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Introduction
ized time - a contrast that now seems pretty obvious - but above ali in hav
ing rethought and found new terms for our perception of duration. His
1911 Oxford lectures, entitled The perception of change, offer us a synthesis
of this set of problems and, more importandy, provide an opening into the
world of aesthetics, which was always implicit in Bergson but never ad
dressed direcdy.2
It is well-known that Bergson reproached positive science and tradi
tional metaphysics for the quandary of reducing reaHty to a concept and
preconceived ideas, forgetting its spécifie character of concrete duration
and temporality. To grasp the real, according to the French philosopher,
one must overcome many theoretical préjudices, because reasoning, com
pared to perception, is always partial. Because of the inadequacy of our
senses, ali of philosophy, ever since the Eleatic school, has made a «substi
tution of the conceived for the perceived», taking recourse in the spirit's
faculties of abstraction and conceptual élaboration. This entailed, however,
distancing ourselves from the concreteness of the real, available through
our senses, thereby falling into the error of allowing method to prevali over
purpose. How, then, can we immerse ourselves in the real? This has be
come the fondamental question posed by this philosopher. What alterna
tive method should we adopt for grasping existence without running the
risk either of duplicating the real in concepts, or on the other hand perceiv
ing the real as fiat and répétitive, like something purely and coldly natural
isée? Bergson was aware of the difficulty in such a perspective, which finds
science and common sense to be its major obstacles. It would be necessary
to revitalize our faculty of perception, to turn to «the direct perception of
change and mobility» in order to «grasp anew change and duration in their
originai mobility». It seems, however, that to do this philosophy must take
artistic expression as a model; indeed, in art reality no longer appears static
to us, but shows us its nuances, its most hidden qualities, its dynamism. For
Bergson, artistic experience has the double privilège both of being situated
in the heart of sensed reality, and also of making us see its further, unex
pected aspects, which we might otherwise miss. Art shows us what philoso
phy is not capable of doing, namely, of extending experience beyond expe
rience itself, and perception beyond perception. The artist has no immedi
ate interest in life, has detached himself from the ordinary run of things,
and does not intend to use his perception for utilitarian purposes; and for
this very reason he succeeds in perceiving directly.
For Bergson, the difficulties metaphysics experiences in grasping dura
Ernst Bloch
Adorno
Bloch's in many ways, nevertheless follow in his wake. In his thought, the
role of music is fondamental, both for its philosophical implications and for
its sociological and psychological ones. His special aptitude for gathering
philosophical meanings from language and the most hidden recesses of mu
sical technique dérivés both from his in-depth studies of music, notably
under the guidance of Alban Berg, and from the intense criticai analysis of
contemporary cultural expressions that he conducted in the early 1930s at
the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. But it also comes from his
knowledge of the work of Ernst Bloch, to whom he recognized a debt of
gratitude.
The role of expressing the most profound utopian moments of subjec
tivity, which Bloch assigned to music, is présent, but problematical, in
Adorno. In fact, the dialectic within musical material, which Bloch charac
terized in terms of fracture and discontinuity, becomes, in Adorno, con
crete and continuous. Indeed, following in part the linéaments of Hegelian
logie, the moments that constitute dialectical opposition are stili in force
for him in a compelling, and in some sense, binding way. But in contrast to
Hegelian dialectic, that of Adorno is negative; thus the moment of antithe
sis is not eliminated by virtue of a superior speculative synthesis, but re
mains in its own state of unresolved opposition and, in the case of disso
nance, unfulfilled expectation. On the one hand, this means that Adorno
views with a certain nostalgia the age of tonality, the period in which even
the most dramatic dialectical contrasts flowed together in a peaceful resolu
tion, that is, in a finale (the tonai cadenza) in which ali the tensions were
reconciled. On the other hand, for him the only opportunity to escape from
cultural conditioning resides in a total withdrawal into atonality. Funda
mentally, ever since Mahler - who, according to the German philosopher
used traditional materiale in order to «disturb their balance» and hence to
reveal the historical void beneath them - any return to tonality is suspected
of reflecting an ideology and of adapting itself to the existent. This led
Adorno to denounce implacably the music of Stravinsky and ali the neo
classicists of the first post-war years. That of Schònberg, to the contrary,
represents the position of a man who stubbornly resists any compromise
with the dominant culture and bourgeois taste, at the price of an existential
isolation with neither oudets nor prospects. His condemnation of aliénation
and the dehumanization of contemporary society is indeed reflected in the
émancipation of dissonance and the breaking of hierarchical relationships
within acoustical space. Renouncing the unity of the work and an externally
imposed coherence, Schònberg affirms the rights of language and tech
nique in their immanence. In this way he escapes the laws of production
and commodification. At the same time he highlights the problem of turn
ing production and artistry into an object. For art to assume within itself
the social contradictions and the existential anguish of contemporary man
Vladimir Jankélévitch
In the first part of the century, the idealistic thought then dominant in
Italy had the great merit of including the country in the European philo
sophical debate. And later, the oppositions it provoked constituted a ter
rain of criticai discussion of notable cultural value. In addition, idealistic
aesthetics made an important contribution to turning art into an au
tonomous field of philosophical research. As regards music, the scholar
who best succeeded in faithfully and consistendy applying the aesthetics of
Croce to this art was Alfredo Parente (1905-1985). Starting from the thesis
of the fondamental unity of the arts, the author of Music and the arts7
identified music as the privileged instrument for grasping the absolute uni
ty of feeling and expression, form and content, which is the objective of
idealist aesthetics. In this, he is in agreement with Fausto Torrefranca
(1883-1955), who, in The musical life of the spirti? upheld the «spiritual
precedence» of music over the other arts; this is due to what Torrefranca
calls - in romantic and mysticizing tones - the «germinai and abstractive
globality» of music.
On the one hand, the tendency to seek the absolute in art, together
with the belief that pure artistic expression is almost totally independent of
technical and material conditions, allowed music to assert its proper status
as an autonomous creative expression, whether in individuai genres or in its
historical and sociological concretizations. On the other hand, it widened
the gap between the Framework of idealism and actual developments in
contemporary artistic practice. Indeed, a survey of Italy in the second half
of the twentieth century reveals a clear libération from this framework and
a reorientation of research towards phenomenological positions.
In any case, the need for a différent criticai approach and for a more
flexible aesthetics, in the face of a musical reality in constant transforma
tion, led a number of musicologists to révisé idealism, while stili remaining
faithful to its theoretical assumptions. Massimo Mila (1910-1988) in partic
ular, while theorizing about the unconscious nature of artistic expression,9
granted that evidently dull, purely technical examples of twentieth-century
musical practice could stili acquire some aesthetic dignity when analyzed
for their deeper intentions and motivations. It is remarkable, then, how
close Mila cornes to the more open and problematic positions of aesthetics
and musicology, as well as to the phenomenological and materialistic ex
pectations that are generally considered the exact opposite of idealist abso
lutism.
The phenomenological school, however, starting in the 1930s, followed
an independent theoretical course, using as their point of departure the cri
tique of Crocean idealism made by Antonio Banfi (1886-1957). According
to this founder of the Milanese philosophical school, the problems inherent
in identifying art with aesthetics, and feeling with expression, prevented the
aesthetics of Croce - and therefore that of Parente - from adequately un
derstanding the phenomenon of art in general, and of music in particular.
To do so, according to Banfi, would require a greater capacity for intuition
and a «concrete sensitivity to the problems of art» - for example, the prob
lem of interprétation, of technique, of structure - which an abstract meta
physics, based on what Banfi calls «conceptual realism», ends up conceal
ing behind a sériés of ideological préjudices.10 Banfi's student, Enzo Paci
(1911-1976), explored in greater depth the problem of music and provided
a theoretical outline of the problem of how to apply Husserl's thought to
the field of music, by understanding phenomenology in a sense that is open
to French existentialism, Marxism, and to a significant rereading of Kant's
transcendental schematism.11 Indeed, just as for Husserl perceptive expéri
ence cannot be reduced to atomized elements, so also for Paci musical ex
périence cannot be isolated from the complex reality in which it finds itself,
nor can it be reduced to technical data or linguistic factors as ends in them
selves. Going back to Kant, whose Critique of pure reason had shown how
the schema of time could harmonize the opposites of the categorical and
the perceptible, Paci proposes a «temporal phenomenology», aimed at
overcoming the antithesis between the spiritual and the corporeal, the eter
nai and the transitory, the structural and the mental. Similarly, the funda
mentally temporal structure of music allows this art to go beyond the oppo
sition between space and time rigidly understood as abstract ideas, between
feelings and représentations expressed linguistically and technically, and
also between system and liberty, tonality and atonality. Musical time, says
it is only «by going back to the origins of the worid of sounds, to the pure
perception of the acoustical fact», that is, by adopting the process of
Husserl's eidetic réduction, that man can recover his lost rapport with him
self and with nature.14
Musical-philosophical research of a phenomenological stamp has found
a sequel and an unusual deepening in the thought of one of Paci's students,
Giovanni Piana (1932), who has moved from the «temporal phenomenolo
gy» of his teacher towards a phenomenological structuralism, enriched by
both the neopositivist epistemology of Wittgenstein and the neo-Kantian
transcendentalism of Cassirer.15 The necessity of avoiding any mental reflec
tion when dealing with the possible création of a perceptive experience led
Piana to seek out the basic rules, the originai eidetic nuclei, which, as a pre
liminary to language and every cultural médiation, preside over the forma
tion of the meaning and significance of an object or a work. In the case of
music, pure sound, noise, acoustical space, as well as the multiple dimen
sions of the imagination, assert themselves, even at the non-specialist level,
in their phenomenological obviousness. Following this methodology, Piana
has not only set himself the goal of providing a solid epistemological frame
work for a theory of music, but has also prevented aesthetic considérations
about this art from being reduced to a sterile empirical relativism, inade
quate to a correct understanding of the complex reality of music.
Luigi Rognoni, Fenomenologia della musica radicale, Milano, Garzanti, 1974, p. 34.
Giovanni Piana, Filosofia della musica, Milano, Guerini e associati, 1992.
17 Yves Baudrier, «Avec Igor Stravinsky», in Musique russe. Etudes réunies par Pierre
Souvtchinsky, Paris, PUF, 1953,1, pp. 139-149.
and others, though almost unknown in Italy until recently,18 deserve great
credit for establishing a «problematics of limits»19 around the crucial issues
of musical aesthetics, which were otherwise at risk of being monopolized
by a dualism between a technical and a semantic analysis of the subjects in
question.
On the one hand, Langer's aesthetics has been used by some of them20
to overcome any positivistic obstacle to musicology, making straight the
road to legitimate research about what is spécifie to music in its symbolic
and imaginative aspects and emphasizing the temporal makeup of this art.
In the footsteps of Cassirer and neo-Kantian transcendentalism Langer de
serves credit for having succeeded in justifying theoretically ali those as
pects of music that a scientific orientation is inclined to exclude or demote
to second rank. Nonetheless, the excessive weight given to the virtuality of
the art and to its connection to the dynamics of a sense of life has led the
American philosopher to make a sharp séparation between the artistic élé
ment and the materiality of the phenomenon, thereby falling into a typically
idealistic quandary. On the other hand, the phenomenological method em
braced by these musician-philosophers has allowed them to combine the
need for an analytical and scientifically grounded description of music with
the acknowledgement that this art maintains an unbreakable bond with ex
ternal reality and with the perceptive experience of listening, as well as with
the world of human feelings. Recourse to intentionality serves to justify the
epistemological status of the musical object as a noematic pole correlated
to a particular way of understanding music as a vital experience. Moreover,
it has led to the récognition that musical experience is a privileged sphere
within which a «logie of the phenomena» is at work - this concept is also
derived from Husserl - and it allows one to identify in musical temporality
not only a reflection of psychic life, but also the objective articulation of a
logie intrinsie to perceptible matter, for which technical analysis is one of the
preferred descriptive tools. In this way the phenomenological contribution
has been appropriately integrated both with a focus on music as a symbolic
form in Langer's sense of the term, and with a hermeneutics of meaning
24 See Des paradis éphémères, Entretien avec H. Lachenmann, par Peter Szendy, livre
programme, Paris, Festival d'Automne, 1993.
25 A decisive rôle in catalyzing research in music philosophy in the direction outlined
here is stili played by other institutions that lie outside both the musicological academy and
philosophical specialism: for example, Ircam in Paris, the Cahiers publications, the School of
Music and Philosophy of Maratea (directed by Antonio De Lisa), the journal Sonus, the Semi
nario permanente di Filosofia della musica at the University of Milan (founded and directed by
Giovanni Piana) and the on-line journal De Musica.
Carlo Migliaccio