jobet notes that between 1928 and 1930,
foreign investment rose from $451 million to $700 million,
that on July 21, 1930, a law was created which delivered
over to North American imperialism 50% of the country's
nitrate and of the public reserve, that most of the profits
of the nitrates also went to foreigners, and that IbSnez
also insured foreign imperialists a monopoly over electric
power and transportation. 72
Thus in Jobet*s view, Ibanez did not succeed in creating
economic development based on the industrialization of the
country because Chile remained a supplier of raw materials
for the North American economy. And being the servant of
imperialism, the Ibanez government was the representative
of the minority plutocracy in the country of large haciendas,
industrialists, businessmen and bankers. 73
While Jobet's argument is perhaps too severe, it cannot
be discounted. Ibanez had made the Chilean economy pecu­
liarly dependent on the international economic situation.
And while it is undoubtedly true that the depression would
have eventually hit Chile, its impact might have been very
different.
When in 1931 the nitrate exports fell off disastrously

72
Jobet, Ensavo critico, pp. 176 ff.
73Ibid., p. 179.

44
and there was an accompanying drop in copper, Chile was
unable to import and to meet her foreign debt obligations.
Although there was not a significant or lasting rise in
unemployment, the restriction of foreign trade hit the urban
centers hard. IbSnez was deposed with the oncoming debacle.^
While at this time there was a resurgence of democratic,
anti-militaristic sentiment, the economic issue was over­
riding. In retrospect, it appears that IbSnez had simply
postponed rather than precipitated political fragmentation,
but he postponed and at the same time precipitated the form
if not the essence of economic crisis.
Ibanez certainly did not create the worldwide economic
depression, but he had made the Chilean economy so dependent
on the United States that after the stock market crash had
shut off the flow of liquid capital to Chile, the crisis
was much more abrupt and all pervasive. To allay the effects
of the disaster, Ibanez had sought to bolster the economy
by the formation of Cosach (Compania Salitre de Chile) to
concentrate the entire nitrate industry into fewer and more
efficient plants. In so doing, he established a giant
monopoly corporation and owned partly by the government and
75
partly by Chilean and foreign capitalists. But all attempts
to stabilize the price of nitrates failed. There was also

^ C f . Drake, "Leftward Movement," pp. 52 ffj C.H.

Haring, "The Chilean Revolution of 1931," Hispanic American
Historical Review, (hereinafter cited as HAHR) 2 (May 1933).
75
•Jobet, Ensavo crxtico, pp. 168 ff.

45
no market for other Chilean mineral or agricultural products.
Thus the general breakdown and collapse of the economy was
accompanied by chronic labor unrest. On December 25, 1931,
the so-called "Tragic Christmas*', strikes which originated
in Copiapo and other northern centers were violently
suppressed resulting in many casualties. 76
A League of Nations study suggested that Chile was hit
harder by the effects of the depression than any other
nation in Latin America. 77 The sale of nitrate and copper —
the backbone of the economy — declined from $27 million in
1929 to approximately $3.5 million in 1932. Imports fell
88% between October 1929 and October 1930, and by 1932 they
were less than one-fifth of what they had been in 1929.
In 1931 alone, unemployment rose 100,000, there was a dis­
astrous crop failure and the price of staples dropped as
salaries declined.
On February 4, 1931, Ibanez received powers from
Congress to decree any administrative and fiscal measures
necessary to halt the complete fall of the economy. But it
was already clear that only an artificial prosperity had
been able to stave off the growing opposition to Ibclfiez.
On July 22, 1931, a group of students seized the main building

7fi
Drake, Socialism and Populism, pp. 54 ff.
77
Cf. P.T. Ellsworth, Chile. An Economy in Transition
(New York* 1954).

46
of the University of Chile and started the chain of events
78
that brought Ibanez down. The ruthless suppression of the
student revolt resulted in a general strike by the doctors
of Santiago, who were soon joined by lawyers, teachers,
engineers and other white collar workers. Bowing to the
rising tide of passive resistance to his rule, Ibanez handed
over the reins of power on July 26, 1931 to the President of
the Senate, Pedro Opazo betelier.

F. Movements for National Redemption

Ibanez left Chile not only in the midst of its most
desperate economic crisis, but also with a political void
and out of this situation the "social question" again
79
emerged as the most central for the future of the country.
On July 27, acting President Letelier turned over the govern­
ment to the Minister of the Interior, Juan Esteban Montero,
who in due course defeated Alessandri in the Presidential
elections held in 1931. But Montero, bound by the Consti­
tution in attempting at one and the same time to mitigate
against the reaction to authoritarian rule and to solve the
economic crisis by deflationary measures, made himself the
favorite target of the Left. Led by Alessandri, a Federation
of the Left including the Democrats, Doctrinary Liberals,
some Radicals and a number of smaller parties demanded new
parliamentary elections, (because Parliament was made up of

78
Stevenson, Popular Front, pp. 48 ff.
79
For the background to this development, cf. Arturo
Olavarria Bravo, La cuestion social en Chile (Santiagoi 1923).

47
Ibanez’ hand-picked men) and the dissolution of Cosach (because
80
it was an instrument of "foreign imperialism").

1. The Left and the Right

It was the extreme Left that finally brought down
Montero by a virtually bloodless coup on June 4, 1932 and set
81
up a "Socialist Republic." The revolt was begun by an
uprising of the Chilean airforce and the refusal of other
military units to take up arms against the rebels. The
conspiracy was headed by Colonel Marmaduke Grove* Eugenio
Matte and Carlos Davila. But this "Socialist Republic"
was a true indicator of the divided nature of Chilean
politics after Ibanez. It lasted 12 days and saw four
different revolutionary juntas. Grove represented enlight­
ened militarism, Matte, freemasonry and primitive socialism;
but the military finally intervened to support the ibanista,
Davila. Davila’s "100 days" were ended by an army coup,
and after more revolts and counter-revolts in which the
military played a decisive role, an election finally returned
Alessandri to power and the country to a period of relative
stability.
During its short existence* the Socialist Republic
issued a pamphlet outlining its 30 point revolutionary
program, which was a true reflection of the curious inter­
mingling of socialism and militarism that its author's

80
Drake, "Leftward Movement," pp. 109 ff.
81Ibid., pp. 87 ff.

48
supported. It stated that the coup had been made against
"oligarchical and clerical oppression, political corruption
and the disdain of the late rulers for the misery of the
Chilean people." In addition to promising a purge and a
re-organization of the judicial system, it proposed the re­
establishment of a Tribunal of National Sanction. Its
drastic solutions to the crisis were to be paid for by the
rich. Grove's political formulation carried the most force,
but it was Davila who alone was able, if even for a short
time, to put his ideas into effect. He believed that the
socialization of certain key industries was necessary to
lessen the impact of the depression in Chile, but he planned
to let private capitalism co-exist with a semi-collectivist
economy. During his administration he passed much legis-
lation by executive decree. 82
The period between the fall of Ibanez and the return
of Alessandri saw the rise of at least sixteen new political
movements, each with its own program for the solution of
83
Chile's problems. Seven called themselves socialist and

82
For a critique of the "Socialist Republic", cf.
Alfredo Guillermo Bravo, 4 de Junio: El festin de los audaces
(Santiago: 1932) and Manuel Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de Junio
(Santiago: 1933).
83
Julio Cesar Jobet, El partido socialista de Chile
(Santiago: 1971), I, pp. 65 f .

49
these were eventually united in April 1933 to form the
84
Socialist Party. This Socialist Party of Chile was in
fact a merger of the small groups which had contributed to
the triumph of the Socialist Republic but because of their
fragmentation had failed to lend the government the necessary
support of a well organized and well disciplined political
organization. The Party grew rapidly and for a short time
became the strongest mass party in Chile. Its declaration
of principles stated its allegiance to Marxism, advocated
the collectivization of private property, the dictatorship
of the proletariat and even the economic and political unity
of all of Latin America.
Three other parties gained some prominence in the 1930s
— the Radical Socialist Party, the center-right Agrarian
Party and the Democratic Party, but the rise of the Left —
the socialist Left — can only be understood in terms of the
temporary eclipse of the older established parties and the
85
Communist Party. Of the traditional parties, the Conserva­

84
Jobet has written most perceptively about Chilean
socialismi cf. Sianificado del partido socialista en la
realidad nacional (Santiago: 1940) and Socialismo v comunismo
(Santiago: 1952). Drake gives a comprehensive picture of
the party and its literature in "Leftist Movement," pp. 109 ff.
Less important reformist groups inspired by socialist ideology
included the New Public Action, founded by Eugenio Matte, the
Socialist Revolutionary Action, the Marxist Socialist Party,
the Unified Socialis t Party and the Socialist Order.
Q C
Echaiz, Evolucifin, pp. 176 f.

50
tive Party fared the best in the immediate post-Depression
period* because its economic base had emerged intact despite
the crisis. Neither the depression nor the revolutionary
ferment had caused the dissolution, expropriation or heavy
taxation of the land. But the Conservatives had had no
86
answer to the crisis and still had none.
The Liberal Party was left impossibly fragmented, even
though the majority of them had nothing more to distinguish
them from the majority of the Conservatives — both represented
the same economic interests and social stratum. The leaders
of both parties belonged to the aristocracy, they still
owned the vast majority of the agricultural lands (which
was still the base of electoral power) and they still had
control of large banking and business. Because economically,
both the Conservatives and the Liberals represented capital;
because socially they both represented the old power elite;
and because now all the old barriers between them had been
removed, they were destined to unite to form the new bloc of
the Right.87
The Radical Party had in the meantime moved to the Left.
This was particularly significant because, in contradistinc­
tion to the other parties which represented relatively small
segments of society, the Radical Party included not only the
northern liberals from the mines, but also the large and small

88Cf. Edwards and Frei, Historia. pp. 223 ff.

87Ibid., p. 222 f.

51
landholders in the south and the bulk of the middle class.
Indeed, the middle class — the petty bourgeoisie of profes­
sionals and bureaucrats — not sided with the proletarian
class and advocated a system in which individualism would be
replaced by social solidarity. To be sure, the Radical
Party presented no united front in advocating ideas of state
socialism and Communism, but being ideologically split on
the Left, it was now able to exercise a moderating influence
on the new socio-economic programs that were being proposed. 88
Its very ambiguous nature was thus its greatest asset.
Federico Gil noted that "the Radical Party plays a double
life. In the electoral arena it is fond of slogans and
frequently allies itself with the Socialists and Communists.
When in control of the government it often has a rightist
twist, allying itself with Conservatives and Liberals in
89
defense of vested interests."
In the new realignment of vested interests and politi­
cal parties that accompanied the fall of Ibanez, the Communist
Party did not assume the leadership of the Left, and this
perhaps as much due to developments in the Communist move­
ment as to developments within Chilean society. In 1931,
the Comintern split between Stalin and Trotsky became public.
The Chilean Communist Party split too. Manuel Hidalgo be­
came head of the Trotskyist wingj Elias Lafferte head of the
Stalinist wing. Both factions continued to grow and provided

OQ
Jobet, Ensavo critico, pp. 227 f.
®^Gil, Political System, p. 64.

52
added support to the new born Chilean Left. The Trotskyists
later merged with the socialists, strengthening still further
90
their leadership of the Left.

2. The Nacis and the New Politics

The election of 1932 was a showcase for the multi­
party system that had replaced the traditional structure
based on the Conservatives and the Liberals. Of the five
candidates, one was Conservative, one Liberal, one Communist,
one Socialist and Alessandri represented the Radical Party,
receiving his support largely from the middle class and most
of the center groups. In office, however, he ironically
received his major support from the Conservative and Liberal
parties because the Radical party was too divided to adopt a
consistent policy and the rest of the political spectrum was
too politically fragmented. Having a majority in both the
Congress and the Senate, he was spared the executive-legisla-
ture struggle of a former time and was able to rule decisively
through a period that saw his regime and his solution to the
problems facing the country constantly under attack. But,
as Bicheno writes: "Surprisingly, the actions of the new
revolutionary parties strengthened the system they sought to
91
overthrow."
Throughout Alessandri*s second term — from 1932 to

^Echaiz, Evolucifin. pp. 158 f. and 174 f. Cf• also,

Stevenson, Popular Front, p. 55 f.
91Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and
Opposition, p. 375.

53
1938 — the two most active revolutionary parties clashed
with each other more than with the government. One was the
Socialist Party; the other, the National Socialist Movement of
Chile (MNS). The National Socialist Movement rose out of
the political ferment in 1932, but interest in Fascism in
92
Chile was noticeable throughout the 1920s. As early as
1923, an editorial in El Mercurio concluded that only
communists were expressly opposed to Fascism, and Las Ultimas
93
Noticias proclaimed that "what Chile needs is a Mussolini."
In 1925, El Mercurio periodically praised Fascism and suggested
that Chile follow patterns similar to those being established
94
in Spain by Primo de Rivera. The ideology of the corporate
state was also welcomed by Catholic churchmen in the twen-
QC
ties. Its most outspoken propagandist was Father Guillermo
Vivani Contreras who in 1927 expressed his support for both
96
Mussolini and Primo de Rivera. Pro-fascist sentiments were
also evident among military officers and officials high in
the IbSnez cabinet. And there is evidence that IbSnez himself

92Jobet, Ensavo c n*t i c o . p. 195.

9^E1 Mercurio (April 8 , 1923); Las Ultimas Noticias

(January 4, 1923).
QA
El Mercurio (May 4 and 9, 1926); Armando Donoso, while
visiting Spain in 1926, sent back many articles praising
Primo de Rivera which were published in El Mercurio. Javier
Vial Solar praised Fascism in Spain and Italy in a letter to
El Mercurio (May 8 , 1927).
95Cf. El Diario Illustrado (June 12, 1924), which contains
a letter by Bishop Gilberto Fuenzalida Guzman; and Bishop
Martin Rucker's review of Doctrinas sociales in El Mercurio
(February 5, 1928).
QC
El Mercurio (August 18 and 21, 1926); Cf. also his
article, "La crisis del r€gimen parlamentaria," in El Mercurio
(February 5, 1928).
54
entertained Fascist ideas and in fact he adorned his admini-
97
stration with some of the more external features of Fascism.
But a certain openness to Fascism and admiration for its early
economic and social achievements was noticeable in most of the
European and North American countries in the twenties and
in this Chile was not atypical.
The Chilean National Socialist Movement was among
the new political groups that came into existence following
the fall of Ibanez and it is more directly linked to this
event than to the proto-fascist and fascist sympathies that
were evident on both the private and the public levels of
Chilean society during the preceding decade. But while the
MNS was part of a general trend during the thirties charac­
terized by the growth of parties seeking to mobilize the
masses outside the political system, it was the only party
that in fact actively stood outside the political system.
And this was perhaps the essential obstacle that it had to
overcome. Being neither Left nor Right in either the pre-
or post-Ibanez context of the Chilean political system, it
nevertheless had to function as a party within that system.
This then was part of the irony of the new politics in Chile.t
While other parties tried to mobilize the masses outside
the political system, they were too much a part of it to do
so effectively. In contrast, the MNS was too much outside it
to do so effectively. Perhaps this was due to the fact that

97Pike, Chile, pp. 192 ff.

55
even out of power the MNS tended to function meta-politically.
The MNS was founded officially on April 5,- 1932 by
Jorge Gonzalez von Marees and a coterie of seven other like-
minded men he recruited from among his friends and associates. 98
Carlos Keller, one of its founders, tells the story* "In
March 1932 he was invited by General Francisco Javier Diaz,
who had military training in Germany, to meet another young
man at the general's house whom Diaz knew to be very interested
in political action, namely, Jorge Gonzalez. General Diaz
showed them a copy of Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party program which
he wanted to see implemented, with some obvious adjustments,
by a national socialist party in Chile. Jorge Gonzalez,
however, felt that a specifically Chilean nationalist program
which sought to recapture the spirit and vigor of the nine-
•
teenth century Portalian consitution should be aimed at." 99
Keller found himself closer to Gonzalez than to Diaz, but he
suggested a greater emphasis on "socialism" to counterbalance
Gonzalez' emphasis on nationalism.100
The founders of the movement were by and ^large young,
middle class and well educated. Of the seven, four were
lawyers, one an engineer, one a businessman, and one an

98
Cf. Francisco Javier Diaz, "Los nazis," El Mercurio
(June 26, 1932), p. 5) "Los 'nazis* y la colectividad alemana,"
El Mercurio (July 29, 1932), p. 2s Articulos sobre la oraaniza-
cion militar de Chile publicados en El Mercurio de Santiago.
1931-1932* propaganda social nacionalista (Santiago* 1932).
99
Carlos Keller, "El 5 de Abril de 1932," Traba io
suplemento (April 5, 1938).

56
 101
intellectual and government official. They adopted the
name of their party from Hitler's and even adopted the nickname
"Nazi” in a Spanish form: "Naci". But although Mussolini
and Hitler had captured their imaginations, they wanted to
distinguish their party from its European counterparts.
They did not want their party to be considered as an exten­
sion of either the Italian Fascist or the German Nazi Party.
Keller and Gonzalez — the intellectual and the activist —
shaped the National Socialist Movement in Chile according
to their perceptions of the crisis and how to overcome it
and the history of the MNS in Chile must begin and end with
them.

^^Cortes and Fuentes, Diccionario. p. 331. The

official founders in addition to Gonzalez and Keller, were
Mauricio Mena, Fernando Calvo Larrain, Luis Felipe Lazo,
Juan de Dios Valenzuela and Gustavo Vargas Molinare.

57
 II

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF

CHILEAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM

On August 19, 1932, Carlos Keller, the philosopher —

ideologue — of Chilean National Socialism, addressed a
"Crisis Conference" at the Academy of War in Santiago on
the situation in Chile. He began with a general statement
which identified him as an adherent of the fascist outlook.
"For many," said Keller, "this lecture will be a disappoint­
ment. I am not going to give any formulas or theories. I
don't believe in theories or formulas. I believe rather in
the creative power of nature. Life is an eternal process
of birth and death. Economic life is an organic system
subject to the same laws that govern nature. Social evolution
is determined by the collective will, desires and longings
of societies. Though man has free will, there are general
laws which allow us to know the collective behavior of
peoples — that is to say, their reactions to certain
situations."
Keller spoke of the injustice of full warehouses and
empty stomachs, of unemployment, and of the relation between
Chile's crisis and the world crisis. Specifically referring
to Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West, he predicted
that "the world economy will have a future similar to the
Roman empire during its last centuries." The nature of the
present illness was that "the capitalist system doesn't

58
function.” "The decomposition of the capitalist system,"
he lamented, "has produced both political and social disin­
tegration. The old liberal principles are insufficient to
contain the chaos." But although he noted the need "to
modify substantially the economic structure of our country, ”
Keller’s solution to the crisis was much more far-reaching:
"It is necessary to organize all healthy and valiant elements
to carry out socially useful labor. We have to form a new
political front which constitutes a bulwark, disciplined
in procedures, and which submits its members to rigorous
moral control, which divulges and studies the meaning of our
epoch so that government doesn't find itself in a vacuum."1
Indeed, in these words Keller summed up an approach
to an epoch — an approach at once both historical and mytho­
logical, both philosophical and analytical, both political
and meta-political. In his person, Keller was representa­
tive of a distinct outlook on the past, the present and the
future of Chile in the Latin American and the world context.
It did not originate with him. He was so to speak its end
product,— the most prolific spokesman for a cause. This
cause was not Fascism or National Socialism per se. The
cause was Chile. But in the 1930s the cause of Chile and the
cause of National Socialism became linked in Keller’s thinking.
It is thus and only thus that the intellectual influences
on Keller can be considered the intellectual origins of

Carlos Keller, Como salir de la crisis (Santiago:

1932), pp. 3-31. I have telescoped Keller's remarks.

59
National Socialism in Chile. There is no attempt here to
suggest that Nicolas Palacios, Alberto Edwards and Francisco
Antonio Encina were the only influences on Keller*s thinking.
But an examination of the thinking of these three significant
figures in Chile’s intellectual life throws light not only
on Keller but upon the whole complex of nationalist thinking
which, when mixed with the socialist and populist traditions,
became politicized and assumed a form similar to the Fascist
movements in other countries.

A. Nicolas Palacios and Raza chilena

1. The Mestizo
Nicolas Palacios was born in 1854 of Chilean parents
2
in Santa Cruz, a small village, in Colchagua. The oldest
of six children, it is said that in physical appearance he
early began to appear as a perfect representative of the
mestizo which he would later celebrate.
Palacios* mother died when he was very young and he
was raised by his s t e m father, who was a small farmer.
Deprived of an early home education, Palacios went to Santiago
when he was 14 to receive an education. There he studied
at the National Institute under the direction of the Chilean
historian, Diego Barros Arana. At the Institute he acquired

2
Senan Palacios, "El Autor de *Raza chilena* Dr.
Nicolas Palacios," Revista chilena de historia v qeoqrafia
10 (March 1918) *535-540.

60
a certain positiviatic and scientific spirit with the
healthy scepticism of a free thinker. He was particularly
attracted to Darwin, who was anathema in Catholic Chile.
In 1874, he received a Bachelor's degree in the humanities
and decided to study medicine. In this and in other dis­
ciplines, he proved astonishingly active and showed wide
ranging intellectual interests.
The 18 79 War of the Pacific produced an explosion of
patriotic sentiment in Chile and Palacios was not unaffected.
In fact, it was during the time when he served in the war
that he came to admire the strength and endurance of his
mestizo countrymen. Although he completed his medical degree
and became a licensed physician, Palacios did not want to
practice medicine. Instead, he read a great deal and came
under the influence of Spencer. He became a convinced
individualist and an enemy of socialism which he remained
to the end of his life. His main argument against it, not
surprisingly, was Darwinism — he believed that the basic
law of human progress was the "survival of the fittest".
At the age of 40, Palacios went to the northern nitrate
fields to work as a doctor. There he also wrote newspaper
articles calling for the nationalization of nitrate. It
was there also that he became convinced of what Darwin and
others had written about the distinctive traits that charac­
terized the Chilean race. He travelled to Europe to study

3
Carl Solberg, Immigration and Nationalism (Austini
1970), p. 158.

61
sources for his theories and returned to publish Raza
chilena in 1904. Before he died in 1941, he also published
Decadencia del espiritu de nacionalidad.4

2. Patriotism and Prejudice

Words did not come easy to Palacios, nor was he capable
of improvising in public. He made up for his lack of fluency
by the energetic and dramatic gesture. Many of the chapters
or sections of Raza chilena were published before 1904 as
newspaper articles and the book has a certain episodic
quality. Palacios* argument, however, gives the book a
unity. He claims, in the preface, to have been provoked to
write it in defense of the Chilean people who, he felt, had
been unjustly criticized in the press. But it is certain
that he was also responding to the disdain which nineteenth
5
century Chilean intellectuals had heaped upon the mestizos.
Another and more immediate reason for the book was Palacios*
criticism of the country's immigration policies.

a. The Ethnography of the Chilean People

Raza chilena is divided into seven unequal parts, and
there is good reason to accept Palacios' own contention that

4Decadencia del espiritu

*
de nacionalidad (Santiago:
1918). Other works by Palacios are Colonizacion chilena
reparos v remedies (Valparaiso: 190477 "Algunos efectos de
la colonizacion extran jera, ** Informe. Chile: comision
parlamentaria (Santiago: n.d.). p p . 383-95; Nacionalizacion
de la industria salitrera (Santiago: 1908).
5
Solberg, Immigration, p. 158.

62
 g
the first six are a prologue to the seventh. In these six
sections, Palacios explores the origin and character of the
Chilean race by means of a good deal of historical and pseudo­
scientific data. In his view, the Chilean race is mestizo.
The father of the race was Gothic, the mother Araucanian.
The conquistadores came from Spain, he notes, but their real
place of origin was the Baltic coast, in particular south of
Sweden. These conquerors were supposedly the direct descen-
dents of the blond barbarians, the warriors and conquerors
who in their exodus to the south of the European continent
7
destroyed the Roman empire. These were the goths, the
prototypes of the Teutonic German race of the north. Palacios
claims to have examined pictures of the conquerors and to
have determined that only 10% show signs of having mixed
Spanish origins of the Iberian type. Large numbers of
Iberians started to settle in Chile only during the eighteenth
century. To support his contention of the superiority of
Gothic over Iberian blood, Palacios claimed that only a few
men in the Chilean Senate are of Latin extraction, most are
Q
of Germanic extraction.
Thus Palacios* first task is to separate the true
Chilean peoples from Latin and Mediterranean racial groups.
He recognizes that the latter racial groups are numerous in
Chile, but he claims that the intermingling of their blood

g
Nicolas Palacios, Raza chilenai libro escrito por un
chileno para los chilenos (Valparaiso! 1904), p. 523.
^Ibid., p. 4.
®Ibid., pp. 6 f.

63
with that of the Chileans has only in rare cases produced
men of superior quality. Having supposedly proved that
legitimate Chileans have no Latin blood, Palacios writes*
"The Latin peoples don't sympathize with the Chileans because
we are not of the same nature and therefore they don’t
9
understand u s ."
The mestizo is the roto chileno — the ragged one,
the mass. He is the ethnic base of the nation and it is
from this base that the middle and upper classes arose by
natural selection. Palacios noted that the Indians have
been scorned by the press for a long time and that the
impression has been given that only the illiterate Chileans
have Araucanian blood. But, argues Palacios, it is the
mixture of the two ethnic elements of the Chilean race —
the Gothic and the Araucanian — that imprints on the physiog­
nomy of the Chileans certain characteristics common to all,
despite differences in personal appearance. The Chilean race
is thus special and distinct from the rest of the world.19
Palacios goes even further. Not only are there
characteristics common to the Chilean physiognomy, there is
11
also a uniformity in the Chilean moral and social makeup.
Despite the racial differences between the Goths and the
Araucanians, Palacios insists that the Chileans all feel
and think in the same way on the cardinal questions of morality

9Ibid., p. 7.
10Ibid.
1XIbid., p. 5.

64
and society. The Goths and the Araucanians both posessed
patriarchal and manly characteristics. The man is supreme
over the woman in all spheres of mental activity. The
roto chileno is for Palacios the Gran Huerfano — the
great orphan — disinherited in his own country, which he
loves, and whose glories have been acquired with the price
of his blood. Thus Palacios glorifies the mestizos and
celebrates their bravery and military spirit. His genius is
12
not to be found in the Spanish, French, or Italian meridian.

b. The Necessity of Natural Selection

Palacios' ethnography includes observations on the
psychological component of the Chilean race and he strongly
believed that psychological factors were important in
differentiating races, but his picture of the Chilean
character is not filled out. Palacios was much more at
home with biology. He himself noted that his "inveterate
affinity for studies in biology" lead him to his belief in
the gravity of racial mixture. But Palacios was not only a
biological Darwinist, who believed in racial improvement
through natural selection, he was also a social Darwinist, .
who believed in the importance of artificial selection as a
factor in human development. He was well acquainted with
Darwin's observations on Chile, and he cited Spencer to
support his thesis. His ideas on race and evolution were

12Ibid., p. 7.

65
also partly derived from Gustavo Le Bon (Sociological Laws
of the Evolution of Peoples) and G. Sergi (Decadence of the
Latin Nations). Le Bon’s influence is apparent in Palacios*
contention that the Chilean race has certain fundamental
characteristics; Sergi apparently contended that the Germans
and Scandinavians of northern Europe were superior to the
Italians and Latin peoples of the south. 13
Not surprisingly, Palacios devotes considerable space
to social selection, and in particular the problem of
foreigners. After studying the 1895 census figures, he
found that there was a greater incidence of crime among
foreigners. He distinguished, however, between those immi­
grants who came to Chile on their own funds, and those who
were sent by "agents" in Europe. The latter were supposedly
recruited from vagrants and criminals. 14 But in comparison,
Palacios contended that there was not only less incidence
of criminality among Chilean nationals, but also a higher
morality. He wrote: "Few peoples are in such good innate
moral condition as ours to form a superorganic or social
being of strong organization, as understood by Spencer —
that is, an organic aggregation in which biological and
15
social laws are fulfilled.” To Palacios, the robustness
of the body and spirit of the roto chileno was an example
of the superorganic disposition of the race. And noting

13Ibid., pp. 185-246.

14Ibid., p. 252.
15Ibid., p. 276.

66
the regrettable results that "anti-national" regressive
selection has had in some countries in which protection
was given to moral degenerates of all kinds* Palacios goes
so far as to concur with Spencer's dictum* "To feed the
16
incapable at the expense of the capable is a great cruelty."
Palacios admits that it is natural that selection has its
victims, but that in the end it succeeds in producing types
capable of withstanding and conquering without any dimuni-
17
tion of their physical conditions.
Of particular interest in this context are Palacios'
remarks on the Jews. He writes: "They go wandering and
without country for 19 centuries; the word country ought not
to have meaning for the heart or the mind of that race* if
it ever has had. Also, I understand their hatred for the
idea of nation, because it is that which has persecuted
them and made them suffer great tribulations for 1900 years."
He writes further* "It is useless for a Jew to talk of love
for humanity because he doesn't believe it." 18 Because
of their hazardous and miserable life, according to Palacios,
the raza israelita has had to learn the art of deception,
hipocracy, egoism, avarice, all of which Christ reproached.
But this did not imply any sympathy for the Jews on Palacios'
part. He speaks of them as "Marxists". If the apostle of
modern socialism and the creator of the International had

16Ibid., p. 286.
17Ibid., p. 499.
18Ibid., p. 478.

67
signed himself "un Judio" instead of Karl Marx# writes
Palacios, his doctrines would have lost the prestige which
they enjoy in the world today. 19
Palacios also drew attention to how much evil the
Jew, Heinrich Heine, and others had caused the moral culture
of Germany with their disruptive doctrines. And he pointed
to the great evil that Jewish writers were causing some
20
of the other European nations. In Palacios* view, the
Western nations used the privileged talents of the Jew in
the management of its great capitals. The private and public
virtues of the superior men of the raza israelita are examples
in whatever country they inhabit and some of their most
illustrious members have known how to identify themselves
with their countries and to lend great services. But, asks
Palacios, should they have the right to intervene in the
moral, political, religious and social evolution of the
nations which welcome them, being, as they are, racially
and socially distinct from those nations? 21
Palacios expressed concern that through immigration
the evil that the Jews had caused in Europe would spread
to America, because in his view the United States was an
22
example for Chile to follow. He noted that the racial
basis of the United States was "teutonic", being inhabited
by Anglo-Saxon, German, Dutch and Scandinavian extractions.
But more than this, Palacios was at pains to show how social

19Ibid., pp. 479 f. and 482. 20Ibid., pp. 481 f.

21Ibid

68
selection in the United States had produced workers and
intellectuals "who have transformed the industrial machine,
making it produce more cheaply than in any other country,
while at the same time their earnings are greater than those
of any artisan." Indeed, he wrote that "the superior
aptitudes of command, the organizational skills, scientific
knowledge and technical skill, the extraordinary physical
and mental energy which these men must possess are impon­
derable. ”23

C. The Threat of "Colonization"

Despite Palacios* favorable assessment of the United
States, he was worried that it would export some of its "evil"
people like negroes and gypsies to Chile and undermine the
race.24 In his view, immigration was the greatest threat
to the racial and social development of Chile. Thus the
object of the seventh and most important section of
Palacios* book is to generate public reaction against the
forced introduction of foreigners into the country. He
noted that Germany, the United States, and other countries
were going to close their countries to immigrants and that
this would mean that the physically handicapped and intel­
lectually backward would invade Chile to her great detri­
ment. He referred to immigration as "a virus which pene­
trates the human organism without pain and without pain
25
extends its lethal power to the source of life itself."

23Ibid•, p. 499. 24Ibid., p. 507.

25Ibid., p. 523.

69
 Palacios feared not only the introduction of foreign
racial elements into Chile, but the introduction of foreign
ideas as well. He insisted that egalitarian ideas of
socialism and Communism were incompatible with the indivi­
dual, because they destroy the natural process of selection
and protect the weak rather than the strong. "Socialism
is the negation of social and political progress, of demo­
cracy and its law," wrote Palacios, "what is truly admirable
is nothing more than the instinctive resistance of the
Chilean people to socialist doctrines, in spite of the
constant sermons of socialism in the press . . . and the
presence of apostles of socialism and anarchism which immi-
26
gration has brought us."
Ironically, Palacios concluded his book with an
attack on the aristocratic oligarchy. 27 He claimed that
the country's problems stemmed from the absence of moral
selection resulting from the absence of penal sanctions on
the upper class. This made it impossible for the country
to take advantage of the superior aptitudes of all of its
citizens because of the barriers placed by those who governed.
While Palacios shared Spencer's view on the danger of
foreigners owning wealth, he felt in general that the major
defect of the Chilean race — the one which had most directly
contributed to bringing the country to the edge of the abyss
— was the absence of natural selection to ownership of the

26Ibid., pp. 560 f. 27Ibid., pp. 739 ff.

70
nation's wealth. Only selection would make possible the
development of the great merchant, the great businessman,
the great industrialist, the director of associations and
trusts. Only selection would separate the superior from
the inferior and insure the progress of Chile's development.

B. Francisco Antonio Encina and Nuestra

inferioridad econ6mica

1. The Aristocrat
Encina was born in 1874 in the province of Talca and
educated in his early years in the small city bearing the
same name. A scion of a landed family long established in
the region, he early exhibited many characteristics of the
28
rural Chilean aristocracy. But Encina was also petulant,
diabolic and exhibited the spirit of the huaso (Chile's
29
cowboy), with a strong love for tradition and the soil.
He was a Chilean from head to toe. 30
In his youth, Encina read omnivorously and became
acquainted with the works of European history, literature
and philosophy from Plutarch and Don Quijote to Gibbon,
Macaulay, and Comte. Although he completed the course in
law at the University of Chile, Encina never practiced law;
his active career was primarily that of a landowner concerned

28
Charles F. Griffin, "Francisco Encina and Revisionism
in Chilean History, HAHR 37 (February 1957) * 3.
29Ricardo Donoso, Alberto Edwards v Encina (Santiago*
n.d.), p. 51..
on
Griffin, "Francisco Encina," HAHR. p. 3.

71
 31
with the economic problems of the nation. But during his
university days in Santiago, he became politically active
and joined the ranks of the National Party, the party of
Manuel Montt. In 1906, at 32 years of age, he was elected
to Congress as a deputy from Talca, and in 1910 he became
an important ideologue of the National Party by making a
32
speech at the Party's convention.
Encina's speech to the National Party's convention in
1910 contained a number of ideas that would appear in a
fuller form two years later in Nuestra inferioridad economica.
He spoke of the need to establish a stable and intelligent
economic policy and in doing so he pointed out the value of
Chile's agricultural land and how poorly it was being
exploited. He spoke of the over-dependence on mining to
i
the detriment of agriculture. But the main thrust of his
remarks was directed at what he considered the weakness of
the educational system in Chile which, in his view, had
caused the present moral crisis. And if Chile was to under­
take industrialization, said Encina, it would first have to
reform education. 33

2. Encina and Palacios

In 1911, Encina published an article in Revista Chilena

31Ibid., p. 4.
32Donoso, Edwards and Encina. pp. 51, 54-55.

33Ibid., p. 55.

72
on "Don Nicolas Palacios".34 He wrote that Palacios had
"earnestly looked for conciliation between his scientific
prejudices and his patriotic sentiments" and that "Raza
35
chilena was the fruit of this labor." His article begins
with criticism and ends with praise. Specifically, Encina
was critical of Raza chilena on a number of grounds. He
pointed out that Palacios had no sense of causality in
his discussion of sociological matters and that he had
resisted any kind of synthesis of his findings. Aside from
indicating the many historical errors, Encina was unable
to accept the gothic origins alone as capable of explaining
the paternal (Spanish) origins of the Chilean race. He
accepts the fact that there must have been an intense psycho­
logical selection which differentiated the conquistador of
Chile from the mass of the Spaniards and those who settled
other colonies in Latin America, but Encina, as will be
seen below, interprets the meaning and ethnic transcendence
of that selection differently from Palacios. Encina is
doubtlessly correct in saying that Raza chilena is more
descriptive than analytic and that Palacios' treatment of
the impressionistic psychology of the Chilean people is
puzzling. 37

34Francisco A. Encina, "Don Nicolas Palacios," Revista

Chilena (1911), 1, pp. 306-314. For an opposing view of
Palacios, cf. Joaquin Edwards Bello, El Nacionalism
continental (Madrids 1935), pp. 47-69. This book is a series
of essays, one devoted to Raza chilena. by a well-known
journalist and writer.
35Ibid., p. 307. 36Ibid., p. 308. 37Ibid., p. 309.

73
 Despite its shortcomings, Encina insists that Raza
chilena deserves high praise for the material Palacios
accumulated and particularly for its psychological contri­
butions. In descriptive psychology, writes Encina, Palacios
38
has no rivals in Latin America. But Encina does not bother
to explain what he means by this, and he was himself soon
to far surpass Palacios in his description of Chilean
psychology. Another aspect of Palacios' book not sufficiently
appreciated, in Encina*s view, is Palacios' "intense optimism,
the simple faith in the destinies of his country which all
of his publications exude.” According to Encina Raza
Chilena appeared at the precise moment when Chile's material
and moral crisis was at its apogee. 39 Because Palacios,
perceiving the gravity of the moment was, according to Encina,
profoundly alarmed by the loss of the country's habits and
traditions, by the foreign control of the nation's wealth,
and by the failure of liberal criticism to comprehend the
problem and to find a solution. Palacios had awakened con­
fidence and faith in the future.
The influence of Palacios on Encina was considerable,
if not decisive, and Encina's critics have made much of this.
His most virulent critic, Ricardo Donoso, writes that "In
the period of the publication of Nuestra inferioridad
econ6mica (1912), Encina, who had passed through the House

38Ibid., p. 310.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., p. 312.

74
of Deputies without leaving a trace* was following in the
path of Dr. Palacios. Indeed, Encina also paid some attention
to the study of anthropology and races, loyal to the prin­
ciples which Gobineau had attempted to establish in the
middle of the nineteenth century. An admirer of Lapouge
and Gustavo Le Bon, who then constituted his favorite reading,
he attributed the moral decadence of the country to the
influence of public education because it had oriented the
youth toward the liberal professions and public employment.
His sociological studies were limited to Spencer, Comte and
Novikov, to the North American Lester Ward, and one or two
41
other writers of similar persuasion."
Donoso contends that Encina, in pointing to the
economic and moral decline of Chile, did no more than repeat
Palacios * arguments in Decadencia del espfritu de nacionali-
dad.42He also claims that Encina even took credit for
inspiring many of the ideas contained in Raza chilena.
alluding to a correspondence Encina had had with the French
psychologist, Alfredo Fouilee. An observation made by Fouilee
with respect to the decadence of Spain was the basis for
Palacios* hypotheses that the conquistadors of Chile were

^ R i c a r d o Donoso, Francisco A. Encina simulador, 2

vols. (Santiagoi 1969-70), I, p. 110. C f . also by Donoso,
Rectificaciones a una diatriba contra don Diego Barros Arana
(Santiago! 1947), directed against Encina*s critique of
Barros Arana.
42
Ibid., p. 111. Cf. Oscar Bermudez, "El Dr. Nicolas
Palacios y la industria del salitre," Revista chilena de
historia y qeoqrafia (1969).

75
to be included among the superior races. Donoso quotes
from Encina* "Some years ago, before talking to Palacios,
we had exchanged ideas with Fouilee concerning the influence
of gothic blood in the Spanish descendants of the conquest of
America.”4^ Lastly, Donoso notes the influence on Encina of
a series of articles Palacios wrote on the bloody events
(the worker’s strike and the massacre) in Iquique, published
in El Chileno in 1908 in Valparaiso. In these articles,
Palacios had called attention to the protection which the
government was affording foreign investors and the subsidies
it was providing them. Encina, like Palacios, was critical
of both.44
Encina*s other major critic, Julio Cesar Jobet, also
writes that "The influence of Nicolas Palacios on F.A. Encina
is very profound. His criticism of Chile’s economic reality
and his remedies to transform it, as they appeared in his
essay Nuestra inferioridad econSmica. were furnished in great
part by the writings of Palacios. For Palacios, the possi­
bility of a new Chilean destiny is found in the creation of
an industrial economy and in the reform of education, with
the purpose of giving it a more realistic and utilitarian
orientation. In such propositions, one finds the rich
source of the thought of F.A. Encina . . . Also the adven­
turous racial theories of Palacios provoked his enthusiasm

43
Ibid., p. 134. One of Fouilee's works cited in Raza
chilena is Bosque no psicol6qico de los pueblos euroneos.
a psychological sketch of the European peoples.
44Ibid., pp. 89 f.

76
and his passionate adoption, using them to demonstrate the
superiority of the Castilian-Basque aristocracy and their
historic right to lead the country, a right threatened by
45
the rise of the aboriginal blood of the '’inferior classes” .
There is no denying the influence of Palacios* racism on
Encina. His own is extreme and dogmatic. Even after his
interest moved from economics to history, he awarded the
primacy to race and inheritance in his general theory of
46
cultural dynamics. Thus Jobet*s observations, as well
as those of Donoso, concerning Encina are valid up to a
point. But both Donoso and Jobet overstate Encina*s
reliance on Palacios, and in so doing they understate his
originality and obscure Encina's contribution to the arsenal
47
of the nationalist critique of Chilean conditions.

3. Matter and Moral

In 1964, Jose Vincente Mogollon claimed that "without
fear of exaggeration, one can say that Encina*s ideas haven't
changed since the publication of Nuestra inferioridad

45 *
Julio Cesar Jobet, "Las concepciones historiograficas
reaccionarias de Francisco Antonio Encina," in Temas
historicos chilenos (Santiago* 1973), p. 79. Cf. also by
Jobet, "Francisco A. Encina, sociologo e historiador," in
Tres ensavos hist6ricos (Santiago* 1950).
^Griffin, "Francisco Encina," HAHR 37*7 f., and p. 17.
47
Cf. my discussion of Edwards and Encina below.

77
 48
economica in 1912 to the present." Whether or not this is
an exaggeration, Encina repeats throughout his other works
and most particularly in the 20 volumes of his magnum opus,
Historia de Chile desde la pre-historia hasta 1891, 1941-
49
1952 the ideas he first presented in his 1912 book.
Donoso suggests that the initial stimulus to the
writing of Nuestra inferioridad economica was Encina's reaction
to a book published in 1910 by Alejandro Venegas (under the
pseudonym, Dr. Valdes Cange), Sinceridad. Chile intimo en
50
1910. Venegas' book dealt with Chile's economic and social
problems and the political corruption and moral crisis of
the period. He described the miserable living conditions of
the workers in the nitrate fields and their exploitation by
company stores, and the whole system of industry which had
led to their indebtedness. He criticized the alcoholism,
prostitution and gambling on which many of the workers
depended. Venegas attributed Chile's decadence to the
maintenance of paper money — the fundamental tool of wealthy
bankers and agriculturalists — as well as to Chile's depen­
dence on foreign capital and antiquated methods of agricul­
ture. And he condemned not only the decadence and corruption

48Jose Vincente Mogollon, "Francisco Antonio Encina su

personalidad y sus ideas sobre la raza, la economia, y la
educaci6n escenarioi Chile, 1910," Atenea 155 (July-September,
1964).
^Griffin, "Francisco Encina," HAHR 3713.
50
Donoso, Encina simulador. pp. 107 f.

78
of all political parties but the electoral system itself.
Most particularly* he complained of poorly trained teachers
and the fact that so much of the educational system was in
the hands of the church. This meant that too little attention
was given to the development of the scientific spirit. Also
attributing the perpetuation of class differences to educa­
tion, he called for a new policy and recommended a number of
reforms. 51 According to Donoso it was not so much that
Encina rejected Venegas* conception of the crisis; but he
rejected in part his description of the causes and in toto
his solutions. In part Encina*s Nuestra inferioridad
economica would seem to confirm this.

a. Economics of the Foreigner

It might be said that Encina*s Nuestra inferioridad
economica begins where Palacios' Raza chilena left off —
with the problem of the "colonization" of Chile through
foreign influence and immigration. Encina notes that up to
the mid-nineteenth century, internal commerce in Chile was
almost exclusively in the hands of nationals and that the
Chilean initiatives in foreign trade were extended along
the Pacific and part of the Atlantic. But economic develop­
ment had come to exhibit symptoms of a pathological state.
"In less than fifty years," wrote Encina, "the foreign
businessman has drowned our nascent commercial initiative
both at home and abroad, eliminated us from international

51Ibid. These reforms are listed by Donoso.

79
traffic, and in large part replaced us in retail commerce.
The same has occured in our extractive industries. The
foreigner is the owner of two thirds of the production of
nitrates and continues to acquire our most valuable deposists
of copper. Our merchant marine is also weakened. Our banks
continue to cede terrain to foreign banks. Loans are
50
increasingly being controlled by foreign banks."
During the first half of the nineteenth century,
according to Encina, Chile developed and evolved quite
independently of any outside influences. This changed with
the coming of the foreigner. At first the country was able
to absorb them, but as their numbers increased and they
became more involved in the economy, it became less easy to
absorb them. And Encina remarks, "Their sociological in­
fluence contributed a valuable share toward the phenomenon of
the subordination of our society to the European civiliza-
tions." 53 Here he mentions specifically the influx of
foreign books, Chilean intellectual’s imitation of Europe's
intellectual products and the foreign traveler. All these
contacts nourished Chile's subordination to the advanced
civilizations. "This admiration for foreign civilizations,

52 ,
Francisco A. Encina, Nuestra inferioridad economica.
9th ed. (Santiagot 1955), p. 1. This new edition has a
prologue to Encina by Eduardo Moore. The first edition
appeared in 1912.
53Ibid., p. 93.

80
awakened through intimate contact,'* writes Encina, "could
not develop without diminishing the very vitality of our
organism, without curtailing its spontaneous forces of
development ■ . . This subordination of our collective soul
marks the advent of a new sociological agent, and a trans­
cendental change in the conditions which effected our evolu­
tion. This began from 1870 onward. Changes in ideas, senti­
ments, institutions, customs were all determined by European
influence." 54 To be sure, Encina, lika Palacios, viewed
the foreigner and foreign influences with a jaundiced eye.
But different from Palacios, he placed as much, if not more,
responsibility for the "inferior economy" of Chile on the
Chileans themselves.
In this, Encina's social Darwinism and belief in natural
selection was much more consistent than Palacios', who refused
to entertain any failing on the part of the Chileans. As
Encina saw it, Chile's moral decline was caused by the intense
penetration of the "national soul" by "stronger civiliza­
tions." Thus "the will of the inferior is weakened and
subordinated to that of the stronger." The intensity of the
European penetration caused a weakening of those forces
which, like the will to struggle and dominate, race pride
and the ambition to be great, constitute the spirit of
nationality. In addition, foreign businessmen stimulated
the consumption of exotic articles, as opposed to articles

54Ibid., p. 97.

81
produced at home. This lead to the desire to sell more and
to realize greater profits. But the habit of consuming
foreign articles had the effect of "strangling national
55
industry in the cradle." Thus there was both an internal
and an external reason for Chile*s national decline.
Encina is also careful to distinguish between the immigrant
who comes to Chile to live and the foreigner who exploits
Chile while living in his own country. He values the former,
56
and condemns the latter.

b. Psychology of the Collective Will

For Encina, Chile’s moral crisis, the decline in the
spirit of nationality and the "inferior economy" are inti­
mately linked. He noted that the Chileans were not worried
about the conditions he describes and the grave sociological
significance of this fact* "They reflect a state of anemia
or weakness of the complete national organism, which shows
it is incapable of dominating or absorbing foreign elements.
It also reveals an extraordinary economic ineptitude in the
national population, 'daughter of the mentality of the race’
and the completely inadequate education to fulfill the demands
of contemporary life." 57 Encina continues: "Among the
moral factors which count most in economic development, the

55Ibid., pp. 144 f.

56Ibid., pp. 5 f.
57Ibid., p. 6 .
sentiment of nationality occupies first place; that is,
the collective egoism which impels people to place national
interest first and to pursue in their relations with others
only their own national prosperity and agrandizement. This
sentiment, which is but the instinct of conservation in
societies, has profoundly decayed among us in the last thirty
years. The desire to be great, the will to dominate and
absorb foreign elements which come in contact with us are
asleep • . . There is general indifference for development
and prosperity in national industries.”58
Encina compares Chile unfavorably with its Latin Ameri­
can neighbors, in particular, Argentina; and he points out
59
that Chile's economic inferiority has not gone unnoticed.
But nobody has understood it! Some say it is caused by the
inflationary issuance of paper money, others that it is do
to the credit problem. Not so, says Encina: "Our economic
weakness derives, in effect, from other causes. It is the
consequence of the nature of physical factors of growth and
60
the economic aptitudes of the population . . Thus
Encina does place a certain emphasis on physical features,
61
in particular, agriculture. He notes that within the
context of the national economy agriculture was too dependent
on the income from mining and industry. On the one hand,
he advocates a more independent agriculture, and on the
other the assimilation of mining wealth into manufacturing
industries. But although Encina recognizes climate

58Ibid., pp. 9-10. 59Ibid., pp. 13 ff.

60Ibid., p. 17. 61Ibid., cf. chapter III, pp. 19 ff
83
and geography as important in explaining a civilization, he
believes they have no meaning independent of culture and
race. And in the final analysis, it is the psychology of
the collective will which determines the race's economic
aptitude.
There is no question of the overriding importance
Encina gives to this factor. He states quite clearly that
he believes the nation has the resources and other conditions
favorable for the growth of industrialization. But, he
writes: "Our race, in part by inheritance, in part because
of the relative backwardness of its evolution and in part
due to the detestable and inadequate instruction which it
received, although vigorous in war and rather apt in agri­
cultural tasks, lacks all the conditions required for indust-
6?
rial life." In Encina's view, the Spanish inheritance of
the Chileans is not an enviable one. Because of it, they
have shown an incapacity for cooperation on even the most
primitive level — the military. The Chilean still does
not clearly perceive the social entity. Society for the
Chilean is the extension of his personality, and aid to his
personal ambitions. In a time of conflict, he sacrifices
fiQ
the social interest to his individual interest. Thus,
Encina writes* "Our will is prostrate. The national soul
does not feel with force the desire of greatness and power.
Confidence and the valor in economic struggle have declined.

62Ibid., p. 17.
63Ibid., p. 43.

84
The spirit of sacrifice has almost disappeared in "the present
64
and for the future.'*

c. Education of the Social Organism

Why are the inclinations and aptitude of the Chilean
race other than what they should be? What has created the
"antinomies" between the physical and psychological factors
for economic expansion? While Encina, in answering these
questions, places some emphasis on the backward "stage of
evolution" of the Chilean "race" and makes offhand remarks
concerning "inheritance", he places the major emphasis on
the education, or rather the mis-education of the Chilean
people. 65 His solution to Chile's moral crisis — and the
condition of "economic inferiority" — is also to be found
in the role of education. In my view, this requires a re-
evaluation of Encina and the criticisms of Donoso and Jobet.
Although Encina explains himself in psycho-historical and
racial terms obviously influenced by Palacios, his under­
standing of race is more cultural than biological. And
although, as noted above, Encina does disagree with Venegas
concerning the kind of education which has brought about
Chile's decadence and crisis and the kind of education
required to change it, he nevertheless accepts Venegas'
thesis that the Chilean people have been molded and must be

64Ibid., p. 78.
Ibid., pp. 33, and p. 67 ff.

85
remolded by education.
“The Chilean people," writes Encina, "are in particu­
larly favorable circumstances to be molded by education. The
disassociation of their characters, a consequence of
"bloodmingling", makes them a plastic mass extremely sensible
to all influences. What constitutes their gravest defect
discloses at the same time the possibility of their great­
ness. But among our intellectuals there are none who have
the scientific preparation or the spirit of observation
necessary to understand deductively the fundamental diffe­
rence between the Chilean and the European soul from the
standpoint of education . . . And our programs and methods
of instruction don't correct the inheritance, but aggravate
66
its defects, destroying the energy and will . . . " Encina
admires the European education as superior to the Chilean*
But he believes that European education was not suitable
for Chilet "This admiration for foreign civilizations,
awakened through intimate contact, could not develop without
diminishing the very vitality of our organism, without
67
curtailing its spontaneous powers of development." It
was this subordination of Chile's "collective soul" that
marked the advent of a new sociological agent and a trans­
cendental change in the conditions which effected Chile's
evolution.88

66Ibid., p. 52 67Ibid., p. 97.

68Ibid., p. 98.

86
 This sociological agent* this transcendental change
was none other than the road to industrialization. As
Encina sees it* Chile's geo-economic conditions oblige it
to be a manufacturing* commercial and shipping people, if
it does not want to interrupt its development.69 But the
inclinations and aptitudes of the people* due to the in­
fluence of European education* were set upon different
roads than those for which nature had destined them.
Partly because of the social condition, and partly because
of education, the Chilean looks down upon manufacturing and
commerce* while at the same time he lacks the character and
aptitudes for success in industrial activity. But the social
condition itself is the result of miseducation. Encina notes
that the children leave high school without ideas and senti­
ments which are the motors of an active economy. Their
instruction does not increase their desire and will, does
not ennoble the end of industrial effort — "the power base
70
of the greatness of peoples today". In this* we can see
Encina*s major contradiction. On the one hand* he deplores
industrialization as not in harmony with the nature and soul
of Chile* and on the other hand he realizes that industriali­
zation is the road to greatness in the modern world. Indeed,
this inherently contradictory attitude toward industrializa­
tion — in fact* capitalism — can be recognized as one of
most distinguishing features of Fascism or National Socialism.

69Ibid., pp. 67 ff.

70
Ibid.* pp. 53-54.

87
 Another aspect of this contradictory attitude toward
industrialization can be seen in Encina*s view of urbaniza­
tion. The growth of the city has, in his view, had serious
ill effects on the peasants drawn to them. It has caused a
moral breakdown not only in the cities but also in the
provinces. The same social and economic conditions which
led to urbanization also led to the growth of parasitism —
lawyers, doctors and public employees living at the expense
71
of the collective mass without producing anything. In
fact, Encina is altogether opposed to Chileans who favor
work in the professions over against agriculture, commerce
and manufacturing pursuits. He writes* "There exists in
Chile a veritable obsession with the liberal professions.
These professions absorb the best elements, and the general
desires to become a lawyer, a doctor or an engineer channels
the immense majority of the young within a program of
instruction which atrophies the development of their capacities
72
for the economic life." And here Encina introduces yet
another aspect of the creed which the fascists would adopt —
the critique of the professional and the idealization of
the worker. A misdirected education has caused the young
people to strive for positions which are essentially para­
sitic. Thus they leave high school lacking the technical
skills and the spirit of work necessary for a functioning
economyi "Methodical and permanent work, which is among

7lIbid., pp. 104-107.

72Ibid., p. 38.

88
the conditions of present-day industrial activity, is the
undeniable basis of success, and is still repugnant to
#

Chileans* ”73
Deploring the material and moral decadence of Chile,
Encina refers to lack of initiative, drunkenness, prosti­
tution, gambling and any number of other conditions which
are indicative of the character and psychology of the
74
Chilean people and are effecting the Chilean economy.
In the final analysis, his argument is circular. Moral break­
down led to economic inferiority and economic inferiority
led to moral breakdown. Contact with Europe "produced a
disequilibrium in our soul, determined by the excessive
development of intellectual faculties without correspond­
ing moral development, by the great need imposed by a life
more civilized on a people detoured from economic activity
by the education it receives . . . " 75 The economic conse­
quences of the moral disruptions, according to Encina, left
Chile not only with limited possibilities for economic
expansion but also with a legacy of misgovemment. Encina
notes specifically that the phenomenon of moral decadence
76
is most pronounced in the youth of the country. Thus
educating the young people in a proper way is the only
solution to the problem. But he did no more than suggest
the obvious fact that education was the sole preserve of the

73Ibid., pp. 38-42, and pp. 53 ff.

7^Ibid., pp. 55 ff., and pp. 64 ff.
75Ibid., p. 124 76Ibid., p. 144
\

89
 77 ♦
government. The solution to the problem was in the end

political.

C. Alberto Edwards and La fronda aristocratica

Respect for Alberto Edwards transcended narrow ideo­
logical boundaries. A necrology written in 1933 by one of
Chile's outstanding men of letters, Raul Silva Castro,
78
called him one of the greatest intellectuals of all time.
The Nacis praisec’ Edwards as "the greatest political mind
79
of his generation." This adulation was understandable,
for if Palacios, in Raza chilena. provided the biological
foundation of Naci thought in Chile, and Encina, in Nuestra
inferioridad economica, provided the economic and social
foundation, Edwards provided the political foundation in
La fronda aristocratica.

1. The Sociology of Oswald Spengler

Because it was under the dominating influence of the
ideas of Oswald Spengler that Edwards conceived, composed
and gave form to his arguments in La fronda aristocratica,
which appeared in 1928, it is first necessary to examine
Edwards' Key article which appeared in 1925 under the title,

77Ibid., p. 126.
78Raul Silva Castro, "Don Alberto Edwards," RCHG 74
(January-April 1933) *5. In addition to this necrology
(pp. 5-23), Castro has assembled a full Edwards bibliography
(pp. 24-64).
79
"Problemas politicos de actualidad," Trabaio (June
22, 1933), p. 2.

90
 80
"The sociology of Oswald Spengler." Edwards openly
acknowledges the impact Spengler's Decline of the West had
on him* "Naively, I confess: this book in a certain way
has revolutionized my spirit. Having read it, I see things
in another way. Furthermore, only now have I come to under­
stand the intimate idea, the subconscious of authors hereto­
fore familiar to me. It is as if I had put on spectacles
with which I could now see objects which once appeared hazy
81
more clearly." In Edwards' view, Spengler had tried to
formulate a theory which would give meaning to the darkness
and obscurity which was then appearing to engulf not only
Chile but the whole world.
Edwards noted that Spengler's Decline of the West had
produced a sensation in most intellectual centers of the
world. But he predicted that Spengler would be little
read in Chile or in other Latin American countries unless he
would be clearly and simply translated into French, as were
the German philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries and as was Einstein more recently. And he suspected
that Spengler would not have the good fortune of his prede­
cessors and contemporaries in France because he was a German

80Alberto Edwards, "La sociologfa

* de Oswald Spengler,"
Atenea 95 (September-October 1949) :309-344. First published
in June-July 1925. On Edwards attempt to introduce Spengler
into Chile, cf. Augusto Iglesias, "Filosofia y politica de
Spengler," Atenea 37 (April-June 1960). Carlos Keller told
me in a personal interview in Chile in 1967 that Edwards
was strongly influenced by Spengler, and particularly by
his book, Years of Decision, which ascribed the downfall of
the Weimar Republic to the lack of strong leadership.
81
Edwards, "La sociologia," Atenea 37:310-311.

91
 fl9
nationalist. Thus Edwards assumed the task, not of trans­
lating Spengler but of expounding his ideas. This he did
not so much in terms of those ideas themselves, but as
they effected him personally.
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze Edwards’
remarks in terms of the Decline of the West. Enough to say
that Edwards did not in any significant way misunderstand
83
either Spengler's meaning or intent. As Edwards saw it,
Spengler had provided a new and fecund way of understanding
history and the evolution of human societies. He pointed
out that Spengler proposed a morphology of universal
history and formulated general theories of historical trans-
84
formation that permitted him to predict the future.
Edvards correctly pointed out that "in spite of the
antipathy which Spengler professes for Darwin, his intent
appears similar to that of the English naturalist. As the
latter theorized on the evolutions of the organic world,
Spengler would demonstrate the principle which governs the
85
changes experienced by human societies." Edwards also
saw that Spengler was challenging the notions of Comte and
Spencer regarding humanity as one, irresistably progressing
culturally forward from the beginning of time. Spengler,

82Ibid., pp. 309 f.

83
Cf. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the Westi I
Form and Actuality (New York* 1926) and II Perspectives of
World History(New Yorki 1928), both translated by Charles
Francis Atkinson. Also on Spengler, H. Stuart Hughes,
Oswald Spengler (New York* 1962).
84Ibid., p. 312. 85Ibid.

92
he noted, outlined the birth, life and death of cultures,
the process explained by an inevitable law common to all
physiological organisms. Edwards recognized that Spengler*s
notions about decay were not new, that Burke and Carlyle had
expressed similar ideas; but he felt that none had expressed
Of
them so well as Spengler. He also recognized that
Spengler had a richer view of history than Comte because,
different from the latter, the former's observations went
beyond the Western world to embrace civilizations under
different influences than those experienced during the
Middle Ages in Europe. The reason why Comte did not account
for the death of any culture, wrote Edwards, was because
87
for him no other culture existed but his own.
Spengler distinguished between civilization and culture.
And Edwards also pointed this out. Culture, according to
Spengler, has a soul, it is a live spiritual being, a dyna­
mic force; civilization is static, it is an inert product
of culture. Being a spiritual entity, a culture in Spengler's
view raises us above human bestiality, it is a superior way
88
of understanding life. But unfortunately, according to
Spengler, history reveals many civilizations existing without
a soul. Edwards found this idea intriguing and particularly
applicable to his own conception of what was happening in
Chile. He wrote* "Spengler sustains, and in my opinion
proves, that the culture he calls Faustian or Western will

86Ibid. , pp. 313 f. 87Ibid., pp. 315-318.

88Ibid., p. 319.

93
have an end similar to those whose history we know and that
the phenomena which appear to us are precisely those which
have invariably symptomized the decay and senility of
of cultural souls and announced the oncoming end of that
89
same product of the dead spirit which he calls civilization."
Edwards named these symptoms as liberalism, individualism
and democracy. 90 To illustrate his point, Edwards drew
attention to the decline of the French Empire and the Republic.
What was of value in the United States was the puritan spirit
which the American people still preserved en su masa, in
spite of the businessmen of pleasure by which the United
States is usually judged. "Observe," said Edwards, "that
today it is the peoples that have best conserved the
beliefs and traditions of the past that have organic govern­
ments which still function with regularity and success within
democratic formulas." 91

2. Anarchy or Authority?

a. The Spirit of the Aristocracy

Edwards begins his famous book, La fronda aristocratica
by analyzing the origins and character of the Chilean aristo­
cracy. He points out that it did not have feudal origins,
but was a mixture of the descendents of the conquistadores

89Ibid., p. 332.
90Ibid., p. 340.
91Ibid., p. 343.

94
and those bourgeois merchants of others who acquired
wealth and inter-married with the decadent aristocracy of
the conquerors. 92 The spirit of this aristocracy, according
to Edwards, was sound in that it believed in hierarchical
superiority and had no passion for egalitarianism as did
the European bourgeoisie. It had a love of work, was
economical and practical. Moreover, Edwards attributes a
special mentality to it which was the result of racial
selection. Their fronda spirit is partially explained by
the Basque origin of many of its members. And in general
its members were full of originality and a vigor of a kind
found nowhere else in America after independence. 93
According to Edwards, in 1800 only the aristocracy of
Santiago and the army in Conception in the south were capable
of political action. The rest of the country was made up
of "inert, human cattle." Only in 1900 did the lower class —
la plebe — acquire some notion of political rights. There
was no middle class, just landlords and peasants. In
Santiago, the merchants were part of the aristocracy; and
in Chile as a whole the bourgeoisie was part of the aristo­
cracy. Thus Chile was spared during this period the disrup-

9^Alberto Edwards, La fronda aristocratica. 4th ed.

(Santiago* 1952), p. 17. This edition contains a prologue
to Edwards by Eduardo Moore. The chapters of Edwards' book
were first published between August 1927 and February 1928
in El Mercurio and in book form in 1928.
93Ibid.

95
tions of industrialization and capitalism that disturbed
94
Europe. In this, it can be seen that Edwards understood
very little about economic and social conditions. He was
much more at home analyzing political conditions.
Edwards praises the Chilean aristocracy at the time of
independence. For twenty years it obediently lent support
to all governments and contributed to the greatness of Diego
Portales, the founder of Chile's conservative government.
But during the 1810-1830 period, and after it, the fronda
aristocratica , as Edwards calls it, was consistently hostile
to authority and at times in open rebellion against it. In
Edwards' view, the political history of Chile is essentially
the history of the struggles between the aristocracy and
95
the government — between anarchy and authority.

b. The "State in Form"

Most Latin American countries, writes Edwards, have
experienced either stable or anarchic forms of political or
military caesarism. The Chilean presidential system "in
juridic form" and the parliamentary oligarchy are exceptional
cases t "The Spanish republics of America have had many
constitutions, but none save Chile succeeded in establishing
a constitutional tradition, a permanent and orderly regime
on juridical and moral bases, a 'State in form (estado en

9^Ibid.» pp. 24 f.
95Ibid., p. 15.

96
forma) * according to the happy expression of Spengler.

Most of the other Spanish states in America do not deserve

97
the name republic, in Edwards’ opinion.
Edwards explains that Spengler's expression, estado en
forma. has a much deeper meaning than would first appear,
that it implies not only the regular succession of a govern­
ment in conformance with a juridical or historical order
but also the existence of inherited sentiments in the
society, of superior spiritual forces which constitute the
98
state as a living organic being with a collective soul."
Republican Rome was such a state, but the Empire of the
Caesars was not because "the society had lost its vital
spirit and was converted into an inert and amorphous mass . . ."
The Spanish monarchy and its colonies constituted a "state
in form", but the major part of the new-born republics were
not. Chile was an exception. Some of the factors contri­
buting to Chile’s "state in form", according to Edwards,

96
Ibid., pp. 39 and 45. Cf. German Riesco, "El estado
en forma," RCHG 123 (1954-55) *5-14. Riesco calls attention
to Edwards* use of the term estado en forma in La fronda and
elsewhere. He also notes that it had wide currency in Chile.
Riesco attempts to prove that Edwards did not use the term .
correctly — as Spengler used it. But I disagree. Riesco
is correct in pointing out that, according to Spengler, a move­
ment has "form", but that which is moved is "in form". That
which is moved is "in perfect training" like a boxer. And
this is precisely how Edwards uses the term. The Portalian
state was "in form" — it was a "trained" Republic that was
being moved — it was "making history". Riesco incorrectly
asserts that Edwards was using the term to describe a regu­
lar succession of government in accordance with a juridical
or historical order. But this is precisely the opposite of
Edwards' conception of the Portalian state.
Q7 GO
Edwards, La fronda. p. 45. Ibid., p. 68.

97
were its geographic situation and social conditions — its
isolation and its relative poverty. The 1833 Constitution,
in his opinion, had an insignificant and passive role in
this achievement. Nevertheless, Edwards argues that although
it has been said that the Constitution was absolutist and
oppressive, its language was that of a republican and demo­
cratic constitution — no more restrictive than that of
France and the United States. It simply wasn’t implemented
in its literal sense in terms of government of the people,
by the people and for the people. Edwards' argument here is
obviously forced and to a large extent contradicts his
distrust of real democracy. He admits that in practice it
was absolutist and that its only, enemy was the frondist
99
spirit of the aristocracy.

c. The System Supreme

Prior to 1830, the Chilean government was, like the
other Latin American "republics", a government "without
lOO
form". Edwards considers Diego Portales responsible for the
transformation that took place after 1829. This transforma­
tion, writes Edwards, took place in only a few months "under
the strong and powerful hand of that man of genius . . .
and the surprise turns to stupor when one discovers that the
spirit of Portales was converted as if by a miracle into
the spirit of the whole nation . . other individual

gg
Ibid., pp. 68-70. Cf. chapter 10 in general.
100Ibid., p. 46.
101Ibid., p. 50.

98
or party in Chile had formulated a similar idea. What was
this idea? As Edwards saw it: "The work of Portales was
the restoration of a fact and a sentiment which had served
as the basis of public order during the Octavian peace of
three centuries of the colonial period. The fact was the
existence of a strong and durable power superior to the
prestige of the *caudillo' or the force of a faction; the
sentiment, the tradition of respect for authority in the
abstract — legitimate power established independent of those
who exercised it. His idea was new because it was old.
What he did was to restore the monarchy materially and
morally, not according to its dynastic principle, for
that would have been ridiculed, but in its spiritual funda­
mentals as the conservative force of order and institu-
tions." 102 In so doing, Edwards concluded, Portales ignored
or appeared to ignore the theoretical principles of public
law and social philosophy that were in vogue at the time.
But, writes Edwards: "His indifference to written institu­
tions was only relative and perfectly in accord with the
superior and higher idea which inspired his policy.
Constitutional expertise was of little importance to him.
What was essential in his idea was to arrange what he called
'the principle spring of the machine' — that is, traditional
authority, a government that was obeyed, a government that
was strong, respectable and respected, eternal, immutable,
superior to parties and personal prestige." Once this idea

102Ibid., p. 51.

99
of the state, which in Portales, Edwards believed, was not
learned but inherited, had taken root in the national
consciousness the country, according to Edwards, continued
to obey authority not as it was embodied in leaders such
as Prieto and Bulnes but as an abstract entity, a soul which
didn't die — "the government".
icn

To Edwards, Portales appeared as a man inspired by

abstract and grandiose thought and at the same time as
skilled in the management and strategies of details as the
most expert of politicians and agitators. He was molded
by tradition, but had a profound knowledge of the realities
of the present. He established a system that was so superior
in authority that he was not required to run it."^4 Portales
was never president; he installed a general who was able to
govern within the system he had created. The system worked
so well that Portales left the government altogether for a
time and returned to Valparaiso, where he became a business-
man. 105 In general, the new men of the government were
disciplined functionaries, intelligent, hard-working and
competent. They obeyed; they were submissive. Thus, in
Edwards' view, the wonder of the Portales system was that
it was able to curb the fronda spirit of the aristocracy
1Ofi
and use it for the benefit of the government. "From that

103Ibid., p. 53. 104Ibid., p. 57

105Ibid., p. 61. 106Ibid., p. 65

100
day when the miracle was achieved," writes Edwards, "the
palace of the .Presidents of Chile returned to be, as in the
colonial period, the center of a disciplined and obedient
society, more out of fear and calculation than conviction
107
and temperament." They feared Caesarism and O'Higginism
and thus they were cooperative.

d. The Enemy of Tradition

Liberalism — the spirit of the nineteenth century —
is, according to Edwards, "a spiritual revolution, a belief,
a philosophy which has its theologians and doctors and which
penetrates instinctively even more profoundly the masses.
It is the soul of society in rebellion against inherited
ideas and sentiments and against the historic forms of
culture." 108 In a sense, it is a negative religion whose
dogma is essentially hope in progress. In Edwards' view,
it was not a party, a political school, an economic program
or a constitution, but a faith. And this character of
liberalism explains its enormous popularity and its equally
enormous inefficiency as a constructive element and disci­
pline of government.
In attempting to explain the nature of traditional
liberalism in Chile, which took the form of opposition to
the Conservative government from 1830-1850, Edwards character-

107Ibid., p. 67.
108Ibid. , p. 148.
l09Ibid., pp. 148 f.

101
ized these elements as the "new fronda wing". During these
years, certain elements of the aristocracy yearned for
parliamentary government, the end of presidential absolutism
— the replacement of governmental power by political parties.
Edwards dismissed these movements as "little revolutionary
and much less romantic".11^ He explained that up until 1856,
divisions among the aristocracy were primarily on judicial
grounds, but that after this new political faction developed
on religious and other grounds. Between 1849 and 1862 there
was a transformation of the Portalian system. Now the
government was not only the president but a fusion of
different elements which did not give even passive obedience
to authority. It was an alliance of aristocratic circles
and intellectuals with their own goals and tendencies whose
unity was not l a s t i n g . T r a d i t i o n a l conservatives with
liberal tendencies were led to make special efforts to
destroy the work of Portales. This put them into contact
with the liberal fronda, radicals and other parties which
had come into existence. And Edwards cautioned that anyone
who confuses Chilean liberalism with a party in the English
or North American sense for the period beginning in 1875
would never be able to understand Chilean history. The
"Liberal Alliance", formed in 1875, did not, according to
Edwards, radically modify the established system, but it did
set the stage for parliamentary anarchy. 112

110Ibid., p. 73. i:L1Ibid., p. 134.

112Ibid., p. 159.

102
 Edwards believed that the oligarchical parliamentary
regime which replaced ^residential absolutism rested on
historical spiritual forces. But when that system came to
an end* he asked: "What force is going to direct us now?
113
What juridical form would this force assume?" Believing
as he did that political regimes "in form" are not decreed
and that their possibility depends on the existence of live
organic elements prior to and superior to written constitu­
tions , he drew attention to Figueroa's inability to resolve
the conflict between the executive and the political forces
of the opposition during his brief reign as president from
1925 to 1927 — that is, his inability to make the consti­
tutional system that came into existence in 1925 work. The
constitutional system, according to Edwards, had no prece­
dent in Chilean history. It was not traceable to a slow
and gradual evolution of social forces in conflict, but
of the cerebrations of some thinkers and jurists. 114 And
Edwards wrote: "No authority or hierarchy, no economic or
social order has had its origin in law. The work of jurists
is only fertile in that it systematizes and gives form to
what already exists. The law consecrates fact, but does
115
not create it." Edwards saw Chile faced again in 1925
with the problem which had its origins in Chile's society
and history — anarchy or authority?

113Ibid., p. 282.
114Ibid., pp. 282 and 289.
115Ibid., p. 282.

103
 e. The Leader Supreme
Edwards' preference for authority in La fronda aristo­
cratica is consistently argued, but his concept of authority
is inherently contradictory. Does authority rest in the
''government" or in the leader? In his discussion of the
Portalian "state in form", Edwards argued that the system
of authority was not embodied in leaders such as Prieto,
Bulnes or Montt, nor even in Portales, but in the system
itself. Perhaps Edwards believed that this system was
sufficient in and of itself during the regimes of Prieto
(1831-1841) and Bulnes (1841-1851) but already in his
discussion of Montt (1851-1861) the contradiction is evi­
dent. It will be remembered that it was during the years
of Montt's regime that Edwards recognized the transforma­
tion of the Portalian system. But he never clearly spelled
out the change in his concept of authority which this trans­
formation demanded. Quite the contrary, he praised Montt
for following in the Portalian tradition and maintaining
it.116 Of Montt, he wrote: "the absolute and impersonal
domination of authority was a kind of religion for him, but
the idea of a government of parties was completely foreign
to him." Edwards obviously failed to realize that his
concept of authority was no longer "impersonal". He wrote
again of Montt: "He was 'the supreme chief of the nation*
whose authority extended to everything concerned with the

116Ibid., p. 97.

104
objective concerving of public order and the internal secu-
117
rity of the nation."
Although Edwards* adulation of Ibanez has puzzled many,
it is more understandable if it is viewed against the back­
ground of his understanding of the evolution of the Porta­
lian "state in form". If he was willing to accept Montt*s
regime as "in the Portalian tradition" while at the same
time recognizing that that system was being transformed, in
fact undermined, he was even more ready to accept Ibanez
when he felt that Alessandri had put an end to the system
11Q
of the Portalian state. Edwards notes that after the
military intervention of 1924 he wrote to a friend interpre­
ting the present events and offering some suggestions
concerning how the country would be able to re-establish
order. The letter reads in part*
I don't view the future with tranquility.
If I had to judge by my instinct, in spite of
all the optimistic signs, I would say that we are
on the verge of a period of anarchy. It can be
avoided, but it will be difficult. The old
organization of Chile is in ruins, not only
in its juridic forms, which are not so important,
but in its soul. I can see only a society
spiritually disrupted, a chaos of passions and
no force save the saber able to direct ehem
and contain them . . . Within a year, we
will have a dictator of the sword or a Phrigian
cap in Chile. God willing it be the former."119
Edwards felt that Ibanez had saved Chile from the
necessity of a dictatorship* "The events which have developed

117Ibid 118Ibid., p. 296.

119Ibid., pp. 296 f.

105
in Chile since September 1924 have led us# as if by the
hand, to avoid choices. They have placed at the head of
the Republic a just and strong man (Ibanez) of erect spirit
and healthy intentions# a leader not bound by any party who
'better than anybody else guarantees what is essential for
the country — the permanence of authority 'normally* obeyed
1 JCl
and respected." The reason why Edwards accepted IbSnez
is that he saw him, strangely enough, in the Portalian
tradition. He wrote:
Administrative and financial reforms are#
without a doubt, high objectives and very
worthy of consideration by the statesman.
But there is something previous to and
superior to all that — what Portales
called 'the main spring of the machine',
the necessary instrument of all effective
action, the existence of a firm and obeyed
authority. This is where one must 'begin*.
Philosophic dogmas, historical forces and
laws upon which public power rests are moda­
lities to some extent indifferent to the
magnitude of primary necessity. Societies
organize as best they can and with the
elements at their disposal; but at the risk
of their falling into dissolution and anarchy,
it is necessary for them to obey someone or
something which can be in certain cases a
dynasty which is supposedly consecrated to
God, a President who represents 'the will of
the people', a constitution respected by all,
a ’fact' which it knows and succeeds in imposing,
the simple inertia of custom, the inherited
habit or, as Portales called it, 'the weight of
the night' . . . Therefore, it is my under­
standing that the grand service which our present
President (Ibanez) has had the fortune of
lending the Republic is the radical recon­
struction of the fact of authority. We know
that someone governs the country and that he
is obeyed. That is what is essential.121

120Ibid., p. 311
121Ibid., pp. 297 f.

106
 3. Edwards and Encina
Like Encina, Edwards was born in 1874; but unlike
Encina, he was a porteno, born in Chile's port city of
Valparaiso. 122 And while Encina's character reflected the
qualities of the land, Edward's character was practical and
cosmopolitan. The only professors who made a lasting
impression on him in his university studies were Abdon
Cifuentes and Valentin Letelier. By his own admission, he
continued to be a disciple of both, although he was neither
a conservative like the first nor a radical like the second.
Again, like Encina, Edwards became politically active
in the university and joined the ranks of the National
Party, the party of Manuel Montt. He also studied law,
but never practiced it. Instead, he continued his studies
in geography, statistics, the natural sciences and history.
It was the latter discipline that he chose as a vocation.
He published his first work in 1903* Bosqueio historico de
los partidos politicos chilenos. This work reflected an
aspect of his character which he himself noted* "I have rooted
and well defined convictions, but I would like to forget
123
that I have them." But he never did. In Bosque~io
historico. he called attention to the prevailing parlia­
mentary anarchy and showed favor for reducing the number of
political parties. He expressed his alarm at the political
importance the Radical party was then enjoying and the

122
Donoso, Edwards and Encina, p. 51,
123ibid.

107
socialist tendencies which dominated it. He considered such
questions as democracy, universal suffrage, balance of powers,
and parliamentarism overly abstract and rhetorical for the
masses. "To have opinions on these matters," he wrote, "is
a privilege of the most educated." Indeed, many of the ideas
which Edwards would later develop can be found in this
book, although they were significantly modified. 124
In 1910, Edwards, again like Encina, became an
important ideologue of the National Party by making a speech
at the Party convention. But unlike Encina, who concentrated
on the political aspect of Chile's problems. He considered
the National Party, by virtue of its traditional respect for
the authority of strong and responsible governments, to
be the party to remedy the weaknesses of the parliamentary
system. And he proceeded to recommend a series of reforms
of that system. 125
In 1911, Edwards became associated with the Sociedad
Chilena de Historia y Geografia, founded by Enrique Matta
Vial, and he published his Apuntes para el estudio de la
orqanizacion politica de Chile in the Society's Revista (it
was gathered together in book form after his death). In
this work, Edwards, among other things, noted the so-called
"espiritu santiaquino" — the hostility and disrespect shown
by the urban classes for the sons of the provinces, an idea
which was later picked up by the Nacis. The work shows a
further development of ideas expressed in Bosoueio histfirico,

124Ibid., pp. 52 f.
125Ibid., p. 55.
108
but they were not yet fully developed# as they would be in
1 oc
La fronda aristocratica.
In 1927, under the Ibanez regime Edwards became head
of the Department of Administrative Geography within the
Ministry of the Interior and collaborated on reorganization
127
of the administrative divisions of the country. When
his magnum opus appeared in 1928# La fronda aristocratica
« 128 *
carried Ibanez' picture on the front cover. And in
October 1930, Edwards was asked by Ibanez to serve as
Minister of Public Education# which he did, and later he also
served briefly in a post in the Ministry of Foreign Rela­
tions. But the drama of Ibanez' fall was too much for
Edwards. He saw in it the defeat of the illusions he had
held about the efficiency of strong government and with them
the political ideals that he had held dear throughout his
life. Four years of dictatorship had led to bankruptcy#
depression and humiliation. He died of a brief illness on
April 3# 1932, just two days before the founding of the
Chilean Naci movement. 129

126Ibid., p. 60.
127Ibid., p. 66.
128Ibid., p. 68.
128Ibid., p. 72. Edwards' high regard for Ibanez is
noted by Donoso. He claims that Edwards won the complete
confidence of Ibanez after the publication of La fronda and
that it was out of gratitude that Ibanez made Edwards Minister
of Education and later Minister of Foreign Affairs on the
eve of Ibanez* fall. Donoso also notes that because of
Edwards* later disillusionment with Ibanez# he left a memo
condemning the regime after it failed (cf. Donoso# Desarrollo
politico, pp. 137 f.)
109
 But Edwards' ideas were not to die. They were to live
not only during the 1930s in the Naci movement but beyond
in the writings of Encina. Donoso claims that Encina
gathered all the thought of Edwards together, while giving
little credit to Edwards. This is no doubt true. And it is
also true, as Donoso claims, that there is a definite
130
ideological identity between Edwards and Encina. Although,
as I pointed out above, Donoso fails to see Encina's origina­
lity, Edwards influence on Encina is undeniable in his later
works. But Nuestra inferioridad economica, published in
1911, shows little influence of Edwards, whose major work
was not published .until 1928. In fact, Edwards' La fronda
aristocratica shows the influence of Encina. And Encina's
Nuestra inferioridad econ6mica, as noted above, contained the
key ideas which he was to develop later when he turned to
history. But when Encina published his biography of Portales,
the influence of Edward's La fronda aristocratica was notice­
ably present.
Although it appeared only in 1935, Encina had completed
his Portales in 1933, when he first read Spengler. He
writes* "Although it appears unbelievable, up to 1933 I
had not read Spengler. In the middle of the year, taking
advantage of a forced seclusion, I fulfilled my desire to
leaf through the chapters of Portales . . . I rapidly looked
through the Decline of the West, more conjecturing than
acquainting myself with its contents. I was struck by the

130Ibid., p. 71.
110
most pronounced similarities in my Portales. and I added as
a epigraph a half dozen thoughts on Spengler, in substitu­
tion for other equivalents of Leibnitz, Nietzsche, Comte and
131
Ward." Donoso does not believe Encina. He insists that
Encina's works show the "servile way" in which he followed
Spengler*s ideas and used many of his characteristic phrase­
ology such as "estado en forma", the "mandate of the blood"
132
and the "spiritual forces". But these are not to be
found in Nuestra inferioridad economica. The biological-
sociological references such as "organic" are clearly taken
from Palacios, before Spengler had even written the Decline
of the West. And beginning with Portales. Encina clearly
borrowed such expressions and concepts from Edwards, so it
is quite conceivable that Encina did read Spengler for the
first time only in 1933. Donoso*s argument is inconsistent
with his own contention that Encina gathered "all" the
thought of Edwards together.

D. Carlos Keller and La e t e m a crisis chilena

Carlos Keller R. was without question the most
prominent founder and member of the National Socialist
Movement in Chile. A kind of renaissance man, he wrote on
economics, philosophy, politics and history; he also wrote
novels and explored other avenues of creative endeavors. A

^^Ibid. , p. 67. Quoted in Donoso.

Ill
classic example of the intellectual who yearns to unite
thought and action, his involvement in politics was not
surprising. Given his background, his involvement in the
MNS was not surprising. Edwards cited Keller approvingly
in La fronda aristocratica. and Keller reflects in his works
the influence of what might be called the nationalist
"school" of thought to which Edwards belonged. 133 Ironi­
.

cally, in becoming the foremost representative of this

"school," indeed, in fulfilling in a sense its will in both
thought and action, Keller would succeed in discrediting it
both historically and politically.

1. The Chilean German

Keller was born to a family of German origin in
Concepcidn in 1 8 9 8 . Not surprisingly, his parents sent
him back to Germany to be educated. These were the years
of the First World War and Keller experienced the psycholo­
gical shock which this event and its aftermath in Germany
brought about. In his university studies, Keller specialized
in economics and the natural sciences, but his broad
education and interests led him to pursue a wide range of
fields such as history, anthropology, and statistics.
Perhaps most significant, while in Germany Keller made

133
Edwards, La fronda. pp. 90 ff.
'*'3^The following biographical details were given to
me by Keller himself when I interviewed him and traveled
with him in Chile in 1967.

112
friends with Oswald Spengler, and this just at the time of
the writing of The Decline of the West. The philosopher
made an impact on the young Keller’s thinking both by the
force of his personality and his ideas. When Keller returned
to Chile, he maintained a correspondence with Spengler and
supplied his mentor with information on the Indian civiliza­
tions of South America.
Although inclined by nature to highly intellectual
pursuits, Keller was forced by economic necessity to work
for the government and to write articles and books for
popular audiences. During the IbSnez regime, he worked in
the department of census and statistics and introduced new
methods which made more efficient the work of a department
notorious for its antiquated approach to statistical
research. It was during this time that Keller met Edwards
and they found much in common on both the personal and the
intellectual levels. After IbSnez' fall, Keller drifted into
the newly formed weekly, HOY, where he began to write articles
on economic subjects. He held this position until Jorge
Gonzalez approached him with the idea of forming a National
Socialist Movement in Chile. The two men had never met
before March 1932. Keller had come to the attention of
Gonzalez through a book which Keller had written on Chile's
economic crisis. The book was La eterna crisis chilena.

113
 2. Spengler and the Political-Cultural Situation
in Latin America
Keller's first important publication, a study of
Spengler, Spengler v la situacion politico-cultural de la
135
America Iberica. appeared in 1927. Keller first called
attention to Spengler's concern with the problem of the
state. He pointed out that Spengler was of the opinion
that the final hour of parliamentarism had come and that it
would be replaced by dictatorships, caesarisms and other
such forms of government. Citing quotations from Spengler,
Keller suggests that future development will follow the
pattern of other governments in South America and Mexico —
powers which have no special form. Moreover, Keller con-

1
Carlos Keller, Spengler v la situacion politico-
cultural de la America Iberica (Santiago: 1927). Cf.
Guillermo Izquierdo Araya, La racionalizacion de la democracia
(Santiago: 1934). Izquierdo was a professor of public law
at the Catholic University in Chile during the 1930s, and
he devoted his writings to an analysis of a wide range of
political systems, including most notably corporatism.
The interesting feature of this book is that it contains a
prologue devoted to a discussion of Spengler. He claims
not to be "an enthusiastic supporter" of Spengler's "system"
and "thought", but he nevertheless insists that "it isn't
possible to interpret the emotional moment in which the
world lives without contemplating the panorama which the
powerful thought of Oswald Spengler has outlined." Izquierdo
notes that Spengler has called attention to one of the
principal problems of the times — the absence of a true
state and the absence of responsible governments. But
Izquierdo also pointed out that to recognize this fact was
not to accept Spengler's prediction of the outcome. Con­
trary to Spengler, and to Keller and his intellectual for-
bearers, Izquierdo defends democracy and its efforts to
overcome the crisis. His book is devoted to an explanation
of how democracy can be sustained and its institutions re­
vitalized. Thus it would be incorrect to conclude that the
influence of Spengler in Chile, which was evidently quite
strongly felt during the late 1920s and early 1930s, led
necessarily to the solutions which Edwards and Keller offered.

114
eludes on the basis of this that Spengler was suggesting
that the states of Spanish America represented a higher
form of political evolution than either Europe or America.
Yet, said Keller, we in Spanish America feel inferior to
13G
Europe and America and continue to follow them as models.
While Keller's discussion of Spengler's ideas concern­
ing humanity, culture and decadence are by and large correct,
if not original; his discussion of Spain and Spanish America,
which is the burden of his small book on Spengler, is not
137
correct. Clearly Spengler's concept of estado en forma
did not suggest that states without form, either in Latin
America or anywhere else, were in an advanced stage of poli­
tical evolution. What is probably evident here is that the
young Keller was flattered by Spengler's asking him for
information on the Indian civilizations of South America
and misunderstood his interest. Then too, Keller was
concerned with Chile’s crisis and how to solve it ala Spengler.
Keller refers to his correspondence with Spengler and
the latter's interest in the Indian civilizations of South
America. Based on these studies, Keller notes, Spengler
concluded that the cycle of the Indian cultures was just
as important as other cycles. The Indians had reached a
higher stage of development than the Europeans who had come
to the New World, but they were in a state of decline.

13®Keller, Spengler. pp. 7 f.

137Ibid., pp. 10 ff.

115
Spengler did maintain that some of the Indian cultures (i.e.,
the Incas) did reach a higher civilization than the Spanish
conquistadores, but Keller made out of this a theory which
138
Spengler did not have. He correctly recognized that in
Spengler's view decadence is a spiritual problem and not an
ethnic one. Culture is synonomous with spiritual tension
and decadence is thus the lack of it. Spengler concluded
that because of Spain's decadence, hispanic culture did not
enter the stage of civilization (Spengler's last stage of
evolution). Different from England, France and Germany,
Spain hadn't evolved to this stage either materially or
technically. The period of Spanish decadence ended in 1810
with the emancipation. 139
Here Keller understood Spengler's argument. And at
the end of his small book we see that Keller did not really
misunderstand Spengler at all. What first appears as a
rejection of the Edwards-Encina thesis is in fact its
acceptance. What is at work is Keller's skill as a polemi­
cist. He began by attempting to point out Chile's superiority
vis-a-vis Europe and the United States; he ends on quite a
different note. He notes that the evolution of Spanish
America after 1810 was an attempt to fill the cultural
vacuum left by the decadence of Spain. Because no bases for
developing original values existed in the countries of
Spanish America, they were forced to copy thoseof Europe

138Ibid., pp. 22 ff.

139Ibid., pp. 16 and 42 ff.

116
in a servile way.140 Thus all the initiatives have come
from abroad — from the merchants and industrialists of
France and Germany. They have formed the spiritual
ambience of Chile. Indeed, writes Keller, Chile's economic
and spiritual life has been but a reflection of Europe. He
continues: "We have only the desire to imitate, not to
create because we consider ourselves inferior * . . To
Spengler, the caudillo in Latin America is a sign of deca­
dence."141 But Keller ends on a positive note. If Chile's
culture in the past was imported from Europe, so was its
decadence. Parliamentarism is disappearing in Europe, but
it has already passed away in Chile. In this sense, Chile
is more advanced than Europe. Thus now there is the
possibility for creating a new culture, a culture which
will adapt the methods of Europe but not the results, a
culture which will inculcate a new spirit into Chile's
youth. But most important, writes Keller, a culture which
will create and not imitate.

3. Organization and Action

In the prologue to La eterna crisis chilena. which
appeared in 1931, Keller stated i "This book has not been
written with the patience of a scientific investigator; I
have written it with the animus of a boxer. Its purpose is

140Ibid., p. 44.
141Ibid., p. 45.

117
to trace Chile's political, cultural and economic problems
142
from their origins to the present.” Keller's statement
can be understood in terms of the intellectual as a man of
action, but its meaning is most certainly intended to be
more specific. Spengler borrowed what he called "a profound
sporting term" to describe currents of life. The term, as
noted above, was "in form". In fact, Spengler used the
example of a boxer being "in form", and this is undoubtedly
143
the source of Keller's statement. Being "in form", he
was not writing history but "making history". Like Encina,
Keller thus wrote intuitively rather than scientifically.
This does not mean that what Keller wrote was not based on
facts, any more than this was true of Encina, but it did
mean that he was interested in educating for the sake of
action rather than for the sake of knowledge.
In a sense, Keller synthesized the thought of Palacios,
Edwards and Encina and gave it a new meaning to the decade
of the 1930s. The works of Keller's three predecessors bear
the imprint of the nineteenth century, but Keller's works
clearly bear the imprint of the twentieth. What was for
them the problem of industrialization is for Keller the
problem of capitalism; for them the main enemy was liberalism,

142
Carlos Keller, R., La e t ema crisis chilena (Santiago*
1931), prologue unpaginated.
143 .
Riesco, "El estado en forma," RCHG. pp. 7 and 9.

118
for Keller it is Communism. La eterna crisis chilena begins
with politics, concentrates on economics and ends with
immigration and colonization. Thus it might be said that
Keller’s book proceeds inversely from Edwards to Encina to
Palacios.

a. What is Politics?
Edwards' discussion of Chilean politics was contempla­
tive, Keller's discussion is active. Edwards' concept of
politics was abstract, Keller's is concrete. Keller states
that the political organization of peoples cannot be based
on idealistic abstract postulates because politics is not
the realm of ideologies but of concrete possibilities.
Political organization, therefore, is the result of politi­
cal forces which struggle against and cooperate with one
another in society. The ingenius statesman, according to
Keller, is one who tries to organize society in a way which
permits the free development of all the vital forces of the
nation. The less conflict, the better the organization. 1 4 4
In Keller's view, no one system of government is better
than another in itself. The success of and value of politi-
145
cal institutions should not depend on those who govern.
Here Keller repeats the ideal form of the concept of the
Portalian estado en forma — that is the system is more
important than the president. He contends that the dogmatic

144
Keller, La eterna crisis, p. 7.
145Ibid., p. 7.

119
conflict between capitalism and socialism doesn't interest
him. What does interest him is the practical problem posed
by the fact that political parties in Chile are in a state
of anarchy, are semi-dissolved and there is no organization
strong enough to guarantee an independent state. Military
dictatorship resolves nothing, says Keller, and a state
based on class interests, right or left, would not in his
opinion be able to function. "We need to replace dead
issues with new conceptions based on an analysis of our
reality," writes Keller. And he believed that Chile had
the "racial basis" to achieve that goal.
The practical problem of politics for Keller is
organization. And organization demands action. But, writes
Keller, "our eternal crisis has its most profound and true
cause in our mind. It is independent of dotrinaire
questions. We can organize the state as communist, socialist,
liberal or conservative, but if we don't modify our mental
a Jk M

attitude the crisis will not disappear." If mental

organization must precede political organization, then
thought must precede action. The crisis in society is a
reflection of the crisis of the soul. Keller attempts to
speak to the crisis within and without and to resolve both
at the same time.

146Ibid., p. 318.
147Ibid., p. 319.

120
 b. The Crisis of Capitalism
Encina's discussion of Chilean economics was contempla­
tive, Keller's is active. Encina's concept of economics was
abstract, Keller's is concrete. Being a trained economist,
by far the largest portion of Keller’s book is concerned with
the problem of economics. He has chapters on "The Spirit of
the Economy", "Mining", "Agriculture", etc. "Basically,"
writes Keller, "the crisis which developed before the War
of the Pacific has remained unsolved — the problem of intro­
ducing modern capitalism. We need state intervention to
ij • , 148
avoid economic anarchy."
Keller's discussion of the economic development of Chile
proceeds from the standpoint of the development of capita­
lism. Analyzing Werner Sombart's concept of the genesis of
the spirit of the new economy — the spirit of capitalism —
Keller concluded that Chile was a paradise for the new
capitalists because it had no capitalists of its own. The
conquistador, freed from the imposed economic restraints of
Europe had proved dynamic in his search for wealth, but
149
this "primitive capitalism" was little more than plunder.
Chile lacked a modern capitalist spirit, the kind of finance
capital necessary to create large enterprises, and the
kind of technological knowhow to establish and manage them.
The push came from outside. Modern capitalism from abroad
triumphed in Chile.150

148Ibid., p. 316. 149Ibid., p. 84.

150Ibid., pp. 90 ff., and 103 and 114.

121
 Keller traces briefly some of the major economic and
social developments in Chile from the time of the conquest
to the nineteenth century. 151 He notes the establishment
of a landed oligarchy and a large class of workers and peons.
He assesses the oligarchy in favorable terms, seeing their
rule as moderate and sound. He indicates that in the mid­
nineteenth century m o d e m capitalism was extended to Chile
with the development of copper, silver, and nitrate mining
and that this totally transformed the economic and social
structure of the country and with it the sociological basis
of the political forces of the nation. There arose a rich
industrialist capitalist whose wealth was based on mining.
He acquired money rapidly and spent it equally fast. He
bore the psycho-social characteristics of the miner —
he lacked scrupples, was brutal and immoderate. In poli­
tics, he believed that money bought all and thereby corrupted
the government. And he was joined by professionals, business­
men, and others who lived off capital, because politics was
a means for acquiring wealth. Unlike, England, France and
Germany, where capitalism developed slowly and organically,
in Chile it was produced in a few decades.
In Keller’s view, capitalism gave rise to a middle
class in Chile which had no sense of tradition, no moral
base, because it had arisen in a socially corrupt environment.
This middle class had no discipline and was thus in constant

151Ibid., pp. 10-18.

122
conflict with the demands of the orderliness of capitalism.
Having, in Keller's view, no cultural tradition, it had no
measures to evaluate problems and was thus willing to accept
abstract formulas and the leadership of persons who had no
moral character. Chile's middle class continued to live in
the spiritual ambience of 1789 either for resentment against
the landowning aristocracy or on the mere pretext of hiding
or defending interests. In reality, this class had no firm
,
ideology. 152

Keller points out that the proletariat which also

emerged with the development of capitalism differs consider­
ably from the middle class. Despite his poor conditions and
his exploitation, the Chilean worker, if treated humanely
and cared for, is a factor for progress of the first order,
according to Keller. He is imaginative and can be educated.
But the interests of the ruling class don't coincide with
those of the workers. And in this context, Keller also
points out that the danger of Communism in Chile is espe­
cially grave for the simple reason that the north is almost
exclusively mining and is exposed to strikes. "The life of
the camps favors enormously the contagion of Communist ideas. ..153
With reference to the typologies of capitalism out­
lined by Wagemann, Keller designates the countries of Latin
America ss "neo-capitalist" meaning those in formation, with

152Ibid., pp. 19-24.

153Ibid., pp. 24-26.

123
little population density and a high degree of dependence
on the world economy. One of the major arguments in
Keller's study is that Chile has not had a tradition of
saving* nor has it had a tradition or organizing national
industries* the result being that the majority of firms
concerned with exports are foreign owned. Likewise* Chile's
balance of payments problems are the result of the lack of
national capital formation and an exaggerated use of
foreign capital. The solution to Chile's balance of payments
problems would be the formation of capital. Chile's economy
will always be subject to great instability as long as it is
dependent solely on foreign capital. The economic crisis
of the late 1920s proved this, writes Keller. Chile, he
claimed* must develop a policy to control imports, even if
it is against the will of the country. The deficient for­
mation of national capital is the principle cause of Chile's
economic crisis* not the least because it promotes the
deliberate devaluation of capital and inflation. 155
Keller also draws attention to the geopolitical
problem resulting from economic differences, in particular
differences in wealth in the country. Therefore Chile must

154Ibid., p. 115.
^ “’ibid.* pp. 139-145. Keller makes reference (p. 139)
to the publication of a series of articles in El sur de
Concepcion in 1924* "El problema monetario de Chile,"
which may be the original study that was republished in 1932
under the title, Nuestro problema monetario.

124
promote a more organic development of the economy.1^8
This cannot be done with economic theories. Interpreting
the essence of m o d e m capitalism according to Werner
Sombart, Keller believed that in the present economic
revolution in Chile the active intervention of the state is
157
necessary. From 1891 to 1924, the state was constantly
invaded by economic activities. The revolution of 1924
resulted in an exaggerated reaction in that state interven­
tion discouraged private enterprise. It was over-regulated.
But Keller is adamant in arguing for the controlled
economy. Believing as he does that economic activities are
totally tied to the political system, Keller writes that it
is anachronistic to think of re-establishing a government
along the lines of those of the nineteenth century. He
is proposing a twentieth century solution to the problem.
For Chile's economic well-being, Keller states that it is
absolutely necessary to cease completely the production of
nitrates within a few years and to increase agricultural
exports. Imports must also be diminished, and foreign capital
replaced by national capital. He is critical of extreme
protectionism, but recommends the use of foreign capital
to free national economic forces for the purpose of slowly
1Rfl
replacing it with national capital.

156Ibid., pp. 146-149.

157Ibid., pp. 151-156.
158Ibid., pp. 157-176.

125
 It is significant that Keller devotes separate chapters
to mining and to agriculture, recognizing the duality of
the Chilean economy. He briefly traces Chile's mining
history and includes a discussion of how Chile lost control
of the nitrate industry to foreign capital after the War of
the Pacific.159 "The crisis in which we find our mining
industry," writes Keller., "-is not due to lack of capital
or manpower. It is essentially due to our lack of control
over the forms of modern capitalism."159 Reviewing briefly
Chile's agricultural history, Keller also notes that "It
is not possible to adopt the forms of m o d e m capitalism
while the spirit of the conquistador exists. The conquista­
dor could discover unknown continents and conquer exotic
peoples, but he does not have the organized intelligence to
dominate the very complicated mechanism of m o d e m capital
which requires constant dedication, submission to laws, a
will to develop slowly and interprise. We have imitated
Western forms, but have not transformed them into life . . .
It is not possible to work with the methods of the man of
the twentieth century if the spirit of the conquistador is
not modified. This is the true and most profound cause of
1fi1
our agricultural problem and our mining problem." It
is the profound cause of the crisis of Chilean economy and
society.

159Ibid., pp. 186-195 and 195-205.

160Ibid■, p. 205.
161Ibid., pp. 232 f .

126
 c. Decadence and Beyond
"Those who analyze our spiritual culture in general,"
writes Keller,"have not analyzed the fact that our present
spiritual life represents a movement which departs from a
period of decadence, the decadence of classical Spanish
1CO
culture." Here Keller returns to the argument he
developed in his small book on Spengler. From the mid­
seventeenth century, Spanish culture, after centuries of
flowering, entered a process of stagnation, a dissolution
of forms, of decadence. "What is decadence?", Keller asks.
It is the absence of creation. And where there is no creation
of new forms, there is no spiritual life — there is no
16 3
solution to problems, no originality, no cultural life.
"We speak of 1810 (Chile's independence) as the beginning
of the history of a young and new people. Yet, our spiritual
history began with Charlemagne. By the nineteenth century,
there was a vacuum in Spanish culture and the nineteenth
164
century was a period dominated by filling this vacuum."
But, writes Keller, "In Chile spiritual development was all
imitation of Anglo-Saxon traits which came with the advent
of capitalism after the War of the Pacific. Our evolution
lacked conviction, the impulse, the sacred fire of the
creators. Our thinkers have absolute faith in other authori-

162Ibid., p. 45
163Ibid., p. 46
164Ibid., p. 49

127
 165
ties and merely cite models as if they were magic*"
Keller thus launches into a profound critique of the Latin
American imitation of European models i "Our imitation is
always superficial; we are not imaginative, but merely
receptive."1®*’ What is Keller's solution? "The great
spiritual problems we must resolve can be summed up in the
term 'nationalization'. What we need to do is to substitute
mechanistic imitation with active participation in the
Western spirit of the epoch. We must make its methods and
procedures ours. Instead of imitation of foreign models,
we should try to adapt the same spirit which dominates
Western creations for the purpose of awakening our creative
faculties. In this way, we will effect our nationalization
1fi7
and awaken the spiritual qualities of the nation."
Chile's problem, as distinct from Europe's, according
to Keller, is to educate a population which lives in diffe-
ICQ
rent worlds. The oligarchy wants to keep the people
ignorant. It believes that social progress is only possible
where the need is felt and where the will to improve condi­
tions is strong. But the campesino has excellent qualities
which should enable him to transform himself into an element
of progress. Schools should devote themselves primarily the
task of deepening and transforming the lives and convictions
and the habits of the campesino. M o d e m life, in Keller's

165Ibid., p. 50. 166Ibid., p. 54.

167Ibid., p. 56. 168Ibid., pp. 59 ff.

128
view, requires the application of practical knowledge.
But the schools in Chile reflect the spiritual life of the
nineteenth rather than the twentieth century. The schools
should not only transform the behavior of the lower class,
but also the middle and upper classes. "He who does not
control his habits and behavior," writes Keller, "reveals
169
also a lack of spiritual culture." Schools should teach
those social habits necessary to overcome Chile's economic
inferiority — discipline, subordination, punctuality and
exactitude — those essential elements of the scientific
economic system of today and the collective economic system
of the futre.
But for Keller, Chile's eternal crisis is a material
and a spiritual problem. Thus he insists that Chile must
not only increase its material capital but its "spiritual
capital". And he writes:"we need an immigrant who contri-
170
butes to us spiritual capital." Thus Keller is not
opposed to immigration and colonization, but like material
capital it must be regulated. He emphasizes Chile's racial
homogeneity and stresses that no group racially dominates
Chile. For Keller, the racial composition of peoples is
less important than other problems. "Peoples do not live
off inheritance from the past," writes Keller, "but through
the realization of some ideal which still does not exist in

169Ibid., p. 64. 170Ibid. , p. 273.

171Ibid., p. 312.

129
material form but which gives off spiritual and material
171
forces." Here again Keller's practical approach took
precedence over prejudice. Racism is not practical.
Foreign capital cannot be nationalized, but the immigrant
can be. As far as Keller is concerned, Chile has the "racial
basis” to achieve its goal, to overcome the crisis: "We
can do iti Bravo, bravo . . . A new generation has come to
act in our society. In its youth it experiences the passions
of a world in convulsions and bitter spiritual struggles . . •
What is essential is that the new youth understands that the
cause of our eternal crisis is not outside ourselves, but
most profoundly in each of us." 172

d. The New Politics

La eterna crisis chilena was written after the fall of
Ibanez, but before the election of Montero. It begins
with the past and attempts to analyze Chile*s present
conditions. In 1932, Keller published Un pais al garete.
It begins with the present and attempts to predict Chile's
future. Keller himself considered Un pais al garete a
complement to La eterna crisis chilena. Keller subtitled
his book "Contribution to the Social Seismology of Chile"
and in the prologue he contends that the coup and uprisings

171Ibid., p. 312.
172Ibid., p. 320.

130
that Chile had been experiencing over the years are perfectly
predictable. '
Keller develops his thesis systematically and histori­
cally. After World War I, the political evolution of Chile
entered a "seismic period" in which social tremors came to
constitute a normal condition of public life. Keller
writes* "Our social structure is in constant seismic
vibration . . . This seismic cycle was announced by the
intense fluctuations revealed in our exports since the
174
outbreak of World War I." He notes that not all of these
uprisings and disruptions have been successful, but that
they have produced alarm and lack of confidence. But,
according to Keller, the "Revolution of 1891" was not due
to economic causes. Its objective was to deliver control
of the government to new social classes which had arisen
from the mining wealth of the country. "Since 1891, we
haven't had a government. Political life has been in chaos.
Our wealth didn't require us to have a government because
175
economic life proceeded independently of politics."
Thus, in Keller's opinion, the sane and hard-working elements
retired from political life and left it to those who saw
it as a business and used it for their own purposes. The
result was that no efforts during this period were made to

173
Carlos Keller, R., Un pais al garete (Santiago*
19 32), pp. 5 f .
174Ibid., p. 7.
175Ibid., p. 9.

131
solve Chile's major problems.
Returning to an emphasis on the political aspect of
Chile's problems, Keller argues that more than the deficient
economic structure it was Chile's presidents who should be
blamed. In his opinion, Alessandri, Ibanez, Montero and
Davila were individually and collectively responsible for
Chile's problems. But his argument is circulari "We have
not come to understand or identify our problems. Our offi­
cial phaseology is pre-war — dogmas and doctrines that are
academic and abstract . . • This period will not end until
we put an end to serious economic fluctuations, which are
the true cause of the problems in our political life . • •
We have not had the good fortune in finding a statesman of
1
great stature." Here Keller makes clear that if organi­
zation is the key to the economy, action is the key to
politics* "The great statesman will always have the large
part of public opinion against him because his intuition
and genius will be opposed to the ideas in the air. The
true statesman will have to govern forcibly against public
opinion." 177 Only such a statesman can overcome the atomi­
zation of the people and the party system.
"Given the situation in the country," Keller writes,
"we need state intervention — that is to say, of the organ­
ized collectivity (sic). We need a state of a new kind and

176Ibid., pp. 11 f.
177Ibid., p. 13.

132
the problem of defining it is not abstract but practical*
As always, the solution will depend on the accidental
appearance of a strong personality, conscious of his mission,
*un verdadero endemoniado' who might succeed in uniting a
group of select individuals with whose help he can achieve
178
his mission." Keller wants to remove the President from
politics and give his responsibilities to a cabinet. In
effect, he wants the President above politics. But the
President will be the Chief of the Cabinet responsible for
the policy of the government. He can change the members of
his cabinet at will in accord with his understanding of
national needs, but he will not be responsible for the
failure of his collaborators. The number of members of
both houses of congress should be reduced and the executive
should be reduced, and the President should have the power
to dissolve parliament whenever convenient. "The state of
the future," writes Keller, "ought to have the maximum of
initiative. Its will should be stronger than its parts.
It should have a higher sense of its mission than individuals
try to give it. The state should do what it has to do
without awaiting the demands, protests and complaints of
17Q
public opinion."
In view of Chile’s hyper-dependence on foreign trade,
Keller raised concern that the present circumstances of the

X78Ibid., p. 28.
179Ibid., p. 30.

133
economic crisis could result in Chile's return to a less-
developed economic system similar to the one it had during
the colonial period. He noted that Spengler, in his Decline
of the West, had indicated that such a reverse development
180
had taken place elsewhere. "But this decadence which
threatens us does not have to occur," writes Keller, "There
isn't any logic that it should be the natural result of our
situation." He points out that cultures have lain fallow
for prolonged periods and then begun again to grow. Ever-
thing depends on a "strong will". Chile was in a fallow
state before Portales changed it* "Portales, sociologically
considered, was our Cromwell, our Richelieu, our Frederick
the Great — the educator of the people, an autocrat who
with a hand of steel repressed individual aspirations and
made us feel for the first time what a state really is."
And Keller adds* "The problem we face now is essentially
the same which Portales solved, but it is more grave and
difficult."181

e. The New Economics

Keller rejected the description of capitalism as given
by Ricardo, Smith and Marx. He found their dogmatic economic
systems unable to explain the Chilean economy. The liberals,
said Keller, committed the basic error of supposing that
Chile is a capitalist country. Without exaggeration, the

180Ibid., p. 57.
181Ibid., p. 59.

134
majority of the population is anti-capitalist. By anti­
capitalist, Keller means that the Chileans don't think in
18 2
terms of practical economics. He believed Chile to be in
the hands of a dozen large enterprises which manage the
economy in accord with their needs. There is no free trade
or competition. A realistic assessment of the economy
revealed that its impulses come from the outside, from
183
demand for products by the world market.
What was Keller's solution? He wrote: "I don't
propose a system. I don't believe in the capitalist or the
socialist solutions to our problems. Capitalism doesn't
remedy anything as it is an exception in our economy;
Socialism doesn't have any meaning in economic terms in our
society. It means social justice and longing for equality,
184
but nothing else." What Kellerdid propose was a High
Council of Planning for the economy as a whole to replace
individualistic activity.18^ He called not for total
collectivization, but for a directed economy in which the
state had an increasingly important role in stimulating
development, pricing, quotas, etc. In effect, he sought to
end what he considered the division between the state and
the economy, to end the situation in which the economy was
taking control of the state. "We can expect little help
from the world economy," writes Keller. "Its structure has

182Ibid., pp.63 ff. 183Ibid.,pp. 66 ff.

184Ibid,, p. 67. 185Ibid.,pp. 75 ff.

135
been destroyed by the nationalistic policy of the great
powers. The re-establishment of free trade, the termination
of protective measures to maintain the value of our currency,
will leave us at the mercy of the major powers . . .
Recovery from economic crisis depends on the state’s inter-
vention in the economy with a plan to enforce it. "
Keller offered many other suggestions for the trans­
formation of the Chilean economy, but this was the crux of
his concept of the planned economy. It semmed to contradict
Keller's expressed profound conviction that economic life
represents an organic process which operates independently
of laws which men create, and he Knew it. Nevertheless,
he said that Chile's collective will would make the diffe-
rence.187

4. The "Philosopher" and the "Politician"

It might be argued that Keller was no more a true
"philosopher" than Gonzalez, the future Jefe of Nacismo,
was a true "politician"; nevertheless, the man of intellect
was destined to meet the man of action. If Keller yearned
for action and GonzSlez aspired to intellect, they found
each in the other. If action was to lead and intellect
to follow, this was the will of both. And, in the final
analysis it did not matter. Their "philosophy" was as doomed
as their "politics".

186Ibid., pp. 87 f.
187Ibid., pp. 133 ff.

136
 Even before they met, Keller and Gonzalez shared
certain assumptions about the nature of Chile’s "crisis".
Both believed that that crisis was directly linked to the
world-wide crisis of capitalism. Both believed that
liberalism was the chief cause of moral decadence in
Chile. Other correspondences could be mentioned. But, as
will be shown in the next chapter and those that follow,
it was not only their shared belief in the causes of
Chile's "crisis" that united Keller and Gonzalez; but, and
most important, their shared belief in the means to solve it
and the end desired. If the means were inspired by the
political exigencies of the 1930s, (both national and
international) the desired end, as this chapter has attempted
to show, owed as much to Chilean nationalism as it did to
foreign ideology.

137
 Ill

EL JEFE t JORGE GONZALEZ VON MAREES

A. The "Leader" as the Sine qua non of National

Socialism
Communist parties in this century have survived their
leaders, fascist parties have not. The fact that there are
today quasi-fascist parties in Italy* Germany and elsewhere
does not dispute this because these parties have grown up
around new "leaders" and their success or failure will be
inevitably linked with the ability of these individuals.
Thus an analysis of Nacismo in Chile must necessarily be
concerned with what has been called the "authoritarian
personality". Seymour Martin Lipset* in his study of
Political Man. and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski
in their study of "The Dictator" in Totalitarian Dictatorship
and Autocracy, are concerned primarily with leaders in power.1
There have, of course, been many studies of Mussolini,
Hitler and other fascist leaders on their way to power, but
these have in the main been written in light of their ulti­
mate assumption of power. The study of a Fascist "leader"
and his relation to a party that never achieved power, as
was the case with Jorge Gonzalez and the Chilean Naci Party,

^Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. The Social

Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.J. i 1963). Lipset's
section on "The Making of an Authoritarian" is suggestive
but simplistic. Cf. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K.
Brezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York,
Washington, Londoni 1966)","pp. 31 ff.

138
has been little studied. But insights can be gleaned from
the classic study of The Authoritarian Personality under­
taken by T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik et al., in the
late 1940s.2
The major hypothesis of The Authoritarian Personality
is "that the political, economic, and social convictions of
an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as
if bound together by a ‘mentality’ or ’spirit* and that this
pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his
3 4
personality." While concerned with the "potentially
fascist individual", the authors found that numerous
characteristics of personality go together to form a
syndrome.4 Some of the other conclusions of this study are
less convincing, such as the notion of the "potentially
antidemocratic individual" or the overemphasis on the problem
of anti-Semitism. Others have pointed out the limitations
of the approach, the data and the conclusions of The
Authoritarian Personality which do not concern us here.'*
What does concern us is the study of personality and its

2
T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson,
R. Nevitt Sanford, in collaboration with Betty Aron, Maria
Hertz Levinson and William Morrow, The Authoritarian
Personality (New York* 1950).
3Ibid., p. 1
4Ibid.
"*Cf. Studies in the Scope and Method of ’The Authori­
tarian Personality’, ed. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda
(Glencoe, Illinois: 1954) i also, David W. McKinney, Jr.,
The Authoritarian Personality Studies. An Inquiry into the
Failure of Social Science Research to Produce Demonstrable
Knowledge (The Hague: 1973)•

139
relation to ideology. The authors of The Authoritarian
Personality point out that the emphasis on personality
"required a focusing of attention of psychology rather than
on sociology or history — though in the last analysis the
C
three can be separated only artificially." I wish also to
emphasise that the following analysis of Jorge GonzSlez von
Marees does not presuppose that he was the sole reason for
the rise of a fascist party in Chile or, for that matter,
the sole cause of its failure. X have in earlier chapters
and will in the chapters to follow emphasize social,
economic and political factors. But in the final analysis,
these factors "can be separated only artificaally" from the
personality factor.
Personality patterns cannot be dismissed as "pathologi­
cal" because they are not in Keeping with the most common
manifest trends or the most dominant ideals within a society.
They have, in many cases, "turned out to be but exaggerations
of what was almost universal below the surface in that
society."^ But such a judgement must be taken with caution.
The fact that Gonzalez did not succeed in taking power does
not necessarily deny that what he represented was "almost
universal below the surface" of Chilean societyj and had he
succeeded, it would not necessarily have affirmed it. There
is always the possibility that "what is 'pathological* today

®Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality, p. 3.

^ Ibid., p. 7.

140
may with changing social conditions become the dominant
trend of tomorrow'*, but what is and what is not pathological
in terms of personality and society is by no means self-
evident.
After it was all over, Keller would write that
"GonzSlez probably became obsessed with holding and extending
his power, until by 1938 he showed signs of having become
a cynical opportunist who was, at least temporarily,
8 9
emotionally and nervously unbalanced." Pike concurs.
Ernst Halperin, basing himself on Olavarria Bravo, writes
that the "Chilean Nazi Party was effectively disposed of
by having the Nazi leader Gonzalez von Marees taken to a
mental hospital for examination."10 Donoso writes that
"the personality of the creole Fuhrer . . • did not give
rise to serious worries in those days because his statements
bordered on the picturesque."11 These judgements notwith­
standing, a recent study by Frederick J. Young, "Jorge
12
GonzSlez von Marees: Chief of Chilean Nacism" notes "that
Jorge Gonzalez, although the leader of a national-socialist

p
Cf. Carlos Keller, La locura de Juan Bernales
(Santiago: 1949). In this quasi- hitorical novel, Keller
portrays the Jefe as becoming increasingly fanatical.
°Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 393 n., 171.
10E m s t Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile
(Cambridge: 1965), p. 47 n.
i;1Donoso, Alessandri. aqitador v demoledor 2: 193.
1^Frederick J. Young, "Jorge GonzSlez von MareSs: Chief
of Chilean Nacism," Unpublished manuscript.

141
movement, need not be a personality identical or even similar
to Adolf Hitler." And Young writes* "The conclusion of
this writer is that he was in fact not at all like that
immensely successful but wickedly cynical personality.
Jorge GonzSlez was very much a s t e m middle-class moralist
in private as well as public life, who as an able and ambitious
young man in a period of political uncertainty was drawn
to (no doubt by virtue of his background), and adopted a
fascist political philosophy. However much one may deplore
the philosophy, one must judge the man on his conduct, and
his was not lacking in honor." Indeed, it is by no means
apparent that GonzSlez possessed those qualities of leadership
which would appear necessary for the "leader" of a fascist
movement.’ No where do we find a trace of the all-important
charisma, the personal dynamism or the strong urge for
political involvement and power common even among those young
Chileans who aspired to leadership. GonzSlez was essentially
modest, of quiet demeanor, and cerebral. On the other
hand, it was just these qualities, combined with other
aspects of his character such as his sobriety, rigid self-
discipline and high sense of moral purpose and honesty, that
made GonzSlez uniquely appealing as a leader. It might be
said that GonzSlez was a "leader" with a small "1", whereas
a "Leader" with a large "L" is necessary for the success of
a fascist party even when other circumstances are propitious.
In attempting to formulate a theory of the "total per­
sonality", the AP study notes that "personality may be re-

142
garded as a determinant of ideological preferences." But the
authors also note that behavior is not the same thing as
personality* "personality lies behind behavior and vithin
the individual. The forces of personality are not responses
but readiness for response; whether or not a readiness will
issue in overt expression depends not only upon the situation
of the moment but upon what other readinesses stand in
13
opposition to it.” In the last analysis, the complex
relationship and interaction between personality and behavior
and between ideology and action can only be studied through
their effects.

B. Germanic Ambience* The Formation of a Personality

According to the AP study, "the effects of environ­
mental forces in moulding the personality are, in general,
the more profound the earlier in the life history of the
individual they are brought to bear. Jorge GonzSlez von
MareSs was born in Santiago in 1900 to upstanding middle
T *5
class parents. His father, Marcial Gonzalez, was a success­
ful physician in the national medical corps; his grandfather,

13Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality, p. 5.

^Ibid., pp. 5 f.
^ M u c h of the data on Jorge GonzSlez* family background
was acquired through personal interviews in Santiago (1967-1968)
with his widow, Sra. Laura Allende de Gonzalez and his brother,
Dr. Marcial Gonzalez. I also consulted a brief unpublished
memoir written by GonzSlez in 1960-61. Cf. Diccionario
bioarafico de Chile. 3rd ed. (Santiago* 1940), pp. 418 f.
and Quien es Quien en Chile. (Santiago* 1937), p. 202.

143
Celedonio GonzSlez, had been a lieutenant in the Army and a
notary in Talca. In politics, the GonzSlez family had been
strong balmacedistas and when the Revolution of 1891
overthrew Balmaceda, Marcial GonzSlez, who was studying in
Germany, lost the government stipend he was receiving for
his medical studies. And perhaps this experience, more
than any other, might explain the anti-oligarchy, populist-
liberal outlook of the family which Jorge GonzSlez exhibited
throughout his life.
GonzSlez' mother, Sofia von Marees, was the daughter
of a well-to-do Prussian Army officer who had fought in the
Franco-Prussian War and later retired on a government pension.
Her uncle, Hans von Marees, was one of Prussia's foremost
19th century painters.1® The family von Marees was originally
Hugenot, but Sofia had been raised Catholic by her mother.
Sofia, in turn, raised her son Catholic but Jorge was not
to become a convert.
When Jorge was three years old, his father returned
to Germany to resume his medical studies, this time bringing
his family with him. But two years later, on a return trip
to Chile, Marcial Gonzalez died at the age of 39 of a rare
disease. Sofia Gonzalez, who had remained in Germany, had
been left few resources to raise Jorge and her three other

1®Hans von Marees' mother was apparently Jewish, a bit

of information which Jorge Gonzalez cited while he was Jefe
to support his contention that he was not anti-Semitic.

144
children. Thus she and her children remained in Germany long
enough for her to bear the child she was carrying at the
time of her husband*s death. In Germany, her own family
were financially able to insure her a comfortable life and
a future in military service for her sons. But Sofia GonzSlez
respected her husband's wishes, and as soon as she was able
she returned to chile, there to raise her children. But
the Germanic ambient of Jorge's young life was still to be
dominant because in 1910 Sofia GonzSlez married Enrique
Ewerding, a German and a professor of German for many years
at the National Institute in Santiago. Ewerding was very
stodgy, a quiet man with a military demeanor. He encouraged
the young GonzSlez and his brothers and sisters to speak
German because he didn't speak Spanish very well. Thus
although Jorge never returned to Germany, his familial
surroundings were largely those of a German buraherdom —
proud, proper, ambitious, s t e m and exceedingly moralist.
GonzSlez* widow has testified that her husband was more
European than Chilean in his mental outlook. 17
This was manifestly not Sofia's intention for her son,
and her influence on him was far more persuasive than her
husband's. She bent her efforts to make him Chilean.
Although for a short time after his return to Chile from
Germany, he had to spend a brief period in a German School.

17 #
Cf. Young, "Jorge Gonzalez''* Young interviewed
GonzSlez* widow in May, 1972.

145
His mother sent him to the National Institute to learn the
language and traditions of his own country. But GonzSlez
writes in his memoirs that despite his mother's efforts to
make him Chilean, she was not able to change his deeply
felt intellectual and spiritual affinity to Germany or those
Germanic qualities in his character which he had inherited
from her. Like Carlos Keller, Jorge GonzSlez was a Chilean
German.

C. Chilean Ambience* The Education of a Nationalist

Though GonzSlez' personality and character were from
the beginning profoundly influenced by his Germanic back­
ground, he nonetheless developed during his student years
uncommonly strong Chilean nationalistic sentiments. In
the period following World War I, the University of Chile
was the scene of intense student political activism sparked
\

by the Cordoba Movement, Chile's "social question" and

revolutionary ideologies imported from Europe. Among the
latter, Anarcho-Syndicalism, Socialism, Marxism and Communism
captured the idealism of the students, which they in turn
channeled into active support for the cause of the workers.
The Federation of Chilean Students (FECH) leaped into
prominence and rallied the students to form alliances with
labor and establish schools for the workers.
Having entered the University of Chile, GonzSlez shared
the youthful idealism of his contemporaries in the student
movement, but he was not given to radicalism. He rejected

146
anarchism and Marxism as destructive and would have nothing
to do with the efforts of the FECH to organize the workers.
But just as he rejected the radical solution to the "social
question", he also rejected the oligarchic solution which
was to restrain and control it. Jorge's solution, which
was shared by many others of the youth and the progressive-
liberals, was to reform the workers to educate and moralize
them. Early in 1920, he wrote to his mother expounding his
views on the mistaken direction Chile had taken since 1891
and expounding his belief that the proletarian masses should
be educated so that they might better themselves economically
and socially and in the process better the Republic. And
he acted on his conviction, for in this same year he colla­
borated with a few of his friends in organizing a neighbor­
hood night school in Nunoa to educate lower class youth who
because of their circumstances were forced to work during
the day. After the school was established, he wrote his
mother a letter dated July 14 which is so revealing of his
relation to her, his personality and his outlook that I
quote it at length*
X was very happy with your letter of the other day
and I do not doubt that you are right in what you say,
as I have never doubted your prudent advice. Don't
think that I am not in agreement with your ideas
regarding the social questioni quite the contrary,
I respect them. I agree with them on all counts, so
much so that I am putting them into practice e v e r y day.
As you say, the worst thing we can do to the people,
and above all ours, is to throw in their face their
misery and sad situation, since with this one only
succeeds in fomenting passions and a sterile hatred
that leads to nothing, if it doesn't in fact worsen

147
the situation of these people even more and cause
them complete ruin. Nevertheless, I believe that you
are able to recognize as X do that our people, day
by day, are finding themselves in a lamentable
situation, so lamentable that it makes one cry
to see the backwardness and abandonment in which
the large majority of our compatriots live, a
situation certainly more desperate than that of those
whose responsibility it is to remedy this evil by
whatever means possible.
I don't want to say that our people have nothing
to eat, no; unfortunately life in this country is
even too easy and the real proof of this is that our
race is essentially lazy and highly immoral. To
my way of thinking, it is not this, not the economic
side of our people that we are obliged to attempt to
improve, but the moral and intellectual side; and
above all the moral, for I am certain that a person
morally healthy and moderately instructed (educated)
can, given the favorable conditions of our country,
be as well a personal well fed and well clothed.
Don't think that I am a follower of those who have
been designated social vindicators; I am very far
from believing that something will be achieved
by a social revolution. I believe the opposite, that
if our people rise in revolt they will find
themselves only deeper in misery. Although it seems
exaggerated, I am absolutely convinced that there
is only one road to follow in this matter, and
this road is the instruction (education) of our people,
those of modest means and those of the high aristo­
cracy as well. Until this problem is solved, I
believe all other means are destined to fail.
It may perhaps appear ridiculous that I, insignificant
as I am, should attempt to make myself into a
regenerator of humanity. Nevertheless, I wonder if
it is true that one can do nothing or almost nothing
by oneself. I know very well that I am a mere boy,
that I can commit many errors; but is this a reason
for crossing one's arms? Facta non verbal said the
Normans. It seems to me that if someone had dared to
question that phrase we would not find ourselves in
the present state of backwardness and degeneration.
Since I have opened the school, there have been
those who have said that that which I do is a gesture
of denial. I don't regard it as such. Everyone has
their way of doing things, and if for those people
it is an act of denial to attend night school and not

148
 to eat, for me it is a pleasure and so much so that
I have not missed one time. What would these people
tell me if I told them that it is an act of denial
to go to a cantina or a bar to pick up whores.
And nevertheless, for me this would be a true
sac ifice.
In sum, I have come to the conclusion that I am of
age to do something for the common good and it is
for this reason that I am in a hurry to begin my
work, since later other occupations will prevent
me from doing it. I will lose time, I will
become annoyed, I will feel tired, I will spend money.
For this I will probably receive no material benefit
in exchange, but I will get something that is much
more precious than those gifts. This something is
the certainty that a person of my insignificance
can effectively improve humanity in whatever of its
multiple aspects. Everyone talks, but only a few
do anything positive — I want to be one of those
few. It is my pride."
Gonzalez* friends soon lost interest in their school,
but he continued to teach courses in Chilean history there
for two more years and also became the president of a
"League in Favor of Popular Education". The achievement of
the goal of educating children of the working class against
overwhelming odds and through great personal sacrifice gave
GonzSlez deep satisfaction. This he revealed in a speech
at the Escuela in which he emphasized the importance of
submitting oneself to tests and embarking on unexplored
horizons for the conquest of an ideal. But there was a
right ideal and a wrong ideal. "Throughout the world,
Gonzalez claimed, there is a clamor for equity and justice.
Overcome by the desperation of misery and cheated by
chimerical promises, the working masses of all countries
have set out in search of a fantastic and unrealizable

149
 18
ideal*" He was speaking of "the threat of Bolshevism*"
He condemned the communists for carrying out a revolu­
tion that destroyed not only their country but their homes,
traditions and beliefs. To Gonzalez, these were the things
which were important and must be preserved and strength­
ened. He wanted to save Chile from the scourge of Communism
and the only way to do this was to solve its problems by
other means, and uppermost among these was education. But
Gonzalez* appeal was also to the workers*
Workers! Perseverance is our call, and it should
be yours too. Always bear in mind that although
your situation today is not ideal, . . . neither
bitterness nor revolution will bring you better
days. True democracy doesn't consist in delivering
the conduct of social interests over to the unconscious
multitudes, nor does it consist either in bringing
those above you down to your level by force of
arms. Democracy — don’t ever forget it — requires
the existence of an oligarchy, but an oligarchy of
work, knowledge, intelligence, morality, education
and good will. This oligarchy, reduced to its
principle, ought to grow more and more each day; into
its ranks ought to be incorporated, slowly, one after
another, all the individuals of the human species,
until the splendid hour arrives — and it has to
arrive — when this same oligarchy will be transformed
into a large and true democracy. Thus persevere in
your desire for more education and you shall
obtain what we all search for.19
This was Gonzalez* ideal and he expressed it with all the
passion of youth* "We are young men and enthusiasts; we
feel full of life and optimism; let us defend the very
beautiful cause, and have blind faith in the triumph. Youth,

18
From a prepared manuscript of the speech (unpublished).
19T, . ,
Ibid •

150
faith* and love are with us. With these arms, who will be
able to conquer us?" Thus GonzSlez ended his speech on
August 22, 1922.20
Not surprisingly, in educating the youth of the workers,
Gonzalez educated himself. In preparation for his lectures,
he became an avid reader of history. In reading Gonzalo
Bulnes' account of the War of the Pacific, he was particu­
larly attracted to the modest and self-effacing minister of
the war campaign, Rafel Sotomayor, who represented in
2i
GonzSlez* view the supreme expression of civic virtue.
Years later, in his memoirs, he wrote* "Always beginning
in my student days, I have dreamed of seeing Chile transformed
into a model country. I remember that the reading of the
book of Palacios.Raza chilena, made a profound impression
on my mind. The history of the War of the Pacific, of
Don Gonzalo Bulnes, made me vibrate with profound patriotic
ardor. The personality of the minister of the war campaign,
Rafael Sotomayor, who came to represent for me the highest
expression of civic virtue. The knowledge that I obtained

21
Cf. Jorge Gonzalez,'*A la menoria de un aran ciudadano*
Don Rafael Sotomayor "(Unpublished and undated: probably
1920), 18 de setiembre 1810-1921. obseouio de la liaa pro
educacifin popular "Rafael Sotomayor". dedicado especial-
mente a los abreros (Santiago* 1921), and "La liga en pr o de
educacidn popular ' Rafael Sotomayor'"(Unpublished and undated*
probably 1922).

151
from reading about Diego Portales made the personality of
22
the great minister assume romantic proportions in my mind.”
Already as a young man, Gonzalez had read the letters of
Portales, who became his hero. He was soon after to read
the writings of Edwards, Encina and later Keller. Their
heroes — in addition to Portales, Montt and Balmaceda —
23
also became his heroes.
Having already indicated the relation between the
writings of Palacios, Edwards, Encina and Keller and
Gonzalez' ideas in the preceding chapter, specific mention
must be made of the influence of the writings of Spengler
on Gonzalez. For Gonzalez, Spengler was a discovery. He
apparently read The Decline of the West and other of Spengler*s
writings in the original German. 24 He was henceforth to
proclaim them as his Bible. In later years, he would refer
25
to Spengler as the true philosopher of Fascism.
GonzSlez' mother died in September 1922 and he was
severly shaken by the loss. Soon after, his stepfather
returned to Germany and he was left alone. Although he
continued to live in his parents' house, his economic

22
Jorge Gonzalez "A la memoria de los nacistas que
murieron por sus ideales, en una lucha aunque esteril,
constituyo un ejemplo de abnegacion y patriotismo. *' (Un­
published » 1960).
23
Information from interview with Gonzalez* widow,
March, 1973.
^Interview with Sra. Laura Allende de Gonzalez
and Marcial GonzSlez.
Jorge Gonzalez, "Oswald Spenglert filosofo de
fascismo" in Trabaio (April 5, 1934).

152
circumstances were difficult. He had first been interested
in a career in engineering, but had soon switched to law
and in 1923 he graduated from the law school of the University
of Chile and received his degree. His thesis, entitled
"The Problem of the Worker in Chile” , offers significant
insights into the mind of the future leader of Chilean
Nacismo — his views on the "social question” and on other
26
national issues. Many of the ideas that later found
expression in the Naci movement can be found in embryonic
form in Gonzalez' thesis.
The main objective of GonzSlez' study was to call
attention to the miserable, sordid conditions under which
the workers of the country were living and to suggest
solutions for their problems before it was too late —
before they fell into the arms of the communists. "Happily
the Communist activities," writes Gonzalez, "still have had
little success among the masses * . • however, the repression
of strikes gives the illusion that workers have no just
grievances. The fact is that their passivity is coming
27
to an end."
From GonzSlez* perspective, the problem of the workers
in Chile was not so much economic, but moral and cultural.
He did not consider the unequitable distribution of wealth

26
Jorge GonzSlez, El problema obrero en Chile. Memoria
de prueba para optar al grado de licenciado en la facultad de
leyes y ciencias pollticas de la universidad de Chile.
(Santiago! 1923).
27Ibid., p. 9

153
and the resultant poverty of the workers as the major cause
of their discontent. "In spite of their misery," writes
Gonzalez, "a considerable fraction of our working class
lives perfectly happy under the 'scourges* which oppress
them. They have no conception of a better life and thus
JO
don't rebel." Gonzalez thought the workers received an
equitable salary for the labor they performed. What they
lacked were those fundamental mores and values necessary for
their advancement.
Following Palacios, Gonzalez claimed that the workers
spent their money foolishly on alcohol and gambling.
Because of their lack of education, the mind of the worker
*'is so brutish and uncivilized that even the most rudiment­
ary rules of hygiene, of order, and in general, everything
that constitutes the foundation of a healthy decent life is
29
almost incomprehensible to him." Indeed, Gonzalez saw the
worker as essentially lazy. He only worked five days a
week, whereas the rest of humanity worked six. Moreover,
the worker lacked honor and professional pride in his work,
"finding pleasures and passions only . . . in the midst of
vices." 39
Viewing the problem of the workers as he did, Gonzalez'
solutions were other than economic. "The conditions of the

28Ibid., P* 10
29Ibid., P* 54
30Ibid., P» 56

154
workers aren't simply going to be improved by better
31
salaries," he claimed. More important, it was necessary
to educate them, to modify their way of life and to develop
habits of order, cleanliness, modernization, work and honor —
in short, they should be educated to respect all the values
which made up Gonzalez' own personal code of conduct. But
Gonzalez contended that it was not enough for the workers
to understand the value of these habits, they must also
understand the need for them.
No doubt because of his experience in teaching workers
and their children at the Night School, Gonzalez had arrived
at the conclusion that preference in education should be
given to those "whose nascent mentality is susceptible to
substantial modification." If education were to insure
that the child of a worker would develop the same qualities
as a child of a bourgeois, it was necessary for education
to begin at the level of the primary schools.
In retrospect, in Gonzalez' answer to the "social
question," one can already detect the s t e m moralist "leader"
of the future Naci movement. He believed that men were
badly in need of moral regeneration and reclamation. They
were not naturally decadent, but they had been corrupted
by a society that had lost sight of the values which had led
to its greatness. What Gonzalez felt was that widely shared

31Ibid., p. 87.
32Ibid., p. 99.

155
sentiment, predominant in the writings of his mentors in
the early decades of the twentieth century, that Chile was
in a state of moral decline* The social problem was a
symptom rather than a cause* Both the ruling class — the
"plutocracy”, as Gonzalez called it — and the governmental
leaders lacked the will to deal with the country’s ills*
Because of their "egoism", both were disinclined to act on
matters of national importance. As GonzSlez saw it: "There
are only conferences, no action. • • We are a people of
orators . . . our principal activity is conversation. Our
governmental officials, insteadof leading the country, have
left it tochance. The art of politics in Chile has reached
33
its lowest level of decadence."

D. Prelude to Politics
After his graduation in 1923, Gonzalez embarked on a
career of public service which involved him in various
activities in the municipality of Nunoa, a middle-class
residential area in greater Santiago. During the years
1924-1932 he proved that he had the strength of his convic­
tions. In 1924-25, he held an unpaid post as Justice of
the Peace and he applied himself to the task of meeting the
common complaints and pleadings of the people. On December
23, 1925, he was advanced to thepost ofMunicipal Police
Judge, and later to the post ofLegal Secretaryof the

33Ibid., p.

156
municipality of Nunoa. Early in 1932, he was appointed
mayor of Nunoa by the Montero government, but he resigned
in June of the same year after the inauguration of the
"Socialist Republic." During the short period he served
as mayor, during the Depression crisis, he reduced his own
salary and sold the automobile that was maintained by the
municipality for the mayor. Also during this Nunoa period,
and in his spare time, GonzSlez founded a civic movement
called Uni6n Civica to unite people against political parties.
It was composed in the main of municipal functionaries and
retired military officers.3^
Throughout Gonzalez' municipal career he exhibited
those traits of character which served him for both well
and ill as head of the Naci Party. It is possible that he
was a member of the conspiratorial TEA group which planned
to overthrow Alessandri in 1924, but for the most part
GonzSlez had no major involvement in party politics during
35
these years. It was a period dominated by the presidency
of Ibanez and Gonzalez was partial to the brand of strong
government which IbSnez represented. Like many others, he
saw in Ibanez the chance to reclaim the fallen prestige of
the Republic. The callapse of the IbSnez dictatorship in
July 18 31 undoubtedly had a strong impact on GonzSlez as it

Interview with GonzSlez* widow, March 1973.

35
Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes," Government and
Opposition, p. 22j Trabaio (July 20, 1933), p. 5.

157
did on Chilean politics in general. It opened the door to
competing political ideologies each with its own solution
to the "social question." GonzSlez had his own, and to a
very large extent the ideology of Chilean Nacismo was
GonzSlez* own ideology. Likewise, the Chilean Naci party
was largely a reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of
GonzSlez character and personality.

E. Toward a Socio-Psychological Portrait of El Jefe

On April 5, 1932, the day the Movimiento Nacional-
Socialista de Chile was founded, Jorge GonzSlez celebrated
his 32nd birthday. Keller was 34. When these two young
men were shown a copy of Hitler's Nazi Party program a few
days earlier, they had both decided that what they wanted
to see implemented was a specifically Chilean program which
would seek to recapture the substance and spirit of the
nineteenth century Portalian state — that ideal so clearly
manifest in the writings of Edwards and Encina. A few days
later, they met with several other friends to create the
M.N.S. All were agreed that Gonzalez should be the leader.
So close in their ideas and goals, the difference in person­
ality between Keller and Gonzalez was clearly the decisive
factor. Gonzalez was a leader; Keller was not.
What made GonzSlez a leader was that he was the epitome
of the bourgeois; more, he embodied the characteristics of
the bourgeois in an exaggerated form. Rigidly self-righteous
and self-disciplined, he was intent upon serving a higher

158
ideal with moral fervor. He adhered to a strict code of
personal honesty and integrity and observed a puritan ethic
which forbade smoking and drinking. Married in 1923 to
Laura Allende Wood, with whom he had four children, he
remained a devoted husband and father. Valuing honor and
virtue above all else, he abhorred compromise and had only
contempt for those with a more easy-going attitude than
himself. Quite obviously, these very characteristics which
made Gonzalez appealing as a leader were also the most
formidable drawbacks to his leadership.
According to Gonzalez' widow, he was self-assured but
not socially-assured, he was quiet and had to be forced
to talk, "he didn't have memories and thus lived for the
future." His ideas were so fixed from an early age that few
could influence him and thus he had few followers of an
independent mind (Keller was obviously a striking exception).
If he stamped his character on the Chilean Naci movement, he
also stamped his idea on its ideology. If he was too
civilized to be an effective "Leader" of a fascist movement,
he was also too cerebral. He was well read in history and a
perceptive commentator on Chile's past and problems.
Gonzalez* speeches were not fanatical and emotional
tirades filled with political propaganda, but coherent and
developed expositions based on a central theme. In fact, he
despised party politics. He was the teacher; his major goal
still education. But he was not a naturally gifted public
speaker. He had to overcome a certain shyness and in the
159
Movement's early days he laboriously worked over his speeches
for hours* committing them to memory or at least mastering
them to the point where he could deliver them with relative
ease. Even so* he usually had difficulty beginning his
speeches. But once in form* he was able to speak clearly and
forcefully. One of his unsympathetic listeners was forced to
note that he was "perhaps one of the most succinct orators
and with the greatest facility of expression that we have
known in Chile* He approaches problems with extraordinary
discipline* surrounds them with what is necessary to eluci­
date them* he disgards all that is useless and superficial
going directly to the point and never losing himself in
36
vague digressions."
If he was overserious and lacked humor* GonzSlez made
up for it by being intense and lucid. He did not assault
his listeners and followers and attempt to stir them to
states of mindlessness. He sought rather to persuade them
by appealing to their minds. But he never realized that in
politics idealism is a hindrance to power if it is taken as
seriously by the "Leader" as it is by his followers.

Ricardo Boizard* Voces de la politics, el pulpito

v la calle (Santiagoi 1948), p. 41. -

160
 IV

AN "IDEOLOGY" OUT OF POWER

A. The Nature of Naci Thinking in Chile

1. Ideology and Utopia

In his book, Ideology and Utopia. Karl Mannheim examined
the social basis of thought or what he called the "sociology
of knowledge". The principal thesis of Mannheim's book is
that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately
understood without understanding their social origins. His
method of analysis is both logical and psychological. He
pointed out that it is incorrect to explain the totality
of an outlook with reference only to its genesis in the mind
of the individual. An individual thinks in modes of a
group, of a society; his view of the world is intimately
related to the society in which he lives. The "sociology of
knowledge" attempts to comprehend thought in the concrete
historical-social situation out of which individually
differentiated thought emerges. In so doing, it attempts
to link concretely existing modes of thought to collective
action.
In Mannheim's view, the possibility of a "sociology of
knowledge" in a society emerges when horizontal mobility is
accompanied by intensive vertical mobility — when rapid
social ascent and descent shake the validity of established
thought-forms. He saw vertical mobility as the decisive

161
factor in making persons uncertain and sceptical of their
traditional view of the world. When he published his book
in Germany in 1936, his understanding of his time was reflected
in his work* "It is obviously no accident that the sociolo­
gical standpoint was added to the others only at a relatively
advanced date. Nor is it by chance that the outlook which
brings together the social and the cognitive spheres emerges
in a time in which the greatest exertion of mankind once
more consists in the attempt to counteract the tendency of an
individualistic undirected society, which is verging toward
anarchy, with a more organic type of social order. In such
a situation there must arise a general sense of interdepen­
dence — of the interdependence which binds the single expe­
rience to the stream of experience of single individuals
and these in turn to the fabric of the wider community of
experience and activity."1
The discovery of the social-situational roots of thought,
according to Mannheim, first took the form of unmasking —
political unmasking. The final intensification of the
intellectual crisis is characterized by two slogan-like
concepts — ideology and utopia. Emerging from political
conflict, the concept of ideology denotes that ruling groups
can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound
to a situation that they are no longer able to see certain

^ a r l Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction

to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York* 1966), p. 29.

162
facts which would undermine their sense of domination.
Implicit in the word "ideology" then is the insight that in
certain situations the collective unconscious of certain
groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself
and to others and thereby stabilizes it. The concept of
utopia reflects the opposite discovery of the political
struggle — namely, that certain oppressed groups are
intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and
transformation of a given condition of society that they
unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which
tend to negate it. Utopian thinking is thus incapable of
correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society. In
fact, it is not concerned with what exists, for it is already
seeking to change what exists. It is thus not the diagnosis
of a situation, but a direction for action. The collective
unconscious of the utopian mentality is guided by wishful
representation and the will to action and in so doing it
obscures certain aspects of reality. In short, it rejects
everything which would shake its belief and thus paralyze its
desire to change things.
In seeking to understand the social basis of Naci
thinking in Chile, it is first necessary to point out that
the totality of the outlook does not have reference only to
its genesis in the mind of Gonzalez (or Keller). It is
intimately related to Chilean society and the concrete
i

2Ibid., pp. 49 ff.

163
historical-social situation of the 1920s and 1930s. It
was a time when horizontal mobility was accompanied by inten­
sive vertical mobility, a time when the validity of the old
order was shaken and with it the thought-forms established
by it. And it was a time when a more organic type of social
order was being sought by a number of competing social
philosophies. Gonzalez' single experience was bound to
Keller's and the single experiences of many others and these
in turn were bound to the experience of the wider community.
The collective activity of the group — the MNS — did
not, however, become the collective activity of society
because in the 1930s the concrete historical-social situation
was already changing. Moreover, in Mannheim's terms, and
unlike the European forms of Communism and Fascism, the
philosophy of the MNS was more ideological than utopian. It
was not concerned with the destruction and transformation
of a given condition of society. It was more a diagnosis
of a situation than a plan of action. It was concerned with
the existing situation in Chile. But like the ruling group,
it obscured the real condition of society both to itself
and to others and thereby stabilized it. The philosophy of
the MNS was an "ideology" out of power.
Because the Chilean Naci movement never managed to
gain power, we are necessarily limited to studying its ide­
ology and its relation to action in what might be called the
pure form of the relation between theory and practice. In
power, there would undoubtedly have occured a breech between

164
theory and practice. But Eugen Weber has pointed out that
the real essence of certain fascist doctrines — and this is
true of Communist doctrines as well — are already clearly
evident and indeed have their most profound expression in
the period of their formulation, controversy, soap-box oratory
q
and pamphleteering. In the case of the MNS, and different
$
from European Fascism, there was already a received body of
thought from Palacios, Edwards, Encina, and Spengler which
crystalized in the mind of Keller and GonzSlez. The funda­
mental ideas and doctrines were elaborated and modified rather
than developed and transformed.

2. Chilean or Foreign?
Was Chilean Nacismo rooted in native Chilean traditions
or was it imported from abroad? In large part, this question
has already been answered. Eduardo Frei has written* "In
no nation of South America was there a group, small but
militant, which so profoundly absorbed this ideology
(National Socialism), as the group which formed the National
Socialist party of Chile."^ But Frei, and many other writers
like him, who attributed the rise of the Naci movement in
Chile to the external influences of Italian Fascism and

3
Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism. Doctrines of
Revolution in the Twentieth Century! (New York: 1964), p. 10.
4
Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva,
Historia de los partidos politicos Chilenos (Santiago:
1949), p. 241.

165

r
German National Socialism and mirabile dictu also contend
that Naci ideology was merely a carbon copy of its European
prototypes, have simply not taken the trouble to analyze the
form and content of Nacismo in Chile.
Gonzalez openly acknowledged the indebtedness of Nacismo
to Italian Fascism and German National Socialisms "The
worst thing a people like ours can do is to pretend tobe
original. It would be ridiculous for us to resist the
ideological and spiritual tendencies . . . " But Gonz£lez*
statement cannot be taken at face value. Shortly after the
establishment of the movement, he explained the relationship
between the MNS and its European counterparts:
We consider that fascism, in its fundamental ideas,
is not only an Italian movement, but a world movement.
It incarnates the spontaneous and natural reaction
of common men against the political decomposition
produced by the democratic-liberal state. It signifies
the triumph of the 'grand politics', that is, of the
politics directed by the few superior men of each
generation, over the mediocrity which constitutes
the character of liberalism; it signifies also the
predominance of race over economic materialism and
internationalism. In this sense we are fascists,
without that signifying in any sense that we intend
to copy Italian fascism or German Hitlerism. Our
movement is characterized by its essentially nationalist
tendency."
Indeed, Gonzalez conceived fascism as a phenomenon applicable
to all of Western civilization:
Fascist ideology has in our judgement a magnificent
resource which makes it applicable to all peoples
of our culture . . . There is in fascism an inspiration

5
El Imparcial (October 25, 1932), p. 2.

166
 which is not only Italian, but universal • • •
Although our ideology is inspired by the genius of
Mussolini, it does not mean that our movement is
not genuinely national. Our work consists precisely
in adapting the essence of the universality of fascism
to the necessities and tendencies of our age."°
An examination of Gonzalez* statements on this issue
is very instructive. They appear contradictory because
Gonzalez* conception of Nacismo in Chile was full of contra­
dictions. On July 12, 1932, he had written: "Italy and
Japan have their Fascism, Germany has its Hitlerism, Chile
its Nacismo. Do these movements have anything in common?
Evidently, yes. They strive to produce a national rebirth
opposing the decadence of historic political parties, the
faith in action which unites in one the interests of all.
All of them reject the idea that the state is the bounty of
a war of the social classes which seek to gain power through
parliamentary struggle. All of them want to establish a
7
strong state conscious of its mission and debt to the nation."
But in this same article, he wrote* "We reject, therefore,
the opinion that the MNS of Chile is an imitation of any
similar movements in Europe. The similarity is merely
formal. The content of our movement is purely Chilean, and
nothing more than Chilean."8 GonzSlez reiterated these views 9
e
El Imoarcial. (October 25, 1932), p. 2.
7
"El nacismo chileno y movimientos similares en otros
pafses," El Imparcial. (July 12, 1932), p. 2.
8Ibid.
9Cf. El Ravo (May 15, 1935).

167
when he was interviewed on the nature of Nacismo in 1935.
In 1936, Keller made the point again very specifically*
In truth, if Nacismo were to imitate the work of Hitler
and Mussolini, it would not be copying the best models
which old Europe presently offers. But such imitation
doesn't exist. Neither Italian Fascism nor German
National Socialism have the conception of Nacismo
concerning the cultural unity of Western Christendom
as a base of spiritual life; neither of those two
European doctrines has developed the ideas which we
have expounded on anti-imperialism; neither of them
have arrived at depersonalizing the principle of
command leadership, as does Nacismo; its ideas
concerning the political structure are purely
Chilean; and it one studies with greater understanding
the rest of the doctrines expounded on these pages
(Acci6n Chilena) numerous other differences will be
seen both in basic ideas and especially in the means
of achieving them."i°
Thus the answer to the question: "Chilean or foreign?"
is nob as simple as it would first appear. Certainly
Nacismo was not a carbon copy of European Fascism or National
Socialism. Its ideology, although containing certain
borrowings from both Fascism and National Socialism, was
predominantly Chilean. It was "foreign" primarily in the
sense that Gonzalez understood Fascism as the spirit of the
age. He categorically denied that it was a European pheno­
menon provoked by the disorders arising out of the First
World War. He saw it as an irrepresible world-wide force
which, contrary to Mussolini's contention, proved to be for
export. GonzSlez saw the proof for his contention in the
fact that Fascist-inspired movements had arisen all over
Europe and also in the New World.11

^Acci&i Chilena. 5 (October, 1936)* 120-121.

11C f . "Ideologias criollas," El Imparcial (November 29,
1932).

168
 Believing that Fascism was destined to impose itself
upon the world, Gonzalez denied that it could be imitated
i

if it were to respond to national reality. If it was, as he

believed, to reflect accurately the longings, aspirations
and most importantly the collective feelings of the times,
to revive the spirit of the people and give it organic struc­
ture, it must do so in terms of the historical-social situa­
tion in Chile. Gonzalez* conception of Nacismo in Chile
made for an indigenous adaptation of certain Fascist and
National Socialist concepts to the nationalist-historical
tradition which he and Keller inherited. The result was a
semblance of a unified ideology, but not a unified program.
The latter, in particular, fluctuated in response to both
domestic and foreign exigencies, and in particular in
response to the policies of the major European fascist states.
Despite the apparent influence of developments in Italy
and Germany on the formation of Nacismo, the Nacis showed
some reluctance to identify themselves with either Italian
Fascism or German National Socialism. Although the MNS was
formed in 1932, it was not until 1934 that Gonzalez made his
first major public speech linKing Nacismo with the European
i

ideologies. Prior to this time, the Nacis only periodically

asserted their comradeship with the other Fascist powers.
After having asserted their commitment, they were soon faced
with the burdensome problem of having to justify the unpopu­
lar acts for which Mussolini and Hitler became known. When
the German Nazi Party did try to extend their influence and

169
and activities to Chile and attempted to indoctrinate and
harness the Chilean Nacis to its own ends, it disparaged
them for their lack of anti-Semitic vigor and for advocating
that German-Chileans should give up their German ethnic
identity and become completely assimilated. The MNS never
received any support, financial or otherwise, from either
the German or the Italian government and by 1936-37 the
Chilean Nacis no longer waved the Fascist flag and in fact
began denouncing some of Hitler's policies and actions.

3. The Ethos of Nacismo

In an address to the first general assembly of the
MNS, on June 21, 1932, Gonzalez first attempted to define the
ideology of Chilean Nacism*
Above all, Nacism is a national movement, not a
political party in the style of the old parties of
the liberal epoch. Its goal does not consist in
attempting to realize a rigid and dogmatic program,
but in trying to create a civil force, surcharged
with life, from which there will arise a new conception
of the State in harmony with the social, economic
and intellectual tendencies of the century.
Nacism is a popular movement. In it all the sane
elements of the nation will take part, all those
Chileans who feel the passionate desire to redirect
the national destiny into new channels . . .
All the creative forces of the nation, the industrialist
and the worker, the professional and the employed,
will find a place in our ranks to work in common for
the collective betterment . . .
Nacism is a moral force. All the spiritual values of
the racet probity, rectitude of intention, the
unquenchable faith in the destiny of the country . . .
will be rehabilitated by us and concentrated in a mighty
impulse that will re-establish the national prestige . . .
To re-establish in Chile the pride of the race — that
is our fundamental mission. But along with being a
moral force, Nacism will know also how to be a physical

170
 force which will not fear to respond to violence with
violence. In principle violence is to be condemned,
but it is necessary when reason is unable to impose
sensible judgement . . .
Nacism is a socialist movement. But our socialism
has no point of contact whatever with Marxian inter­
nationalism, nor with any of those utopian doctrines
which hold that the greatness and happiness of peoples
revolves exclusively around economic materialism.
Naci socialism is not predicated on the class struggle,
but on the cooperation of diverse social groups . . •
We are socialists in the sense that in all national
activities we desire that the profit motive and private
interest be replaced by 'social function* . . .
The Naci concept of the State grants to it full
authority over all national activities. It is the
State which ought to control and direct private initia­
tive with the object of making it yield a maximum of
effectiveness for the benefit of the common weal . . .
Naci socialism, therefore, can be translated into the
concept of the individual as the servant of the State.
Consequently, the logical co ollary of our political
ethic is discipline . . . discipline which permits
the placing of each one in the post which is best suited
to his capabilities....
Finally, Nacism stresses men rather than programs . . .
Hence let us in principle dedicate ourselves not only
to organizing the active forces of the nation around
our ideology, but to the task of selecting the human
elements which at the right moment will be able
to realize our aspirations. In this sense, Chile needs
men not programs. It needs vigorous and resolute
individuals ready to act with a clear ideal of their
duties to the collective will . .
The major themes contained in this preliminary state­
ment were there-after developed and clarified in public
lectures, newspaper articles, and printed pamphlets by
Gonzalez and others, which will be analyzed below. A "Naci

12
Jorge Gonzalez, El movimiento nacional-socialista
de Chile discurso pronunclado por el iefe del MNS en la
pnme r a asamblea nacista, celebrada en Santiago de Chile de
21 de Junio de 19321 (Santiago t 1932), pp. 17-21.

171
page” was contracted in the daily newspaper* El Imparcial,
already in 1932. The following year, the MNS began publishing
its own weekly, Trabaio, edited in large part by GonzSlez.
In January 1934 Keller began editing a journal called,
13
Acci6n Chilena. La revista de los nroblemas nacionales.
For the first year, Acci6n Chilena. was devoted exclusively
to publishing extensive expositions of foreign fascist
ideology and to translations of excerpts of articles written
by foreign fascist writers. But its success in this year
led the MNS to adopt it as their official organ and beginning
in 1935 it was devoted primarily to Chilean Naci writings.
These publications, combined with the books and occasional
writings and speeches of Gonzalez and Keller, provide the
basis for an analysis of the ideology of the Chilean Naci
Movement.

B. Nacism, Marxism, and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

The Nacis viewed the triumph of Liberalism in Chile
as the principle cause of national decline. From 1891 to
1924, the years of the parliamentary republic, the country
was subjected to the domination of an oligarchy which pursued
its own self-interests at the expense of the nation as a
whole. Because of this group*s insensitivity, the country
had lost its sense of mission, forgotten its past, and lost

13
Keller explains the reasons for the founding of
Accion Chilena in the first issue of this publication
(January 24, 1934).

172
its pride. In the economic sphere, liberal democracy had
resulted in the development of materialism at the expense
of spirituality and morality; the pursuit of wealth had in
turn corrupted the ruling class and the government.

1. Two Alternatives of Collective Existence

Gonzalez considered fascist socialism more humane than
Marxist socialism because it was not an economic doctrine
but a new concept of life. He also contended that while
Marxism was subjective and speculative, Fascism was objective
and dealt with problems of reality. In contrast to Marxist
socialism, fascist socialism categorically affirms the right
of private property. Why? Because private property is the
corner-stone of Western culture, and in GonzSlez* view the
destruction of private property would spell the destruction
of this culture. However, he was careful to point out that
the fascist concept of property differed also from that of
liberalism. Liberalism sees property as an individual and
private right; Fascism sees it as a collective and social
right. Man should not enjoy the right of property for his
own satisfaction and needs but for the satisfaction and
needs of the nation. The right of property is not an end in
itself, but a means to insure — to compel — men to work
for the betterment of society. "The individual doesn't act
for himself, but as an integrative element of the nation."
Therefore, the individual has a right to property only to
the extent that that right also benefits the collective

173
 14
whole*
Fascist socialism is thus the affirmation of the primacy
of society over the individual. What this means in effect
is that the state decides what is good for society rather
than the individual. The state is to direct and channel
private initiative with the objective of achieving the
maximum efficiency for the general interest. To do so it
must repress "parasitic capitalism" and turn money into an
instrument of progress. For the state* all social classes
are equal and should be treated equally. Different from
Marxist socialism, fascist socialism recognizes that classes
cannot be destroyed and it would not even be desirable to
do so. But by treating all classes equally, the fascist
state solves the problem of class conflict without class war.
All upper, middle and lower classes contribute equally in
their own way to the forward march of the national organism
in the same way that all pieces of a watch function together
harmoniously.15
Keller considered liberal democracy a device of
exploitative capitalism. He was thus anti-democratic to
the extent that he was anti-capitalist. Nacismo intended to
replace liberal democracy, which served individual interests,
with a national socialism which would regulate capitalism.

14
These remarks are based on Gonzalez' discussion in
La concepci6n nacista del estado (Santiago* 1934), pp. 51 ff.
15
Ibid., pp. 54 ff. Cf. also GonzSlez, El Movimiento.
p. 18.

174
In the context of political life in Chile in the 1930s,
defending liberal democracy meant defending the dictator­
ship of money which was sustained by public communication
and electoral bribery. In Keller's view, defending liberal
democracy meant defending the slavery of the fourth class —
the proletariat — created by the French Revolution.
In his 1937 article, "Nacismo and Marxism", the most
definitive statement of the Chilean Naci movement's under­
standing of this relationship, Keller insisted that the
Nacis did not come out of the ranKs of the reactionary
Right, but out of the Lef t . ^ He himself evolved from a
sympathizer of the Russian Revolution to Nacismo. His
initial response was a reaction against the injustices of
the capitalist system — the miserable conditions of the
workers and the exploitation of this class by the rich. He
separated from his old communist friends because he felt
they had lost their revolutionary spirit. He still admired
the Russian Revolution, but was very critical of its short-
comings.17
Keller found it strange that the parties of the Chilean
Right celebrated the French Revolution, although it destroyed

X6 #
Cf. Carlos Keller, "Nacismo y marxismo," Accion
Chilena, 6, no. 2 (September, 1937), also Keller, "Anti-
marxismo," Acci6n Chilena. 5, no. 2 (October, 1936), and
Gonzalez, Nacismo o communismo. Discurso pronunciado por
radio por el Jefe del Nacismo, Jorge Gonzalez, el 28 de
Julio de 1 9 3 6 (Santiagoi 1937). For the Nacis, tHe~terms
Marxism and Communism were interchangeable.
17Ibid., pp. 71 f.

175
the latifundia system in France which still existed in Chile.
He also found it strange that the Left celebrated the French
Revolution because it was a bourgeois revolution which
prohibited the right of association and organization of the
workers. Capitalism had been able to take advantage of
liberal democracy and make it an instrument of its domina­
tion. For twenty years the Communists opposed liberal demo­
cracy, but Keller felt that this was no longer the case. He
saw Nacismo as an alternative to capitalist dictatorship and
Communist dictatorship.
It would be a mistake, wrote Keller, to think that the
Marxists are not individualists like the liberals. They are,
and in an exaggerated way, because they not only reject all
spiritual and moral obligations but also believe that the
highest ideal of the individual is the satisfaction of his
material and sensual needs. This is why they demand an
equitable distribution of things among all individuals.
*

Marxism has failed to live up to its goals in the Soviet

Union. It has not only destroyed the basic unit of the
family, but has made the Soviet Union into an imperialist
power governed by a "small Jewish Minority" which prevails
18
in the Communist Party.
Keller calls the Popular Front a "Trojan horse", and
in Chile he claims that the Soviet Union is using Masonic
lodges to cooperate with the Popular Front. He also accused

18Ibid., pp. 80 f.

176
the Soviet Union of establishing associations and leagues
in Chile to spread Marxist propaganda, and further of spreading
pornographic magazines to undermine the moral principle of
the family. He then lashed out at the liberal state which
he claimed had proven unable to control this Bolshevik
spiritual assault. The liberal regime in Chile tolerates
the publication of Marxist literature. Why? Because Marxism
had its origins in the Encyclopedists and a large part of
the bourgeoisie was educated in this ideology and are prepared
to receive it. The fact that the popularity of Marxism had
increased in Chile demonstrated to Keller that the bourgeoi-
19
sie was spiritually sterile and incapable of opposing it.
In Keller's view, Marxism was continuing the work begun
oy liberalism — the emphasis on materialism and the advance­
ment of individual interests. In effect, Keller was saying
that only Nacismo promised socialism; socialism is not an
economic but a spiritual concept* "For us, life continues
in all its extension of the marvelous Western culture which
was formed during the course of two millenia. For us, God
is not deadjfor us, there are ideals which mam has the
obligation and the duty to sacrifice himself for; for us,
there are spiritual and moral values which constitute the
basis of our existence and without which life is not worth
living. These are the reasons for our anti-Marxism. We
reject the Marxist mentality. We reject the very basis or
foundation of Marxist doctrine — its atheism, its negation

19Ibid., p. 82.

177
of the spirit, its nihilism, its banality, its degradation
20
of the human being to the level of a best."

2. Chile and the West

GonzSlez' arguments on Chile's place in Western culture
closely paralleled those of Palacios. He wrote that Chile
was among the few South American countries in which the
Spanish conquistador element ethnically dominated the
Indian. In this regard, Chile's situation was similar to
that of the United States where the Indian was totally
eliminated by the white man, who transferred to the North
American continent his way of life, social organization,
politics, religion — in short, Western culture. In Chile,
first the Spanish, then the German, British and other
European elements came to dominate. The indominable resis­
tance of the Indian to submit himself to the invaders resulted
21
in a relatively limited mixing of races.
Thus Gonzalez argued that Chilean nationality in both
its racial and cultural aspects forms part of the nations
of Western Europe} and its political, social, and economic
institutions also belong to that tradition. Chilean culture
is Western culture and as a good Spenglerian, Gonzalez argues
that Chile's collective development will respond to the same
"vibrations" and follow the same evolutions as Europe.

20Ibid., p. 83.
21 ^
GonzSlez, La concepcion nacista del estado. p. 19.

178
GonzSlez is careful to point out that this does not mean
that Chile must imitate the customs and ways of Western
peoples. The European nations all retained their individual
cultures and Chile must maintain its national characteristics *
"We are Western in that our basic concepts of life coincide
with those in Europe, such as the organization of the family,
property, religion, good and evil, justice and injustice,
etc. On the other hand, we have our own Chilean customs and
22
way of life which distinguishes our nationality."

3. A Party or a Movement?
Political parties, from the Naci viewpoint, were
considered one of the key manifestations of liberal demo­
cracy and it is for this reason that they were condemned.
Gonzalez wrote that the country was longing for a national
government free from political parties and the tyranny of
doctrines. The Nacis would do what Portales did; it would
rid the country of factions and doctrines which agitate and
disturb the body politic. Only with the elimination of
parties could the government return into the hands of states­
men with the qualities of leadership which had prevailed
until 1891. The direction of the destiny of the country
should be returned into the hands of those few select strong
personalities who appear in each generation. 23

22Ibid., p. 20.
23Ibid*, pp. 35-38.

179
 Throughout the period of his leadership and even after,
GonzSlez contended that the system of parties in Chile consti­
tuted the negation of the fundamental principles of a healthy
democracy because it eliminated all effective direction of
public matters by preventing the forces of labor from partici­
pating in it. In the sense that political parties represented
the tyranny of the few over the many, they were anti-national.
In fact, even if all of the parties were to participate in
the government, Gonzalez argued, they still wouldn't repre­
sent the nation because parties are not representative expres­
sions of Chilean nationality. What was needed was an inte—
grative mechanism and spirit above parties. Nationalism and
socialism are the two elements which must necessarily come
together in order to establish a National government in the
true sense of the word. Gonzalez* claimed that the socialism
of the Nacis was of a new kind, in essence, a rehabilitation
of the permanent spiritual values of humanity. Because it
was not conditioned either by economic struggles or the
struggles they breed but derived from the intimate nature of
every human being, it was independent of all external material
forces. Such a "spiritual conception of socialism" would
revive the nationalism which had prevailed in Chile before
the advent of liberal democracy. Beyond rationalism and
materialism, Nacismo was not a party but a movement for the
salvation and rebirth of Western culture in general and its

180
 24
Chilean manifestation in particular.

C. The Naci Conception of the State

Above all else, according to its leaders, Nacismo was
fundamentally a new conception of the state. It is not
without significance that Gonzalez* major political writing
during the period of his leadership was his 1934 book, La
concepci6n nacista del estado. Nacismo. he wrote, seeks to
rid the country of political personalism; the system should
25
exist above the individual. In 1938, in Una revolucion en
marcha. el movimiento nacional-socialista ante la politica
del pais. Keller wrote i " • . . w e will restore the Portalian
concept of the state. The Portalian creation consisted
precisely in dissociating the state from all private and
class interests with the purpose or goal that it assume the
role of arbiter of the national interest . . . On the other
hand, it.would be an error to restore the political organism
created by Portales. In Portales* epoch, Chile was essen­
tially an agricultural country — a country of latifundistas
without any middle classes or a proletariat. Thus the
Portalian structures don't conform to the social and politic
cal reality of today. Thus one cannot attempt a restoration.
Our revolution will integrate various components to consti-

24
Idem., El mal de Chile» sus causas v sus remedios.
(Santiagoi 1940), pp. 17-22 and 71-77.
25
Idem., La concepci6n nacista del estado, p . 16.

181
tute a unity."2® In 1940, in mal de Chile. GonzHlez
returned again to this idea. In reviewing the historical-
political panorama of Chile, he noted that Portales had put
an end to anarchy. Portales made the machine of government
work minus personalism. He instilled in the aristocracy
and the army unconditional respect for the tradition of
government. Quoting Edwards, Gonzalez noted that the Portalian
conception of the state was no more nor less than the arrang-
ing of the "mainspring of the machine".27 This mainspring
was respect for the tradition of government.
Gonzalez denied that Portales was an autocrat. He was
precisely the opposite. "If he governed dictatorially, it
was only because he had to." It was not for personal
political power, but for the power of the state. Portales
was not the dictator, the state was the dictator. Portales
didn't scorn constitutions, he simply relegated them to their
proper place. The written document meant nothing if it
didn't reflect the collective spirit. The Marxists were
wrong to criticize Portales* government as based on the class
struggle because there were no classes. "The Portalian
tradition of government," wrote GonzSlez, "should be restored.
The concept of a strong and vigorous government should be
re-established — not a dictatorship of the caudillo. but

26
Carlos Keller, Una revoluci6n en marcha. El movimiento
nacional-socialista ante la politica del pais (Santiagot
1938), p. 10.
27
Gonzalez, El mal de Chile, p. 18.

182
the returning of executive power to the President, giving
him the power and prestige and the incontestable authority
28
as in days past.”

1. The Organization and Structure of the Corporate

State
In a speech in the latter part of 1932, GonzSlez
asserted that ”The state in the. highest sense of this word
does not exist in Chile. National interest lacks direction.
There isn’t a clear vision of the course it should follow,
and in the midst of this general orientation, incompetence
and immorality reign in all public organisms." 29 What were
the causes of this situation? They were many, said GonzSlez.
But fundamentally it was the absence in Chile of any clear
and precise conception of what role the state should play
vis-a-vis the changing economic and social conditions of the
country. Chile had been transformed both economically and
socially, but the political and administrative structures of
the country had remained unchanged — based on liberal
principles. Having been created with the almost exclusive
purpose of maintaining order and defending public interests,
the liberal state had outlived its usefulness and was unable
to prevent the weakening of its institutions resulting from
the post World War I era. As GonzSlez put iti "the political

28Ibid., p. 71.
29 „
Idem., "Concepcion nacista del estado," speech given
on September 9, 1932, p. 4.

183
doctrinarianism of the past century has been replaced by
30
the present economic empiricism.*'
Because of the inadequacies and shortcomings of the
liberal state# the Nacis claimed that neither constitutional
nor legislative changes could rectify Chile's ills. It was
therefore necessary to undertake a substantial modification
in the basic conception and structure of the state itself
in order to provide for order# work, and social justice. 31
They called for the establishment of a strong state "conscious
of its mission" to serve the needs of the collective
national interests of groups and classes and to promote in
principle the maximum well-being of the nation and its people.
In achieving this goal, the state would also be contributing
to the establishment of a "Chilean community" — "an organic
whole" — in which each citizen would carry out a role in
32
accordance with his capacity.
Moreover, the function of the Naci state should go
beyond serving merely as the guardian of public security,
but not to the point of bringing all social matters under
its control. While the state should intervene in most

30_, . . c
Ibid., p. 6.
31Ibid., p. 9.
32
Plan de accion del movimiento nacional-socialista de
Chile (Santiago* June 6, 1932)# p. 3.

184
national activities, there should also be limitations on its
33
actions in accordance with the general will. In this way,
the Nacis hoped to realize their goal of a state based on
socialist principles adapted to national purposes; a state in
which the interests of the individual are compatible with
the collective or national interest. The ideal social order
was one in which social classes were well-defined and each
contributed to the organic whole. The Nacis claimed that
by revitalizing the nascent class identification in the
w

moribund liberal parties they were striving to make indivi-

duals understand and appreciate their societal functions. 34
The Nacis opposed not only parliamentary government
but the presidential system Of Chile's liberal regime. They
claimed that the best government was one run by ministers
directed by a Prime Minister, who was responsible to the
President. In December 1932 (i.e., before Hitler), they
declared that the German government offered the best example
of what a sane presidential system should be. 35 There was a
President above parties, less concerned with politics than
with the national interest. Thus changes in ministries and
policies did not disturb the continuity of the government.
It was said that Chile was never able to understand the

33El movimiento nacional socialists de Chile. Declara-

ciones fundamentales plan de accion-orqanizacion-proarama
(Santiago! 1932).
34
"Nacismo y socialismo," Ideario Nacista (September 13,
1932).
35
"Regimen Presidencial," El Imparcial (December 30,
1932), p. 2.
advantages of this type of system* thus all the politicians
aspired to the presidency rather than to the Ministry of the
Interior, which was much more effective. This was Ibanez*
30
mistake, but one which Portales didn’t make.
In the final analysis, all power was to reside with
the President. The Nacis even called for dissolving the
division between the executive and legislative branches of
government i "The present division of the state into three
independent powers is fictitious and weakens the action of
public authority until it comes to paralyze it. The MNS
will annex the legislative branch to the President, who will
37
continually be advised by a representative council." It
was also claimed that the independence of the judiciary had
led to the decadence of its members and that this branch of
the government should also come under the direct surveillance
and supervision of the President. In theory, this would not
limit the independence of judges to make decisions, but
would curb the influence which political parties and bribery
had over the courts.
The President of the Republic was to serve as the symbo­
lic leader of the state. Keller referred to him as the "true
father of the nation," who would embody the virtues and

37
El movimiento nacional-socialista de Chile» Mani­
festo impartido por el iefe del movimiento nacional-
socialista de Chile. (Santiago! July 12, 1933).

186
traditions of the nation but would not identify with the
government and the administration. He was to be elected by
the people and serve as the supreme arbiter of political
differences. He was to be responsible for monitoring the
duties of the Chief of State, who would run the government
similar to a Prime Minister. The President's powers were
to be unlimited and only subject to his success or failure
38
in office. Again, the example was pre-Hitler Germany.
But the new Jefe of a Naci Chile was to be "the symbol of
the country . . . the Christ of politics with the cross he
39
was obliged to carry with bravery and sacrifice."
The corporate state outlined by the Nacis in their
various pronouncements was ostensibly similar to Italian
corporatism, although the influence of the papal encyclicals
40
Rerum Nova rum and Quadraaesimo Anno can also be noticed.
To be sure, the MNS was not the first or the only group to
advocate some form of a corporate state in Chile. Corporat­
ivism was a topic of considerable scholarly interest and
discussion in the 1920s and 1930s. The Agrarian Party founded
in 1931 within the Agrarian Society of Concepcion, had as its
goal to give representation to agriculturalists in the South

^®"Regimen Presidencial," p. 2.
39El movimiento nacional-socialista de Chilet mani­
festo impartido por el iefe. (July 12, 1933).
^Gonzcilez, La concepcion nacista del eBtado, p. 9.

187
along corporativist lines* In 1934, Agustin Edwards promoted
the idea of corporate representation in the Liberal Party,
claiming that Chile should follow the rest of the world in
creating her own corporate state. He called for the
formation of provincial assemblies which would be composed
of representatives from among the workers and owners of
production, who would choose their representatives in
provincial corporate organizations. He called also for
mining, industrial, commercial and professional corporate
structures.41
Gonzalez specifically called for the corporate state in
La concepcion nacista del estado. He insisted that the
\

natural function of the state was to direct individual

activities, especially economic ones. Because under the
liberal state the control of economic life had fallen into
the hands of "bankers and international speculators" who
were exploiting the people, the Naci state would assume to
represent them and use its authority to re-establish a balance
of interests. The people, according to Gonzalez, did not
clamor for liberty, but for work. In fact, the orientation,
stimulus and defense of labor constituted the prime reason
for the state's existence.42 Thus the organization and power
of the state is naturally based on the forces of labor. This
meant that the political structure of tomorrow ought to rest

41
Agustin Edwards, Las corporaciones v la doctrina
liberal (Santiago* 1934), p. 7.
42Gonz£lez, La concepcion nacista del estado, pp. 44-46.

188
on the organisms which represent the national labor force.
Thus the old liberal .parties will be replaced with entities
formed by the workers* "Workers and businessmen, laborers
of muscle and brain, all who work in one form or another
for the general good and progress will have a place in these
organisms. Only the lazy and the exploiters will be
43
excluded." The main cells of the new Naci state will be
labor syndicates. The amorphous mass will be replaced by a
people hierarchically organized in accordance with the
different labors they perform. The labor groups will be
organized in corporations and will function as the true
representatives and directors of the productive forces of
the nation, subject only to the supreme "intuition" of the
Government.44

2. The "Democracy" of the Aristocracy

A society of well-defined classes was also one which
was hierarchical and disciplined; but discipline was to be
more spiritual than physical, the result of conviction rather
than force. The Naci, Javier Cox, put it most forcefully*
"to achieve its goal of uniting all Chileans into one national
soul, in order that it might constitute a single collective
force and one common purpose, crossing all party lines,
Nacismo recognizes that it is indispensable above all to
discipline the nation, which is consumed by the anarchy of

43Ibid., p. 47
44
Ibid., p. 49. Cf. also pp. 90-94.

189
groups and factions, doctrines and individual egoisms • . .
It is necessary to discipline the nation; discipline groups,
discipline clans, discipline social classes; and subordi-
45
nate them all to the national interest."
As a corollary to their contention that the progress
of the nation was best served by the maintenance of class
differences — or the diversification of social-functions —
the Nacis stressed the importance of the aristocracy as the
governing class. The aristocracy exists to lead the nation.
It was the "cement of the nation". GonzSlez contended that
VA nation which lacks a healthy and vigorous aristocracy is
prevented from maintaining lasting political forms." He had
in mind Chile's traditional aristocracy which had governed
the country during its period of greatness — from Portales
to Balmaceda — and which had been replaced by a plutocracy
which pursued wealth and pleasure at the expense of the
nation. "Our boldly conceived aristocracy,” wrote Gonzalez,
"is none other than the reflection and continuation of old
patrician habits." This old aristocracy had been destroyed
by the predominant role political parties had come to play in
47
the government.
The new aristocracy was to be composed of the "best"

45
Javier Cox, "Que es el nacismo?", Trabaio (May 15,
1932), p. 4, and (June 21, 1932), p. 19.
^GonzSlez, La concepci6n nacista del estado. p. 42.
47
"Aristocracia nacista," Traba io (July 9, 1936), p. 3.

190
individuals of society, determined not by wealth or political
influence but on the basis of individual merit and achieve­
ment* As Javier Cox put it, "the aristocracy would be
chosen from among the people on the basis of their qualities
of intelligence and strength of will, and by their example
48
of integrity, abnegation, and other civic cirtues." The
Nacis thus considered their conception of the aristocracy in
the future state "democratic". In the words of the Naci,
Mauricio Mena, "Nacismo employs the concept of 'democratic
aristocracy*, that is government of the best by those most
qualified, regardless of their social class origins." 49
Aristocracy and democracy were thus considered perfectly
compatible. A government of the "best" was the logical and
natural result of a healthy democratic state. Those most
capable should have both the right and the obligation to
rise in the social order. Democracy consisted in propor­
tioning to each this opportunity in accordance with his
50
aptitude.
According to Gonzalez, the "best" should be chosen by
the "best". Thus the masses of the people should not be
allowed to select their leaders. It was absurd to give the
selection of the most apt and honorable to the inept and

48
Javier Cox, "Aristocracia y oligarquia," Traba jo
(September 14, 1935), p. 3.
49
Maurico Mena, "La base politics del nacismo,"
Traba io (April 5, 1933).
50 *
Gonzalez, La concepcifin nacista del estado, p. 40.

191
irresponsible masses. Their democracy consisted in the fact
that all citizens of the state were allowed access to positions
and public honors according to their abilities. The Nacis
categorically rejected the contention that they favored
51
dictatorship, but they accepted the concept of elitism.
"Democracy, as we understand it," wrote GonzSlez, "is closely
tied to the concepts of hierarchy and discipline. The
popular base of government can only reside in equality of
opportunity."52

D. Nacismo and Economy

In El mal de Chile, written after the demise of the
MNS, Gonz£lez still maintained what he had from the
beginning — that "the economy is only a manifestation of
the spirit of man." 53 The Nacis believed that the economy,
though important, could not in and of itself create the
conditions for the construction of a solid and stable
social structure. This was, of course, the exact opposite
of the "Marxist” view of economy; but it was more than that.
Believing that moral and spiritual forces are more important
and in fact decisive in the orientation of the destinies o f .

51
Cf. "Entrevista con Jorge GonzSlez,” El Imparcial
(May 15, 1935); Nemrod, "Estado y jefe," Trabaio (August 24,
1936), p. 13; Juan Jose Jara, "Gobierno fuerte y gobierno de
fuerza," Traba io (July 1, 1936), p. 3. Cf. also Rene Silva
Espejo, "Las verdaderas posiciones del nacismo," Traba io
(September 14, 1933), p. 5.
52
GonzSlez, La concepciSn nacista del estado, p. 13.
53
Idem., El mal de Chile, p. 80.

192
the world — more important and decisive than material
forces — the economy played only a secondary role to the
concept of the state, which was itself a spiritual concept.
In order to carry out the fundamental goal of Nacismo —
the re-establishment of national unity — the Nacis quite
naturally claimed that it was first necessary to bring the
economy under state control. 54 "Laissez-faire economy,"
Keller asserted, "is for liberalism; and it is a failure.
If Adam Smith, a superior person with moral and humanitarian
inclinations, could observe the consequences of this system
which he created, it is a certainty that he would commit
cc
suicide." In fact, Keller rejected any specific economic
system claiming that they had all failed. What was needed
was not another economic system, but the re-establishment
of moral order and the socialization of the individual in
order to overcome the polarization which threatened to
anihilate everyone. But Keller did cite one model: "Without
contracting debts, without receiving loans from outside,
without monetary inflation and even exposed to a boycott
by much of the world, Hitler has managed to lower the number
of unemployed in less than two years from six and one-half
million to two million. There is no formula to explain
Hi tier* s success. The secret of Hitler’s success is not in

54 „
Idem., La concepcion nacista del estado. p. 52.
55
Carlos Keller, "Nacismo y economia," Accion Chilena,
2, no. 1, (February, 1935), p. 10.

56Ibid., p. 12.

193
his program, but in the socialist conscience inculcated in
each individual. In order to rebuild the economy, it is
first necessary to restore the state.’* But Keller's citing
of Hitler's example is not in itself significant, because
many Western governments were also admiring Hitler's early
achievements. Nevertheless, Keller was correct in noting
that Hitler's economic successes’were in large part based
on extra-economic considerations.
In his 1934 speech, "The Democratic Function of the
Corporate State," Javier Cox noted that the Chilean economy
had developed in an arbitrary, particularistic, inorganic
and disordered manner precisely because the liberal democra­
tic state had not brought economic activities under the
control of the state. As a result, formidable forces were
created which not only pursued divisive ends foreign to the
state but sometimes were directed against it. In economy,
the key problem was to harness private interests to the
general interests of the nation. Cox reiterated GonzSlez*
contention that economic matters had come to dominate the
human spirit to the extent that men and governments were
more than ever before absorbed in economic matters to the
57
exclusion of spiritual matters. He saw society clearly
divided into two large groups or classes — salaried workers

57
Javier Cox, "La democracia funcional del estado
corporative," unpublished text of speech delivered sometime
in 1934, pp. 1-3.

194
and owners, i.e., those who do not own the means of produc­
tion and those who do. Economic conflict was tending more
and more to divide society into these two groupings, more
than any ideological or doctrinal differences. He noted
that the Marxist parties had recognized the importance of
these economic and social issues of the times and the
divisions between labor and management and that in the
class conflict the Marxists represented labor. But, said
Cox, the necessity of the times is not to destroy these
differences but to place them in harmony so that both classes
58
would work for the common good.
The Nacis believed that the objective of a functional
democracy was to establish a corporate state; the organic
structure of the state was to be based on unions — syndi­
cates and associations of workers, and syndicates and
associations of owners — in which workers and owners would
be equally represented. The purpose of this system was to
regulate the distribution of the benefits of production
among the factors that contribute to it. The principal
function of the corporate structure was to organize production
in such a way that it would benefit not private interests,
59
but the national interest*
The syndicates of the corporate state structure were
to be formed according to public law, organized hierarchi­
cally, each divided into workers and owner organizations at

58Ibid., pp. 4-6.

59Ibid., pp. 7-9.

195
all levels, and united at the national level. If this
system was to insure more equal representation for the
workers and their employers, it was also to seek a more
equal representation for the peasants vis—a—vis the land­
owners. The Nacis claimed that the latifundia system was
a cancer in the national economy and that the large land­
owners had used politics to protect their positions and
sustain the system. Thus the Nacis called for distribution
of the land and they specifically criticized the policy of
giving loans only to the rich. In theory, Nacismo would
extend credit to all who deserved it. It would free the
campesinos and make them landowners. It promised free
education and a higher standard of living for the inquilino.
It would organize rural unions similar to those in the urban
areas. Thus, in economic terms, Nacismo was revolutionary;
but for the Nacis this would be the result of a revolution
of the spirit.

E. Common Cause with the Church

In response to the question* "Can a Catholic be a
Naci?", an editorial in Traba io noted that the ideals of
Nacismo were similar to those of the church* "Chilean
Nacism respects religion as a restraint on passions." Like
the church, Nacismo respected everything that contributes to
the actual progress of the country. Like the Church,
Nacismo attacked the class struggle and its exploiters.
Consistent with the encyclical of Leo XIII, Nacismo pursues

196
the wellbeing of the popular classes* Yes, a Catholic could
be a Naci.6®
In the Naci view, the Portalian aristocracy was
Christian, But later, transformed by its aspirations for
money, it had put religion in the service of its social
obligations. Christianity had become a means rather than
an end. Because of this, the masses had left the church
and become atheists, Masons and Marxists. In particular,
the Nacis attacked the existing relation between the
Conservative Party and the Church. Keller characterized
this relation ast "We will maintain you with our money; but
you have the obligation to deliver to us the votes of the
children of the Church." He contended that many Conservatives
had opposed the Papal encyclicals Rerum Nova rum and Qua-
draqesimo Anno, and drew attention to the fact that one of
the most influential Conservatives in Chile had claimed
that the encyclicals were unsuited to Chile because its
social conditions were totally different from those in
Europe. Keller noted further that Diario Illustrado.a
Conservative newspaper, had not at first wanted to publish
the encyclicals and then published them only in edited
versions. Finally, he suggested that there was in fact much
anti-Conservative sentiment in the Church, but the Church
feared that the anti-Christian parties might do them greater

60
"Puede un cat6lico ser nacista?” , Traba io (October
19, 1933), p. 3.

197
damage.®1
Because Nacismo claimed its basis in Western-Christian
civilization, it accepted the moral values of Christianity
for society. When it spoke of re-establishing the spiritual
unity lost in modern times, it meant to do so on the basis
of Christian principles. Nacismo, according to Keller,
doesn't pretend to create a new morality. It wants to
create the political, social, and economic conditions
favorable to Christianity. But it wants the Church to stay
out of politics and tend to religious affairs. This is why
it wants to free the Church from the Conservative Party and
from others who use it politically. In pursuing this
separation of Church and S ate, Nacismo would refrain from
making any declarations about faith.
In his statement on the Church, Keller recognized that
the majority of Chileans are Catholics, and that the majority
C
of the Nacis are Catholics, although not exclusively so.
People with other beliefs were welcome in the MNS. Moreover,
Keller noted that within the ranks of the MNS there didn't
exist a prevailing religiosity which would alienate people
who were not Catholics. It was not probable that the Naci
doctrine on the Church would change — that it might fight
the Church. But this might occur if the Church were to

^Carlos Keller, 'La iglesia,' in "Nacismo,” Accifin

Chi-1ena 5, 2 (October, 1936), p. 109.
62Ibid., p. 110.

198
attempt to intervene in Nacismo*s affairs or vice-versa.
But in general, Nacismo offered the Church enormous benefits
and this was noted by a number of churchmen who shared
Nacismo's ideals. The relations between Nacismo and the
Church were cordial, and the active and enthusiastic coopera­
tion of the Church was considered essential to the moral
regeneration of the country. But though the Nacis played
great importance on the cultivation of Christian values,
they were opposed to openly identifying themselves as
61
defenders of the Catholic Church.
When asked if he was a Christian or a Catholic by the
editors of Lircav. the organ of the Juventud Conservador.
Gonzalez replied: "I am a Christian and a Catholic. The
Christian concept extends also to the political realm; and
with regard to morality and those principles upon which it
is founded, our people*s morals should conform or coincide
with Christian principles. Nevertheless, I reject that there
exists 'a Catholic structure of the state. The Church accepts
all political forms with the sole condition being that these
don't violate its fundamental principles. In an article in
Traba io, "Apuntes sobre fascismo," Gonzalez disagreed with
the Conservative, Ricardo Boizard, that Nacismo should make
pronouncements concerning the truth of religion. It should
only accept its role. It was only essential for the Catholic
to know that the state recognizes, supports and develops

Gonz£lez, La concepci6n nacista del estado. p. 74.

199
religion.^
As in other matters of ideology and program, the
Chilean Nacis were also at odds with Hitler's attacks on the
Catholic Church. Hitler violated a concordat made with the
Church in the summer of 1933 and the Church issued a Papal
Encyclical on March 14, 1937 to bishops and archbishops in
Germany condemning Hitler's actions. In an article in
Traba io on March 24, 1937, Gonzalez publicly declared his
opposition to what was happening in Germany:
Although the state officially proclaims freedom
of conscience and beliefs, in fact its general
policy is far from satisfying this requirement . . .
There is little difference between the German viola­
tions of religious and moral conscience, and Soviet
efforts to exterpate the idea of God.65

F. Anti-Imperialism
Problems provoked by the American Electric Company in
Chile in November 1935 caused the Nacis to declare that one
of the gravest situations affecting the country and the
66
people of Latin America generally was Yankee imperialism.
In June 1936, Gonzalez wrote that Latin America was suffering
as never before from the insolent presure of North American
imperialism, which threatened to strangle it. He painted the

64 *
Jorge Gonzalez, "Apuntes sobre fascismo," Traba io
(May 17, 1934), p. 3.
65 „
Jorge Gonzalez, "El estado contra la iglesia,"
Traba io (March 24, 1937), p. 3.
66
"Anti-imperialismo," Traba io (November 6, 1935), p. 3.

200
painful picture of Chilean nitrates, copper, electric energy
and other principle riches being irresistably delivered into
the hands of American capital. In the end, it would absorb
Chile completely unless strong measures were taken to free
67
the country from its oppressive grip.
The opposition of the Nacis to United States imperialism
grew increasingly bitter in the latter part of the 1930s.
When the United States offered Chile "warships", Keller
accused their northern neighbor of attempting to incorporate
Latin America into its system of national defense for the
imminent world war. He also claimed that the United States
was adopting various methods such as an extension of the
Monroe Doctrine to include military alliances and mutual
defence pacts. This, Keller asserted, had the effect of
weakening Latin American unity and making the Latin American
nations dependent on the United States. He specifically
CQ
called pan-Americanism a fraud. The offer of the warships
was likened to the offer made by the British to their
colonies. Acceptance of it, in Keller’s view, would be
tantamount to incorporating Chile into the defense effort of
a q
the United States.

67 ^
Jorge Gonzalez, Pueblo v estado (Santiagot 1936), p. 12.
CQ
Carlos Keller, "El imperialismo de los Estados Unidos,"
Traba io (August 27, 1937), p. 3.
69
Idem., "El arrendamiento de bugues de guerra
nortamericanos," Traba io (August 28, 1937), p. 3.

201
 To be sure, the anti-imperialism argument of Nacismo
was entirely consistent with its strong argument against
capitalism. But while their argument against capitalism was
a general one, and couched in terms applicable to all of
Western civilization,,their argument against imperialism was
specific — it was applied only to the United States. This
would seem to imply that the anti-imperialism of Nacismo owed
more to Palacios than to Lenin and that it was more concerned
with the actual problem of foreign control of Chilean industry
and commerce than to the theoretical problem of the highest
stage of capitalism. Anti-imperialismo meant anti-foreign
control; and the largest and most conspicuous "foreigner”
involved in the Chilean economy was the United States.

6. Racism and the Jews

Though racism in general and anti-Semitism in parti­
cular were integral in the ideology of German National
Socialism, this was not the case with most fascist movements,
and particularly among those who looked to Mussolini's Italy
for a model. 70 Either because of their own predilections or
simply because there was no basis for exploiting the "Jewish
question" in their own countries, most of the fascist leaders
resisted, though with varying degrees of success, the
injection of racism and anti-semitism into their movements.
The Chilean Naci movement, however, was one of the few

70
George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology
(Londoni 1966), p. 23*

202
fascist movements which did engage in racism and anti­
semitism, although in no sense did they even approach the
excesses of the German Nazis. The tenor and substance of
Nacismo*s racism and anti-semitism was primarily an expression
of radical nationalism, stimulated by feelings of racial
pride and by the belief that the Jews were a "foreign"
race. Again, it owed its inspiration much more to Palacios
than to Hitler. At least this is true with regard to the
general racism of Nacismo.
In view of their own determination to develop a fascist
movement based on Chilean reality, it is somewhat of an
anomaly that the Chilean Nacis ventured to exploit anti­
semitism in their political propaganda. Though anti-semitic
sentiment no doubt existed sub rosa in Chilean society as
elsewhere, and anti-semitism was overtly expressed periodi­
cally in certain kinds of literature, there was no widespread
endemic public antipathy for the Jews which promised high
political returns for such a campaign. Any realistic assess­
ment by the Nacis of the prospects for an anti-semitic
campaign should have disuaded them from such an attempt.
Different from Europe, where there was a large Jewish
population which was disproportionately powerful in the
economy and the professions, the Jewish population in Chile in
the 1930s was composed of approximately 12,000 members or
about 0.2% of the total population. Jews had come to Chile
beginning with the inquisition, after independence and during
the middle nineteenth century; but they were few in number.

203
The majority of the small Jewish community in Chile had
arrived during the early decades of the twentieth century
in response to the pogroms in Russia and the persecutions in
Europe* Economically, the Chilean Jews could be found in a
wide variety of activities, with no particular pattern of
domination evident in any specific economic sector. Seventy-
five percent of the community resided and worked in Santiago,
most engaged in small businesses, financial activities,
clothing and furniture manufacturing. Others were owners of
fundos in Puerto Montt, Chilian, and elsewhere, engaged in
the growing of fruit, vegetables and other agricultural
71
products for local consumption and for export.
Under the circumstances, the anti-Semitism of the Chilean
Nacis remained the weakest and most insignificant feature of
their program, because it had no basis in the actual condi­
tions of Chilean society and because, quite simply stated,
their hearts weren*t in it. Nevertheless, they did make
diatribes against the Jews with specific reference to the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Henry Ford's International
Jew, both of which were available in translation in Chile
during the 1930s. The first purported to prove that there
was a Jewish conspiracy to seize world power; the second,
in line with the first, attempted to show that there were
conspiratorial Jewish groups at work on Hall Street and

71
Robert Levy, "Los judios en la vida economica de
Chile," Mundo Judio (November 3, 1938), pp. 9-11.

204
elsewhere in the world seeking to control the world money
72
markets >
Within the general framework of the arguments contained
in the Protocols and the International Jew, the Chilean
Nacis also denounced the Jews for .their adherence to Commun­
ism. An editorial in Traba io read* "With the exception of
Lenin, whose antecedents were more Mongol than Russian, all
the rest of the leaders of the revolution are Jews and old
Social Democrats."- Claiming that Bolshevism was a Jewish
movement, the Nacis insisted that because they were anti­
communists they must also be anti-semites. Then too, the
Jews were viewed as imperialists. The Guggenheims were said
to be part of the Jewish movement to control the world, that
they were enslaving Chile by means of their control of the
nitrate industry. Two familiar slogans were* "Our nitrate
industry agonizes under the claws of international Judaism"
and "What is the meaning of Nacismo? Liberation of Chile
from the economic yolk of international Judaism." 73
But from the beginning, Nacismo denied that their anti­
semitism was in any way related to Hitler's. An article in
El Imoarcial in 1932 read* "The fact that the MNS has simi­
larities to Hitlerism has led many to believe that the party

72 '
Cf. Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide. The Myth of
the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion f L o n d o n * 1967).
73
Cf. Traba io (July 27, 1933), p. lj Traba io (September
27, 1934), p. 4; Traba io (April 18, 1935), p. 1.

205
in Chile was adopting the same position as Germany concerning
the Jews. We are not anti-semites. We are not trying to
initiate a campaign of enmity and bitterness against them
for their being Jews. Racial questions don’t interest us,
because in reality we have no intention to follow in the steps
74
of German Nazism in this matter.” As late as 1937, when
interviewed in Hov. Gonzalez spoke out on this problem trying
to clarify and distinguish the position of the MNS. He saidi
"Here in Chile that problem of the Jews does not exist. Our
position is not systematic, but realistic. We have nothing
against the Jewish elements who have brought to Chile their
spirit of initiative, their creative dynamism. We have
nothing against them if they are serving national needs.
Certainly our attitude would differ if they followed a
different plan. There are those who believe in racial
imperialism and we are opposed to this." 75

H. The Politics of an Ideology Out of Power

The nature and outworking of the Naci political
structure and movement will be discussed in the chapters to
follow. But here it is important to note that politics is
first and foremost the art and science of government or the
principles and tactics of political parties. An ideology

74
El Imparcial (August 6, 1932), p. 2.
75
Alberto Alzamora "Con Jorge GonzSlez von Marees,"
Hov (January 28, 1937), p. 12.

206
is not in arid of itself political, although it may be. And
a movement is not necessarily political, although it may
become political.
At the start, the ideology of Nacismo was political;
<
the movement was not. When the movement was ultimately
forced to become political, its ideology proved to be a poor
guide to action because, as noted above, the concrete histor­
ical-social situation on which it was based was already
changing. Indeed, it had already made the ideology of
Nacismo obsolete. In theory, it looked more to the past
than to the future. In practice, it was compromised and
ultimately discarded. The fact that the ideology of Nacismo
could not survive the politicization of the movement was its
greatest critique. And Nacismo as a political movement
within the Chilean system could not survive without its
ideology. In order to survive as an ideology, Nacismo as a
movement would have had to destroy the political system in
Chile, as Fascism did in Italy and Nazism did in Germany.
But this was only possible after the Italian and German
movements had achieved power. The Chilean movement never did.
Indeed, the political unmasking of Nacismo both as an
ideology and a movement is the necessary prerequisite for
any consideration of the phenomenon as it appeared in Chile
in the early 1930s. The structure of such an unmasking
involved a consideration of the historical-social origins, the
intellectual origins, and the psychological origins of the

207
movement and its "Leaders." Nacismo. both in its organization
and its active role, in fact never ceased to inhabit that no-
mans-land between politics and meta-politics. Only when
understood in this way can its fate be explained. A movement
with an "Ideology," in or out of power, will always be
political and at the same time more than political because
its final goal is the destruction of politics.

208
 V

THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF NACISMO

Nacismo offered its followers a way of life which

fulfilled many diverse emotional needs. For those in search
of comradeship, it provided a sense of national belonging
which no other political party could equal. For those in
search of excitement, adventure and action, it provided
marches, meetings, and street confrontations with the sub
rosa esqpectation of violence. But more than this, Nacismo
was very much a populist movement in that it appeared to be
taking politics out of the back rooms of the upper class
clubs in Santiago and making it part of the people. It
sought to give the humblest of citizens the feelings of
participation in a cause aimed at the betterment of the
nation.

A. Nacismo as a Political Movement

Because Nacismo was conceived as an alternative to the
"corrupt and inefficient" political parties in Chile, it was
"anti -par tido" — in principle against all parties of
liberal democracy wherever they were located on the politi­
cal spectrum.1 As noted earlier, when the MNS was established
it was purported to be not just another political party or

Wavier Cox, "Que es nacismo?,” Traba Io (June 8, 1935),

p. 2. Cf. Jorge Gonzalez, "Apuntes sobre fascismo,"
Traba io (May 17, 1934), p. 3.

209
dues collecting organization but an entirely new and uni-
que political movement. The distinction, if not always
maintained, was fully appreciated by the Nacis and revealed
in both the structure and organization of their movement
and in the style of their political cction.
Because the Nacis conceived of the MNS as a real
alternative to political parties, they presented themselves
to the public as the only hope of those in Chile who would
place the national interest above the interest of any
O
political group. But in conceiving the interests of the
nation as above politics, the Nacis, in effect, had a meta­
political conception of their movement* "What characterizes
Nacismo and distinguishes it from all political parties is
precisely its pretensions of being." Thus the Nacis spoke
of creating a national force of men and women of all classes
and backgrounds who were prepared to dedicate themselves to
the task of building a greater Chile* "Our movement is not
in any way a vulgar political party, with its assemblies and
other demogogic meetings; it is much more than all that. It
is a new national spirit forged in the heat of the purest
virtues of the race."

2E1 Imparcial (July, 1932). Cf. Gonzalez, El mal de

Chile, pp. 71-74; Wilfredo Mayorga, "Alessandri y el nacismo
frente y frente," Ercilla, no. 1612 (April 27, 1966), p. 18.
Biblioteca Nacista, (1932), no. 1
4 -
Keller, "Nacismo y marxismo," Accion Chilena, 6, p. 70.
5
Statement in the first issue of Traba io (April 5,
1933), p. 3.

210
 The MNS was not the only political group in Chile
opposed to political parties. Parties were considered
completely out of touch with national realities* prone to
interminable disputes and petty conflicts and intrinsically
demagogic. The Nacis expressed the judgement that* "It is
useless to attempt to mold political parties to this new
state of national life with changes of programs or names,
since the spirit which moves them and the mentality of their
members belong to a past epoch."® The party system according
to the Nacis, represented the tyranny of the few over the
will of the nation as a whole. To be sure, the Nacis
contended that theirs was the only movement in Chile in
which the son of a carpenter could walk side by side with a
businessman or banker. In a country like Chile, where the
people had been for so long inarticulate and uninvolved in
politics, the principle task of the MNS was to seek out the
"anonymous mass," those "men of the race," those "true
statesmen" who knew how to place realities before political
doctrines and who were capable of building a new Chile by the
n
sheer force of their personalites. The Nacis stressed men
over ideas.®

®E1 predominio de la mediocridad. Reportaie publicado

en el d i a n o "El Imparcial" el 25 de Octobre de 1932
(Santiago* 1932).
Keller,"Nacismo y marxismo," Acci6n Chilena. 6, p. 80.
0
"Hombres, ante que programas," Ideario (July 23,
1932), pp. 6-7.

211
 1. Authoritarianism in Action

a. The Portalian Principle

The internal structure of Nacismo was similar to fascist
movements in Europe and elsewhere in that it was a highly
centralized authoritarian movement in which all power resided
g
in the hands of the "leader"! el Jefe. But* although
Gonzalez much admired both Mussolini and Hitler, it was Diego
Portales, Chile’s illustrious nineteenth century statesman,
with whom he identified and who was for him the model of
effective leadership. As noted above, Gonzalez admired
Portales because the latter had exemplified the virtues of
the leader who placed himself above all factions and paro­
chial interests, who placed the interests of the nation above
those of any social or political group. Equally important,
Portales was a strong authoritarian figure, yet appropriately
modest and self effacing. Though he possessed great power,
he did not personalize it; he institutionalized it both in
the constituion and the presidency.1®
The leadership principle was accepted from the very
beginning. At the founding meeting of the movement, Gonzalez
reportedly announced that he would take charge until there

g
Mauricio Mena M . , "Genesis y desarollo del Nacismo,"
Accion Chilena, 4, no. 2 (October, 1936), p. 81.
^ J o r g e Gonz&lez, "El legado de Portales," Acci6n
Chilena, 4, no. 1 (October, 1935), pp. 2-9.

212
was someone who could replace him with advantage. But
Gonzctlez' claim to leadership was undisputed. Looking back
on the first meeting, one of the founders noted that it was
the last decision of the movement that was made democratically
— by a vote of the members.11
According to Nacismo’s organizational manual, drawn up
in 1934, the MNS was to be headed by a Council of Advisers
which varied in size from year to year throughout the 1930s;
12
the usual number was 10. The members of this Council were
appointed by GonzSlez annually during the first week of
April. There were no restrictions on who might serve or how
long they might serve continuously. This was left to the
discretion of the Leader. In theory, the members of the
Council were also to act as the heads of the various admini-
13
strative departments of the MNS.
In practice, however, Gonzalez depended very little
on the Council for the direction of the movement. He very
seldom convened it and used the appointment of its members
as a means of rewarding loyal followers with status positions.
Instead, he chose to rely on an inner circle of confidants,
all of whom were incidentally members of the Council, who

11
Mena, "Genesis y desarollo, Acci6n Chilena. 4, p. 81.
12
Cf. "0rganizaci6n Nacista," 4, no. 2, Accion Chilena
(October, 1936).
13Ibid.

213
were consulted regularly on important matters of policy and
political strategy. Most important among these were Carlos
Keller, Gust vo Vargas, Mauricio Mena, Javier Cox Lira,
Pedro Foncea, and Oscar Jimenez. ^ But in accordance with
the leadership principle, Gonzalez wielded total power over
the movement and was the final authority on all matters of
doctrine, organization, and political strategy. There was
hardly any issue, however insignificant, about which Gonzalez
did not have the last word. He displayed a somewhat fanatic
insistence on discipline and total obedience to his leader­
ship. The wider membership of the MNS did not vote on any
of its officers, even those for the smallest provincial
nuclei. The congresses that were held from time to time
were neither concerned with elections nor with the approval
or disapproval of the movement’s positions on specific
15
issues.
The only notable open challenge to Gonzalez* leadership
of the MNS occurred in mid-1933 when two members of the
Council attempted to unseat him in an ill-fated coup. This
coup, inappropriately likened by one journalist to the
attempted Roehm-Strasser Putsch against Hitler, was planned

14Interviews with Gustavo Vargas Molinare and Ernesto

Duran in Santiago in 1968.
15
Cf. "La esencia del fascismo," Traba io (July 4,
1936); Javier Cox, "El espiritu del jefe," Traba io (November
23, 1935); "El Jefe," Trabaio (June 1, 1933); Keller, "El
Jefe," Traba io (April 4, 1935); "Jefe," Traba io (November
16, 1935^

214
by Rene Silva Espejo, director of Traba io. and Fernando
1C
Ortuzar Vial» chief of the Naci assault troops* Both
young men, notable journalists and recent converts to Nacismo.
were articulate spokesmen for fascism in their own right as
revealed in El Debate, the newspaper which together they
founded and edited.
As evidenced in their public statements and in Gonzalez*
denunciations of them in Traba io after their expulsion from
the movement, their disagreements with the Jefe were both
ideological and personal. Gonzalez stated the causes of their
expulsion from the MNS as •‘marked personalist tendencies"
demonstrated by Espejo and Vial for having publicly challenged
official Naci doctrine in their editorials in El Debate and
for having engaged in certain "manipulations" to force the
Jefe out of office. 17 Espejo and Vial, on their part,
denied these allegations and the latter openly denounced
Gonzalez as incompetent* "I have not been a Naci for you,
but have been one in spite of you, submitting myself reluc­
tantly to an uthority lacking qualities worthy of
18
respect." But aside from this incident, Gonzalez* leader­
ship went unchallenged and the organization of the movement

16
Cf. Fernando Ortuzar Vial, Respuesta a don Jorge
Gonzales^ von Marees (Nunoa* 1933) ; Rene Silva Esoeio. Mi
expulsion del moving entp_nacional social is ta (Santiago*
1933).
17
Interview with Fernando Ortuzar Vial in Santiago in
1968.
18Ibid.

215
reflected the absolute power of the Jefe.

b. The Administrative Apparatus

The administrative apparatus of Nacismo was character­
istic of a movement much larger and more complex. It had a
full scale division of labor, but since funds were limited,
few of the administrators worked full time.
Each level of the Naci organization was linked to a
higher level and finally to the highest level. The smallest
unit on the local level was called a nucleus and within
each district these nuclei were organized into smaller and
larger communes closely supervised by district commissars
who reported to department heads in some major urban areas
or to provincial commissars.19 Gonzalez appointed all commi­
ssars, except on the communal level. These were appointed
by the provincial commissars. The Nacis managed to establish
nuclei in virtually all of the major electoral districts of
the country, although there were many more in the north
than in the south. By 1937 there were as many as 2,000
throughout the country.
On the national level, the MNS was organized into
seven major administrative departments in 1933. Although
some administrative changes were made both in personal and
organization, these departments remained the structural
core of the movement. ,

19
Cf. ”0rganizaci6n Nacis ta", Acci6n Chilena, 6,
(October, 1936).

216
 I. Organization* responsible for the recruitment
and processing of the applications of new members.
Headed by Juan Pumpin.
II. Preparation* devoted to matters of doctrine and
theory, organizing study groups and conferences
and providing articles for Naci publications.
Headed by Keller, Ricardo Cox, and Rene Silva.
III. Finance* devoted to matters of fund raising, etc.
Headed by Humberto Valenzuela.
IV. Naci Assault Troops * for street confrontations
and the protection of El Jefe. Headed by Fernando
Ortuzar.
V. Accion Social * directed activities such as Work
Service (Servicio de Trabajo). Headed by Otto
Krahn S .
VI. Propaganda* responsible for Traba io and other Naci
publications. Headed by Mauricio Mena.
VII. Provinces * in charge of all matters related to
the movement's provincial activities; coordinated
the activities of the nuclei to departments.
Headed by Felipe Laso.
Also in 1933, the MNS set up a university group which
was first called Grupo Arauco and later Grupo Nacista
Universitario. Attempts were made to form syndicates in
the professions. The first one, established in 1935, in
medicine, was headed by Vargas* brother, Ruperto Vargas M.
In August of this same year a Juventud Nacional Socialista

217i
THE HGRPHGLOGICAL STRUCTURE

III

IV

I The leader
II Tbs hational Level
III The Provincial Level
IV The District Level
V Tbe Nuclear Level

218
 !
> t-i .
OU

<4Q '
sli
O ita :

n
n

i
§

§
H

• i

219
was organized by Crestoes Vera Perez for young people between
the ages of 14-18• In all these enterprises, the hierarchi­
cal structure of the movement, with the "LeaderM at the top
(or center) was never lost.
Two departments of the MNS deserve special mention —
the TNA and the Servicio de Trabaio.20 Shortly after the
formation of the Naci movement, in late 1932, a special force
of uniformed militants, the Naci Assault Troops of TNA was
established. These "storm troopers" or elite fighting guard
appears to have been modeled on Mussolini's and Hitler's
counterparts. The members of the TNA openly carried wooden
clubs and often revolvers in the streets to deal with
Socialists and Communists who became their implacable enemies
throughout the period. Traba io referred to them as "the
best bulwark which the people have against the destructive
21
anarchy and disorder of Marxist demagoguery. '* The Nacis
eulogized the TNA as the most important group within the
movement. Gonzalez often referred to it as "the backbone of
Nacismo", the training ground for men of the highest moral
rectitude, discipline, and sacrifice.
The TNA had its own internal organization modeled
along military lines, with a Brigadier General at its head

20
Cf. Generally, Francisco Maldonado ChSvez, Manual
del TNA (Santiagot 1936).
^1Traba io (August 2, 1934).

220
and numerous subordinate officers descending hierarchically
to the basic units of Naci nuclei. It also had its own code
of behavior which was stricter than the general guidelines
for the behavior of the regular membership of the movement.
According to the TNA manual i ’’The TNA was created in order
to fulfill one of the purest and highest or noblest princi­
ples of the M N S ; its rank and file should compose . . . the
aristocracy of Nacismo." It was to give every man an
opportunity to excel and to assume greater responsibility
and leadership. A member of the TNA should not only Know
how to die for the cause, but to live for it looking toward
the greatness of Chile. Those who would one day aspire to
Jefe should know how to work well and with devotion. 22
The MNS adopted the institution of Servicio de
Traba io or Work Service in late 1932, after it had been
introduced somewhat earlier into Hitler's program for
Germany. 23 It was first discretely proposed in a Traba io
editorial as an alternative to military intervention in
political affairs. The editorial suggested that the army
become involved in activities such as building roads, canals
and other kinds of public works projects. The Nacis contended

^Javier Cox, "T.N.A. y J.N.S.," Traba io (August 17,

1935), p. 2; c f . Accion Chilena 4 (October 1935) and for the
TNA songs, Accidn Chilena 6, (May, 1937).
^"Milicia del Traba jo,” El Imparcial (December 2,
1932), p. 2} "El ano de trabajo," El Imparcial (December 8,
1932), p. 2.

221
that the passive national defense role being played by the
army left them little to do and that merely cutting the
size of their forces or setting up a countervailing force
such as the Republican Militia, as Alessandri had proposed,
would not avoid further military intervention in the affairs
of state. In the Naci view, an obligatory year of Work
Service would be a good substitute for the required meaning­
less year of traditional military service.
The Nacis viewed Work Service as one of the principal
means of promoting the spiritual regeneration which they
advocated for the society of the future Naci state. They
claimed that it was superior to military service for trans­
forming undisciplined youth into concerned citizens willing
to sacrifice themselves for the advancement of national
greatness. Work Service would do what the primary schools
were failing to do — to develop civic responsibility,
morality, and a sense of the national interest.
Work Service was also conceived as a substitute for
government sponsored colonization projects which, according
to the Nacis, were poorly organized and ineffectual because
the colonists lacked sufficient training and the resources
to develop their land. Work Service would organize colonists
into brigades and train them, under technical supervision,
to build roads, clear the land and build houses.
During the thirties, the Naci leadership often used
Work Service to develop the esprit de corps and moral and
spiritual values of its own youthful militants. As many as

222
fifty young Nacis, under official supervision, would gather
for outings. They would rise at 5*30 a.m., eat modest
rations and work a long day or perhaps a long weekend. Some
of these outings were held in urban areas such as working
class neighborhoods where they cleaned the streets. Others,
in rural areas, would repair roads. In general, Servicio de
Traba io appealed to sentiments which have been exploited by
24
any number of movements whether for good or ill.

2. Meta-Political Props
There is no doubt that the Fascists in Europe learned
from the Communists and that later Stalin learned from Hitler
the significance of symbols for both propaganda and leader-
ship purposes. 25 The visual representation of something
.

that represents unity and authority, however, is not new.

It is as old as socio-political organization. And certainly
flags, insignias, and salutes are a part of any organized
state. What was new was the use to which they were put by
the mass movements of the twentieth century. It was not
only a question of quantity, but of quality. It had to do
with the militarization of social organization. That

24 * ~
On the servicio de trabajo, see Jose Sanchez V., "El
servicio de trabajo," Acci6n Chilena I, no. 1 (January, 1934),
pp. 7-8j Carlos Keller, "El servicio de trabajo," Accion
Chilena 4, no. 1 (October, 1935), pp. 26-35.
Jorge Gonzalez, La mentira democratica, (Santiago*
1936), p. 36{ cf. Wolfgang Sauer, "Fascism as the Revolt of
"The Losers," in The Place of Fascism in European History,
ed. Gilbert Allardyce, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.* 1971), p. 164.

223
 quantity-quality "leap" occurred when the group became more
important than the individual* when individual will gave
way to the collective will* When the goal of a manifestly
political movement is to in fact destroy politics and insti­
tute a state which will become the supreme arbiter of personal
as well as national concern, then the use of symbols becomes
transformed. Their appeal is at one and the same time to
something both below and above politics.
Like the Italian Fascists, the Chilean Nacis adopted
26
the Roman salute. They showed more originality in the
design of their own specific symbols. Their uniform con­
sisted of a steel grey shirt and tie, a grey cap with the
Naci insignia, and a brown leather strap with a ribbon over
the right shoulder. The pants were optional, but blue or
black were preferred. Various colored patches were worn on
the collars of the shirts indicating differences in both
geographical and hierarchical location and vocation,
although the exact determination of these colors was never
, widely known. The Naci insignia was a composite of different
symbols of the Chilean national tradition* the arms repre­
sented energy and strength* the star, the Chilean star in
the national flag* the snow, the snow of the Andes; the red,
the blood of national heroes fallen in battle. Testimonials

26
"Reglamento de uniformes, distintivos y saludo Nacista,"
Acci6n Chilena, 5 (October 1936). Cf. also Sergio Recabarren
V . , Mensaie vlqente (Santiago* 1964), p. 37.

224
to the contrary, the Nacis did not wear swastikas on their
uniforms* Their insignia was quite obviously meant to
symbolize not the German Nazism nor even universal fascism
but Chilean nationalism.
The flag of Nacismo was a modified replica of Chile’s
first flag, displayed in 1812, shortly after independence,
by Jose Miguel Carrera, the flag which flew over Chile during
the Portalian epoch. To the banner of bold blue, white, and
yellow stripes the Nacis added a diagonal ray of lightning
27
symbolizing the new era which Nacismo hoped to usher m *

3* Meta-Political Theater
A fundamental characteristic of fascist movements,
including the MNS, was the commitment to action. Weber noted
that the fascist ethos is emotional and sentimental and that
28
the ends of action count less than the action itself.
The Nacis denounced political parties for being too pre­
occupied with programs that didn’t lead to action. An
editorial in Trabajo proudly noted that the MNS didn’t look
for the solution to national problems in legislation but in
29 „
action. Jimenez noted that "Action was the immediate
manifestation of the MNS, which was born with the firm

^Ibid., Cf. Accion Chilena, 4s 112, and Tito Mundt, Las

banderas olvidadas. 2nd ed. (Mexico 1965).
28Weber, Varieties of Fascism, p. 144.
29
Traba io (June 6, 1933) and Cox, "Qu£ es nacismo?,"
Traba io (June 8, 1935), p. 2.

225
 30
intention of not being just another political party.
"Chileans to action" was the call of Gustavo Vargas at the
founding of the MNS. The Nacis would be devoted to direct
action.31
As noted earlier, Gonzalez and Keller were more con­
cerned with theory than many of their European counterparts
and Nacismo provided a much more sophisticated critique of
Chilean conditions than did either Mussolini of Italian
conditions or Hitler of German conditions. But this theory
was largely for the leaders, who were intellectuals, not for
the rank and file, which were not. Keller and Gonzalez
obviously felt that action — and action for action's sake —
was much more appealing and much more useful. This basically
anarchist position played no significant role in the study of
The Authoritarian Personality, but years later, in commenting
on the anarchist element in the New Left, Theodor Adorno note
that unmediated praxis leads to a fetishization of action
for its own sake, that "absolute praxis" is a mistake but
"pseudo-action" is theater. 32

30Mayorga, "Alessandri y el nacismo frente a frente,"

p. 18.
31Ibid.,
32
Cf. Martin Jay, "The Permanent Exile of Theodor W.
Adorno," Midstream, A Monthly Jewish Journal. 15, no. 10.
(December, 1969), p. 67 and "Resignation" in Theodor W.
Adorno zum Gedachtnis. ed. Hermann Schweppenhauser,
(Frankfurt A.M. i 1971), pp. 9-13.

226
 The following is the "Naci Hymn" i

CHILEAN, TO ACTION
(Chorus)

Forward, fearless Chileans,

Tahe action with strength and with zeal
To unite a greater Chile
As one single mind and heart
I
May the fratricidal class struggle
Become merely a memory of the past
On the anvil of a new life
We shall weld together
The son of the palace and the son of the shop
Woe to the fool who attempts
To destroy this noble and holy union
The blindfold will fall from his eyes
By force, if not by reason
II
We feel the powerful stirrings
Of pride of race, of Chileans
On this solid foundation we will build
The most beautiful and the happiest Fatherland
With the serene gaze of the brave
With our souls burning with emotion
We shall march, sowing the seeds
Of justice, peace and salvation33
The fundamental dictate of Fascism was not to Know, but
to feel. Action based on thought at least has the chance of
being rational; but action based on feeling, by its very
nature is irrational. An editorial in Traba io insisted
that "The essential characteristic of Fascism is not,its

33
Many of the Naci*s hymns are collected in Homenaje a
los nacional socialistas inmolados el 5 de septiembre de 1938
en la torre de la sanqre: poemas y canciones. (Santiago! 1$32).
disciplinary organization, nor in its program for political,
economic and social achievements, but in its spirit. It is a
spirit of living intensively. To be a Fascist one has to
feel it in all acts of life, both private and public. With
regard to the past, one has to turn over a new leaf and to
"3A
initiate a new life." A former member of the Conservative
Party who had joined the MNS distinguished between the two
organizations by stating that "Conservatism is a cold concept
with the smell of a tomb. Nacismo is a generous sentiment by
which one lives from moment to moment." 35
The strength of the movement depended not only on
discipline but on the cultivation of deep feelings of comrade­
ship and unity among the militants. Each rank and file
member had to feel a sense of belonging and the Nacis
developed these sentiments through a variety of activities.
Then too, each rank and file member had to have a deep sense
of commitment to the cause of building a movement for the
restoration of Chile's national greatness. In this regard,
the romance and ritual familiar to European Fascist move­
ments also played a role in the Chilean movement. Like
their European counterparts, the Chilean Nacis looked back to
a bygone age — the golden age of the Portalian state.
One of the most impressive ceremonial observances which

34 "La esencia del fascismo," Traba io, p. 5.

35
Rafael Cambroso, "Conservatismo y nacismo," Traba io
(July 8, 1936), p. 3.

228
the Nacis cultivated was the bi-monthly swearing-in of new
converts# It was usually held on alternate Tuesday evenings
at the main Naci headquarters in Santiago where sometimes as
many as 100 militants would take an oath to dedicate them­
selves to the MNS and to work for the grandeur of Chile.
Maria Viancos, a passionate militant, wrote a doubtlessly
exaggerated but nevertheless interesting account of one of
these ceremonies demonstrating the way in which the Nacis
employed dramatic techniques to create a particular atmosphere
and mood. The ceremony began with a short blaze of bugles
followed by the appearance of the Jefe. The Naci Assault
Troops then marched toward him and extended Roman salutes
which he acknowledged with his own salute. He would pause
briefly and then mount the stage where he was again greeted
with Roman salutes from those to be sworn-in. As he approached
them, they would recite in unison* "In the name of Chile,
in the name of those who have labored for the prestige and
glory of Chile, I pledge to dedicate myself comple ely and
forever to the grandeur of Chile." Then everyone sang the
national anthem. "It was when we were singing the anthem,"
Viancos wrote, "that I felt a special sense of fervor in the
audience. With such enthusiasm, with such deep fervor, we all
sang. How powerful and vibrantly resounding were the
stanzas which budded forth not so much from our mouths as
from the depths of our hearts. It was as if a secret flame
was burning in all our chests and transforming all our fea-

229
tures."36
The Nacis also tried to demonstrate their patriotism
by organizing parades on national holidays. On May 21 of
each year, the Nacis would converge on Valparaiso from all
over Chile to pay homage to Arturo Prat and the heroes of
the battle of Iquique which led to Chile*s victory in the
War of the Pacific. These parades were carried on with
great fanfare. Thousands of Nacis in uniform, led by
Gonzalez and the TNA, would march through the streets with
flags waving and bands playing national songs. As part of
the celebration, a wreath was placed at the foot of Prat*s
statue, after which Gonzalez would make a speech extoling
the victor and the greatness of Chile. A swearing-in cere-
37
mony of new Naci militants provided the appropriate climax.
But the main thrust of Naci propaganda was directed at
the youth and the MNS attempted to develop comradeship among
the young people through periodic machitunes or folklore
parties held in the open air. The former militant,Oscar
Jimenez, recalled that the machi tun was, for him, the
"maximum expression of happy comradeship." 38 It took the
form of a modest celebration of Araucanian and national

qc
J. de M. (Maria Viancos de Jara) El juramento
nacional socialists. Traba io (February 28^ 1937)•
37
On the Nacis' utilization of Arturo Prat as a
national symbol, cf. William F. Sater, The Heroic Image in
Chilei Arturo Prat » Secular Saint. (Berkeley j 1973).
38
Mayorga, "Alessandri y el nacismo frente a frente,"
p* 18.

230
culture through dances, songs and story-telling. The leader
of the machi tun assumed the role of an Araucanian chief and
all participants, regardless of rank, delivered over to him
full command of the festivities. Discipline at these parties
was sacrificed to happiness and the spirit of friendship of
comrades participating in a common celebration. 39 The
spirit of these outings is captured in the "Song of the
Machi tun” j

SONG OF THE MACHITUN

When the soul is truly healthy

And the body is, as well
Then joy should prevail
There should be a woman
Who lights up our thoughts
Who inspires our hopes
And who shows us, with each drink
The true color of passion
Let's drink (let's sing) with job
Let's drink (let's sing) to our union
And may we know how to give our lives
When the time comes
When the time comes
When the time comes
Our revolutionary cause
And a life that is noble and true
Will always be the banner
That inspires our faith
Our faith means optimism
Our faith means redemption
And that carries us over the abyss
In ever upward flight.
Let's drink, etc.

39Ibid.
40
Homenaie a los nacional socialistas. p. 16

231
 B. Nacismo as a “National" Movement

1* Geographical Distribution
The process of growth for the Nacis was similar to
most parties in Chile in that they first established and
developed organizational strength in the major voting
districts of greater Santiago and Valparaiso and then
extended into the provinces. In little more than two
years after coming into existence in 1932 they had set up
nuclei in Santiago, Valparaiso, Vina del Mar, Chilian,
Temuco, binares, San Bernardo and Osorno. Like the Social­
ists and Communists, the Nacis viewed their local nuclei
as the principle means for voter recruitment. These local
branches had an important prosylitizing mission to play
among the urban masses and also among the rural peasantry,
whose loyalty the Nacis as well as the parties of the Left
were attempting to win over.
Outside of Santiago and Valparaiso, GonzSlez and the
Naci leaders spent most of their time spreading the gospel
of their movement in the Southern provinces of the frontier
region and the lake district. It was there and not in the .
north, that the Nacis expected to find and to some extent
did find a receptiveness to their causes of national regener­
ation and anti-Communism. Moreover, GonzSlez and his chief
lieutenants travelled extensively in the south, giving
speeches and holding public assemblies in many out of the
way towns given little attention by the other political

232
parties•41
Gonzalez noted in 1934 that it was in the provinces
that he expected to find intact the virtues of race and the
traditions of the old ruling class upon which Nacismo
42
planned to build the future Naci aristocracy. Because
the northern cities had long been the strongholds of
Socialist and Communist support, the southern provinces
offered the most propitious advantages for recruitment. But
there were other reasons. The social and economic charac­
ter of the region made it more open to a new movement.
This was a region essentially dependent on small farming and
industry and small commercial enterprises. Then too, it was
here where a large percentage of European immigrants and
their decendents had settled. Beginning in the nineteenth
century, a large contingent of Germans had settled in the
lake region, followed later in the century by another
sizable migration of Europeans with the opening of the
Araucania. Still another influx had followed the First
World War.
The Nacis also had links to the southern communities
through the personal contacts of a few of their leaders,
some of whom were either born there or travelled there on
business. Gustavo Vargas had strong personal and business

41"La region austral y la polltica nacional," Trabaio

(January 30, 1937).
4^Jorge Gonzalez, Concepci6n nacista (1934), pp. 43-44.

i
233
'kies with groups in Temuco. Carlos Keller had family and
personal associations in Valdivia* Hedilberto Bizama, a
travelling salesman, went to the south so often on business
that he became head of the Department of the Provinces in
43
the Naci administrative structure.
GonzSlez' visits to the south usually involved stop­
overs in the major urban centers, such as Puerto Montt,
Puerto Varas, Temuco, Osorno and Valdivia. But he frequently
visited in smaller towns such as Gorbea, Coral, Pitrufquen,
Villarrica, and elsewhere. On each visit of the Jefe. it
was customary for the local Nacistas to arrange a parade
followed by a public meeting in a theater or plaza where he
would give a speech, swear in new militants, and at election
44
time launch the local Naci candidates for office. i

2. Social Composition
The social composition of Naci militants and sympa­
thizers during the 1930s in Chile is difficult to determine
with any degree of certainty. Membership lists of the
MNS, while useful for making some general observations
about the Naci following, are much too small for any
conclusive statement about the socio-economic status in
districts where the Nacis showed electoral strength; and
these lists were by and large destroyed after the ill-fated

43
Interview with Hedilberto Bizama in Santiago, 1973.
44
Interview with Carlos Keller in Santiago, 1968.

234
Naci coup of September 5, 1938. An added problem was the
fact that due to the unpopularity of Nacismo in many circles
it was difficult for members to openly identify themselves.
As a result, there grew up a number of cells or secret
groups of militants which existed clandestinely within the
organization. 45

a. Classes
In claiming to be a national movement, the Nacis sought
to represent the interests of society as a whole. They
thus rejected any identification with special interests or
a particular class. Moreover, their propaganda appeals
were not made to any particular group or class. Neverthe­
less, during the first few years of its existence the MNS
managed to attract sizeable albeit ephemoral support from
among Chile's upper class elements, both young and old.
Many of these elements joined the movement during the
chaotic and uncertain days of the short-lived Socialist
Republic and shortly thereafter, believing that the Nacis
represented the most effective bulwark against the threat­
ening spread of socially disruptive "Communism".^
An observer in the United States Embassy, writing in

45Carlos Keller, ha locura de Juan Bernales, p. 65.

46
Interview with Ernesto Duran, Treasurer of the MNS
in Santiago, 1968. Cf. Rene Leon Echaiz, Evoluci6n
hist6rica de los partidos politicos chilenos (Santiagoi
1939), p. 192 and Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri. aaitador v
demoledor. II, p. 199.

235
October 1933, notedt “There is much in this (Naci) program
to appeal to property owners, business and professional men
and all those who feel that they have material interests to
protect from extreme mass action or from irresponsible
An
dictatorship." But Alessandri*s success in establishing
relative political stability in a short time after his elec­
tion severely undermined the Naci's prospects of recruiting
further support from these traditional elements of society.
As Mena noted in his brief history of the early period of
the movement, once the threat of "Communism" had diminished
early in 1934 the Nacis lost much of their support from those
who saw the movement as a bulwark against the spread of
"Bolshevism" in Chile* "Upon the disappearance of the
imminence of the Communist danger, many believed that the
necessity for our existence had also disappeared. They
saw Nacismo as simply an organization called into action
to half the advance of threatening doctrines, ignoring the
profound creative spirit which it embodied. Those were grey
48
days, somber days, for Nacismo and our leader."
Beginning sometime around the mid-1930s, according to
Ernesto Duran, the treasurer of the movement, it became
clear to Gonzalez and his lieutenants that the MNS was not
Jk M

Norveb, Santiago to the Secretary of State (October

11, 1933), Department of State Archives, 825.00/815, p. 2
48
Mena, "Genesis y desarollo," Acci6n Chilena. p. 83.

236
going to be able to retain even conditional support of the
upper class. Thus, there is evidence that they shifted
their recruitment to the masses and openly declared that
theirs was a "popular" movement. A 1935 editorial in
Trabaio indicated this change:
When they tell you that Nacismo is anti-popular,
tell them that such a movement would not count among
its ranks precisely 90% poor people, workers and
employees of modest means. Moreover, an anti-
popular movement does not so openly attack, as does
Nacismo. the corruption and errors of the upper
classes and public officials . . . For Communism, the
worker is a machine; for liberals, a product; but
for Nacismo. he is a man.49
The lower class support of the Nacis in the later
1930s was estimated to have been between 60% and 70% by
Guillermo Izquierdo, who although not a Naci, took an
interest in Gonzalez because of his own scholarly interest
50
in the phenomenon of Fascism.
Like the Socialists, Communists and Democrats, the
Nacis tended to run well above their national percentages
in the heavily populated first electoral district of greater
Santiago. This district, although socially diverse, was a
composite of a large cross-section of urban workers and it
is almost certain that the Nacis enjoyed considerable support

49
"A1 Obrero consciente y honrada," Traba io (October
30, 1935), p. 2.
50
Interview with Guillermo Izquierdo A. in Santiago,
1967-1968.

237
i
 t

51
from the working classes of Santiago,
Frederick Pike has claimed that Nacismo failed to win
large lower class support because* unlike Communism* it
did not glorify the laboring sectors. Instead* he contends
that Nacismo "blamed much of Chilean Bolshevism on lower
class depravity and degeneration and held out to the masses
the prospect of hard work and rigorous reform without any
52
compensating promise of proletarian control of government."
While it is certainly true that the MNS did not promise
proletarian control of government, it did not necessarily
exclude the working class from participation in the govern­
ment of the future state. Gonzalez wanted the "best" of all
classes to rule. And it is not true that the MNS did not
appeal to the working classes. Gonzalez* early social labors
with worker education showed that he had a strong feeling
for these classes and there is nO indication that he aban­
doned his somewhat romantic view of laboring people. And
the vote also argues against Pike’s contention that the
MNS did not enjoy the kind of lower class support that the
Communists and Socialists enjoyed* at least for the short

51
In the 1937 Congressional election, the Socialists
received 28.6% of their total votes from the first district,
the Communists 21.5%, the Democrats 18.8%, and the Nacis
28.4%. For the returns on this and other Congressional
elections during the 1930s, see Chile. Pirecci6n general de
estadistica, Estadistica Chilena. Sinopsis 1937 (Santiago:
1937), pp. 858-859.
52Pike, Chile, p. 208

238
 S3
period of its existence.
Chilean Marxist writers like Hugo Zemelman have inter­
preted Nacismo as essentially the reaction of an economically
and ideologically divided middle class and petit bourgeoisie
to the struggle for political power being waged between the
54
working class and radical bourgeoisie against the oligarchy.
Within the context of this struggle* Nacismo is seen to have
attracted the support of middle groups who were seeking a
radical solution to their plight in the radical Right and
against the Marxist Left. This Marxist analysis* while
having particular relevance to the situation of the Fascists
in Europe* had also* as noted above* some base in fact in
the Chilean context. But the Marxist analysis is neverthe­
less too simplistic because in the early years of the Naci
movement certain elements of the middle class and petit
bourgeoisie were more concerned with the threat of the radi­
cal left. But later they made common cause with the radical
left in the Popular Front in the struggle against the oli­
garchy.

53
In Italy and Germany, and in all cases where a Fascist
regime was established, a strong worker's movement was as
necessary as a frightened upper class. Fascism arose in
northern Italy where the lower classes possessed a revolu­
tionary potential and where the capitalists as a class were
in a weaker position.
^^Hugo Zemelman M . * "El movimiento popular chileno y el
sistema de alianzas en la decade de 1930*" in Enzo Faletto*
Eduardo Ruiz* and Hugo Zemelman* Genesis historica del proceso
politico chileno (Santiago! 197l), p. 3 4 . Cf. Wilhelm Mann,
Chile luchando por nuevas formas de vida. I .(Santiago! 1935).
(

239
 b. Youth
The MNS was first and foremost a youth movement —
that is* it was a movement of young men who had developed
for the first time a strong political consciousness in the
1920s and who subsequently helped to awaken it in the youth
55
of the 1930s. Like most revolutionaries* the Nacis recog­
nized the importance of youth to the maintainance of the
movement's energy and strength. Youth represented the
dynamic factor for permanent renewal — for the renewal of
the revolutionary spirit so essential to the essence of
Fascism. An article in Trabaio summed up the movement's
understanding of the importance of youth* "For Nacismo,
youth is the very soul of the movement, its life, its reason
for existence. It is for this reason that it concentrates
the maximum of its energies to the conquest of the young
spirits of the Republic."56
It is true that the Nacis were able to conquer the
spirit of the young in ways which the traditional parties
were either unprepared or disinclined to do. Nacismo offered
a new and romantic way of life that was not available else­
where. For many, the movement undoubtedly represented an
outlet for rebellion against parents, school* and society
in general. For some of the upper-middle and upper class
families attached to Conservatism* Liberalism or the Radical

55Cf. WiIfredo Mayorga* "La diffcil generacion del

20," Ercilla. no. 1720 (June 5-11, 1968), pp. 43-44.
56Pedro S. Maino S., "Juventud,” Trabaio (June 22, 1935).
Party# joining the Naci movement was a way of detaching
themselves from the "respectable society” into which they
had been born* Others were attracted by the militaristic
57
spirit# the colorful parades# ceremonies and meetings. It
was these and other more complex motivations that led the
young Naci hero of Fernando Alegria's imaginative but
CQ
disdainful novel to join the movement.
In a little over a year after the founding of the
MNS# the Nacis established contingencies of National
59
Socialist Youth for boys between the ages 14-18. These
groups were Known as the Jota or "J" from the first letter of
the JNS: Juventud Nacional Socialista. The members of the
JNS held meetings# sold the Naci newspaper, Traba io. and
actively engaged in monthly outdoor excursions. Together
with the young men of the TNA, those of the JNS were often
glorified by the MNS as the most likely leaders of the future
Naci state. Boizard noted: "These men are what we call 'the
good young men* of good families# whose names cause a sensa­
tion when they appear in the press."6**

58 w
Fernando Alegria# Manana los auerreros (Santiago:
1964).
6^Cf. "J.N.S.#" Traba io (September 25, 1936) and J.A.
Salinas Ortiz, "Nacismo y juventud," Accion Chilena. 4, no.
2 (October, 1936), Special Edition.
66Camara de diputados Boletxn de sesiones. (December
14, 1936), p. 752.

241
 The spirit of Nacismo in the University of Chile and in
the Catholic University was cultivated by the Grupo Nacista
Universitarioi GNU.®1 The Nacis were actively engaged in
university politics and presented their own candidates in
69
the annual election of the Chilean Student Federation.
From 1934 to 1936, Nacismo became an increasingly signifi­
cant political force at the University of Chile. Although
the students of the left maintained control over the FECH,
the Nacis showing in the student elections during this
period revealed a steady increase in support from 127 to
910 votes.63

c. Women
Up until the end of 1935, the Nacis made no efforts to
attract women into the movement because Gonzalez believed
that politics was a sphere of activity which should be

The counterpart of the popular front on the university

level was the United Anti-Fascist Group (Grupo Unico Anti­
fascists) or GUA. The Communist dominated Avance group, early
in 1936, approached the radicals in the university with an
invitation to participate in a broad anti-fascist front (La
Opinion, May 5, 1936). Violent clashes between the Nacis
and the Leftists in the university became increasingly
frequent. Cf. Bonilla and Glazer pp. 100-101, and Tito Mundt,
Las banderas olvidadas (Mexicoi 1965), 2nd ed., p. 18. ,
6?
The students, particularly through FECH, helped to
recast Chilean politics. Cf. Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer,
Student Politics in Chile (New Yorki 1970), pp. 32-135; and
Julio Cesar Jobet "La juventud de 1930 y el socialismo,"
Arauco, no. 9 (July, 1960), pp. 29-32.
63
Acci6n Chilena (August, 1936), Jorge Marshall ”Las
elecciones de la FECH,” Traba jo (July 11, 1937), p. 3.

242
limited to men. The principal role of women in society was
1 £* M
to serve as wife and mother. An editorial in Traba io
expressed succintly the Jefe's positioni “It is the man
who makes history; he does it through his heroic acts, his
peaceful labors, and creations of the spirit. The woman is
herself history; thus her mission consists in transmitting
in her 'bowels* the deeds of men to future generations."®®
These views were in line with the position taken by the
German Nazis on the role of women in German society. Common
to both movements was the idea that encouraging women to be
on an equal plane with men would result in the destruction
of the home and the family. It was also for this reason
that both movements condemned "Marxist” egalitarian notions
which were thought to create an unhealthy competition between
men and women.
Although the Chilean Nacis never significantly changed
their views on women in politics, they did in December 1935
formally authorize women to join the movement and become
active members. There is no doubt that this was brought
about by the fact that it was just at this time that women
for the first time were given the right to vote in the munici­
pal elections ip -Chile. On this point, doctrine had to give

®^Fr. Haeusler, "La Posici5n de la mujer en el estado

nacional-socialista," Accion Chilena 2 (July, 1934) *182.
Cf. Isabel Carrera, "La mujer chilena dara leccidn de civismo,"
El Ravo (April 3, 1935).
65
Traba io (December 21, 1935), p. 3.

;
243
way to practical politics. Women were first sworn into the
66
movement in December 1935.
In the following years, the Nacis were successful in
establishing a small number of brigades and Work Service
detachments of women in Santiago, Valparaiso, and else­
where. In total numbers, however, women probably did not
account for more than a few hundred members, although this is
a rough estimate given by one of the movements female
members, Maria Viancos de Jara. Because of the lack of
data, it is impossible to determine the social composition
of the women, although a goodly number, according to Maria
Viancos, came from her own social background. Her husband
was the founder of the Bank of Credit and Investments. Her
friends, such as Inez del Rios de Balmaceda and Mrs. Luis
Garreton were of the same high social standing, as were
others, including the wives of some of the leaders of the
67
movement.
The activities of the women's brigades were largely
those connected with charitable functions in the poor neigh­
borhoods of the cities. These consisted of making clothes
and providing food for the poor at low cost, or working in
hospitals. According to Naci thinking, this type of chari­
table work would not destroy the initiative of the workers
by giving them something for nothing, but would increase
their initiative. Women were also involved in the activities

66Ibid., p. 3.
67
Interview with *:'ar£a Viancos de Jara, Santiago, 1968.
244
of. the Propaganda Department, and in particular with the
68
writing of articles for Trabaio. Maria Viancos, who wrote
under the pseudonym, J. de M., became an outstanding writer
of this paper and many of her articles appeared in the last
years of the movement.®9

d • Labor
At the start of the 1930s, the vast majority of the
Chilean workers were not organized, presumably because the
existing unions were weak and ineffectual. This situation
was unchanged, despite the increased number of unions during
the period. The FOCH never recovered from its dismantling
by Iaanez, and the "legal" unions fared no better. In
general, the unions were attached either to the political
parties or the government, or both, with most workers
dividing their loyalties between the Socialists and the
Communists. The Communists certainly lost control of labor
under Ibanez, but they still remained strong. The Socialists
and the legal unions under IbSnez fared better. In the
election of 1931, the labor vote was split between Alessandri
and the Communists; the Socialists became the dominant force
In labor politics, although the Democrats became the largest

68
Cf. J.A. Salinas Ortiz, "La mujer nueva," Traba io
(July 16, 1936); Dr. P. Sadilla Urrutia, "La mujer y el nacismo,
Accion Chilena. 5, no. 1 (August, 1936); For a report of a
Conference in Valparaiso before the Brioada Femenina de
Valparaiso, see Acci6n Chilena. 5, no. 2 (October, 1936), p.
119.
69For example, J. de M., El espiritu del nacional-
socialismo. (Santiago! 1936).
party in the Congress* With their "syndicalist” program,
the Nacis were singularly unsuccessful in their attempts to
organize labor, although, as noted above, this did not
mean that their support among the working classes was
lacking.^0

e* Germans
In view of the unmistakable identification and early
sympathies shown by the Nacis for German National Socialism,
it would seem that the MNS could have counted on mobilizing
considerable support among the small contingent of German
Chileans and descendents of Germans in Chile* Most of these
were located in the southern provinces of Cautin, Valdivia
and Llanquiue, although a significant number were also
located in Santiago, Valparaiso, and ConcepciSn. Most
members of the German colony were descendents of a large
wave of immigrants who colonized the southern region in the
mid-nineteenth century with the encouragement of the Chilean
government and the entrepreneurs 1 assistance of Bernardo
71
Philippe and Perez Rosales.
The Nacis did win support from a few landowners of
Germanic background, such as Ernest Wagner in Villarica.

70
The Left, in general, has tried to exempt the
"working class" from active support of Fascist governments,
but this was not the case anywhere in Europe, and certainly
not in either Germany or Italy where the working classes were
major supporters of both Mussolini and Hitler.
71
Cf. George F.W. Young, "German Immigration and
Colonization in Chile 1849-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Uni­
versity of Chicago, 1969, and Mundt, Las banderas olvidades,
p. 63.
246
Carlos Keller, who travelled often in the south, claims to
have been warmly received by large numbers of the German
72
colony in Osorno and elsewhere* And enthusiasm for the
HNS among the Germans in Valdivia encouraged the Nacis to
establish a special newspaper, El Ravo. in 1935, in large
part to propagate the cause of Nacismo among the Germans in
73
southern Chile*
However, despite these efforts, and despite the ties
between the movement and the German colony in the south, the
Chilean Nacis did not support the Hitlerite activities among
the German population in the south and this caused consi­
derable friction. Gonzalez openly denounced the German youth
organization in the south and its leader, Rudolfo Schwartzen-
berg, for carrying on such activities. In 1935, irresolvable
differences developed between the MNS and the German
Juqendbund when it became clear to GonzSlez that it was serving
not the cause of the HNS but the cause of the German Reich
in Chile. In an editorial in Traba io on June 22, 1935,
Schwartzenberg was denounced for his Hitlerist tendencies and
expelled from the MNS.7^
Gonzalez was undoubtedly correct when he maintained
that the Juqendbund was not simply promoting a closer contact

72
Interviews with Carlos Keller in Santiago, 1967-68.
*^ E 1 Correo de Valdivia (March 26, 1938), p. 8. Juan
Pablo Costa, "El pangermanismo en America," Traba io (March
29, 1938).
^Trabajo (June 22, 1935), p. 3.

247

i
between Chileans of German descent and German culture, but
was in fact now wholly dependent on the German Nazi Party
and therefore no longer a Chilean but part of the Reich's
Hitler youth. The uniform was the same, the emblem was the
same, and Schvartzenberg preached the same racial ideas which
GonzSlez found incompatible either with his conception of
Nacismo or with allegiance to the cause of Chile* According
to Gonzalez the Juqendbund "sustains racial ideas which
75
are absolutely incompatible with Chilean national sentiment."

3. Did Nacismo Become a National Movement?

The Nacis were moderately successful in their efforts
76
to establish a mass based national political movement.
From April 1932, when Gonzalez established the movement,
until its demise in 1938, it has been estimated that Nacismo
managed to attract over 20,000 militants and sympathizers
at the high point of its popularity. In view of the number
of parties in Chile at the time, this was no small achieve-
ment. 77 Thus, despite the fact that they never succeeded

Jorge Gonzalez, "Contra la unidad de la raza," Traba jo

(July 6, 1935), p. 3.
76
Acci6n Chilena, 4, no. 2 (October 1935), p. 83.
77
Although the MNS was never a movement of mass pro­
portions, at its pealc it was probably the largest of the minor
political parties. Duran claimed that there were 15,000
cuotas paid in Santiago alone. The Naci meeting in Concep-
ci6n in 1936 was attended by over 3,000. In the election of
1937, GonzSlez received 40,000 votes in spite of the fact
that young followers couldn't vote. The U.S. military attache
in Chile estimated in October 1933 that the MNS had about
8,000 members. In September 1936 GonzSlez ordered that the

248
in becoming a major political force in the short period of
their existence, the Nacis managed to become a nation-wide
movement. In this sense* they succeeded in becoming a
national movement.
The threat of Socialism and Communism in the early
1930s led a good number of middle and upper class citizens
to view Nacismo as the only movement which would stave off
these movements. They joined the MNS less out of agreement
with its goals than out of a negative attitude toward movements
which they considered even more destructive. But, according
to Donoso, their numbers were few. And it is difficult to
determine to what extent the Nacis enjoyed support among the
active military, although it is clear that they did manage
to recruit a number of prominent military officers in
retirement such as, Lautaro Clavel, an ex-under secretary of
the Navy, Anibal Godoy, a general in the Army until 1932,
and Arturo Mujica, an army lieutenant Colonel who retired in
1925. Nacismo*s failure to attract more followers than it
did, and particularly among the middle and upper classes,
is undoubtedly due to the fact that Alessandri was able to
maintain order, instill confidence, and protect their
interests. They didn't need GonzSlez or Nacismo to do that.

membership be doubled. Trabaio noted that some 200 nuclei

would be represented in the Congress of Directors to be held
on October 12, 1937 to decide on the Presidential elections.

249
 VI

THE NACIS IN POLITICSi 1932-1938

Although in the election of 1932, Arturo Alessandri,

was the candidate of the Left, the Nacis were not on public
record as his vociferous opponents. In fact, the MNS left
its members free to vote for whomever they pleased in the
presidential election. There was no Naci candidate, because
the movement opposed the party system. As noted earlier,
they opposed coalition politics of any kind. But the
nature of Chilean politics during the 1930s forced them to
function as a party and ultimately to form coalitions.
Alessandri was a formidable opponent, and the Nacis were
forced to play out their role in politics against the back­
ground of the changing nature of the Lion of Tarapaca's
second administration. In theory, and in their propaganda,
the main enemy of the Nacis was the Left; the main enemy of
the Left, the Nacis. But in fact, the main enemy of both
was Alessandri.
Alessandri came to power in 1932 determined to make the
1925 Constitution in fact, as well as in theory, the funda­
mental law of the land. The most striking single character­
istic of the Constitution, as Stevenson has pointed out,
was its abolition of parliamentary government. The presi­
dential system which Alessandri adopted was not unlike the
i one outlined by Portales and Balmaceda. He won the 1932
election at the head of a Federation of the Left which

250
included the Democrats, Doctrinary Liberals, some Radicals
and a host of smaller parties. In fact, he won the support
of most of the Center groups, including the Radical party
and the more advanced Liberals with a goal that was almost
sure to conflict with their interests once he was in power.
But as his relations with the moderate Left and Center
rapidly cooled, they cooled also with the Nacis. Perhaps
the most curious aspect of the Nacis in politics was that
as Alessandri "moved to the Right" they moved to the Left
and found their most natural allies among their worst
enemies.
It is clear that Alessandri understood that economic
recovery would be impossible without some form of political
repression and that he was prepared to use his power
effectively. His support had started with those who had
signed the Pact of the Left. Some opposition developed over
the tax and economy measures resulting in some defections
among those parties. The Radicals were divided. The
Liberals and Conservatives formed to organize the opposition,
although opposed to many economic and tax measures. They
gave passive support because they desired to maintain
constitutional government and to avoid further political
disturbances. But the Extraordinary Powers legislation
radically changed the alignment of the parties in relation
to the Executive. Alessandri lost most of his support among
the former groups of the Left and received the solid vote
of the Liberals and Conservatives.

251
 Both Donoso, on the Right, and Alexander, on the Left,
emphasize that during Alessandri*s second administration he
"moved to the Right."'*' As Alexander saw itj "Although
elected as the nominee of the moderate Left, he swung
increasingly to the Right during his administration. The
Radicals withdrew and he began to rely on the Conservatives
and Liberals for most of his support. During this admini­
stration, Alessandri*s role was that of the restorer of
economic and political stability rather than that of social
reformer and advocate of change." This is perhaps the best
was to understand Alessandri*s policies during the 1930s —
that he was a "restorer" rather than a "reformer."
Alessandri recognized that stability was the first order of
business. Given the nature of the Chilean situation, he
now put economic change over social change.

A. The Nacis and the Politics of Opposition

Throughout the 1930s, the Nacis remained marginal to
the mainstream of Chilean politics — they reflected rather
*
than molded the political climate. Once opposition politics

■*"Cf. Ricardo Donoso, "Chile desde la constitucion de

1833," in Historia de America , 9, pp. 452 ff. Cf. Samuel
Gajardo, Alessandri v su destino. pp. 21 ff.
2 * *
Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution
(New York* 1962), pp. 66 ff.
3
The political background to this chapter has already
been developed in Chapter X and the standard works on the social
and political history of Chile noted in that chapter have also
provided the background for this one. Other works which deal
more in depth with Alessandri*s second administration, e.g.
Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, aqitador y demoledor, 2 vols.

252
— opposition to the Alessandri regime — became the central
and overriding fact of Chilean politics during this period,
the Nacis# together with the Ibanistas, constituted a Kind of
third force# as distinguished from the Left and the parties
of the Right* They never ceased to search for their
rightful place in the political spectrum. That they never
found it says much about the nature of the movement and
about the nature of Chilean politics during this decade of
great uncertainty.
It was the Socialist Party, rather than the Naci
movement or the Communist Party, around which opposition
politics tended to center and the political climate was
shaped by that party*s response to the second Alessandri
administration*s increasingly repressive policies. The
Nacis met the Socialists in the streets and Alessandri in
the corridors power. From 1932 to 1938# the encounters
with the Socialists began with violence and ended with
rapprochement; the encounters with Alessandri began with an

(Mexico* 1954), have given me a fuller background

to the period than the specific references to them may
indicate. However, I have endeavored# wherever possible,
to utilize on-the-spot accounts of what was happening
in Chile during this period (1932-1938) — Embassy reports,
newspaper reports, memoirs and letters# etc. — in order
to let the facts interpret themselves in their unfolding.
They explain, more than any Left, Right or Center inter­
pretation# the short-lived rise and fall of Nacismo as a
political movement.

253
unofficial rapprochement and ended with violence. As
noted above* the central irony of the period was that while
Alessandri moved to the "Right," the Nacis moved to the
"Left." It is this curious development, not to be found
in the history of any other "fascist" party, that informs
the nature of the Chilean Nacis in politics.
The Socialists, like other segments of the Left,
were committed to both economic and social reform at a
time when the multiparty coalitions, led by Alessandri and
the centrist forces, were devoted primarily to economic
change. This created tension in the Socialist Party not
only internally but in their relations with the other
parties. After the rejection of the "Socialist Republic,"
Grove, in November 1932, had openly rejected any attempt
to gain power through force of arms and stressed that the
Socialist Party would now employ legal electoral means»
"I do not speak of taking power by assault, but of pre­
paring ourselves to conquer it in. the way the bourgeois
parties have done . * . We will work in the light of day,
4
and we will conquer."
Though divided internally by Trotskyists and Social
Democrats, the Socialist Party was united in opposition to
both the Communists and the Nacis. Attacks on the leaders
of the Socialist Party by both led to the creation of the
*

^La Opinion (November 12, 1932), pp. 1 and 5| quoted

in Drake, "Chilean Socialist Party," p. 4.

254
Socialist Defense Militias which played an important role
in the street battles against their Party's opponents in the
following years. ® The official Communist Party, led by
Elias Laferte, was, next to the Socialist Party, the second
most important opponent to Alessandri. Though it did not
fully adhere to the strategy of the Comintern aimed at
the destruction of the Social Democrats, the communist Party
maintained an intransigent position against coalitions
with other parties of the Left.^ Already in 1931 it had
expanded the composition of its membership, which up to
that time had been made up almost exclusively of workers,
to include intellectuals and professionals. In 1933 the
Party resolved that its task was "to create a profound
chasm between the Communist Party and all the bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois parties, above all "Grovism" and "Hidalguismo,"
the leader of the Trotskyists." Up to 1935, the Communist
Party maintained an attitude of intransigence, but then, in
accord with the Comintern, it came closer to the progressive
bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats in the fight against

5
Julio Cesar Jobet, Socialismo v comunismo (Santiago:
1952), p. 30.
C
Cf. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America
(New Brunswick: 1957) and Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and
Communism in Chile (Cambridge* 1965).
7
Alan Angell, Politics and the Labor Movement in Chile
(London* 1972), p. 89.

255
Fascism. But by 1935, the Party had definitely lost out
O
to the Socialists as the spokesman for Chilean labor*
The Nacis and the parties of the Right had in common
their anti-Communism and this above all was what made them
uncomfortable bed-fellows, at least until the Nacis moved
to the Left politically (although not ideologically). The
common bond between the Nacis and these parties was
especially strong in the early 1930s when the latter looked
to Nacismo as a defense against the "Socialist Republic."
The differences between them were vague with regard to
their attitudes toward socialism. To be sure, the Nacis,
in their speeches and tracts, attacked "plutocratic"
capitalism and expressed devotion to "Fascist socialism."
Yet when one examines the contents of the socialism they
espoused, their differences with the parties of the Right
do not appear to have been very great. The Nacis didn't
oppose capitalism as an economic system for the future
state. Thus it is a legitimate question whether or not
"Fascist 3ocialism" was hostile to the great bulk of.the
middle class, whether it was more suited to the proletariat
than to the bourgeoisie.
In early debates on political strategy, the Naci
leadership was itself divided over the posture the MNS
should take toward the political system. Some preferred
to refrain from premature efforts to win electoral office,

p
Halperin, Nationalism and Communism, p. 135.

256
thus avoiding contamination by the system they condemned.
Others, including GonzUlez, saw benefits to the Movement in
making known its view in a political campaign and advocated
that the MNS put up candidates for the 1932 Congressional
elections. The latter position won out in the end, but
the debate over the issue caused such bitter feelings among
* 9
the leadership that some of its founders resigned.
The MNS put up five candidates for the 1932 Congressional
elections* Juan de Dios Valenzuela, a lawyer; Esponsorio
Espinosa Escobar, a worker; Gustavo Vargas Molinares, a
businessman; Carlos Yavar Harbin, a private employee; and
Otto Krahn Schlack, a lawyer. Thinking it advisable not
to taint himself with a possible defeat, Gonzalez did not
himself become a candidate. As it turned out, it was the
right decision. The results of the election proved
disappointing to the Nacis. None of their candidates were
elected; and in fact the five candidates together did not
garner 1000 votes.
The defeat of the Nacis in their first electoral
campaign meant that they would have to content themselves
with campaigning from outside the parliamentary system they
so strongly denounced. But, from another point of view,

g
Wilfredo Mayorga, "La fugaz violencia del nacismo,"
Ercilla. no. 1611 (April 20, 1966), p. 18.

257
their electoral defeat saved them from the premature
contamination of coalition politics, which they condemned,
and enabled them to demonstrate the truth of their asser­
tion that they were a national movement above political
parties, without allegiances either to the Right or the
Left. But the failure to adhere to coalition politics left
the Nacis without allies in the political system either to
defend themselves against the Alessandri regime or to
advance their cause.
Opposition to the Alessandri regime developed parti­
cularly in response to his support of the Republican
Militia and his use of extraordinary powers. Although
the main thrust of Alessandri*s repressive policies were
directed against the Left, throughout the 1930s the govern­
ment Kept the Nacis on the defensive by strict and constant
surveillance. Moreover, with the license provided by
Alessandri*s "extraordinary powers" and the general laws
for internal security, the government was able, under the
slightest pretense, to close down the Naci paper, Traba io,
and to detain its editors for violations. However, while
keeping the Nacis on the defensive, Alessandri was never
able or willing to deal a death blow to the movement. This
may be explained by the fact that he, like other governments
in similar situations, tolerated its existence because he
found the vouna Nacistas useful surrogate shock troops in
his struggles with the Left.

258
 In view of its mission to defend the Constitution and
to maintain order, and by virtue of its acceptability
among the more prestigious groups, Alessandri*s government
warmly supported the Republican Militia, despite opposition
to its existence from some sectors of the military and from
some elements in the parties. A privately organized para­
military force, the Militia came into existence in July
1932 with the express purpose of preventing further military
involvements in politics. It was not the only such para­
military organization in Chile; other small civilian groups
of a similar nature had been formed spontaneously after the
June 4 coup. They took up arms to protect their property
from seizure by the government. The Militia, however,
incorporated some of these independent groups and by 1933
boasted an estimated 10,000 militants. Controlled by a
general staff headed by its founder, Julio Sanchez, its
members were outfitted in dark blue uniforms and provided
training in the use of arms, a sizeable cache of which was
reportedly supplied by the government to wage battle with
the army and maintain the civilian government if necessary.
The Militia attracted members from all classes, although
it was composed primarily of upper middle and upper class
families. Among its ranks were to be found such Radicals
as Alamos Barros, Julio Duran, Jorge de la Cudadra, Emilio
Schwartzenberg, Andreas P'rada, and Italo Alessandrini.
Most were associated with the traditional parties, but a

259
few adventurous Leftists entered it as well. When it
finally made itself public by staging an impressive march
through the streets of Santiago, on May 10, .1933, Alessandri
and his ministers were among the viewers. More, the Presi­
dent addressed them exuberantly and expressed support for
their goals. 10
Ostensibly, the Republican Militia had much in common
with the Nacis and no doubt to Gonzalez* chagrin it was
quickly successful in attracting more support than the
Nacis. Nevertheless, Gonzalez openly acknowledged the
communality of interests that existed between the two
organizations. In an editorial in Traba io. he supported
the goals of the Militia and favorably acknowledged their a-
political stance. However, he questioned whether it was
possible for a group of this kind to remain neutral in view
of its upper-class membership. Conversely, he also doubted
whether it could become a political movement. If it did,
he claimed that it certainly wouldn’t be fascist, as some
had contended, since the Militia lacked an ideology and a
popular base of support.11

^Cf. Wi If redo Mayorga, *'La milicia republicans,"

Ercilla (April 6, 1966), pp. 18-19.
11Jorge GonzSlez,"La milicia republicans analizada
por el Jefe del Nacismo," Traba io (May 11, 1933). An exchange
followed t An Open Letter to the Republican Militia appeared
in Traba io on May 16, 1933, and the Militia responded with
a letter dated May 20, which was published in Traba io on May
25, 1933. Gonzalez sent another unpublished letter to the
Militia on September 1, 1933,* and on September 9 the Militia
responded claiming incompatibility with Nacismo.

260
 Here Gonzalez* remarks seem disingenuous. When the
Militia was first organized many Nacis covertly joined its
ranks and many of those in the Militia became Nacis. Thus
the membership in both organizations overlapped. This was
in direct contravention to the Naci doctrine and strategy
of not forming alliances or coalitions. Moreover# the
Nacis not only sought a rapprochement with the Republican
Militia, but they infiltrated its ranks, some managing to
gain control of the Militia's arsenals.
But Gonzalez'reservations about the Militia shortly
became more serious and in another Traba io editorial he
openly questioned its neutrality. Specifically, it was said
that the Militia had pledged itself to oppose any changes
in the constitutional order and to fight against any attempt
to install a fascist government in Chile — the Militia
supported Alessandri. This position was clearly anathema to
the MNS, but when GonzSlez confronted Schwartzenberg with
it the latter insisted that there was no incompatibility
between the two movements. But the sense of incompatibility
became more apparent as time went on. When the Militia
issued a decree that its members could not accept commands
from other leaders in military matters and that they must
swear total loyalty to the Militia, Gonzalez, on September
10, 1933, ordered all Nacis to resign from the Militia or
0 1 9
be expelled from the Movement.

261
 The failure of the Nacis to establish a rapprochement
with the Republican Militia had unfortunate consequences for
the movement. Not only did the MNS lose some of its members,
who chose to remain with the Militia but it now had to
compete more energetically with the Militia for middle and
upper class support. Then too, Alessandri continued his
ambivalent support of the Militia, even though it created
political difficulties for him among the moderate and
13
progressive elements in the Radical and Decmocratic parties.

B. Theater Politics; Street Politics

With the exception of the short-lived affair with the
Republican Militia, and up until the birth of the Popular
Front in 1936 when the Nacis did start making alliances and
coalitions with other parties, there were two primary
manifestations of Naci politics. The first, which might
be called "theater politics" (discussed in the preceding
chapter), was primarily for the edification of the faithful.
This was the many rallies, inarches and demonstrations, which
were accompanied with banners, uniforms and the various
other meta-political accouterments described in an earlier
chapter. Such gatherings were essential to fascist movements
everywhere and in this the Chilean Nacis were no different.
Visitations and speeches by the "Leader," in this case
Gonzalez, were also part of these rituals. Exhortations for

13Hoy (July, 1933), pp. 7 and 9.

262
self-sacrifice and the subordination of the individual to
the collective became political virtues. In fact, in the
"theater" everything was political.
The other, preeminent manifestation of the Nacis in
politics during the period was what might be called "street
politics.” And if the most conspicuous aspect of theater
politics was ritual, the most conspicuous aspect of street
politics was violence. The Nacis had initially denounced
the use of force and violence to achieve their objectives.
An early programatic statement on the matter read* "The
evils of liberal democracy in Chile should be ended, but
not by brute force, but by convictioncarried to the depth
of the national soul."14 This did not mean, however, that
the Nacis were not prepared to resort to violence under
certain conditions. In a speech in June 1932, GonzSlez
made this very c l ean
If the situation should arise, Nacismo will Know how
to be a physical as well as a moral force. It will
not fear to respond to violence with violence. While
violence should be condemned in principle, it becomes
necessary when reason becomes impotent. Ideas can’t
be fought with ideas when those who advocate them use
the most brutal means to achieve their ends. In
such cases, it is necessary to repay force with
force, attacK with counter-attack.1*
It was less than a year after Gonzalez made this
pronouncement that the Nacis first became embroiled in bitter
street fights with the Communists and the Socialists. The
first of many street fights took place on August 6, 1933,

14E1 Imparcial (June 21, 1932).

15E1 Imparcial (July 12, 1932).
263
when the Communists allegedly stoned the Nacis as they were
leaving a meeting held at the Providence Theater in Santiago.
This event was soon followed by another not unexpected
confrontation later in the same month when, according to
Trabaio, over 300 Communists again attacked the Nacis as
3.6
they were leaving the Iris Theater after a meeting.
These early outbreaks of violence between the Nacis
and the Communists motivated Gonzalez Videla, a prominent
member of the Radical Party, to raise the matter before the
House of Deputies in an effort to gain support for a re­
solution demanding strong governmental action to prevent
their reoccurence. The House debated the resolution for a
couple of days, during which a variety of views concerning
the Naci movement were aired. The diverse reactions to
Gonzalez* statement on violence were highly revealing of the
public image of the Nacismo m 1933. 17
Gonzalez Videla was perhaps the most concerned about
4

the threat of Nacismo. He viewed it as a violent revolu­

tionary movement which threatened the very basis of parlia­
mentary stability in its attacks on political parties. He
decried Nacism and "Bolshevism" as both major threats to
democracy because both were determined to use force and

16
Wilfredo Mayorga, "El camino de la violencia,"
Ercilla. no. 1614, (May 11, 1966), p. 18.
17
Camara de diputados. Boletin de sesiones (August,
1933).

264
direct action to achieve their goals. In response to these
threats, he said "we will fight with equal vigor the
revolutionary action of the Communists and the Nacis, the
latter is nothing less than Right-wing Communism that seeks
to gain power by violent means." He expressly warned the
many who were sympathetic to Nacismo because of their
shared anti-Communism not to belittle the gravity of the
movement.
Different from GonzSlez Videla, representatives of the
traditional parties were not so harshly antagonistic toward
the MNS. Eduardo Moore of the Liberal Party expressed
little sympathy for Nacismo. but he declared that if the
ideological tendencies of the Chilean Nacis were striking
sympathetic chords in the country it was because the major
parties were not in agreement on serious ideals which the
people longed for to establish an orderly republic. His
views were shared by Zepeda and Guzman Garcia his colleagues
on the Right, both of whom lamented the weakness of the
government in fighting against Communism, which necessitated
the rise of Nacismo. Others like Carlos Vicuna and Raul
Zuniga denounced the violence of the Nacis, but inferred
that they were no less a threat than the Republican Militia,
18
which bore arms.

18 #
Cf. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, "Los procedimientos de
los nacistas crillos," La Nacion (September 3, 1933), p. 11.
In this article, Gonzalez called Gustavo Vargas, one of the
Naci leaders, "a little Hitler" and termed the Nacis "a
reactionary and demogogic minority which attempted to usurp
power in the name of socialism." He claimed that the Nacis

263
 On June 3# 1934, GonzSlez wrote to his wife from
Valdivia that in O s o m o they had been greeted by the local
Nacis and by the Communists, the latter first with shouts
19
and then with rocks and on June 19-20, the Nacis again
crossed swords with the Communists at the University of
Chile. Indeed, the frequency and intensity of the Naci
confrontations with the Left led the movement to a more
extremist position with regard to the use of violence as
a political tactic. Reminiscent of Sorelian utterances on
the use and glorification of violence, the Nacis in 1935
decried the reluctance of Chileans to accept the need for
20
violence as a means of regenerating society.
On September 19, 1935, the Nacis had their first
martyr for the cause. Pablo Acuna was killed in the company
of his brother during a protest in the Parque Cosinuo in
Santiago. He had been a member of the 1NA and had fought
against the Communists from the very beginning when they
met in the streets after a meeting at the Providence
Theater in 1933. He had also fought against the Communists
at the University of Chile on June 19 and 20, 1934. About

were recruited from the displaced elements of previous

reactionary dictatorships, of the timid bourgeoisie, and
certain young people from good families dedicated to the
sport of injuring workers and communists to satisfy their
distaste for classes.
19
Letter from Jorge Gonz£lez to his wife (Valvidiat
June 3, 1934). Unpublished.
20
Nuestra violencia", Traba1o (October 19, 1935).

266
this time two radicals* Enrique Alfonso and Raul Morales*
together with the Social RejpuJ»l'ican Arturo Olavarria,
introduced during the debate iri the House on the Nacis a
resolution calling for the Minister of Interior to take
drastic measures to put an end to revolutionary activity by
the Nacis and all other organizations seeking power by vio­
lent means. The House passed by a large majority the
resolution* condemning the activities of both the Nacis and
the Communists. The House also approved two other measures
condemning the Communists in particular and the Nacis in
general..
On October 13, 1935 in Concepcion, a battle between
the Nacis and the Socialists ended in the death of the Naci,
Manuel Bastias* and the injury of five others. On November
17, in Osorno, six Nacis were gravely injured in street
fights with the Anarcho-syndicalists. In April 1936 a
dispute between Naci and Socialist youths resulted in the
death of one of the latter, Julio Llanos in the barrio of
La Cisterna in Santiago. Less than a month passed before
militant Socialists attacked a Naci local in Santiago and
killed Labrana, a Naci militant. On June 6, in Valparaiso*
both the Nacis and the Socialists went into the streets to
sell their newspapers. The result was another violent
encounter in which the bronze buckles of the INA won out over
the Socialist's clubs. Thereafter, the Socialist Party
alleged the existence of a secret group within the MNS of

267
suicide-prone militants called Arauco who were especially
trained for action against the Socialists. They accused a
prominent doctor in Valparaiso of being their organizer and
trainer. The tension continued as a group of Socialist
militants, claiming to be sympathizers, appeared at the local
Naci headquarters and proceeded to break the electric fuses
and cut the cables from the street. In retaliation, the
Nacistas placed oil and other flammable materials on the
stairs of the Socialist headquarters and set fire.
Writing much later about these events, Wilfredo Mayorga
recalled! ". . . The violence is so unbounded it is as if
each had a hidden desire to destroy the other. They are
two winds, two political movements which both look directly
and surely to spread their influence; they want to gain
political power, to control the government totally. Their
21
fight will be to the death.” On the evening of June 13,
1936, in Santiago, a group of about 30 Nacistas and an equal
number of Socialists opened fire on each other resulting in
the death of Manual Munoz and two other unidentified Naci
militants. Another encounter took place at the University
of Chile on July 8.
After a young socialist, Hector Barreto, was killed
in a street fight with the Nacis on August 22, 1936, Gonzalez
issued another decree on the Naci attitude toward violence*

21
Mayorga, "El camino de la violencia," Ercilla. pp.
18-19.

268
 We reject the principle of violence which is
attributed to us. It is not true that we propose to
impose Naci ideology by means of force . . . But while
we categorically deny and reject the charge that force and
violence are the means of our political conviction,
we do not pretend to deny that our men have been forced
under certain circumstances to employ these means.
We have been violent we have spilled the blood of
Chileans, and we also have spent the lives of some of
our co-nationals•
I therefore declare to the heart of the country that
I assume full responsibility for the death of young
Barreto. (However), I declare that the bullet which
killed that boy was not stupidly discharged by a group
of conscienceless and soulless individuals, but rather
that that bullet and all those which have come from
the Naci ranks have obeyed a personal inspiration.
To those today who ask for my head in vengeance for
that death, I give notice that I do not hide it from
those who wish to come and take it; but I wish to serve
notice that I will not deliver it as a sheep and that
while that head reposes on my shoulders no one will
keep me from that line of conduct which I have chosen.
We have employed violence and will continue to employ
it each time it becomes necessary. To practice violence
in those cases of defensive necessity is not only the
legitimate right of a collective conscience, but the
organic manifestation of life. To condemn violence
simply because it is violence is not a sign of culture
but of patent degeneration.22
According to Keller, as of August 28, 1936, the toll
taken by violence of Naci militants was* 4 dead and 77
injured by gunshots, knifings and other means. No statis­
tics are available for the Socialists and Communists, but
without doubt there were an equal number of victims as a

22Jorge Gonz£lez, La violencia nacista v los nartidos

politicos. Discurso pronunciado por radio por el iefe del
nacismo Jorae Gonzalez el 28 de aqosto de 1936 (Santiago*
1937). ;

269
 23
result of confrontations with the Nacis. But by 1936 the
time for street politics had passed. The Nacis would now
attempt to make politics through the traditional channels.
When that failed, they would attempt to carry street politics
into the houses of government. The mediator would again be
violence and in the end would prove their undoing.

C. Strange Alliance
During the years 1936 and 1937, the political fortunes
of the Nacis and all other political groups were to change
in Chile. The key was the changing nature of Alessandri's
second regime — how he, in the eyes of the left was trans­
formed from the "idol of the people" into an "instrument of
the oligarchy" because of his unyielding determination to
implement the 1925 Constitution whatever the cost. 24 As
noted above, his central objective was to establish consti­
tutional rule on a firm basis and to overcome the economic
crisis rather than to push socio-economic reform. Up to
1936, a majority of the Radicals voted with Alessandri,
which allowed him to successfully fight against the "Block
of the Left" organized by Grove and consisting of the Socia­
lists, Democraticos, Radical Socialists and Trotskyites.
But early in 1936, growing working-class dissatisfaction with
Ross's economic program (which had solved neither unemploy­
ment nor inflation) led to a major strike of the railroad

23
Accidn Chilena. vol. 5, no. 2, p. 119.
24
Stevenson, Chilean Popular Front, p. 58.

270
employees on February 2-3 i and they were supported by other
unions. On February 8, Alessandri declared martial law,
dissolved Parliament, closed down the opposition press and
imprisoned members of the Left. He claimed that he took
this action because he was under a state of siege, that it
was necessary to combat an attempt of Communist elements —
agents of the Third International based in Montevideo — to
overthrow the government. These repressive measures evoked
a bitter reaction by the Left throughout the country against
Alessandri personally and against his government. The
President was accused of trying to establish a dictatorship.
The formation of the Popular Front was a direct result of
25
Alessandri’s overreaction.

1. The Birth of the Popular Front

The birth of the Popular Front was inspired by the
Socialist Party in an effort to strengthen the "Block of the
Left." On February 6, a meeting of the "Block" was held
and a call issued to the Radicals and the Communists to join
with the Socialists in opposition to Alessandri and the
Rightest parties. It was partly in reply to this call that
Deputy Justice Justiano Sotomayor two weeks later presented
a proposal to the Central Committee of the Radical Party for
the establishment of a Popular Front in Chile. Although the
Conservatives and Liberals continue to maintain that the

25Ibid., pp. 63 ff. 26Ibid., p. 165.

271
Popular Front was a Communist creation and Moscow-inspired,
there is little doubt that it was, as the Radicals maintain,
"the spontaneous expression of the general dissatisfaction
with the government,” at least on the part of the Leftist
27
parties and their sympathizers.
There can be little doubt that the idea of Popular
Front governments originated in the decision of the Moscow-
dominated Comintern in 1935, which instructed Communist
parties throughout the world to form alliances with democra­
tic and bourgeois parties to fight against Fascism. But
the Popular Front in Chile was not, as in Europe and else-
28
where, an alliance to stop Fascism. To be sure, the parties
of the Left were bitter enemies of the Nacis and fought them
in the streets. However, these differences, while real
enough, were not so vital and immediate to expend their
energies on, and the timing of the formation of the Popular
Front in Chile cannot be specifically related to any particu­
lar conflict with Nacismo. Alessandri was the enemy and both
the parties of the Left and the MNS were waging their battle
against him and his government. As Stevenson has notedi
"actually the Popular Front was nothing more nor less than a
political alliance of the Left and its organization in
Chile was, in truth, more of a defensive than an offensive

27
Cf. Alfredo Guillermo Bravo El partido radical v el
frente popular (Santiago• 1936).
28
Cf. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile,
pp. 44-45.

272
 29
maneuver.”
By early May 1936, a pro-Alessandri movement was gaining
strength for the formation of a National Front to oppose the
Popular Front. Sentiment both for and against the govern­
ment rapidly began to crystalize and those not in the ranks
of the opposition had to join forces with the government in
order to protect their interests. At the same time, the
Popular Front held a meeting and outlined the conditions of
its future role in Congressi
The parliamentary representation of the Popular Front
is instructed, once the urgent projects necessary to
meet the imperative necessities of the people are
present, to oppose positively the legislative proposals
of the government as long as the President does not
satisfy the following aspirations t a) the immediate
dissolution of the Republican Militia and return to
the State of the arms of the Army illegally in posses­
sion of the Militia; b) elimination from the
government of the Minister of Finance, Gustavo Ross;
c) strict application of the provisions of the law to
prevent the unjustified high prices of commodities
to the consumers.30

2. The Nacis and the Front* Phase X

The changing nature of the Nacis* relation to the
Popular Front was determined by their growing awareness of
the fact that Alessandri was their common enemy and the
latter*s increasingly repressive measures against the Nacis.
In the first phase, the formal animosity between the Nacis
and the Front was maintained, even though they both opposed

29
Stevenson, Chilean Popular Front, p. 71.
3QLa Naci6n (May 25, 1936).

273
the government* But by the end of the second phase, the Front
had recognized the Nacis as potential allies in their struggle
against Alessandri and the Nacis had finally accepted the fact
that they had no chance against the government without allies.
With his slender majority of one in the Senate, increasing dis­
content in the Army, and a strongly united opposition on the
Left, Alessandri had little choice; his enemies were now to the
extremes on both sides.
The rhetoric of the Popular Front tooK the form of mili­
tant and virulent campaigns against both European Fascism and
German National Socialism, and they didn't distinguish between
them or between those sympathetic to them and Chilean Nacismo
despite the efforts made by the Nacis to differentiate their
movement from the Hitlerist movement in southern Chile and
abroad. To be sure, the overseas organizations of the Reich
were covertly disseminating propaganda and organizing support
for the triumph of Hitlerism in Chile. But, as pointed out
earlier, the Chilean Nacis were by this time openly critical
of Hitler. Nevertheless, the Popular Front's campaign against
31
Nazism in the south was also a campaign against Nacismo.

31
The articles in Frente Popular against Nacismo were
primarily Communist propagandat cf. "La moral nacista al
descubierto" (March 3, 1937); "El nacismo debe decidirse" (July
13, 1937); "El Nazismo alemSn burla y pisotea la libertad de
prensa en Chile" (August 21, 1937); "La Lucha contra el nacismo”
(August 26, 1937); "Contra el nacismo y sus agentes" (August 30,
1937); "La cruz swastica, la marca infamante, infesta los campos (
del sur de Chile" (August 31, 1937) ; "El nacismo criollo al servi-
cio de Hitler" (September 11, 1937); "El nacismo 'chileno*, es
tan solo una sucursal obediente del nazismo alem&n" (September
14, 1937); "El integralismo brasileno vendido al oro hitlerista"
(October 16, 1937); "Insulta a Chile y a los Chilenos" (November
15, 1937).

274 .
 The year before, when the Socialists were leading the
parties of the Left, both in fact and in propaganda, they
had made no such distinction. Consigns was the organ of the
Socialists. In an article titled ,,M.N.S.,' on April 21, 1935,
the weekly reported: "Unfortunately, we have seen for some
time now that a group of young men guided by a 'Mister
Gonzalez' is attempting to implant in this country a regime
which is a loyal copy of Prussian Nazism with all its banali­
ties and cruelties. It is easy to recognize a creole Naci,
even when he does not carry his insignia; by his looks,
movements, his anthropological traits, you will recognize
the primitive man in m o d e m dress." 32 On October 19,
Consigns called Gonzalez a 'pseudo-creole Fuhrer' and on
October 26 the headline read: "Workers and the Middle
Class Throughout the Country Express Repudiation of the Naci
33
Assasination." On this same day, an article titled "Nacista
Barbarism" read:
Nacismo has come to follow the trajectory of Germany.
The Chilean Naci Movement, though detached from our
reality and directed by obtuse germanized minds of a
vulgar and immitative kind, can grow on a platform
which discredits democratic parties . . • The fight
against Fascism has been and will now be one of the
fundamental preoccupations of the good Socialist
militant. To fight against them will destroy among us
the spirit of brutality and violence which gave rise to
Nacismo and its sinister results . . . In imitation of
Germany it has affected culture, destroying books,
persecuting races of men by means of the myth of the 34
pure race, jailing or exiling scholars, philosophers.

^"M.N.S." in Consigns (April 21, 1935) p. 2.

33
"La barbarie nacista," in Consigns (October 19, 1935),p
 In his radio address, "Nacism or Communism," on July-
28, 1926, Gonzalez indicated the feeling of the Nacis toward
the Communists, and he made no distinction between Communism
and Marxism or Marxist parties. He recognized t e historical
justification for both Nacismo and Communism because both
fought against the bankruptcy of the present regime. But
most important was that he contended that the Socialist Party
was leading the masses to complete Bolshevization. Thus while
the Socialists and Communists did not distinguish between
Chilean Nacismo and German Nazism, the Nacis threw the
Socialists and the Communists into one pot. 35
If Alessandri was emasculating his opposition on the
Left by diplomacy and coalition, he was openly provoking the
MNS. One of numerous such incidents occurred on the evening
of November 15, 1936, when a small contingent of Nacis were
returning by train to Santiago after a political rally in
Chilian. The train made a brief stopover in Rancagua, where
a Radical Party deputy was paying homage to the Popular Front
on a platform before a large crowd. He said* "Long live the
Popular Frontj Down with Nazism." The Nacistas shouted*
"Long live Nazism; Down with the Popular Front." Thereupon,
according to a former Naci militant who was present, orders

35
Jorge GonzSlez, Nacismo o comunismo. Discurso pronunciado
por radio por el iefe del nacismo, Jorge Gonzalez el 28 de
Julio de 1936. (Santiago*, 1937).

276
vere shouted from the platform for the Nacistas to lower the
blinds over the windows of the train and to "shut up" and avoid
any provocations. As the train pulled away from the station,
the shouts against the Nacis were followed by bullets, reputed
to have been fired by government agents on the platform. The
Nacis returned the fire. Nevertheless, when the train reached
Santiago, GonzSlez and Keller, who were on it and had been
involved in the incident, were taken into custody and they
together with 89 Nacistas were returned to Rancagua to stand
trial.
Immediately after the Rancagua incident, Alessandri sent
a message to Congress asking for strong repressive measures to
insure the internal security of the state. He recommended
that the following legislation be included to protect the
country from a dictatorship of the Right or of the Left*
1. Repression of all revolutionary action looking toward
a Nazi dictatorship.
2. Outlaw Communism and allied doctrines.
3. Authority for the State to suspend circulation of
newspapers.3'
Alessandri left no doubt that he was adopting an
attitude of firmness toward his opponents and that this was to
be directed not only against the Nacis but against the

36
Wilfredo Mayorga, "Alessandri y el nacismo frente a
frente." . Ercilla. no. 1612 (April 27, 1966), p. 18-19.
^Philip* Embassy Report (November 18, 1936), 825.00/955.

277
 Communists as well. If he had tolerated their existence to
fight the Pact of the Left, he would do so no longer.
Following the Rancagua incident there was considerable
protest by all parties in the House of Deputies resulting in
the unanimous approval of a declaration to Alessandri demanding
that the government take immediate action to prosecute those
^uilty and to prevent such events from happening again.
Shortly thereafter, but only in part because of the Rancagua
incident, the Alessandri government closed down the Naci press,
an act which was welcomed by the Conservative Senator, Gumucio,
38
in an article written for Diario Ilustrado. Alessandri and
the Minister of Interior also urged the Congress to expedite
passage of the Internal Security bill which had been submitted
at the opening of the "Extraordinary Session.” This was opposed
in the House of Deputies by the Progressive Radicals, the
- Radical Socialists and the Socialists, but to no avail.

3. The Nacis and the Front: Phase II

The establishment of the Front, while clarifying the
lines of battle between the parties of the Right and the
opposition middle-Left coalition, placed the Nacis in a
peculiar position. The increasing process of political polari­
zation — the lining up of forces — left them in the middle —
neither Left nor Right — and worst of all, powerless. They
opposed the government, fought the Left and avoided the Right.

38
Donoso, Alessandri. II, p. 198.

278
Furthermore, the disbandment of the Republican Militia in July
1936 had left them in a particularly exposed position. By
1937 they found themselves under considerable pressure to
consider the alternatives and choose between them. The March
1937 congressional elections and their aftermath made the choice
imperative because the elections clarified the lines of battle
between the parties of the Right and the opposition middle-
Left Popular Front coalition*
The 1937 parliamentary elections provided the Nacis with
their first real opportunity to prove themselves as a major
national electoral force. Having come into existence only six
months before the 1932 election, and virtually unknown outside
the capital, the MNS was only able to put up five candidates
in Santiago, all of whom made a poor showing. .The 1935
municipal election proved more encouraging in that the Naci
candidates garnered over 5000 votes and won a place in local
government. By 1937 there was considerable expectation that
the movement was going to do much better.
The Nacis organized an all-out national campaign for the
1937 election by putting up 56 candidates in 12 of the ‘27
electoral departments, all of whom now ran exclusively on the
Naci ticket. This was in keeping with their long preferred
opposition to forming political alliances or coalitions with any
of the other parties, Left or Right. GonzSlez declared himself
a candidate at the head of the MNS list in Santiago's first
electoral district. Other Naci leaders headed lists in some of

279
Chile's other major urban areas where they had built up
personal followings over the past few years: Fernando Guarello
Fitz-Henry in Valparaiso, Gustavo Vargas in Temuco, Carlos
Keller in Valdivia, Hedilberto Bizama in Llanquiue.
In comparison with the Naci showing in the 1932 election,
the results were impressive. From a mere 961 votes garnered
in their first election, the Nacis collected 14,564 votes.
Although in percentage terms this amounted only to between 3
and 3.5% of the total vote of the electorate, it was a reason­
ably good showing for a relatively young party in Chile. In
fact, it marked the first meaningful victory for the MNS in
its five years of existence. Three of its candidates —
Gonzalez, Vargas, and Guarello — were elected to the Chamber
of Deputies; and Keller just missed getting elected in Valdivia.
The Nacis claimed, with some justification, that the
election results were not an accurate indication of their true
strength in the country because a sizeable percentage of their
supporters and sympathizers were not of voting age. But
the election did provide some picture of the support which the
Nacis enjoyed on a national basis. For example, it is clear
that by 1937 they had ceased to be a local or regional
phenomena, like the Agrarian Party, and had in fact become a
national movement. And although they did poorly in several
areas of the country, the Nacis had made inroads into a good
OQ
number of electoral districts throughout the country.

39
Cf. Carlos Keller, "Las derecha y las tSltimas elecciones"
Trabaio (April 3, 1937}; "Las izquerdas y su posicion
electoral" Trabaio (April 4, 1937) j "El nacismo y las ultimas

280
 It is true that the bulk of the Naci's following was
highly concentrated in five electoral districts, all with
major urban centers. For the most part, they gained little
support in large areas of Chile's central valley — that
part of Chile traditionally dominated by the Liberals, Conserva­
tives, and more recently the Radicals. Likewise, it is apparent
from their poor showing in highly industrial or mining
districts such as Tocopilla in the north and Concepci6n in
the south (where the Nacis didn't even bother to put up a
candidate) that there the Socialists and Communists continued
to dominate. Nevertheless, it is significant that at least in
comparison with the Communist Party (which ran under the National
Democratic label), which won only 17,040 votes, the Nacis did
extraordinarily well.
The results of the 1937 election are also significant
because they illustrate that the Nacis were not dependent on
the German population in the south for their major strength.
In spite of the contention of several writers, only about 20%
of the Naci vote came from the southern provinces, and in
Temuco, where the Nacis won a seat, the German vote was not a
deciding factor. The Chilean Nacis would have done well
without the Germans.
But, in spite of what would appear to have been a strong
showing by the MNS, Gonzalez was apparently disappointed with

elecciones” Trabaio (April 5, 1937).

281
the results* It was now clear to him that Nacismo was not
going to sweep the country. The significance of this judge­
ment undoubtedly helped change GonzSlez* attitude toward the
Popular Front. Whatever his movement’s successes in the 1937
election, it was still a weak political force in a system of
political parties that was becoming increasingly polarized
into two camps.
Although the Right had managed to maintain its dominance
in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, it was apparent
that the parties adhering to the Front stood a reasonably
good chance to win the presidential election in October 1938.
Above all else, the success of the opposition depended on the
maintenance of unity, but it was also necessary to gain further
support from other parties and groups, such as the centrist
United Democratic Party, the free-floating IbSnistas. and
even the Nacis should circumstances make such a coalition
possible. Such circumstances were already in the making.
In addition to the deteriorating economic conditions,
the actions of the Alessandri regime against the Nacis helped
to further define the movement's alignment with the Left.
Once in the Chamber of Deputies, GonzSlez made the most
of it. In the midst of the strong attack by the opposition
against Alessandri for his economic policies in general and the
high cost of living in particular, Gonzalez, on April 8, issued
an impassioned open letter to Alessandri proposing "immediate
measures to alleviate the hunger of the people." "If there
is misery," he said, "it is due to the scandalous depreciation

282
of our money and in no way proportionate to the meagre
increases in wages and salaries." Ross, GonzSlez noted, had
been the principal cause of this state of misery and hunger
in which the Chilean people were living* "In his desire to
serve the interests of the national plutocracy and international
capitalism, he doesn't hesitate to sacrifice to those interests
40
the life of all the people in Chile*"
Gonzalez asked* If the producers of wheat are receiving
three to four times the price of a few years ago, isn't it
elementary justice that the workers receive a similar increase*
How was it possible that the North American companies who mine
Chile's copper and receive astronomical profits therefrom do
not increase the salaries of the workers in the mines? These
problems, he claimed, would not be solved without major politi­
cal and administrative changes in government. All those who
have diverted attention from these problems should be tried
for crimes against the nation and the people. A "Tribunal of
Popular Sanction" should be formed to bring to trial Don
Gustavo Ross, Comelio Saavedra, Don Waldo Palma and others
guilty of such crimes. And after eliminating incompetents in
the bureaucracy, Gonzalez recommended the following measures *
a) Suspend the law for payment of the external debt

^ J o r g e GonzSlez, Sensacional carta polStica al

presidente de la republica el iefe del nacismo propone al
primer mandatrio medidas inmediatas para aliviar el hambre del
pueblo , (April 8, 1937).

283
 b) Impose a tax on the export of copper in relation
to the world price
c) Establish tight exchange controls limiting foreign
payments to necessary and useful imports
d) Establish a monopoly on gasoline and re-establish
the tax on imports of crude oil
e) Prohibit the export of all articles of primary
necessity
f) Determine the domestic internal consumption require­
ments for agricultural products and force the agricul­
turists to produce them
g) Establish sanctions for all who would disobey these
orders
h) Establish a regulating tribunal for wages and
salaries and to insure that they are determined in
strict relation to costs and benefits for production.

Alessandri responded to Gonzalez* demands by again trying

to use the Internal Security Law to declare the MNS an illegal
organization. He ordered that its militants be arrested
and prosecuted if found wearing their uniforms in the streets.
But later in April the interpretation of the Law by the Minister
of the Interior was reversed by the Supreme Court. It explained
that* unliKe the Communist Party, the Naci Party did not
advocate the overthrow of the government or engage in subver­
sive activities toward that end and that consequently the Law
did not apply. The members who had been arrested were thus
42
summarily released.
On May 25, in one of his first speeches in the Chamber of
Deputies, Gonzalez openly recognized the Nacis* common struggle

41Ibid.
42
Philip* Embassy Report (April 28, 1937), 825.00/992.
Cf. Stevenson, Chilean Popular Front, p. 74.
284
with the Left. He said* "We consider that today there are
only two positions in Chile* the position of those who wish
to continue speculating with the hunger of the people and that
of those who desire that the people be liberated once and for
all from all their misery and suffering . . . We are neither
of the Left nor the Right; but I emphatically declare that in
the dilemma of having to support one of these two currents,
we cannot but acknowledge that for the most part the Left
pursues an ideal which is also ours, which is that the people
obtain the justice which this regime denies them." And again
on June 22, the Minister of Interior, Luis Salas Romo, issued a
circular outlawing the MNS. It read* "Individuals belonging
to the association known as the National Socialist Movement
(Nacis) have recently assaulted persons and property causing
tumult, and inciting disorder at the site of a public corporat-
tion to the point of impeding or interrupting its activities..."
But this attempt also failed .43 Needless to say, these actions
by Alessandri further intensified the bitterness toward the
regime. And although the Nacis still sought to maintain their
position of being neither Right nor Left, they were increasingly
forced by these and other (mainly economic) circumstances to
align themselves with the struggle of the opposition Left.
After attempting to consolidate his forces in late May
and early June, and failing in his attempts to strengthen his
. *

43Trabaio (June 23, 1937).

285
government by inclusion of representatives of the Radical
Party, Alessandri accepted the resignations of the entire Cab­
inet early in July.44 This action was taken in order to leave
the President free to deal with the situation arising from
recent parliamentary criticism of the government by all the
major political groups. GonzSlez responded on July 12 with a
speech at the Carrera Theater in Santiago in which he violently
denounced the government and the presidential candidacy of
Ross. In the middle of his speech, two carabineros. who had
been sent by the government, approached the platform and
informed him that he was violating the Internal Security Law
and ordered the meeting broken up. This declaration caused
great commotion in the theater, followed by the explosion of
tear-gas bombs, rioting and Gonzalez* arrest by the carabineros.
Gonzalez was shortly released, and the following day in
the Chamber of Deputies he attempted to exploit the incident
fully by denouncing the government for having violated the
personal immunity of a congressman. The official government
report had said that his arrest was for insulting a police­
man, but GonzSlez produced a recording of his speech (he
claimed to have anticipated the government's action) which
supported his testimony that he was indeed arrested solely for
his criticism of Gustavo Ross. This act by the carabineros,
Gonzalez claimed, was evidence that they too had been under-

44
Embassy telegram (July 13, 1937), 825.00/999.

286
mined by politloueria and had become a corps of executioners.
But the owners of the country were mistaken, he continued, if
they thought that the carabineros and the Armed Forces were
45
going to unconditionally serve the interests of the Right.
The reactions to Gonzalez* testimony from both the Left
and the Right were remarkable, if not unpredictable. Those
who spoke for the Conservative and Liberal parties (with the
exception of Ricardo Bqizard, a long and bitter opponent of
the Nacis) were supportive of GonzSlez* position, claiming
that his rights as a Deputy had been violated and that the
incident itself was indicative of the misuse of government
power. A spokesman for the Radicals said that his party had
opened an investigation of the affair and supported Gonz&Lez•
position. The parties of the Left — both the Socialists and
the Communists — approvingly greeted GonzSlez* speech.
Indicative of the attitude of the parties of the Left
and the Popular Front were the remarks of the Socialist, Julio
Barrenechea. He called the Teatro Carrera meeting "a gesture
of the people in the face of the imminent danger of Ross *
candidacy.” He noted that Nacismo before 1937 had fought
against the workers, attacked Leftist meetings and berated
the Popular Front. But now, in Congress, the Nacis had recog­
nized that the Popular Front was working for the people and was

^cSmara de diputados, Boletfln de sesiones (July 12,

1937), pp. 1036-1039. Cf. Mayorga, "Alessandri y el nacismo,"
p. 19.

287
sympathetic to its delimma. Naci doctrine* said Barrenechea*
"had not recognized either the Left or the Right* but pretended
to live on top of the waters without getting its feet wet in
reality. That doctrine in this Chamber has profoundly failed
and Senor GonzSlez von MareSs* in order to be able to interpret
the longings* the true aspirations of the people of Chile* has
had to place himself within — at the tail, at the side* but
finally within — the Left. Senor GonzSlez von MareSs . . . has
been able to experience perfectly that there is no political
stratosphere* that there is no third dimension in Chilean
politics* there is only the Left and the Right. The Nacis
have lost the support they had on the Right, and now Gonzalez
AfL
should recognize that his independent position has failed."
GonzSlez had realized this fact of Chilean politics.
Barrenechea*s remarks rang true. There was no "third force"
possible. To remain aloof from the Right and the Left meant
to remain outside of politics. And that Gonzalez and the Nacis
were no longer willing to do. But they were soon disillusioned,
and their next independent step — on the 5th of September —
was to prove their last.

D. The Fall of El. Jefe

1. Ibe&nez and the 1938 Election

As the 1938 election approached* it became increasingly

46
Camara de diputados* Boletin de sesiones {July 12*
1937), p. 1038.

288
apparent that the contest was going to be between Gustavo
Ross, the candidate of the Right# and a yet to be named
representative of the Popular Front. Ross* candidacy was a
foregone conclusion* but who would represent the Popular Front
was not at all clear, due to the fact that there were several
competing factions. But in spite of the growing polarity of
the parties of the Right and of the Left, the Nacis were early
determined to avoid any alliance. After Juan Antonio Rios,
the president of the Front, called for an all out campaign to
prevent Ross from becoming President of Chile, the Nacis declared
their lack of faith in the Front as an effective movement to
promote national consciousness against what they called the
"Ross danger." They suggested the formation of a "National
Front" against Ross to be led by IbSnez — although he wasn't
at first mentioned by name — a man without ties to parties
and who represented the interests of all the people. 47
In their endeavor to gain support for a third force
candidacy, the Nacis early in October 1937 formally declared
their support for IbSnez under the banner of a "National
Front." IbSnez, however, had given no indication of his
willingness to accept this nomination. Thus the statement
issued the next day in Trabaio hedged by announcing that in
case citizen Carlos Ibctnez were to participate in the next
election for the presidency, the MNS would lend all its elec-
48
toral strength and propaganda to his candidacy.

47Traba io (July 1, 1937).

48
Trabaio (October 13 and 16, 1937).

289
 r

Despite the Naci*s declaration of support for his candi­

dacy* IbSnez attempted to avoid any identification with them.
Instead* he drew attention to the social and economic problems
confronting the country and called upon the masses to support
the Popular Front in its effort to solve them. The U.S.
Embassy reported: "It was evident that he (Ibctnez) was
slightly embarrassed by the proferred Nacista backing and
preferred to align himself with the more influential radical
opinion. Leaders of the Front met his overtures with
distinct coolness, but he finds favor with certain rank and
file of the Front membership* and the Radical newspaper displays
a most friendly feeling toward him. The Administration press
characterizes such support as the fifth wheel of the Popular
Front. The Nacista organ* El Trabaio. in the face of IbSnez'
statement, temporized and made vague references to the accepta­
bility of the Front were it to purge itself of extremist ele­
ments* such as the Communists. "Strange bedfellows may be
49
found in his camp." That Ibctnez was truly intent on
avoiding any identification with the Nacis was made unmistak­
ably clear toward the end of January when he declared his
complete sympathy with the doctrines of the Front and that he
was anti-fasicst.
The Naci answer to ibSnez* declaration appeared in the
form of an article* "Anti-Fascism and Frontism," in Traba -jo
on January 30:

49
Philip: Embassy Report (October 29, 1937), 825.00/1010.

290
 Two aspects of the declaration formulated yesterday
by General IbSnez deserve from us special comment*
his 'anti-Fascist* position and his inclination toward
the Popular Front.
Ibanez said that in the struggle between autocracy and
democracy he is decisively on the side of the latter. It
is difficult to believe, with the exception of Ross
and his followers, that there would be anyone in Chile
who would not share this opinion . . .
It is this genuine and honorable democratic position of
Mr. Ibanez that leads him to declare himself a partisan
of the Popular Front. But understand well, his frontism
does not have the narrow limitations which to this end
certain elements guided more by foreign directives than
by healthy patriotic aspirations pretend to give it.
Mr. IbSnez doesn’t see the Front as simply an electoral
coalition of political forces, but believes that all
organized forces favoring similar ideas of redemption
and social justice should be a part of it.
Though we do not share his optimism that the Front can
transform itself into that national conglomeration to
which it or he aspires, we have repeated that the General
is the only man who would be able to achieve this miracle,
this indispensible fusion, for the triumph of the cause
of the p e o p l e . 50

Yet another answer to IbSnez* declaration appeared in Traba io

on February 1* "Nacism and the Candidacy of Ibanez":
Ibcenez is not our official candidate, though we will
help him. In an editorial, "Anti-fascismo • • we
noted what we understood to be IbSnez* Frontism. What
he desires is the union in one solid block of all the
popular and anti-reactionary forces who fight for the
implantation of a true democracy in Chile; and among
these forces, Nacismo occupies a preponderant part.
Only those who want to sow discord among different
currents, interpret IbSnez* inclination toward the Front
as a repudiation of Nacismo. No one group can demand
that Ibctnez submit exclusively to their doctrinal

50
"Antifascismo y frentismo," Trabaio (January 30, 1938),
p. 3. Cf. Teniente Lopez, "Nacismo chileno y facismo inter-
nacional," Traba io (January 30, 1938), p. 3.

291
 51
conceptions*
A similar editorial "The Meaning of a Candidacy" appeared in
Traba io on February 2, indicating that although IbSnez had in
52
fact spumed the Nacis, they were not willing to give him up.
The Popular Front held its convention, as it had planned,
on April 15-17, composed of the Radicals, the Socialists, the
United Democrats, the Communist Party and the FOCH. After 13
roll calls, Grove was defeated and Aguirre nominated. As a
gesture of unity, Grove was placed in charge of the campaign.
Aguirre lacked personality and had little magnetic popular
appeal, but he was a good candidate for the Front because of
his centrist position, which was acceptable to all factions.
Grove* s candidacy was clearly too controversial. Ironically,
according to Olavarria, Aguirre had been opposed to the Front
because of a fear of the Communists.
The conservative press praised the selection of Aguirre,
although they feared his centrist position was merely a cloak
to hide the machinations of the Popular Front. The U.S.
Embassy reported i "Leaders of the Left have subordinated their
own ambitions in the interest of common unity. Interestingly
enough, the convention proceedings were so conducted that
Ibanez* name could not be submitted and it is possible that

51 . M
"El Nacismo y la candidatura Ibctnez," Traba io
(February 1, 1938), p. 3.-
52
"A1 significado de una candidatura," Traba io (February
2, 1938), p. 3.

292
Ibfinez saw this and that this was the reason for withdrawing
publicly his name. He had lost the support of the Communist
Party and his other supporters were either undesirable or
disunited."^3
The parties of the Right, composed primarily of the
Conservatives, the Liberals and the Democrats, nominated
Gustavo Ross at their convention of April 23. Although Ross
was in Europe at the time, his supporters had complete control
of the proceedings and encountered little difficulty in
winning support for his nomination. And in addition to Ross
and Aguirre, IbSnez also became a candidate.
Although his earlier government had been widely dis­
credited, Ibanez had maintained a strong following — mainly
among ex-military officers and politicians. He also enjoyed
considerable popular support among the lower classes, who
remembered the jobs which they had obtained in public works
programs. He also had a broad based following among the
middle classes and some intellectuals, less for any ideologi­
cal position than for what he represented — moral rectitude,
patriotism, authority. IbSnez had been allowed by Alessandri
to return from exile and his candidacy was officially launched
by a group (headed by chief of the army, Tobias Barros Ortiz)
soon to be organized under the banner of the Popular Liberation
Alliance.
m

53Frosti Embassy Report (April 20, 1938), 825.00/1026.

Cf. Juan F. Femctndez, Pedro Aguirre Cerda v el frente popular
chileno (Santiago* 1938).

293
 2. The 21st of May
Shortly after the nominations of the candidates* the
leaders of the Popular Front sought a formal audience for
themselves and a sizeable delegation (50 to 100 Frentistas)
with Alessandri in mid-May to make a special plea for fair
play in the election and voting arrangements. Some of them
had been open in their denunciations* both personal and
political* of Alessandri and he replied that his record in the
handling of the last two elections, in which the Popular Front
experienced no impediments and was rather successful, proved
that no new guarantees were needed* Nevertheless* he indicated
that he would receive a limited number of Frentistas. with
the proviso that none of his notorious traducers would be
included.
The Front leaders also claimed that the President had
added that it was not his fault that they had picked a candi­
date whose lack of ability to win had inspired such fears in
them. Professing to have been wantonly insulted by the Presi­
dent* the Popular Front deputies met in full conclave and passed
a resolution opposing Alessandri*s appearance at the opening
session of Congress. Upon receiving the message* Alessandri
retorted that as President he had the right and the duty under
the Constitution to appear before Congress and to deliver his
message and that he would take whatever steps necessary to do

54
Norman Armouri Embassy Report (May 18, 1938), 825.00/
1032.

294
 When Alessandri arrived in the Senate on May 21st, a
bomb exploded outside the building, portending violence* When
the president of the Senate rose to introduce Alessandri,
Gonz$lez Videla, the President of the Popular Front, demanded
the right to speak, but was not recognized. And even though
order could not be obtained, Alessandri rose to deliver his
message. Videla was adamant, insisting upon the right to
address the President; and when he could not get the floor
he and his supporters in the Popular Front began to file out
toward the entrance. They were joined by Jorge Gonzalez and
the other Naci deputies, Vargas and Guarello, the Socialists
and the Communists; all of whom apparently made defiant
remarks and gestures to the other deputies who remained. The
harsh language exchanged led to further disturbances. GonzSlez
was apparently jostled in the process and perhaps struck by
agents or supporters of the government. He thereupon drew a
small calibre revolver and fired a shot (which he later
claimed was aimed at the ceiling) which struck the wall rather
high up above the rostrum where Alessandri was seated.
Plainclothes officers and the carabineros immediately
seized several of the Leftist deputies and administered
severe beatings. Two deputies of the Radical Party, Justiniano
Sotomayor and Fernando Maira, were also injured in the alter­
cation and were arrested for having resisted government officers.
*

Andres Escobas, a Communist deputy, was also injured and

arrested, as were other members of the Popular Front. Gonz&lez

295
was knocked down in the course of the fighting and suffered
severe injuries to his leg (which apparently incapacitated him
for a few days). Because of this he was given provisional
liberty and was carried by his friends into the cloakroom of
the Chamber. Later in the evening, when acting under orders
from the Minister of Interior Salas, the Prefect of Police
came to arrest GonzSlez, the President of the Popular Front
telephoned Salas to protest the Jefe's arrest. Receiving no
satisfaction, GonzSlez Videla then attempted physically to
restrain the arresting officers and was himself taken tempo-
55
rarily into custody. Jorge Gonzalez was taken off to jail.
Under the circumstances, the deputies and senators of the
Left believed they had been victims of high-handed and force­
ful coercion by the government. They regarded their arrests and
injuries suffered in the congressional chamber as assaults on
their legal rights. As a result, they signed a joint manifesto
shortly after GonzSlez* arrest, determined to strengthen their
combined action in the legislature for popular unity. They
pressed resolutions of censure against the Minister of Interior
demanding Salas* resignation for violation of the congressional
precincts in the arrest of GonzSlez and for assaults on several
of their deputies by the police in congressional session.
Thus common cause was made between the MNS and the Popular Front

55
Armour* Embassy Report (May 25, 1938), no. 61* Subject
"Disorders attending Inaugural Session of Chilean Congress —
Political Effects"; Armour* Embassy Report (June 6, 1938),
no. 83* Subject* "Opening of Chilean Congress".
 GonzSlez was defended in the case against him by a Radical
deputy, Manuel Cabezon Diaz before the Court of Appeals. He
attempted to prove that Gonzalez had fired the shot into the
air to detain his assailants from attacking him. Representa­
tives from the government investigation team accused GonzSlez
of having fired at Alessandri. But because there existed no
"firm resolution," he was freed. He returned to Congress on
the evening of May 23 and was warmly greeted by opposition
deputies. The events of May 21 had made him a hero and a
martyr of the MNS and Ibcinez.
Shortly thereafter, GonzSlez apparently began proclaiming
the new solidarity of the opposition forces. On May 24, in
Trabaio. Keller claimed that the unity of the parties of the
opposition in Congress would insure their victory. He now
included the MNS among the parties of the Popular Front against
the Conservatives, Liberals, Democrats and Independents.
Following this declaration of unity, the parties of the
opposition rallied together in different parts of the country.
On May 28, Traba io reported that Keller would represent
GonzSlez at a gathering to honor Aguirre and to confirm the
unity of Nacismo with the Popular Front. It was attended by
30,000 supporters.
This same May 28 issue of Trabaio contained an "Official
Declaration of the MNS1 by GonzSlez made on the occasion of the
formation of a pact for the unification of parliamentary action

^ Trabaio (May 28, 1938).

297
 57
by the political forces of the opposition, including Nacismo,

But the importance of this declaration far outweighs its

immediate stated purpose, for it is indicative of how far to
the Left .the MNS had moved and how drastically changed was the
conception of Nacismo in Gonzalez* thinking. In a sense, it
might be said that whereas there was a contradiction between
the ideology and the politics of Nacismo. now the contradiction
had been resolved.
The first points of the declaration were familiar* the
fundamental objective of creating a government that would put
into effect political, economic and social reforms supporting
the working classes, the ideals of nationalism and socialism,
the opposition to all governments based on autocratic or
personalist principles, the goal of an authentic democracy in
which the liberties of the people are guaranteed, anti­
imperialism and the repudiation of capital as an instrument of
political domination (although not of capitalism, per se) • But
the declaration also stated that* "The National Socialist
Movement solemnly declared that it does not have nor has it
ever had any associations with international Fascism, and that
its essentially democratic and anti-imperialist nature leads
it to oppose all pretentions to establish in Chile a government
inspired by Italian or German Fascist regimes, or any others."
It further stated that* "The MNS desires to contribute by

298
whatever means possible to the solid unification of the forces
of the Left in the country and puts itself at the service of
this ideal, and is opposed to all personalism and any other
considerations which might not lead to the rapid and complete
triumph of the cause of the people." This was an extraordinary
declaration for the head of a "Fascist” party to make. It
might also be argued that Nacismo had, in theory if not in fact,
ceased to be a "Fascist" movement.
But in spite of the declaration of unity between the
Nacis and the Popular Front, the strain between them continued
leading to the formal organization on June 1, 1938, of the
Popular Liberation Alliance by the MNS, the Union Socialista
and the other Ibamista groups. Traba io estimated the strength
of the Alliance * 30,000 Nacistas, 15,000 Union Socialists, and
an unspecified number of Ibamistas. The campaign was publicly
launched on June 4 at a meeting attended among others by Barros,
Vigorena, Juan B.. Rossetti, Ricardo Latcham, GonzSlez and, of
course, IbSnez. At this meeting, GonzSlez stated* "We need a
Chilean president; • . . Gustavo Ross is not a Chilean. He
58
doesn't ave roots in this country." An editorial in Traba io
on June 7 claimed that the Nacistas are for unity, but that the
socialists were destroying it by refusing to negotiate with

50
”A1 frente popular le falta un hombre, en cambio la
alianza popular libertadora ya tiene su hombre,” Traba io (June
5, 1938), p. 1. Cf. Rene Montero, Confesiones pol^ticas
(Santiago), pp. 100 ff., and Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer,
Student Politics in Chile (New York* 1970), p. 95.

299
the Alliance* May 21st was mentioned as symbolic of the unity
that was needed.59 The preceding day, the socialist paper,
Claridad, had criticized the very formation of the Alliance
as contributing to the splitting of the opposition*
Strangely enough, in the aftermath of the events of May
21st, efforts were again made by groups within the Popular
Front to induce Ib£nez and his followers to join* These
efforts were also made as a contingency in the event that an
abandonment of Aguirre's candidacy became desirable* There was
a feeling in the Front that Aguirre was going to fall some
30,000 votes short, which would be made up by the Nacis (15,000),
Union Socialists (10,000), and from Ibatnista army officers
(6,000), such as Tobias Barros Ortiz. But in the event that
this might still not do it, it was thought that Ib&nez himself
might become the candidate of the combined Popular Front* Among
the Radicals, Juan Antonio Rios was most notably leaning
toward IbSfiez. A dispatch dated June 23 noted widespread
rumors that most people felt that Aguirre would not remain
the candidate of the Popular Front, that he would withdraw in
favor of IbSnez or Grove.
To be sure, Nacismo had changed. In an article that
appeared at the end of June 1938,”IbSnez and Chilean Nacism," the
editor of the independent daily Asies, Tancredo Pinochet, who
had attended the founding meeting of the Alliance, made clear
*
just what this meant* He wrote i

59
"Defendamos la unidad popular," TrabaIo (June 7, 1938),
P* 3.
 Chilean Nascism was b o m seduced by the figure of
Hitler* GonzSlez von MareSs was the Chilean Hitler and
Keller was his Spengler* GonzSlez still has, in his
physiognomy, in his manner of speaking — and something
in his manner of thinking — Hitlerian traits • • • But
Gonzalez von Mare^s and Keller, and creole Nacismo,
have evolved in the Chilean sense; they are neither
planets nor satelites of the Hitlerian solar system.
Chilean Nacismo has made a point of professing faith
in democracy...as a preferred system; creole Nacismo
has sympathies on the side of legal Spain * * . The
vernacular of Nacismo is not imperialist * . • and
Hitler wants to conquer the world.
After studying its ideals, etc., I believe that it is
the most genuinely patriotic national party.
Pinochet also suggested that the MNS drop the mysticism surround­
ing the Fuhrer and that the Nacis should henceforth call their
movement Democratic Socialist. But the import was unmistakable*
the Nacis were becoming respectable, an eccepted part of the
Chilean political scene.

3. The 5th of September

The question of why GonzSlez and the Nacistas attempted
on the 5th of September 1938 to overthrow the government in a
coup has never been adequately answered. Why the sudden
change from the electoral route to violence? Why was GonzSlez
in such a hurry? What was IbSnez*role? Did IbSnez betray
Gonzalez or did GonzSlez betray Ib&nez? Was it an act of
desperation? Or was it the act of a concerted revolutionary?

Tancredo Pinochet, "IbSnez y el nacismo chileno,"

Asies (June 21, 1938), pp. 1-2. Cf. also Tancredo Pinochet, "Son
los nacistas mala compania?" Asies (August 8, 1938), pp. 1-2,
reprinted in La Alianza (August 14, 1938), pp. 3-4.

301
 In retrospect, Jimenez suggested that GonzSlez attempted
the coup because he was going to be detained on September 6th
or 7th for his role in the events of the 21st of May, leaving
the Nacis without a leader* And it is true that after May
21st Gonzalez left the door open for the action he took. He
remarked at that time* "I say that the pistol and the bullet
are symbols because they have been the notice given by the
political Left of Chile that is disposed to impose its ideals —
the people's ideals — by force, within the law or outside it;
including, if the circumstances require it, the spilling of
the blood of those who oppose these high objectives." He
added that he was honored to belong to the militant Left. And
it is an interesting question whether Gonzalez would have
attempted so drastic a step as a coup if he had not moved to
the Left.
The prevalent mood of desperation on the Left was even
more deeply felt among the Nacis. The failure of IbSnez*
campaign for the presidency to win popular support and the
imminent defeat of the Popular Liberation Alliance was a clear
indication that they were not going to ride into power side by
side with their knight on horseback* The very fact that
Gonzalez chose not to run for the presidency himself — that
he chose IbSnez instead — is perhaps indicative of the fact
that he did not really believe that the Nacis would be able to
*
win any appreciable electoral support*
Personally disappointed, but unwilling to admit defeat,
and facing two alternative outcomes of the 1938 election —

302
the odious Ross or the conservative Aguirre -- both undesirable,
Gonzalez felt compelled to take drastic action to save his
movement and the nation from what he apparently believed was
certain catastrophe for the nation. The election of Ross, who
was much less inclined to accept or even tolerate the opposition,
would spell the end of the movement. The victory of Aguirre,
and the traditional opponents of the Nacis, might also have the
same consequences. He had said that the MNS was ready to use
violence when it was necessary and anavoidable. He had proved
it in the past. He would prove it again. Undoubtedly feeling
a sense of urgency, Gonzalez made the decision to attempt a coup
rather than wait for the outcome of the election.61
The plan for the putsch was devised by GonzSlez and
several of his young cohorts; in particular Oscar Jimenez, a
medical student at the University of Chile. It involved the
participation of militants both in the MNS and in the Army.
But, perhaps not surprisingly, the most perplexing questions
concerning its outcome have to do with the roles played by those
two pivotal figures on the Chilean political scene — IbSKez
and Alessandri. The first question concerning Ibanez is what
role he actually had in the planning of the qolpe. After it was
all over, and when Gonzalez was already rethinking and revising

61There are many accounts of the events of the 5th of

September. In addition to those cited here directly, also helpful
were* Cesar Urrutia Godoy, Los sucesos del 5 de Seotiembre
(Santiago; 1939); Maria viancos de Jara, La senda del sacrificio
5 de septiembre 1938; Comision investiqadora de la camara de
Diputados. r Ts Tr I (Reporter X)• La verdad sobre los sucesos
del 5 de septiembre (Santiago* 193B); Ricardo Boizard. Historia
de ana derrota (Santiago* 1941).

303
his own role in that historical event, he clearly credited
Ib£nez with the original inspiration and plan for the coupi
I have declared and repeat the General IbSnez was the
soul of the revolutionary movement. He was deeply
convinced — and thus he declared to me tens of times —
that the popular triumph of the electoral route was
absolutely impossible, and that there was no other way
of preventing the assumption of the presidency by Ross
than to organize a coup to overthrow Alessandri.
Guided by this conviction the General maintained during
the next months a close contact with the officials
of numerous regiments in the country, personally as
well as by means of intermediaries. The main ones
were Caupolican Clavel and Pedro Foncea.
At the same time, the General asked me to proceed with
plans to organize a group of armed civilians with the
purpose, at the right moment, to collaborate with
the regiments. Personally, he delivered to me a large
sum of money to buy munitions and also paid from his
own pocket the dues of the National Socialists who
belonged to the Rifle Club in Santiago for training
in the use of arms.62
While the facts of this account are probably correct,
it is more likely that Ibanez was going along with a plan which
was Gonzalez' own, that he gave Gonzalez a good deal of encourage­
ment but wavered in making any firm commitment to be an active
participant, until he could be certain of the outcome. It was
GonzSlez who became impatient to act. He tells us that ten
days before the coup he indicated to Ibctnez that it should take
place soon because there was a danger that the plot might be
discovered by the government. According to Gonzctlez, by this
time the government had already discovered some of their
preparations in Puerto Montt and Talca. But there was another
reason for Gonzalez* impatience! he would soon be incarcerated
for his participation in the events of the 21st of May. GonzS-

62Trabaio (March 24, 1939).

304
lez had been sentenced to serve one and a half years in jail
63
and his appeal had finally been denied on August 25.
According to the original plan, as GonzSlez reports it,
the Nacistas were to create disorder by occupying the Social
Security building, while IbSnez would proceed to the Cavalry
School or to the Buin Regiment, where the majority of the
officers were his strong supporters. Ibanez had originally
suggested taking over the La Nacion building, but it was
agreed that the Social Security building would make a better
fortress once they were inside. In the final plan, the main
building at the University of Chile was also to be taken. At
the same time, there was to be a declaration from the Chorrillos
Regiment in Talca, which also supported Ibanez. The officers of
Ch rrillos had reportedly solicited Ibctnez to lead the coup with
them, but he refused considering it more convenient to go to
the Los Andes Regiment. Once the coup broke out, however, the
Chorrillos Regiment was prepared to cooperate anyway. In the
final plan, all those regiments loyal to IbSnez would march on
Santiago, hopefully with Ib£nez at their head, to declare the
victory of the aolpe.**4
By the first of September, Gonzalez had decided that he
could wait no longer. There is little doubt that he was
genuinely worried about the conspiracy being discovered by the
government. But the concensus in the country was that Ross
would win the election, spelling the end of the Jefe*s career
and the end of his movement. Given his heroic frame of mind

63Ibid. 64Ibid.

305
and what appeared -to be a desperate situation, Gonz&lez
probably felt he had nothing to lose. On September 2, he sent
word to IbSnez through Clavel that the date for the coup was
September 5th. IbSnez wanted it later in the week, but
GonzSlez refused to postpone it further. Thus it apparently
began with no clear commitment from IbSnez that he would be an
active participant.
Jimenez was put in charge of taking the University
building. Clavel was to inform the Santiago garrison and IbSnez
on the morning of the 5th that the coup was going to take
place at 12:30 p.m., and that he should direct himself to the
Cavalry School or to the Buin Regiment. Enrique Rojas, a
friend of General Foncea*s, was to transmit to Foncea the order
to act* and Jimenez was to announce the outbreak of the coup
to the Chorrillos Regiment by radio transmitter.
As planned, at about 12:30 p.m. on the afternoon of
September 5th — it was a Monday — a contingent of about 50
young Nacistas. led by Ricardo White of the TNA and armed with
pistols, a Thompson automatic and some homemade bombs, entered
the 12 story Social Security building located in downtown
Santiago. Employees leaving the building for their lunch
hour and passersby in the street, under the impression that the
Nacis were attempting some spectacular kind of holdup, called
it to the attention of a carabinero who had just arrived on
the corner. Upon approaching the entrance to the building to
investigate the incident, the carabinero encountered the Nacis

306
in their efforts to secure the door of the building. He drew
his weapon and exchanged fire with Gallmeyter, one of the Naci
coterie. The carabinero was shot and killed instantly.
Retreating into the building, the Nacis hurriedly made their
way to the upper floors where they took hostages. Barricading
themselves with furniture and other articles at the entrance
to a stairwell, they awaited orders from their leader*
In another part of the city, another contingent of about
70 Nacistas led by Cesar Pareda (candidate for president of
the Federation of Chilean Students), also heavily armed, had
made their way into the main building of the University of
Chile, located a short distance from the Social Security
building. Having barricaded the entrance, this contingent also
took hostages — Juvenal HernSndez, the Rector of the University,
and some employees. They also sought to capture Arturo
Alessandri Rodrigues, the Dean of the Law School and brother
of the President, but they could not locate him. Having
accomplished their main objective, they also awaited further
orders from their leader.
At the time of the assault on the Social Security
building, President Alessandri was working nearby in his office
in the Moneda. Hearing the shots fired, he ran to his office
window where his eyes fell upon the carabinero lying in a pool
of blood. Recognizing him as one of those who had often guarded
him on his walks, Alessandri ran to his assistance. When he

65Ibid.

307
arrived on the scene# he was told that the carabinero had been
shot by a group of crazy men who were attempting to rob the
building. Aware that the building held no large sums of money#
Alessandri was unconvinced by this explanation. He rushed to
the office of the Intendency nearby and called General Arria-
gada of the carabineros to the scene. It was then that he
learned from a professor who had been at the University
building that it also had been taken over by an armed band. His
suspicions were thus confirmed; he became convinced that this
CC
was an attempted coup by the Nacistas and the Ibanistas.
' About the Nacistas he was right; but not about the
Ibarnistas. Apparently Clavel never did advise the Chorrillos
Regiment that the coup was taking place. He did, however,
inform Ibetnez, who refused to have any part in it. Instead of
proceeding to the Los Andes Regiment as planned (with the result
that it was also not advised), he left his home in the company
of Tobias Barros (the President of the Popular Liberation
Alliance) and other Ibanistas and travelled with them by car
from Santiago to San Bernardo a few miles away. There he
sought asylum in the Infantry School, where he was detained by
Commander Guillermo Barrios, who sent word to the Moneda that
Ibctnez had been taken into custody. He was later driven back to
Santiago.
But if the General — Ibanez — had refused the call of
gc
Arturo Alessandri Palma, Recuerdos del gobiemo, II,
pp. 186-193.

308

i
destiny and preferred the safety of the Escuela during the
attempted coup, where was the Jefe — GonzSlez — while his
Nacistas were obeying the call to action? He wasn't with the
contingent occupying the University building; nor was he with
the contingent occupying the Social Security building. He
was apparently far from the scene, in the basement of the
house of Enrique Zorrilla, supposedly directing the operations
in the Social Security building by radio. Pi ton 10 Las Condes
was the call from the Jefe; the radio operations being directed
by Pedro del Campo Benavente. He was, obviously, in communi­
cation with the building, but it is not known what his exact
instructions were or whether they were carried out.
With the specter of another overthrow like the one he
had experienced in 1924/25, Alessandri acted quickly and called
the head of Investigations, Waldo Palma, and the head of the
Armed Forces and avilable ministers to the Moneda. There he
conferred with them on a strategy to put down the coup, and it
was decided by them and General Novoa to order the Tacna
regiment in the city to move on the University building with
artillery and blast open the main entrance. The Buin regiment
would move on the Social Security building and do the same.
The Tacna regiment moved quickly. Upon their arrival
at the University building, there were periodic exchanges of
gunfire between the Nacis and the carabineros. But a cannot was
*

set up in short order and with two blasts the door was blown
open. The Nacis were soon rounded up, their hostages freed, and
marched out into the streets with their hands over their heads.

309
The first act of the drama was ended; and with tragic results.
Six of the young Nacistas had been killed in the assault. Some
said that they were gunned down by the carabineros and the army
after they had entered the building; others that they were killed
by the cannon blasts. The cause of these deaths, however was
never determined with certainty.
Though the retaking of the University building was
accomplished relatively quickly and with a minimum of fighting,
it proved much more difficult to dislodge the Nacis from the
Social Security building. There they had quite successfully
barricaded themselves on the upper floors out of the reach of
fire. Moreover, they had cut off access to the upper floors by
stopping the elevator and periodically dropping bombs down ,
the shaft to discourage their pursuers. They were well enough
armed to hold out until nightfall, and prepared to so do, in
the hope that the expected support of IbSnez* troops would arrive
and declare the victory of the revolution. It was a tragic
situation; they could not know that Ibctnez and his troops would
not be coming, that they never had any intention of doing so.
There is no certainty what Alessandri*s true feelings
were once it became apparent that the Nacis were not going to
be easily put down. In subsequent public testimoney, he gave
the impression that he had considered the situation very grave
and feared that if the Nacis were not captured by nightfall
the panic that would develop might well insure the success of
the coup. He claimed that by early afternoon he had already
begun to receive reports of signs outside the city that people

310
vere beginning to celebrate the triumph of the revolution. Thus
it was decided, in discussions between Alessandri and General
Novoa, that the uprising must be put down by whatever means
necessary by 4i00 p.m. in the afternoon.
The carabineros had their orders; and Alessandri and
Novoa sat down to devise means of how to accomplish their
task. They first thought to bombard the upper floors of the
building with cannon. Other possible plans were discussed.
As they weighed the alternatives, the Nacis captured at the
University building were marched by the Moneda on their way to
N
.

the intendency; seeing them, it occurred to the President and

his General that these captured Nacis might be used to convince
their comrades at the Social Security building to surrender —
that their cause was lost. Upon instructions from Alessandri,
these 35 young Nacistas were then marched to the encounter. At
the Social Security building, they were taken to the sixth
floor and one of them was sent up to the seventh to negotiate
a surrender with his fellow militants. The strategy was
obviously successful, for soon a white flag was waved from the
upper floor indicating to the carabineros and the army that they
were prepared to surrender. But when the latter began climbing
over the obstacles which had barricaded the upper floor, the
Nacis allegedly began throwing furniture down the stairs and the
Commander of the carabineros was reportedly toppled. Further
*
negotiations finally led to the freeing of the hostages and
the Nacistas filed down the stairs carrying one of their dead
comrades and were taken prisoner.
 Once apprehended, however, they were not taken from the
building. According to the testimony of one of the survivors,
Carlos Pizzaro, an officer from the lower floors appeared on the
scene claiming that he was in charge and that all of the
Nacistas were to be liquidated. Some 20 or more of the prisoners
were taken straightaway into an adjoining room and machine-
gunned to death. The remaining contingent on the floor below
were also gunned down. Though all were left for dead, later in
the evening Raul Marin, Alfonso Canales, Gilberto Lizana and
Dr. Ricardo Donoso gained entrance to the building and found
four survivors: Carlos Pizzrro, David Hernandez, Facundo
Vargas and Alberto Montes. After interrogation, these four
were taken to a hospital. The bodies of those not so lucky
were removed in the night to a government hospital for identifi­
cation. A telegram sent by an official at the American Embassy
in Santiago to the Secretary of State in Washington reported
two days later: "It is now established that the number of
casualties is greater than at first estimated. Official figures
give 63 killed, 2 of whom were Carabineros and the balance
Nacistas. Unofficial figures run as high as 95 dead1
.** It read
furthers
It now appears that the affair had more serious
possibilities than at first seemed to be the case.
Gonzctlez von Marees, the Nacista leader, surrendered
last night with his principle lieutenant and it seems
probable that their admissions, with those of the few
survivors among the young Nacistas who participated
in the uprising, will throw further light on what is
still a confused situation.67

67
Armour: Telegram to the Secretary of State (September
7, 1938). Cf. Hov (September 5, 1938).

312
 The "confused situation" was never to be cleared up
completely. To this day there is still considerable debate
as to who was actually responsible for giving the order that
led to the cold-blooded massacre of the Nacis in the Social
Security building. Positions on this question have usually
reflected the personal and political biases and loyalties of
go
those involved or those reporting. Some blame Alessandri;
some the man in charge. General Arriagada. Clearly, the
evidence implicates them both.
Although it is not an objective of this study to deter­
mine who was responsible — it was probably both — it should
be pointed out that President Alessandri assumed full responsibi­
lity for the massacre (although not the order) and defended the
action taken by the government in putting down the rebellion
on the grounds that the Constitution and the nation*s stability
were dangerously threatened. He was supported loyally in his
stand by the newspapers under the control of his followers;
and to this extent the full truth of the events of the 5th of
September were hidden from the public.
When the first contingent of prisoners from the Univer­
sity building were, marched to the Moneda earlier that afternoon,
they had been met by General Arriagada, who asked the carabi-
go
Cf. Wilfredo Mayorga, "La tragedia del seguro obrero,"
Ercilla. no. 1621 (June 29, 1966), pp. 18-19; Ricardo Boizard,
Historia de una derrota (Santiago * 1941); Fernando Alegria
Maffana los quererrosfSantiaao* 1964), 2nd ed.; Ramon Vergara
Montero, Perspectiva tr£aica (Santiago* 1939); Sergio Recabarren,
Mensa1e viqente (Santiago* 1964).

313
fferos who they were. When told that they were the Nacis who
had been captured at the University building, the General is
reported to have said* “These bastards must be liquidated, all
of them." According to Humberto Arriagada, the General's
son, after this first group of prisoners had been in the Seguro
building for about half an hour his father telephoned an order
to the Prefect of Santiago, Colonel Jorge Diaz Valderrama, to
communicate to the Chief of forces in the Social Security
building that if his carabineros had not secured the building
by 4t00 p.m., the army would bombard it with artillery in
69
accordance with the orders of General Novoa.
The nature and exact wording of this order is still a
considerable point of dispute. According to Humberto Arriagada,
Colonel Diaz sent a written order to Generals Pezoa and GonzSlez
which read* "My general orders is that the situation at the
Seauro be liquidated immediately." The Moneda was also report­
edly in touch directly with General Pezoa and General Gonzalez j
and Humberto Arriagada claims that Alessandri sent a message
through a carabinero (who did not appear at the trial nor was
he ever discovered) who gave the order to General GonzSlez to
Kill the Nacis; but Pezoa claimed that he had received no such
direct order from General Arriagada. The trial ended in
indecision.70
On September 6, Jorge GonzSlez, the fallen Jefe, wrote to

69 .
Wilfredo Mayorga, "La tragedia del seguro obrero",
Ercilla. (June 29, 1966), p. 19.
70
C f . Comision investiqadora de la c&nara de diputados.

314
his wife*
Please forgive me for all the suffering I have
caused you. I realize that I have been too cruel to
you* but the passion of my ideals has blinded me.
In these hours of terrible anguish, and most of
all of the oppressive weight of my conscience for
the irreparable damage I have caused, only your memory
comforts me. Although everybody is against me,
I taiow that you are today more firmly at my side than
ever before.
I am prepared for the worst and only hope that
God will give you the necessary strength to withstand
this new and terrible test which my egotism
has subjected you to.
This afternoon I will deliver myself to justice . . •
I believe . . . that your husband has definitely
become a failure* but, he will remain devoted wholly
to you... 71

La Opinion wasn't able to publish on September 6-7

because it had been shut down by government agents; but on
September 8, with both IbSnez and Gonzalez under arrest, they
published a photograph of some of the cadavers of the students
who had been killed in the Social Security building claiming
that they had been massacred in cold blood. It was also
claimed that the government was trying to prevent the publication
of the list of those who had been killed. There can be no doubt
that the army and the carabineros were concerned about the
impact of the press on the thinking of the people concerning the
events of the 5th of September* because already on September
6th they issued a joint statement indicating that the investi­
gation of those events and public tranquility would be threatened

73Xetter from Jorge GonzSlez to his wife* (September

6* 1938).

315
 72
if newspapers were allowed to publish "incorrect information."
But Alessandri obviously felt he could not justifiably muzzle
the press without incurring even more criticism. Thus on
September 9 La Opinion reported on student strikes and various
celebrations of homage to the fallen youths, and on the funerals
73
of some of the victims. The FECH also vigorously protested
the slaughter of the Nacistas and many of those same young
men who had themselves engaged the Nacis in pitched battles
74
only days earlier made manifestations honoring the fallen.
But the rightest press, attributing the responsibility
for the events of September 5th to Ib&nez, praised the form in
which the mutiny had been put down. El Diario Illustrado
violently attacked Ibctnez and referred to the Nacis as
"underground delinquents." La Nacion carried stories of Nacis
in hiding who would carry out a terrorist campaign in the
country. It was also claimed that if the Nacis had gained
power they intended to confiscate property from the Catholic
Church, expel all foreign priests and prohibit the practice of
religion. In days following, La Nacion reported on unsubstan­
tiated stories that had the Nacis succeeded they would have
instituted a reign of terror — there would have been mass
shootings, an end to all personal freedom, and concentration
camps. This was all undoubtedly designed to justify the action

72
La Qpinifin (September 8, 1938), pp. 1-3*
73
La Opinion (September 9, 1938), pp. 1-3.
74
Bonilla and Glazer, Student Politics, p. 103.

316
 75
the government had taken.
' But strangely enough, Chilean public opinion at the time
regarded ~ and to some extent still today regards — the Naci
aolpe of September 5th as a pardonable expression of youthful
76
passion and enthusiasm. Twenty years after the event,
commentators continued to suggest that this was fundamentally
a rebellion of youth agains the oligarchy in general and
Alessandri in particular. 77 Whatever the interpretation,
it was the end of Nacismo as a political force in Chile.

7^Cf. La Nacioni (September 17, 1938), pp. 1-4;

"Explicacion irrefutable" and "La prensa de toda el pais condena
el atentado nacista" (September 11, 12, and 16, 1938); Joaquin
Edwards Bello, "Basta con el 5 de septiembre" (January 9, 1939).
76Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, p. 45.
77
Viente anos. 5 de Septiembre 1938 5 de Septiembre 1958
(Santiagoi 1958).

317
 EPILOGUE i THE METAMORPHOSIS OF NACISMO

1. The Aftermath of September 5 th

The massacre of September 5th had predictable conse­
quences for the presidential aspirations of Carlos Ibanez.
Though he did not participate in the attempted coup, he had
been fully implicated in the planning of it and was thus
discredited by his association with Gonzalez and the Naci
movement. Having no alternative but to resign his candidacy,
IbSnez prepared in his jail cell a formal statement of
withdrawal with the assistance of his friend, Rene Montero.
According to Montero, IbcJnez had considerable difficulty in
writing this statement, not finding it easy to do so
gracefully. 1
While Ibctnez fretted over his formal statement of
resignation, Gonzalez had already decided to throw his support
to Aguirre Cerda. Although he still hoped for the defeat
of Ross, his final decision may have been encouraged by a
rumored deal he had made with Aguirre Cerda that if the
Nacis would support the Popular Front he would be given a
presidential pardon. Whatever the truth of this rumor,
the death penalty that had been asked for during Gonzalez'
trial following the 5th of September was commuted by
Aguirre Cerda the same day he took office — on December 24,
2
1938. But despite their past political differences with

*Rene Montero, La verdad sobre IbSnez (Santiago* 1952),

pp. 101-2.
2
Trabaio (December 25, 1938), p. 1.
318
the Popular Front, the Nacis had little alternative but to
support Aguirre Cerda against Ross. Gonzalez* memorandum,
written shortly after tdie 5th of September, readt
To continue to insist upon the candidacy of IbSnez
in the present circumstances would be to deprive the
people of their last possibility for victory over
Ross. Even with the support of Ibanismo. the triumph
of Aguirre is very problematical, but not impossible,
if one considers the general irritation which the
massacre the 5th (of September) had provoked against
the Right. I have the impression that if I fervently
asked the Nacis to help the cause of the people,
represented in this instance by Aguirre Cerda, the
large majority would respond to this call with great
enthusiasm."3
The attempted coup and its brutal suppression by the
government was the turning point in the electoral campaign.
The Right tried to shatter the unity of the opposition by
releasing Ibanez from prison two days before the election
and attempting in the press to give the public the impression
that it was still a three-way presidential battle; but Ibcmez,
like Gonzalez, had also thrown his support to Aguirre Cerda.
The Left press countered by reiterating Ibanez' renunciation
of his candidacy and by publishing a picture of IbSnez and
4
Aguirre together after the General was released from prison.
The election on October 23 was orderly and the final
count gave 222,700 votes to Aguirre and 218,609 to Ross.
Thus the Popular Front won by about 3,000 votes. Since

3
Memorandum from Jorge GonzSlez to Mauricio Menai
unpublished and undated. ,
4
Stevenson, Chilean Popular Front, p. 87.

319
about 22,000 votes came from the Nacis and their sympathi­
zers (including those who favored IbHnez), there is little
doubt that it was the Naci vote that was decisive. When
Aguirre Cerda's victory was made public, the president of
tiie Liberal Party immediately entered a protest demanding
a recount, alleging intimidation at the polls by Leftists
in certain industrial districts. The Left had shortly
before the election predicted that Alessandr * would use his
extra powers in favor of Ross* But, in fact, neither the
Left nor the Right illegally interfered; and after General
Novoa and General Arriagada publicly announced that they
would not stand back of Ross's claims before the Electoral
Tribunal, he finally gave them up on November 12 and left
Chile for France. He was also undoubtedly aware that the
country as a whole had taken the election of Aguirre as an
accomplished fact and that any attempt to change it would
have led to trouble which the government, unsure of the
5
support of the, army, would not have been able to handle.
But there was bitter disappointment and disillusion­
ment on the Right. Compared to the conditions existing when
Alessandri took office in 1932, the country was much better
offs and Alessandri was the first to admit that Ross had

5
Ibid., p. 87. Cf. Recabarren V., Mensaie viaente. p.
70 and Embassy Report* "Presidential Election Analysis"
(October 29, 1938), 825.00/1085.

320
played a very significant part in this — one in which both
he and Alessandri justifiably had a right to expect more
from the electorate. Even given the failings in Ross's
personality and his shortcomings as a campaigner, he
probably still would have won had it not been for the 5th
of September and Alessandri's handling of that fateful day.
In a sense, Jorge Gonzalez von Marees, the Jefe of Nacismo.
had been indirectly responsible for discrediting both
Ibanez and Alessandri — the two giants on the Chilean
political scene — and this was no small accomplishment for
the leader of such a small and peripheral political group.
Precisely because of this, the 5th of September was —
although, in a negative sense — the greatest triumph of
Chilean Nacismo because at the same time that it marked the
beginning of the end of Nacismo it was also the hour of their
greatest impact on Chilean politics.
The Naci attitude toward both Alessandri and Ib£nez
had always been ambivalent; but, of course, Ibdnez had been
the hope. In 1938, Keller wrotei "I had been an Alessan-
drista in 1920, favored the revolution in 1924 and was a
supporter of the national mission which the government of
Ib£nez was achieving. Together with ny great friend,
Alberto Edwards, we talked almost daily about the situation
of the country, and we both criticized many acts and measures
*
of the government. But neither he nor I had the opportunity
to implement our points of viewi he was sick and wasting

321
awayi and I was nothing in the administration. I didn’t
even Know ibSnez." Yet, "in spite of the criticism,” Keller
stated that "both of us had admiration for the great
President which IbSnez was. When he fell, I retired to
analyze the problems of the country; and the fruit of my
work was La eterna crisis chilena. In that book, Keller
criticized IbSnez for attempting to repress criticism of
his regime. In 1933, an unsigned article in Traba io
thought he lacked the qualities of statesmanship and said
that, like Portales, he was demagogic and power hungry. An
editorial in Traba io in 1935 took issue with Edward’s
notion that IbSnez was another Portales, but admitted that
Q
his government had been the best in recent years. In 1938 —
in Una revoluci6n en marcha — Keller wrotei ” ... we
will restore the Portalian concept of state ... Our revolution
9
will integrate various components to constitute a unit."
After the 5th of September — in a Traba io article,
"Ibanez and the 5th of September," published on March 24,
1939 — Javier Cox, in his defense of GonzSlez, attacked
IbSnez for his defamation of the Jefe, even though GonzSlez

^Carlos Keller, "El 5 de abril de 1932” , Traba io.

supplement (April 5, 1938).
7
Keller La eterna crisis chilena. pp. 32 f
Q
Traba io (May 8, 1935). Cf. Traba io on IbSnezj July
13, 27 and 29, 1935).
g
Keller, Una revoluci6n en marcha. 1938, p. 10.

322
 had asked him not to bother. Cox noted that when Ibcmez
retained to Chile in 1937 to run for the presidency he had
found the doors to the political parties and the press closed.
There was sympathy for Ibcinez, but it was not organized* and
Alessandri made it as difficult as he could for his old
enemy* Only Gonzalez and the MNS began to campaign for him
and finally made him a candidate. Given the impossibility
of forging all Ibanista elements into one party, Cox noted,
Gonz£lez had created the Popular Liberation Alliance and
had edited the campaign program approved by Ibanez.1** Cox
was bitter, as were many Nacistas; Gonzailez was less so. In
1939 in Traba io. Gonzalez wrote a long article in which he
contended that Xbctnez* hesitation was the principal cause for
the final debacle of the 5th of September.11 But in 1940, in
El Mai de Chile, he wrote concerning Ib&nez* first administra­
tion!
In contrast to Portales, Ibctnez was eminently
personalist. He didn't know how to impose obedience
and respect for the government, but only fear of
himself. He didn't have Portales* gift to govern on a
second plain, but made the mistake of assuming in
person the supreme command of the country * . . IbSnez
left office after four years of personal government
without having concretized a political construct of
tradition to respect.12
If the Right was bitter and disillusioned, the Left was

10Javier Cox, "IbSnez y el 5 de septiembre," Traba io

(March 24, 1939), pp. 3-7.
*
11Trabaio (March 24, 1939).
12
Gonzalez, El mal de Chile, p. 35.

323
perhaps too elated and hopeful. It was widely held that
Aguirre Cerda's victory was fundamentally due to the fact that
the ,,people,, of Chile had at last made their will felt, that
they had awakened and that there would be a gradual metamorphosis
of the lower classes. But since 1915 Leftist sentiment had
commanded something like one half of the populace and its
showing in the 1938 election was in actuality not much stronger
than it had been for a quarter of a century. This is not to
deny that during the last four years of Alessandri *s administra­
tion the Radical and Socialist parties had not grown rapidly,
but according to an electoral analysis by the American Embassy
the aggregate gain of the Leftist parties was only slightly
larger than the gain of the Right.
It was Aguirre Cerda who had GonzSlez and the Nacis to
13
thank. In an interview with the American, Charles A.
Thomson, late in October 1938, in which Thomson told him that it
appeared strange to a foreigner that the Nacis tas, who in the
past had been regarded as Fascists, were cooperating with the
Popular Front, Aguirre answered confidentially that the Naci
movement originally had "Nazi” ideals but that it had not
found the atmosphere in Chile propitious for them. Therefore,
Aguirre explained, the movement had undergone an evolution and
now its chief tenet was a demand for strong, efficient and
clean government. This demand for clean government, according

13
Cf. Arturo Olavarria Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri,
I, pp. 350 ff., and 360 ff.

324
to Aguirre, was largely a reaction to the corruption which had
14
prevailed under the former conservative administration.
Soon after, GonzSlez renounced his position as the Jefe and
claimed that the tragedy at the Social Security building was
not due to his overambition, but to the desperation of the
15
masses.
GonzSlez had begun his re-evaluation of the events of
the 5th of September and of the history of Nacismo. He was
interviewed in prison on December 1, 1938 for the magazine
16
Hoyt
What were the precise goals of the 5th of September?
Gonz&lez t ...though I have not vacillated in assuming
responsibility for what occurred on the 5th of
September (sicl), X have not been able to free
myself from those who directed IbSnez* campaign
and today blame me for the failure of his candidacy.
Had we not attempted the revolution, the opposition
would have arrived at the election divided and the
triumph of Ross would have been inevitable. I
fought forcefully for the unity of the Left around
the General, but already much before the 5th of
September I became convinced that it was an una-
chieveable ideal, and that impression was shared by
all the directors of the Popular Liberation Alliance.
What would the victory of Ib£nez have meant if. as
you say, the Left was divided?
GonzSlezt Exactly. The triumph of the revolution would have
meant the immediate elimination of Ross' candidacy.
Were you certain about the outcome of the revolu­
tionary movement?

14Embassy Report (October 29, 1938), 825.00/1085.

15
Diccionario politico, p. 335.
^Reprinted in Traba io (December 1, 1938), p. 3.

325
GonzSlez j Although ■ . . Hov has claimed that the revolutionary
attempt was *madness*, such assertions are based on
a lack, of understanding of the true intent in the
origins of the movement.
It has been said that the Nacis vho participated
in the 5th of September were led into it blindly
and that only a few knew about it.
GonzSlez* That's a vile lie* as so many other lies have been
spread about the 5th of September massacre • . .
But the revolution failed.
GonzSlezs In all revolutions* no matter how well planned,
there are always a percentage of risks deriving from
that which is unknown and beyond the control of the
organizers. This is what happened in the present
case.
And what about the 48 red hours and the list of
300 politicians it is said would have been shot if
the Naci revolution had triumphed?
GonzSlezi Another dastardly invention of the government..■
When did vou know that the movement had failed?
What was vour impression upon learning it?
GonzSlezi Up until the last hours of the night of Monday, the
5th, and even after having learned of the surrender
of the occupants of the University and of the Social
Security building, -I held out hopes of success and I
continued to await some news from outside Santiago.
Only after midnight was I definitely convinced that
all had failed, though ignorant of the precise
reasons. These I learned only days later. When
I learned the magnitude of the tragedy, I decided
to deliver myself over to the law. I considered
the situation lost and decided to accept the punish­
ment, whatever it might be. I only learned of the
death of my companions two days after my detention.
Being incommunicado prevented me of learning of the
massacre sooner. My first feeling was of self
contempt, and I cannot deny that in the solitude of
vay self I was overcome with grief for the fallen,
the majority of whom I knew intimately. Those were
the saddest days of my life and I would not want to
relive them.
What spiritual and historic implications do vou
attribute to the massacre besides that of the defeat

326
 of the candidate of the Right?
Gonzalez * The revolution failed to materialize, but its spiri­
tual effect has had and will always have implications
which it would be absurd to deny. The sacrifice of
the young Naci men has had the virtue of moving the
popular spirit in even its most intimate fibres. The
spiritual vigor of the race, which had seemed gone
forever, was suddenly reborn in the presence of the
magnificent example set by those Chilean youths
who were annihilated for having had the audacity to
fight to defend their ideals of popular spirit and
national greatness. The 5th of September separated
two epochs of national life. On that date the
popular revolution triumphed and the chains of the
oligarchy were destroyed. The electoral victory of
the 26th of October constitutes only the first
material result of that triumph.
On December 23, 1938, the American Mr. Evans Clark,
the director of the Twentieth Century Fund, and his wife,
Freda Kirchwey, the editor of The Nation, interviewed Gonz£lez
in the Santiago prison. At that time he had already been
told that he would be released the following day when Aguirre
Cerda took office. The interview took place in the prison
yard without any guards or officials within ear-shot, and the
Jefe apparently spoke without reserve. In his memorandum on
the interview, which he wrote for the American Embassy in
Santiago, Evans commented* "He, Gonzalez, is a man who looks
to be in his early 30s, blonde, clean shaven, with a clean-
cut, sincere expression and with a distinct personal magnetism.
He understands English fairly well but speaks it very little."
(Manuel Checa Solari, the son of the former Peruvian Ambassador

to Argentina, who had arranged the interview, acted as interpreter

17
Despatch No. 439, American Embassy, Santiago. Tot
Cecil Lyon (United States Embassy, Santiago, Chile). From*
Evans Clark, 339 West 42nd Street, New York City, (December 27,
1938), 825.00 n/11.
 A report sent to the American Secretary of State a few days
later noted that "both Mr* and Mrs. Clark, in discussing their
interview, gave evidence of having been impressed by the
forceful character of von MareSs and stated that they could
well understand why this leader was able to influence the youth
of Chile to the extent that he had. Mrs. Clark was of the
opinion that von Mareeis' period of imprisonment had had a
salutary effect on him, and while he had undoubtedly held very-
strong feelings prior to the September putsch and at that time
felt that violence was in order he now gave evidence of be­
lieving that moire orderly measures could be followed. She
believed that his change in attitude resulted from the country
18
having been given a fair election."
The questions put to GonzSlez by Mr. and Mrs. Clark were
directed entirely to the organization and policies of the
19
Chilean Nacistasi
Has the Chilean Nacista Party any connection at
all with the Nazi party in Germany?
GonzSlez: No.
Not even in the earlier days?
GonzSlezi No, at no time. In the early days we used to argue
with some of our German members in the South who
wanted to follow Hitler, but we didn't follow
that line at all.
Whv was vour party called by the same name?
Gonz&Lez * We called it Nacista because our party had a
National Socialist aim and the initials made a good
name. Ours is spelled NACI not NAZI. We were called

18
Embassy Report! no. 439 (December 28, 1938).
19Cf. note 202.
328

\
 that before the German party came into power.
Has vour party any anti-Semitic feeling or policy?
Gonzalezt Absolutely not — we have some Jewish members —
one of our chief leaders is a Jew.
How large a proportion of vour party are of German
extraction?
GonzSlezx A few, but not many — about 5 percent.
Has the German Nazi party tried to control or
influence vour party?
Gonzalez * There have been some attempts, but of no effect —
not important.
What are the chief policies vour party advocates?
GonzSlezs We are going to hold a party convention next month
to draw up a platform — and at that time we are
going to change the name and make a public statement
that will show clearly we have no connection with
German Nazism.
What policies do vou think that convention will
approve?
Gonzalez * We are opposed to imperialism. We advocate the
national ownership of the nation’s land and chief
industries — such as mines and public utilities.
We are. also in favor of a democratic form of govern­
ment under a constitution — free speech and free
elections.
Do vou advocate paving a fair compensation for
private property which is taken by the state?
Gonzalezi Yes, we do. We believe that the former owners should
be paid for their property . • • The present
copper interests could be fully compensated in ten
years.
1 cannot see much difference between the Naci party
policies and those of the Socialists — is there any?
Gonzalez* Not very much in program — but we have a vitality,
a devotion, a spirit, a discipline that they haven’t
got.
What is the strength of vour party?

329
Gonzalez* We have grown very rapidly. I can't tell just how
many now but I should think about 30,000. Our
vote in 1933 was 800; in 1937 it was 15,000 and in
the last election 25,000. The total vote of all
parties is about 400,000. The Socialists have
60,000 and the Communists 25,000.
What is vour party's attitude toward the new
.Aguirre Cerda administration?
Gonz£lez * We have supported it. But we have some doubt about
Aguirre Cerda's ability to put through sufficiently
drastic reforms.
On December 25, 1938, Traba io announced that on the
afternoon of the preceding day Aguirre had signed the decrees
freeing those Nacis who had been detained in jail following
the events of the 5th of September. It was the new President's
first act of state. Those freed included GonzSlez, Juan
Salinas (ex-director of Traba io). Keller, Jimenez, HemSndez,
20
Vargas and others.

2. Formation of the Vanctuardia Nacional Socialista

Already late in 1938 Gonzalez had indicated that the
Nacis were going to change the name of their movement. In
answer to a direct question put to him during his Traba io
interview just before he was released from prison, he said:
"All the nuclei of the country have been studying this point,
which I consider of great importance for us, and I have sent
their conclusions to be presented at the Congress. This
matter ought to be resolved with absolute certainty, without
21
concern for false sentimentalities . . . " In answer to a

20
Traba io (December 25, 1938), p. 3.
21
Traba io (December 24, 1938), p. 3.

330
question put to him on January 14, 1939 — just prior to the
2nd National Congress of the movement — concerning why
Nacismo had declared itself anti-fascist, Gonzalez said*
...in the first stage of the Movement I declared
publically that it was founded spiritually on World
Fascism. But from then until now things have changed
radically in the world, and we have completed the
natural ideological revolution which all political
organizations ought to experience in the first years of
their growth* Today we are anti-fascist because the
concept has willy-nilly been transformed into tyranny,
oppression of conscience, an instrument of racial and
religious intolerance and this we cannot accept . . . I
do not deny that in the beginning we had certain ideolo­
gical contact with Hitlerism and with Italian Fascism.
It was in the infancy of the movement when we were
looking for our own definitive position within the
reality of national politics. But understand, I am
only speaking of a similarity of tendencies and of outward
appearances; we were only indirectly connected with
foreign fascist organizations.22
Gonzalez denied that the 5th of September was similar
to Hitler* s 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Emphasizing Nacismo*s
independence, he pointed out that the Chilean Nacis had opposed
Franco and the "imperialist ambitions of Italy and Germany”
in Spain. He also said that if Chile were attacked by one
>

of the European Fascist powers, his Nacistas would not

hesitate to spend the last drop of blood to defend Chile.
Finally, he was asked again i "Why do you intend to change the
name of the MNS? What name will it be?" and he answered* "We
intend to change the name because there is a need to get rid
of even the last trace of confusion with German Nazism. The
23
Congress will decide this and the future name."

22
Traba1o (January 14, 1939), p. 3.
23Ibid.

331
 The Congress GonzSlez spoke of was held on January
14-17, 1939 and the decision was made to change the name of
the movement to Vanguardia Popular Socialists (Nacional
Socialist Vanguard). It was not just a deceptive cover for
the same old organization — one designed to make it more
acceptable to the new Popular Front government — as has been
suggested. The new name reflected a changed organization —
if not in structure, in content — and a changed ideology.
In the "Brief Explication of Doctrine," which was published,
the VPS saw the historical trajectory of Chile as involving
O vt
the "predominance of one class over the people." It
claimed that both the old aristocracy and the new plutocracy
had exploited the people in collaboration with imperialist
capitalism and was responsible for the overthrow of Balmaceda.
New forms had been introduced by the "social revolution" in
1920. The struggle between the old form and the new ones
led directly to the martyrdom of the 5th of September, which
began a new epoch. The principal task in this new epoch was
to carry out what Keller called "the march of the revolu­
tion."
The term "Chilenidad" was now defined as the reintegra­
tion of the values of the national spirit i all theories of

24 #
Vanguardia Popular Socialistsi Breve explicacion de
su doctrina7 (Santiago* 1939)} Cf. Realamentos fundamentales
del movimiento vanguardiata (Santiagoi 1939)% El u 1tima
baluarte de la chilenidad . . . (Santiagot 1940); due es la
vanguardia? El movimiento vanouardista, definido nor Jorge
GonzSlez (Santiago t 1941).

332
racial supremacy were repudiated. Spiritual values were to
be based on new forms of collective life* but support was
given to the inalienability of human rights and the freedom
of thought and conscience. "Organic democracy" was real
democracy, and all other forms of government were repudiated.
The class struggle was the struggle of the exploited classes.
The Vanguardia was to be revolutionary; it would support the
radical transformation of the collective mentality. But
violence was rejected as a tactic (although condoned in
"accidental" situations); and all forms of political totali­
tarianism, including Fascism, were condemned.
To be sure, all was not new in this new ideology of the
VPS. Gonzalez and his Nacis did not overnight become diffe­
rent human and thinking beings because of the events of the
5th of September. The VPS promoted a conception of socialist
life that in fact subordinated the individual to the collective.
It justified private property only as a means of satisfying
collective needs. It had always been more kin to socialism
than to capitalism. It repudiated the "Romanist" conception
of law for a new social law in which the source of all rights
is the right to work. It repudiated all forms of imperialism,
called for the economic liberation of Chile and the nationali­
zation of its vital resources — those then in the hands of
the wealthy and foreign capital.
*
It supported agrarian
reform and the incorporation of the peasant into the life of
the nation, the free organization of workers and intellectuals,

333
women in politics and solidarity with all the oppressed
classes* races* peoples* and nations. Considering its program
••Leftist,** it called for the union of all the forces of the

Left.25
As leader of the Vanguardia. Gonzalez continued his
career in Congress. There he initiated the extraordinary tax
on revenues from exports levied on U.S. copper companies for
the purpose of financing the newly created Corporacion de
F omen to (CORFO). He also took it upon himself to scrutinize
the conduct of the government. One instance of this was that
he charged the Minister of Foreign Relations* Abraham Ortega
Aguayo* with extortion' in the granting of entrance visas to
Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. A presidential investigation
ensued and the minister resigned. Other damaging scrutiny by
Gonz&lez was further indication that his relations with
Aguirre had definitely cooled. In fact, the Vanguardia had
en masse reacted unfavorably to the President* s pardoning of
the carabineros who had been responsible for the massacre of
the 5th of Septmeber.2®
If there were strained relations between the Vanguardia
and the government, there were also within the Vanguardia
itself. On February 12* 1940, several members* dissatisfied
with Gonz£lez* leadership, broke away and formed the Movimiento
Nacionalista de Chile. This new organization supported Ib£nez

25Ibid.
26
Frederick Young* "Jorge GonzSlez von Mareesi Chief of
Chilean Nacism" (Unpublished manuscript) •

334
and strongly opposed the Popular Front government as too
favorable to the Communists* In moving to the Left, GonzSlez
had been outflanked on the Right. Those still of a more
fascist persuasion had abandoned him. And he was never at
home on the Left*
From May to August 1940, GonzSlez delivered eight lectures
in Santiago which he titled "The Chilean Reality'* and which
were published before the end of the year under the title*
El Mai de Chile. The ideas expressed in them, both old and
new, are indicative of the continuity of his thinking and his
view of the then present situation. He noted that there was
uncertainty and anguish in the country about its future and
a belief that some cataclysmic disaster will break out.
During the past decades there had occurred a "grave deformation
of the collective consciousness of our people, which is trans­
lated into a moving away from all moral restraints . . . above
all in the last decade a veritable epidemic of destruction of
27
the great permanent spiritual values of the Chilean people."
This was vintage GonzSlez. He traced the history of Chile up
to the appearance of Portales; and he viewed the post-Portalian
28
period in essentially the same terms as Alberto Edwards.
Coming to the m o d e m period, Gonzalez contrasted Alessan­
dri and IbSnez both unfavorably with Portales; and he defended
the failed coup of the 5th of September as an attempt to
#

27
Gonzalez, El mal de Chile, pp. 9 f.
28Ibid., pp. 10-40.

335
"restrain the reactionary avalanche (i.e., Ross) by means of
29
violence" because of their failure. He sav the victory of
the Popular Front government — Aguirre Cerda — on October
25, 1938, as a victory for the nation, but this did not imply
his continued support of the Front. He wrote*
The Popular Front was not the spontaneous and natural
expression of the popular political and social sentiment
of the people, but only a tactical combination of
parties incorporated in the national political struggle
by order of the Communist International. It was created
by the inspiration of the Communist Party with the
precise goal of preventing the victory of Fascism a la
Ross, which would have meant the end for Communism.
Now that the Front has achieved its first objective of
destroying the oligarchy, it will procede with its
second objective, that of Communist infiltration. 30
Gonzalez* solution*
The only way to counter the process of Communist
deformation of the popular mentality is to establish
as soon as possible a political regime which loyally
corresponds to the political and social sentiments of
the people, i.e., a political regime which transforms
in work and action the intimate desires and longings for
which the Chilean masses have fought in vain during the
. last four decades. These longings are twos a National
government, above political parties and classes, founded
on the confidence of the people and charged with the
necessary executive power to develop the country, its
integrity and creative potential; and on the social and
economic plane, a regime essentially socialist, which
rises above class conflict by means of the structuring
of a new collective order based on the most ample social
justice and which places individuals on the plane of
development consonant with their intellectual, moral,
and physical possibilities for the good of society.
The Portalian tradition of government should be re­
stored •31
GonzSlez had come back to first principles; fundamentally,

90
Ibid■, pp. 41-53.'
30Ibid., p. 57.
31Ibid., pp. 69-71.

336
he had not changed at all. He still looked for a socialism
of a new kind and this socialism could only be created through
the "rehabilitation of the permanent spiritual values of
humanity" because "the economy is only a manifestation of the
spirit of man." On this point there was no doubt* "There are
■
*
»

moral forces which are more powerful and decisive in the

orientation of the destinies of the world than material
forces, and in all basically healthy people there beats a
spiritual conception of life which is more potent than the
base materialist aspiration of the individual." In GonzSlez*
socialism, the fundamental subject of life is not the individ-
dual, but society.32
In the third part of his book, GonzSlez outlined
specifically the configurations of his conception of "organic
democracy". It amounted to a m o d e m reformulation of the
Portalian Constitution of 1833. He suggested that the people
and the state should be brought together and that the best
form of representation was the "corporate model." Instead of
a parliament, the government should be advised by organically
structured bodies of representatives of all professionals
of various organizations* The President of the Republic and
his collaborators — the Ministers of State — would be given
maximum executive authority and responsibility; and the
President should be constitutionally obliged to hear the
opinions of the collaborative body on legislative matters.

32Ibid., p. 80.

337
A Council of State would function as the supreme political
and administrative tribunal, composed of ex-functionaries of
high rank and of other citizens deserving of this distinction.
Municipal authority was to be incorporated into the general
national administration and the mayors would be chosen by
the executive. Instead of 25 administrative capitals, there
should be only 10. The bureaucracy should be curbed. 33
Gonzdlez made it clear that he was presenting a plan
for the reconstruction of the country in only the broadest
terms. But in the last four chapters he dealt specifically
with the economy because he contended that “the anarchy and
disorganization in economic life is greater than in political
34
and administrative life.” He particularly attacked the
economic policies of Ross, as he had done in his 1937 book, El
Problems del hambre. and recommended, among other things,
the revaluation of the peso, nationalization of the nitrate
oe
industries and agrarian reform. The key to the latter was,
as in his earlier book, the attainment of monetary stability.
If GonzSlez* social and political ideas were somewhat mysti­
cal, his economic ideas were much more practical and concrete.
On the eve of the congressional elections of March 1941 —
specifically, on February 6 and 7 — GonzSlez made certain

33Ibid., pp. 94-110.

34Ibid., pp. 123 ff.
35
Cf. Jorge Gonzalez, El problems del hambre (Santiago*
1937), pp. 14 ff.

338
pronunciamentos over the radio Cooperativa Vitalicia, which
were published in pamphlet form shortly thereafter under the
titlet Gonzalez Von Marees. se diriae a los chilenos.
Gonzc»lez noted that the Vanguardia had been silent about the
political events of the past few months, the reason being
that this time was spent strengthening the internal organiza­
tion of the movement, but that it was now going to speak.
Whatever the results of the March elections, he said, they
won't have any meaning until the "forces of destruction" in
Chile are contained. He and his colleagues were of the
opinion that the Parliament was an anachronistic institution
and that the Vanguardia aspired to increase their representa­
tion in it only to strengthen their ability to change it —
qg
to "rennovate all the old political forms and habits."
Linking the history of the Vanguardia directly with the
history of Nacismo, he recalled* "our early days were
difficult. The ideals which we considered were too high and
pure to be understood immediately by the people." 37 He then
explained at length the reasons why the motives of the earlier
movement had been misunderstood — spiritual, social and
political — along the same lines that he had done since the
early 1920s. He even noted that the name of their movement —
"Naitional-Socialist" — had presented a problem* We were
presented to the country as a band of fanatics . . • crazy

Gonzalez von Marees se diriae a los chilenos (Santiago*

1941), p. 3.
37
Ibid., p. 6.

339
men* In the minds of a large sector of Chilean public
opinion, we passed for some kind of soulless beings, without
God or law, out for blood and filled with bitterness against
the working class. Impressed by these characterizations, the
mass of working class repudiated us with all their heart."
But the movement had, nonetheless, grown,he said, and had
attracted thousands of idealistic youths and a not unimpressive
number of workers. The persecutions and lack of understanding
they had suffered had forged in them a spirit of self-sacri­
fice. Finally, he related the events of the 5th of September
38
and explained why he had supported the Popular Front.
But the Vanguardia made a very poor showing in the March
elections and this spurred some of its members, out of
frustration, to violence. At a Radical Party convention in
Santiago in May 1941, a group of young Vanguardists held a
street demonstration and one of them fired into the crowd
of Radicals killing one delegate and wounding several others.
The Minister of the Interior, Olavarria Bravo, and President
Aguirre decided to use this as a pretext to get rid of a
worrisome pest — GonzSlez von MareSs, and in doing so they
hoped to effectively destroy the organization which he headed.
According to the penal code, persons deemed potentially dange­
rous to public safety could be apprehended and held for
psychiatric examination. Although they knew that he was not
insane, this is precisely what happened to GonzSlez on May 21,
1941. Even the suggestion of mental instability was enough

38Ibid., pp. 7-9.

340
to discredit him in the public mind and submit him to ridicule.
Has it not logical to assume that a man who had exhorted his
39
youthful followers to "heroicos locos** was not himself loco?
Certainly Gonzalez* politics during the next year —
the last in which he remained the leader of the Vanguardia —
would cause one to wonder. His main objective was to Iceep the
Popular Front government of Aguirre from breaking relations
with the axis and joining the Allies} for, as critical as
Gonzalez was of Hitler and Mussolini and Fascism, he was more
opposed to United States imperialism. Thus, in the presidential
election of February 1942, the VPS supported Xb£nez, together
i

with the Liberals and Consevatives, against the Radical Juan

Antonio Rios, because Rios was for the Allies and Ibcmez for
the Axis. This issue had thrown the two organizations — the
Vanguardia and the Nacionalistas — together again and they
duly became the Union Nacionalista in 1942 under the presi­
dency of Juan Gomez Millas. But this was too much for
GonzSlez. With far too many enemies both within and without
the new movement, he had little prospect of attaining his
political goals. He resigned; and when he was defeated for his
seat in the congressional elections in March 1945, he retired
to practice law. The Jefe was gonej and it was not long before
the organizations which he had inspired were gone too, his
former followers finding their way by and large into parties on
. ,
39
Young, "Jorge GonzSlez,” p. 17.

341
the Right.

3. The Folly of Juan Bemales.

After the 5th of September, Carlos Keller — the
Spengler of the movement and a man of extraordinary intellec­
tual gifts — withdrew from politics and returned to his major
scholarly pursuits of geography and economic history. He
also wrote novels, one of which was a slightly veiled
fictional biography of Gonzalez and Nacismo. Published in
1949, La locura de Juan Bemales was a critical backward
glance at Keller’s own excursion into politics, reflecting
his own disillusionment with the movement in general and the
Jefein particular. His choice of the title was not acciden­
tal — the word locura meant not only folly, but also madness,
and Keller later said that he really believed that GonzSlez
had during his last years as Jefe gone loco.^
In the novel, Juan Bemales is a man b o m to a Conserva­
tive family. As a youth, he helps found a movement which
is at first unnoticed. When he becomes its leader, he
prohibits smoking and drinking to test the self-restraint of
its members. He stresses the importance of sports, expecially
boxing, but the militaristic aspect is underplayed. There is
mention of Traba ~io. quotas on membership, and character
sketches of other members of the movement such as Mena. The
figure of Alberto Edwards appears prominently. The movement is
a reaction to immorality and political disorganization; it

40
Interview with Carlos Keller in Santiago, 1968.

342
is more important to act than to debate. Fanaticism lies
41
close beneath the surface of conviction.
Keller's story follows the history of the MNS quite
carefully, but the figure of Juan Bemales soon dominates
all. He has great vitality, an urge for action, a mysterious
attraction for his followers, a need for challenge. His
ability to speak is uncanny. He is both the betrayed and the
betrayer. The movement is full of spies — spies for the
government and spies for the opposition. Bemales is in jail
and out. Everything rests on the 1937 elections. The
country is more important than the individual. Bemales l e ams
that his girl friend is a Communist spy; the Communists are
revolutionaries. Bemales insists that Nacismo is not an
enemy of the church and Christian morality. He emphasizes
discipline and the spirit of sacrifice. He bemoans the
economic conditions of the country; he tells how the government
should be organized.^
Keller's ambivalence toward his former Jefe is embarras­
singly obvious throughout. As the novel progresses, it becomes
clear with each passing day that B emales is the man of the
hour, the one to save the country. He brilliantly debates
with his critics. There are more than two political alterna­
tives — dictatorship or democracy. The best government is one

41
Carlos Keller R.,, La locura de Juan Bemales. (Santiago*
1949), pp. 21 f., 25-27, 40-45.
42 *
Ibid., pp. 66 f., 88 f., 114 f ., 168, 180, 184, 185,
188.

343
which had the initiative, the spontaneous acceptance of its
people. There is only one model for Chile to follow — it is
the model of PortalesX Here Keller digresses to a discussion
of the presidency and the state. But the man of the hour —
Juan B e m a l e s — comes to believe in his own myth* he comes to
believe that the future of the country depends on him and him
alone.43
Although Keller was at least as important as Gonzalez
in creating the myth of Juan Bemales, he critically describes
the metamorphosis of the Jefe. Bemales begins talking too
much like a revolutionary; he is too anxious for power. He
considers becoming himself a candidate for the presidency;
but, knowing that he is too young, he decides at least to
become the king-maker of Ibanez. As his belief in his own
self-proclaimed genius and mission becomes more important to
him, Bemales' principles become less important. He must avoid
detention at all costs, to keep himself free for the people.
He becomes increasingly paranoid, feeling himself surrounded
by enemies. 44
Keller is unkind to his hero. He blames him, rather
than history for his "transmutation." In Keller's view, the
21st of May was a fiasco; the 5th of September a disaster. He
could not forgive the man whom he had chosen to put an end to
"the eternal crisis of Chile." He had to destroy him. And
he did I At the end of his novel, in describing the events of

43Ibid., pp. 190 ff., 192-200, 201.

^Ibid., pp. 216, 220, 221 f., 224, 228, 236 ff.

344
the 5th of September, he wrote that the autopsy report on Juan
Bemales had established beyond a shadow of a doubt that he
had committed suicide.45 For Keller, GonzSlez was dead, both
politically and spiritually. It was not a heroic death. Keller
had denied him that. It was self-serving, for that is the way
Keller saw him now.
Indeed, most of those who had followed Gonz&lez and
who had been sympathetic to his political persuasion looked on
his later development as madness or betrayal or both, for in
the late 1940s the former Jefe of the MNS joined the Liberal
Party. In fact, he rose to become its General Secretary before
he resigned in September 1951 to campaign for Arturo Matte
Larrain. Having his whole life believed that "liberalism"
was the main cause of the spiritual, economic and political
decline of Chile's greatness, his joining the Liberal Party
must have seemed the act of a greatly disturbed man. And if
that were not enough, his candidate, Matte Larrain, was an
oligarch and the son-in-law of Alessandri.
A number of answers have been given to explain Gonzalez*
strange political odyssey following the 5th of September. His
widow has said that he thought he might be able to inject his
ideas into the Liberal Party because it had no doctrinaire
ideology of its own, although she admits that he was unsuccess­
ful.^® Sergio Recabarren, one of Gonzalez' former followers
*

45Ibid., p. 307.
4®Interview with Sra. Laura Allende de GonzSlez.

345
who became himself active politically in the 1950s, has written
that Gonzalez believed that the Right would be returned to
power and that he wanted to be in a position to influence
policy when that happened* "He stood apart, like Moses,
47
although he knew how to search for the promised land#"
Another former follower, Guillermo Izquierdo Araya, who became
an IbSnista, has suggested that GonzSlez may somehow have been
trying to atone for his youthful political extravagances and
to justify himself before his critics — especially those among
48
the upper classes* A recent American commentator, Frederick
Young, finds this "the most understandable and satisfying
explanation"} but he goes on to suggest that "as a man of
culture and intelligence, Jorge Gonzalez, no doubt, realized by
1945 that the liberal-democratic state in some form or other,
be it only a false front, was the form of political organization
which all peoples in the West (and indeed in the East) aspired
to." 49
There is probably some truth in all of these explanations.
Perhaps there is no one truth — no one explanation that could
suffice. Perhaps GonzSlez was now simply facing the reality of
Chilean political life as he now saw it and as he expressed in
an interview after he had become the Secretary General of the
Liberal Party in 1950. His interviewer. Dr. Lux, asked him

47
Recabarren V., Mensale viaente. pp. 105-107.
48Interview with Guillermo Izquierdo Araya.
49Young, "Jorge GonzSlez," p. 19.

346
how his extraordinary change from a Naci to a Liberal had come
about. GonzSlez answered *
I don’t deny that in the years following the extinction
of Nacismo I have modified my political ideals in some
important respects. Experience, the defeated coup, the
serene contemplation of reality, together with the
hindsight of the stage of life I have reached — I am
now 50 years old — have all made me abandon certain
concepts which I earlier defended with great intensity.
In the times of Nacismo. I was convinced that neither
political parties nor democracy ought to be a part of
a system of government. Today, on the other hand, I
maintain that democracy and the parties, with all their
defects, are irreplaceable. Without them, there is
only disunity, anarchy or dictatorship.50
But GonzSlez was careful to point out that, although he had
changed his politics, he had not changed his principles:
You shouldn’t confuse the concepts about the structure
of government, to which I have referred, with the
political principles that I have maintained all my life
and which constitute the essence of the ideas which I
inculcated in my followers in the times of Nacismo —
authority, honor, discipline, hierarchy, sacrifice for
the public good • . . It is not enough to simply
proclaim them, but it is necessary that the politician
Knows how to practice them and imbue them in others.
And without false modesty, I affirm that in Nacismo
such principles were practiced and were real, from the
leader down to the lowest militant. Today, I still
believe that the evils of Chile can only be solved
when these principles once again become part and
parcel of political practice. All else is secondary.
After the defeat of Matte Larrain by IbSnez in the 1952
presidential election, GonzSlez withdrew from politics. Again
he had supported the wrong man at the wrong time* He was the
champion of lost causes; persona non grata politically to the
Right, the Left and the Center. Were his principles too

50
Dr. Lux, "De Nazi a Liberal," Nuevo Zig-Zag (1950),
P a 29 •

347
strong for politics? Or was politics too strong for his
convictions? Whatever, he had failed extravagantly. In 1958,
he underwent an operation for a brain tumor that caused many
to again insinuate that he was mad. Perhaps it was this that
had been the cause of his "loco heroicus" during the 1930s
and his almost schizophrenic political turnabout thereafter?
But medically, if it was malignant, it could have been there
only a short time or it would have killed him.
Perhaps shaken by his nearness to death, Gonzalez
51 *
wrote his "Memoirs" in 1960. They speak both confession and
justification. He noted that Nacismo had been mistakenly
pictured in the public mind as a "foreign" ideology from its
inception to the present. For the sake of historical justice,
he wanted to emphasize again the absolute "Chileness"*
"chilenidad" of the goals of Nacismo. He claimed that the
very expression "chilenidad" , which was now in common usage,
was a word which the Nacis resurrected and gave its. meaning of
synthesizing the spirit and virtues of the Chilean people.
At the same time, it was the Nacis who had brought the national
flag into the streets and taught the people to sing the
national anthem at their meetings. Long before he became
*
popularly known in Encina’s History, it was the Nacis who had

51
Jorge Gonzalez, "A la memoria de los nacistas que
murieron gor sus ideales, en una lucha que, aunque esteril,
constituyo un ejemplo de abnegacion y patriotismo." (Unpublished)
1960, 8 pp.

348
first resurrected the figure of Diego Portales and made his
name known abroad in the country. According to GonzSlez,
all these manifestations of patriotism, which were later
incorporated as a matter of course into the routine of other
political organizations, had been first used by the Nacis.
Nevetheless, Gonzalez had to admit that Nacismo did not find
itself at home in Chile* "I should acknowledge that the
political organization which I founded could not, because of '
its inherent context, prosper in an ambience such as ours. Even
though the ideals of this movement were most noble and sincere,
even though its political aspirations were most profoundly
Chilean, its soul — that is to say, theintimate motor which
gave it life — were not Chilean."
GonzSlez did not explain what he meant by this last
seemingly paradoxical statement. He only hinted at it in the
following sentences* "What gives life to a political organiza­
tion and makes it prosper is the spiritual force which creates
it. If that spiritual force does not correspond to the
aspirations of the people on whose behalf it acts, it is
condemned to failure by public opinion." What GonzSlez seems
to be saying is that if Nacismo had found a fertile ground
among the Chilean people, it would have prospered; but because
it didn’t prosper, that fertile ground must not have been there.
Sometimes, he said, a great caudillo can overcome even this
*
and can detour the "natural political trajectory" of a people —
he cites the case of Mussolini and Fascism in Italy — but

349
once that exceptional personality ceases to act as a political
force, the life of the people returns to its original course.
Only in Germany had National Socialism found fertile ground.
This was, to be sure, a criticism of himself that
GonzSlez was making. In his view, he was not, like Mussolini,
a great caudillo who could by the force of his personality
turn the Chilean people toward Nacismo despite the lack of a
fertile ground for it in Chile. At this point he digresses to
a discussion of his origins, both German and Chilean, and
seems to suggest that the fact that he had been unable to
accomplish this task was due to his split personality — split
racially and spiritually. He writes *
I note the above with the exclusive purpose of making
it understood the internal processes which compelled me
to create Nacismo. I feel Chilean from head to toe.
But it is a fact that 5096 of the blood that runs through
my veins is German. I inherited from my father the
strictness of judgement of the Castillion, and from my
mother German romanticism . . .
I have recorded these intimate facts because they
decisively influenced the formation of my personality.
My mother made me 100% Chilean, but could not modify
the German traits in my character which I had inherited
from her. It is certainly not true that such traits
weakened my patriotic sentiments. To the contrary,
they fortified them, impressing on my personality a
depth of sentiments which do not generally correspond
to the Chilean soul. I insist that this does not have
anything to do with my intimate feeling of nationality;
but with my moral characteristics, which are in many
ways typically German. The soul of the people is one
thing, the conscience of its nationality quite another.
One can be a great patriot and nevertheless have a
political soul which is different from most of his
countrymen.
GonzSlez further contrasted the Chilean and German mentalities
in many different aspects in order to show that they were at

350
odds with one another both within him and within Nacismo*
As he put it* "the German soul is generally incomprehensible
to the Latin soul and vice-versa." This, he said, explained
the initial success and ultimate failure of the movement.
But, in the final analysis, GonzSlez blamed himself.
"Although placed in the most favorable circumstances, and
although it could have had a leader more capable than me,"
he wrote, "Nacismo, as it was conceived by me was condemned
to inevitable failure because the soul — i.e., the spirit —
with which X inspired it was not molded to the Chilean
mentality." He was, nevertheless, not apologetic* "Although
the road which I chose was in error, the fundamental goals
which I pursued were realistic. The need for radical purifi­
cation of our political habits and practices, which was stressed
by Nacismo in a National-Socialist sense, continues, in my
judgement, to be as necessary today as it was 25 years ago.
And I have the satisfaction of having been able to observe
in the last decade how the ideals of Nacismo have become
widespread in the conscience of the Nation."
On March 14, 1962, GonzSlez underwent a second operation
for a brain tumor, but this one he did not survive. He was
dead at the age of 62 and buried without fanfare in a modest
casket. A necrology which appeared a few days later reported*
With his messianic attitude and his private honest
conduct, Jorge GonzSlez transformed himself into a
caudillo of the first order. The young followed him
with enthusiasm and faith throughout the country. The
adults did not believe in him. He was for this reason,
surely, never able to achieve parliamentary represen­
tation of significance.•. Upon his death, Jorge GonzSlez

351
 cj
had no importance politically.

52Revista Vea (March 22, 1962).

352
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Periodicals and Articles

Acci6n Chilena* 1934-38

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tendencias politico-sociales," in Anales de la univer-
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Atenea, (April-June, 1960).
Jobet, Julio Cesar. "La juventud de 1930 y el socialismo,"
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. "Ideologfa y programs nacista," Accion Chilena.
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_________ • "El nacismo frente a las realidades chilenas,"
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Chilena. 3, no. 2 (May, 1935), pp. 85-92.

362
 .' "TransformaciSn nacista de la economia nacional,
"Acci6n Chilena, 3, no. 3 (June, 1935), pp. 134-156.
__________ . "Portales," Accion Chilena. 2, no* 5 (May 23,
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Ercilla. no. 1612 (April 27, 1966), pp. 18-19.
__________ • ”E1 camino de la violencia,” Ercilla. no. 1614
(May 11, 1966)
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(October 23-29, 1968), pp. 41-42.
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1611 (April 20, 1966), pp. 18-19.
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(April 6, 1966), pp. 18-19.
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Newspapers

La AHanptp. Santiago, 1938.

Asies. Santiago, 1938.
Consigna. Santiago, 1935.
El Correo de Valdivia. Valdivia, 1937-38.
El Debate. Santiago, 1933-34.
El Diario Illustrado. Santiago, 1933-38.
Frente Popular. Santiago, 1937.
La Hora. Santiago, 1935.

363
El Imparcial. Santiago* 1932--34.
Lircay. Santiago, 1935
El Mercurio. Santiago, 1932-38*
Mundo JudSo. Santiago, 1935-38*
La Naci&i. Santiago, 1932-38.
La Opinion. Santiago, 1933-38.
El Rayo. Valdivia, 1935.
Trabaio. Santiago, 1933-38.
Las Ultimas Noticias. Santiago, 1923.

Dissertations and Manuscripts

Cox, Javier. "La democracia funcional del estado corporativo."

Unpublished.
Drake, Paul Winter. "The Leftward Movement of the Chilean
Electorate," Ph. D. dissertation, Department of
History, Stanford University, 1972.
. "The Chilean Socialist Party and Coalition
Politics, 1932-1946." Mimeographed.
Gonzalez von Marees, Jorge. "A la memoria de los nacistas
que murireron por sus ideales, en una luncha que,
aunque esteril, constituyo un ejemplo de abnegacion
y patriotismo." Unpublished and datedt 1960.
. "A la memoria de un gran ciudadano* Don Rafael
Sotomayor." Unpublished and undated* 1920?
__________. "La liga pro de educacion popular *Rafael
Sotomayor'." Unpublished and undated* 1922?
_________ . Selected letters, 1920-1939. Unpublished and in
the possession of Laura Allende de Gonz&lez.
Tarr, Terrence Stephen. "Military Intervention and Civilian
Reaction in Chile, 1924-1936". Ph. D. dissertation,
Department of History, University of Florida, 1960*
U.S. Department of State. Embassy reports, dispatches, and
memoranda from Santiago, 1932-1939. Files* 825.00,
825.00-n, 825.00 Revolutions, 825.52-Germans.

364
Valenzuela, Arturo Arms* "Clientelistic Politics in Chile,
An Analysis of Center-Local Linkages'* • Ph. D. disserta­
tion, Department of Government, Columbia University, 1971.
Young, F.W. George. "German Immigration and Colonization in
Chile 1949-1914". Ph. D. dissertation, Department of
History, University of Chicago, 1969.
__________ • "Jorge GonzSlez von Marees* Chief of Chilean
Nacism." Mimeographed.

365