LUISITO G. PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. R. NO.

220149. JULY 27, 2021

The Pulido case

In Pulido, the petitioner contracted marriage with a woman

whom we shall refer to as W1.  Subsequently, petitioner
contracted marriage with another woman, W2.   Stung by this
betrayal, W1 filed a complaint for bigamy against the
petitioner. The petitioner’s defense was that his marriage with
W1 was void because of the absence of a marriage license. In
accordance with the then case law, the petitioner was however
convicted by the RTC of Las Piñas City since there was no prior
judicial declaration of his marriage with W1 at the time he
married W2.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. 
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, a judgment
was entered by the RTC of Imus, Cavite, declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and W1 as void due to the absence of
a marriage license.   

With this development, the Supreme Court held that the

petitioner should be exonerated from criminal liability.  The
High Court stated that for bigamy to arise, there must have
been a prior valid marriage.  The fact that the judicial
declaration of nullity was obtained after the accused had
contracted the second marriage will still not give rise to
bigamy because a void marriage is inexistent from the very
beginning. 

With respect to Article 40 of the Family Code, the Court held

that its application to a bigamy charge was not warranted. 
The Court held that by the express terms of Article 40, the
prior judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage is a
requirement only for purposes of remarriage and that Article
40 should not have been construed as imposing a requirement
for the accused to raise the defense of nullity of the first
marriage. 

Thus, in the light of Pulido, the answer now to (b) of the

hypothetical is that the judgment of nullification will exonerate
Horace from criminal liability for bigamy.

Effect of Pulido on prior rulings re prejudicial question

The doctrine laid down in Pulido will necessarily call for a

revisit of previous doctrines which held that a pending
marriage nullification case will not pose a prejudicial question
in a bigamy case.

In light of Pulido, the answer to (a) of the hypothetical is that

the motion for suspension on the ground of prejudicial
question should be granted.  The resolution of the issue of
whether the prior marriage between Horace and W1 is valid is
determinative of whether the criminal case for bigamy will
proceed.

It should be noted that by virtue of the 1 December 2000

amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil case
in order to pose a prejudicial question must have been filed
prior to the institution of the criminal case.  Hence, if the civil
case for marriage nullification was filed after the criminal case
had been instituted, there will be no suspension of the
criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question.
In such a case, the remedy of the accused is to prove the
nullity of his prior marriage in the criminal case.  Pulido held
that a prior judicial declaration is not the sole means of
proving the nullity of the prior marriage.  The accused may
collaterally attack the validity of the first marriage by
introducing evidence, for example, that no marriage license
was obtained therein.  The Court held that a certification from
the LCR that no record of a marriage license was found in its
record would cast reasonable doubt on the accused’s guilt.

Retroactive effect of Pulido

What about an accused who had been convicted of bigamy

notwithstanding a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage?  May he invoke the Pulido doctrine?

It is submitted that the accused may do so.  It is axiomatic that

a law should be given retroactive effect if favorable to the
accused. (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).  Judicial decisions
favorable to an accused should be given retroactive effect
since such decisions form part of the law in accordance with
Article 8 of the Civil Code and so as not to infringe upon the
constitutional right of the accused to equal protection of the
law. (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). In
such a case, the accused may file a petition for habeas corpus
to obtain his release from prison.