See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/254097716

The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern

Africa

Article  in  International Area Studies Review · March 2007

DOI: 10.1177/223386590701000104

CITATIONS READS
5 7,501

1 author:

Kyu-Deug Hwang
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
5 PUBLICATIONS   19 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Kyu-Deug Hwang View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Kyu-Deug Hwang on 02 October 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Internationalhttp://ias.sagepub.com/
Area Studies Review

The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

Kyu Deug Hwang
International Area Studies Review 2007 10: 55
DOI: 10.1177/223386590701000104

The online version of this article can be found at:

http://ias.sagepub.com/content/10/1/55

Published by:
Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Peace Research Institute Oslo

and
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for International Area Studies Review can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://ias.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://ias.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://ias.sagepub.com/content/10/1/55.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Mar 1, 2007

What is This?

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

International Area Review Received: 21 Mar, 2007
Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2007 Accepted: 15 May, 2007

The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and

Regionalism in Southern Africa
Kyu Deug Hwang∗
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

Abstract

This paper analyzes the creation and evolution of Southern African regionalism(s)
including the FLS and SADCC up to the end of apartheid. The primary and root causes of
current SADC regionalism, which were embedded in the course of development of the past
regional projects, will be elaborated from the earlier period of European colonialism to
the ending of the apartheid era. In this paper, focusing on evolutionary regionalism in
Southern Africa in times of historical relations of enmity among and within nation-states, it
attempts to provide the fundamental mechanisms of the regional organization. This will, as
a result, facilitate an understanding of the nature of contemporary SADC regionalism of
post-apartheid Southern Africa.

Key Words: Colonialism, South Africa’s Apartheid Policy, SADC(C), Regionalism, and
Southern Africa

I. Introduction

In 1980, when the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) was

established, its members (Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe
and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) succeeded the
Frontline States (FLS) in order to counter apartheid destabilization in Southern
Africa. Before and after the inception of SADCC, the terms, South Africa’s
apartheid policy, had a significant impact on both the creation and evolution of
regionalism in Southern Africa. These unfriendly terms were deeply embedded in

∗
Dr. Kyu Deug Hwang is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Hankuk University of
Foreign Studies. The author has received his Ph.D. in International Relations, at the University of Pretoria, RSA.
His research areas of interest are political and economic regionalisms in Africa, including SADC, SACU,
COMESA, ECOWAS, and the AU. Phone: 031) 321-7176, 019-472-3181, E-mail: kyudeug@hanmail.net

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

56 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

European colonialism and its legacy which had continuously bred a series of fear,
enmity and confrontation in terms of ideological and material values.
The region’s construction, as a site called Southern Africa, was “premised on
the discovery of minerals and, equally so, that these were located in South
Africa.”1 Since the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) in South Africa,
copper in Zambia, and coal in Zimbabwe, the regional setting of relations within
and among nations have had “a long (though infamous) pedigree,”2 even so much
as to influence the current regional orders. Therefore, the present and future
scenario of regionalism in Southern Africa can be, to some extent, approached and
understood in the context of the past. Given the fact that current SADC
regionalism evolved out of the region’s past experiences – the FLS and SADCC -
it is necessary to examine a historical overview of regionalism(s) which was not
only represented as the driving force, aim and strategy of each regional
organization, but also utilized as the defensive instrument of ‘nation-building’ and
‘state-making’ in the name of ‘region-making’ in Southern Africa.
This paper analyzes the creation, evolution and process of Southern African
regionalism(s) including the FLS and SADCC up to the end of the Cold War and
apartheid. The primary and root causes of current SADC regionalism, which were
embedded in the course of development of the past regional projects, will be
elaborated from the earlier period of European colonialism and its counterforce of
Pan-Africanist movement to the ending of the apartheid era. In this paper, focusing
on evolutionary regionalism in Southern Africa in times of historical relations of
enmity among and within nation-states, it will highlight the fundamental
mechanisms (on which later on SADC was largely based and affected) of the
regional organization, its aim, value and modus operandi. This will, as a result,
facilitate an understanding of the character, nature and type of contemporary
SADC regionalism of post-apartheid Southern Africa.

II. Southern Africa: colonialism and its legacy

Before the outbreak of the colonial fervor in the 1890s, Europeans had already
made tangible intrusions into Southern Africa.3 Before this date, Southern Africa
evolved through the growth of pastoralism of the indigenous people and inflows of
Bantu-speaking farmers4 with knowledge of iron-working from the north, together
with trade, in fostering large-scale polities.5 Yet, it has often been assumed that,
during this period, the region was “economically more underdeveloped, politically

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 57

more inexperienced and culturally more backward than any of the greater colonies
of settlement. After one and a half centuries the colony contained one town worthy
of a name and five or six little villages.”6 This situation was greatly changed and
transformed following the discovery of mineral wealth such as large deposits of
diamonds and gold in the region, specifically in South Africa, in the late 19th
century.
Under these new circumstances that took place in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the region’s history has been “more influenced by European
colonialism than indigenous factors. … [N]ot only the main components of the
Southern African boundary framework but the political status of the regional
territories were determined.” 7 In more detail, between 1795 and 1870, radical
changes took place throughout Southern Africa.8 The expansion of the Europeans
led to the movement of Africans into different places. During the early nineteenth
century, the combined impact of ecological and European pressures and the
consolidation of power in some African states generated the mfecane, a massive
dislocation and movement of peoples which had a profound impact on the size of
political communities and their respective distribution.9
Towards the end of the 19th century, the imperialist powers of Europe
competed in a ‘scramble for Africa’ to secure the largest possible areas of control.
Their rivalries, however, were resolved at the Berlin conference of 1884-85, which
carved Africa into ‘spheres of interest’ and of intended occupation by the
Europeans. The national boundaries that were drawn up in Berlin have remained
almost unchanged until the present time.10
Despite the justification of colonialism in the name of the civilization of the
region, of particular importance is that as these settlers moved further inland,
infrastructure was built to meet their needs. That is, “the region’s indigenous
peoples were excluded from its rewards, and so began the long history of violent
suppression and deprivation designed to keep them in their place.”11
In the first half of the twentieth century, Southern Africa experienced a number
of important developments in the region.12 In these major developments in the
region, the Union of South Africa set up the passage of the Land Act of 1913
which established the ‘native reserves’ or ‘homelands.’ The efforts at embedding
racism in the historical-economic framework in the region that were developed
into the implementation of Apartheid following the National Party’s victory in the
election in 1948, ultimately made Southern Africa a ‘raced’ space.13 This raced

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

58 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

space could, once produced, limit and channel further efforts at creating the
Southern African region.14
Meanwhile, in the late 1950s after the Second World War, the ‘wind of
change’ began to blow over not only Southern Africa but the whole of Africa. In
the period 1961-68, the British government agreed to grant independence to
Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. But despite the
euphoric hopes of the people, the early independence process failed to transform
the regional status quo.15 The newly independent states in the region were unable
to dislodge the colonial legacy in which their own security was weaved deeply into
the region’s integrated economy, protected and promoted by global capitalism. In
this regard, Vale described the idea and reality of independent majority-ruled
states in Southern Africa as ‘neo-colonial’ independence. 16 In terms of neo-
colonial influence in Southern Africa, the networks related to the division of labor
reflected the inequalities inherent in colonial domination. That is, the historical
development of South Africa’s incorporation into the capitalist world-economy as
an advanced semi-peripheral capitalist nation has resulted in the peripheral
underdevelopment of the indigenous Southern African people.17
Under the neo-colonial influence by the beginning of the decolonization
process, Southern Africa as a region was defined by a complex network of
relations which consisted of “a flow of people (labor), commodities (increasingly
manufactures) and capital (both of South African and foreign origin).”18 Therefore,
even before, during and after the period of decolonization in the region, Southern
Africa occupied by Europeans had been integrated into a web of Western
influences characterized by all the trappings of colonial domination.
Within the colonial history of Southern Africa, the region experienced the
processes of regionalization projects involving the FLS and SADCC. Each of the
organizations out of which SADC evolved are deeply rooted in and connected
with the current SADC in terms of objectives, values and modus operandi. The
overview of these historical settings that evolved and predated SADC will be
discussed in the following sections. This is essential for understanding the nature
of contemporary SADC regionalism as a deliberate political project and strategy as
well as the driving forces, goals and approaches to drawing a region together for
the mutual benefit of all its members in Southern Africa.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 59

III. The FLS As A Stepping-Stone To SADCC

As a political response to both apartheid South Africa and colonial rule in

Southern Africa, the Frontline States (FLS) came into being in 1974. The original
members were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria,19 Tanzania and Zambia
and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of
the organization for most of its existence. 20 The evolution of regional security
structures and frameworks in Southern Africa has a history that predates
decolonization. For the first decades since the outset of such cooperation in the
late 1950s, the focus of efforts was on decolonizing and terminating white
minority regimes in the former Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa.21
Indeed, in this period, decolonization throughout the whole of the African
continent was the major theme of African political consciousness and was a
crucial impetus in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).22
Within an anti-colonial context, thus, the FLS can be viewed as one of the most
important mechanisms to appear in the mid-1970s at a time when the ending of
colonialism and racial oppression were the hottest issues in the subregion, as well
as on the continent.
The evolution and framework of the FLS was, thus, deeply influenced by the
Pan-Africanist influence. The activities of the FLS often took after those of the
OAU’s African Liberation Committee (ALC), whose primary goal was to promote
the decolonization process. In addition, the Inter-State Defense and Security
Committee (ISDSC) was, in particular, formed in 1975 as an important structure
of the FLS with the mandate to address various security challenges related largely
to the South African apartheid ideology facing the member states in the Southern
African region.23
Apart from its ideological underpinnings of Pan-Africanism, the solidarity of the
FLS was based on three other factors. First, it operated within an ad hoc fashion of
decision-making with presidential summitry. The FLS summit would involve heads of
state and government as well as representatives of the liberation movements. Second,
the FLS’ self-imposed restriction on membership generated a simplified management
structure and a reduction of intra-FLS conflicts. Third, the informal nature of the FLS
afforded members the flexibility to pursue independent policies.24 These factors later
on impacted substantially upon the structure and nature of SADCC in terms of an ad
hoc fashion of decision-making and informal nature of the organization.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

60 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

The FLS, like SADCC later, aimed not only at fighting for independence and
liberation of member states but also at meeting some of their political as well as
economic security needs. Toward the late 1970s, the attempts by the FLS to
confront their weaknesses in Southern Africa evolved into a comprehensive search
for a functional regional grouping to promote economic liberation through
coordinated development initiatives.25
However, although the FLS expressed its roles in economic cooperation
outside the region as well as inside, the key to steer the function of the
organization was the politico-security oriented strategy as a response to
destabilization of an apartheid South Africa’s policy. The policy of destabilization
of the white South African regime against the black states in Southern Africa
continued throughout the 1980s till the defeat of South Africa at Cuito Cuanavale
in Angola in 1988.26 In this period, the destabilization of the region was led by the
Botha regime’s ‘total strategy’. This strategy sought to promote economic and
political collaboration with its neighbors on its own terms, and to preserve access
to regional resources without compromising its own political system. This policy
was formalized early in 1979 in a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’
(CONSAS) program, to be underwritten by mutual security agreements as well as
various forms of political and economic association.27
Hence, the destabilizer sought to dissolve the newly independent black states
in the region with not only supporting the rebel groups politically, economically
and militarily but also promoting the psychological sympathy and justification of
the defensive policy from the neighboring states as well as international
community. 28 This implied that the region was a battleground in which it was
divisive and further fragmented among and within the newly independent states.
Consequently, “the region witnessed increased militarization, on the one hand by
forces that viewed colonial regimes as hampering their freedom, independence,
and security and on the other hand by the colonial powers, who saw their acquired
benefits and interests in peril.”29 In this respect, the FLS was seen as an important
conduit for constructing and strengthening the realist perspective of security in the
region, focusing mainly on the military and state-centric thinking. Nonetheless, the
regional (in)security laden with zero-sum logic helped ultimately to propel the
FLS to formulate an African resistance throughout Southern Africa and beyond.
Together with the complex pictures of destabilization in the region, the
experiences of anti-colonial struggle and Pan-Africanism of liberation in
accordance with independence were, thus, the foundational elements of the FLS’

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 61

formation. Under the asymmetrical environments between white minority in

domination and black majority in subordination and/or resistance, national
sovereignty, which was centrally placed into realist security thinking in the region,
was little compromised by any cooperative initiative, rather strengthened in order
not only to preserve newly acquired independence but also to enhance the
cohesion of African nationalism in line with Pan-Africanism of liberation. Hence,
the FLS as a predecessor to SADCC conditioned and characterized, to varying
degree, the successors of regional security mechanism.

IV. SADCC As A Building-Block To Evolutionary Regionalism

The Pursuance of Collective Self-Reliance

SADCC was established in Lusaka in 1980 by nine independent African states:
the six Frontline States (FLS), Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. 30
SADCC’s founding statement, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, provided the
guidelines for economic liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration,
the SADCC states’ leaders agreed to create a regional economic organization that
would solidify the members, harmonize their policies, and lessen the influence of
South Africa’s hegemony. 31 As derived from this Declaration, the regional
grouping’s goals were as follows:

- reducing the economic dependence of member states, especially but not

exclusively, on South Africa;
- creating and rehabilitating the regional network of transport and
telecommunications infrastructure as a precondition for genuine and
balanced regional integration;
- mobilizing resources in order to promote national, bilateral and regional
development policies and programs;
- co-ordinating action so as to secure international cooperation with and
support for SADCC projects.32

In order to achieve the goal of economic liberation in the region, SADCC

member states prioritized the pursuance of collective self-reliance as a way of
constructing “political emancipation of the region.” 33 However, as SADCC
emerged out of the interactions of regional, continental and global forces, the
evolution of it should not be limited to Southern African efforts alone. In fact, both

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

62 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

the influence of Western actors and African states themselves were substantially
responsible for creating and evolving SADCC. Thus, it is important to note that
the evolution of SADCC was a mixed and intertwined product of African
initiatives and European influences. In that regard, Mandaza argues, “… Even
analysts on the left should remind themselves of the dialectical relationship
between imperialist domination and revolutionary pressures.”34
Yet, notwithstanding the enormous support that it received from Western
donors in the northern hemisphere, SADCC evolved not only out of considerations
voiced by African leaders (such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Khama) in the early
1960s, but also from its unique approach to regional cooperation. The SADCC
leaders chose its own way of project or sectoral responsibility which differed from
those of other organizations like the Economic Community for West African
States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that pursued
mainly economic (market-oriented) integration.
Within this context, as major driving forces to evolve SADCC, two points
were highlighted by the leaders of the organization, which were included in the
objectives of the Lusaka Declaration. The first was the reduction of dependence
(particularly but not only) on South Africa and the second was the forging of links
to generate ‘equitable development’ in the pursuit of balance and equity through
regional cooperation. Its two major objectives were, however, in effect
contradictory: while the fact that “more than 90 percent of financing for SADCC
projects came from foreign funding” 35 implies the organization’s severe
dependence, the fundamental theme of SADCC was to liberate economy from the
legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, it was inconceivable to create a
genuine and equitable region while diminishing reliance on South Africa “since
the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral
states tightly integrated into the core.”36
According to Thompson, Southern African economic relations, especially
trade ties were products of the colonial system, in terms of economic links and
infrastructure, which caused an ‘economic regime’ between South Africa and
seven of the nine SADCC countries to develop.37 She goes on to argue that:

South Africa also provides a link with western markets, and also serves as
an outpost for these markets in terms of multinational corporations within
South Africa. … [the] dominant economic regime in the region, between

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 63
South Africa and SADCC, is reinforced by the dependency patterns which
link the region to the Western capitalist system.38

Although reducing economic dependency on South Africa was identified as

the major objective of SADCC, ironically, since SADCC was established, several
states increased, rather than decreased, their economic dependence. 39 SADCC
should therefore not be considered as an attempt to create a totally different region
but as a defensive effort to circumvent the effects of the distorted integrative
structure in the region including South Africa.40 In this way, some argue that the
ability of the SADCC’s organization was fundamentally limited and fractured by
the nature and framework of SADCC. Mumbengegwi sums up as follows:

Desire for collective independence from South African domination is

one thing but commitment to regional integration is another. ….
Consequently, cooperation in SADCC is a loose arrangement from which
a member state can opt out without any serious repercussions on its
domestic economy. Thus, SADCC’s claim to political strength and unity
is its economic weakness.41

Nonetheless, SADCC was not only the symbol but the substantial and
authentic embodiment of the states of the region in their struggle for
liberation. It was a political-economic project of the independent states of
the region, which was perceived by apartheid South Africa as a dangerous
enemy of its regional hegemony.42 The emergence of SADCC in 1980 can
be partly seen as a reaction to South Africa’s proposal of a CONSAS
program in 1979 with a view to preventing the SADCC member countries
from being turned into South African satellites. Although economic
development was an important goal of the SADCC members, the
organization was, in essence, politically motivated by the FLS not only to
ward off South Africa’s hegemonic destabilization but also to attract
(more) foreign aid.43 As a whole, however, the South African threat to
SADCC in the region gave the organization an opportunity to “represent
the Southern African dream of economic development, self-determination,
mass welfare and winning free of South African domination.”44

The SADCC’s Rejection of the Neo-Liberal Approach

During the 1980s when SADCC was initiated and shaped, neo-liberalism,
which advocates the primacy of the market mechanism over government

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

64 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

intervention in the economy, was a dominant theoretical approach to development

including the issues of regional cooperation. Yet, in terms of regional cooperation,
SADCC, from its inception, rejected neo-classical economic theories that are
dealing only with “benefits from trade.” 45 For the neo-liberal approach is
indifferent to existing inequalities between the SADCC members, assuming that
they are either not serious problems or that they will eventually be solved by the
market.46 However, because colonial legacies, which tend to reinforce the uneven
development among and within the SADCC region, are still prevalent in the region,
SADCC members were disinterested in “relying solely on exchange relations”
based mainly on trade and market integration to manage their economies.47
Thus, SADCC chose a different approach to regional cooperation from other
sub-regional and continental approach, including European examples. Although
the initiation of SADCC was inspired by the EEC’s success and encouraged by the
Lagos Plan of Action, SADCC succeeded, to some extent, in shunning the
predominant influence of concepts and strategies alien to their needs and interests:
“SADCC neither embraced the EEC-type model with its economic-community
foundation nor did it adopt concepts emanating either from CONSAS or from the
Lagos Plan of Action.” 48 Given the ineffectual and inefficient outcomes of
regional economic integration schemes elsewhere in Africa, as proved especially
in the case of EAC, SADCC purposely rejected a common market or free trade
approach to integration. Rather, SADCC chose a “project coordination approach”
which emphasized the need to promote projects in the areas of industrial
production and infrastructure in order to boost cooperation in regional
development projects.49
During the inaugural SADCC Summit in Lusaka 1980, together with the
Lusaka Declaration, the organization adopted a framework for the Program of
Action which concretized and specified economic activities and development
projects to be pursued. The Program of Action explains the initial approach to
regional cooperation, which was based on discrete projects, focusing on the
promotion of allocating specific sectors (transport and communications, mining,
agriculture, energy, tourism, and so on) for coordination by each country.50 Within
this context, SADCC adopted a mechanism that was termed “sectoral
programming.”51 That is, the founders of SADCC rejected the formulation of a
regional economic integration scheme based mainly on a neo-liberal (market
integration) approach. Rather, they attempted to devise a strategy of regional
cooperation in order to enhance the economies of member states through the

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 65

development of the project coordination approach with each member state taking
responsibility for a specific sector.

The Nature of Informality in SADCC

The project or sectoral responsibility approach as functional cooperation
brought forth the decentralized structure of SADCC with power resting in the
Heads of State Summit and the Council of Ministers. 52 This created the anti-
bureaucratic structure of the organization, which implies that the political structure
of SADCC purposefully placed constraint on the progress of an autonomous
bureaucracy. Furthermore, this means that SADCC, from the start, eschewed
formal legally-binding mechanism in line with the statement that “informality
(which is referred to as informal agreements and/or informal bargains) is best
understood as a device for minimizing the impediments to cooperation, at both the
domestic and international levels.” 53 Rather, SADCC resorted to a consensual
decision-making approach, which aimed not at unanimity, but at cohesion within
the organization.54
The decentralized structure of the SADCC institution was linked to the
emphasis of national autonomous responsibility for allocated sectors. This implies
that the various commitments to regional cooperation in each member state could
consequently leave large rooms to generate management problems. As in the case
of the FLS, SADCC’s informal structure can therefore be seen in the context of
“the insistence on the sanctity of national sovereignty which is fundamental to
SADCC’s modus operandi.” 55 That is, SADCC, which was emphatically
composed of independent states, aimed not at establishing regional integration but
at enhancing regional cooperation placing emphasis on the role of individual states
in areas of coordination, such as transport and communication. This determined
the character of SADCC’s organizational structure focusing on the sectoral
responsibility approach in attempting to avoid a supra-national, centralized or
bureaucratic system.
The decentralized nature of SADCC, which was an explicit rejection of neo-
functionalist regional integration, ultimately was to help not only to protect each
country’s national dignity and sovereignty, but also to soothe the fragmentation
and diversity caused by a colonial influence of unequal regional development.
That is, the decentralized structure through a sectoral responsibility approach was
advantageous to SADCC in terms of its emphasis and promotion of ‘equality’
among member states. Moreover, the informality and decentralization of SADCC

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

66 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

contributed to the creation of a Southern African identity through “fostering a

spirit of ‘we’ among its members, as opposed to excessive centralization, which
would result in SADCC being perceived as ‘they’ by the member states – a factor
which weakened regional integration efforts in Africa.”56
Indeed, according to SADCC’s 1992 theme document, “more than anything
else, the greatest success has been in forging a regional identity and a sense of
common destiny among the ten member states.”57 Yet, despite the emphasis of
importance of ‘regional identity’ built by SADCC, it is preposterous to define
SADCC as an organization that would have been willing to put region over and
above nation to formulate and strengthen a regional identity and unity. Rather
SADCC, (which had a strong sensitivity to loss of sovereignty in terms of the
group of newly independent states), was a national interest-driven organization to
address national concerns through regional coordination and cooperation instead
of integration.

V. Concluding Remarks: towards the regional relations of amity in the

post-apartheid Southern Africa

Throughout the origin and evolution of SADCC, the organization managed to

succeed, to some extent, in diminishing and clearing the fears of members of losing
their independence by allocating sectoral responsibilities to each member state in
order to put more emphasis on the matter of ‘equality’ rather than ‘equity’. Yet,
SADCC had a difficulty to reconcile national matters with regional ones which
would raise crucial problems for political and economic cooperation among member
states. Under the circumstances of lack of genuine regional identity, “[D]omestic
elites were frequently unwilling to put the interest of the region over and above the
benefits they received from national-based development projects.”58 Together with
this challenge, SADCC faced other major problems as well. “SADCC’s
administrative arm was deliberately kept small, weak and fragmented,” apparently in
order to preserve and strengthen each member state’s influence and authority above
any other intervention or interference.59 Under this great challenge to overcome, it
was required of SADCC that the member states reconsider the issues of
decentralization versus centralization of the organization. In this context, for
SADCC to be much more credited in the post-apartheid era, SADCC (now SADC)
was required to do some reformations in order to play a more autonomous role.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 67

The regionalism(s) in Southern Africa, which manifested in the FLS and

SADCC, however, evolved over time, with roots being of a nature of nationalist
sovereignty orientation and deeply embedded in the colonial history of the region.
In this context, Southern African regionalism illustrated complex networks in
dealing with regional concerns and problems. In fact, although one of SADCC’s
major objectives was to reduce dependence on South Africa and European
imperialists, the member states had contradictory effects in which they increased
their dependence on South Africa and foreign aid instead of decreasing these
influences. By implication, this can be comprehended in the sense that the (then)
regional order was aligned in the background against weak states and powers of
(black) majority versus hegemonic regional power, South Africa. In this regard,
Zacarias noted:

The recent history of instability in Southern Africa is not associated with

wars caused by border disputes, entrenched rivalry between states, peoples or
tribes, but to colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, … instability and the fear
and fragmentation it generated were particularly related to apartheid’s struggle
for survival and reflected South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions.60

SADCC was the product of the FLS’ response to destabilization of an

apartheid South Africa’s policy. Although SADCC expressed its major raison
d’etre in economic and development coordination and cooperation, the key to steer
and maintain the function and capacity of the organization was the politico-
security oriented strategy transferred from the FLS. As a whole, however,
regionalism in Southern Africa, as was shown in the case of the FLS and SADCC,
played an important role in projecting the values of political and economic
survival and stability of member states among and within the member states. In
prioritizing ‘self-reliance’, the newly independent member states of each
organization recognized the importance of a regional collective identity built
through learning from past experiences (which were largely characterized by the
terms such as ‘asymmetry’ and ‘polarization’). Although there was a partial and
insufficient rationale to promote and preserve this regional identity or unity, yet,
given the unique history of Southern Africa, it requires a cautious heed to
understand why member states in each organization chose to align their aim, value
and modus operandi in line with the sanctity of national sovereignty and interests.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

68 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

The move towards amity in the post-apartheid Southern African region

coincided with the transformation of SADCC into SADC (1993) which expanded
to include the regional power, South Africa. In the face of “a changing, and
increasingly complex, regional and global environment,” 61 SADCC was
challenged to change and transform its cooperative strategy so that it would enable
the countries of the region to cope with the problems from external as well as
internal forces more effectively. Furthermore, in the absence of apartheid Southern
Africa, it has been asserted that the region’s security should be enhanced by
balanced and concerted cooperation and integration to “address the region’s
subordinate position within the global economy.”62
Since the end of the Cold war, as a number of scholars have argued, the
referent object for security and regionalism has been broadened and widened. For
Southern Africa as well, various new security issues emerged as important objects
to address. In the context of a broadening of referents, it is timely to point out that
the state is not excluded, but it is no longer the sole or primary referent of security
and regionalism. In line with this proposition, new SADC regionalism in terms of
security discourse can be researched in the further study.

Notes
1
Peter Vale, Security and Politics in South Africa: The regional dimension (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2003), 30.
2
Adrian P. Hull, “Rational choice, security, and economic cooperation in Southern Africa,” Africa Today, 43,
1(1996), 33.
3
By the 1880s the stream of settlement (dominated by the expansion of Europeans) was already touching the
Limpopo, over a thousand miles into the interior from its base at Cape Town, see Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A
Short History of Africa (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 139.
4
These became later on the majority of the population of the region.
5
John Iliffe, Africans: the history of a continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 98.
6
C. W. De Kiewet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 30.
7
Nana Poku, Regionalization and Security in Southern Africa (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 18.
8
There were two major processes. One was a series of significant disturbances among the African farming
communities throughout much of Southern Africa. The other was an expansion of White people northward and
eastward from the Cape Colony at the expense not only of Khoisan communities, as before, but also of Bantu-
speaking Africans. Both processes were punctuated by violence and resulted in the creation of new states, see
Leonard Thompson, “Southern Africa, 1795-1870,” in African History: from earliest times to independence eds.
Philip Curtin, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, and Jan Vansina (London: Longman, 1995), 268.
9
John D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1994), 59-66.
10
Tom Ostergaard, SADCC: A Political and Economic Survey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Danida, 1990), 19.
11
Peter Vale, “Southern Africa: exploring a peace dividend,” CIIR Reports and Briefings, (Catholic Institute for
International Relations: CIIR, 1996), 7.
12
The establishment of a Union of South Africa (1910) following the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902), the
withdrawal of Germany as a colonial power in South West Africa (now Namibia) after the First World War, the
formation there of a South African Mandate under the League of Nations auspices, Portugal’s intensified
exploitation of Angola and Mozambique (from the mid-1920s), and the creation of a Federation in Rhodesia and
Nyasaland by the present Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (1953), see Omer-Cooper, op. cit. 158-261.
13
The pass laws in South Africa, the housing of labor in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later,

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 69

manufacturing facilities all reflected the racialization of space in Southern Africa.

14
Michael Niemann, A Spatial Approach to Regionalisms in the Global Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2000), 108-109.
15
The labour migration to South Africa continued, and South Africa’s railways provided cheap routes for the
export of primary products to international markets. In addition, South Africa’s capital base was to augment
foreign capital in large-scale infrastructural investment projects (like the Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique,
built in the 1970s), see Vale, 1996, op. cit. 7.
16
Ibid.
17
Margaret Lee, SADCC: the political economy of development in Southern Africa (Nashville: Winston-Derek
Publishers, 1989), 32.
18
Niemann, op. cit. 109.
19
Nigeria, which was voted as a member of the FLS by Zimbabwe, participated in a number of meetings as an
informal associate member, Khabele Matlosa, “Dilemmas of Security in Southern Africa: Problems and Prospects
for Regional Security Cooperation,” in A United States of Africa? ed. Eddy Maloka (Pretoria: Africa Institute of
South Africa, 2001), 399.
20
Tandika Nkiwane, “The Qest for Good Governance,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s evolving security
challenges, eds. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 60.
21
Jakkie Cilliers, Building Security in Southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture, ISS Monograph
Series No. 43 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 1999), 3.
22
Ali Mazrui and Donald Gordon, “Independent African States and the Struggle for Southern Africa,” in Southern
Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, ed. John Seiler (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 183.
23
Matlosa, op. cit.
24
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security 1975-1993
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 257.
25
Ibid., 219.
26
Robert Davies, “After Cuito Cuanavale: The new regional conjuncture and the sanctions question,” in
Sanctions against Apartheid, ed. Mark Orkin (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), 198-206.
27
CONSAS was to include South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries),
Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Bantustan states (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei).
28
See, for example, through mass media, the primary instruments in South Africa’s destabilisation of Angola and
Mozambique were respectively the UNITA and RENAMO movement in the name of warding off the Marxist and
Communist threats, see Richard Davies and Dan O’meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An analysis of
South African regional policy since 1978.” Journal of Southern African Studies 11,2(1985), 201-206.
29
See Agostinho Zacarias, Security and the State in Southern Africa (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1999),46-51.
30
Namibia joined in 1990 after winning its independence from South Africa.
31
Khadiagala, op. cit. 228.
32
Southern Africa Record, Report on SADCC Industry and Trade Sector 46 no.1 (1987), 4.
33
Zacarias, op. cit., 164.
34
Ibbo Mandaza, “SADCC: Problems of Regional Political and Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: An
Overview,” in Regional Integration in Africa: unfinished agenda, ed. P. Anyang’ Nyong’o (Nairobi: The Regal
Press Keyna Ltd., 1990), 143.
35
Edward Ramsamy, “South Africa and SADC(C): A critical evaluation of future development scenarios,” in The
Geography of Change in South Africa, ed. Anthony Lemon (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), 202.
36
Niemann, op. cit. 111.
37
Although the degree of dependence differs, South Africa played the leading role of trading partner with all of
the SADCC countries, with the exception of Angola and Tanzania, see Lisa Thompson, “SADCC: part of a whole
or whole of a part?,” International Affairs Bulletin 15 no.1 (1991), 64-65.
38
Ibid., 67.
39
Lee, op. cit. 5; for details on the extent of the SADCC member states’ economic dependence both on South
Africa and on the advanced capitalist nations, see ibid., 66-116.
40
Niemann, op. cit. 111.
41
Clever Mumbengegwi, “Food and Agriculture Cooperation in the SADCC: Progress, problems and prospects,”
in SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and development in Southern Africa, eds. Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala,
and Ibbo Mandaza (London: Zed Books, 1987), 79-80.
42
Reginald Green and Carol Thompson, “Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC and South Africa,” in
Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War, eds. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (Harare: Zimbabwe
Publishing House, 1986), 261.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

70 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

43
Ostergaard, op. cit. 51-79.
44
Reginald Green, “SADCC versus South Africa: Turning of the Tide?,” in Africa Contemporary Record, Vol.20,
Annual Survey and Documents 1987-1988, eds. Colin Legum and Marian E. Doro (New York: Africana
Publishing Company, 1989), A25.
45
Given a number of attempts such as the Central African Federation (CAF), East African Community (EAC) and
SACU, which led to the severe unbalances and inequities in the distribution of gains, it is conceivable why
SADCC began to challenge the neo-liberal approach to regional cooperation by encouraging ‘production before
trade’, see Carol B. Thompson, “African Initiatives for Development: the practice of regional economic
cooperation in Southern Africa, Journal of International Affairs, 46 no.1 (1992), 130-132.
46
Robert Davies, “Economic Growth in a Post-Apartheid South Africa: Its Significance for Relations with other
African Countries,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 11 (1992), 63.
47
Thompson, 1992, op. cit. 132-133.
48
Bernard Weimer, “The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): past and future.”
Africa Insight 21, 2(1991), 80.
49
SADCC, SADCC Annual Progress Report 1989-90, (Gaborone: SADCC, 1989).
50
Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen, Southern Africa: In search of a common future, from the conference to a
community (Gaborone: SADC, 1994), 31-67.
51
Advocates of the sectoral programing were reluctant to use the term ‘integration’. Instead they viewed this
mechanism of SADCC as an instrument of ‘self-reliance’ among developing countries to generate ‘a
redistribution of world production, control over the creation and allocation of surplus and the power to make
decisions on matters that affect their societies’, see Derrick Chitala, “The Political Economy of the SADCC and
Imperialism’s Response,” in SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and development in Southern Africa, eds.
Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala, and Ibbo Mandaza (London: Zed Books, 1987), 13.
52
Ostergaard, op. cit. 58.
53
Charles Lipson, “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?,” International Organization 45 no.4
(1991), 500.
54
Mandaza and Tostensen, op. cit. 73.
55
Douglas M. Anglin, “Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA,”
International Organization 37 no.4 (1983), 692.
56
Mandaza and Tostensen, op. cit. 72; SADC, Report of the SADC Council of Ministers on the Review of the
Operations of SADC Institutions (28 November 2000), 23.
57
SADCC, “SADCC: Towards Economic Integration,” Theme document for the 1992, Annual Consultative
Conference. (Gaborone, SADCC, 1992), 3.
58
Ramsamy, op. cit. 203.
59
Anglin, op. cit. 695.
60
Zacarias, op. cit. 171.
61
In June 1991, when the Abuja Treaty was adopted in establishing the African Economic Community (AEC),
SADCC was also challenged to attain progressive cooperation of the member states by enhancing a more
balanced development of its ‘production’ and ‘marketing structures’, see S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa’s
Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), 87-88.
62
Apartheid Southern Africa was deeply rooted in the imperialist global economy – uneven development,
inequalities of resource access and allocation, unemployment, and poverty characterized the region. Security
threats, such as drugs, arms, and illegal migrant labor flows are regarded as symptoms of structural inequalities.
Therefore, according to many, security in post-apartheid Southern Africa could and should not be ensured through
traditional types of interstate military cooperation, see e.g. Vale, 2003, op. cit. 81.

References

Anglin, Douglas. “Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern

Africa: SADCC and PTA.” International Organization 37,4(1983), 681-711.
Asante, S.K.B. Regionalism and Africa’s Development: expectations, reality and
challenges. Houndmills: Macmillan press. 1997.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa 71

Baregu, Mwesiga. “Economic and Military Security.” In Mwesiga Baregu and

Christopher Landsberg (eds.), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s
evolving security challenges. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2003.
Chitala, Derrick. “The Manufacturing Sector in the East and Southern African
Subregion.” In Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala, and Ibbo Mandaza (eds.),
SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and development in Southern Africa.
London: Zed Books. 1987.
Cillers, Jakkie. “Building Security in Southern Africa: An update on the evolving
architecture.” ISS Monograph Series 43, November. 1999.
De Kiewet, C. W. A History of South Africa: Social and Economic. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1957.
Davies, Richard. “Economic growth in a post-apartheid South Africa: its
significance for relations with other African countries.” Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 6,1(1992), 51-71.
Davies, Richard and Dan O’Meara. “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An
analysis of South African regional policy since 1978.” Journal of Southern
African Studies 11,2(1985),183-211.
Green, Reginald and Carl B. Thompson, “Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC,
South Africa and Sanctions.” In P. Johnson (eds.), Destructive Engagement:
Southern Africa at War. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. 1986.
Hull, Adrian. “Rational Choice, Security, and Economic Cooperation in Southern
Africa,” Africa Today 43,1(1996), 33-52.
Iliffe, John. Africans: the history of a continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1996.
Khadiagala, Gilbert. Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African
Security 1975-1993. Athens: Ohio University Press. 1994.
Lee, Margaret. SADCC: the political economy of development in Southern Africa.
Nashville: Winston-Derek Publishers, Inc. 1989.
Lipson, Charles. “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?”
International Organization 45,4(1991), 495-538.
Mandaza, Ibbo. “SADCC: Problems of Regional Political and Economic
Cooperation in Southern Africa: An Overview.” In A. Nyong’o (ed.),
Regional Integration in Africa: unfinished Agenda. Nairobi: The Regal Press
Keyna Ltd. 1990.
Mandaza, Ibbo and Arne Tostensen. Southern Africa: In search of a common
future, From the conference to a community. Gaborone: SADC. 1994.
Mazrui, Ali and Donald Gordon. “Independent African States and the Struggle for
Southern Africa.” In J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese
Coup. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press. 1980.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

 72 The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa

Mumbengegwi, Clever. “Food and Agriculture Cooperation in the SADCC:

Progress, problems and prospects.” In Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala, and Ibbo
Mandaza (eds.), SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and development in
Southern Africa. London: Zed Books. 1987.
Niemann, Michael. A Spatial Approach to Regionalisms in the Global Economy.
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 2000.
Nkiwane, Tandika. “The Quest for Good Governance.” In Mwesiga Baregu,
Christopher Landsberg (eds), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s
evolving security challenges. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2003.
Oliver, Roland and J. D. Fage. A Short History of Africa. London: Penguin Books. 1988.
Omer-Cooper, John D. History of Southern Africa. London: James Currey. 1994.
Ostergaard, Tom. SADCC: A Political and Economic Survey. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: Danida. 1990.
Poku, Nana. Regionalization and Security in Southern Africa. Houndsmills:
Palgrave. 2001.
Ramsamy, Edward. “South Africa and SADC(C): A critical evaluation of future
development scenarios.” In Anthony Lemon (ed.), The Geography of Change
in South Africa. London: John Wiley and Sons, pp197-214. 1995.
SADCC. SADCC Annual Progress Report 1989-90, Gaborone: SADCC. 1989.
SADCC. “SADCC: Towards Economic Integration”, Theme document for the
1992, Annual Consultative Conference. Gaborone: SADCC. 1992.
SADC. SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000: challenges and
opportunities for regional integration. Harare: SAPES. 2000.
Southern Africa Record. Report on SADCC Industry and Trade Sector 46,1(1987), 3-67.
Thompson, Carol. B. “African Initiatives for Development: the practice of regional
economic cooperation in Southern Africa.” Journal of International Affairs
46, 1, (1992),125-144.
Thompson, Lisa. “SADCC: part of a whole or whole of a part?” International
Affairs Bulletin 15, 1, (1991), 59-71.
Thompson, Leonard. M. “Southern Africa, 1795-1870.” In Philip Curtin, Steven
Feierman, Lisa Thompson (eds.), African History: from earliest times to
independence. London and New York: Longman. 1995.
Vale, Peter. “Southern Africa: exploring a peace dividend”, CIIR Reports and
Briefings Catholic Institute for International Relations. 1996.
Vale, Peter. Security and Politics in South Africa: The regional dimension. Cape
Town: UCT Press. 2003.
Weimer, Bernard. “The Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC): Past and future.” Africa Insight 21, 2, (1991), 78-89.
Zacarias, Agostinho. Security and the State in Southern Africa. London: Tauris
Academic Studies. 1999.

Downloaded from ias.sagepub.com at AMS/HANKUK UNIV LIBRARY on April 29, 2012

View publication stats