Alysa Kristel R.

Asido
3rd Year - AB Political Science
CASE DIGESTS
DAISY B. TIU, Petitioner vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., Respondent
Facts • Platinum Plans PH, Inc. (Platinum),
respondent, employed Daisy Tiu,
petitioner as its Division Marketing
Director and Senior Assistant VP and
Territorial Operations Head in charge
of its international operations, from
1987 to 1989, and 1993 to 1995,
respectively. Platinum is a corporation
that engaged in the pre-need industry.
Such enterprise furnished a contract of
employment valid for 5 years.
• However, the petitioner stopped
reporting for work on September 16,
1995, and started to work for another
company namely Professional Pension
Plans, Inc., an enterprise that also
engaged in the same industry.
• Thereafter, the respondent sued the
petitioner before the RTC of Pasig City
for the breach of contract of
employment, specifically the violation
of the non-involvement clause
stipulated therein.
• Basically, the non-involvement
provision or clause stated that an
employee must not engage in a
corporation or association, whether
directly or indirectly, voluntary or for
cause, for the next 2 years thereafter,
that is engaged in the same business or
belonging to the same pre-need
industry as the employer (Platinum).
Otherwise, the employee is liable to
pay damages to the employer in the
amount of Php100,000.
• Contrary to the respondent’s argument,
the petitioner said that such non-
involvement provision was
unenforceable since it was against
public order or public policy;
Transferring to a rival company in the
said industry was valid/accepted. The
products offered/sold by both
companies are of the same kind, there
was nothing peculiar to protect the
former company. Also, the moment the
petitioner entered the industry, she
already possessed the skills and
knowledge which depicts that the
respondent did not provide any training
to her. Lastly, strictly applying the
contract’s provision would deprive her
of the right to engage in the work she
was an expert of.
• Since the contract stipulated the two-
year restriction, the RTC upheld the
validity of the non-involvement clause.
It stated that a valid contract in restraint
of trade should have a stipulation of
Alysa Kristel R. Asido
3rd Year - AB Political Science
limitation upon either time or place.
Hence, the 2-year restriction was valid
and reasonable.
• With the foregoing, the petitioner
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision stating that the
petitioner was expected to fulfill not
only the contract’s expressed
stipulation, but also all the
consequences that follow it given that
they are not against good faith, usage,
and law. It also held that the non-
involvement clause of the employee for
2 years was valid and enforceable,
considering the inherent nature of the
respondent’s industry.
Issue/s 1. WON the non-involvement clause is
valid
2. WON the CA erred in upholding the
non-involvement clause’s
constitutionality
Ruling 1. The Court held that the non-
involvement clause had its time
restriction which pertained to the 2-
year non-involvement beginning on the
day when the petitioner’s job with the
respondent ends. Another restriction
also stated that the employee must not
engage with any pre-need business that
is the same with the business of the
respondent. Technically, she was
prohibited from engaging in a
commerce that is comoarable to her
former company. Given that she was a
former Senior Assistant VP and
Territorial Operations Head in charge
of the respondent’s Hong Kong and
ASEAN operations, she knew very
well the highly confidential and
sensitive marketing strategies of her
former company. This would put the
respondent’s trade secrets at stake
considering how competitive the
marketing industry was. Hence, the
non-involvement clause valid given the
restriction of time.
2. The Court held that the decisions ruled
by the RTC and CA were not
erroneous. The petitioner did not
manifest any willful intention to satisfy
the non-involvement clause in good
faith. With this, the petition was denied
due to lack of merit. The petitioner
shall pay the liquidated damages to the
respondent.
Alysa Kristel R. Asido
3rd Year - AB Political Science
JOSE SANICO AND VICENTE CASTRO, Petitioners, vs. WERHERLINA P.
COLIPANO, Respondent
Facts
• On December 25, 1993, Werherlina P.
Colipano (Colipano), respondent, rode
a jeepney with her daughter. The said
transportation was operated by Jose
Sanico (Sanico), petitioner and it was
driven by Vicente Castro (Castro),
petitioner. The driver made the
respondent sit on an empty beer case
which was located at the edge of the
rear entrance/exit of the jeepney. The
respondent’s child was sleeping on her
lap at the time she was made to sit on
the said case. When the jeepney went
uphill, it did not have sufficient power
to reach the top, so the respondent
pushed both her feet against the step
board, so she and her could prevent
from falling or being thrown out of the
exit/entrance. With a wet step board,
she accidentally slipped her left foot
which caused it to be crushed between
the coconut tree and the step board.
This caused her leg to be amputated.
With this, she filed for damages.
• Despite admitting that the petitioner’s
leg was amputated due to the incident,
the petitioners rebutted that it was the
petitioner’s fault that she encountered
such accident. They argued that the
jeepney lost its power and the
conductor advised everyone not to
panic, but the petitioner opposed which
caused her foot to be crushed between
the coconut tree and the step board.
• Sanico explicated that he paid for all
the medical and hospital expenses of
the petitioner, and that the latter
voluntarily and freely carried out an
Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim.
• The RTC ruled that the petitioners
breached the contract of carriage
between them and the respondent.
They only gave the actual and
compensatory damages which was
insufficient in favor of Colipano.
Thereafter, the petitioners appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed with
modification the trial court’s ruling.
• The CA also modified the affirmed
damages (based on the RTC’s
computation) by reducing the
compensatory damages from
Php360,000 to Php200,000.
Alysa Kristel R. Asido
3rd Year - AB Political Science
Issue/s 1. WON the CA erred in finding that the
petitioners breached the contract of
carriage with the respondent
2. WON the Affidavit of Desistance and
Release of Claim is binding upon
Colipano
3. WON the CA erred in the amount of
damages awarded
Ruling 1. Since Castro is not a party to the
contract of carriage, it is only Sanico
who breached the said contract. In
other words, the Court held that the
CA erred in finding both the
petitioners as parties to the contract.
The Court held that the contract only
applies between the operator and the
respondent. Castro cannot be made
liable. Therefore, his case shall be
dismissed. The obligation to carry
Colipano safely from her point of
departure to her destination is
subjected to Sanico. The elements of a
contract of carriage even existed
between the petitioner and the
respondent:
a) Consent – when Castro
(Sanico’s employee) accepted
Colipano to board the jeep and
as to the latter, when she rode
the transportation
b) Cause/consideration – the
moment the respondent paid
the fare
c) Object – transportation of the
respondent from the point of
departure to her desired
destination
- Under the Civil Code, Sanico was
expected to observe extraordinary
diligence as he is the owner and
operator of a common carrier. There
was a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the petitioner
when Colipano’s leg was
injured/amputated while she was
riding the jeepney. He can discharge
such burden by proving that he
exercised extraordinary diligence.
However, he did not show meritorious
evidence of practicing such
extraordinary diligence. The
negligence was also manifested when
Castro made the respondent sit on an
empty beer case near the entrance/exit
of the jeepney. This put Colipano in
greater danger/peril compared to other
passengers who were sitting properly
and appropriately on the seats installed
inside the jeepney. Furthermore, the
failure to ascertain the jeepney’s
engine to be at its best condition
further aggravated the petitioner’s
Alysa Kristel R. Asido
3rd Year - AB Political Science
precarious position. This was a clear
manifestation of fault on the part of
the operator.
2. The Court also ruled that the Affidavit
of Desistance and Release of Claim
was void/invalid. Colipano stated that
she had no understanding of the right
she was waiving and such right’s
extent. She also did not understand
English language and was forced to
sign a document in a language that
was alien to her. With this, Sanico
cannot be excused from liability and
payment of damages even if he had
shouldered the medical bills of the
respondent. Clearly, the Affidavit of
Desistance and Release of Claim was
void due to involuntariness upon the
respondent.
3. The Court held that the CA erred in
using Colipano’s age at the time she
testified as basis for computing the
loss of earning capacity. The former
stated that the computation for the loss
of earning capacity must start at the
moment the respondent’s leg was
crushed on December 5, 1993. She
was roughly 27 years old at the time
her leg was amputated. Following the
corrected formula, the net earning
capacity of Colipano is Php212,000.
Sancio was also liable to pay interest
upon the discretion of the Court.