First Basic Principle of Interpretation of Statutes

I. Intention of the legislature

A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a
statute is to seek the 'intention of its maker, A statute is to be construed according to the intent of
those that make it and the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the legislature.

The expression intention of the legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by
the accepted principles of interpretation." If a statutory provision is open to more than one
interpretation the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the
Legislature.

The function of the courts is only to expound and not legislate.

The intention of the Legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In or aspect it carries the concept of
'meaning', ie., what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of ‘purpose
and object’ or the son and spirit' pervading through the statute. The process of construct
therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches.

In all ordinary cases and primarily the language employed is the determinative factor of
legislative intention. The first and primary rule of construction said Justice Gajendra Gatkar is
that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The
question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. "I do not
care what their intention was," said Mr. JUST HOLMES in a letter. "I only want to know what
the words mean. BROUGHAM has more emphatically stated the importance of the text of the
statute in the following words: "If the Legislature did intend which has not expressed clearly;
much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended
pretty nearly the oppose of what is said, it is not for judges to invent something which they do t
meet within the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text a of course, by the
context). These and like opinions lay stress one aspect of intention, i.e., what the words mean,
and undoubtedly to extent the 'referent' is clearly indicated and the words have a 'plain' meaning,
the courts are not too busy themselves with 'supposed intention with 'the policy underlying the
statute"

The Courts cannot interpret a statute the way they have developed the common law 'which in a
constitutional sense means judicially developed equity.

Words of any language have the ability I have the capability of having different references in
different context. But such problem is enhanced multiple folds in borderline cases, where the
ends of the statute do give more than one interpretation.
 1. Solmon v Solmon

Facts- Mr. Solmon was a leather shoe manufacturer who owned a leather shoe business as a sole
proprietor. He later converted it to a private limited company by incorporation. Other members
of the newly incorporated company where his own family members. When Solmon gave away
his sole proprietorship he was paid in shares and debentures making him a secured creditor.
When company failed and went into liquidation he wanted to be paid ahead of other creditors.
Others creditors objected to it by giving the contention that the company was an agency of
Solmon and nothing more. The liquidator of the company agreed to this contention. Both the
High Court and the Court of Appeal declared the company to be a myth.

However, on further appeal to House of Lords the decisions of High Court and court of appeal
was overturned. House of Lords observed that the law was clear and consistent that to form a
limited company you should have at least seven subscribers and therefore, the intention of the
legislature was clear from it. That every entity that is duly incorporated shall be given the status
of a company no matter how it is internally arranged. House of lords also mentioned that since
the legislature refrained from mentioning how much shares each subscribers hold, so it doesn’t
matter if each of them have just one share or more but the judiciary cannot read into the
provisions where the intention of the legislature was clear. Therefore, Solmon was considered a
separate legal entity from his company and the concept of corporate veil came about.

Principle- Interpretation should not be regarded as search for the purpose of the statute but as one
of attribution of purpose (what purpose the legislature has attributed to it).

The first and the primary rule of construction is that such intention of the legislature must be
found in the words used by the legislature itself.

The question is not what the judges think the legislature supposed to have intended but what has
been said.

We have to find out the spirit of the law.

Interpretation must be based on the text and the context of the statute. Neither can be igoned.

Text from the statute itself and context from parliamentary/legislative debate, preamble of the
act, etc.

Right construction of the act can only be attained if its whole scope and object together with an
analysis of its wording and circumstances in which it is enacted and taken into consideration.

Scope + Wording + Circumstances

 2. Chartered accountants of India vs Prince Waterhouse

It was held that the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used
which means that attention should be paid to what has been said and also what has not been said.

3. Crawford vs Spooner

It was held that Court cannot aid the legislatures.

4. State of Gujarat vs Dilip Bhai Nathji Bhai Patel

It is contrary to the rules of construction to read words into an act, unless it is absolutuely
necessary to do so.

5. RS Nayak v AR Antule

The Supreme Court held that if the words of the statue are clear and unambiguous it is the
plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision.
The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the
words in the statute would be self defeating. Therefore, the court should always apply the rule of
plain construction and legislative intent in the light of the object sought to be achieved.