Memoria Técnica 2000: Contenido Página

MEMORIA TÉCNICA 2000
CONTENIDO Página
EVALUACIÓN DOSIMÉTRICA DE UN CASO DE INCORPORACIÓN CONTINUA

DE CS 137
Gómez Parada I. y Rojo A.M. 1
RESULTADOS DE LA PARTICIPACIÓN DE LA ARN EN EL PROGRAMA DE
GARANTÍA DE CALIDAD DEL EML- DOE PERÍODO 1995-1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.;
Grinman, A.D.R.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Bomben, A.M. y Diodati, J.M. 9
THE HYDROGEN GENERATED AS A GAS AND STORAGE IN ZIRCALOY
DURING STEAM QUENCHING
García, E.A. 25
LOCALIZED IRRADIATIONS, EVALUATION THROUGH “COMET ASSAY”

Di Giorgio, M.; Taja, M.R.; Nasazzi, N.B.; Bustos. N.; Cavalieri, H. and Bolgiani, A. 53
BIOLOGICAL DOSE ESTIMATION OF PARTIAL BODY EXPOSURES IN

CERVIX CANCER PATIENTS
Di Giorgio, M.; Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.; Roth, B.; Sardi; M. and Menendez, P. 63
DETERMINACIÓN DE DOSIS EN LA POBLACIÓN.

CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL CÓDIGO CREAM
Alonso, M.T. y Curti, A.R. 71
MODELING OF THE HYDROGEN GENERATED DURING OXIDATION

OF ZRY AT 1100°C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE HYDROGEN PARTITION:
ABSORBED AND AS A GAS
García, E.A. 85
BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY OF MIXED NEUTRON – γ RAY FIELD

Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.; Di Giorgio, M.; Barrios, L.A.; Gregori, B.N. and Kunst, J.J. 95
RETROSPECTIVE DOSIMETRY USING CHROMOSOME PAINTING

Nasazzi, N.B.; Di Giorgio, M. and Taja, M.R. 103
ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY

Touzet, R.E.; Bombén, A.M.; Felizia, E.R.; Oliveira, A.A.; Menossi, C.A.; Esmerián, A.,
Clein, D. and Bergoc, M.R. 113
RISK PERCEPTION AND BENEFITS PERCEPTION

(SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION)
Touzet, R.E.; Barón, J.H.; Caspani, C. and Remedi, J.O. 127
THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS IN THE APPLICATION OF QUALITY SYSTEMS IN

NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND RADIOTHERAPY
Touzet, R.E.; Larcher, A.M.; Menossi, C.A. and Sánchez, G.D. 137
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FEDERATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION

SOCIETIES (FRALC)
Touzet, R.E.; Bombén, A.M.; Ortiz Magaña, R.; Jova Sed, L.; Maldonado Mercado, H.;
Medina Gironzini, E.; Khoury, H. and Puig, D. 149
MÉTODO PARA EL ANÁLISIS DE ESPECTROS ALFA

Equillor, H.E. 161

GARANTÍA DE CALIDAD DEL EML-USDOE, PERÍODO 1998-2000
Equillor, H.E.; Grinman, A.D.R; Serdeiro, N.H.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.;
Bonino, N.O.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Diodati, J.M. y Medici, M.A. 169
i
ANÁLISIS DE DOSIS OCUPACIONALES, PERÍODO 1990/1999
Curti, A.R. y Alonso M.T. 175
NATURAL RADIONUCLIDES IN DRINKING WATER IN ARGENTINA

Bombén, A.M. and Palacios, M.A. 185
INDOOR RADON MEASUREMENTS IN ARGENTINA

Canoba, A.C.; López, F.O.; Arnaud, M.I. and Oliveira, A.A. 197
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE

WASTES IN ARGENTINA
DÁmato, E.; Siraky, G.; Petraitis, E. and Novo, R.G. 205
SEPARACIÓN DE URANIO, PLUTONIO Y AMERICIO EMPLEANDO

RESINAS EICHROM
Serdeiro, N.H.; Grinman, A.D.R. y Bongiovani, S 213
PARTICIPATION OF ARN- ARGENTINA IN THE QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,

EML-USDOE SINCE 1995 TO 1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.; Grinman, A.D.R.;
Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Bombén, A.M. y Diodati, J.M. 219
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC INTERCOMPARISON PROGRAMME FOR

PERSONAL DOSIMETRY
Gregori, B.N.; Papadópulos, S.B.; Saraví, M. and Kunst, J.J. 225
GAMMA RADIATION FIELD EXTREMITY PERSONAL DOSIMETER:

CALIBRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Papadópulos, S.B.; Gregori, B.N. and Cruzate, J.A. 235
MULTISPHERE NEUTRON SPECTROMETRIC SYSTEM WITH THERMOLUMINESCENT

DETECTOR
Cruzate, J.A.; Gregori, B.N.; Papadópulos, S.B. and Kunst. J.J. 241
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE DETECTION OF LEU BENEATH HYDROGENATED

ABSORBERS: SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
Cruzate, J.A; Papadópulos, S.B.; Kunst, J.J.; Gregori, B.N. and Barrios, L.A. 251
CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIATION-INDUCED APOPTOSIS IN DEVELOPING

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
Pérez, M. del R.; Gisone, P.A.; Dubner, D.L.; Michelin, S.C. and Sanjurjo, J. 259
LATIN-AMERICAN RADIOPATHOLOGY NETWORK: MEDICAL RESPONSE FOR

RADIATION ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN THE REGION
Gisone, P.A.; Cárdenas, J.; Valverde, N.; Sanhueza, S.; Pérez, M. del R. and Di Trano, J.L. 267
DETERMINACIÓN DE EMISORES ALFA EN RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS.

EXTENSIÓN DEL PROCEDIMIENTO PARA EMISORES BETA EN RESIDUOS
RADIACTIVOS DE MEDIA Y BAJA ACTIVIDAD
Diodati, J.M. y Equillor, H.E. 273
TRACKING AND POSITION RECOGNITION APPLIED TO REMOTE MONITORING

TO BE USED IN INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS
Bonino, A.D.; Pérez, A.C.; Krimer, M.J.; Teira, R.O.; Vigile, R.S.; Valentino, L.I.;
Giordano, L.A. and Ferro, J.M. 281
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING FOR SAFEGUARDS PURPOSES

Castro, L.B.; Fernández Moreno, S.; Vicens, H.E.; Valentino, L.I; Saavedra, A.D.;
Maceiras, E. y Mairal, M.L. 291
TRAINING IN RADIOPROTECTION AT UNDERGRADUATE AND POSTGRADUATE LEVEL

AT THE SCHOOL OF PHARMACY AND BIOCHEMISTRY, BUENOS AIRES UNIVERSITY
Bergoc, R.; Caro, R.A.; Rivera, E.S. and Menossi, C.A. 299
CRITERIOS DE USO Y VALIDACIÓN DE CÓDIGOS DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR

Ventura, M.A. 307
ii
SISTEMA NACIONAL DE CONTABILIDAD Y CONTROL Y COOPERACIÓN
CON LAS SALVAGUARDIAS INTERNACIONALES
Valentino, L.I.; Maceiras, E. y Fernández Moreno, S. 319
CALCULATION OF SENSITIVITY TO PARAMETERS IN SINGLE-PHASE

NATURAL CIRCULATIONS FLOWS USING ADIFOR
Ferreri, J.C. and Ambrosini, W. 327
REGULATORY CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINE

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Calvo, J.C. and Caruso, G.J. 335
CONTROL OF THE SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES AND THE SECURITY

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Oliveira, A.A. 341
DETERMINATION OF IODINE-129 IN SAMPLES OF CONIFERS COLLECTED

IN ARGENTINA
Quintana, E.E. and Thyssen, S.M. 349
LINEAR AND NONLINEAR ANALYSIS OF DENSITY WAVE INSTABILITY PHENOMENA

Ambrosini, W.; Di Marco, P. and Ferreri, J.C. 357
DOSIS ABSORBIDA EN EL FETO

Rojo, A.M.; Gómez Parada, I.M. y Di Trano, J.L. 369
OPERACIÓN DE INSTALACIONES RADIACTIVAS Y NUCLEARES DE ARGENTINA

EN 1988. DOSIS EN LA POBLACIÓN
Curti, A.R. y Alonso Jiménez, M.T. 375
PLANTA DE FABRICACIÓN DE ELEMENTOS COMBUSTIBLES EN JAPÓN.

ACCIDENTE DE CRITICIDAD
Canavese, S.I. 383
LUTETIUM-177-EDTMP FOR BONE PAIN PALLATION.

PREPARATION, BIODISTRIBUTION AND PRE-CLINICAL STUDIES
Rutty Solá, G.A.; Argüelles, M.G.; Bottazzini, D.L.; Furnari, J.C.; Gómez Parada, I.;
Rojo. A.M. and Vera Ruiz, H. 389
DETERMINATION OF 129I IN CONIFER SAMPLES AROUND NUCLEAR FACILITIES

IN ARGENTINA
Quintana, E.E. and Thyssen, S.M. 397
NEW DEDICATED AMS SYSTEM AT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY

IN ARGENTINA
Beninson, D.J.; DÁmato, E.; Oliveira, A.A; Stark, J.W., Bonino, N.O.; Bustos, G.R.;
Alvarez, D.E.; Amodei, A.J.; Bonino, A.G.; Giannico, M.A. and Pomar, C. 405
STABILITY ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-PHASE THERMOSYPHON LOOPS BY FINITE

DIFFERENCE NUMERICAL METHODS
Ambrosini, W. and Ferreri, J.C. 413
222
MEASUREMENT OF THE UNATTACHED FRACTION OF RN PROGENY USING
WIRE SCREENS
Canoba, A.C. and López, F.O. 425
GESTIÓN DE RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS

Pahissa Campá, J y Pahissa, M. H. de 437
TRANSITORIO DE PÉRDIDA DEL CAUDAL DE ALIMENTACIÓN A LOS

GENERADORES DE VAPOR EN CNA1 CON RELAP5/MOD3
Marino, E.J.L. 453
DOSIS OCUPACIONAL DEBIDA A NEUTRONES EN ACELERADORES LINEALES

DE USO MÉDICO
Larcher, A.M.; Bonet Durán, S.M. y Lerner, A.M. 497
iii
Evaluación dosimétrica de un caso de
incorporación continua de Cs 137
Gómez Parada I. y Rojo A.M.
Publicado como PI 1/00 de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear

EVALUACIÓN DOSIMÉTRICA DE UN CASO DE INCORPORACIÓN
CONTINUA DE Cs 137
Gómez Parada I. y Rojo A.M.
Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear

Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
En el presente informe se presenta la evaluación dosimétrica realizada en un caso de

rd
incorporación continua de Cs 137. El problema fue uno de los propuestos en el "3 European
Exercise on Internal Dose Assessment", ejercicio del cual participó el grupo de Evaluación de la
Contaminación Interna de la ARN.
El caso describe la contaminación interna de un habitante del Valle del Po (Italia), debida a la
dispersión de productos de fisión en la atmósfera y posteriormente en la cadena alimenticia,
después del accidente de Chernobyl. El Cs 137 fue tomado como trazador de la mezcla de
radionucleidos emitidos durante el accidente y fue seguido por medio de mediciones de
contador de todo el cuerpo. Los datos informados corresponden a un sujeto de la ciudad de
Bologna, que fue tomado como ejemplo de la población masculina adulta del lugar.
Las mediciones de actividad retenida en todo el cuerpo se realizaron, en un principio

mensualmente, y luego cada dos meses. Algunas mediciones se perdieron por falta de
disponibilidad del sujeto. En total, el período de medición se extendió desde el primer mes
posterior al accidente hasta aproximadamente 880 días después.
En el ejercicio de intercomparación se pedía a los participantes estimar la incorporación total

desde el momento del accidente hasta el final del período de monitoreo, la dosis efectiva recibida
en 1986 y en 1987, y la dosis efectiva comprometida debida a la incorporación estimada.
MEDICIONES DEL CONTADOR DE TODO EL CUERPO
En la Figura 1 se muestran las mediciones de actividad de Cs 137 retenida en todo el cuerpo.

El crecimiento continuo de la carga corporal observable durante aproximadamente el primer
año posterior al accidente, es atribuible a la ingesta continuada de alimentos contaminados. La
posterior disminución de la carga se interpreta como producto de la eliminación biológica del
radionucleido conjuntamente con la disminución de la ingesta diaria.
137
Cs - Actividad medida en todo el cuerpo
5000
4000
Actividad (Bq)
3000
2000
1000
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Tiempo (días posteriores al 26/4/1986)
Figura 1. Actividad de Cs 137 en todo el cuerpo en función del tiempo
3
CÁLCULO DE LA ACTIVIDAD INCORPORADA
La actividad incorporada se estimó en base a un esquema de incorporación continua y

constante por ingestión, y una posterior eliminación biológica. Este esquema de incorporación
es una simplificación de la situación, dado que en realidad la concentración de radionucleido en
los alimentos no es constante, sino que aumenta progresivamente luego de la liberación, para
luego disminuir. De esta forma, la incorporación, si bien es continua, no es a tasa constante. No
obstante, se adoptó este esquema simplificado como una primera aproximación al problema.
Posteriormente, estimaciones alternativas, demostraron que la suposición fue adecuada en
términos de las dosis efectivas calculadas.
El código de cálculo utilizado para la estimación de la incorporación, y posteriormente de la

dosis, fue el código Cindy (Code for Internal Dosimetry. Versión 1.4.). Se utilizó este código por
la facilidad que presenta para el tratamiento de incorporaciones crónicas, con respecto al
código LUDEP. Si bien el CINDY no incorpora el nuevo modelo pulmonar ni los coeficientes de
ponderación de tejidos del ICRP 60, igualmente puede utilizarse en este caso por tratarse de la
incorporación por ingestión de un radionucleido de distribución uniforme en todos los tejidos
blandos.
El modelo de retención sistémica utilizado para la evaluación de los datos, fue el presentado en
la publicación 30 de la ICRP, en el cual, la componente larga de eliminación biológica se fija en
110 días. La comparación de los datos medidos con la curva teórica resultante de la aplicación
del modelo del ICRP 30, muestra una retención real mayor que la esperada. Como en la
publicación 30 de la ICRP se indica que el valor de 110 días es el considerado promedio pero
que se han reportado en algunos casos T1/2 biológicos de hasta 200 días, este último valor fue
el utilizado en la estimación de la incorporación. En la Figura 2 se comparan los valores medidos
con las curvas teóricas obtenidas con los dos T1/2 biológicos, observándose el mejor ajuste para
T1/2 biológico = 200 días.
Comparación de las mediciones de carga corporal con las curvas

teóricas para las dos componentes largas de retención.
104
Actividad Retenida (Bq)
103
Mediciones
T1/2 biológico: 110 días
T1/2 biológico: 200 días
102
10 100 1000
Tiempo posterior a la iniciación de la incorporación (días)
Figura 2. Comparación de los datos de medición con los valores de las curvas teóricas para el modelo
biocinético del ICRP30, y con el resultante de modificar el T1/2 biológico de la componente de retención
larga.
4
Como fecha final del período de incorporación crónica constante se tomó el 5 de mayo de
1987, cuando, de acuerdo a las mediciones, la actividad retenida en todo el cuerpo comienza a
decrecer.
La fecha del comienzo del período de incorporación se fijó en base al mejor ajuste de los datos
medidos con las curvas teóricas, probando para diferentes fechas, considerando que debía
resultar entre el día del accidente y el día de la primera medición. En la Figura 3 se muestra, a
título de ejemplo, dos intentos con diferentes fechas (15-05-86 y 25-05-86), y en la Figura 4, el
ajuste con la fecha finalmente elegida como inicio del período de incorporación, el 20 de mayo
de 1986.
4 10 4
10
Comienzo de la incorporación: 15-05-86 Comienzo de la incorporación: 25-05-86
Actividad Retenida ( Bq)
Actividad retenida (Bq)

Mediciones Mediciones
Curva teórica Curva teórica
3 3
10 10
2 2
10 10
1 10 100 1000 1 10 100 1000
Tiempo posterior al inicio de la incorporación (d) Tiempo posterior al inicio de la incorporación (d)
Figura 3. Ajuste de la fecha de inicio del período de incorporación.
104
Comienzo de la incorporación: 20-05-86

Actividad retenida (Bq)
Mediciones
Curva teórica
103
102
1 10 100 1000
Tiempo posterior al inicio de la incorporación (d)
Figura 4. Comparación de los valores medidos de actividad retenida en todo el cuerpo con la
curva teórica para una incorporación continua y constante por ingestión desde el 20-05-86 al
05-05-87, utilizando el modelo de retención sistémica modificado en su componente larga de
retención.
5
ESTIMACIÓN DE LA INCORPORACIÓN TOTAL
Con las hipótesis propuestas, esto es:
− Incorporación crónica y constante por ingestión

− Período de la incorporación crónica: 20-5-86 al 5-5-87
− T1/2 biológico: 200 días
se utilizó el código CINDY para estimar la tasa de incorporación que resultó de 23 Bq/día, lo
que implica, durante 350 días, 8,05 kBq de incorporación total.
CÁLCULO DE LA DOSIS EFECTIVA
La dosis efectiva en los años de interés y la dosis efectiva comprometida a 50 años, pueden
calcularse de dos formas distintas:
1. A partir de la tasa de incorporación ya estimada

2. Directamente por integración de la curva de retención
Cálculo de las dosis efectivas a partir de la tasa de incorporación:
El código de cálculo CINDY permite estimar la dosis efectiva recibida en distintos períodos de
interés, en este caso las recibidas durante 1986 y 1987 por separado, (e(86) y E(87)), así como
la dosis efectiva comprometida a 50 años E(50). Los valores se obtienen entrando la
incorporación diaria, la fecha de inicio y la de finalización del período durante el cual tiene lugar
la incorporación crónica, seleccionando la vía de entrada y el modelo de retención sistémica en
concordancia con el utilizado para calcular la incorporación. Se utiliza el modo Año Calendario
para calcular las dosis en años específicos, y el modo Período Especificado de Tiempo, para el
cálculo de la dosis efectiva comprometida.
Los valores obtenidos de esta manera resultaron:
− 0,04 mSv en 1986

− 0,11 mSv en 1987 y
− una dosis efectiva comprometida a 50 años de 0,20 mSv.
Cálculo de las dosis efectivas por integración de la curva de retención
En casos de radionucleidos como el Cesio, en los que la actividad se distribuye uniformemente

en todos los tejidos, es posible integrar la curva de actividad retenida en función del tiempo
para obtener el número de desintegraciones que se producen en los tejidos fuente, en los
períodos de interés. Multiplicando este número de desintegraciones por la Energía Específica
Efectiva (SEE), se obtienen las dosis efectivas. En este caso corresponde SEE(CE←CE), donde
CE significa Cuerpo Entero,
La integración de la curva de retención se resolvió utilizando el código ORIGIN 4.0. En la Figura 5

se indica el número de desintegraciones obtenidos para los distintos períodos para los cuales
se quiere calcular las dosis efectivas.
Para la dosis efectiva integrada a 50 años E(50), el número de desintegraciones que se sumó a
los obtenidos por integración directa de la curva, se obtuvo con la siguiente expresión:
50 años ln 2
− t
739 [Bq ] ∫ e 196 dt = 1,8 E 10 des
0
donde:
6
− 739 Bq es la última medición disponible, y
− 196 días es la vida media efectiva de la componente larga de retención.
31-12-86 31-12-87
(día 225) (día 590)
3
4x10
20-5-86
(día 0)
Actividad en todo el cuerpo (Bq)
3
3x10
1986 22-9-88
(día 857)
2x10
3 1987
1.0E11 trans
3.0E10 trans
3
1x10
3.0E10 trans T =200 días
b
0 1.8E10 trans
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Tiempo posterior al comienzo de la incorporación (días)
Figura 5. Estimación del número de desintegraciones en todo el cuerpo, por integración de la curva de
retención
Como valor de la Energía Específica Efectiva, se usó el de la biblioteca del software LUDEP
2.04, esto es:
SEE(CE←CE) = 9,98 E-16 Sv / desintegración
Los valores de las dosis efectivas estimadas de esta forma resultaron:
− 0,03 mSv en 1986

− 0,10 mSv en 1987, y
− una dosis efectiva comprometida a 50 años de 0,18 mSv.
Como resultó que los valores de las dosis efectivas obtenidos por ambos métodos de cálculo
eran similares, se decidió informar los resultados obtenidos y aceptar el esquema de
incorporación simplificado, propuesto inicialmente.
7
REFERENCIAS
[1] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION. “Limits for

Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers”. Annals of the ICRP (1979); ICRP30.
[2] Jarvis, N. S., Birchall, A., James, A. C., Bailey, M. R. and Dorrian, M. D. LUDEP 2.04
Personal Computer Program for Calculating Internal Doses Using the New ICRP
Respiratory Tract Model. (National Radiological Protection Board, Chilton) NRPB-
SR264 (1996).
[3] CINDY. Code for Internal Dosimetry. Version 1.4. Battelle Memorial Institute (1995).
(Code is distributed via Canberra Industries Inc.).
[4] MICROCAL ORIGIN - versión 4.00. Microcal Software, Inc.
8
Resultados de la participación de la ARN
en el programa de garantía de calidad
del EML- DOE período 1995-1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.;

Gavini, R.M.; Grinman, A.D.R.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.;
Bombén, A.M. y Diodati, J.M.

RESULTADOS DE LA PARTICIPACIÓN DE LA ARN
EN EL PROGRAMA DE GARANTÍA DE CALIDAD DEL EML- DOE
PERÍODO 1995-1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.;
Grinman, A.D.R.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Bombén, A.M. y Diodati, J.M.

Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
Todo laboratorio radioquímico debe contar con técnicas analíticas optimizadas y sistemas de
medición calibrados para la obtención de resultados confiables. Además de los controles
internos que cada laboratorio necesita realizar (obtención de eficiencias, fondos de medición y
rendimientos químicos), es indispensable que en los programas de garantía de calidad sean
incluidos en intercomparaciones con laboratorios calificados. La Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear
(ARN) de la República Argentina participa desde 1995 en el Programa de Evaluación de
Calidad (Quality Assessment Program - QAP) organizado por el Laboratorio de Mediciones
Ambientales (Environmental Measurements Laboratory - EML) de los Estados Unidos. En este
trabajo se detallan y analizan, desde diversas perspectivas, los resultados de la participación
de la ARN en las diez intercomparaciones en las que ha intervenido, en el período 1995-99.
DESCRIPCIÓN
Un programa de intercomparación consta normalmente de las siguientes etapas: el laboratorio

organizador prepara las muestras y las envía a los laboratorios participantes; estos analizan las
muestras y remiten los resultados; luego el laboratorio organizador hace una evaluación de
todos los resultados recibidos y la da a conocer a los laboratorios participantes.
El Programa de Evaluación de Calidad del EML (QAP)
El Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) [1], es una entidad gubernamental creada

en 1947 que depende del Departamento de Energía de los EE. UU. (DOE), con sede en New
York.
El programa QAP [2] llevado a cabo por el EML desde 1977, tiene como objetivo la evaluación
de la calidad de las mediciones reportadas por los laboratorios contratados por el DOE.
También participan otras agencias gubernamentales e instituciones de otros países (que
representan aproximadamente el 19% del total de los laboratorios participantes), estas son en
su mayor parte organizaciones responsables de la evaluación radiológica del medio ambiente.
Participan más de 130 laboratorios.
El programa implica mediciones alfa, beta y gamma, y se aplica a cuatro tipos de matrices:
agua, filtro, vegetal y suelo. Para cada intercalibración se envía un total de seis muestras,
conteniendo una amplia variedad de radionucleidos en concentraciones de nivel ambiental. El
número de análisis que son requeridos es alrededor de 52 (25 emisores alfa, 10 emisores beta
y 17 emisores gamma), siendo este número variable con cada intercalibración. Cada
laboratorio reporta aquellos que son de su interés, o para los cuales está preparado. Las
muestras se envían a principios de marzo y de setiembre, y existe un plazo de tres meses para
reportar los resultados obtenidos. El EML informa un rango de concentraciones orientativo para
cada radionucleido y para cada matriz, el que es variable con cada ejercicio de
intercomparación. En la Tabla 1 se pueden observar los tipos de muestra y los diferentes
radionucleidos que se analizan, para cada matriz:
11
Tipo de Cantidad de Radionucleido
muestra radionucleidos
3 55 60 63 90 137 234 238
AGUA 1 13 H, Fe, Co, Ni, Sr, Cs, U, U, U(Bq),
238 239 241
U (µg), Pu, Pu, Am
AGUA 2 2 Alfa Total, Beta Total
54 57 60 90 106 137 234 238

FILTRO 1 13 Mn, Co, Co, Sr, Ru, Cs, U, U,
238 239 241
U(Bq), U(µg), Pu, Pu, Am
FILTRO 2 2 Alfa Total, Beta Total
40 60 90 137 238 239 241 244

VEGETAL 8 K, Co, Sr, Cs, Pu, Pu, Am, Cm.
40 90 137 212 212 214 214 228 234

SUELO 14 K, Sr, Cs, Pb, Bi, Pb, Bi, Ac, U,
238 239 241
U, U(Bq), U(µg), Pu, Am.
Tabla 1. Tipos de muestras y radionucleidos a analizar.
Criterio de evaluación
El EML analiza cada una de las muestras y sus resultados son los valores de referencia.
Asimismo realiza una completa evaluación de la dispersión de los resultados enviados por
todos los laboratorios participantes tomando en cuenta los datos históricos. Para ello mantiene
actualizada, una base de datos con los resultados que reportan los laboratorios que participan
en el programa. Con esos datos calcula una distribución generalizada de frecuencias a partir de
todas las mediciones reportadas en los últimos diez años, relativas al valor del EML, para cada
radionucleido y matriz. Luego, tomando como base esta distribución, se eligen límites de
control dentro de un rango de percentiles, delimitando así tres categorías: A, W y N [2]. Los
resultados informados por los laboratorios participantes se clasifican dentro de estas
categorías:
− Clase A o aceptados (error bajo): son los resultados que se encuentran comprendidos
entre el 15 avo y el 85 avo percentil de la distribución acumulativa normalizada, lo que
equivale aproximadamente al 70% de las mediciones históricas.
− Clase W o aceptados con reservas (error medio): son aquellos resultados que se ubican
entre el 5 avo y el 15 avo percentil y entre el 85 avo y el 95 avo percentil. Esta área
representa alrededor del 20% de los resultados.
− Clase N o no aceptados (error alto): son los resultados ubicados por debajo del 5 avo
percentil y por arriba del 95 avo percentil, es decir aproximadamente el 10%.
Estos límites varían de acuerdo con el par radionucleido-matriz.
Cuando los datos históricos no son suficientes, se usan límites de ±20% y ±50% de error
respecto del resultado informado por el EML.
Participación de la ARN en el programa QAP
En el campo del monitoreo ambiental, la ARN posee una experiencia de larga data. Desde
hace muchos años lleva a cabo un programa de mediciones ambientales, directas e indirectas,
para emisores gamma, en muestras de distinta naturaleza (aguas, filtros, suelos, vegetales, y
otras matrices). También desde hace mucho tiempo viene aplicando técnicas para la
12
226 222
determinación de actínidos y otros emisores alfa como Ra y Rn. Asimismo posee una
90 3
amplia experiencia en la medición de Sr y H (en forma directa o por enriquecimiento
electrolítico).
Con el objetivo de validar sus resultados, la ARN participa periódicamente en diversas

intercalibraciones. Esta participación constituye una evidencia significativa de la capacidad del
laboratorio de producir resultados confiables. Estos ejercicios pueden también proveer
información útil para la detección de posibles fuentes de error en las técnicas radioquímicas o
en los sistemas de medición.
La ARN participa desde 1995, en los dos ejercicios anuales que organiza el EML, habiendo
participado hasta el momento en diez ocasiones.
La participación en este programa implica la realización de mediciones de variadas
características: espectrometría gamma, espectrometría alfa, centelleo líquido, detectores de
ZnS, contador proporcional y fluorimetría para la determinación de masa de U.
METODOLOGÍA
Para el tratamiento radioquímico de las muestras [3-11] se procesan como mínimo dos
alícuotas de cada muestra, aunque en la mayor parte de los casos se trabaja con tres o más.
Estas se procesan independientemente, con el fin de prevenir posibles errores de proceso. La
medición de los actínidos consume un tiempo considerable por lo que cada una de las
alícuotas de las muestras, debe seguir un cronograma de trabajo adecuado, que además debe
coordinarse con la medición gamma.
Todas las técnicas utilizadas en el programa de intercalibración, están constituidas por tres
etapas esenciales:
90
Tratamiento previo Actínidos, Sr
3 55
Separación Hy Fe
Gammas, Alfa Total,

Beta Total Medición
Figura 1. Esquema general de tratamiento de las muestras.
Tratamiento previo
El tratamiento previo comprende todos aquellos procesos que se realizan con el fin de preparar
la muestra para la etapa posterior de separación. Consiste en la destrucción de materia
orgánica, eliminación de sílice y solubilización de la muestra, que se lleva a cabo mediante el
uso de procedimientos de digestión con ácidos fuertes, o bomba de digestión a presión.
90
Se aplica a las determinaciones de Sr y actínidos.
El tratamiento previo presenta diversas características según el tipo de matriz a procesar:
13
− Agua: la muestra de agua se procesa directamente dado que se trata de una matriz muy
simple y no requiere tratamiento previo.
− Filtro: se disuelve completamente tratando la muestra con ácidos nítrico y fluorhídrico.
− Vegetal: una alícuota de aproximadamente 10 g de vegetal se mufla a través de varias

etapas de temperatura para eliminar en su totalidad la materia orgánica. Luego se lleva a
cabo la disolución de las cenizas mediante tratamiento ácido.
− Suelo: esta es sin duda la matriz más compleja y requiere un tratamiento mas prolongado
para lograr su disolución. Se emplean técnicas que involucran el uso de ácidos fuertes
como nítrico, clorhídrico y fluorhídrico, agentes complejantes como ácido bórico y el
proceso se completa en varios días.
Generalmente es necesario realizar un análisis previo, de características más simples, usando

una alícuota pequeña de la muestra, con el objetivo de obtener un resultado aproximado. Esto
determina la cantidad de trazador que se deberá agregar antes de comenzar el análisis.
Recordemos que en el caso de los actínidos, el trazador es un radionucleido emisor alfa e

isótopo del radionucleido a analizar (de comportamiento químico similar), pero de energía bien
242 238 239 243
diferenciada, lo que permite su evaluación independiente ( Pu para Pu y Pu, Am para
241 244 232
Am y Cm, y U para U). Este es un testigo fiel del comportamiento del radionucleido de
interés, y permite una adecuada cuantificación de las pérdidas sufridas a través de todo el
proceso radioquímico, cualesquiera sean las etapas.
Separación
Está compuesta por todos aquellos procesos que tienden a la separación de cada uno de los
radionucleidos, tanto de la matriz, constituida por el conjunto de los elementos inactivos que
conforman la casi totalidad de la muestra, como de otros radionucleidos capaces de interferir
en la medición. Todas las muestras requieren procesos separativos, siendo los más complejos
los que se refieren a vegetal y suelo.
90 55 3
Se aplica a las determinaciones de Sr, actínidos, Fe y H.
90
− El Sr se determina por intermedio de una técnica analítica de separación de su producto
90
de decaimiento en equilibrio, el Y. El proceso incluye dos extracciones con HDEHP (ácido
bis 2 etil hexil fosfórico) 10% en tolueno, reextracción en medio nítrico diluido, y posterior
precipitación del Y(OH)3 mediante agregado previo de Y inactivo como portador, para lograr
una mejor separación de los posibles interferentes. El precipitado se disuelve y la muestra
queda lista para su medición.
3
− La determinación de H se lleva a cabo sobre la muestra de agua. El análisis no es directo
y requiere una técnica que permita separar los emisores beta/gamma, que interfieren en la
medición. La separación se realiza por medio de destilación. Sin embargo este proceso no
puede efectuarse en forma directa puesto que la muestra se recibe acidificada con ácido
clorhídrico. El hierro forma un compuesto volátil en presencia de los iones cloruro, por lo
55
que es necesario neutralizar con hidróxido de sodio, para fijar el Fe y evitar su pasaje al
3
destilado, ya que debido a su baja energía (5 keV), se mide en la misma región que el H y
por lo tanto su presencia incrementaría el resultado final. La técnica de destilación fue
optimizada fijando las condiciones para el punto final y el posterior ajuste de la acidez con
nitrato de plomo. Los análisis se llevan a cabo sobre 2 alícuotas de 50 ml cada una.
55
− El Fe se analiza en agua y requiere también la utilización de técnicas de separación
55
radioquímica, basadas en extracción con TBP (tributil fosfato). El Fe se extrae en medio
de HCl 6 M y se reextrae con agua.
14
− Los actínidos requieren la mayor cantidad de tiempo de procesamiento, puesto que es
indispensable una purificación extrema de los mismos, antes de ser medidos. Se analizan a
través de una marcha que permite separar cada uno de ellos, con el fin de medirlos
individualmente. Esto es indispensable debido a que algunos poseen casi la misma energía
238 241
( Pu y Am) y es imposible evaluarlos por espectrometría alfa cuando se hallan juntos.
Las técnicas incluyen una purificación inicial de los actínidos en grupo, por medio de
coprecipitación con oxalato de calcio e hidróxido férrico. Luego, los actínidos se separan
entre sí por intermedio de columnas de resina de intercambio aniónico. La fracción de
plutonio generalmente se evapora, se mineraliza y se electrodeposita, con lo que queda
lista para su medición. La fracción de uranio es necesario purificarla aún más, debido a la
presencia de hierro, que es un fuerte interferente en la electrodeposición. El uranio se
separa del hierro por medio de extracción con TBP (tributil fosfato) en medio nítrico 5 M y
luego se electrodeposita cuidando de que su masa no exceda de 20 µg. El americio y el
curio requieren un proceso más laborioso y esto se debe a que con ellos avanza la mayor
parte de la matriz (inactiva), así como también radionucleidos naturales como el torio (el
228
Th interfiere directamente en la medición de americio). El proceso que se usa para la
fracción de americio y curio incluye extracción con HDEHP (ácido bis 2 etil hexilfosfórico)
en medio débilmente ácido, columnas de intercambio iónico en medio de alcohol metílico y
ácido nítrico, y algunas veces columnas de intercambio catiónico. Finalmente se
electrodepositan juntos. La técnica de electrodeposición se lleva a cabo en celdas
electrolíticas desechables (viales de centelleo de plástico), se basa en un electrolito de
sulfato de amonio y sigue en esencia el procedimiento descripto por Talvitie [8]. Como
resultado, se obtiene un disco de acero inoxidable, en cuya superficie pulida se encuentran
depositados los actínidos, bajo la forma de una muy delgada capa. Esta, constituye una
geometría apropiada para la medición por espectrometría alfa, debido a la baja
autoabsorción, lo que a su vez permite obtener picos bien definidos en el espectro de
emisión alfa. Cuando el resultado de la electrodeposición no es satisfactorio, se procede a
la redisolución del depósito, su purificación, y posterior electrodeposición.
− El
226
Ra se determina sobre la matriz suelo. El proceso incluye una coprecipitación con
BaSO4 y redisolución del precipitado con EDTA en medio alcalino. Se coloca la solución en
222
un vial de centelleo, se sella, y se deja crecer el Rn y sus hijas durante unos 15 días.
Medición
Los radionucleidos 90Sr, 3H, 226Ra y 55Fe se miden por centelleo líquido. Los actínidos se miden
por espectrometría alfa con detectores de ion implantado en cámaras de vacío. Las mediciones
de actividad Alfa Total se llevan a cabo por medio de detectores de ZnS con tubo
fotomultiplicador y contador proporcional. La actividad Beta Total se determina por medio de
contador proporcional. Las mediciones gamma se realizan en forma directa sobre la muestra,
en caso del filtro, o sobre alícuotas de las muestras en el caso de las otras matrices, en
detectores de germanio hiperpuro.
− Las mediciones de Alfa Total se realizan sobre una alícuota de la muestra de agua y sobre
la muestra de filtro en forma directa. Se llevan a cabo no menos de 5 mediciones de 1000
minutos cada una, para lograr mayor precisión en el resultado. En el caso del agua, la
eficiencia se obtiene mediante el método del "standard" interno. Para el filtro se emplean
filtros patrón, preparados en nuestro laboratorio, de geometría similar a la muestra.
− Las mediciones de Beta Total, sobre las muestras de agua y filtro, se realizan en contador
proporcional, que discrimina radiación alfa de beta. La eficiencia se obtiene utilizando como
90
referencia patrones de Sr preparados en nuestro laboratorio.
90 90
− El Y proveniente de la etapa separativa de la determinación de Sr, se mide por centelleo
líquido mediante efecto Cherenkov. Se realizan varias mediciones de 400 minutos.
También se usa contador proporcional cuando es necesario obtener menores límites de
detección.
15
3
− Como es habitual, las mediciones de H, se realizan por centelleo líquido, utilizando
equipos con sistema de contaje de bajo fondo. Se trabaja con cinco metodologías de
evaluación, basadas en curva de quenching y standard interno, lo que permite aprovechar
al máximo el ejercicio. Se realizan múltiples mediciones para optimizar los resultados.
55
− Dada su escasa energía y baja actividad, el Fe se mide únicamente por centelleo líquido.
− Los actínidos se miden en detectores de ión implantado. Los tiempos de medición oscilan
entre 1 y 10 días. Los espectros se registran en una computadora con emulador multicanal,
y luego se analizan mediante un programa de computación diseñado especialmente para
este fin. En la mayor parte de los casos, los espectros obtenidos, presentan picos que se
superponen parcialmente, por lo que es necesario utilizar algoritmos que permitan
discriminarlos.
226
− El Ra se mide por centelleo líquido luego de separar la fases. Si bien la determinación de
226
Ra solo fue requerida una vez, este análisis se sigue realizando puesto que los
214 214 226
resultados de Pb y Bi, que si son requeridos y que están en equilibrio con el Ra,
permiten validar la técnica de determinación de radio.
− La medición gamma se lleva a cabo en detectores de germanio hiperpuro montados en

blindajes de muy bajo fondo, con eficiencias relativas de 60% y 100%. Para el agua se
utiliza una geometría de 100 ml; para suelo y vegetal se utilizan recipientes plásticos de
aproximadamente 70 cm de diámetro por 40 cm de alto, mientras que el filtro se mide
entero. Los tiempos de medición son de dos días como mínimo para el caso del suelo y
vegetal, y un día para el filtro y agua. Cada medición se repite como mínimo 3 veces (6 en
el caso del filtro), para compensar errores de posicionamiento de las muestras. Para poder
cuantificar se realizan mediciones de fuentes de idéntica geometría a la de las muestras,
obteniéndose curvas de calibración para cada geometría y para cada detector. También se
realizan mediciones del fondo de los sistemas. La evaluación se lleva a cabo obteniendo
las áreas de los fotopicos presentes en los espectros de las muestras, y comparando
directamente estos valores con aquellos obtenidos en la medición de fuentes de
calibración.
Cada una de las soluciones patrón utilizadas como referencia, fueron adquiridas en laboratorios
de reconocida calidad. Por otro lado, varias de ellas son habitualmente chequeadas también en
nuestros laboratorios, con el fin de corroborar la calibración original, empleando principalmente
medición por centelleo liquido y espectrometría alfa.
Para las mediciones gamma, se adquirieron fuentes de referencia adecuadas a las geometrías
en que debían medirse las muestras. En otros casos las fuentes de referencia fueron
preparadas en nuestros laboratorios.
RESULTADOS
Resultados generales
En la Figura 2 y Figura 3 se muestran los promedios de los resultados obtenidos por todos los
laboratorios y por la ARN, correspondientes a las últimas diez intercalibraciones, en forma
comparada [2,12-18]:
16
A
A 79%
73%
W
18% W
N 15%
N
9%
Figura 2. Promedio de los resultados de
6%
Figura 3. Promedio de los resultados de
todos los laboratorios (período 1995-1999).
la ARN (período 1995-1999).
Al analizar el promedio de los resultados obtenidos por la ARN (Figura 3), se observa que la
mayor parte de los resultados informados pertenecen a la clase A, es decir aceptados. Cuando
comparamos estos resultados con los presentados por el conjunto del total de los laboratorios,
puede observarse que la ARN ha logrado mejores valores promedio que el resto (mayor
porcentaje de resultados clase A, menor porcentaje de resultados clase N).
En la Tabla 2, se presentan los resultados generales de la ARN, basado en el análisis realizado

por el EML, en las diez intercomparaciones llevadas a cabo:
Año QAP n n% Clase A Clase W Clase N

ARN Todos los ARN Todos los ARN Todos los
(*) (**) % laboratorios % laboratorios % laboratorios
% %
%
1995 42 35 68,6 54 67 34 22 11 11
1995 43 18 34,0 94 70 6 21 0 9
1996 44 33 51,6 82 74 3 19 15 7
1996 45 29 58,0 72 69 14 21 14 10
1997 46 28 52,8 54 70 39 20 7 10
1997 47 36 69,2 78 77 17 14 6 9
1998 48 43 87,8 91 75 9 16 0 9
1998 49 41 69,5 88 77 12 13 0 10
1999 50 40 80,0 85 77 15 15 0 9
1999 51 49 90,7 88 74 6 17 6 9
Promedio (***): 79 73 15 18 6 9
Total de análisis: 352
Tabla 2. Resultados de la participación de la ARN según las diferentes categorías,

comparados con los resultados del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes.
(*) Quality Assessment Program. Número dado por el EML a cada ejercicio de intercomparación.
(**) Número de resultados informados por la ARN. El n% corresponde al porcentaje de resultados informados con
relación al número de datos requeridos por el EML.
(***) Los promedios calculados para los resultados de la ARN han sido ponderados teniendo en cuenta el número
de resultados presentados en cada intercalibración.
17
Al observar los porcentajes de resultados clase A (Tabla 2), se puede notar que en ocho de las
diez intercalibraciones, los resultados informados por la ARN presentan valores mejores que
los correspondientes al promedio del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes. Una tendencia
similar pero inversa, se advierte en los porcentajes de valores clase N.
Puede verse que estos números han adquirido también una significativa estabilidad en los años
más recientes (1998-1999), considerando tanto los resultados clase A, como los clase N. Esta
misma característica de estabilidad puede observarse también en el número de resultados
informados, el cual representa un elevado porcentaje de los requeridos por el EML. Un
creciente esfuerzo y una sensible mejora en la organización del trabajo, permitieron superar a
fluctuación, que se produjo en las primeras intercalibraciones.
La Figura 4 permite observar en un gráfico de dispersión todos los resultados individuales

reportados por la ARN, expresados en relación a los resultados del EML (ARN/EML), en
función del tiempo.
Puede advertirse que los datos fluctúan alrededor del valor 1, es decir alrededor de los valores
del EML, a lo largo de todo el periodo de participación.
Figura 4. Resultados de la ARN completos (período 1995-1999)
Si se observan los datos clase A + W (Tabla 3), o sea los resultados aceptados en general,
puede notarse que estos se encuentran en constante aumento desde el año 1996, es decir en
las últimas 8 intercalibraciones, y en los últimos 6 ejercicios, estos resultados superan el
promedio general obtenido por el conjunto de los laboratorios. Esta tendencia pero en el
sentido de disminución puede observarse también para los datos clase N, o sea los no
aceptados.
18
Intercalibración ARN Todos los laboratorios
Clase A+W Clase N Clase A+W Clase N

% % % %
1995 89 11 89 11
1995 100 0 91 9
1996 85 15 93 7
1996 86 14 90 10
1997 93 7 90 10
1997 94 6 91 9
1998 100 0 91 9
1998 100 0 90 10
1999 100 0 92 9
1999 94 6 91 9
Promedio (*): 94 6 91 9
Tabla 3. Resultados de la participación de la ARN según las categorías A+W,

comparados con los resultados del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes.
(*) Los promedios calculados para los resultados de la ARN han sido ponderados teniendo en cuenta el número de
resultados presentados en cada intercalibración.
Si bien se obtuvo una disminución en los dos resultados clase A, en el primer ejercicio de 1997,
la suma de las clases A + W de esa intercomparación se mantuvo en el nivel estándar.
También se puede notar que en 3 de las ultimas intercalibraciones no se obtuvieron

calificaciones N, es decir que todos los resultados se ubicaron en la categoría de los aceptados
(A + W). Si bien esta situación ya se había producido antes, es decir en la segunda
intervención de la ARN, en el año 1995, el número de resultados presentados en ese caso
representa menos de la mitad de los presentados últimamente.
Resultados según el tipo de radionucleido emisor
Al observar la Tabla 4 se puede apreciar un comportamiento homogéneo en la distribución de

los datos clasificados de acuerdo con las categorías de calidad del EML (A, W y N).
Emisor n n% Clase A Clase W Clase N
nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%

Alfa 170 62,0 139 81,8 20 11.8 11 6,5
Beta 36 41,9 25 69,4 9 25 2 5,6
Gamma 146 89,6 115 78,8 24 16,4 7 4,8
Tabla 4. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN, de acuerdo con el tipo de radionucleido emisor.
n: número de resultados totales informados por la ARN; n% corresponde al porcentaje de resultados informados con
nA%, nW%, nN%: porcentaje de resultados informados por la ARN con relación al número total de datos informados.
19
La Figura 5 muestra la distribución, en porcentaje del total, del número de resultados según el
tipo de emisor:
Beta 10,2%
Gamma
41,5%
Alfa 48,3%
Figura 5. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN según el tipo

de radionucleido emisor (período 1995-1999).
Resultados según el tipo de matriz
En la Tabla 5 se presentan los datos distribuidos según el tipo de matriz, donde se puede
apreciar también un comportamiento homogéneo dentro de cada una de las categorías.
Matriz n n% Clase A Clase W Clase N
nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%
Filtro 123 74,5 102 82,9 11 8,9 10 8,1
Suelo 72 58,5 56 77,8 14 19,4 2 2,8
Vegetal 60 75,9 44 73,3 13 21,7 3 5,0
Agua 97 62,2 77 79,4 15 15,5 5 5,2
Tabla 5. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN, de acuerdo con el tipo de matriz.
n: número de resultados totales informados por la ARN; n% corresponde al porcentaje de resultados informados con
nA%, nW%, nN%: porcentaje de resultados informados por la ARN con relación al número total de datos informados.
20
La Figura 6 muestra la distribución, en porcentaje del total, del número de resultados según el
tipo de matriz:
Vegetal 17,0%
Suelo 20,5%
Filtro 34,9% Agua 27,6%
Figura 6. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN según el tipo de

matriz (período 1995-1999).
Resultados según un criterio alternativo
Cuando observamos los resultados generales desde otro punto de vista (Tabla 6), es decir,
cuando se los clasifica en función de la desviación porcentual respecto de los resultados del
EML, podemos apreciar que más de la tercera parte de ellos sufrieron un error menor o igual
que 5%, mientras que el 83% de estos se ubicaron en la franja del 20%.
Resultados generales (1995 - 1999)
Clase n% n% n% n%
(alfa) (beta) (gamma)
≤ 5% 31,3 25,3 25,0 39,7
≤ 10% 58,0 57,6 41,7 62,3
≤ 20% 83,0 81,8 72,2 87,0
≤ 50% 96,6 94,1 94,4 100,0
> 50% 3,4 5,9 5,6 0
Tabla 6. Resultados de la participación de la ARN, según su desviación porcentual

respecto de los resultados del EML, en el periodo 1995 - 1999.
n%: porcentaje de resultados informados con relación al número total de datos.
21
Resultados correspondientes al año 1999
Los resultados obtenidos por la ARN durante el año 1999 también comparados con los
resultados del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes, se muestran en las Figuras 7 y 8.
A
A 87%
74%
W
17%
W
N 10%
N
9%
3%
Figura 7. Promedio de los resultados de todos los Figura 8. Promedio de los resultados
laboratorios (1999). de la ARN (1999).
Comparando los resultados obtenidos el último año con los que corresponden al período 1995-
1999 (Figura 3) puede observarse una sensible mejoría en los valores.
CONCLUSIONES
Luego de analizar el conjunto de los 352 resultados presentados por la ARN en los últimos 5
años, pudieron apreciarse valores mejores que los presentados por el conjunto de los
laboratorios participantes. Además se ha podido observar que los resultados reportados por la
ARN, se encuentran en sostenido mejoramiento, desde distintos puntos de vista y desde hace
varios ejercicios.
Según se ha visto, el número de resultados reportados ha crecido en los últimos ejercicios.
También se ha puesto en evidencia que, de acuerdo con el tipo de emisión y del tipo de matriz,
la distribución de los resultados presenta comportamiento homogéneo dentro las categorías A,
W y N.
Por otro lado, las mejoras se han visto reflejadas también en la dinámica interna con que han
sido organizadas y se han desarrollado estas últimas intercalibraciones y además, en el
esfuerzo realizado para cumplimentarlas con mayor eficiencia.
Todas las técnicas fueron optimizadas considerando desde el aspecto radioquímico hasta la
medición, la utilización de estándares de referencia calificados y de metodologías
estandarizadas de calibración. Una mejor organización ha permitido optimizar tiempos de
proceso, costos operativos y lograr una mayor eficiencia de trabajo. Asimismo ha sido renovado
la mayor parte del equipamiento, tanto en lo que respecta a los laboratorios como así también
a la medición.
La participación en estas intercalibraciones, como parte de los programas de garantía de

calidad, permitió cumplir con el objetivo permanente de contar con técnicas validadas para
obtener resultados más exactos y precisos, como así también para optimizar los insumos, el
equipamiento y los recursos humanos cumpliendo en forma adecuada con las misiones y
funciones de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear.
22
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
[1] Http://www.eml.doe.gov.
[2] Http://www.eml.doe.gov/qap.
[3] The Procedures Manual of the EML, HASL 300, 28 Th edition, Feb. 1997 y
Http://www.eml.doe.gov/procman/.
[4] Health and Environmental Chemistry, Los Alamos National Lab., Margaret A. Gautier, 1987.
[5] A. Yamato, Journal of Radioanalytical Chemistry, Vol. 75, N° 1-2, p265, 1982.
[6] S. Ballesta, R. Fukai, Talanta Vol. 30, N° 1, p45-48, 1983.
[7] E. Holm, S. Ballesta, R. Fukai, Talanta, Vol. 26, p791-792, 1979.
[8] N.A. Talvitie, Anal. Chem. 44, 2, p280-283, 1972.
[9] K. Bunzl, W. Kracke, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chem., Vol. 115, N° 1, p13-21,
1987.
[10] G. Jia, C. Testa, D. Desideri, M. Meli, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chem.,
Vol. 133, N° 2, p227-236, 1989.
[11] Publicación interna ARN 30/98.
[12] QAP Report-EML569, Sanderson, C.G., Greenlaw ,P., Pan, V., 1995.
[13] QAP Report-EML576, Sanderson, C.G., Greenlaw, P., 1996.
[16] QAP Report-EML591, Greenlaw, P., 1997.
[17] QAP Report-EML594, Greenlaw, P., 1998.
[18] QAP Report-EML596, Greenlaw, P., Minick, S., 1998.
23
The Hydrogen Generated as a Gas and
Storage in Zircaloy during
Steam Quenching
García, E.A.

THE HYDROGEN GENERATED AS A GAS AND STORAGE IN ZIRCALOY
DURING STEAM QUENCHING
García, E.A.
Nuclear Regulatory Authority

Argentina
ABSTRACT
RESUMEN
A simple one-dimensional diffusion model
has been developed for the complex Se ha desarrollado un modelo simple de
process of Zircaloy oxidation during steam difusión en una dimensión con el objeto de
quenching, calculating the hydrogen simular el proceso complejo de la oxidación
liberated as a gas and the hydrogen stored de Zircaloy durante una trampa en vapor de
in the metal. The model was developed on agua, calculando el hidrógeno liberado
the basis of small-scale separate-effects como gas y el hidrógeno retenido en el
quench experiments performed at metal. El modelo fue desarrollado sobre la
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe. The new base de experimentos de laboratorio, en
oxide surface and the new metallic surface pequeña escala, realizados en el
produced by cracking of the oxide during Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe. Las nuevas
quenching are calculated for each superficies oxidadas y las nuevas
experiment performed at 1200°C, 1400°C superficies metálicas producidas por la
and 1600°C using as-received Zircaloy-4 rotura de la capa de óxido durante la
(no pre-oxidation) and with Zircaloy trampa en agua son calculadas para cada
specimens pre-oxidized to give oxide experimento efectuado a 1200°C, 1400°C y
thickness of 100µm and 300µm. The results 1600°C usando Zircaloy con su superficie
are relevant to accident management in sin oxidar y con muestras de Zircaloy
nuclear power plants. previamente oxidadas con capas de óxido
de 100µm y 300µm. Los resultados son
relevantes para el manejo de accidentes en
reactores nucleares de potencia.
INTRODUCTION
“An important accident management measure for controlling severe accident transients in light
water reactors (LWRs) is the injection of water to cool the degrading core. Flooding of the
overheated core, which causes quenching of the fuel rods, is considered a worst-case scenario
regarding hydrogen generation rates which should not exceed safety-relevant critical values.
Before the water succeeds in cooling the uncovered core, there will be enhanced oxidation of
the Zircaloy cladding that in turn causes a sharp increase in temperature, hydrogen production,
and fission product release. The complex physico-chemical processes during quenching and
their mutual influence is not yet sufficiently known. In most of the code systems describing
severe fuel damage the quench phenomena are not considered or only modeled in a simplified
empirical manner” [1]. Many experiments have been performed recently at Forschungszentrum
Karlsruhe (FZK) to investigate the in-vessel hydrogen source term that results from water
injection into the uncovered core of a light water reactor (LWR) to cool it down. They can be
divided into two types; large-scale bundle quench tests and small-scale experiments performed
in the single-rod "quench-rig" facility.
The objective of the present paper is to contribute to the understanding and knowledge of the
oxidation process during steam quenching under the conditions of the quench-rig experiments,
giving the possibility to calculate with a simple hypothesis the hydrogen generated as a gas and
the hydrogen stored in the metal in the same way like as for water quenching [2].
27
THE MODEL
The previously developed model [2] is used to analyze the results of experiments in which the
specimens are rapidly cooled, i.e. "quenched" in steam [3]. The model is able to simulate the
oxide and oxygen-stabilised alpha layer growth, during uniform oxidation under isothermal
conditions and oxidation during temperature transients. This will be used in the case of
oxidation during steam quenching of samples without any preoxidation, to calculate the total
hydrogen produced and the partition between the hydrogen liberated as a gas and the hydrogen
T
stored in the metal. The partition is defined by a parameter λ m, at the quench temperature T
and for the oxide layer that defines a maximum oxide thickness, m, which is able to allow
diffusion of hydrogen through it. Below this value, the hydrogen generated is assumed to be
completely absorbed by the metal, above this value the hydrogen generated during the
T
oxidation is assumed to be liberated only as a gas. Because the λ m parameter previously
determined for water quenching should be different to those of steam quenching, we identified
T
the latter by λ m,S. The model also simulates experiments performed with preoxidized Zircaloy in
which during quenching the previously protective oxide layer and the adjacent metallic Zry are
fractured due to the stress, and new metallic and substoichiometric oxide surfaces are thus
exposed to the steam atmosphere.
Then, as in the previous paper [2], the one-dimensional diffusion model with a fissure at the
“quench time” and with a different surface percentage during the quenching process of oxidation
is used to calcite the new substoichiometric oxide and new metallic surfaces exposed to the
oxidising atmosphere which are necessary to reproduce the experimental results.
MODEL RESULTS
Samples without preoxidation
Applying the “complementary hypotheses” mentioned in a previous paper [2], the one-
dimension diffusion model for the oxidation is used to calculate firstly the oxidation during steam
quenching in the cases of samples without preoxidation at 1200°C, 1400°C and 1600°C. Here
T
we have two parameters to be determined: t0 and λ m,S, with the experimental knowledge,
supplied by the authors [3], about temperature as a function of time for each portion of the
sample (namely the upper end, central region and lower end thermocouple) and the total
hydrogen generated, that is the addition of the hydrogen stored and the hydrogen generated as
a gas.
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show the oxidation kinetics at 1200°C, 1400°C and 1600°C, for
specimens without preoxidation. Tables I to III summarize the calculated results in comparison
T
with the experimental ones. The values λ m,S were calculated for the three temperatures:
1200°C, 1400°C and 1600°C, they are 4.5µm, 5.5µm and 5µm respectively and were
determined to obtain the desired final values for the hydrogen as a gas. In comparison with the
values previously obtained [2] for water quenching they were of the same order of magnitude:
4µm, 6µm and 8µm respectively.
The values t0 were determined to obtain the desired final values for the total hydrogen
production. The first temperature value for the “quenching time” was extrapolated for negative
times up to the corresponding t0 values because there is no experimental information about the
temperature history during this period. The reason is that the oxidation starts before the “quench
time” defined by the experiment [3]. The values are summarized in Table IV.
Samples with preoxidation treatment and without fissures in the oxide
In Figure 2, we show typical oxidation kinetics, where we observe the hydrogen generated as a
gas in the case of sample quenching after preoxidation and no fissures produced during steam
quenching. This is the case of quenching from 1200°C and 100µm of oxide thickness after
28
preoxidation. The experimental results show no fissures in the oxide and no hydrogen stored.
Then the transient model is only a continuation of that for the oxidation during the pre-oxidation.
The results are summarized in Table V.
Samples with preoxidation treatment and with fissures in the oxide
In Figures 3a, b, c and d, we show typical oxidation kinetics, where we observe the hydrogen
generated as a gas and the hydrogen absorbed in the metallic Zry in the case of sample
quenching with preoxidation and fissures produced at the “quench time” for all the experiments.
In this type of experiment, with preoxidation and fissured oxide, we considered that for oxidation
T
of a sample with an oxide layer of thickness less or equal to λ m,S, the hydrogen generated is
T
stored in the metal. The values, λ m,S, are those previously determined for the samples without
T
preoxidation, at each temperature. Figure 4 shows the λ m,S in the case of steam quenching and
T
the λ m,W previously obtained [2] for water quenching.
Tables VI to IX summarize the calculations corresponding to the steam quenching experiments

with preoxidized samples and with fissures in the oxide after quenching. The corresponding
table for steam quenching from 1400°C and 100µm oxide layer is not presented because the file
containing the temperature histories for the three thermocouples was lost.
The Tables
Each table, like those in reference [2] has two parts. The first part relates to the original
experimental data set [3], quenching temperature, comparison between experimental and
modeling results of different layers, oxide and α-Zry, the experimental results of hydrogen
generated as a gas and hydrogen stored in Zry. The three thermocouple placements in the
15cm long pin define three sections of 5cm length, termed here (U) upper, (C) central and (L)
lower respectively. Experimental information concerning in which sections the fissures were
observed is recorded. The second part of each table relates to the hydrogen production and
storage obtained from the code, and the necessary calculation according to the model
proposed, to obtain good agreement with the data. Particularly, for the three steam quenching
T
experiments without preoxidation, as in the earlier paper [2] we determine, to and λ m,S to obtain
the density of hydrogen generation for each 5cm section for the hydrogen stored, and for the
hydrogen liberated as a gas. Then the addition must give the correct density of the total
hydrogen generation. For other experiments with preoxidation and fissures, the second table
has particular features, the density of total hydrogen generated is the addition of the density of
total hydrogen generated as a gas and the density of total hydrogen stored. Because both
quantities are experimentally determined only for the whole sample we are not able to know the
contribution of each section, the three sections are given the same values (the columns for
Total Gas and Total Storage have the same values for the three sections). Another particular
feature is that we must consider the hydrogen gas from the oxidation of substoichiometric
T
zirconia and the hydrogen gas from the oxidation of metal for oxide layers larger than λ m,S. As a
consequence of fissures, new metallic surfaces are exposed to the atmosphere; these new
exposed reaction surface, oxide surface and metallic surface areas are calculated, as a
percentage of the total sample surface. The new metallic surfaces exposed will oxidize,
T
introducing hydrogen into the metal up to an oxide thickness less or equal to λ m,S. Further
oxidation is deemed to produce hydrogen only as a gas. Then the total gas generation is
determined to be the sum of hydrogen from the oxidation of substoichiometric oxide a gas plus
hydrogen liberated as a gas from the new surface. The hydrogen storage defines the new
M
metallic surface S resulting from cracks in the metal. The surface that generates hydrogen as a
M M
gas from the metal oxidation defines a surface SG that must be equal or smaller than S . When
M M
SG < S , we are in the case of hydrogen starvation. This is the case of all samples with
preoxidation and fissuring under steam quenching.
29
DISCUSSION
The values obtained for the to in the case of steam quenching are the same order of magnitude
T
as those in the case of water quenching, as seen in Table IV. Contrarily, the values for λ m,S
have a different behavior as a function of inverse temperature, as shown in Figure 4. The use of
the same values of crack length obtained experimentally for steam quenching [4] in the analysis
of water quenching [2] could be the reason of this discrepancy.
The validity of the a and b bands for steam quenching can only be compared with those for
water quenching for the 300µm oxide thickness cases, as shown in Figures 5a and 5b
respectively. It is important to mention that in the case of water quenching we were obliged to
use the determination of crack length for steam quenching, for want of experimental data. Then
the comparison is relative, and another difficulty is that we have only three temperatures, then,
only three points to describe the behavior of validity of a and b bands. Nevertheless, both have
similar behavior; those for steam quenching (SQ) are bigger than those for water quenching
(WQ) except at higher temperatures, 1600°C, where appears a small inversion. The values for
the b band (SQ) seem to be too big, specially for 1400°C. The reason could be related to the
real crack length in the metal, because in the present calculation we consider that a fissure in
the oxide produces a fissure in the metal. However, in different metallographic cross-sections
from elevation 913mm in the QUENCH-01 water-quenched bundle experiment, which involved
significant preoxidation before the quench phase, the remaining metallic Zry is completely in the
brittle alpha phase. Then, it was possible to observe several fissures in the metal for one fissure
in the oxide [5], as shown in Figure 6. A factor four must be considered in this case, with a
similar reduction in the b band value. The crack length determination from outside seems to be
insufficient to calculate the new Zry surface exposed to the steam. It must be complemented by
systematic cross-section determinations to measure the real metallic crack length in the
remaining Zry, or another technique must be used.
CONCLUSIONS
The use of a one-dimensional diffusion model with fissure at the “quench time” and certain
“complementary hypotheses” plus the calculation of new oxide and new metallic surface
exposed gives a possibility to describe the way in which the oxide and the metal show different
fracture surfaces during the steam quenching process, under conditions to reproduce the
experimental values of hydrogen generated as a gas and the hydrogen stored in the metal.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. Tim Haste, Joint Research Center, Ispra, Italy, for
reviewing the paper.
30
o 1200
1200 C, 0µm, λm,S =4.5µm
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
1800
80 76.9
β-Zry 1600
70
Interface position, µm
to=-2s,"quench time"=61.29s
60
lower end thermocouple 1400
Temperature, C
50
1200
40 oxide/α-Zry Interface
α-Zry/β-Zry Interface
30 α-Zry 1000
o
20
20.4 800
10 Oxide
0 600
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
Time, s
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
1800
0,6
2
Hydrogen Generation, mg/cm
.54 1600
0,5
.47
1400
Temperature, C
0,4
Total Hydrogen Generated
Hydrogen as a Gas 1200
0,3
Hydrogen Stored
1000
0,2
o
0,1 800
.07
0,0 600
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
Time, s
Figure 1a. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
quenching in the case of the lower end thermocouple for 1200°C and as-received Zry-4.
31
o 1400
1400 C, 0µm, λm,S =5.5µm
1500
28
25.6
26
1400
24
22
β-Zry oxide/α-Zry Interface
1300
20
α-Zry/β-Zry Interface
Temperature, C
18
1200
16 α-Zry
14
12 1100
12.9
10
Oxide 1000
o
8
6
to=-2s, "quench time"=92.43s 900
4
lower end thermocouple
2
0 800
90 92 94 96 98 100
Time, s
1500
.32
0,30 Total Hydrogen Generated
2
1400
Hydrogen as a Gas
0,25 Hydrogen Stored
1300
.22 Temperature, C
0,20
1200
0,15
1100
0,10 .10
1000
o
0,05 900
0,00 800
90 92 94 96 98 100
Time, s
Figure 1b. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
32
o 1600
1600 C, 0µm, λm,S =5µm
85
80 β-Zry 74. 1600
75
70
oxide/α-Zry Interface 1400
65
60 α-Zry/β-Zry Interface
55
α-Zry 1200
Temperature, C
50
to=-6s, "quench time"=54.45s 1000
45
40 lower end thermocouple
35 800
30
25 31.
o
600
20
15 oxide 400
10
5
0 200
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time, s
1,0
.86 1600
2
0,8 .73 1400
1200
Total Hydrogen Generated
Temperature, C
0,6
Hydrogen Stored
0,4 800
o
600
0,2 .13
400
0,0 200
40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time, s
Figure 1c. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
33
o 1200
1200 C, 100µm, λm,S =?
1400
240 247.
oxide/α-Zry Interface
1200
220 α-Zry/β-Zry Interface
200
1000
Temperature, C
to=-7s, "quench time"=97.5s
180
lower end thermocouple α-Zry
800
160
o
140 600
105.
120
400
100
100 120 140 160 180
Time, s
1400
.019
2
0.020
1200
Hyd. as a Gas = Tot. Hyd. Gener.

0.015
1000
0.010 800 Tem perature, C
600
o
0.005
400
0.000
100 120 140 160 180
Time, s
Figure 2. Interface position and hydrogen generation histories during steam quenching for the
1200
lower end thermocouple, for 1200°C and a pre-oxidation of 100µm. The λm,S values have no
meaning here because the oxide layer was protective, then no fissures in the oxide and no
hydrogen stored.
34
o 1200
1200 C, 300µm, λm,S =4.5µm
700
650 673. 1200
600
fissured oxide/non fissured oxide
550 1100
non fissured oxide/α-Zry
500
450
α-Zry/β-Zry 1000
Temperature, C
400
350 α-Zry 900
297.
300
250 293. 800
200
fissured oxide
o
150 700
to=0s, "Quench time"=109.2s
100
upper end thermocuple
50 600
0
110 115 120 125 130 135 140
Time, s
0,8
.717 1200
2
0,7
0,6 .657 1100

.655 Total Hydrogen Generated
0,5 1000
Hydrogen as a Gas
Temperature, C
0,4
Hydrogen Stored 900
0,3 800
o
0,2
700
0,1
600
.06
0,0
110 115 120 125 130 135 140
Time, s
Figure 3a. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
quenching in the case of the upper end thermocouple for 1200°C and a pre-oxidation of 300µm,
with a fissure at “quench time”.
35
o 1400
1400 C, 300 µ m , λ m ,S =5.5 µ m
700
650 678. 1400
600 β -Zry
fissured xide/non fissured oxide
550
Interface position, µ m
500 non fissured oxide/ α -Zry 1350

450 α -Zry/ β -Zry
Tem perature, C
400
α -Zry 1300
350 non fissured oxide
300.
300
250 293. 1250
200 fissured oxide
o
150
100 t o =0s, "quench time"=139.2s 1200
50
0
1150
139.0 139.5 140.0 140.5 141.0
Time, s
.783 1400
0,8
2
.708
1350
.679 Total Hydrogen Generated
0,6
Hydrogen as a Gas
Hydrogen Stored 1300 Temperature, C
0,4
1250
o
0,2
1200
.075
0,0 1150
139,0 139,5 140,0 140,5 141,0
Time, s
Figure 3b. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
quenching in the case of the lower end thermocouple for 1400°C and a pre-oxidation of 300µm,
36
o 1600
1600 C, 100 µ m , λ m ,S =5 µ m
240
242. 1600
220 β -Zry fissured oxide/non fissured oxide
200 1400
non fissured oxide/ α -Zry
180 α -Zry
160 α -Zry/β -Zry 1200
Tem perature, C
140 non fissured oxide
1000
120 116.
100
103.
800
80 t o =0s, "quench time"=100.5s
60 lower end thermocouple 600
o
40
fissured oxide
20 400
0
200
100 120 140 160 180 200 220
Time, s
.403 1600
0,4
2
.341 1400
0,3 Total Hydrogen Generated 1200
Temperature, C
.245 Hydrogen as a Gas
1000
Hydrogen Stored
0,2
800
o
600
0,1
.062
400
0,0 200
100 120 140 160 180 200 220
Time, s
Figure 3c. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
37
o 1600
1600 C, 300µm, λm,S =5µm
700 1800
650 681.
fissured oxide/non fissured oxide 1600
600
550
non fissured oxide/α-Zry
1400
500 α-Zry/β-Zry
Temperature, C
450 1200
400
α-Zry non fissured oxide
350 311. 1000
300
250 293. 800
o
fissured oxide
200
600
150
to=0s, "quench time"=126.2s
100 400
50
0 200
120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
Time, s
1800
1,0 .952
1600
2
0,8
.887 1400
.745 Total Hydrogen Generation
Temperature, C

0,6 Hydrogen Stored
1000
0,4 800
o
600
0,2
.066 400
0,0 200
120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
Time, s
Figure 3d. Interface position and hydrogen generation as a function of time during steam
38
o
Temperature, C
1600 1500 1400 1300 1200
8.
8,0
Water Quenching
Steam Quenching
7,0
, µm
6.
m,S
6,0
T
and λ
5.5
5,0
5.
m,W
4.5
T
λ
4,0 4.
5,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0
4
1/T, 10 /K
T
Figure 4. Calculated from the proposed model the present steam-quench results ln(λ m,S) vs.
T
the reciprocal absolute temperature (triangles) and preceding water-quench results [2] ln(λ m,W)
vs. the reciprocal absolute temperature (circles).
39
Steam and Water Quenching. Preoxidised Zry: 300µm.
0,50
0,45
0,40
SQ-300µm
validity a band, mm
0,35
0,30
0,25
0,20
0,15
0,10 WQ-300µm
0,05
0,00
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600
o
Temperature, C
Figure 5a. Calculated validity a band vs. quenching temperature in samples with a pre-
oxidation of 300µm. Comparison between steam quenching (SQ) present results and water
quenching (WQ) results [2].
Steam and Water Quenching. Preoxidised Zry: 300µm.

40
38
36
34
32
30
Validity b band, mm
28 SQ-300µm
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12 WQ-300µm
10
8
6
4
2
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600
o
Temperature, C
Figure 5b. Calculated validity b band vs. quenching temperature in samples with a pre-
oxidation of 300µm. Comparison between steam quenching (SQ) present results and water
quenching (WQ) results [2].
40
OXIDE
α-Zry
Figure 6. Cross-section of Zry-4 cladding tubes at 913mm axial bundle elevation in the
QUENCH-01 experiment with a preoxidation treatment, showing that one fissure in the thick
oxide layer could produce in the adjacent brittle α-Zry a tree of fissures, increasing the crack
length determination performed from the outside. From P. Hofmann et al. [5].
41
Table I
Steam Quenching 1200°C, 0µm
Term.: Lower, Central, Upper

Test Temperature Oxide layer Oxide layer Oxide layer Oxide layer α-Zry α-Zry α-Zry α-Zry Hydrogen
Fissure at Quench-time
before before before after after before before after after Spectro-
quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching meter+
Hydrogen
Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. stored=
Model Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
2
°C µm µm µm µm µm µm µm µm mg/cm
6 20.4 5 56.5 9.5+3.=12.5 - L

16046_3 1200 0* 0 0 0
6 5.42 5 1.71 .181+.06= - C
5 8 4 4.8 .238 - U
42
1200°°C, 0µm, Hydrogen Generation as a Gas and Storage. t0= -2.s of quench time.
T 2
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λ m,S= 4.5µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm
H as a gas H storage Total H
2
L [mg/cm ] .47 .07 .543
2
C [mg/cm ] .015 .042 .057
2
U [mg/cm ] .076 .045 .12
2
Total [mg/cm ] .0187 .052 .237
Total [mg] 9.81 2.75 12.43
Experimental results: different temperatures at “quench time” for each sector (L, C, U).
H as a gas: 9.48 [mg], H storage: 3.03 [mg] and total H: 12.51 [mg]
42
Table II

Hydrogen
Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model stored=
Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
2
11 12.9 12 12.7 14.6+4.4=19 - L

16046_2 1400 0 0 11 13.2 0 0 12 12.5 .278+.084= - C
11 13.5 12 12.6 .362 - U
43
1400°°C, 0µm, Hydrogen Generation as a Gas and Storage. t0= -2s of quench time.
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 5.5µm. Surface Sample=52.47cm2
2
L [mg/cm ] .220 .101 .322
2
C [mg/cm ] .219 .108 .327
2
U [mg/cm ] .229 .104 .333
2
Total [mg/cm ] .223 .104 .327
Total [mg] 11.7 5.46 17.16
Experimental results: H as a gas:16.6 [mg], H storage: 4.4[mg] and total H: 19.0 [mg]
43
Table III

Hydrogen
Total Exp.
Hydrogen
Mg
2
24 31. 25 42.9 39.+5.5=44.5 - L

16046_4 1600 0 0 29 29.7 0 0 28 35.5 - C
28 30. 27 34.5 .74+11=.85 - U
44
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 5µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2
2
L [mg/cm ] .728 .131 .860
2
C [mg/cm ] .710 .096 .806
2
U [mg/cm ] .692 .117 .809
2
Total [mg/cm ] .71 .115 .825
Total [mg] 37.25 6.03 43.29
Experimental results: H as a gas: 38.98 [mg], H storage: 5.5 [mg] and total H: 44.5 [mg]
44
Table IV
T
λ m,S and to determinates during the steam quenching in as received Zry
1200°°C 1400°°C 1600°°C
T
λm,S 4.5µm 5.5µm 5. µm
45
to -2s -2s -6s
45
Table V

Hydrogen
Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
°C µm µm µm µm µm µm µm µm
2
mg/cm
100. 104.93 150. 141.9 .88+0=.88 - L
16046_1 1200 100 104.16 105. 104.31 - 133.3 165. 137.1 .017+0=.017 - C
100. 104.4 170. 138. - U
46
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S = ? µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2
2
L [mg/cm ] .019 - .019
2
C [mg/cm ] .008 - .008
2
U [mg/cm ] .01 - .01
2
Total [mg/cm ] .012 - .012
Total [mg] .63 - .63
Experimental results: H as a gas: .88 [mg], H storage: 0 [mg] and total H: .88 [mg]
46
Table VI
Oxide layer Oxide layer Oxide layer Oxide layer α-Zry α-Zry α-Zry α-Zry Hydrogen
Term.: Lower, Central, Uper

Test Temperature before before after after before before after after Spectro-meter+
before quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching Hydrogen
quenching stored=
Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
2
µm µm µm µm µm µm µm µm mg/cm
°C
250 297.3 400-500 375.8 4.+12.=16 y U

27036_1 1200 ~300 293.7 270 299.1 - 375.7 400-500 376.4 y C
275 298.6 rest 376. .08+.23=.31 y L
47
1200°°C, 300µm, Hydrogen Generation as a Gas and Storage, to= 0s of quench time.
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 4.5 µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2.
H as a gas H storage H as a gas, new surf. Total H
Pos. Fiss. Total % of Total % of Total % of Total
2 2 2 Total Gas
[mg/cm ] Surface [mg/cm ] Surface [mg/cm ] Surface Storage
U y1 .654 11. .060 383. .003 268. .08 .23
C y1 .655 9. .060 383. .029 105. .08 .23
L y1 .655 9.5 .060 383. .020 89. .08 .23
Total
2 .655 9.8 .06 381. .017 71.8 .08 .23
Average [mg/cm ]
Total [mg] 34.37 3.36 3.15 12.0 .892 .64 16.
Experimental results: H as a gas: 4 [mg], H storage: 12 [mg] and Total H: 16 [mg]
47
Table VII

Hydrogen
Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
µm
2
°C µm µm µm µm µm µm µm mg/cm
240. 300.3 450. 377.7 3.+16.8=19.8 y L
25036_2 1400 300 293. 290. 301.7 - 375.7 rest 378.7 .057+.32= y C
290. 301.2 rest 378.4 .377 y U
48
1400°°C, 300 µm, Hydrogen Generation as a Gas and Storage, to= 0 s of quench time.
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 5.5 µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2.
2 2 2 Total Gas
L y1 .679 7. .075 426.7 .029 32.7 .057 .32
C y1 .678 7. .048 666.7 .075 12.7 .057 .32
U y1 .681 7. .040 800. .076 12.3 .057 .32
Total
2 .679 7. .054 588.8 .06 15.9 .057 .32
Average [mg/cm ]
Total [mg] 35.64 2.50 2.85 16.78 3.15 .50 19.78
Experimental results: H as a gas: 3 [mg], H storage: 16.78 [mg] and Total H: 19.78 [mg]
48
Table VIII

before before before after after before before after after Spectro-meter+
quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching Hydrogen
stored=
Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Model Total Exp.
Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
2
°C µm µm µm µm µm µm µm mg/cm
µm
95 115.8 200. 126. 15.3+2.57= y U
26036_1 1600 100 104.16 95 122.7 - 133.3 220. 122.3 17.87 y C
95 128.2 210. 120.7 .29+.05=.34 y L
49
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 5 µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2.
2 2 2 Total Gas
U y1 .245 100. .096 52.1 .062 4.5 .29 .05
C y1 .250 100. .064 78.1 .080 50. .29 .05
L y1 .260 100. .066 15.2 .249 3. .29 .05
Total
.252 100. .075 65.2 .130 30.5 .29 .05
Average [mg/cm2]
Total [mg] 13.22 13.22 3.94 2.57 6.82 2.08 17.87
Experimental results: H as a gas: 15.3 [mg], H storage: 2.57 [mg] and Total H: 17.87 [mg]
49
Table IX
Term.: Lower, Central,

before before before after after before before after after Spectro-meter+
quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching quenching Hydrogen
stored=
Uper
Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Exp. Model Total Exp.
Hydrogen
mg
2
230. 310.9 450. 369.6 3.76+3.66= y U
26036_2 1600 ~300 293.7 290. 312.5 - 375.7 rest 368. 7.42 y C
280. 310.9 rest 368.9 .072+.07=.142 y L
50
Maximum permeable oxide layer thickness for hydrogen: λTm,S= 5 µm. Surface Sample=52.47 cm2.
2 2 2 Total Gas
U y1 .725 1.7 .067 104.5 .161 37.1 .072 .07
C y1 .712 1.7 .063 111.1 .189 31.7 .072 .07
L y1 .715 1.7 .065 107.7 .166 36.1 .072 .07
Total
2 .717 1.7 .065 107.3 .172 34.6 .072 .07
Average [mg/cm ]
Total [mg] 37.6 .64 3.41 3.66 9.03 3.12 7.42
Experimental results: H as a gas: 3.76 [mg], H storage: 3.66 [mg] and Total H: 7.42 [mg]
50
Table X
Steam Quenching
a, deep average re-oxidation of substoichiometric oxide, mm

b, distance from the fissure of new metallic surface exposed, mm
H as gas from oxide H storage through

Crack length a b
fissures. the new metallic surface.
mm mm mm
% of total surface % of surface
º
1200 C, 0µm 0 0 0 0 0
100µm -112.9±382.7=0-269.8 0 0 0 0
51
300µm 1797±382.7=1414.3-2179.7 9.8 381. 0.24-0.36 9.2-14.1

º
1400 C, 0µm 0 0 0 0 0
100µm 73±188.1=0-191.1 - - - -
300µm 882±188.1=763.9-940.1 7. 588.8 0.39-0.48 32.9-40.4
º
1600 C, 0µm 0 0 0 0 0
100µm -6.4±132.1=0-125.7 100. 65.2 From 41.7 From 27.
300µm 746±132.1=613.9-878.1 1.7 107.3 0.1-0.15 6.4-9.2
51
REFERENCES
th
1. M. Steinbrück (Editor), Extract from the prologue of 5 International QUENCH Workshop,
Compilation of handouts, October 19-21, 1999, Karlsruhe, Germany, FZ Karlsruhe Interner
Bericht 32.21.08, PSF 3329, November 1999.
2. E.A. Garcia, “The Hydrogen Generated as a Gas and Storage in Zircaloy During Water
Quenching”, ARN PI - 6/99
3. P. Hofmann, V. Noack, “Physico-Chemical Behavior of Zircaloy Fuel Rod Cladding Tubes

LWR Severe Accident Reflood”, Part I: “Experimental Results of Single Rod Quench
Experiments”, FZKA 5846, May 1997.
th
4. L. Steinbock, “Surface Crack Formation of Oxidized Zircaloy Tubes during Cool-down”, 4
International QUENCH Workshop, M. Steinbrück (Editor), Compilation of handouts, October
6-8, 1998, Karlsruhe, Germany, FZ Karlsruhe Interner Bericht 32.21.08, PSF 3312, October
1998.
5. P. Hofmann, W. Leiling, A. Miassoedov, D. Piel, L. Schmidt, L. Sepold and M. Steinbrück.

“Flooding Experiments on the Determination of the Hydrogen Source Term”. Cooperative
Severe Accident Research Program Meeting. Albuquerque, New Mexico, May 3-6, 1999.
52
Localized Irradiations, Evaluation Through
“Comet Assay”
Di Giorgio, M.; Taja, M.R.; Nasazzi, N.B.;

Bustos. N.; Cavalieri, H. and Bolgiani, A.
Publicado como PI 4/00 de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear.

Presentado en 10th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association – IRPA,
Hiroshima, Japón, 14-19 mayo 2000
LOCALIZED IRRADIATIONS, EVALUATION THROUGH “COMET ASSAY”
Di Giorgio, M.; Taja, M.R.; Nasazzi, N.B.

Bustos. N.; Cavalieri, H. and Bolgiani, A.

Fundación Fortunato Benaim
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
During the last 50 years various radiation accidents involving localized irradiations occurred,
60 137 192
resulting mainly from improper handling of sealed sources of Co , Cs or Ir at workplaces
for industrial gammagraphy and other radiation sources (1-3). Severe skin reaction may develop
at the contact sites. Such inhomogeneous irradiations lead to a differential exposure of lympho-
cytes in lymphatic tissues or other organs that may recirculate into the peripheral blood produc-
ing a mixed irradiated and unirradiated population of lymphocytes.
Applying the mathematical models “Contaminated Poisson” of Dolphin (4) and Qdr method of
Sasaki (5), a mean dose in the irradiated body area and its size can be estimated from unstable
chromosome aberration scoring. There are also different biophysical techniques that can give
response in localized irradiations. Biological dosimetry is a necessary complement to physical
and clinical dosimetries. Thus, there is increasing interest in the assessment of biological mark-
ers that permit the detection of radiation induced damage in the localized irradiations.
The “Comet Assay” (single cell gel electrophoresis) is a sensitive, rapid and relatively inexpen-
sive method for measuring DNA damage in individual cells (6-7). Single cells are embedded in
agarose on microscope slides, lysed to remove the majority of the proteins, electrophoresed,
then stained with ethidium bromide in order to visualize the DNA. When visualized using a fluo-
rescent microscope, DNA of undamaged cells appears as a spherical mass occupying the cav-
ity formed by the lysed cell. Following radiation damage, the smaller the fragment size and the
grater the number of fragments of DNA, the grater the percentage of DNA that it is able to mi-
grate in an electric field, forming a comet image. The assay can be performed under alkaline
conditions to examine DNA single strand breaks (SSBs), or in non denaturing (neutral) condi-
tions to measure double strand breaks (DSBs) in individual cells.
The advantages of the technique include: 1) collection of data at the level of individual cells,
making it possible to identify different populations of cells within the same sample; 2) the need
for small numbers of cells per sample; 3) its sensitivity for detecting DNA damage and 4) that
virtually any eukaryote cell population is amenable to analysis.
The objective of this work is to apply “Comet Assay” method to evaluate the effect of radiation
on skin tissues, to test its use as a biological marker for differentiation of irradiated from unirra-
diated body areas. It could provide a useful tool to estimate the extension and the dose in the
irradiated region, contributing with the current techniques.
In this first study, we evaluate the alkaline comet assay as a method for detection of DNA radia-
tion induced damage in keratinocytes from primary and secondary cultures obtained from me-
dium thickness skin biopsies and in epidermal cells, without culture, obtained from the same
sample of skin biopsies of patients requiring skin grafts.
55
Skin and, particularly, keratinocytes were selected as an appropriate cellular system due to:
1) Skin is the first barrier against radiation exposure and therefore the first target.
2) Basal cells, from which keratinocytes derive, represent approximately 5% of all epidermal
cells. It is the basal cell that responds to damage and initiates migration and repopulates the
affected areas.
3) As differentiating keratinocytes undergo a physiological apoptotic via and it is not possible to

distinguish apoptotic cells from strongly irradiated cells, we consider that keratinocytes from
primary and secondary cultures are adequate for a preliminary approach to the comprehension
of the radiation induced changes observed in the biopsies without culture.
We evaluate the response of unirradiated and irradiated keratinocytes from primary and secon-
60
dary cultures, using Co gamma rays, in order to get information to be applied on the evalua-
tion of the skin biopsies without culture for an early assessment of irradiation consequences in
the locally irradiated individuals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Cultures of human keratinocytes were established according to the technique of Rheinwald and
Green (8-9).
Isolation of epidermal cells:
Medium thickness human skin samples (biopsies) were taken. The tissue sample was placed in
medium containing antibiotics (95% DMEM, 5% fetal calf serum, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 IU/ml
streptomycin) and immediately transferred to the laboratory for processing.
The biopsy was washed with PBS and minced into fine pieces, placed on a Petri dish containing
10 ml of dispase II solution and incubated 1h at 37°C. After incubation; the epidermis was
peeled from the dermis with the aid of fine tweezers.
The epidermal pieces were treated with 0.25% trypsin/0.02% EDTA 15 min at 37°C; trypsin ac-
tion was blocked adding an equal volume of DMEMc (90% DMEM medium/10%fetal calf se-
rum). The suspension was filtered through gauze to remove cellular debris and the stratum cor-
neum and centrifuged at 250 g during 10 min, at 4°C.
Cells were resuspended in 5 ml keratinocyte growth medium, KGMc medium (75%

DMEM/25%Ham’s F12). Supplements applied were as follow: 10% fetal calf serum, 24 µg/ml
adenine, 0.5 µg/ml hydrocortisone, 5 µg/ml insulin, 6 ng/ml cholera toxin, 5 µg/ml transferrin, 1.3
ng/ml triiodothyronine, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 IU/ml streptomycin, 10ng/ml epidermal growth
factor.
Cells were counted using trypan blue to identify dead cells. A sample of these cells was des-
tined for Comet Assay technique (named epidermal cellular suspension of the biopsy without
culture). The rest of the cells were used to prepare primary and secondary cultures of keratino-
cytes.
Primary and secondary cultures of keratinocytes:

2
A concentration of 20,000 viable keratinocytes per cm in KGMc medium were grown in the
2
presence of lethally irradiated 3T3 fibroblasts, 20,000 cells per cm , and incubated at 37°C in
humidified atmosphere containing 5% CO2. The medium was changed each 48 h - 72 h until the
cultures became subconfluent (between 7 and 10 days). Cells from subconfluent cultures were
56
++ ++
washed with PBS (Ca and Mg free) and treated with 0.02% EDTA solution (5 min at 37°C
with gentle shaking) in order to obtain complete fibroblast detachment. The supernatant was
discarded and keratinocytes were trypsinized (0.05% trypsin / 0.02% EDTA) during 10 min at
37°C.
Keratinocytes were counted and tested for viability. These cells were destined for Comet Assay
technique.
Gamma irradiation of cells:
Epidermal cell suspensions of the biopsies without culture and keratinocytes from primary and sec-
60
ondary cultures of three different donors (A, B and C) were irradiated on a Co source (Gamma cell)
at a mean dose rate of 1.9 Gy/min in sterile plastic tubes with 0 Gy, 1.5 Gy and 3 Gy. After irradia-
tion the cells were kept on ice to prevent the repair of any DNA lesions.
Alkaline Comet assay, preparation:
Alkaline Comet assay was performed according Singh (10) and Tice (11) technique with modifi-
cations. A layer of 1.5% normal melting agarose was prepared on microscope slides with
frosted end. After cell irradiation, ≈25,000 cells in 50 µl were mixed with 100 µl of 0.5% low
melting agarose. The suspension was pippeted onto the precoated slides and cover with a
cover slip (24 x 40 mm). The agarose was allowed to cool down for 5 min in a refrigerator, the
cover slip was removed and the microscope slide was immersed in cold lysis solution at pH 10
(2.5 M NaCl, 100 mM Na2EDTA, 10 mM Tris pH 10, 1% Triton X–100, 10% DMSO) and kept at
4°C for 45 min. To allow denaturation of DNA, the slides were placed in alkaline electrophoresis
buffer at pH 13 (1mM Na2EDTA / 300 mM NaOH) and left for 13 min. Subsequently, slides were
transferred to an electrophoresis tank with fresh alkaline electrophoresis buffer and electropho-
resis was performed at a field strength of 0.8 – 1 V/cm for 10 min at 4°C (30 V – 250 mA).
Slides were neutralized in 0.4 M Tris pH 7.5 for 5 min, stained with 20 µg/ml ethidium bromide,
covered with a cover slip and incubated for 5 min in dark.
After adding the cells to the slides until the end of the electrophoresis, direct light irradiation was
avoided and all the steps were performed at 4°C to prevent additional DNA damage.
Evaluation of DNA damage:
For visualization of DNA damage, observations were made using a 20x objective on a epifluores-
cent microscope equipped with an excitation filter of 515-560 nm and a barrier filter of 590 nm.
The extent of DNA damage was assessed using a visual classification method. 100 – 500 cells
were analyzed per sample and given a score from class 0 (undamaged) to class 4 (severely
damaged nucleus) and the results expressed as arbitrary units.
Cell viability was monitored prior to the lysis step using trypan blue dye. Cell viability did not fall
below 78%.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Keratinocytes from primary and secondary cultures
Figure I represents a visual analysis of radiation induced damage in keratinocytes from primary
and secondary cultures, irradiated in vitro with 0 Gy, 1.5 Gy and 3 Gy, obtained from skin biop-
sies of three patients (A, B and C) requiring skin grafts. 100-500 comets per slide were sorted
visually into classes 0-4, representing increasing amount of damage, and the results expressed
as arbitrary units. The DNA damage correlated with dose for the three samples analyzed.
57
400
0Gy 1.5Gy 3Gy
350
DNA damage (arbitrary units)

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3
Samples
Figure I. Radiation induced damage in keratinocytes from primary and secondary

cultures obtained from skin biopsies of patients A, B and C.
From the same set of data, Figure II shows the distribution in classes of the comets for the three
samples evaluated. A significant difference in migration pattern was observed from the unirradi-
ated and the irradiated cells, with a shift to the upper classes with the increase of the dose.
These results suggest that exposure to γ-rays caused a dose-dependent increase in DNA dam-
age in keratinocytes. Also such effect showed similar trends in all three subjects evaluated.
Patient A - 0 Gy - Patient B - 0 Gy - Patient C - 0 Gy -
60% 50%
40%
50% 40%
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
40% 30%
30%
30%
20% 20%
20%
10% 10% 10%
0% 0% 0%
Class 0 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 0 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 0 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Comet classes Comet classes Comet classes
Patient A - 1.5 Gy - Patient B - 1.5 Gy - Patient C - 1.5 Gy -
60% 50%
40%
50% 40%
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
40% 30%
30%
30%
20%
20%
20%
10%
10% 10%
0% 0% 0%
Patient A - 3 Gy - Patient B - 3 Gy - Patient C - 3 Gy -
70% 70% 70%

60% 60% 60%
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
Frequency (%)
50% 50% 50%

40% 40% 40%
30% 30% 30%
20% 20% 20%
10% 10% 10%
0% 0% 0%
Figure II. Distribution in classes of the comets for the three patients evaluated
at 0 Gy, 1.5 Gy and 3 Gy.
58
Epidermal cells of the biopsies without culture
The epidermis is a multilayered, stratified squamous epithelium, completely cellular, made up of

progressively maturating keratinocytes from the basal layer to the keratin layer.
The suspension of epidermal cells (after removing the stratum corneum) comprises mainly ke-
ratinocytes with different status of differentiation and thus, many of them undergo physiological
apoptosis, basal cells (Figure IIIA) and other cellular types in minor proportion.
A rough view, after alkaline comet assay, of the unirradiated and irradiated epidermal cell sus-
pensions without culture showed a great amount of cells with high fragmentation of their DNA.
As the contribution of non-viable cells and apoptotic cells may lead to erroneous results, it was
necessary to recognize non-viable and apoptotic cells to exclude them from data evaluation.
Identification of non-viable and apoptotic cells was possible by the typical shape of the comets,
as can be seen in Figure III. Unlike the comets of γ-rays damaged cells (Figure IIIB), the comets
of dead cells appear with a balloon shaped tail and low fluorescence density (Figure IIIC) and
the extensive DNA fragmentation present in the apoptotic cell (Figure IIID) allowed most of the
DNA to migrate, leaving only a small amount of DNA in the original position (and approximate
size) of the nucleus.
IIIA IIIB
IIIC IIID
Figure III. Fluorescence micrograph of a basal cell from a suspension of skin bi-
opsy epidermal cells (A). Fluorescence micrographs after comet assay; identifica-
tion of irradiated (B), non-viable (C) and apoptotic (D) keratinocytes.
The percentage of cells with balloon shaped tail identified during fluorescence microscopy was
of the same order as the percentage of non-viable cells obtained during viability studies with
trypan blue technique before comet assay. For unirradiated cells the percentage of non-viable
cells during comet assay was about 14% (viability 86%) and the same percentage was ob-
59
served with the cell viability test, monitored prior to the lysis step. The viability decreased to
78% after irradiations, showing about 22% of balloon shaped tail cells during comet assay.
When compared unirradiated with irradiated biopsy samples, non-viable cells and apoptotic
cells were excluded from data analysis because most of these comets (class 4) are not radia-
tion induced, for the doses evaluated. However, small doses of radiation may induce signifi-
cant apoptosis and comets of physiological apoptotic cells are indistinguishable from comets
of radiation induced apoptotic cells or highly damaged cells. Therefore, class 3 and class 4
comets were also excluded from analysis. We observed a decrease of the percentage of cells
in the lower comet classes (class 0 – class 2) that tended to be dose dependent for the sam-
ples analyzed.
Further information is required to validate this observation, increasing the size of the sample
and taking into account confounding factors such age and status of health of the individuals
evaluated.
CONCLUSIONS
The results presented here show that the alkaline comet assay can be applied to the study of
DNA radiation induced damage in keratinocytes from primary and secondary cultures obtained
from skin biopsies of individuals requiring skin grafts. DNA damage correlated with dose. The
distribution in classes of comets showed a significant difference in migration pattern with the
increase of the dose, suggesting that exposure to γ rays caused a dose-dependant increase in
DNA damage in keratinocytes with similar trends in all three subjects evaluated.
The fact that the comet assay is a microdosimetric technique based on the selection of individ-
ual cells in a heterogeneous cell population on the basis of nuclear morphology and shape of
comets has been reported for liver cells, for male germ diploid vs. haploid cells and for perito-
neal macrophages (12-13). Our results indicate that the alkaline comet assay is a suitable
method for identification of non-viable and apoptotic cells in the cellular system evaluated.
Skin biopsies are particularly interesting since they are taken from the patient, processed to
obtain a suspension of individual cells that are directly evaluated through comet assay, avoiding
culture and within the same day. Therefore, skin biopsies provide an adequate cellular system
for an early assessment of the localized irradiation consequences evaluated through comet as-
say. Moreover, there are many factors operating in vivo that could not be evaluated from pri-
mary and secondary cell culture simulations.
When compared unirradiated with irradiated biopsy samples, excluding comets from non-viable
and apoptotic cells and also class 3 and class 4 comets, we observed a decrease in the per-
centage of cells in the lower comet classes that tended to be dose dependant.
Although further studies are required to validate these observations, we consider that the reduc-
tion of undamaged cells, applying comet assay, would be an appropriate parameter for differen-
tiation of irradiated from unirradiated body areas.
As most of the cells in the lower comet classes are dividing cells that initiate migration and re-
populate the skin affected areas, a reduction in the percentage of these cells would correlate
with the reduction and, finally, with the loss of regenerative capabilities of the skin, having pre-
dictive value. It could provide a useful tool to estimate the extension and, at least, thresholds of
dose in the irradiated region, contributing with the current techniques.
The influence of confounding factors such as age and status of health of the evaluated individ-
ual on the decrease observed should be assessed.
60
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9. H. Green, O. Kehinde, J. Thomas. Growth of cultured human epidermal cells into multiple
epithelia suitable for grafting. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 76(11), 5665-5668 (1979).
10. N.P. Singh, M.T. Mc Coy, R.R. Tice and E.L. Schneider. A simple technique for quantitation
of low levels of DNA damage in individual cells. Exp. Cell Res. 175, 184-191 (1988).
11. R.R. Tice. The single cell gel/comet assay: a microgel electrophoretic technique for the de-
tection of DNA damage and repair in individual cells. Environmental mutagenesis. D.H. Phil-
lips and S. Venitt, eds. Oxford, 315-339 (1995).
12. R.R. Tice. G.H.S. Strauss. The single cell gel electrophoresis/comet assay: a potential tool
for detecting radiation induced DNA damage in humans. T.M. Fliedner, E.P. Cronkite, V.P.
Bond, eds. Assessment of radiation effects by molecular and cellular approaches, Stem
Cells 13(S1), 207-214 (1995).
13. C. Bock, A. Dube, K.O. Greulich, P.K. Gupta. Identification by microscopically controlled
comet assay of peritoneal macrophages in a mixture of peritoneal exudate for DNA strand
break analysis. Mutat. Res. 439, 171-181 (1999).
61
Biological Dose Estimation
of Partial Body Exposures
in Cervix Cancer Patients
Di Giorgio, M.; Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.;

Roth, B.; Sardi; M. and Menendez, P.
Publicado como PI 5/00 de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear.

Presentado en 10th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association – IRPA,
BIOLOGICAL DOSE ESTIMATION OF PARTIAL BODY EXPOSURES
IN CERVIX CANCER PATIENTS
Di Giorgio, M.; Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.

Roth, B.; Sardi; M. and Menendez, P.

Instituto de Oncología “Ángel H. Roffo”
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
At present, unstable chromosome aberration analysis in peripheral blood lymphocytes is the

most sensitive method to provide a biological estimation of the dose in accidental radiation
overexposures (1-3). The assessment of the dose is particularly reliable in cases of acute, uni-
form, whole-body exposures or after irradiation of large parts of the body. However, the sce-
narios of most radiation accidents result in partial-body exposures or non-uniform dose distribu-
tion, leading to a differential exposure of lymphocytes in the body.
Inhomogeneity produces a yield of dicentrics, which does not conform to a Poisson distribution,
but is generally overdispersed. This arises because those lymphocytes in tissues outside the
radiation field will not be damaged. Most of the lymphocytes (80%) belong to the “redistribu-
tional pool” (lymphatic tissues and other organs) and made recirculate into peripheral blood
producing a mixed irradiated and unirradiated population of lymphocytes. So-called overdisper-
sion, with a variance greater than the mean, can be taken as an indication of non-uniform expo-
sure.
The main factors operating in vivo partial-body irradiation may be the location and size of the
irradiation field and, at high doses, various cellular reactions such as reduced blast transforma-
tion, mitotic delay or interphase death may contribute.
For partial-body exposures, mathematical-statistical analysis of chromosome aberration data

can be performed to derive a dose estimate for the irradiated fraction of the body, been more
realistic than to quote a mean equivalent uniform whole body dose. The “contaminated Poisson”
method of Dolphin (4) or the Qdr method of Sasaki (5), both based on similar principles, can
achieve this.
Contaminated Poisson considers the overdispersed distribution of dicentrics among all the cells
scored. The observed distribution is considered to be the sum of a Poisson distribution, which
represents the irradiated fraction of the body, and the remaining unexposed fraction. Cells con-
taining aberrations will have been in the irradiated part of the body. Normal undamaged cells
will comprise two subpopulations; those from the unexposed fraction and irradiated cells repre-
-Y
senting the first term (e ) of the Poisson series. From the degree of the deviation from Poisson,
the fraction of irradiated lymphocytes of the body and its mean dose can be obtained.
The alternative Qdr method considers the yield of dicentrics and rings only from those cells that
contain unstable aberrations and assumes that these cells were irradiated in situ. The Qdr value
represents the expected frequency of dicentrics and rings among first division damaged cells
(containing dicentrics, rings and excess acentric fragments). It is dose dependent, but inde-
pendent of dose homogeneity and of a dilution of damaged cells by undamaged cells.
Qdr assumes that the excess acentric fragments follow the Poisson distribution, but this is not
borne out by data from in vitro experiments. It also assumes that cells containing excess acen-
tric fragments will have been in the irradiated fraction of the body. However, their induction is
65
not radiation specific, showing a variable spontaneous frequency. As these limitations are
thought to be important, they were avoided by considering the yield of dicentrics + rings in those
damaged cells which contain just dicentrics + rings (Qdr reduced equation). This simplified
equation produces a dose estimate identical to that obtained by Dolphin method. Therefore, we
apply Qdr reduced equation for data analysis.
After inhomogeneous exposures, information on the absorbed dose and its distribution in the
body is of great importance for an early assessment of irradiation consequences in the exposed
individuals.
As cancer patients undergoing partial-body fractionated radiotherapy may provide a model for in
vivo irradiation, the objective of this work has been to assess the possibilities and limitations of
Qdr method to determine reliable dose estimates for data based on conventional scoring of
dicentrics plus rings for the model proposed.
Patients
Chromosome analyses were carried out in five female cervix cancer patients, mean age 41.2 ±
7.3 years. The patients were selected on the basis that they had not undergone previous che-
motherapy or radiotherapy, and that the irradiated volumes were similar.
All patients gave their informed consent to be included in the study.

60
Patients were treated with γ rays from a Co therapy unit with total doses between 45 Gy - 50 Gy
delivered in daily fractions of 2 Gy.
Blood sampling and cell cultures
From each patient, peripheral blood samples were collected just before the treatment (control)
and at different sampling times after radiotherapy: 24 h after first fraction (2 Gy) and 72 h after
th
5 fraction (10 Gy).
Knowing the field sizes (AP–PA and laterals), the depth at which the dose was delivered from
3
AP – PA and lateral portals and assuming density of the body 1 g/cm , two irradiated volumes
where estimated for each patient: I) a therapeutic volume (tumor area in which the therapeutic
dose is delivered) and II) a complete volume (tumor area plus surrounding tissues) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Schematic representation of therapeutic and complete volumes
66
In all cases, 0.8 ml – 1 ml peripheral blood was cultured for 50 h in 8 ml RPMI 1640 medium
supplemented with 25% fetal calf serum, L-glutamine, antibiotics (1% penicillin/streptomycin)
and phytohaemagglutining-P. Colchicine was added 2 h before harvesting. To select first divi-
sion metaphases, 6µg/ml bromodeoxyuridine was added since the set up of the cultures. Slides
were stained by the Fluorescence plus Giemsa technique (6).
Cytogenetic analysis
Scoring was performed for the exclusively first division metaphases for unstable chromosome
aberrations including dicentrics, rings and excess acentric fragments.
Statistical analysis
To check if the distribution of chromosome aberrations among cells followed a Poisson distribu-
2
tion, σ /y (variance/mean) and the Papworth u test (7) were used.
Dose estimation for the irradiated fraction of the body was performed following the Qdr method
(Sasaki and Miyata 1968) using the laboratory dicentrics + rings calibration curve.
Qdr is the expected yield of dicentrics and rings, X, among the damaged cells, Cu (first division
metaphase cells containing unstable chromosome aberrations), given by equation I (Qdr re-
duced equation).
-Y
Qdr = X / Cu = Y / (1 – e ) (I)
Where, Y is the expected yield of dicentrics + rings, is a function of the dose and derivable from
in vitro dose-response curve. The values of the estimated dose (D) were obtained by iteration.
The standard errors were calculated taking into account the variance of dicentrics + rings
among unstable cells.
As originally published, the Qdr method did not go on to determine the size of the original irradi-
ated fraction, but Sasaki (6) has shown that this can be estimated using the same principle as in
equations II-IV from Dolphin method. Thus, in order to estimate the fraction of cells originally
exposed (F) we use the following equations:
F = ( f / p ) / ( 1 - f + f / p) (II)
Yf = X / N (III)
( -D / D0 )
p =e (IV)
Where, f is the fraction of cells scored which were irradiated, p is the surviving fraction of cells,
taking into account the selective loss of irradiated cells due to interphase death and mitotic de-
lay. N is the number of all cells scored, D is the estimated dose to the irradiated fraction (f) of
cells scored and D0 is 3.5 Gy for γ-rays (8).
The yields of unstable chromosome aberrations in peripheral blood from patients 1-5 before
irradiation (control) and after partial-body irradiation (2 Gy and 10 Gy) are listed in Table I.
The aberration frequencies in the control samples (before treatment) were in good agreement
-3
with aberration background levels (1x10 dicentrics/cell).
67
Patient Dose (Gy) N N-Cu Cu Chromosome aberrations Dicentrics/cell Qdr
Dicentrics + rings
1 0 500 500 0 0 0 -
2 0 500 500 0 0 0 -
3 0 500 500 0 0 0 -
4 0 500 500 0 0 0 -
5 0 500 500 0 0 0 -
1 2 500 488 12 17 0.034 1.42
2 2 500 487 13 16 0.032 1.23
3 2 500 490 10 12 0.024 1.20
4 2 500 492 8 12 0.024 1.50
5 2 500 487 13 16 0.032 1.23
1 10 500 459 41 60 0.120 1.46
2 10 500 462 38 57 0.114 1.50
3 10 380 329 51 86 0.226 1.69
4 10 480 423 57 100 0.208 1.75
5 10 408 350 58 100 0.245 1.72
Table I. Chromosome aberrations from cervix cancer patients observed after

partial body radiation
The data on distributions of the dicentrics among lymphocytes are given in Table II for patients
1-5 after partial-body irradiations.
The distribution of dicentrics plus rings was overdispersed respect to Poisson distribution (the
2
dispersion index, σ / y > 1; test quantity, u > 1.96) for all irradiated samples. The u values
tended to increase with dose, for the same irradiated fraction of the body.
Patient Dose (Gy) N Distribution of Dicentrics + Rings Variance/Mean "u"

0 1 2 3
1 2 500 488 7 5 0 1.56 9.07
2 2 500 487 10 3 0 1.35 5.64
3 2 500 490 8 2 0 1.31 5.15
4 2 500 492 4 4 0 1.65 10.66
5 2 500 487 10 3 0 1.35 5.65
1 10 500 459 26 11 4 1.65 10.35
2 10 500 462 24 9 5 1.73 11.66
3 10 380 329 28 11 12 1.87 12.07
4 10 480 423 26 19 12 1.90 13.93
5 10 408 350 28 18 12 1.84 12.05
Table II. Distribution of dicentrics + rings among cells in different samples
68
Doses and fraction of body irradiated estimated by using Qdr method are shown in Table III.
While a best fit with physical doses and fraction of the body irradiated is achieved after 2 Gy
partial body exposures, after 10 Gy the dose is underestimated and the volume overestimated.
The fraction, p, of irradiated cells, which survived and reached metaphase, decreased with
dose: 0.5 and 0.3 at doses of 2 Gy and 10 Gy respectively.
Patient Dose (Gy) Qdr Method

Dose (Gy) F (%)
1 2 3.04 (2.61-3.49) 10±1
2 2 2.29 (1.96-2.61) 13±1
3 2 2.13 (1.79-2.48) 11±1
4 2 3.30 (2.71-3.89) 7±1
5 2 2.29 (1.96-2.61) 13±1
1 10 3.18 (2.93-3.43) 30±1
2 10 3.30 (3.03-3.57) 28±1
3 10 3.82 (3.55-4.09) 42±1
4 10 3.96 (3.70-4.23) 38±1
5 10 3.89 (3.63-4.15) 44±1
Table III. Dose and percentage of body irradiated using Qdr method
Patient Age Body Weight Therapeutic Complete

(kg) volume volume
1 38 70 4.13% 15.10%
2 36 63 4.06% 11.36%
3 42 75 3.41% 15.48%
4 35 56 5.16% 14.59%
5 55 83 3.48% 14.67%
Table IV. Therapeutic and complete volumes estimated for each patient
Table IV shows the therapeutic volume and the complete volume estimated for each patient.
When compared the fraction of the body irradiated, estimated by using Qdr method, with the
therapeutic and complete volumes, the complete volume better represents the estimation of the
irradiated body fraction, that is a reflection of the irradiated lymphocyte population rather than
the percentage of the body exposed.
69
CONCLUSIONS
It is reported that many irradiated cells are lost during culture of mixed in vitro irradiated and
unirradiated lymphocytes and that interphase death is an important factor influencing the aber-
ration rate, especially at higher doses (9).
Although, the main factors operating in vivo partial body irradiation are the location and size of
the irradiation field, at higher doses mitotic delay and interphase death may lead to a preferen-
tial selection of heavily damaged cells that could explain the underestimation of the dose ob-
served in the cervical cancer patients after 10 Gy partial-body exposure. It is likely that the
higher radiation doses received by lymphoid tissues in the pelvis resulted in extensive inter-
phase death. Additionally, most of the cells scored came from the unexposed part of the body
and only a few irradiated cells were able to reach metaphase after 50 h of culture.
After 2 Gy partial body exposures, it appears that the yield of unstable chromosome aberrations
serve as reference for dose estimation applying the simplified Qdr method when a complete
volume is considered (11%-15%). For such small irradiated volumes, Qdr function seems to
saturate rapidly with the increase of dose, above 2 Gy.
REFERENCES
1. A.T. Ramalho, A.C.H. Nascimento and A.T. Naatarajan, Dose assessments by cytogenetic
analysis in the Goiana (Brazil) accident. Radiat. Prot. Dosim.25, 97-100 (1988).
2. L.G. Littlefield, E.E: Joiner, S.P: Colyer, R.C: Ricks, C.C. Lushbaugh and R. Hurtado-
60
Monroy, The 1989 San Salvador C radiation accident: cytogenetic dosimetry and follow up
evaluations in three accident victims. Radiat. Prot. Dosim, 33,115-123 (1991)
3. M. Bauchinger, Cytogenetic research after accidental radiation exposure. Stem Cells 13(1),
182-190 (1995)
4. G.W. Dolphin, Biological dosimetry with particular reference to chromosome aberration

analysis. A review of methods. Handling of radiation accidents. STI/PUB/229 IAEA SM 119/4.
Vienna, 215-224 (1969).
5. M.S. Sasaki, Use of lymphocyte chromosome aberrations in biological dosimetry: Possibili-

ties and limitations. Ishihara, T. and Sasaki, M.S., eds. Radiation-induced chromosome damage
in man. New York: Alan R. Liss, 585-604 (1983).
6. P. Perry and S. Wolff, New Giemsa method for differential staining of sister chromatid. Na-
ture 261, 156-158 (1974).
7. D. Papworth, Curve fitting by maximum likelihood. Appendix to paper by J.R.K. Savage,

Radiation induced chromosomal aberrations in the plant Trasdescantia. Dose-response curves.
Radiation Botanics 15, 87 (1975).
8. S. Matsubara, M.S. Sasaki and T. Adachi, Dose-response relationship of lymphocyte chro-

mosome aberrations in locally irradiated persons. J. Radiat. Res. 15, 189-196 (1974).
9. D.C. Lloyd, R.J. Purrott and G.W. Dolphin, Chromosome aberration dosimetry using human
lymphocytes in simulated partial body irradiation. Phys. Med. Biol. 18, 421-431 (1973).
70
Determinación de dosis en la población.
Características del código CREAM
Alonso, M.T. y Curti, A.R.

DETERMINACIÓN DE DOSIS EN LA POBLACIÓN
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL CÓDIGO CREAM
Alonso, M.T. y Curti, A.R.

Argentina
RESUMEN ABSTRACT
En esta publicación se presentan las caracte- This paper presents the main features of the
rísticas del PC CREAM, un programa para la PC CREAM, a program for performing radio-
determinación de dosis a la población debido a logical impact assessments due to radioac-
la operación de las instalaciones radiactivas y tive discharges into the environment during
nucleares. El paquete de programas CREAM the operation of radioactive and nuclear fa-
está constituido por seis módulos interrelacio- cilities.
nados entre sí, que permiten determinar dosis
individuales y colectivas como consecuencia de PC-CREAM is a suite of six programs that
la descarga al ambiente de efluentes radiacti- can be used to estimate individual and col-
vos líquidos y gaseosos. lective radiation doses. The methodology of
PC CREAM is based on updated environ-
La metodología aplicada dentro del sistema mental and dosimetric models, including
CREAM está basada en modelos ambienta- ICRP 60 recommendations. The models in-
les y dosimétricos actualizados, incluyendo clude several exposure pathways and the
las recomendaciones del ICRP 60. Los mo- input files are easy to access. The ergonom-
delos incluyen numerosas vías de exposición ics of the program improves the user interac-
y las bibliotecas del programa son de fácil tion and makes easier the input of local data.
acceso. La ergonomía en el diseño del pro- This program is useful for performing sensi-
grama permite una fácil interacción con el tivity analysis, siting studies and validation of
mismo lo que posibilita el ingreso de los da- model comparing the activity concentration
tos locales. Es además un programa muy output data with environmental monitoring
práctico para realizar análisis de sensibilidad, data.
estudios exploratorios de emplazamiento y
estudios de validación con datos de monito- The methodology of each module is de-
raje ambiental, debido a que presenta como scribed as well as the output data.
resultado las concentraciones en diferentes
matrices ambientales.
En este trabajo se describe la metodología

de cálculo en cada módulo del programa y
sus resultados.
73
INTRODUCCIÓN
Una parte fundamental de la práctica de la protección radiológica es la determinación y evaluación

de las dosis. El sistema de protección radiológica para la población, recomendado por la Comisión
Internacional de Protección Radiológica (ICRP) está basado fundamentalmente en los límites y
restricciones de las dosis individuales.
Es prácticamente imposible determinar la dosis efectiva en la población en forma directa, por lo que
se utilizan programas de cálculo que incluyen modelos ambientales, metabólicos y dosimétricos. La
determinación de las dosis dependerá de modelos que representen el transporte de los radionu-
cleidos de la fuente a la población, modelos que pueden ser verificados con otros modelos o vali-
dados con mediciones ambientales.
Los modelos ambientales son representaciones matemáticas aproximadas del medio en que vivi-
mos y de los procesos reales que ocurren dentro de él, que involucran el transporte de radionuclei-
dos. Este medio ambiente se puede representar como un sistema complejo de compartimentos
donde hay determinada concentración de material radiactivo. Las interrelaciones entre los compar-
timentos reflejan los procesos naturales de transferencia de elementos químicos en sus ciclos natu-
rales.
Todos los parámetros de los modelos tienen asociado un valor de incertidumbre por lo que se ne-
cesita que sean lo más realistas posible para que las dosis no estén sujetas a grandes subestima-
ciones o sobreestimaciones.
A modo de actualización de los códigos de cálculo se está comenzando a implementar en la ARN

el programa PC CREAM, desarrollado por la National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB), para
determinar dosis en la población debido a las descargas gaseosas y líquidas de instalaciones nu-
cleares y radiactivas en operación normal.
Alcance de este trabajo
En este trabajo se describen brevemente las características del programa CREAM, con todos los
módulos asociados, y la metodología aplicada.
Características del PC CREAM
El PC CREAM es una herramienta de cálculo de fácil manejo, con flexibilidad en la introducción de

parámetros locales, ergonomía en su diseño, gran disponibilidad de datos y una variedad conside-
rable de vías de exposición del hombre.
CREAM (Consequences of Releases to the Environment Assessment Methodology).
Este programa está basado en la metodología de la Unión Europea [1] para el cálculo de la dosis
individual (grupo crítico) y colectiva producto de descargas continuas de instalaciones nucleares y
radiactivas.
Generalidades
El código CREAM está constituido por 6 programas que evalúan el impacto de la descarga de los
efluentes líquidos y gaseosos (están incluidos los aerosoles) y su transferencia por los diferentes
compartimentos ambientales hasta llegar al hombre.
74
− ASSESSOR: permite realizar la evaluación dosimétrica y se divide en los siguientes mó-
dulos: atmosférico, de ríos y marino, según el medio receptor de la descarga.
− PLUME: estima la dispersión atmosférica de los radionucleidos emitidos a la atmósfera.
− DORIS: estima la dispersión de radionucleidos en agua de mar alrededor de Europa
− FARMLAND: estima la transferencia de radionucleidos a través de las cadenas alimenta-
rias terrestres.
− RESUS: estima la concentración de actividad en aire de radionucleidos depositados y resus-
pendidos por la acción del viento.
− GRANIS: estima la dosis gamma externa a partir de radionucleidos depositados en el suelo.
Nota: Los resultados de cada programa pueden ser usados como archivos de datos suplementa-
rios del ASSESSOR.
En el diagrama de bloque se presenta un enfoque simplificado del sistema CREAM.
Las dosis efectivas son calculadas siguiendo la metodología recomendada por la ICRP 60 [2], utili-
zando los factores de conversión de dosis de la ICRP 72 [3], para tres grupos de edades: 1 año, 10
años y adultos.
El usuario tiene la facilidad de introducir datos locales sobre parámetros de transferencia y hábitos
de vida de la población, en un determinado rango dado por el programa, y en cada paquete del
mismo.
Metodología de cálculo
El CREAM usa el modelo de compartimentos, y la transferencia entre los mismos es modelada

usando flujos que toman en cuenta los procesos naturales relevantes como translocación, intempe-
rismo, intercepción, resuspensión, y todo proceso relacionado con el transporte de contaminantes
en el medio.
75
Cada flujo representa la cantidad de sustancia transferida por unidad de tiempo de un comparti-
mento a otro, o las pérdidas de actividad del compartimento. Se asume un mezclado instantáneo
dentro del compartimento y una distribución uniforme una vez ingresado el radionucleido al mismo.
El CREAM es un código Fortran que provee soluciones analíticas a las ecuaciones diferenciales de
primer orden que gobiernan la variación del inventario en el modelo de compartimentos.
PLUME
El PLUME es un código que evalúa, en función de la distancia, el comportamiento de la actividad

descargada a la atmósfera en forma continua a partir de una fuente puntual. El programa permite
también el modelado de escenarios de descarga de más de una fuente puntual de emisión.
En el PLUME los datos requeridos para el cálculo de dispersión atmosférica son la altura de la
emisión, los datos meteorológicos y la distancia del receptor, los radionucleidos emitidos, la rugosi-
dad del terreno y el esquema de categorías de estabilidad.
El PLUME usa el modelo semi-empírico de pluma Gaussiana y considera tres procesos de remo-
ción de material radiactivo de la pluma: decaimiento radiactivo, depósito seco y lavado. La tasa de
depósito está determinada por la velocidad de depósito, definida como la relación entre la tasa de
depósito por unidad de superficie y la concentración en aire por unidad de volumen sobre la super-
ficie del terreno. La velocidad de depósito depende de la naturaleza del material particulado. Los
gases nobles, el tritio y el C-14 tienen valores de depósito nulos. El valor usado por omisión en el
-3
código, excepto para los iodos, es de 1 x 10 m/s.
El lavado por acción de la lluvia se determina mediante el coeficiente de lavado Λ, definido

como la fracción de material removido del penacho por unidad de tiempo. Se recomienda un
-4 -1 -1
valor de 1 x 10 s , para 1 µm de tamaño de partículas durante una precipitación de 1 mm h .
Para mayor descripción del modelo ver metodología aplicada [1].
Resultados del PLUME:

3
− Concentración en aire (Bq/m ).
2
− Tasa de depósito (Bq/m .s).
− Dosis gamma por inmersión (Sv/a).
FARMLAND
El FARMLAND es el programa de cálculo que permite evaluar una de las vías principales de expo-
sición: la ingestión de alimentos. Determina la concentración de radionucleidos en los alimentos a
partir de las descargas gaseosas.
Es un programa de mucha utilidad que permite comparar los resultados de sus corridas con los
resultados de las mediciones ambientales realizados en planes de monitoreo. Este código permite
la utilización de una gran variedad de parámetros del modelo o la entrada de parámetros locales
dependientes e independientes del elemento radiactivo.
Son considerados todos los procesos químicos, físicos y biológicos que intervienen en la migración
de material radiactivo a través de las cadenas alimentarias.
76
El FARMLAND consta de 6 submodelos de cadenas alimentarias:
− Pasto - vacas
− Pasto - ovejas
− Vegetales de hojas
− Tubérculos y raíces
− Granos
− Frutas
Cada submodelo de cadena alimentaria está asociada a uno de los dos modelos de suelo desarro-
llados. Estos son: suelos utilizados para prácticas agrícolas y suelos no perturbados (pasto, zonas
urbanas).
El modelo de suelo removido asume un solo compartimento donde los radionucleidos están homo-
géneamente repartidos en el mismo. Este se usa para todos los cultivos.
En el segundo modelo, la migración de radionucleidos en la columna de suelo es modelada a tra-

vés de una serie de compartimentos consecutivos, dentro de los cuales se asume mezcla homogé-
nea de los radionucleidos. Las cadenas alimentarias pasto-ganado incluyen este tipo de modelo de
suelo.
La naturaleza química del elemento radiactivo, la composición del suelo, el clima (humedad, tasa
de precipitaciones) influyen en la movilidad y disponibilidad de los radionucleidos en el suelo.
Vías de exposición de cadenas alimentarias del FARMLAND [5].
77
Se presenta una variante de subcompartimentos en los que puede descomponerse el comparti-
mento ANIMAL de la figura anterior.
Los datos de entrada para la corrida del FARMLAND son:
− Radionucleidos emitidos.
− Parámetros dependientes del elemento: movilidad, factores de transferencia suelo-planta,

ya sea pasto o algún alimento específico, transferencia pasto-animal (carne, leche, hígado)
y la consideración de sus modelos metabólicos.
− Parámetros independientes del elemento: factor de intercepción para el depósito de la

planta, productividad del tipo de vegetal a evaluar, densidad del suelo, coeficiente de re-
suspensión, velocidad de depósito, fracción de la planta considerada como peso seco,
cantidad de pasto consumido por el animal, fracción de consumo correspondiente al suelo,
cosechas por año, semiperíodo de permanencia del radionucleido en la planta (excluyendo
el decaimiento radiactivo) y producción de leche.
En todos los modelos de cadenas alimentarias se debería disponer de la mayor cantidad de pará-
metros locales, de lo contrario se pueden utilizar parámetros en rangos dados por el CREAM.
Resultados del Farmland
− Concentración de radionucleidos en alimentos, suelo y pasto (Bq/kg).
GRANIS
El GRANIS determina la exposición gamma, resultante del depósito radiactivo, a 1 m sobre la su-
perficie del suelo. El depósito de radionucleidos es una fuente de irradiación externa al hombre a lo
largo de los años, la cual depende del espectro energético de los radionucleidos emisores gamma
depositados, de su migración en el suelo y del período de semidesintegración radiactivo de estos
elementos. El movimiento de radionucleidos en el suelo es influenciado fundamentalmente por la
naturaleza química de la sustancia a la que está ligada el elemento, el tipo de suelo, su textura, el
contenido de materia orgánica, la humedad, las precipitaciones, la acción intrusiva de animales y
plantas, y la remoción del suelo para trabajos agrícolas.
78
Se usan dos tipos genéricos de suelo que representan la composición de un suelo húmedo y uno
seco. Para los suelos húmedos se parte del supuesto que los poros intersticiales están rellenos de
agua, y en el caso de los suelos secos, de aire. Se considera que un 50 % del suelo está repre-
sentado por los poros intersticiales y el otro 50 % por la fracción sólida, que está conformada por
minerales y componentes orgánicos del suelo.
Al igual que en el FARMLAND se incluyen dos modelos de suelo en la evaluación:
− Modelo de suelo utilizado en prácticas agrícolas, representado por una capa de suelo de 0-
30 cm, donde la distribución del radionucleido es uniforme. Las pérdidas de este comparti-
mento están relacionadas con los procesos de difusión y transporte con el agua que se va
filtrando a través del suelo.
− Modelo de suelo no perturbado: se asume que los radionucleidos migran a través de cinco
capas de suelo cuyas profundidades son: 0 - 1 cm, - 5 cm, de 5 - 15 cm, 15 - 30 cm, 30 -
100 cm. Los radionucleidos están uniformemente mezclados en cada compartimento. La
profundidad de 0 - 1 cm está referida a la capa donde ocurre la resuspensión y de donde
los animales ingieren suelo al pastar. Las capas hasta 15 cm están relacionadas con el
sistema radicular de las plantas. Existe un amplio rango de variación para los coeficientes
de transferencia entre compartimentos. En el modelo descripto se utilizan los parámetros
determinados en estudios hechos con Pu, lo cual es bastante adecuado para simular el
comportamiento de elementos no tan móviles como el Sr y el Cs, pero muy conservativo
para elementos tan móviles como el iodo.
Los cálculos toman en cuenta la atenuación de la radiación a través del suelo y del aire.
Resultados del GRANIS
- Dosis efectiva por irradiación externa resultante del depósito radiactivo (µSv/año).
RESUS
La resuspensión es un proceso importante en la inhalación de radionucleidos. En la metodología

aplicada [1] se describe la resuspensión en aire de la actividad depositada sobre el suelo. Los pro-
cesos que influyen en las características de la resuspensión son variados y complejos. Entre ellos
está el tamaño de las partículas asociadas a los radionucleidos, la velocidad del viento, el tiempo y
la naturaleza del depósito, y la naturaleza de la superficie donde ocurre el depósito.
Los procesos que intervienen en la resuspensión se podrían dividir en forma global en dos grupos:
mecánicos y provocados por la acción del viento. Los primeros son en general, causados por acti-
vidades humanas, transporte automotor, prácticas agrícolas, etc. Al ser muy localizados sólo son
importantes para el cálculo de la dosis individual; en el RESUS no se toman en cuenta. Los segun-
dos son muy complejos, y el modelo está basado en mayor medida en mediciones experimentales
de niveles de concentración sobre suelos contaminados, que en los mecanismos involucrados.
Además, provocan una mayor resuspensión, lo que involucra a un mayor número de personas. Por
lo tanto, se utilizan también en el cálculo de dosis colectiva.
El modelo para describir la resuspensión está basado en el modelo empírico de Garland [1], ade-
cuado para emisiones continuas. Una forma de expresar este proceso, es a través del factor de
resuspensión, que describe la relación existente entre la concentración en aire y el depósito super-
ficial. El modelo descripto en [1] está basado en un factor de resuspensión dependiente del tiempo,
que decrece con 1/t, t [días]. Es más apropiado para zonas rurales que para zonas urbanas.
79
Resultados del RESUS
3
El modelo da como resultado la actividad resuspendida en aire (Bq.s/m ) resultante de un determi-
2
nado depósito ( Bq/m s).
ASSESSOR
El ASSESSOR es el programa que permite determinar las dosis individual y colectiva alrededor de
una instalación, en base a la descarga anual y al modo de descarga. Se toman en cuenta los pa-
rámetros de dispersión en el cuerpo receptor de la descarga, las vías de exposición del hombre y
los hábitos de vida de la población expuesta.
Para los efluentes gaseosos las evaluaciones de las dosis se hacen a través del módulo atmosférico,
y opcionalmente se puede interrelacionar con los programas PLUME, FARMLAND, GRANIS y RE-
SUS. Para los efluentes líquidos, se cuenta con el módulo río y el módulo marino dependiendo del
medio receptor. El ASSESSOR módulo marino se puede complementar con el programa DORIS.
ASSESSOR (módulo atmosférico)
Los datos necesarios para la evaluación de la dosis individual son:
- Datos sobre el punto de descarga (altura de la emisión).

- Tiempos de integración para los cuales se va a calcular la dosis.
- Datos de descarga (radionucleido y tasa anual de descarga).
- Vías de exposición.
- Ubicación del punto receptor de la descarga (por ejemplo: grupo crítico).
- Datos meteorológicos del lugar.
- Hábitos de consumo, tasas de inhalación y ocupación.
Las vías de exposición incluidas para este modo de descarga son:
- Inhalación de radionucleidos de la pluma.

- Dosis gamma y beta por inmersión.
- Dosis gamma y beta por exposición al depósito.
- Inhalación de material resuspendido.
- Consumos de: carne (vaca, oveja) leche de vaca, productos lácteos, hígados (de vaca,
oveja), vegetales de hoja, tubérculos y raíces, frutas y granos.
Resultados
El resultado final es la dosis efectiva (µSv/a) en el grupo crítico y las concentraciones en los dife-
rentes compartimentos analizados, en las vías de exposición evaluadas. Las dosis pueden ser
comparadas con los límites y restricciones de dosis para la población.
ASSESSOR (módulo río)
En los ríos la dispersión de las descargas está determinada por las características hidrológicas del
río (caudal) y por la interacción de los radionucleidos con los sedimentos. Las vías de exposición
consideradas son: exposición externa a la radiación gamma y beta por material acumulado en se-
dimentos, ingestión de peces e ingestión de agua del río.
80
Vías de exposición en el Módulo Río del Assessor [1]
En este programa se evalúa el impacto de las descargas a partir de dos modelos de dilución:
− De exploración (screening).
− Dinámico.
1. Se utilizan tres tipos de modelos screening, para evaluaciones preliminares, que permiten
evaluar las consecuencias de las descargas con diferentes niveles de complejidad, de acuerdo
a los datos que se dispongan:
a. Modelo de dilución simple, donde se asume que la descarga anual se diluye en el caudal
del río y no toma en cuenta el decaimiento radiactivo. Los datos de entrada son: descarga
anual, caudal del río, y sólidos suspendidos. Tiene la limitante de no tomar en cuenta que
puede haber incrementos locales de concentración de radionucleidos al considerar la dilu-
ción en todo el caudal.
b. Modelo screening extendido con mezcla completa, este toma en cuenta, además de las
entradas del modelo anterior, el decaimiento radiactivo, el tiempo de tránsito corriente
abajo, las dimensiones del caudal (ancho y profundidad) y distancia de interés para evaluar
(ubicación del punto receptor, aguas abajo).
c. Modelo screening extendido, además de los datos anteriores toma en cuenta el factor de
dilución y la tasa del efluente.
2. Modelo dinámico: Caracteriza mejor las condiciones hidráulicas del cuerpo de agua receptor.
Permite evaluar la variación temporal y espacial de la radiación una vez descargado el efluente
radiactivo. Permite la división del río en 8 sectores dentro de los cuales las condiciones hidráu-
81
licas son homogéneas y se asume un mezclado completo en el río de la descarga. Un coefi-
ciente de interacción (k´) permite describir la deposición de sedimentos suspendidos en el le-
cho del río.
Los hábitos de vida considerados incluyen el tiempo de ocupación en las riberas, para el cálculo de
exposición externa a la radiación y las tasas de consumo de agua y pescados. Los datos utilizados
para la transferencia de radionucleidos son: el coeficiente de partición sedimento/agua (Bq/t /
3 3
Bq/m ), y el factor de concentración en el pez (Bq/t / Bq/m ).
Resultados del módulo río
− Concentración de actividad en agua (Bq/l).

− Concentración de actividad en sedimentos y en peces (Bq/kg).
− Dosis efectiva por ingestión de agua y pescado, e irradiación externa. (µSv/a).
Evaluación de las descargas líquidas en el mar
El CREAM tiene dos aplicaciones para evaluar el impacto radiológico de las descargas líquidas en
el mar:
− El modelo de dispersión marina (DORIS) que determina las concentraciones de radionucleidos

en materiales marinos.
− El módulo marino del ASSESSOR para calcular las dosis a individuos y poblaciones.
DORIS
Es un modelo de compartimentos diseñado para la dispersión de radionucleidos en los mares. Se

basa en modelos de dispersión acuática y sedimentación en los mares del Norte de Europa y el
Mediterráneo.
El DORIS está subdividido en modelos local y regional. El modelo local es importante para deter-
minar la dispersión en los lugares cercanos a la descarga, y por lo tanto útil para determinar las
dosis individuales. El regional se usa para describir la dispersión a mayores distancias del sitio de
descarga, y por lo tanto es más importante para la dosis colectiva.
El modelo marino describe los movimientos significativos de masas de agua a través de un sistema
de compartimentos interrelacionados, en las costas europeas. Los procesos que determinan el flujo
de un compartimento a otro son la advección y la difusión. Los materiales marinos sobre los cuales
se hace la evaluación del transporte del material radiactivo están asociados a cada compartimento.
La remoción de actividad de la columna de agua hacia los sedimentos está relacionada directa-
mente con el coeficiente de partición de sedimentos “Kd”, propio de cada elemento químico, y la
tasa de sedimentación del material particulado. Es tomado en cuenta también el decaimiento ra-
diactivo.
Los materiales marinos en los cuales se determina la concentración de radionucleidos son el agua
de mar “filtrada” (agua solamente) y “no filtrada” (agua con sólidos suspendidos), sedimentos y
sólidos suspendidos. La concentración de actividad en agua y en sólidos suspendidos es calculada
a partir de la actividad en agua “no filtrada”, del coeficiente de partición de sedimentos/agua, Kd, y
de la cantidad de material suspendido.
82
Resultados del DORIS
− Concentración de actividad en agua “filtrada” (sin sólidos en suspensión), y en agua “no filtra-
da” (con material suspendido) (Bq/l).
− Concentración de actividad en material sólido suspendido en agua y en sedimentos (Bq/kg).
Estos resultados se toman como concentraciones de actividad en las playas.
ASSESSOR, módulo marino
Está asociado a las descargas directas en el medio marino. Las concentraciones de radionucleidos
en agua y en sedimentos determinadas con el DORIS son una de las vías de entrada a este mó-
dulo.
Las concentraciones de actividad en la biota marina, en aire (debida a aerosoles marinos) y las
tasas de dosis beta y gamma, son calculadas por el ASSESSOR. Este programa combina estas
concentraciones calculadas, con la tasa de descarga anual al mar, con los hábitos de la población
expuesta (ingestión de alimentos procedentes del mar y tiempos de exposición) y con los factores
dosimétricos de los radionucleidos seleccionados, para dar como resultado final la dosis efectiva
anual (µSv/a) que recibe el hombre producto de la descarga al mar, a través de las vías de exposi-
ción seleccionadas.
Las vías de exposición de este módulo son:
− Ingestión de peces, crustáceos y moluscos.

− Exposición a la radiación beta y gamma en las playas.
− Exposición a la radiación beta y gamma en la pesca.
− Inhalación de aerosoles marinos.
Nota: A pesar de haber sido estudiado el programa DORIS, se decidió no implementarlo por ser
este muy específico para mares de Europa.
Evaluación de dosis colectivas
La opción para el cálculo de dosis colectiva aparece en el ASSESSOR módulo atmosférico y en el

ASSESSOR módulo marino.
Para la evaluación de las dosis colectivas alrededor de las instalaciones se trabaja sobre bases de
datos, configuradas como grillas polares, con la distribución de la población y producción agrope-
cuaria (producción de vegetales, granos, carne vacuna, leche de vaca, etc.) y se asume que toda la
población está conformada por adultos. Las tasas de ingestión anual son reemplazadas por las
producciones locales de alimentos para cada segmento de la grilla polar. Los resultados de las
dosis colectivas son presentados para cada vía de exposición y por radionucleido. También se
presenta un total de dosis colectiva regional evaluada desde el punto de descarga hasta 2000 km y
una evaluación del detrimento total a la salud aplicando los coeficientes de riesgo recomendados
por la ICRP 60.
CONCLUSIONES
El CREAM es un programa para determinar dosis en la población debido a la descarga de efluen-

tes radiactivos al ambiente durante la operación normal de instalaciones radiactivas y nucleares.
Permite determinar las dosis individual y colectiva debido a las descargas gaseosas y líquidas.
83
Presenta gran disponibilidad de datos y vías de exposición, lo que permite una evaluación más
completa y un análisis más detallado de la contribución a la dosis efectiva total.
La metodología aplicada está basada en modelos actualizados. El código CREAM da la opción de

trabajar con programas que requieren mayor grado de especificidad para evaluaciones más con-
cretas y detalladas, como es el FARMLAND, RESUS, GRANIS y también con programas como el
ASSESSOR para evaluaciones dosimétricas directas.
Existe gran interacción entre el usuario y el programa CREAM. El usuario tiene la facilidad de intro-
ducir la mayoría de los parámetros locales convenientes para hacer más precisa la evaluación. En
caso de no disponer de los mismos existen rangos de parámetros que por omisión se pueden utili-
zar para hacer posible la evaluación.
Es además un programa muy adecuado para realizar análisis de sensibilidad, para validar con
datos de concentración en matrices ambientales resultantes de planes de monitoreo y para estu-
dios de emplazamiento, disponiendo de parámetros y características locales para la evaluación.
REFERENCIAS
1. Simmonds, J.R, Lawson, G, and Mayal, A. Methodology for assessing the radiological conse-
quences of routine releases of radionuclides to the environment, CEC Luxembourg, EUR 15760
EN (1995).
2. ICRP. 1990 Recomendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP

Publication 60, Ann ICRP 21, Nos 1-3 (1991).
3. ICRP. Age-dependent doses to members of the public from intakes of radionuclides: Part 5,
compilation of ingestion and inhalation dose coeffiecients. ICRP Publication 72, Ann, 26, No 1
(1996).
4. Brown, J. and Simmonds, J.R. FARMLAND: A dynamic model for the transfer of radionuclides
through terrestrial foodchains. Chilton, NRPB-R273 (1995).
84
Modeling of the Hydrogen Generated
during Oxidation of Zry at 1100°C.
The Evolution of the Hydrogen Partition:
Absorbed and as a Gas
García, E.A.

MODELING OF THE HYDROGEN GENERATED DURING
OXIDATION OF Zry AT 1100°°C.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HYDROGEN PARTITION:
ABSORBED AND AS A GAS
García, E.A.

Argentina
ABSTRACT RESUMEN
A model is proposed to interpret the Se propone un modelo para interpretar las

oxidation kinetics of Zircaloy in steam at cinéticas de oxidación de Zircaloy en vapor
1100°C along with the simultaneous de agua y la simultanea absorción de
hydrogen uptake. The model was hidrógeno a 1100°C. El modelo fue
developed on the basis of small-scale desarrollado sobre la base de experimentos
separate-effects experiments performed at de laboratorio, en pequeña escala,
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe. The realizados en el Forschungszentrum
experimental results show nearly the same Karlsruhe. Estos resultados experimentales
oxidation kinetic behavior throughout the muestran una cinética de oxidación
oxidation process, on the contrary the prácticamente normal, por el contrario la
kinetics of hydrogen uptake increase at the cinética de hidrógeno al comienzo del
beginning, but later the hydrogen proceso de oxidación aumenta y luego la
concentration decreases to very low values. concentración de hidrógeno disminuye
The model gives a good description of the hasta valores muy bajos. El modelo da una
phenomena while providing a possible buena descripción del fenómeno y la razón
explanation of the hydrogen expulsion from de la expulsión del hidrógeno de la
the sample. These results are relevant to muestra. Estos resultados son relevantes
accident management in water-cooled para el manejo de accidentes en reactores
power reactors. de potencia refrigerados por agua.
INTRODUCTION
The oxidation kinetics of Zry in steam at high temperature are characterised by particular
behaviors and difficulties in experimental measurements. The classical thermobalance does not
work in a steam atmosphere and therefore it is more practical to perform a series of
experiments where each sample represents only one point of the kinetic curve. Recently it was
shown [1,2] in two experiments thus performed at 400°C and 10 MPa that under such
conditions the general parabolic kinetic behavior is made up of a series of short parabolic
periods. The reason for this reoxidation process was attributed to short circuit diffusion as a
consequence of Interconnecting Porosity (InP) in the oxide. New Zircaloy oxidation experiments
at 1100°C and 1 bar steam pressure were performed in IMF I, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe by
M. Steinbrück [3]. After oxidation, the mass increase of each sample was determined, then the
hydrogen concentration was measured by vacuum extraction. In complementary experiments
the same author [3] determined the effect of dissolved oxygen in the Zry α- and β-phase on
reducing the hydrogen uptake, as a function of hydrogen pressure and temperature, Sieverts’
law. The time dependences of the oxygen concentration and the hydrogen absorption are
shown in Figure 1. The more interesting results concern the kinetics of the hydrogen absorption
by the sample. At the beginning of the reaction the hydrogen generated is absorbed by the Zry
up to a certain concentration. Later the hydrogen concentration decreases to very low values.
Simultaneously the oxidation continues, producing more hydrogen, which however is not taken
up by the sample. The aim of the present work is to model this specific hydrogen behavior.
87
3
35
H in sol. exp. results [3]
30
2
25 2
∆ m H /s, mg/cm
∆ m/s, mg/cm
o
1100 C
20
15
exp. results [3] 1
2
10
exp. res. w/pellets[3]
5
0 0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
time, s
Figure 1. Increase of mass during oxidation of Zry in steam in samples with and without pellets
(left axis) and the hydrogen absorbed (right axis) as a function of time at 1100°C, after M.
Steinbrück [3].
THE MODEL
As this is an isothermal experiment, we use a similar treatment and code as in previous papers
[1,2]. With the help of the experimental data of M. Steinbrück [3] on the effect of previously
dissolved oxygen in α-Zry and β-Zry on reduction of the hydrogen uptake at a given pressure
( PH 2 = 0.5 bar) and temperature expressed by Sieverts’ law:
H   ∆S ∆H 
  = exp − . PH 2 (1)
 Zr  at  R RT 
With
test oxygen content ∆S ∆H

-1 -1 -1
(wt%) (kJ.mol .K ) (kJ.mol )
605 0.12 -0.0982 -61.4
630 0.48 -0.101 -61.1
629 0.73 -0.100 -63.1
628 1.0 -0.0993 -60.9
626 3.3 -0.0970 -51.0
638 3.9 -0.0953 -47.5
639 5.5 -0.0963 -45.2
627 6.1 -0.0970 -51.0
From Martin Steinbrück experiment (3)
88
-1 -1
Where R=8.314 J.mol .K , the temperature is given in K in the range 1250 to 1725K and the
pressure in Pa for different oxygen concentrations. It is possible to calculate in the case of
1100°C (1373K) and a given hydrogen pressure the maximum hydrogen content in each phase,
α and β.
We know from the solution of the diffusion problem of oxygen in Zry, the oxygen concentration
profile in the three phases for each time t and position x:
ZrO α ( x, t ) ; C β ( x, t )
CO 2 ( x, t ) ; CO O
It is well known that hydrogen solubility in the oxide is very low; it is considered zero in this
ZrO2
model, C H ( x,t ) = 0.
From equation (1) and the experimental values of ∆H and ∆S it is possible to calculate the
maximum hydrogen concentration at temperature, T and pressure, PH 2 for each time t and
position x in the α and β phases:
α ( x, t ) = f α C α ( x, t ) ; C β ( x, t ) = f β C β ( x, t )
CH H  O  H H  O 
The functions fα and fβ are obtained from the experimental results and plotted in Figure 2 and
Figure 3 for a temperature of 1100°C and 3 bar hydrogen pressure. In Figure 2, the best-fit
correlation for the α phase is a straight line with the condition of zero hydrogen concentration at
the maximum oxygen concentration permitted by the equilibrium Zry-O phase diagram. One
experimental point was not considered, because it is remote from the others. The straight line
calculated was:
α ( x, t ) = 50.76842 − 0.10665 * C α ( x, t )
CH O
In Figure 3, the best correlation for the β phase is a polynomial fit of order 4:
β β β β β
C H ( x,t ) = 60 − 0.2339 * CO − 0.06965 * (CO ) 2 + 0.00432 * (CO )3 − 8.85805 * 10 −5 * (CO ) 4
β β
Where CO = CO ( x, t ) . This polynomial fit was necessary for the condition of zero hydrogen
concentration for the maximum oxygen concentration according to the Zry-O equilibrium
diagram and the existence of only two experimental points, because one is outside the β phase
region. Then we impose a smooth function.
With these assumptions we can calculate the maximum amount of hydrogen in solution
compatible with the existing oxygen in each phase α and β as a function of time, also
represented in Figure 4,
C2 C4
max C α (t ) = α ( x,t ) dx max C β (t ) = β
H ∫ CH and H ∫ CH ( x,t ) dx
C1 C3
Where C1, C2 and C3, C4 are respectively the solubility limits of the α and β phases in the Zry-O
equilibrium diagram. The choice of 3 bar hydrogen pressure as an equivalent pressure at the
oxide/metal interface was necessary to obtain a hydrogen concentration decrement in the metal
in agreement with the experimental results.
89
3
Hydrogen Concentration, C H , m g/cm
50 Hydrogen Preasure: 3 bar
Experimental Results [3]
α α
40 C H =50.76842-0.10665*C O
α
Model: max. O conc.

Exp. Res. non considered [3]
30
20
10
0
0 100 200 300 400 500
α 3
Oxygen Concentration, C O , m g/cm
Figure 2. Experimental results from Sieverts’ law in the case of α-phase and 3 bar hydrogen
preasure. Correlation between the maximum hydrogen concentration as a function of the
previous oxygen concentration, after M Steinbrück [3].
3
60
Hydrogen Concentration, C H , m g/cm
50
β
40
H ydrogen P reasure: 3 bar

30
Experimental Results [3]
β β β 2 β 3 β 4
C H =60-0.2339*C O -0.06965*(C O ) +0.00432*(C O ) -8.85805E-5*(C O )
20
M odel: max. O conc.
Exp. Res. non considered [3]
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
β 3
Oxygen Concentration, C O , m g/cm
Figure 3. Experimental results from Sieverts’ law in the case of β-phase and 3 bar hydrogen
preasure. Correlation between the maximum hydrogen concentration as a function of the
previous oxygen concentration, after M Steinbrück [3].
90
MODEL RESULTS
Figure 4 shows the model results where was necessary to introduce, as in the previous papers
[1,2], two short circuit diffusion paths in the oxide, termed Interconnected Porosity, InP, at
T
different times: 1000s and 1860s. We introduce a λm,S maximum, m, as before [4,5] for a given
constant temperature, T in steam, S: λ1100
m,S
= 38µm . At the beginning of the oxidation process
λ1100
m,S
was 4µm. The reason for this difference could be that at the start of the experiments it is
very difficult at time zero to have at high temperature a Zry surface free of oxide. Then an oxide
layer of about 34µm on average was possibly present at the start of the oxidation experiments.
Under this condition the experimental results of hydrogen in solution from the start of
experiment up to 2870s are well represented. At that moment the maximum hydrogen in
solution compatible with the oxygen incorporated in the sample limited the hydrogen in solution
and expelled the hydrogen from the sample. This fact produces a small reduction in the
increase of weight of the sample that is insufficient to reproduce the experimental kinetics, line
(i) in Figure 4, but is in good correlation with the reduction of hydrogen in the sample. To
reduce the acceleration of total weight gain due to the hydrogen and oxygen incorporated in the
sample, it was necessary to increase the region of Isolated Porosity at the expense of the InP
previously developed. This was done by a linear back movement of the InP/IsP interface,
generating a completely protected oxide layer, Figure 5, R region. Nevertheless, the speed
reduction seems to be insufficient, in spite of the dispersion of the experimental points.
In Figure 5 all interface movements in the sample are represented. Figure 6 shows the
hydrogen evolution compared with the experimental results in the case of hydrogen in solution.
40 4
2
∆ m O /s and ∆ m O+H/s, mg/cm
H in sol. exp. results [3]

∆ m H /s, mg/cm
H in sol. model
Max. H in Sol. model
20 2
O+H exp. results [3]
O+H exp. res. w/pellets[3]
O weight, model
2
H+O weight, model
0 0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
time, s
Figure 4. Comparison between the experimental results, Figure 1, and the present model
calculations. ( ) Hydrogen incorporated in the sample as a function of time, (+) Maximum
hydrogen solubility according to oxygen concentration, (#) Weight increase due to the oxygen
up take, (i) Weight increase due to the oxygen and hydrogen uptake.
91
400 α -Phase/ β -Phase Int. Pos.
IsP/ α -Phase
300 InP/IsP Interface Position

α -phase
200 β -phase
R
100 IsP region in the oxide
InP region in the oxide
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
time, s
Figure 5. Model calculation for different interface positions as a function of time during steam
oxidation at 1100°C, showing the Interconnecting Porosity region (InP), the Isolated Porosity
region (IsP) and the named recrystallization process in the oxide (R) region.
4
2
3
∆ m H /s, m g/cm
Total Hydrogen Generated, Model

Hydrogen Generated as a Gas, M odel
2
Hydrogen in Solution, M odel
H in sol. Exp. Resesults [3]
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
tim e, s
Figure 6. The hydrogen generated as a function of time. The different partitions after the
present model: as a gas and in solution compared with the experimental results.
92
DISCUSSION
The model presented seems to provide a good description of the experimental results.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out the necessary hypotheses.
The first is the fact that the surface samples after oxidation do not show fissures as in the quench
samples, but nevertheless the hydrogen is absorbed. This implies a short circuit diffusion up to the
oxide metal interface as was proposed in the previous papers [1,2] to describe the oxidation
kinetics adequately. In that experiment the hydrogen uptake was not measured. Then we
introduce here again the concept of Interconnected Porosity (InP), as used before.
The second is the quantity of hydrogen compatible with the oxygen dissolved in the α and the β
phases. The numbers of experimental points in each phase are not sufficient to be sure of the
function proposed. Independent of this fact, the maximum amount of hydrogen in solution
compatible with the oxygen in the metal gives a good account of the mechanism by which the
hydrogen is expelled from the sample. The surprising result is the high pressure, 3 bar, which is
necessary to describe the experimental results.
The third is that the InP zone is reduced to zero in order to become compatible with the
hydrogen uptake kinetics together with the oxidation kinetics. This could be interpreted as being
due to a process of oxide recrystallization, to interrupt the InP and produce the growth region of
Isolated Porosity, IsP, creating a thick protective oxide layer.
Another possibility is that the hydrogen which is expelled from the sample through the InP
impedes the penetration of the steam up to the oxide/metal interface. In the case where the
hydrogen is completely expelled from the sample and the steam could penetrate, a renewed
oxidation will start with a consequent acceleration of the kinetics. This will be observed for
experiments with longer exposure times.
A final possibility is that during oxide recrystallization the diffusion coefficients that simulate the
oxygen diffusion in the oxide decreased. Figure 7 shows the oxidation kinetics with a reduction
of oxygen diffusion coefficient by a factor of 100, for times over 2200s. The calculated total
increase of weight of the sample represents better the experimental points without any
modification of the previously good simulation of the hydrogen in solution.
2200s
40
O -8 O -10
35 D ZrO 2
=2.44*10 D ZrO 2
=2.44*10
2
∆ m O /s and ∆ m O+H /s, mg/cm
30
25
20
15
O+H exp. results [3]
O+H exp. res. w/pellets[3]
10
H+O after model
5 O after model
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
time, s
Figure 7. The experimental results of Figure 1 compared with the new model results, where it is
considered that due to the recrystallization process the diffusion coefficient in the oxide is
2
reduced by a factor of 100. Diffusion coefficients are in cm /s.
93
CONCLUSIONS
The model proposed is exactly the same as that used for oxidation kinetics at 400°C. Short
circuit diffusion in the oxide produced at different times, each 900s or at a given oxide layer
thickness, each 60µm, with a maximum permeable oxide layer for the hydrogen of ~38µm, is
sufficient to describe the behavior of the oxidation kinetics and the hydrogen uptake. It was
necessary to add to this original model the maximum amount of hydrogen compatible with
oxygen in solution in the two metallic phases present at the temperature of the experiment. The
value necessary for a good description of the experiment seems to be too big, 3 bar of
equivalent hydrogen pressure at the oxide/metal interface that is the place where the steam
reacts with the Zry. The proposed recrystallization process and the reduction of the oxygen
diffusion coefficients in the oxide to force the kinetics at longer times to fit the experimental
results must be treated with caution because of the large scatter in the experimental points.
Nevertheless, the model proposed with the new ideas give a good description of the
experiment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. Tim Haste, AEA Technology, Winfrith, UK, for reviewing
the paper.
REFERENCES
1. GARCÍA, E.A. and BÉRANGER, G. “Diffusion model for the oxidation of Zircaloy-4 at 400°C
in steam. The influence of metallurgical structure (precipitates and grain size)”. Journal of
Nuclear Materials 273 (1999) 221-227.
2. GARCÍA, E.A. and BÉRANGER, G. "Influence de l’étain sur la tenue à la corrosion du

Zircaloy-4 à 400°C dans la vapeur d’eau". La revue de Métallurgie - CIT/Science et Génie des
Matériaux, May 1999.
3. STEINBRÜCK, M. IMF I, Forschungszentrum, Karlsruhe. Private communication.
4. GARCÍA, E.A. “The hydrogen generated as a gas and storage in Zircaloy during water
quenching”. ARN-PI 6/99.
5. GARCÍA, E.A. “The hydrogen generated as a gas and storage in Zircaloy during steam
quenching”. ARN-PI 3/00.
94
Biological Dosimetry of Mixed
Neutron – γ Ray Field
Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.; Di Giorgio, M.;

Barrios, L.A.; Gregori, B.N. and Kunst, J.J.
th
Presentado en 10 International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association – IRPA,
BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY OF MIXED NEUTRON – γ RAY FIELD
Nasazzi, N.B.; Taja, M.R.; Di Giorgio, M.; Barrios, L.A.; Gregori, B.N. and Kunst, J.J.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
Radiation induced unstable chromosome aberration frequency (dicentrics and centric rings) in
peripheral lymphocytes is a powerful tool for early biological dose assessment in cases of
accidental overexposures. Occupational accidents or overexposures of people to ionizing
radiation usually involve low LET sources (X-rays or γ-rays). A criticality accident, less frequent
but more complex in its evaluation, involves a radiation emission of a mixed neutron and γ-ray
field. (1)
From the observed frequency of unstable chromosome aberrations it is not possible to

discriminate between those aberrations due to γ-rays and those due to neutrons. However, if the
γ-ray/neutron ratio is known from physical dosimetry measurements it is possible to estimate
both components of the total dose applying an iterative method and assuming that both
radiation qualities are additive in inducing chromosome aberrations and the aberrations do not
show overdispersion compared to Poisson distribution.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of inducing unstable chromosome aberration of a neutron- γ

ray field and the estimation of both components of the total dose using unstable chromosome
aberration frequency as end point, we have performed three sets of irradiations of blood
samples in a suitable research reactor facility, near to the core, using a specially designed
device.
Blood culture and chromosome analysis
Heparinized whole blood from the same healthy 39 years old female was used for all the
irradiations. At least three hours after exposure, to permit enzymatic repair processes to take
place, whole blood cultures were set up applying a micromethod, using 5ml of whole blood and
phytohemagglutinin P (PHA P; 60 µg/ml) as a mitogen.
Stimulated lymphocytes were grown in 10ml of RPMI 1640 medium enriched with 15% of fetal
calf serum, supplemented with 2mM L-glutamine and 20 µM of 5-bromo-deoxyuridine.
Incubation time was 48 h at 37°C. Colchicine was added in a concentration of 0.4 g/ml 2 h
before harvesting. After hypotonic treatment with KCl (0.075 M) for 10 min. at 37°C, the
lymphocytes were fixed by three changes in methanol-acetic acid (3:1), air dried and stored a
60°C overnight.
The slides were stained following the Fluorescence plus Giemsa method (FPG) (2) in order to
assure the scoring of first division metaphases only. Anyway, cells in second o later divisions
did not exceed 5% for any particular dose.
Dicentrics were scored in well spread metaphases with 46 centromeres and long enough
chromosomes (approximately equivalent to 350 bans for G-banding, following ISCN) (3) in order
to recognize clearly multicentric chromosome aberrations and the associated acentric
fragments.
97
Irradiation conditions and physical dosimetry
The RA1 Nuclear Reactor is placed in the Constituyentes Atomic Center of Atomic Energy
Comission. The facility is an open pool research reactor. The reactor core is configured from
individual fuel elements placed as a cylindrical geometry, immersed in a pool of demineralized
water contained in an open shielded tank. The present reactor core consists of 228 Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU) type fuel (graphite reflected) with enrichment slightly less than 20%.
Licensed full power operation is thermal 40 kW.
Neutron irradiation facilities (Figure 1):
− In-Core irradiation device placed in the graphite central reflector.
− Three vertical through-tubes of various sizes and shape ending at the core bottom.
− One horizontal beamport that penetrates the reactor and ends at the face of the pool wall
called fast beam
− A thermal column made of a graphite stack with a central radial beam hole called thermal
beam.
Thermal Beam
Fast Beam
Figure 1. Cross section of the RA1 research
reactor at core level, showing the fast and
CORE
Figure 2.
a) Detail of the irradiation device used in the
first two irradiation sets. 300 mm
b) Device used in the third irradiation set.
(a)
REACTOR CORE
Blood Sample
Irradiation
Tool
90mm
20mm Lucyte to obtain
electronic equilibrium
20mm Pb (b)
REACTOR CORE
Blood Blood
Sample 1 Sample 2
115 mm
98
Measurement and evaluation of neutron doses
The assessment of the neutron kerma in the blood samples placed in the position indicated in
the Figure 2 consists basically on the sum over discreet values of energy δE as follows:
K ∆E
= t irr .∑ k ( δE ).φ( δE ) , where K ∆E
is the mean value of Kerma in an energy
∆E
interval ∆E of interest, tirr is the irradiation time, while k ( δE ) y φ(δE ) are the values of the
tissue blood equivalent kerma factor (4) (Figure 3.) and of the neutron flux (5) respectively,
corresponding the latter to the irradiation position in the RA1 fast beam. The sum is extended
over discreet energy values because the data of the neutron spectrum are reported in energy
groups according to the libraries (VITAMIN-C, WIMS) used in the calculation codes (ANISN,
CITVAP) with which this spectrum was performed.
The validity of this neutron spectrum in the irradiation position was corroborated in the following
way:
− The calculation of the effective cross sections of different activation foils (Au, In, Cu, S)
was based on this neutron spectrum. (Figure 4).
− The activation of these foils was measured in several irradiations.
− The neutron flux was evaluated from the activation of the foils.
− The evaluated flux fits (SE <20%) with that corresponding to the direct integration of the
spectrum in the activation energy range of each foil.
Figure 3. Neutron blood kerma Figure 4. Neutron flux spectrum at

factor. the irradiation position in the RA1 fast
beam.
Measurement and evaluation of gamma doses.
The gamma dose in the blood sample was measured using LiF thermoluminiscent dosimeters of
3mm x 3mm x 0.89mm (TLD-700). The blood sample was placed in a tube (blood holder) into a
special device in order to assure electronic equilibrium (Figure 2 a). The TLD were placed in the
same device, isolated from the blood. The lead container reduces gamma radiation in order to
achieve a gamma-neutron ratio as low as possible, according to the constrains imposed by the
facility.
99
The dose assessment was performed using the TLD-700 calibration curve (range: 1mGy - 100
Gy). SE associated to the gamma dose was lower than 10%. This uncertainty is due to a)
calibration error (< 5%); b) variable device position; c) previous activation status of the reactor;
d) variable time for operation ending and sample recovering.
In the first irradiation set TLD were placed into the blood holder isolated by a polyethylene foil, in
the middle of the tube. In the second irradiation set the TLD were placed at the ends of the
Lucyte blood holders (length: 4.5 cm). In the third irradiation set the blood samples were placed
into a 3.5 cm long holder as it is shown in Figure 2 b. with the TLDs placed in the same position
as in the second set.
Biological dose estimations of the gamma and neutron component was performed using the
60
Co γ ray and fission neutron in vitro calibration curves (6-7) and applying an iterative process
described in the IAEA Report (1986) (8) assuming an additive effect of the neutron a gamma
component in the production of dicentrics. (9) The metaphase scoring was extended to collect at
least 100 dicentrics per irradiation.
Table 1. shows the results of the assessment of neutron and gamma doses from the three
irradiation sets (1-2-3). First and second irradiation set consisted of three consecutive
exposures of one blood sample each. In the third irradiation set, two blood samples were
irradiated simultaneously during each of the three consecutive exposures, totalizing six
samples.
In the first set, the aberration frequencies were pooled and the mean was used in the iterative
neutron and gamma dose assessment because this set had only one physical gamma dose
estimation. In the set 2 and 3 the physical gamma dose informed was the average of the two
TLDs placed at the ends of each blood holder.
The physical neutron dose was previously evaluated in several independent experiences at the
corresponding positions of the blood holders. The results showed the accepted experimental
errors and then, these values were applied for each irradiation set.
Biological Dose Physical Dose

Irradiation set n/Gamma ratio Dicentrics/cell
Gamma Dose NeutronDose Gamma Dose Neutron Dose
1a 0.374 1.81 +/- 0.12 3.41 1.27 3.60 1.347
1b 0.374 1.95 +/- 0.17 3.41 1.27 3.60 1.347
1c 0.374 2.11 +/- 0.21 3.41 1.27 3.60 1.347
2a 0.421 2.35 +/- 0.23 3.67 1.51 3.20 1.347
2b 0.472 1.65 +/- 0.16 3.96 1.87 2.85 1.347
2c 0.434 2.32 +/- 0.22 3.62 1.49 3.10 1.347
3a 0.245 2.40 +/- 0.24 4.33 1.06 5.55 1.363
3b 0.296 2.40 +/- 0.24 4.15 1.23 4.60 1.363
3c 0.267 NG NG NG 5.10 1.363
3d 0.522 1.22 +/- 0.12 2.14 1.12 2.50 1.305
3e 0.555 0.99 +/- 0.16 1.90 1.10 2.35 1.305
3f 0.642 1.28 +/- 0.13 1.87 1.20 2.03 1.305
Table 1. Neutron and gamma physical doses and the corresponding biological assessed doses.
The experience 3 c has no biological results due to the poor growing of cultures (NG) possibly
due to interphase death related with the high doses received. Mitotic index of 3 a and 3 b
experiences were very low too, but enough to collect 100 dicentrics. However, these high
aberration frequencies observed suggest that the total dose produced the saturation of the
dosimeter.
100
Physical and biological dose estimations do not differ significantly, taking into account the SEs
associated with the neutron and gamma physical dose measurements and the Poisson and
calibration curve SEs associated with the biological dose assessment, indicating that it is
appropriate the use of a fission neutron linear coefficient for the biological dose assessment in
this overexposure scenario.
REFERENCES
1. M. Fatome, D. Agay, S. Martin, J.C. Mestries and E. Multon, Biological Dosimetry after a
criticality accident. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 70, 455-459 (1997).
2. P. Perry and S. Wolff, New Giemsa method for the differential staining of sister chromatids.
Nature (London) 251,156-158 (1974).
3. F. Mitelman, ISCN An International System forHuman Cytogenetic Nomenclature,

Cytogenetics and Cell Genetics (1995).
4. ICRU Report 44, Tissue Substitutes in radiation Dosimetry and Measurement (1989).
5. A.M. Lerner, M.R. Madariaga, Determinación del espectro neutrónico en distintas posiciones
del RA1, Proceedings IV Congreso de la Sociedad Argentina de Radioprotección, 21, INIS-AR-
137 (1998).
6. D.C. Lloyd and R.J. Purrot, Chromosome aberration analysis in radiological protection
dosimetry, Radiat. Prot. Dos. 1 (1) 19-28(1981).
7. D.C. Lloyd, A.A. Edwards and J.S. Prosser, Chromosome aberrations induced in human
lymphocytes by in vitro acute, X and gamma radiation., Radiat. Prot. Dos. 15, 83-88 (1986).
8. IAEA Biological Dosimetry: Chromosomal Aberration Analysis for Dose Assessment,

Technical Report Series 260 (1986)
9. E. Schmid, H. Schraube and M Bauchinger, Chromosome aberration frequencies in human

lymphocytes irradiated in a phantom by a mixed beam of fission neutrons and gamma rays, Int.
J. Radiat. Biol. 73 (3) 263-267 (1998).
101
Retrospective Dosimetry Using
Chromosome Painting
Nasazzi, N.B.; Di Giorgio, M. and Taja, M.R.
th
RETROSPECTIVE DOSIMETRY USING CHROMOSOME PAINTING
Nasazzi, N.B.; Di Giorgio, M. and Taja, M.R.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
Chromosome aberration frequency measured in peripheral lymphocytes of persons exposed to

ionizing radiation has been used since 1960s for dose assessment. Suspected overexposure is
usually evaluated by the frequency of dicentrics and centric rings using an appropriate in vitro
calibration curve, according to the radiation quality.
However, these chromosome aberrations are unstable with time after exposure and dose
reconstruction may encounter uncertainties when the time between the exposure and the analysis
is considerable or even unknown.
If those called stable chromosome aberrations (translocations and inversions) certainly persist with
time after exposure then, they may be used as a dosimeter for evaluating acute past overexposures
and, moreover, to show the accumulation of cytogenetical information which correlates with dose
received under fractionated, chronic or occupational exposure conditions. Exist discrepancies
among authors because some of them claim that stable chromosome aberrations are not so stable
(1-2-3). So, one of the purposes of this work is to contribute with information related to the stability
and cumulative behaviour of some stable chromosome aberrations (translocations) in a sample of 7
nuclear power plant workers evaluated by G-banding 6 years before and now by Chromosome
Painting.
All type of stable chromosome aberrations may be detected using G-banding, a cheap, simple and
rapid staining technique although it is a time consuming method for aberration scoring. The most
promising alternative is the so called "chromosome painting", a method based on the Fluorescence
in situ Hibrydization (FISH) technique, painting only some chromosome pairs with specific whole
chromosome DNA probes and then extrapolating the observed translocation frequencies to the full
genome using the formula of Lucas et al. (1992) (4).
The latter method, expensive and not available yet for the majority of the laboratories, allows a
faster aberration scoring than G-banding and appears as a promisory tool in biodosimetry,
particularly when it is necessary to assess low doses and consequently to score a large number of
metaphases, i.e. radiation workers exposed within limit doses.
As in dose assessment based on the frequency of unstable chromosome aberrations, it is

necessary a calibration curve based on the frequency of stable chromosome aberrations. Our
60
laboratory has performed calibration curves using Co γ rays based on the frequency of dicentrics
plus centric rings identified by conventional Giemsa staning and on the frequency of translocations
plus inversions, indentified by G-banding.
This work presents the results of the in vitro γ ray dose-response for unstable and stable
chromosome aberrations identified by Chromosome Painting and the comparison between the full
genome reciprocal translocation frequencies obtained in 7 blood samples of Atucha I Nuclear
Power Plant workers with the expected frequencies obtained applying the calibration curve α
coefficient.
105
Irradiation procedure and lymphocyte culture
Heparinized whole blood from a healthy 39-years old female was exposed in a water phantom at
60
37ºC to a Co source (Picker C4M60) in our Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory at a rate of
0.4 Gy/min with doses ranging from 0 Gy to 3 Gy.
After irradiation, whole blood cultures were set up applying a micromethod, using
phytohemagglutinin P (PHA P, 60 g/ml) as a mitogen. Stimulated lymphocytes were grown in 10 ml
RPMI 1640 medium enriched with 15% of fetal calf serum, supplemented with 2mM L-glutamine
and 20 µM 5-bromo-deoxyuridine. The incubation time was 48 h at 37°C. Colchicine was added
in a concentration of 0.4 g/ml 2 h before harvesting. After hypotonic treatment with KCl (0.075 M)
for 10 min at 37°C, the lymphocytes were fixed by three changes in methanol - acetic acid (3:1), air
dried and stored at 60°C overnight.
The slides were FISH painted immediately of after storing at –20°C for several weeks or even
months. For each irradiation dose, some slides were stained following the Fluorescence plus
Giemsa method (FPG) (5) to determine the frequency of second o later division cells. The fraction
of such cells for any particular dose did not exceed 6%; then it was not necessary to check the
cycle number of each cell scored by FISH.
The same lymphocyte culture and FISH staining protocol was used in the 7 blood samples of
Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant workers.
Fluorescence in situ Hybridization
Before painting, the slides were examined under fase contrast microscope. In those cases when the
cytoplasm was not correctly removed, the slides were treated with 100 µl Proteinase K solution at
37ºC, 3-5 min; then the slides are dehydrated in series of 1 min. ethanol washes (70%, 85% and
100%).
The slides were painted using a commercially available probe: WCP 1-2-4 Mix, Spectrum Orange
(Vysis, Inc.), with DAPI I as counterstain following the manufacturer protocol.
In brief: 1- Slides are denatured 40 - 60 sec .in 70% formamide/2XSSC at 73 ± 1ºC 2- Dehydrate
slides in series of 1 min. ethanol washes (70%, 85%, 100%) 3- Mix 7 µl of WCP hybridization
buffer, 2 µl probe mixture and 1 µl distilled water per target area, at room temperature. 4-
Centrifuge 1-3sec., vortex and re-centrifuge. 5- Heat 5 min. in a 75 ± 1ºC water bath, remove and
place on a slide warmer. 6- Apply 10 µl probe to specimen target area (aprox. 22mm x 22mm) and
mount a coverslip, sealing with rubber cement. 7- Place slides in a prewarmed humidified box at
37ºC overnight. 8- Remove coverslip from the slide and wash in 50% formamide/2XSSC at 46 ±
1ºC (3 rinses, each 10 min.) followed by a 2XSSC wash at 46 ± 1ºC (10 min), then a 2XSSC/0.1%
NP-40 wash at 46 ± 1ºC (5min). 9- Air dry slides. 10- Apply 10 µl counterstain (DAPI I) to the
target area.
Slides were examined using a Nikon Optiphot 2 fluorescence microscope equipped with a Triple
band pass filter (Vysis) which allows simultaneous visualization of 1-2-4 Spectrum Orange
chromosomes and blue counterstained chromosomes. Centromeres and particularly, constitutive
heterochromatin of chromosome 1, are correctly visualizad with DAPI. Anyway, in case of doubt
between dicentrics and translocations those metaphases were reviewed after sequential FISH -
Giemsa staining, washing FISH painted slides twice, 5 min in 2XSSC / 0.1% NP-40 solution
and 5 min. in 2XSSC at 37ºC; then slides are dehydrated in series of 1 min. ethanol washes (70%,
85% and 100%) and finally stained with 10% Giemsa in Na phosphate buffer (70%) and K
phosphate buffer (30%).
106
Aberration scoring
Well spread and clean metaphases, long enough to recognize small translocations or fragments
(approximately equivalent to 350 bands for G-banding, following ISCN (6)) were examined under X
1000 magnification. Metaphases with less than 46 objects were rejected. Chromosomes 1-2 and 4
could be easily distinguished by their size, centromere position and fluorochrome intensity. Then,
every aberration scored is assigned to each chromosome pair. The complete complement of the
material comprising the six painted chromosomes had to be present.
We scored, using PAINT terminology (7): 1- unstable chromosome aberrations: dicentrics: dic (AB)
or dic(BB) with the accompanying bicoloured: ace (ab) or single painted: ace(b); simple painted
excess of acentrics: ace(b); painted centric rings: cr(B) accompanied by the corresponding acentric
fragment: ace(b)
2- stable chromosome aberrations: two - way

translocations (reciprocal or complete translocations: tc): [t (Ab) + t (Ba)]; one - way translocations
(non reciprocal or incomplete translocations : ti) type t(Ab) and type t(Ba) with fragment: ace(b);
insertions (ins) and, where obvious, inversions: inv (1-2 or 4). Cells with complex rearrangements
which involved three or more breaks on two or more chromosomes were recorded separately.
For practically all aberrations involving painted chromosomes it was possibly to identify whether
correspond to chromosome 1, 2 or 4.
Table 1 shows a summary of aberrations scored in the cells. The dicentrics and translocations are
bicoloured, i.e. exchanges between painted and non painted chromosomes. Exchanges between
two painted chromosomes are given in brackets. According to Morton (1991) (8) 1-2 and 4
chromosome pairs represent 22% of the average genome. Genome equivalent cells are shown in
brackets (column 2).
Painted aberrations
No. of No. of
Dose (Gy) unstable stable
cells CR cells tc+ti / dic
dic ac cr tc ti inv ins
2000
0 0 2 (0) 4 0 3 2 (0) 0 0 -
(704)
1000
0.5 1 12 (1) 6 0 4 4 (0) 0 0 8 / 12
(352)
1000
1 0 65 (3) 15 2 32 25 (3) 3 1 57 / 65
(352)
1000
2 10 132 (10) 27 10 84 56 (1) 2 0 140 / 132
(352)
1000
3 21 280 (31) 90 13 150 135 (5) 2 0 285 / 280
(352)
Total 491 (45) 273 222 (9) 495 / 491
60
Table 1. Chromosome aberrations induced by in vitro acute exposure to Co γ rays.
CR cells: cells with complex rearrangements
107
Table 2 shows the observed and expected values of each chromosome (1 - 2 - 4) in translocations
and dicentrics according to their respective chromosome length. (Morton, 1991).
Chromosome 1 Chromosome 2 Chromosome 4

dic tc ti total dic tc ti total dic tc ti total
Observed 143 105 80 328 140 95 61 296 112 72 81 265
Expected 144 99 82 325 140 96 78 314 111 77 62 250
Table 2. Distribution of aberrations amongst the painted chromosomes.
From Table 1, comparing the total translocations ( tc + ti ) with the total painted dicentrics gives a
ratio 495/491 = 1.01.
After correction for control levels the ratio drops to 0.98, close to unit as expected (9-10) assuming
that, excluding cells with complex rearrangements, dicentrics and translocations are induced
independently (11).
Table 2. shows that the ratios between the total expected and observed aberrations are 1.07, 0.87
and 1.06 for chromosomes 1, 2 and 4 respectively. Although using the chi-squared test the
differences are significant, deviations are not large.
When using Chromosome Painting as a retrospective biological dosimeter the blood samples will be
taken a long time (may be years) after acute irradiation. A similar scenario appears when doses are
delivered chronically, i.e. occupationally exposed worker under dose limits.
During this time lymphocytes undergo cell division and there is a selective elimination of cells with
unstable aberrations (Cu cells). The Cs cells are defined as those karyotypically normal plus cells
with monocentris abnormalities only (12). Cu cells contain policentrics, acentrics and include
practically all cells with complex rearrangements (except those with insertions and complete three
way translocations).
Then Cs cells appears as the best type for scoring because they are those which preserve and
even accumulate the radiation damage during a long time.
But unfortunately, to discriminate between Cu and Cs cells implies the analysis of all unstable
aberrations in the counterstained chromosomes too and, obviously, it is a drawback difficult to
accept in such a sophisticated technique. Moreover it is yet an open question if it is better to score
just two way translocations, two plus one way (both types) or two plus one type of one way (t (Ab))
because it is known that both one way translocations decline with time (1) and, moreover nobody
knows how many apparently one way are two way translocations at molecular level and are under
resolution limit.
It has been demonstrated (9) that two way translocations (tc) do not decrease if they are scored in Cs
cells or in all cells ( Cu+Cs), then we have fitted the results (Table 1) of two way translocations (tc) in all
cells (independently to their Cs or Cu status) to a linear quadratic model, using an iteratively reweighted
2
least square method. The linear quadratic model is described by the equation Y = c + αD + βD , were Y
-3
is translocations per cell (ti/cell), c is the background frequency = 3.69 ( ±2.68) 10 , α is the
-2 -1 -2
linear coefficient = 2.26 (±1.54) 10 Gy and β is the quadratic coefficient = 4.23 (±0.79) Gy .
108
A major topic in retrospective dosimetry is that low doses accumulated during years at very low
dose rates requires the best statistics, particularly for the linear coefficient of the linear quadratic
calibration curve and for the background levels and this implies the scoring of a huge number of
metaphases in order to obtain small SE. Assuming that this work does not offer a good enough SE
for the a coefficient but taking advantage of the fact that the extensive work of Lucas et al. (1995)
60
(13) for acute low doses of Co gamma rays gives a similar value for a coefficient, we have
compared the reciprocal translocation frequencies of 7 Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant workers with
the expected values obtained applying the linear coefficient of our calibration curve.
Table 3 shows the observed genome equivalent frequencies of reciprocal translocations (tc) in 7
Atucha I Nuclear power plant workers, the physical doses and the expected frequencies of
reciprocal translocations applying the linear coefficient of the linear quadratic calibration curve.
Dose (mSv) Observed Full genome tc frequencies +/- SE

Worker
Gamma Tritium Neutrons Total (*) tc/eq. cells Expected Observed
1 303.42 52.19 9.76 365.37 (14) 3 / 317 0.011 0.009 +/- 0.005
2 398.44 90.55 0 488.99 (24) 4 / 334 0.014 0.011 +/- 0.006
3 443.59 49.98 0 493.57 (22) 8 / 352 0.014 0.022 +/- 0.008
4 575.27 155.51 0 730.78 (22) 7 / 317 0.020 0.022 +/- 0.008
5 528.46 196.62 9.85 734.93 (22) 5 / 352 0.020 0.014 +/- 0.006
6 561.30 216.99 0.38 778.67 (25) 11/343 0.022 0.032 +/- 0.010
7 703.19 252.11 0 955.79 (25) 15 / 352 0.025 0.042 +/- 0.011
Table 3. Full genome reciprocal translocation frequencies in Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant workers.
(*) In brackets, years under occupational exposure conditions.
Figures in Table 3 indicate that, except for sample N° 7, the expected frequencies are included in
the SE of the corresponding observed frequencies. (Figure 1) Moreover all the observed values are
included in the 95% confidence calibration curves.
0.06
Frequency of reciprocal translocations
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Dose (mSv)
Figure 1. Comparison between reciprocal translocation frequencies of Atucha I NPP workers and
the expected frequencies applying the linear coefficient of in vitro FISH calibration curve.
109
2
Applying chi-square test (χ = 4.75 ; D.F. = 6) the differences are not significant (p > 0.5). Excluding
2
sample N° 7 (χ = 2.17 ; D.F.= 5) significance is p > 0.25.
Samples 2, 3 and 6 (14) were previously evaluated in 1993, scoring the frequencies of reciprocal
translocations in G-banded metaphases. The results were:
Frequency Dose (mSv)

Sample 2 0.010 428.32
Sample 3 0.022 479.98
Sample 6 0.030 621.69
As can be observed the G-banded reciprocal translocations frequencies, compared to tc full

genome FISH frequencies increased or at least remained unchanged (15)
REFERENCES
137
1. Natarajan, A.T., Santos, S.J., Darroudi, F. et al., Cesium-induced chromosome aberrations
analyzed by fluorescence in situ hybridization: eight years follow up of the Goiania accident victims.
Mut. Res. 400, 299-312 (1998).
2. Lucas, J. N., Hill, F.S., Burk, C.E. et al., Stability of the translocation frequency following whole-
body irradiation measured in rhesus monkeys. Int. J. Radiat. Biol, 70, 309-318 (1996).
3. Hande, M.P. and Natarajan, A.T., Induction and persistence of cytogenetic damage in mouse
splenocytes following whole body X-irradiation analised by fluorescence in situ hybridization. IV.
Dose response. Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 74, 441-448 (1998).
4. Lucas, J.N., Awa, A., Straume, T., et al., Rapid translocation frequency analysis in humans
decades after exposure to ionising radiation.. Int. J. Radiat Biol., 62, 53-63 (1992).
5. Perry, P. and Wolff, S. New Giemsa method for the differential staining of sister chromatids.
Nature 251, 475-488 (1974).
6. Mitelman, F., An International System for Human Cytogenetic Nomenclature (ISCN),

Cytogenetics and Cell Genetics (1995).
7. Tucker, J.D., Morgan, W.F., Awa, A.A. et al., A proposed system for scoring structural
aberrations detected by chromosome painting. Cytogenetics and Cell genetics 6, 211-221 (1995)
8. Morton,N.E., Parameters of the human genome. Proceedings of the National Academy of

Sciences, USA, 88, 7474-7476 (1991).
9. Nakano, M., Nakashima, E., Pawell, D.J. et al, Frequency of reciprocal translocations an
dicentrics induced in human blood lymphocytes by X-irradiation as determined by fluorescence in
situ hybridization. Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 64, 565-569 (1993).
10. Kanda, R. and Hayata, I., Comparison of the yields of translocations an dicentrics measured
using conventional Giemsa staining and Chromosome painting, Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 69, 702-705
(1996).
110
60
11. Finnon, P., Moquet, J.E., Edwards, A.A. and Lloyd, D.C., The Co gamma ray dose-response
for chromosomal aberrations in human lymphocytes analysed by FISH, applicability to biological
dosimetry, Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 75, 1215-1222 (1999).
12. Buckton, K.E., and Pike, M.C., Time in culture, An important variable in studying in vivo
radiation induced chromosome damage in man, Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 8, 439-452 (1964).
13. Lucas, J.N., Hill, F., Burk, T. et al., Dose-response curve for chromosome translocations
60
measured in human lymphocytes exposed to Co gamma rays, Health Phys. 68 (6), 761-765
(1995).
14. Nasazzi, N.B., Di Giorgio, M., Ferraro, M. et al., Evaluación de la dosis integrada por dosimetría
citogenética en trabajadores de Centrales nucleares, Proceedings II IRPA Congreso Regional de
Seguridad Radiológica y Nuclear, México (1993).
15. Lindholm, C., Tekkel, M. Veidebaum, T. et al., Persistence of translocations after accidental
exposure to ionizing radiation. Int. J. Radiat. Biol. 74 (5), 565-571. (1998).
111
Argentine Radiation Protection Society
Touzet, R.E.; Bombén, A.M.; Felizia, E.R.; Oliveira, A.A.;

Menossi, C.A.; Esmerián, A., Clein, D. and Bergoc, M.R.
th
ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY
Touzet, R.E.; Bombén, A.M.; Felizia, E.R.; Oliveira, A.A.; Menossi, C.A.; Esmerián, A., Clein, D.
Bergoc, M.R.
Facultad de Farmacia y Bioquímica, UBA
Argentina
The Argentine Radiation Protection Society (SAR) is a non profit society, member of IRPA. It
was originally launched in 1967 and a formal constitution was adopted in 1983. Presently, SAR
has 220 active members, professionals and technicians dedicated to a variety of disciplines
related to different radiation protection aspects: medicine, industry, research and teaching.
Dr. Dan J. Beninson, 1996 Rolf M. Sievert Award, is one of the SAR founder members.
SAR OBJECTIVES
The basic SAR objectives are:
• to promote research and knowledge exchange on radiation protection topics and related
disciplines
• to promote the comprehension of radiation protection criteria with regard to existence and
handling of radioactive and fissile materials and any other radiation sources
• to foster the conception of radiation protection as a professional discipline and to contribute

to its permanent improvement
• to promote the diffusion of the information related to all radiation protection and nuclear
safety aspects, and radiation protection standards and recommendations, not only within the
scientific, technical and academic areas, but also to general public.
SAR ACTIVITIES
To reach their objectives, SAR develops different activities:
• it provides for and supports national radiation protection meetings, in different cities of
Argentina
• it organizes training and refresher courses, seminars and workshops on radiation protection
related subjects
• it sponsors conferences, congresses and courses organized by scientific societies of related

disciplines which support radiation protection
• it sponsors the attendance of authors of scientific papers to regional and international

meetings
• it publishes bulletins and journals to promote the diffusion of radiation protection information,
standards and recommendations in Spanish
• it has its own Web site to update information on radiation protection.
115
NATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION MEETINGS
1st ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS

(November/December 1983, in Buenos Aires)
2nd ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS

(November 1986, in Buenos Aires)
3rd ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS

(October 1988, in Buenos Aires)
4th ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS

(October 1993, in Mendoza)
5th ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS

(October 1995, in Santa Fe)
6th ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY CONGRESS

(September 1998, in Buenos Aires)
All the Congresses were successful from the point of view of participants attendance and the
scientific and technical quality of the presented papers.
These meetings had: Invited Lectures on high interest subjects, presented by well known
national or international experts and Topical Sessions, conducted by two chairpersons, where
the accepted papers were presented. In addition, two or three Round Tables were scheduled to
discuss technical subjects of interest. Occasionally, industrial or commercial exhibition of
radiation protection products took place at the same time. A book of accepted abstracts and the
invited lectures was provided to the participants, at the time of the congress. The proceedings,
with the full papers, were sent at a later time and some selected papers were published in the
journal edited by the Argentine Radiation Protection Society. Certificates of attendance were
given to all participants and accepted papers presentation and invited lectures recognitions
were also delivered.
The 6th Argentine Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Congress was held at the A.
Jauretche Room of the Province of Buenos Aires Bank Museum, in the city of Buenos Aires,
from 22nd to 24th September, 1998. More than 150 participants from all the country, working in
different disciplines related to radiation protection and nuclear safety, attended the Congress.
Sixty-six papers were presented orally in the different topical sessions of the Congress. The
scientific topics included in the program were:
Physical Dosimetry
Radiation Protection at Workplaces
Radiation Protection in the Environment
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Biological Dosimetry
Waste Management
Transport of Radioactive Material
Nuclear Safety of Mayor Facilities
Safeguards and Physical Protection
Quality Assurance Programs
Training, Technical Information and Communication.
A Round Table on “Impact of the Auditing to Ontario Hydro on the Nuclear Industry” took place.
The experts invited were from the Atomic Energy National Commission and the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority of Argentina, the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant and the Argentine Nuclear
Technology Association. Workshops on “Radiation Protection of Health Professionals in Nuclear
116
Medicine” and “Radiation Protection of the Patient” were organized during the congress. A
publications stand, showing all the radiation protection and nuclear safety related bibliography
available, was settled and many participants inquires were received and answered.
TRAINING AND REFRESHER COURSES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS
At the 1997-1999 period, some of the organized activities on radiation protection related
subjects were:
• Workshop on “Radioactive Waste Management”
The workshop was held at the Mechanic and Electric Engineers Society Headquarters in
Buenos Aires, the 4th and 5th September, 1997. More than 100 participants attended the
workshop. Experts from the Atomic Energy National Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory
Authority of Argentina and the City of Buenos Aires Waste Management Coordination Society
(CEAMSE) delivered the invited lectures. Some of the scientific topics included in the program
were: Technological aspects of the waste treatment, Storage and final disposal, Waste
management and legislation and Regulatory aspects of the waste management. Sufficient time
was allocated for questions and discussion.
Support material specially edited for the workshop and certificates of attendance were given to
all the participants of the workshop.
• Course on “Safe Transportation of Radioactive Material”
The course was delivered at the Argentine Nuclear Technology Association Headquarters in
Buenos Aires, from 17th to 28th November, 1997. Three instructors from the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority of Argentina, with outstanding professional experience in the subject were
in charge of the lessons. The participants came from governmental institutes and private
companies related to transportation. Some of the scientific topics included in the program were:
IAEA´s regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, Regulation AR 10.16.1 on
radioactive material transport, Relevant aspects on emergency planning, Consignor´s
responsibilities, Analysis of application problems and International modal regulations (IATA,
ICAO, IMO).
Support material, legislation and subject related publications were given to the participants.
Certificates of attendance and/or completion were given at the end of the course.
• Workshop on “Radiation Protection of Health Professionals in Nuclear Medicine”.
The workshop was held in Buenos Aires, on September 23rd, 1998. More than ninety
physicians and nuclear medicine technicians attended the workshop. Experts from nuclear
medicine facilities of governmental hospitals and private institutes and from the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority delivered lectures and discussed the topics with the participants. Some of
the scientific topics included in the program were: Doses received by health professionals in
nuclear medicine, Quality assurance program in medical procedures, Waste management in
nuclear medicine and Regulatory documents related to nuclear medicine.
Support material specially edited for the workshop and certificates of attendance were given to
• Workshop on “Radiation Protection of the Patient”.
The workshop was held in Buenos Aires, on September 24th, 1998. More than ninety
participants attended the workshop. Some of the topics included in the program were: Radiation
protection of the patient in nuclear medicine and radiation therapy, Biological effects of ionizing
radiation, Deterministic effects in diagnostic radiology, Radiation protection for interventional
radiology, Prenatal effects, Prenatal dose assessment, Excretion of radiopharmaceutical in
117
human breast milk, Interruption of breast feeding and Regulations related to radiation protection
of the patient. Substantial time was allocated for discussion of the topics.
The seminar was hosted by SAR, under the joint sponsorship of the Nuclear Regulatory
Authority of Argentina, the Atomic Energy National Commission of Argentina, the Argentine
Nuclear Technology Association and the Pharmacy and Biochemistry Faculty of the University
of Buenos Aires.
A publication with the invited lectures was edited, extra material related to the subject and
certificates of attendance were given to all participants.
• Seminar on “Aerosols Behavior in Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants”
The seminar was held in Buenos Aires, the 9th and 10th December, 1998. The invited expert
was Dr. E. Hontañón (Nuclear Fission Department-CIEMAT, Spain). Some of the topics
included in the program were: Severe accidents, Aerosols behavior in the reactor cooling
system, Aerosols behavior in the containment and Codes and Experiments.
• Seminar on “Biological Indicators in Ionizing Radiation Overexposed Patients (Dose

Assessment and Follow up)
The seminar was held at the San Rafael Auditorium, in Buenos Aires, on June 10th, 1999. Local
and international invited experts and more than 130 participants, from Argentina and Uruguay,
attended the seminar. The opening conference on “Present and Future on Multiparametric
Dosimetry” was delivered by Dr. P. Voisin (CEA/IPSN/DPHD-France). Dr. O. García and Dr. L.
Morera (CPHR-Cuba) who presented their experience in nucleic acid determination as genetic
damage indicator applied in Chernobyl children. Dra A. Ramalho (IRD-Brazil) presented her
experience in biological dosimetry applied in the Goiania accident and Dr. I. López (CECHEN-
Chile) spoke about the citogenetic dosimetry status in her country.
Some other topics included in the program were: “Linfocitary Apoptosis as Biological Dosimetry”
delivered by Dr. P. Gisone (ARN-Argentina), “Oxidative Stress Evaluation as indicator in
overexposed patients”, exposed by Dr. Boveris (FFyB/UBA-Argentina), “Comet Essay and its
Potential Applications” delivered by Dr. M. Di Giorgio (ARN- Argentina) and “FISH and its
Applications” given by Dr. M.C. Mullman (CONICET-Argentina). At the end of the seminar, an
interesting Round Table on “Biological Indicator of Overexposure and Regional Co-operation”
took place.
The seminar sponsors were: Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina, Atomic Energy National
Commission of Argentina, Argentine Nuclear Technology Association and the Pharmacy and
Biochemistry Faculty of the University of Buenos Aires. Attendance at the seminar was free of
charge.
Support material, subject related publications and certificates of attendance were given to all the
participants.
• Workshop on “Radiation Accidents”
The workshop was held in coincidence with the National Course on “Medical Response to
Radiation Accidents”, at the Atomic Energy National Commission Headquarters, on September
10th, 1999. Local and international invited experts and more than 120 participants, attended the
workshop. Two main subjects were discussed: “Nuclear and Radiation Accidents” and
“Advances in Emergency Response Systems to Radiation Accidents”. A conference on
“Lessons Learned from Recent Accidents” was delivered by Dr. J. Harrison (NRPB-Great
Britain) and Dr. I. Turai (IAEA) spoke about “Recent Accidents, IAEA Intervention”. Dr. P.
Gisone (ARN-Argentina) presented the advances in the project ARCAL XXXVII and the Latin
American radiopathology network of cooperation in case of radiation accidents Attendance at
the workshop was free of charge. Support material and certificates of attendance were given to
118
• Conference on “Advances in Internal Dosimetry”
The conference was delivered by Dr. M. Stabin (Oak Ridge Associated Universities-USA and
University of Pernambuco-Brazil), in Buenos Aires, on October 29th, 1999. More than fifty
participants attended the conference. Some of the topics included were: Advances in Dosimetric
Assessment, Software MIRDOSE and VESSEL, Intravascular Brachytherapy Dose
Assessment, Therapy with Radiopharmaceuticals, Codes for Internal Dosimetry.
The sponsors of the conference were: Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina and Argentine
Nuclear Medicine and Biology Association. A Spanish translation of the conference was given to
the participants.
For the second semester of 2000, SAR is preparing a Course on “Radiation Protection in
Industrial Facilities”
CONFERENCES, CONGRESSES AND COURSES SPONSORSHIP
SAR sponsors conferences, congresses and courses organized by scientific societies of related
disciplines which support radiation protection.
• The National Course on “Medical Response to Radiation Accidents” was held in Buenos
Aires the 8th and 9th September 1999, with SAR sponsorship.
• The Latin American Biology and Nuclear Medicine Association Congress was held in Buenos
Aires, in October 1999, and SAR participated in the organization of two session: “Quality
Assurance in Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Therapy” and “Therapy with
Radiopharmaceuticals and Intravascular Radiation Therapy”.
• The International Congress of Radiology will be held in Buenos Aires, in September 2000,
and SAR was invited to participate in the organization of the radiation protection sessions.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS PROMOTION
SAR promotes the attendance of authors of scientific papers to regional and international
meetings, by granting scholarships. Authors with abstracts accepted at main meetings are
invited to submit the full paper and the selections are made by outstanding specialized local and
international juries.
SAR provided total financial support for the elected scholars at the 3rd and 4th Regional
Meetings on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” that were held in Cusco (Peru) and La
Habana (Cuba) in 1995 and 1998, respectively. SAR also provided total or partial financial
support to argentine participants at the 9th International Congress of IRPA that was held in
Vienna (Austria) in 1996.
SAR PUBLICATIONS
In order to promote the diffusion of radiation protection information, standards and

recommendations, SAR began to publish a Bulletin in 1983, and it launched the edition of
“Seguridad Radiológica”, a journal written in Spanish, in 1992. Papers on specific radiation
protection subjects and general related topics, written by local and foreign authors, are included
in the magazine. SAR also publishes Spanish translations of the International Organization
publications, in order to make available important transcendental information to Spanish
119
speakers. This is a very important task, taking into account the lack of information on radiation
protection written in Spanish.
A Bulletin with news on Congresses, Courses and Meetings and notices of interest, was
launched in 1999. The publications are distributed among SAR members, and they are also
sent, at no charge, to local and foreign Universities, Scientific Associations, and radioactive
material users who may request them.
In addition, an editorial committee was appointed in September 1999. The first decision was to
redesign “Seguridad Radiológica”, from the cover to the back. On that spirit, a competition on
cover illustration was held. Changes in contents and visual design are being made in
accordance with 21st century communication demands. SAR will launch the first issue of this
project in June 2000.
SAR ON THE INTERNET
Since 1999, SAR has its own Web site (www.sar.radioproteccion.org.ar) with all the publications
and material related to the Society and with links to congresses and web sites of interest. This
project has proven to be successful and has increased substantially the relationship with our
members and with all people interested in radiation protection aspects in Argentina and Latin
America.
Presently, SAR is launching a new service in the home page in which people may ask questions
on radiation protection subjects, that will be answered by experts on the different subjects who
had accepted to participate in this program. This initiative will help SAR to maintain permanent
contact with members and general public.
SAR AS MEMBER OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
SAR is a founder member of the Latin American and Caribbean Federation of Radiation
Protection Societies (FRALC) with Brazil, Mexico and Peru. SAR hosted the headquarters of the
Federation (1995-1998) and with the other member societies worked to promote the
establishment of new Radiation Protection Societies within the region. As a result of these
efforts, Cuba and Uruguay formed their own societies.
In 1991, SAR hosted the first Regional Radiation Protection Meeting, in Buenos Aires and
sponsored the 3rd and 4th Regional Meetings on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” that
were held in Cusco (Peru) and La Habana (Cuba) in 1995 and 1998, respectively.
SAR, as member of FRALC and along with Spain and Portugal, integrates GRIAPRA
(Iberoamerican Group of Radiation Protection Societies). One of the objectives of this group is
to foster the co-operation and mutual aid in the study, research and use of the resources, to
promote the radiation protection development among the members. A citogenetic indicators
research program has been developed within the framework of GRIAPRA.
The main objective of SAR, as society and as member of IRPA, is to promote all radiation
protection aspects, and all members and Executive Committee Officers contribute with their
best to reach this objective.
ACKOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to express our thanks to Mr. G. Federico, in charge of the construction and update of
SAR Web site. Thanks are also due to Ms. L. Yannibelli and all SAR regional delegates for their
support.
120
SAR Publications
New edition
Bulletins 1999 edition

Special issue
121
SAR meetings
122
www.sar.radioproteccion.org.ar
123
SAR publications at the Web site
124
SAR Web site links
Q & A section
SAR activities
125
Risk Perception and Benefits Perception
(Survey Results and Discussion)
Touzet, R.E.; Barón, J.H.; Caspani, C. and Remedi, J.O.
th
RISK PERCEPTION AND BENEFITS PERCEPTION
(SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION)
1 2 3 1
Touzet, R.E. ; Barón, J.H. ; Caspani, C. and Remedi, J.O.
1
2
Nuclear Regulatory Authority e Instituto CEDIAC - Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
3
Ministerio de Salud Pública - Provincia de Santa Fe
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
The problem of discrepancies in risk perception
Essentially, the radiation protection criteria and the safety measures applied to a given practice
are based on the risk implicit in such practice and on the acceptance of such risk by the society
involved... In extreme situations, when risks are high, the criteria to be applied must be strict
and the safety measures must be severe. Contrarily, when risks are not significant, safety
measures can be attenuated.
When differences in risk perception arise among various sectors of society, serious
conflicts may be encountered in the establishment of the acceptance levels and the
application of protection measures.
Different Judgements:
The trouble with risk perception lies on the fact that, as a rule, technicians and the public apply
different judgement elements and, therefore, coincidence is almost fortuitous. Usually,
technicians or scientists define risk as the product between the magnitude of the damage that
can result from an event and the probability of occurrence of such event. Contrarily, among the
public, risk may be perceived subjectively through intuitive judgment (Tubiana, 1979; Slovic,
1987; etc).
The technicians’ judgment is based on an almost quantitative engineering criterion and is

derived from the statistical data of previous events and/or from the analytical analysis of
tentative scenarios. Judgment by regular citizens involves a greater variety of individual
opinions resulting from previous experiences and from external factors of different nature, all of
them hardly predictable.
In some cases, the public perceives radiological risk itself (exactly the same radiation dose) in a
very different manner, depending on its origin and the context.
Risk due to radon inhalation at one’s own home may be accepted more easily than that due to
the inhalation of tritium released by a nuclear power plant, no matter if the dose from the latter is
100 times smaller. (..!)
Surveys:
In spite of the complexity of the psychological mechanisms leading an individual to issue a value
judgment concerning a given practice, many efforts have been made in to establish which are
the factors involved in risk perception. By means of different studies, correlation has been found
between the judgments stated and the actual features of the risk, the risk’s social context and
the personal characteristics of the individuals issuing their judgments concerning the risk.
Often, surveys have been used as a tool for evaluating the factors involved in risk perception
and for understanding the reasons for the differences (Sjöberg, 1990,94). However, in addition
129
to knowing the correlation between an individual’s context and his/her opinion regarding a
practice, we must learn which are the reasons for the establishment of such correlation. A useful
tool is the knowledge of the mechanisms by which an individual assumes a certain posture with
regard to a given risk.
Symbols:
Some authors (S.Prêtre, 1997) consider that the intuitive perception of risk is closely connected
to a “symbolic mechanism”. An activity is linked to a given symbol that, for a given individual,
has a pre-established, clear and uncontroversial meaning... Later, the value judgment
concerning a fact is not established with regard to the concrete fact itself, but concerning the
symbol representing the fact. Once the symbolic relationship is established, a psychological
phenomenon may arise by which individuals oppose to reality and make symbols prevail over
facts, so as not to alter the pre-established inner symbolic scheme.
This mechanism is well known and has been extensively used by advertising companies.
Instead of a rational demonstration of the qualities of a product, they prefer representing a
symbol that is dear to individuals’ interest (peace, home, welfare, long lasting, etc.) and, thus,
attain acceptance regardless the intrinsic values of the product. Equally, the application of
negative symbols when representing an activity can be a mechanism used by detractors for
impairing the continuity of such activity. By using this symbolic mechanism, groups representing
the interest of a given sector may lead another pre-established sector of the population to adopt
a posture differing from the one that would result from the application of an independent rational
mechanism.
Summarizing, risk perception may result from two different mechanisms: the rational
evaluation of some measurable elements and the intuitive evaluation based on subjective
considerations; the latter can be strongly influenced by interested opinion-building sectors. The
existence of these two approaches to the problem may bring along conflicts that will damage the
society’s common interests.
On the other hand, knowledge on the mechanisms used by individuals to adopt positions can
be applied to the design of communication policies that will allow smoothen such differences
and reduce conflicts.
PERCEPTION OF BENEFITS
The perception of benefits cannot be analyzed separately from risk perception. The acceptance
of a given risk by part of the population is closely related to the benefits expected, whether
consciously or unconsciously, from the activity producing the risk.
The concept of “perceiving the benefits” is also of a subjective nature and is strongly related to
the nature of the practice involved.
This is why identical risks are considered as opposite, depending on the origin of radiation:
resulting from medical applications or from nuclear facilities... caused by natural radiation or by
artificial radiation.
As an example, the public appreciates the neat benefits of medical practices, while the benefits
arising from the production of nuclear energy are not acknowledged likewise. When asked if
nuclear power actually needed, many people might give a negative answer.
130
Medical practice
The perception of the benefits involved in medical practice leads patients —with full
confidence— to allow physicians make any decisions concerning the technique to be used,
whether in diagnosis or therapy, without any inquiries. The message is “if the doctor says so,
it must be justified”. This circumstance does not occur in other practices in which the
decisions made by radiation protection specialists may generate fear or mistrust within the
public and, thus, generate questioning.
During the survey performed in the hospital environment, in Argentine, the public showed
greater confidence in the information supplied by the hospital experts in radiation protection
(80%) than in that provided by the media (60%), ecologists (12%) and even regulatory
authorities (60%).
Consequently, risks are not accepted in an absolute condition but as related to the
perceived benefits, including the context and, especially, confidence in those
responsible for the practice.
Therefore, an analysis of the factors influencing the eventual rejection of a practice must not
only explore fears, but what is the prestige of those responsible and what are the expectations
regarding the benefits to be obtained...!
INFLUENCE OF "PRESSURE GROUPS" UPON SOCIETY
A realistic analysis of the causes originating a given perception of risk by the public must
include, among the significant factors to be considered, the eventual presence of groups liable
to exert an influence on public opinion.
In the early stages of modern society, an ideal paradigmatic model was postulated by which
all individuals struggled for “common interest”, while disregarding their personal interests. This
paradigmatic model, which was in force soon after the French Revolution, had attained sufficient
legal force to “prevent individuals from gathering in associations for common interest”.
Later, individuals were allowed to gather in political parties, although only to reflect the various
concepts representing the general interest of the Republic.
Sectarian political parties were viewed as factions opposing the idea of general willingness and
common welfare. Suffice it to remember Washington, who —when giving up office— warned US
citizens about “his great concern concerning the polarization of the two majority parties, which
would end up destroying democracy”. “This is just terrible”, he stated!
The nineteenth century;
However, this concept changed in the nineteenth century and political parties are accepted, first,
as a necessary evil and, then, as essential elements for a good performance of the political
system. Gradually, this splitting of society becomes greater and greater through the appearance
of the “interest sectors” or “pressure groups”.
It was only 1908 when A. Bentley said: “... in any organization, decisional activities are nothing
but the ultimate result of a struggle among pressure groups trying to impose their will, all of
them in an attempt to take part in the governing process...”.
The democratic society in which we are immersed is constituted by the government and the
citizens (representatives and those represented), but also by several “intermediate interest
groups” gathering after their interests, opinions, etc.
A. Bentley stated: “... political activity can be ultimately defined as a precarious, unstable,
permanently menaced and always renewed balance among numberless interest groups
exerting pressure to each other...”.
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The presence of pressure groups does not always ensure a balance supporting society’s
general interest. Jacqueline B. de Celis said: “... the representation of general interest is
incomplete, arbitrary and uneven; ultimately, it threatens general interests among regular
citizens...” (there are interests that are not represented or are weakly represented due to lack of
resources and, therefore, sectorial unbalance occurs).
Currently, pressure groups are named lobbies and they have become an alternative power
structure using different persuasive methods to attain prevalence of the individual interests of
the sectors they represent.
Some analysts criticize the role played by pressure groups, which is detrimental to general
interests. A. Borón says: “... the performance of lobbies is designed to impose their sectorial
preferences, leaving out democratic control and participation, where conflicting specific interests
hinder the development of an authentically collective and national will... while they conspire
against general interest and justice...”.
It appears as if, in a real world, the analysis of the relevant factors involved in risk
perception by the population must necessarily consider the existence of organized
pressure groups, representing a given sectorial interest and using information means to
satisfy the interest of the sector they represent.
One of the methods used by pressure groups in order to influence public opinion is the so-called
“free riding”; that is, profiting from some transcendental social or economic event, not originated
by the group, for self benefit. Any information campaign aimed at improving communication
between technicians and the public must be designed taking into account the existence of
pressure groups that, in some cases, may have access to important financial resources.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTION
Long ago, back in the ‘70s, when H. Inhaber performed his first systematic work on risk
assessment for the various sources of energy, the great differences existing between risk
perception and the probability of damage were made evident.
Perhaps, it might be more appropriate to refer to “risk acceptance”. Anyone can be instructed
on the fact that inhaling radon at home, sun bathing or flying on an airplane is exactly as risky,
or even more risky than being irradiated in the vicinity of a nuclear facility... however, even
admitting and perceiving that the risk is the same, individuals decide to accept the former and
reject the latter...!
When an individual “just learns” that radon produces "natural" radiation, he/she quits
worrying and accepts it (B. Lindell, 1993)... however, should the same radon originate in
the storage of uranium tails, then, he/she starts worrying again. ..
The question is that people are not only interested or worried about the magnitude of risk, but
also about the “type of risk”; contrarily, technicians do only assess the magnitude of risk,
which is usually expressed as the possibility of suffering damage.
One could not say that somebody driving a vehicle at a high speed does not perceive the risk;
however, it is clear that he/she accepts it anyhow.
A person may turn down an invitation to visit the surroundings of Chernobyl; however, he/she
would enjoy a trip to Finland, even if in the latter he/she will certainly incur in a larger radiation
dose and his/her risk of contracting cancer will be greater...! Technicians assess the risk of
radiation regardless its origin.
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The public’s acceptance concept is linked to the concept of benefit rather than to the concept of
risk itself. Evidently, nuclear power plants are not perceived as a benefit. Actually, nuclear
power generation is not considered as a convenient alternative but, rather, as a dispensable
activity.
Another determinate factor in gaining acceptance with regard to a given practice is the
population’s confidence in the experts who provide the reports. Trust can be transmitted
without requiring rational explanations.
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
The information reaching the public includes an account of the events and an interpretation or
analysis of the same by the journalistic source in charge of its diffusion. The way in which news
are highlighted in the medium is an element affecting the way in which such information is
picked up by the population.
The media have a natural trend to spread news in the manner that is most interesting for the
public. Media are commercial firms whose goals are optimizing benefits. Journalists use to say:
"bad news can always be sold but, contrarily, good news is no news...!"
The population judges an event on the basis “of the context” under which it is
transmitted. When people are not trained or do not have the necessary data for an evaluation,
they will believe the comparisons and assumptions presented by the media steadfastly.
A recent example, related with the event at Tokaimura (Japan) serves to illustrate the above.
During an interview with several journalists from the printed media in Buenos Aires, a
comprehensive explanation was given —several examples included— indicating that the event
had nothing to do with the Chernobyl accident with regard to its features, its magnitude, or even
considering the worst possible scenario... All the journalists expressed their understanding
and their full agreement with such appreciation... However, two articles were published in
the newspapers in which the event was labeled as “A New Chernobyl” and in which two pages
were filled with a complete retrospective account of the Chernobyl accident.
This allows several remarks:
a) The media tend to present information in the way providing the largest commercial
benefits and, evidently, the Chernobyl accident is the one arising greater interest among the
people and representing bigger sales.
b) When the population is unable to make its own evaluation, the event shall be judged based
on the comparisons presented to them.
Definitely, sometimes, the media behave as a sectorial group of interest trying to obtain the
greatest benefits by selling the goods that are most interesting to the public.
PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCIES
The population’s opinion on the management’s response capacity and qualifications, as well as
on the mitigation means at their disposal to face an eventual radiological emergency, play a
leading role in risk perception. Concerning this matter, both confidence in the authorities and the
forms in which release the news are extremely important.
Considering its magnitude, during the Chernobyl accident, the handling of the emergency was
quite reasonable as far as minimizing public exposure to radioactive dose (which is not
surprising for a country that was prepared for a nuclear war).
The probabilities of occurrence of an accident more critical than that at Chernobyl are very
scarce. However, only 31 members of the plant personnel died, no members of the public
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received doses liable to produce severe effects (on the very same day of the Chernobyl
accident an airplane fell in Ceylon and 50 people died) and the personnel in the plant
neighboring Chernobyl continued to work at the site.
On the other hand, if credit is given to the radiological model now in force —considering non-
threshold stochastic effects—, except for the case of thyroid cancer, the percent increase in
cancer cases due to the accident is so low that any increase above normal incidence will be
unnoticeable.
However, none of these messages was transmitted to the population. Comments were made
about millions of people who were clinically affected, children with incredible mutations and
terrifying leukemia indexes. The public did only receive the images of evacuated people,
destroyed homes and “mutant children”. The level of sensationalistic fantasy displayed was
enormous and even mystic reasons for the destruction of humanity were released.
Because of the information transmitted, the population was misinformed and, additionally,
severe psychological effects were produced among populations that had received
insignificant radiation doses.
CONCLUSIONS
By means of opinion surveys, a good number of detailed studies have been performed in
several countries, in order to establish which are the parameters affecting “public risk
perception” when faced to different scenarios.
Resulting from those studies, various factors have been identified as influencing such
perception. Some of them are related to fear about risk itself, while others have to do with the
observers’ social context and others refer to individual features, such as education, sense of
property, sensitiveness, sex, religion, etc.
Although these individual and social factors must be taken into account on a case-by-case
basis, consideration is given to the fact that, since most of the public has no access to
information other than that published in mass communication media, the source of
information being used is the most transcendental element for people to shape their
opinion and adopt a given posture concerning risk. This remark is still more important for
the population groups with a lower educational level.
This means that the results expected by any survey will be highly influenced by the information
received by each group rather than by the objective risk technically evaluated.
As there is a lack of direct communication on the risk aspects from the technicians to
the public, the influence of the mass communication media on the risk perception by the
public is dominant.
These conditions for the risk perception are therefore very sensitive to the media’s own
interests, who try to sell their product regardless of the scientific seriousness of it. Furthermore,
as many pressure groups with very strong economic interests find the nuclear energy and its
applications a potential competitor, it is evident that these groups will be (and presently are)
modifying the public’s perception of nuclear risks.
Any survey results, therefore, which are taken as representative without taking into
account the influence exerted on them by the mass media and the “competing” pressure
groups, are far from being objective from the technical point of view. Any reading on the
society’s risk perception must be performed taken these aspects into account.
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What possible courses of action can be taken to narrow the gap between the technical objective
magnitude of risk and the public’s perception of it? First of all, the information should be the
preferred tool, but, as this information does not sell, in the mass media concept and their
supporting groups, this comes to be a very difficult task.
Any other viable course of action should require governmental actions. These may be the
inclusion of selected topics on educational programs (starting from primary and secondary
school level), the publication of specific topics in the media by government official documents, or
the most drastic punishment of the misinforming media, when the published news are obviously
sensationalist and not informative in nature.
On this sense, consideration must be given to the fact that the public’s fear and
apprehension that are generated unnecessarily through the release of news exaggerating
reality may generate important psychological damage that will affect people’s quality of
life. More than that, the deformation of reality (objetive risk) by the media and the
economic pressure groups is a threaten to the society’s possibilities of well being,
because it may lead to the preclusion of practices that involve nuclear energy (as has
occurred in several cities), limiting the people’s possibility to have better and longer
lives.
If the scientific community does not express these considerations at the proper governmental
levels, nobody will do so, and the consequences will be the responsibility of this scientific
community.
_____________________
All survey results, statistics and graphics must be included in Poster Presentation Nº 179
Some copies will be also distributed between participants
___________________
THE SURVEY
a) Its design
Consideration was given to the fact that the risk perceived could be easily affected by the
surveying method and its design. Furthermore, the terms used in making the questions and the
actual context in which they are posed are also important as far as results are concerned.
In the social perception of risk, there is a distinction between ionizing radiation when related to
nuclear energy —including nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities (which are associated with
the “evil atom”)— and when used in medical diagnosis and therapy (associated with the “good
atom”). This is why assessing the social perception of risk in the latter case is a matter of
concern.
The design of the survey indicated the need to identify the various groups, assess the risk
perceived by each one of them, define whether there is any logic in such risk perception and
establish which are the differences in the “way of thinking” among the various communities and
regions. This is why the survey was applied in different regions of Latin America and Spain.
Additionally, the design of the survey allowed establishing, comparatively, the differences in
perception of different risks based on people’s educational levels.
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b) The logistics developed
The survey was carried out in a specific area: risk associated to ionizing radiation. Within this
field, the survey was performed in the population sector attending hospitals and focused to
groups associated with the use of ionizing radiation, occupationally exposed personnel
(technicians and professionals) and patients or public at the waiting rooms.
Forms were distributed in the various areas, along with a text explaining their purpose and
requesting cooperation in their completion. When delivered personally, the personnel in charge
of handing them out and collecting them were instructed on how the forms were to be filled. No
fiber pens should be used because marks would appear overleaf; if corrections had to be made
the wrong marks should be first painted white; answer should not be influenced; etc.
In Argentina, forms were distributed in the provinces of Santa Fe, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, San
Luis and Mendoza, as well as in the Buenos Aires Federal District.
c) Intrinsic problems
Generally, a good degree of willingness and acceptance was found. However, the answers to
the questions were strongly influenced by the emotional status of those interviewed. Among the
technical staff, the most typical topics included in the answers referred to the service work load,
interpersonal relations, the types of patients treated and the expertise and availability of the
person in charge of assembling the team. As far as the public is concerned, the factors involved
were whether it was a patient or his/her companion, the type of disease, the educational level of
the person surveyed.
Many of those surveyed started to fill the form, discontinued the task because it was their turn
for an exam and were not willing to continue with the survey after their exit. Some rejections
occurred due to the scarcely diffused knowledge on these topics among individuals with a
scarce scholar training.
d) Validity of the collected data
This survey may be considered as a particular point in a very broad universe. Nevertheless,
evidently, a strict scientific application of the method —developed by a multidisciplinary team
(statisticians, psychologists, physicists and technologists)— allows for drawing valid
conclusions. In turn, these conclusions may further allow another interdisciplinary team
(communicators, sociologists, physicists and legal advisors) designing policies for clarifying
concepts among the public and the technical staff and prompting legislation projects supporting
such policies.
A further analysis of the forms —in time and space— will allow to establish which is the
influence of social communicators on the social perception of certain risks and whether a more
finished knowledge of the subject may promote acceptance.
Based on the results obtained, an assessment can be made of the best way to communicate in
order to attain understanding, appraisal and acceptance by society. This can be done identifying
which are the most credible groups for communication with society and which is the most
effective method for reaching the various communities and regions.
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The Keys for Success
in the Application of Quality Systems
in Nuclear Medicine and Radiotherapy
Touzet, R.E.; Larcher, A.M.; Menossi, C.A. and Sánchez, G.D.
th
THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS IN THE APPLICATION OF QUALITY SYSTEMS
IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND RADIOTHERAPY
1 1 1 2
Touzet, R.E. ; Larcher, A.M. ; Menossi, C.A. and Sánchez, G.D.
1
2
Hospital General San Martín
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
The main objectives of radiation protection in medical applications are:
a) Preventing accidents (potential exposures) and
b) Attaining doses as low as it is reasonably achievable (optimization).
Both planning and the use of preventive or quality systems are essential in the fulfillment of
such objectives. “Planning” is definitely required both for prevention and for optimization.
Planning implies scheduling the activities to be performed in order to comply with the
established goals, through an efficient use of the available resources.
The quality of planning depends on the information available. Anyone planning needs to have,
at least, the following information:
♦ the possible situations and scenarios during operation;
♦ the antecedents of the task to be performed and those related to it;
♦ the behavior of all the elements involved in the system, as a result of the tests performed;
♦ the errors or failures liable to occur; and
♦ what to do in case of deviations and incidents.
Once the sources of error and the eventual causes for the postulated accidents have been
established, a Program of Operating Actions must be put in place in order to reduce the
probability of occurrence of the foreseen failures and errors.
The set of all the operating actions, regulations and activities to be carried out for preventing
failures is called Preventive System or “Quality System”.
This simple and easy-to-apply scheme may lead to significant progress in the implemen-
tation of quality systems and to minimizing errors in treatment planning and dose man-
agement. This, in turn, can improve results and decrease the complication and relapse
rates.
This presentation is aimed at analyzing the factors favoring an effective implementation of

a Quality System, as well as the factor that may hinder such implementation.
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TERMINOLOGY MISUSED
It should be noted that certain confusion has arisen in the terminology used in this field: “Quality
Assurance” and “Quality Control” are often erroneously used as synonyms. Additionally, Quality
Control is often related only to physical issues and, fundamentally, to the equipment. The
presentation of this topic, even in some publications issued by prestigious international
agencies, is highly confusing. Quality assurance programs appear as mere lengthy and detailed
checking lists of the equipment being used. On the other hand, the “Quality Assurance”
contents of the training programs for nuclear medicine and radiotherapy specialists, proposed
by such agencies, are very elementary and appear as a part of Quality Control.
The application of Quality Systems in medical practice is not as widespread as it is desirable.

The topic —which is so significant for attaining high-quality diagnoses and radiotherapy— is not
included in the programs of events for specialists in radiology, nuclear medicine and
radiotherapy.
Justification for not applying a quality system takes diverse forms:
♦ Quality systems generate excessive paperwork.
♦ They are only useful for major facilities.
♦ Complying with the regulatory standards is enough.
♦ Costly specialists or advisors are required.
♦ Quality systems are unnecessary if work is well done.
♦ Quality standards do not apply to actual problems, etc., etc.
Criticism arose in some countries where the corresponding regulatory agencies applied the
same quality requirements used for nuclear power plants. Part of that criticism is correct, while
other is exclusively addressed to designs of Quality Systems that, sometimes, are definitely
inappropriate for the actual needs of a given facility. This indicates that recipes that are good for
some may be inadequate for others and this is the root of the problem.
Technological progress in medicine is constant and practice is modified day after day.
Therefore, in order to face the various circumstances rapidly and avoid accidents, “dynamic and
intelligent” quality systems become essential.
QUALITY SYSTEMS AND QUALITY CONTROL
As defined in the dictionary, a “system” is “a set of elements acting in a coordinated manner to

comply with a given function”. Any production organization is a “social-technical system”
constituted by elements, such as equipment, machinery, documents, materials, tools used in
production (technical elements) and a group of people working in the organization (social
elements).
Since failures may originate in any of the elements of the system, whether material or human,
preventing failures requires a set of actions to control all the elements in the system and their
interrelation.
This set of coordinated actions constitutes the Control System. If is to be controlled, it should
then be named “Quality System”. (Quality Assurance is just one Quality System).
As opposed to the above, Quality Control does only involve some of the elements in the social-
technical system, such as the condition of the equipment.
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This wording confusion is not simply a semantic problem. The use of “quality control”
applied exclusively to part of the tasks brings evidence of only “gross errors”, while
deviations between the desired therapeutic goal and that actually reached cannot be
detected.
Additionally, the absence of quality systems makes it virtually impossible any

comparison among the treatment schemes applied in different services and even among
different techniques applied in the same service.
EVOLVING FROM QUALITY ASSURANCE TO SAFETY CULTURE
Earlier, quality systems were oriented almost exclusively to the technical issues in the
organization. Quality assurance programs involved a careful, methodic and systematic
monitoring of every stage –and every element in the production process, verifying the due
prevention of any failures in equipment, materials or procedures.
For instance, the training programs were devoted to providing individuals with an improved
technical knowledge by providing them with additional and better information. The exams and
evaluations performed allowed assessing whether such technical knowledge had been actually
gained. This does not refer exclusively to the nuclear industry; usually, both schools and
universities apply the same criterion, providing and checking only the acquisition of technical
knowledge.
However, the reason for human errors is not only lack of expertise. Individuals can make
mistake because they are absent-minded, due to conflicting relations with their supervisor,
because they are not motivated or, simply, because they just do not care how well they perform
the job.
This means that a due control has always been exerted upon the technical issues in production
organizations, while the human and social aspects were not focused with the same dedication.
Perhaps people thought that this was an organizational issue, which could not be modified
through training.
This traditional approach has evolved strongly during the last few decades and, essentially,
because of the impact of the Japanese industry’s postwar evolution upon the Western World.
Then, new criteria were developed for the management of production organizations. Thus, in
addition to technical knowledge, emphasis was made on improving the attitudes, motivation and
predisposition of the personnel in an attempt to attain quality and excellence in production.
The key for the success of modern Quality Systems is the stimulation of people, at all
levels, motivating them to fulfill the goals of the organization. This modern system for
organizational management was named “Total Quality Management” (TQM). In such
quality system, the idea of “totality” arises from the facts that, all the workers must
participate and all the production matters must be included in the control system.
Some Argentine hospitals have also implemented Total Quality Systems and two of them
deserved the National Quality Award; however, this was a partial experience and was not
extended to all services.
In the nuclear industry, a particularly transcendental event produced a radical change in the way
in which quality had been traditionally managed: the Chernobyl accident. The Technical
Committee in charge of assessing the causes of the accident established that:
The mere existence of a quality program is not an appropriate guaranty for preventing
accidents... even compliance with all the procedures and the application of good
practices are not enough if they are carried out mechanically and without conviction.
Both the attitudes and motivations of individuals and the Organization Culture are
important. Since then, the latter has been called “SAFETY CULTURE”.
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The message was “if we want to apply due control to the whole system, we must not forget
some of the elements involved in the same: individuals, their attitudes and their relationship with
the tasks they perform”.
This position assumed by the INSAG Committee meant a paradigmatic change. Ten years
before, another similar reviewing committee, the Kemeni Commission, had stated: “the TMI-2
accident occurred due to failures in complying with the Quality Assurance Program” (..!)
Unfortunately, a critical accident had to happen for creating awareness on the importance of this
issue; however, on the other hand, this circumstance led to the dissemination of this message,
extensively, throughout the nuclear community.
QUALITY ASSURANCE / SAFETY CULTURE: SUPPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS
The application of the safety culture allows completing a quality system with the psychological
and social elements that had not been taken into account by the pioneers of quality assurance.
Therefore, safety culture involves supplementary elements that cannot be absent from a
modern quality system.
The implementation of a quality assurance program must include the necessary elements for
stimulating and motivating individuals in the organization and facilitating teamwork. This remark
is applicable to both large companies and the simple radiodiagnosis service in a hospital.
Safety culture —which is essential for the success of a quality system— is not easy to verify
because it contains some “intangible” elements. The latter cannot be evaluated with the tools
usually employed in regulatory inspections or in quality audits. For this reason, regulatory
authorities are reluctant to apply requirements whose compliance they will be unable to verify.
Currently, this situation has led to the coexistence of two counteracting attitudes within the
nuclear community. On one hand, although with scarce concrete results, the importance of
safety culture is being emphasized; on the other, quality systems are implemented without even
mentioning safety culture.
Anyhow, without going deeper into this topic (so as to avoid intensifying the polemics), the
methodology proposed herewith is aimed at overcoming —in a practical manner— some of the
difficulties that may arise.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF QUALITY SYSTEMS IN HOSPITAL SERVICES
The key for the development of a good quality system is the performance of a detailed analysis
of the processes by the personnel responsible for the corresponding tasks. Then, the working
conditions and procedures must be established and, finally, the results must be monitored.
Avoiding the use of “foreign recipes”, just because they worked well somewhere else, is
highly important. Each facility has its own problems, which are related to its own system
and personnel. Consequently, no rules or principles can be extrapolated automatically to
another situation with guaranteed success! Besides, the analysis of the process is very
constructive among workers and obliges them to think about safety issues.(safety culture)
Below is a brief description of the items considered as highly significant for the
successful preparation and implementation of such program.
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TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ELABORATION OF A QUALITY SYSTEM
(OR FOR THE REVIEW OF AN EXISTING ONE)
1. Approaching the task step-by-step and through minor activities
When a project for the elaboration of a quality system is started, the first steps should be
devoted to the activities or working processes posing the biggest problems and, therefore,
providing greater opportunities for improvement.
Only when results have been obtained with regard to a given task or sector, the evaluation of
another area can be started, profiting of the lessons learned and correcting mistakes. Thus, an
important impact upon the tasks performed in the service can be prevented. Conflicts between
the development of the system and the routine work carried out in the service must be avoided.
The task is performed within a given sector, but the rest of the Service must be informed of what
is being done, so that everybody is informed all the time.
2. Participation by all the staff
A successful task depends fundamentally on the participation of all the personnel. There are no
exceptions concerning the people who may contribute to the analysis and evaluation tasks,
including the auxiliary staff and those in charge of housekeeping.
Participation by all the staff in the evaluation tasks, at the various corresponding levels in each
case, is basically aimed at assessing failure risks and the preventive actions for their avoidance
or mitigation. However, there are other far more important benefits:
♦ Workers get to know and understand the weaknesses involved in the processes and their
impact upon safety, as referred to both productivity and quality.
♦ Workers learn how to write procedures.
♦ Workers are trained in handling calculation tools.
♦ Workers learn about the purpose and the importance of safety measures.
♦ Workers understand why there is a need for procedures and the degree of detail required in
each case.
♦ Workers understand why records are important.
♦ Workers become aware of the importance of learning and training.
Automatically, workers acquire the sense of ownership concerning the tasks they
perform and are motivated to generate initiatives (safety culture)
3. The goals shall always include quality, but also productivity and safety
Success cannot be expected from a quality system that does not include productivity, quality
and safety, simultaneously. This is the way to gain support from the patients, from the hospital
management and from the regulatory authority.
Quality assurance programs have been very much criticized, among other things, for ignoring
the consideration of costs.
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During the analysis of a process, the failures affecting each one of the above elements must be
detected. For instance, the concrete goals of a radio-diagnosis service must be:
• a high-quality image,
• the lowest possible cost,
• the shortest time required for the examination and
• the lowest possible dose incurred by both the operator and the patient.
4. The analysis of "processes" (principal and secondary)
All the activities performed in a service must be divided and subdivided into major and
secondary processes in order to facilitate their analysis and their detailed evaluation. For
instance, in a radiotherapy service, the main process can be subdivided into six secondary
processes:
♦ The patient’s identification data (diagnosis, treatment prescribed, reports on previous

treatment, traces in the patient, etc.)
♦ Assessment of the patient’s anatomy (mistakes in defining the irradiation boundaries,

positioning of the patient, definition of critical organs, delimitation of inhomogeneities, etc.)
♦ Definition of the target volume (shape and location, movement in organs or tissues due to
circulation, respiration or patient’s movements, etc.)
♦ Treatment planning (errors in beam data, algorithms, software and hardware in

computerized planning, etc.)
♦ Treatment management (errors in the calibration of treatment units, positioning of the

patient, erroneous treatment parameters, etc.)
♦ Follow up during a certain period, results obtained, appearance of side effects or sequelae.
In turn, for every “secondary process”, the analysis must include the review of all the
elements involved:
♦ The equipment: diagnosing units, treatment units, measuring instruments, planning and
simulation equipment (hardware and software), verification systems and techniques, etc.
♦ The personnel: number of qualification of the participating physicians, physicists and

technicians.
♦ The procedures: including the specification of tasks and responsibilities, communication

among staff members, records, etc.
♦ The materials: shields, accessories, collimators, consumables, reagents and drugs.
For each task, an assessment must be made of the errors and failures that may occur, of
their impact upon results and of the way to avoid them.
(Quality can only be affected by errors and failures. If all the failures in a quality system could be
avoided, such quality system would be perfect).
5. Profiting of both internal and external “operating experience”
There are three important sources of information that must be taken into account for accident
prevention planning:
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a) A detailed and systematic analysis of the processes —including all the participating
elements— aimed at predicting the eventual consequences that may arise from their failure.
b) The “operating experience” of the facility, including both the failures that caused
accidents and those without any consequences. An analysis must be made of the causes of
such events and of the actions taken for avoiding reoccurrence. (In order to profit of this source
of information, it is important to establish a failure registration and evaluation system).
c) The analysis of accidents and incidents occurred in other similar facilities, in order to
establish whether they are applicable to the facility under study. Radiotherapy is an activity
involving major risks and several accidents —some of them with fatal consequences— have
occurred. Additionally, the risk of insufficient doses is also a significant risk for radiotherapy
patients. Appendix 1 contains a listing of the most common causes of accidents in this field.
Accidents can also occur in nuclear medicine and in radiodiagnosis, although they
produce minor consequences due to the magnitude of the radioactivity involved.
6. Preventive, control and mitigation measures
Once the possible sources of failure in each process and the eventual causes of the postulated
accidents have been identified, operating measures must be established to prevent or reduce
their probability of occurrence or to mitigate their damage.
This is the most important task and the establishment of simple, effective and economic
preventive measures depends on the experience of the evaluator.
7. "Grading" preventive measures and "defense in depth"
The magnitude of the actions taken for preventing errors and failures shall be
commensurate with the impact of such error or failure upon the quality of the results and
the doses incurred by the patient and by the operator (grading).
The greater the importance of the damage to be avoided, the greater shall be the magnitude of
the preventive measures and the greater the degree of “defense in depth”
In order to ensure greater effectiveness in the prevention system to e applied, safety measures
are required considering the possibility of a failure in the preventive measures!
This “overpreventive” attitude is called “Defense in Depth Criterion” and involves “foreseeing
failures in the measures taken to prevent failures”. Their degree of redundancy shall be
proportionate to the magnitude of the risk to be avoided.
8. Discussions within the work team
The preventive measures proposed by an analyst shall be reviewed with the Head of the
Service and with all the members of the team. Depending on the subject, consultation may be
required with physicians, physicists and auxiliary staff from other units experienced in the
process under study.
Discussions on the measures to be taken are also useful in prompting and stimulating teamwork
(Safety Culture).
9. Involvement by the hospital’s service Management
The process of change begins when the Management considers that the ideas and objectives
may be convenient for the organization, that a method can be developed for their application
and that the costs involved justify, at least, starting with a small-scale task. Later, after an
evaluation of the results, a decision can be made regarding continuity.
145
Consequently, the Service Head must be involved throughout the work program development
process, including the initial motivation of the staff to assume the task, the establishment of the
organization’s values and the evaluation of the results obtained.
10. The Quality Program and its implementation
The set of preventive, control and mitigation measures established by the work team constitutes
the facility’s Prevention Program or Quality Program that is to be implemented.
The set can be structured as convenient. Measures can be classified for the various processes,
by subject area or following the classical structure of the Quality Assurance Criteria (i.e., those
established in the 50-C-Q or ISO-2001 Standards).
Appendix 2 introduces the Prevention Program of a Nuclear Medicine Service that does not
follow any pre-established structure.
The implementation of the program can be started on a partial basis, upon completion of the
analysis and evaluation of a given process, or after it has been totally completed.
For the final evaluation of a program, comparison with programs applied in other similar
services is advisable ( Benchmarking ), as well as an analysis of the reasons for the
differences encountered. In addition, reference documents (Rules and Regulations), such as
checking lists, can be used to verify the quality of the established program.
Once a quality system has been implemented in a hospital service, it can also be used
conveniently, as a “leading case”, for other services.
After the Quality Program has been implemented, careful attention must be paid to any changes
occurring in the service (people, procedures, equipment or materials), which can modify the
initial conditions under which the evaluation was performed (“change analysis”).
CONCLUSIONS
The elaboration or review of a Quality Program through an evaluation of the processes

by the personnel involved in the service has proved to be successful and to contribute to
the enhancement of Safety Culture.
During the performance of the tasks —and especially in teamwork—, both the professionals and
the technicians enhance their specific training, acquire greater involvement in the tasks and
become more aware of the weaknesses in the process and of the actual validity of the
procedures.
From a regulatory point of view, it is highly important that those responsible for a given
practice are the ones who establish the rules, verify their effectiveness and readjust them
in accordance with the obtained performance.
Medical practice contains certain issues that involve a series of difficulties. One of them is the
interface among the various medical care services and the Hospital’s management. As a
general rule, this leads to the existence of “blurred responsibility” areas. This situation is yet
more conflictive when services are contracted on a temporary basis.
Finally, it must be noted that, in medical applications involving radiation, —both in radiotherapy
and in radiodiagnosis— the Quality of the results depends on the judgment of the
physicians responsible for the diagnosis and for image interpretation. The quality of medical
judgment —very important as far as the result of the process is concerned— can be reviewed
periodically through the application of a peer-review mechanism.
ATTACHMENTS : Appendix 1 and 2
146
APPENDIX 1
SINGLE FAILURES OCCURRED IN RADIOTHERAPY ACCIDENTS
• Failures in the calibration of the irradiation system.

• Failures in the alignment of the irradiation equipment.
• Failures in operators’ training that led to a faulty interpretation of the operating pa-
rameters.
• Failures in training on how to face abnormal situations.
• Computerized systems that were not tested for all the possible operating conditions.
• Errors in equipment maintenance and control before their startup.
• Unawareness of failures occurred in other facilities and of their causes.
• Failures in the assessment of the dose rate, whether superficial or in-depth.
• Failures in communication between the hospital’s physicist and the oncologist.
• Lack of attention to the equipment operating parameters.
• Lack of attention to alarm signals and failure indications.
• Lack of permanent control of the patient’s positioning.
• Failures in the interpretation of the operating parameters.
• Failures in the elaboration of the procedures.
• Treatment applied to the wrong patient due to failure in his/her identification.
• Error in the irradiation of the selected anatomic area.
• Use of wrong irradiation sources.
• Bracchiotherapy sources stuck in the tubules.
• Failures in the calculation of radioactive decay.
_______________________
DOUBLE FAILURES RESULTING IN RADIOTHERAPY ACCIDENTS

(weakening of the “defense in depth”)
• Failure in the manufacturer’s control + failure in receiving inspection.

• Wrongly delivered instructions + failure in operator’s training.
• Failure in computerized planning + lack of knowledge on the system by the operator.
• Failure in treatment planning + failure in the detection of clinical signs of overexposure or
underexposure.
• Failure in the operating procedure + lack of attention in the control of operating
parameters.
• Failure in the operation + lack of supervision.
• Failure in supervising irradiation + lack of control over the disposal of clothes and
wastes.
• Failure in the equipment + disbelief in protection alarms.
• Errors in equipment calibration and alignment + errors in dosimetry.
147
APPENDIX 2
PREVENTIVE PROGRAME IN A NUCLEAR MEDICINE SERVICE

(Topics classified by subject area in a non-conventional manner)
• Qualification and training requirements for professional, technical and auxiliary staff.
• Instructions for the service’s waste management.
• Maintenance manuals of the imaging diagnosis equipment units.
• Requirements for the personal in charge of equipment inspection, control and main-
tenance.
• Manual of Working Protocols.
• Equipment testing and verification book.
• Standards for the control of superficial contamination.
• Periodical monitoring plan and routine checking lists.
• Instructions for the control during the reception of radiopharmaceuticals.
• Book for the inventory of reagents and drugs.
• Registration of patients and tests performed (computerized).
• Regulations for personnel monitoring.
• Plan for intercalibration of radiodiagnosis equipment.
• Book / Register of sources and calibration patterns.
• Listing of technical publications for permanent consultation.
• Book for the registration of failures and minor errors.
• News log book.
• Instructions for emergencies both in the service and outside.
Note: The use of the expression “Preventive Program” instead of “Quality Program” in
hospitals involves a cultural connotation, as well as a strategic approach. In the medical
environment, lack of quality can be criticized, but “lack of prevention” is unacceptable.
Nevertheless, obviously, the important issue is not the name given to the program but its
contents.
148
Latin American and Caribbean
Federation of Radiation Protection
Societies (FRALC)
Touzet, R.E.; Bombén, A.M.; Ortiz Magaña, R.;

Jova Sed, L.; Maldonado Mercado, H.;
Medina Gironzini, E.; Khoury, H. and Puig, D.
th
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FEDERATION OF RADIATION
PROTECTION SOCIETIES (FRALC)
1 1 2 3 2
Touzet, R.E. ; Bombén, A.M. ; Ortiz Magaña, R. ; Jova Sed, L. ; Maldonado Mercado, H. ;
4 5 6
Medina Gironzini, E. ; Khoury, H. and Puig, D.
1
Argentine Radiation Protection Society (SAR)
2
Mexican Radiation Safety Society (SMSR)
3
Radiation Protection Section of the Cuban Physics Society (SPRC)
4
Peruvian Radiation Protection Society (SPR)
5
Brazilian Radiation Protection Society (SBPR)
6
Uruguayan Radiation Protection Association (AUR)
st
The idea of a Federation of Radiation Protection Societies in Latin America came up at the 1
Regional Congress on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety that was held in Buenos Aires
nd
(Argentina), in October 1991. At the 2 Regional Congress, in Zacatecas (Mexico), in 1993, the
Latin American and Caribbean Federation of Radiation Protection Societies (FRALC) was
officially launched.
The founder members were the Argentine Radiation Protection Society (SAR), the Brazilian
Radiation Protection Society (SBPR), the Mexican Radiation Safety Society (SMSR) and the
Peruvian Radiation Protection Society (SPR). Now, the FRALC has accepted as members the
Radiation Protection Section of the Cuban Physics Society (SPRC) and the Uruguayan
Radiation Protection Association (AUR).
OBJECTIVES
The basic objectives of the FRALC are:
• to promote the safe use of radiation and radioactive sources in Latin America and the
Caribbean
• to promote the foundation of new Radiation Protection Societies within the region, as mean
of associating radiation protection professionals, and then, to promote de affiliation of this new
societies to IRPA.
• to encourage the cooperation and mutual aid in the study, research and use of resources, in
order to promote the radiation protection development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
ACTIVITIES
To achieve these objectives, FRALC develops different activities:
• it sponsors regional congresses organized by Radiation Protection Societies members

• it organizes and sponsors seminars, courses and conferences on radiation protection
related subjects
• it spreads radiation protection information in the languages spoken at the region (Spanish
and Portuguese)
• it has a Web site.
151
CONGRESSES
FRALC sponsors regional congresses organized by Radiation Protection Societies members.
rd
3 REGIONAL CONGRESS ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
rd
The 3 Regional Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” was held in Cusco
(Peru) from 23rd to 27th October 1995, having been the first Regional IRPA Congress held in
Latin America. The meeting was hosted by the Peruvian Radiation Protection Society, with the
sponsorship of FRALC and supported by IAEA/ARCAL and OPS. Ing. E. Medina Gironzini was
the president of the Organizing Committee and members of SAR, SBPR and SMSR were
appointed to participate in the Program Committee.
More than 300 participants from 24 countries, working in different disciplines related to radiation
protection and nuclear safety, attended the congress. One hundred eighty-three papers were
presented as posters and some of them were selected for oral presentations in the different
topical sessions of the congress. The meeting had: 5 Plenary Symposia, 7 Refresher Courses,
3 Round Tables, a Highlights Session and a Publications Exhibition.
A compilation of accepted abstracts and invited lectures was provided to the participants, during
the congress. The proceedings, with 224 full papers, were sent later.
th
th
The 4 Regional Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” was held in La Habana
(Cuba) from 19th to 23rd October 1998. The Cuban Radiation Protection Society organized the
congress and CPHR, CNSN and CIEN participated in the Organizing Committee. The sponsors
of the meeting were: IRPA, IAEA/ARCAL, OPS and FRALC. Appointed members of SAR,
SBPR, SMSR and SPR participated in the Scientific Committee.
More than 300 participants from 22 Iberoamerican countries and International Organizations
attended the meeting. The accepted papers were presented at the Poster Viewing Session and
some of them were selected to be delivered as mini-presentations at the 17 Topical Sessions.
At the meeting were also: 9 Invited Lectures and 2 Round Tables. At the Plenary Session, the
main points discussed at the parallel Topical Sessions and Poster presentations, together with
the conclusions reached, were presented.
A Course on “Radiation Protection of the Patient” organized by the GRIAPRA was held from
14th to 20th October, with participants from different Latin American and Caribbean countries. A
Workshop on “Regulatory Aspects of Radiation Protection of the Patient ” was organized as a
pre-congress activity.
th
th
The 5 Regional Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” will be held in Recife
(Brazil), from 29th April to 4th May 2001. The congress will be hosted by the Brazilian Radiation
Protection Society, under the joint sponsorship of FRALC and UFPE-DEN Department of
Nuclear Energy. Its designation as a Regional IRPA Congress has been requested. The
designation of II Congress of the Iberian, Latin American and the Caribbean Radiation
Protection Societies is being considered by the GRIAPRA. Dr. H. Khoury was appointed
president of the Organizing Committee.
The scientific program will include: Invited Lectures, Topical Sessions, Poster Viewing,
Associate Society Forum, Plenary Symposia and Highlights of the Congress. A course on
radiation protection matters will be held during the congress.
152
This meeting will be the appropriate place to promote new developments and new ideas on
radiation protection and nuclear safety. It will be also an excellent opportunity to discuss 21st
century perspectives of radiation protection activities in the Latin American and the Caribbean
region. The main purpose of the meeting is to bring together professionals from the industry,
universities and research laboratories to present and discuss the latest research results, and to
review the state of the art on applied and fundamental aspects of the radiation protection. Focus
will be on Latin America and the Caribbean, however, posters, papers and participants from
other regions are most welcome. The official languages will be: Portuguese, Spanish and
English.
COURSES, SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES SPONSORSHIP
FRALC organizes and sponsors seminars, workshops and conferences on radiation protection
related subjects, with the mutual aid of member societies. It is worthwhile to mention some of
the activities held during 1999:
• Seminar on “Biological Indicators in Ionizing Radiation Overexposed Patients”
The seminar was held in Buenos Aires (Argentina), in June, organized by the Argentine
Radiation Protection Society. Experts from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile and France delivered
lectures and more than 130 participants attended the seminar.
• Conference on “Advances in Internal Dosimetry”
Dr. M. Stabin delivered the conference in Buenos Aires (Argentina), in October. It was
organized by the Argentine Radiation Protection Society and the Brazilian Radiation Protection
Society, with the joint sponsorship of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina and the
Argentine Nuclear and Biology Association.
• Course on “Quality Control in Diagnostic Radiology and Mammography”
The course was held in Lima (Peru), in November. It was organized by the Peruvian Radiation
Protection Society with the support of the Iberoamerican Group of Radiation Protection
Societies.
• Seminar on “Radiation Safety in the Use of Radioactive Materials in the Industry”
The course was held in Lima (Peru), in November. It was organized by the Peruvian Radiation
Protection Society with the support of ARCAL XX and the sponsorship of FRALC.
PUBLICATIONS AND FRALC ON THE INTERNET
One of the main objectives of FRALC is to spread radiation protection information in Latin
America and the Caribbean. In view of this mission, FRALC has a section dedicated to its
activities in the Bulletin “Protección Radiológica”. This publication is edited in Peru and Ing. E.
Medina Gironzini is the chief editor. ARCAL/IAEA and OPS/WHO support this bulletin and it is
supplied free of charge.
FRALC has a special section in the Uruguayan Radiation Protection Association and the
Brazilian Radiation Protection Society electronic bulletins, to promote radiation protection news
and activities within the region.
Taking into account the lack of information on radiation protection subjects written in the region
official languages, FRALC promotes the translation in Spanish and Portuguese of International
Organization publications and radiation protection subject papers.
153
In accordance with 21st century communication demands, FRALC is on the Internet:
www.arcalxx.org.pe/FRALC.0698.htm and www.sar.radioproteccion.org.ar/FRALC/FRALC.htm.
FRALC MEMBERS RECENT ACTIVITIES
ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY (SAR)
The SAR organized a Seminar on “Biological Indicators in Ionizing Radiation Overexposed

Patients (Dose Assessment and Follow up). It was held in Buenos Aires (Argentina), on June
10th 1999. Local and international invited experts from France, Brazil, Chile and Cuba, and
more than 130 participants, from Argentina and Uruguay, attended the seminar.
A Workshop on “Medical Response to Radiation Accidents”, was organized by SAR, in Buenos

Aires (Argentina), on September 10th 1999. Local and international invited experts (UK and
IAEA) and more than 120 participants, attended the workshop. The advances in the project of a
Latin American radiopathology network of cooperation in case of radiation accidents were
presented.
In addition, SAR sponsored conferences, congresses and courses organized by scientific

societies of related disciplines, which support radiation protection.
To achieve the objective of diffusion of radiation protection information, standards and

recommendations, SAR launched a bulletin and its own Web site, in 1999. An editorial
committee was appointed in September 1999. The goal is to create a new-look for ¨Seguridad
Radiológica¨, the journal written in Spanish and edited by SAR, with greater encouragement for
paper contributions and an improved profile. To contact SAR: www.sar.radioproteccion.org.ar or
sar@sede.arn.gov.ar.
BRAZILIAN RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY (SBPR)

th
Presently, all the efforts of the SBRP are focused on the organization of the 5 Regional
Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety”. The Congress Organizing Committee is
looking for financial support and the sponsorship of radiation protection related national and
international Organizations. The committee is making an extensive promotion of the meeting in
all international forums to achieve the objectives of a large number of participants and a
successful congress. To obtain further information contact Dr. H. Khoury, president of the
Congress Organizing Committee: khoury@elogica.com.br.
The SBPR edits a quarterly newsletter and its own Web site is under construction.
RADIATION PROTECTION SECTION OF THE CUBAN PHYSICS SOCIETY (SPRC)

th
After the successful 4 Regional Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety” held in
La Habana (Cuba), in 1998, organized by the SPRC, a lot of activities derived of this meeting
have been carried out.
To contact SPRC president: jova@cphr.edu.cu.
MEXICAN RADIATION SAFETY SOCIETY (SMSR)
The SMSR organized the International Joint Meeting ¨The Role of Nuclear Power to Mitigate
Climate Change¨. It was held in Acapulco (Mexico), from 18th to 21st July 1999, with most than
400 participants from America and Europe. It was sponsored by the Mexican Nuclear Society,
the Latin American Section of the American Nuclear Society and the FRALC.
154
The SMSR has an official publication, ¨Protección Radiológica¨, written in Spanish, which has
been edited for the last 22 years. To contact the SMSR president: mverdejo@intersky.com.
th
At the FRALC General Assembly, that took place at the 4 Regional Congress on “Radiation
Protection and Nuclear Safety”, in La Habana (Cuba), in October 1998, Ing. R. Ortiz Magaña,
SMSR member, was appointed FRALC President. Therefore, SMSR will host the FRALC
Executive Committee Presidency until the next regional meeting
PERUVIAN RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY (SPR)

th
The SPR organized the 4 Peruvian Congress on Radiation Protection that was held from 19th
to 21st November 1999. During the congress, a Course on “Quality Control in Diagnostic
Radiology and Mammography” and a Seminar on “Radiation Safety in the Use of Radioactive
Materials in the Industry” took place. The SPR also organized conferences delivered by regional
experts, in 1999.
Since 1987, SPR continues the training program in radiation protection related to the use of
radioactive material and X-rays in medicine, industry and research. The completion of this
training course is necessary to obtain the individual permission given by the Peruvian Nuclear
Energy Institute (IPEN). Up to now, more than 1500 professionals and technicians have
attended the course.
To contact the SPR: cip@mail.cosapidata.com.pe or medina@ipen2.gob.pe
URUGUAYAN RADIATION PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (AUR)
The AUR was launched in April 1998 and one year later was accepted as member of IRPA.
The AUR and the Argentine Radiation Protection Society organized a Workshop on “Advances
in Radiation Protection”. It was held in Montevideo (Uruguay), under the conduction of Dr R.
Touzet, SAR President, from 24th to 26th November 1998.
A Seminar on “Radiation Protection” was held in Montevideo (Uruguay), from 9th to 11th
September 1999. Some of the topics included in the program were: Radiation protection in
diagnostic radiology, Radiation protection in industrial radiography, Quality assurance program
and Legislation. Dr. A. Yacovenco, from the Rio de Janeiro University (Brazil), delivered the
invited lecture. In addition, a Round Table on “Radiation and Society” was organized in
September.
To achieve the objective of diffusion, some AUR members and its president, Dr. D. Puig,
delivers conferences on radiation protection subjects in different forums and edits an electronic
bulletin. To contact the AUR: divapuig@adinet.com.uy.
155
One of the main objectives of FRALC is to promote new Radiation Protection Societies in the
region and as a consequence of this Panama and Dominican Republic have launched theirs.
Presently, the Panamanian Radiation Protection Association (APPRA) is applying to become a
member of IRPA.
FRALC AS MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
FRALC along with the Radiation Protection Societies of Spain (SEPR) and Portugal (SPCCRI)
launched the GRIAPRA (Iberoamerican Group of Radiation Protection Societies), in Córdoba
(Spain), in 1996.
Several meetings of GRIAPRA Executive Committee took place during regional and
international events (the National SMSR Congress, in Guadalajara (Mexico), in April 1997; the
International Meeting on “Goiania Accident-10 years later”, in Goiania (Brazil), in October 1997;
th
and the 4 Regional Congress on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety”, in La Habana
(Cuba), in October 1998). In these meetings different cooperative projects were presented and
financial supports were analyzed.
Within the framework of GRIAPRA some research programs are being carried out. A project on
biological dosimetry is being carried out, within Argentine, Cuban, Peruvian, Portuguese and
Spanish institutions. A project on the assessment of internal contamination at workplaces, has
been considered with the potential participation of Argentine, Cuban, Mexican and Spanish
work groups. In addition, GRIAPRA sponsored technical visits and the attendance to Courses. A
survey on perception risk in medical practices was conducted, in the framework of GRIAPRA
activities.
One of FRALC main objectives is to promote the foundation of new Radiation Protection
Societies within the region and to achieve this objective, FRALC is contacting and encouraging
professionals who work in radiation protection areas, in different countries of the region. FRALC
is offering them support and its experience in the launching and running of Radiation Protection
Societies.
To achieve the objective of promotion of radiation protection and the mutual support among
professionals in the region, different activities are being schedule for the near future and new
projects are being analyzed.
156
Latin American and the Caribbean Regional Meetings
157
159
5th Regional Congress on
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
V CONGRESO REGIONAL SOBRE SEGURIDAD

RADIOLÓGICA Y NUCLEAR
Recife - Pernambuco, Brazil

April, 29 - May, 04 2001
Topics of interest
• Dosimetry and Instrumentation
• Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation
• Natural Radiation Exposure
• Protection against Non-ionizing Radiation
• Radiation and Nuclear Accidents
• Radiation Protection at Workplaces
• Radiation Protection for Medical Exposure
• Radiation Protection in the Environment
• Standards and Interpretation
• Training, Education and Communication
• Waste Management and Decommissioning
Time Table
May 2000 The 2nd announcement and call for papers
15 August 2000 Deadline for abstract
30 September 2000 Notification for acceptance
31 December 2000 Deadline for full papers
28 February 2001 Notification for acceptance
29 April-4 May 2001 Congress date
Official languages: Portuguese, Spanish and English
Information
Organizing Committee 5th Regional Congress of IRPA and
II Congress of Iberian and Latin American Radiation Protection Societies
CEJEM - Promoções e Treinamento Ltda
Rua General Americano Freire, 394 - Sl. 403 - Boa Viagem
51021-120 - Recife - PE - Brazil
Phone: (81) 465-8594 / 465-8136 - Fax: (81) 325-5015
161
FRALC on the Internet
162
Método para el análisis
de espectros alfa
Equillor, H.E.
Presentado en las Jornadas de Protección Radiológica y Seguridad Nuclear de la SAR,

Buenos Aires, Argentina, 9-10 noviembre 2000
MÉTODO PARA EL ANÁLISIS DE ESPECTROS ALFA
Equillor, H.E.

Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
En este trabajo se describe un método de análisis para los espectros provenientes de medicio-
nes de radionucleidos emisores alfa con detectores semiconductores. Esta es una metodología
alternativa frente a la variedad de propuestas publicadas hasta el presente y productos comer-
ciales. Utiliza una función matemática exponencial relativamente sencilla, que representa con
bastante fidelidad la cola de un pico alfa.
Debido a que las partículas alfa pierden fácilmente su energía al atravesar la materia, las
muestras que van a ser medidas por espectrometría deben hallarse formando parte de una
capa de espesor mínimo, como las que se obtienen mediante procesos de electrodeposición o
microprecipitación. Cuando los depósitos son de buena calidad los picos son finos y en ese
caso las áreas de los picos pueden evaluarse por medio de una simple región de integración.
Sin embargo no siempre esto es así, observándose importantes variaciones en el ancho de los
picos y la aparición de una cola, como producto de la degradación de la energía, que se ex-
tiende hasta el infinito. Esto provoca una superposición entre los picos. Por otro lado no siem-
pre las separaciones radioquímicas son totalmente efectivas por lo que en los espectros pue-
den encontrarse a veces, otros picos, de origen natural o no, que interfieren en el análisis.
Con el objeto de resolver los problemas que plantean estos espectros, muchos autores han
reportado diversas metodologías de distinto grado de complejidad y eficacia (1 – 10). Debido a
que los productos comerciales probados para el análisis de estos espectros no cubrieron total-
mente nuestras expectativas, una nueva metodología de trabajo fue desarrollada (11 - 12).
Esta se basa en una función matemática simple que permite la interpretación de la cola de los
picos alfa, desde las cercanías del centroide, hasta un considerable número de canales hacia
la zona de bajas energías. Dicha función se adapta con bastante plasticidad a la cola producida
por un pico alfa, mediante la variación de un único parámetro de ajuste. Este parámetro puede
ser optimizado teniendo en cuenta la contribución que cada uno de los picos produce en una
zona definida convenientemente en la región de baja energía lejana del espectro.
METODOLOGÍA DE ANÁLISIS
La expresión analítica de la función utilizada es:
 


1 


e ( p ⋅ X + b ) 
 

e
Y = [1]
f
donde X es el número de canal, Y corresponde a las cuentas acumuladas en el canal X, mien-
tras que p y b son constantes cuyos valores cambian según las características de cada espec-
tro y con el contaje. Asimismo, f es un parámetro que permite corregir la forma de la curva en la
zona de baja energía y que denominaremos factor de ajuste. Este es el parámetro que permite
el ajuste de la curva a la forma de la cola del espectro.
Reordenando la expresión y tomando logaritmos en base e, obtenemos:
163
1
ln (Y ⋅ f ) =
( p⋅ X + b )
e
Luego, reordenando y tomando logaritmos nuevamente, llegamos a la expresión:
 1 
p ⋅ X + b = ln  
 ln (Y ⋅ f ) 
donde se observa que los parámetros p y b pueden ser fácilmente obtenidos por regresión
lineal, para un valor dado de f.
Para aplicar esta función al cálculo de un pico, se delimita una zona de datos o sea un grupo
de canales (por ejemplo 5 ó 6 canales), aproximadamente a media altura del pico, aunque se-
gún el caso, también puede ser más lejana. Aplicando el método de cuadrados mínimos, se
obtienen fácilmente p y b para un cierto valor de f. La Figura 1 presenta el mismo espectro de
241
Am, en tres escalas diferentes, mostrando una representación de la función [1]:
180 220 260 180 220 260 180 220 260
241
Figura 1. Espectro de Am en línea gris, mostrando en línea más oscura el trazado de la fun-
ción [1].
En el caso de un pico único, la determinación de f para el ajuste de la curva, se hace definiendo

una segunda zona, a la que llamaremos zona auxiliar, a una distancia considerablemente ma-
yor del centroide, hacia las bajas energías (por ejemplo 100 canales). Luego variando f en pe-
queños pasos, se calculan valores de p y b hasta encontrar aquellos para los cuales, la integral
calculada mediante la curva en la zona auxiliar y el contaje real en dicha zona, alcancen la mayor
concordancia.
En el caso de espectros de múltiples picos, la zona auxiliar, que será ubicada más allá del pico
de menor energía, estará formada por el aporte de cada uno de los picos del espectro. El análi-
sis deberá contemplar entonces que la sumatoria de las contribuciones debidas a la cola co-
rrespondiente a cada uno de los picos sobre la zona auxiliar, deberá ser concordante con el
contaje integrado en dicha zona. Uno de los picos es tomado como modelo (típicamente el pico
de mayor energía). Los otros picos relacionan sus factores de ajuste mediante la fórmula [3]
con el pico modelo. Se varía f en pequeños pasos sobre el pico elegido como modelo, y se
calculan los valores de f para los otros picos. Se obtienen valores de p y b para cada pico,
hasta encontrar aquellos para los cuales, la sumatoria de las contribuciones de cada uno de los
picos sobre la zona auxiliar coincida lo mejor posible con el contaje real en dicha zona.
PARTE EXPERIMENTAL
Los parámetros
Para estudiar la variación de los tres parámetros (p, b y f) de la función [1], se tuvieron en
cuenta las siguientes características del espectro: altura, posición y forma.
164
241
En el caso de las dos primeras, se partió de un espectro con un único pico de Am, el cual fue
modificado convenientemente reiteradas veces con la ayuda de un programa de computación
diseñado para este fin. Se generaron espectros modificados cuya única diferencia fue la posi-
ción en la que aparecía el pico, o su altura. Esto garantizó que no hubiera variaciones de forma
en los picos analizados. Se crearon dos series de espectros, una de las cuales mantenía cons-
tante la posición y variable la altura, mientras que en la otra ocurría a la inversa. Pudo verse que
m era invariable con la posición y altura del pico, mientras que si bien b era invariable con la altu-
ra, resultó dependiente de la posición del pico, de acuerdo con la siguiente relación:
b 2 = m ⋅ ( X 2 − X 1) + b1 [2]
donde X1 y X2 son número de canal.
El factor de ajuste mostró una dependencia con la altura según la expresión:

h1
f 2 = f 1⋅ [3]
h2
donde h1 y h2 son las alturas de los picos.
La relación [3] se esperaba, puesto que f es un factor que surgió al comprobarse que la función
[1], con f = 1, tiende a 1. Cuando el contaje es bajo, el análisis de la cola produce resultados
distorsionados, lo cual fue corregido introduciendo en la fórmula un factor que debía ser mayor
que 1. Para contajes elevados f también puede tomar valores menores que 1.
Para estudiar las variaciones de los parámetros considerados con la forma del pico, es decir para
241
los casos de picos con distinto ancho, se hicieron varias fuentes electrodepositadas de Am,
agregando a cada una distintas cantidades de Fe. Estos espectros fueron luego modificados para
darles a todos la misma posición y altura. Cuando se analizaron resultó que m y b eran variables
con la forma del pico, pero mientras m aumentaba con el ancho del pico, b disminuía. En cuanto
al comportamiento de f, se ha observado un ligero aumento con el ancho del pico.
Los valores de m oscilaron entre -0,02 y -0,07 aproximadamente. Por su lado los valores de b
variaron entre 0,7 y 4 también aproximadamente. Además pudo observarse una corresponden-
cia lineal entre los valores de m y b. Los valores de f oscilaron entre 0,2 y 2 para las variaciones
de forma del pico, pero como ya se mencionó antes, este factor es fuertemente dependiente del
contaje.
Se hicieron algunas pruebas variando la posición de la zona auxiliar. Las variaciones observa-
das son pequeñas y se resumen en la Tabla 1.
Espectro 1 Espectro 2
Zona auxiliar Pico: 253 Zona auxiliar Pico: 254
178-203 -0,2 179-204 1,6
128-153 -1,2 129-154 2,6
78-103 -1,5 79-104 2,4
Tabla 1. Análisis de 2 espectros correspondientes a fuentes electrodepositadas con variación

de la zona auxiliar.
Puede observarse en general que los errores aumentan al aumentar la distancia a la que la
zona auxiliar se encuentra respecto del pico.
En otra serie de espectros, se comparó la eficacia del método para varios radionucleidos, obte-
niéndose los resultados que se muestran en la Tabla 2.
165
Radionucleido Fwhm Contaje real Contaje calculado Diferencia (%)
239
Pu 4,48 15593 15076,6 -3,3
243
Am 5,83 86979 85997,1 -1,1
242
Pu 6,35 961796 93786,1 -2,5
241
Am 8,17 66002 65542,4 -0,7
Tabla 2. Análisis de varios espectros correspondientes a distintas fuentes electrodepositadas

de varios radionucleidos.
Desviaciones
1) Si bien la curva que se obtiene a través de la función [1] sigue con bastante fidelidad los
puntos del espectro real, hay una zona que es aquella en donde la caída del pico adquiere su
mayor curvatura, donde casi siempre la línea pasa por debajo de los valores reales, aunque
cuando el fwhm es alto, la función sobrestima los valores en esta zona.
2) Se dijo más arriba que cuando se analizan varios picos, la sumatoria de las contribuciones
de cada uno de los picos sobre la zona auxiliar, deberá concordar con el contaje integrado en
dicha zona. Para determinar la magnitud relativa de dicha contribución se utiliza la fórmula [3],
suponiendo que todos los picos que poseen exactamente la misma forma. Sin embargo esto es
solo una aproximación debido a que como se sabe cada pico esta constituido por varias líneas
energéticas con valores característicos y en proporciones variables dadas por su rendimiento de
desintegración.
3) Hay una cierta indeterminación en la elección de la zona de datos, lo que puede conducir en
algunos casos a errores mayores. En general conviene tomar varios canales para el cálculo de
la función, para evitar errores por falta de estadística. Una zona que vaya desde el punto donde
termina la caída del pico de menor energía hasta algunos canales antes del máximo puede ser
la más conveniente.
Resultados
La Tabla 3 muestra una serie de resultados seleccionados al azar, correspondientes a espec-

tros de diversos radionucleidos y fwhm, obtenidos a partir de fuentes electrodepositadas, y
analizados por este método.
Fwhm Radionucleido Contaje Contaje Diferencia Contaje calculado Diferencia

Canales real calculado % c/corrección %
239
4,48 Pu 15593 15076,6 -3,3 15628,9 0,2
242
5,73 Pu 98084 95141,6 -3,0 97571,6 -0,5
243
5,83 Am 86979 85997,1 -1,1 87768,3 0,9
242
6,35 Pu 96179 93156,3 -3,1 94930,1 -1,3
241
7,75 Am 63288 62130,7 -1,8 62571,2 -1,1
241
8,17 Am 66002 65542,4 -0,7 65860,1 -0,2
241
8,80 Am 135827 134363,6 -1,1 134683,5 -0,8
241
10,02 Am 124519 126029,9 1,2 121787,4 -2,2
Tabla 3. Análisis de varios espectros correspondientes a varios radionucleidos, provenientes de

distintas fuentes electrodepositadas y medidos en distintos detectores.
166
Para analizar la respuesta frente espectros de más de un pico, se prepararon una serie de
241 243
fuentes electrodepositadas con relaciones conocidas de Am y Am. La zona de datos fue
tomada desde el punto donde termina la caída del pico de menor energía hasta 3 canales an-
tes del máximo. Los resultados se resumen en la Tabla 4.
241 243
Relación Relación Am/ Am Diferencia
241 243
Am/ Am calculada (%)
0,0914 0,09388 2,7
0,0914 0,09275 1,5
0,16025 0,1621 1,1
0,6365 0,637 0,1
1,9263 1,874 -2,7
7,2146 7,281 0,9
Tabla 4. Análisis de varios espectros correspondientes a fuentes electrodepositadas con rela-

241 243
ciones crecientes de Am y Am.
Todos los espectros fueron obtenidos en sistemas de 512 canales con una calibración de apro-
ximadamente 10 keV por canal. Todos los cálculos se realizaron a través de un programa de
computación diseñado especialmente, con comandos manuales que permiten manipular las
variables.
Am-243 Am-241
170 190 210 230 250 270
241 243
Figura 2. Espectro de Am y Am en línea gris, mostrando en línea más oscura el trazado
de la función [1].
Esta metodología fue usada en la evaluación manual y semiautomática de espectros de dife-

rentes características. Se puede destacar que la función fue usada a lo largo de los últimos
años, en la intercomparación que la ARN lleva a cabo dos veces al año con el EML, obtenién-
dose muy buenos resultados.
167
CONCLUSIONES
Una metodología de trabajo alternativa para el análisis de espectros alfa, basada en una fun-
ción matemática logarítmica, fue detallada. La función es de sencilla aplicación y buena res-
puesta en diferentes tipos de espectros. Si bien presenta algunas desviaciones, estas no son muy
significativas.
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
1- Radioactivity and Radiochemistry, 7, 1, 1996

2- IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 39, 4, 1992
3- Nucl. Inst. and Meth. , A299, 272-275, 1990
4- UCRL-53861, vol 1, 1988
5- Appl. Radiat. Isot., 38, 10, 831-837, 1987
6- IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 33, 1, 1986
7- Nucl. Inst. and Meth. , A242, 437-442, 1986
8- Int. J. Appl. Radiat. Isot. , 35, 4, 263-270, 1984
9- Nucl. Inst. and Meth. , 223, 356, 1984
10- Nucl. Inst. and Meth., 185, 261-269, 1981
11- Ortec, AlphaVision Software User’s Manual, 1996
12- Canberra, Genie 2000 Alpha Analyst User’s Manual, 1998
168
Resultados de la participación de la ARN
en el programa de garantía de calidad
del EML-USDOE, período 1998-2000
Equillor, H.E.; Grinman, A.D.R; Serdeiro, N.H.; Fernández, J.A.;

Gavini, R.M.; Bonino, N.O.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.;
Diodati, J.M. y Medici, M.A.

GARANTÍA DE CALIDAD DEL EML-USDOE,
PERÍODO 1998-2000
Equillor, H.E.; Grinman, A.D.R; Serdeiro, N.H.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.; Bonino, N.O.;
Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Diodati, J.M. y Medici, M.A.

Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
Con el objetivo de validar sus resultados la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN) de la República
Argentina participa periódicamente en diversos programas de intercomparación. Esta participa-
ción constituye una evidencia significativa de la capacidad del laboratorio de producir resultados
confiables. Asimismo estos ejercicios proveen información útil para la detección de posibles
fuentes de error en las técnicas radioquímicas o en los sistemas de medición. Desde 1995 parti-
cipa en el Quality Assessment Program (QAP) organizado por el Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML), United States-Department of Energy (US-DOE).
En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de la participación de la ARN en las intercompara-
ciones correspondientes al período 1998-1er semestre 2000, y se analizan estadísticamente de
acuerdo con la evaluación llevada a cabo por el EML. Los valores se comparan con los corres-
pondientes al resto de los laboratorios participantes y se analizan según el tipo de emisión de
los radionucleidos y tipo de matriz.
DESCRIPCIÓN
El programa QAP tiene como objetivo la evaluación de la calidad de las mediciones reportadas
por los laboratorios contratados por el USDOE. Consiste en la determinación de la concentra-
ción de actividad de diferentes radionucleidos emisores alfa, beta y gamma presentes en cuatro
tipos de matrices: agua, filtro, vegetal y suelo. Cada intercomparación comprende un total de
seis muestras. El número de análisis requeridos (Tabla 1) es aproximadamente 52 (25 emiso-
res alfa, 10 emisores beta y 17 emisores gamma), siendo este número variable con cada inter-
comparación. Intervienen agencias gubernamentales e instituciones de otros países, en su
mayor parte responsables de la evaluación radiológica del medio ambiente. Las muestras se
envían a principios de marzo y de setiembre, y existe un plazo de tres meses para reportar los
resultados obtenidos. El número de laboratorios participantes es alrededor de 140.
Tabla 1. Tipos de muestras y radionucleidos a analizar
Tipo de muestra Cantidad de radionucleidos Radionucleido

3 55 60 63 90 137 234 238
AGUA 1 13 H, Fe, Co, Ni, Sr, Cs, U, U,
238 239 241
U (Bq), U (µg), Pu, Pu, Am.
AGUA 2 2 Alfa Total, Beta Total.

54 57 60 90 106 137 234 238
FILTRO 1 13 Mn, Co, Co, Sr, Ru, Cs, U, U,
238 239 241
U (Bq), U (µg), Pu, Pu, Am.
FILTRO 2 2 Alfa Total, Beta Total.

40 60 90 137 238 239 241 244
VEGETAL 8 K, Co, Sr, Cs, Pu, Pu, Am, Cm.
40 90 137 212 212 214 214 228
SUELO 14 K, Sr, Cs, Pb, Bi, Pb, Bi, Ac,
234 238 239 41
U, U, U (Bq), U (µg), Pu, Am.
171
El EML analiza cada una de las muestras y sus resultados son los valores de referencia. Asi-
mismo realiza una evaluación de la dispersión de los datos enviados por todos los laboratorios
participantes. Tomando en cuenta los datos históricos de dispersión, establece los límites supe-
rior e inferior de aceptabilidad. Los valores informados por los laboratorios se clasifican dentro
de las siguientes categorías:
• Clase A (Acceptable)
• Clase W (Acceptable with warning)
• Clase N (Not Acceptable)
METODOLOGÍA
Para evaluar los niveles de actividad de los mencionados radionucleidos se emplean los si-
guientes sistemas de medición: espectrometría gamma, centelleo líquido, espectrometría alfa,
centelleo sólido con ZnS (Ag), fluorimetría, entre otros. Las técnicas radioquímicas aplicadas
90 226
están constituidas por tres etapas esenciales: a) Tratamiento Previo (Actínidos, Sr, Ra), b)
3 55
Separación ( H, Fe) y c) Medición (Emisores gama, Alfa total y Beta Total).
RESULTADOS
Resultados generales. En la Figura1 y Figura 2 se grafican los promedios de los resultados A,

W y N de la ARN y los obtenidos por todos los laboratorios, correspondientes a las últimas 5
intercomparaciones ([2] – [6]):
A
88% A
75%
W
W 16%
N N
11%
1% 9%
Figura 1. Promedio de los resultados de la Figura 2. Promedio de los resultados de
ARN (período 1998-2000). todos los laboratorios (período 1998-2000).
Al analizar el promedio de los resultados obtenidos por la ARN (Figura 1), se observa que la
mayor parte de los valores informados fueron evaluados por el EML como Acceptable, es decir
que pertenecen a la clase A. Cuando comparamos estos resultados con los presentados por el
conjunto del total de los laboratorios (Figura 2), se observa que la ARN ha logrado mejores
resultados promedio que el resto, es decir mayor porcentaje de resultados clase A y menor
porcentaje de resultados clase W y N.
En la Tabla 2, se detallan los resultados generales de la ARN, según el análisis realizado por el
EML, en las 5 intercomparaciones llevadas a cabo en el período considerado.
172
Tabla 2. Resultados de la participación de la ARN según las diferentes categorías, comparados
con los resultados del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes.
Clase A Clase W Clase N
Año QAP n n% ARN Lab. Part. ARN Lab. Part. ARN Lab. Part.
1998 48 43 87,8 91 75 9 16 0 9
1998 49 41 69,5 88 77 12 13 0 10
1999 50 40 80,0 85 77 15 15 0 9
1999 51 49 90,7 88 74 6 17 6 9
2000 52 43 79.6 86 73 14 18 0 9
Promedio 88 75 11 16 1 9
Total de análisis: 216
Lab. Part.: Todos los laboratorios participantes

QAP: Quality Assessment Program. Número dado por el EML a cada ejercicio de intercomparación.
n: Número de resultados informados por la ARN.
n%: porcentaje de resultados informados con relación al número de datos requeridos por el EML.
Al examinar los porcentajes de resultados clase A por cada ejercicio QAP (Tabla 2), se observa
que todos los resultados informados por la ARN presentan valores mejores que los correspon-
dientes al promedio del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes. Una situación similar se ad-
vierte en los porcentajes de valores clase W y N, los cuales han sido menores que el resto de
los laboratorios, en todos los casos. Cabe destacar que los resultados clase N han sido del 0 %
en 4 de 5 oportunidades.
Por otra parte el número de resultados informados representa un elevado porcentaje respecto
de los requeridos por el EML, manteniendo esa tendencia a través de todo el período.
Resultados según el tipo de emisión de los radionucleidos. Al observar la Tabla 3 se advierte

un comportamiento uniforme en la distribución de los porcentajes en cada una de las categorías
(A, W y N).
Tabla 3. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN, según el tipo de emisión.
Emisor n nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%
Alfa 119 104 87,4 12 10,1 3 2,5
Beta 25 22 88,0 3 12,0 0 0
Gamma 72 63 87,5 9 12,5 0 0
n: número de resultados totales informados por la ARN; n% corresponde al porcentaje de resultados in-
formados con relación al número de datos requeridos por el EML.
nA%, nW%, nN%: porcentaje de resultados informados por la ARN con relación al número total de datos in-
formados.
173
Resultados según el tipo de matriz. En la Tabla 4 se presentan los resultados distribuidos
según el tipo de matriz, donde se aprecia también un comportamiento uniforme dentro de cada
una de las categorías.
Tabla 4. Distribución de los resultados de la ARN, según el tipo de matriz.
Matriz n nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%
Filtro 68 61 89,7 5 7,4 2 2,9
Suelo 49 43 87,8 6 12,2 0 0
Vegetal 36 27 75,0 9 25,0 0 0
Agua 63 58 92,1 4 6,3 1 1,6
n: número de resultados totales informados por la ARN; n% corresponde al porcentaje de resultados in-
formados con relación al número de datos requeridos por el EML.
nA%, nW%, nN%: porcentaje de resultados informados por la ARN con relación al número total de datos
informados.
CONCLUSIONES
Luego de analizar los 216 valores presentados en los últimos 3 años de acuerdo con las tres
categorías de evaluación establecidas por el EML, se concluye que el promedio de los resulta-
dos de la ARN ha sido mejor que el promedio del conjunto de los laboratorios participantes,
teniendo en cuenta que el número de radionucleidos informados representa un alto porcentaje
de los análisis requeridos por el EML.
También se ha puesto en evidencia que, de acuerdo con los tipos de emisión y de matriz, la
distribución de los resultados presenta un comportamiento uniforme dentro las categorías A, W
y N. Esto demuestra que la capacidad de los laboratorios de la ARN de producir resultados
confiables se extiende a todos los tipos de emisión y matriz considerados.
REFERENCIAS
[1] Publicación interna ARN PI-2/00
[2] QAP Report-EML594, 1998
[3] QAP Report-EML596, 1998
[4] QAP Report-EML 604, 1999
174
Análisis de dosis ocupacionales,
período 1990/1999
Curti, A.R., y Alonso, M.T.

ANÁLISIS DE DOSIS OCUPACIONALES,
PERÍODO 1990/1999
Curti, A.R., y Alonso, M.T.

Argentina
RESUMEN
En este trabajo se presenta un análisis de las dosis ocupacionales en las principales instalacio-
nes radiactivas y nucleares de la República Argentina correspondientes al período 1990/1999.
En el año 1995 entró en vigencia en el país la Norma Básica de Seguridad Radiológica AR
10.1.1., la cuál incluye los límites de dosis ocupacionales recomendados por la ICRP en su
publicación Nro. 60. Se hace un análisis de las tendencias en la dosis colectiva, número de
trabajadores y distribución de las dosis individuales anuales y de las dosis individuales acumu-
ladas por quinquenio flotante, para las centrales nucleares, los reactores de investigación y
conjuntos críticos, las plantas de producción e irradiación con altas dosis, y las restantes insta-
laciones asociadas al ciclo de combustible nuclear. Se identifican las áreas donde fue necesa-
rio invertir mayores esfuerzos para mejorar las condiciones radiológicas, con el fin de disminuir
las dosis individuales y colectivas, y se describen las principales acciones llevadas a cabo para
cumplir con los nuevos límites de dosis ocupacionales. Se presentan las características del
sistema informático EVADOSIS, desarrollado en la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear para recopi-
lar y procesar la información relativa a la exposición ocupacional en las principales instalacio-
nes del país, y se enumeran las principales aplicaciones regulatorias de este sistema informáti-
co, que permite generar indicadores del comportamiento de los sistemas de protección radioló-
gica en las diferentes prácticas y llevar a cabo distintos análisis estadísticos de la información.
palabra clave: dosis ocupacionales
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
La década del 90 comenzó con un evento revolucionario para la Protección Radiológica como
constituyó la aparición de la Publicación número 60 de la Comisión Internacional de Protección
Radiológica (ICRP) /1/, la cuál contiene los principios fundamentales sobre los cuáles puede
ser basada una adecuada Protección Radiológica.
En la Argentina, muchos de los conceptos contenidos en la ICRP 60, tales como la optimiza-
ción de los sistemas de protección radiológica y las restricciones de dosis para trabajadores se
venían aplicando en las prácticas controladas por el Organismo Regulador. El principal cambio,
por lo tanto, lo constituyó la intensificación de la protección radiológica de los trabajadores me-
diante la importante reducción en el límite anual de dosis por medio de la introducción de un
límite de dosis quinquenal. Esta modificación, al igual que la mayor parte de los conceptos in-
corporados en los nuevos criterios fueron puestos en vigencia en la Argentina en enero de
1995 a través de la aprobación de la Norma Básica de Seguridad Radiológica AR 10.1.1. /2/.
En este trabajo se hace un análisis de la evolución de los parámetros más representativos de la

exposición ocupacional en las instalaciones radiactivas y nucleares más importantes del país y
se identifican las áreas donde fue necesario invertir mayores esfuerzos para mejorar las condi-
ciones radiológicas, con el fin de disminuir las dosis individuales y colectivas, y se describen las
principales acciones llevadas a cabo para cumplir con los nuevos límites de dosis ocupacionales.
177
II. ANÁLISIS GLOBAL
La población analizada corresponde a los trabajadores de las principales instalaciones radiacti-

vas y nucleares del país, como constituyen las centrales nucleares, los reactores de investiga-
ción y conjuntos críticos, las plantas de producción e irradiación con altas dosis, y las restantes
instalaciones asociadas al ciclo de combustible nuclear. El período analizado es 1990/99. Las
dosis fueron evaluadas y enviadas por las instalaciones, y corresponden a mediciones indivi-
duales de exposición a la radiación externa realizadas con dosímetros TLD y estimaciones de
dosis debidas a incorporación de radionucleidos a partir de la medición de muestras de orina y
de mediciones en contador de cuerpo entero. El análisis fue realizado con el sistema computa-
rizado de la Autoridad
Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN) llamado EVADOSIS /3/, cuyas características se presentan en el

Anexo.
La Figura 1 muestra la evolución de la dosis colectiva total y del número total de trabajadores
de la población analizada.
Total de instalaciones
(1990 - 1999)
2500 20
Dosis colectiva (Sv hombre)

2000 16
No. trabajadores
1500 12
1000 8
500 4
0 0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Años
No. trabajadores Dosis Colectiva
Figura 1
La dosis colectiva total promedio para el período fue de 10,9 Sv hombre y el número total de
trabajadores promedio 1793. Para el año 1999, los valores de estos parámetros fueron 11,54 Sv
hombre y 1918 trabajadores. El aporte de las centrales nucleares es muy significativo ya que
éstas, en general, contribuyen con el 95% a la dosis colectiva y con el 80% al número de tra-
bajadores, como puede observarse en la Figura 2.
DOSIS COLECTIVA, AÑO 1999

CENT RALES 95 %
TOTAL: 11,55 Sv hombre
REACT ORES 1 %
USOS INDUST RIALES E INVEST IGACIÓN 3 %
REST O DEL CICLO 1 %
No. TRABAJADORES, AÑO 1999
TOTAL: 1918 trabajadores CENT RALES 77 %
REACT ORES 6 %
USOS INDUST RIALES E

INVEST IGACIÓN 9 %
REST O DEL CICLO 8 %
Figura 2
Estos porcentajes se mantienen, en general, en el período analizado. Es por ello que las cen-
trales nucleares se analizarán en forma separada del resto de las instalaciones. En estas últi-
mas, que incluyen las instalaciones asociadas al ciclo de combustible nuclear, a la producción
178
de radioisótopos, a la investigación e irradiación con altas dosis, a lo sumo 5 trabajadores reci-
bieron dosis anuales mayores que 20 mSv, lo cuál se presenta en la Figura 3.
Total de instalaciones (excepto Centrales Nucleares)

Número de trabajadores con dosis anuales mayores que 20 mSv
No. trabajadores 4
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Año
Figura 3
En estas instalaciones no fue necesario invertir mayores esfuerzos para cumplir con los nuevos
límites de dosis.
III. CENTRALES NUCLEARES
La Figura 4 muestra la evolución del porcentaje de trabajadores de las centrales nucleares que
recibieron dosis individuales anuales mayores que 20 mSv. En ella puede verse la diferente
situación de las dos instalaciones.
CENTRALES NUCLEARES
Porcentaje de trabajadores con dosis mayores que 20 mSv
100,0
90,0
80,0
70,0
% trabajadores
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ATUCHA I EMBALSE Figura 4 AÑOS
En la central nuclear Atucha I (CNA I) el porcentaje de trabajadores con dosis mayores que
20 mSv se ubicaba en el orden del 30% en los primeros años descendiendo a niveles menores
en el quinquenio 1995/99 (entre el 10 y el 20%). La situación de esta central nuclear se analiza-
rá con más detalles en el próximo punto.
179
En la central nuclear Embalse (CNE) este porcentaje tendió a cero a partir de 1996, por lo que
tampoco se presentaron mayores dificultades para cumplir con los límites de dosis.
La Figura 5 presenta la evolución de la dosis colectiva anual y del número de trabajadores en la

CNE. Las discontinuidades en las tendencias de la dosis colectiva y del número de trabajado-
res se debe a la fuerte influencia que tienen en estos parámetros las paradas programadas y
no programadas para mantenimiento preventivo y correctivo, cuyas tareas se repiten sólo en
forma parcial.
CENTRAL NUCLEAR EMBALSE

No. Trabajadores Dosis Colectiva
900 4,5
800 4,0
700 3,5
Nro. trabajadores
600 3,0
Sv hombre
500 2,5
400 2,0
300 1,5
200 1,0
100 0,5
0 0,0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(0,3) (0,7) (1,3) (1) (3) (1) (1) AÑOS
Figura 5
(Parada programada en meses)
IV. CENTRAL NUCLEAR ATUCHA I
La CNA I es un prototipo dentro de los reactores PHWR y tiene los canales refrigerantes de los
elementos combustibles recubiertos de Stellite, aleación de alto contenido de cobalto que por
60
activación neutrónica se convierte en Co. Los procesos de corrosión y erosión dentro del cir-
cuito primario de refrigeración y moderación generaron depósitos en las zonas internas del
60
circuito primario con alto contenido de Co, los cuáles resultan dominantes en los campos de
exposición externa a la radiación en zonas de trabajo.
Para poder implementar los límites de dosis de la ICRP 60 se hizo necesario modificar las con-
60
diciones radiológicas, especialmente los campos de exposición debidos al Co. El análisis de
60
los mecanismos de depósito y el nivel real de actividad de Co fue realizado en la ARN /4/. Se
60
concluyó que resultaba necesario cambiar los canales refrigerantes por otros sin Co. En el
año 1998 se realizó un análisis experimental de la disminución de los campos de exposición y
de las dosis individuales como resultado del cambio del 45% de los mismos, llevado a cabo por
la CNA I, lo cuál concordaba con las predicciones del modelo /5/. Al finalizar el año 1999 se
había cambiado el 64% de los canales refrigerantes.
Uno de los recursos no deseados para reducir las dosis individuales podría haber sido la distri-
bución de las tareas entre un mayor número de trabajadores, lo cuál podría haber traído como
consecuencia un incremento en la dosis colectiva. Por ello es que los esfuerzos se dirigieron
hacia una mejor planificación de las tareas, y a un mejoramiento de los sistemas de protección
radiológica y de los procedimientos. También se efectuaron mejoras en algunos componentes
para disminuir el tiempo necesario para efectuar las intervenciones en los generadores de vapor.
En un principio se había analizado la posibilidad de que la CNA I solicitara al Organismo Re-

gulador un cambio temporario en los límites de dosis de un grupo de trabajadores, tal cuál lo
estipulado en la Norma AR 10.1.1., situación que fue descartada por las dificultades que pre-
sentaba su implementación.
180
La Figura 6 muestra la evolución de la dosis colectiva anual y del número de trabajadores de la
CNAI. En la misma puede observarse la fuerte influencia que tienen las paradas programadas y
no programadas, y las tareas llevadas a cabo en las mismas, en la evolución de estos paráme-
tros. Así por ejemplo, en las paradas de los años 1996 y 1999 se realizó el cambio del 45% de
los canales refrigerantes.
CENTRAL NUCLEAR ATUCHA I
No. Trabajadores Dosis Colectiva

1200 16,0
14,0
1000
Nro. trabajadores
12,0
800
Sv hombre
10,0
600 8,0
6,0
400
4,0
200
2,0
0 0,0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) (2) (2) (1) (2) (2) (6)
Figura 6 AÑOS
(Parada programada en meses)
V. DOSIS QUINQUENALES
La entrada en vigencia del límite de dosis quinquenal trajo aparejada la necesidad de actualizar
en las instalaciones los sistemas de registro de las dosis ocupacionales para permitir la conta-
bilidad de las dosis individuales recibidas en todas las prácticas, acumuladas por quinquenio
(quinquenio flotante).
Esto resulta particularmente importante en el caso de las centrales nucleares, dado que éstas
contratan trabajadores en forma temporaria para intervenir en las paradas programadas para
mantenimiento, muchos de los cuáles rotan por distintas instalaciones.
La Figura 7 muestra el número de trabajadores que recibieron dosis individuales acumuladas

por quinquenio, en todas las prácticas, mayores que 100 mSv, para cada uno de los quinque-
nios comprendidos entre 1984/88 y 1995/99.
CENTRALES NUCLEARES
Dosis individuales acumuladas por quinquenio
Número de trabajadores con dosis > 100 mSv
200
180
160
Nro de trabajadores
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
8
9
/8
/8
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
/9
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
quinquenio
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
EMBALSE ATUCHA I Figura 7

4
181
En esta figura puede observarse que para la CNE, este número de trabajadores fue práctica-
mente cero a partir de la mitad del período en estudio. En la CNA I el número de trabajadores
con dosis individuales acumuladas mayores que 100 mSv superaba los 160 en los primeros
quinquenios, cifra que disminuyó drásticamente a partir del quinquenio 1989/93 para llegar a cero
en el quinquenio 1995/99, primer período de vigencia de la Norma Básica AR 10.1.1. Esto indica
que todos los trabajadores cumplieron con el límite de dosis propuesto por la ICRP 60 e imple-
mentado en Argentina en 1995. Los resultados satisfactorios de las tareas llevadas a cabo para
disminuir las dosis individuales y colectivas no implican la discontinuidad de las mismas. Se espe-
ra que la finalización de las tareas de actualización de la CNA I y la continuación con el mejora-
miento de los procedimientos y con la planificación de las tareas en todas las instalaciones, per-
mitirá continuar mejorando las condiciones radiológicas en todas las instalaciones.
VI. CONCLUSIONES
Los importantes esfuerzos realizados por las instalaciones para el mejoramiento de los siste-
mas de protección radiológica, los cambios estructurales y de diseño de componentes realiza-
dos en la CNA I para disminuir los campos de exposición y el tiempo necesario para realizar
tareas de mantenimiento, el mejoramiento de los procedimientos y la planificación de las tareas
han permitido el cumplimiento del límite de dosis de 100 mSv en 5 años sin superar 50 mSv en
un año, en todas las prácticas en la Argentina.
ANEXO
El sistema informático EVADOSIS fue desarrollado en la ARN con el programa administrador

de bases de datos Microsoft Access /6/.
Está formado por bases de datos relacionadas entre sí que contienen información sobre las ins-
talaciones, los trabajadores, las dosis individuales anuales y las dosis individuales mensuales.
Los principales datos incluidos en cada base se detallan a continuación:
1- Base de datos Instalaciones (áreas):
• código de área y descripción

• ubicación
• licencia o autorización de operación
• condición y tipo de dosimetría
tiene los datos de aproximadamente 100 instalaciones, la mitad de las cuáles está dada de
baja.
2- Base de datos Empleados:
• matrícula
• nombre y apellido
• fecha de nacimiento
• matrícula provisoria
• número de CUIL y número y tipo de documento
• empresa
Esta base tiene los datos de aproximadamente 14 000 trabajadores.
182
3- Base de datos Dosis anuales:
• matrícula
• año, mes y área
• dosis discriminada por tipo de exposición a la radiación interna y externa
Esta base contiene las dosis de los trabajadores a partir del año 1967
4- Base de datos Dosis mensuales:
• contiene los mismos datos que la base anual, pero en forma mensual.
Estos datos se encuentran disponibles a partir del año 1994.
EVADOSIS es un sistema centralizado de dosis de los trabajadores del país que le permite a la
ARN cumplir con sus funciones reguladoras de un modo más eficiente. La base de dosis ocupa-
cionales se actualiza en forma mensual, y en el caso de las centrales nucleares, éstas envían la
información en forma electrónica inmediatamente después de evaluarlas en las instalaciones.
Esto permite tener un control más eficaz de las tendencias en la exposición ocupacional.
Entre las principales aplicaciones del sistema EVADOSIS se pueden mencionar la verificación
del cumplimiento de los límites de dosis, el monitoreo de posibles correcciones de dosis en las
instalaciones, el análisis de tendencias en la exposición ocupacional, la comparación de las
condiciones radiológicas entre diferentes prácticas, la disponibilidad de información dosimétrica
individual histórica, la difusión periódica entre inspectores y responsables de la ARN sobre la
evolución de la exposición ocupacional, y la disponibilidad de información necesaria para fines
legales.
REFERENCIAS
/1/ INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, “1990 Recommen-

dations of the ICRP”, Publication Nº 60, Annals of the ICRP, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New
York (1991).
/2/ ENTE NACIONAL REGULADOR NUCLEAR, “Norma Básica de Seguridad Radiológica AR

10.1.1.”, Revisión 1, Argentina (1994).
/3/ Pardo G., Curti, A.; Características del sistema EVADOSIS (no editado).
/4/ Spano F., Boutet L., Bruno H., Tellería D., “Modelo semiempírico para el comportamiento del
60
Co en un reactor tipo PHWR”, CNEA- Argentina, 01.92 (1992); 02.94 (1994).
/5/ Spano F., Curti A., Tellería D., Rudelli M., “Regulatory Actions Towards Dose Reduction at
Atucha I NPS”, ARN PI-31/98, Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Argentina (1998).
/6/ Curti A., Pardo G., Melis H., “Exposición ocupacional en instalaciones radiactivas y nuclea-
res de Argentina”, ARN PI-1/98, Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Argentina (1998).
183
Natural Radionuclides in
Drinking Water in Argentina
Bombén, A.M. and Palacios, M.A.
th
NATURAL RADIONUCLIDES IN DRINKING WATER IN ARGENTINA
Bombén, A.M. and Palacios, M.A.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
As part of the national survey to evaluate natural radioactivity in the environment, concentration
226
levels of natural uranium and Ra have been analyzed in over 300 drinking water samples
226 222
taken from different locations in Argentina. Ra was determined by Rn emanation and liquid
scintillation counting, and natural uranium by a fluorimetric procedure. Values ranging from 0.03 to
-1 -1
24 µg.l of natural uranium and from 0.06 to 50 µg.l , were measured on drinking water samples
-1
taken from tap water systems and private wells, respectively. Concentrations up to 15 mBq.l and
-1 226
to 22 mBq.l of Ra were found in drinking water samples taken from tap water systems and
private wells, respectively. These values are compared with the reference values accepted for
drinking water. Based on the water intake rate, the age distribution and the measured
concentrations, an annual collective effective dose of 1.9 man Sv and an individual committed
-1
effective dose of 0.49 µSv.y were calculated for the city of Buenos Aires adult inhabitants, for
the ingestion of both natural radionuclides analyzed in drinking water.
INTRODUCTION
When analyzing the total annual effective dose to the human population from natural sources,
such as cosmic rays (0.39 mSv) and terrestrial gamma rays (0.46 mSv) (1), the dose received
by ingestion and inhalation of long-lived natural radionuclides also needs consideration.
Effective doses resulting from the intake of natural radionuclides may be determined directly
from external measuring of its concentrations in the body or estimated from concentrations in
intake materials such as air, food and water. In the particular case of drinking water, information
on several national or regional surveys of natural radioactivity in ground, surface and mineral
waters has been published (2-11). The analysis of the published data shows that natural
radioactivity in water varies over a large range, mainly depending on the geological
characteristics of the soils, and some measured concentrations largely exceed the reference
values accepted for drinking water.
226
This paper presents the quantitative results obtained from Ra and natural uranium analyses
performed on 337 drinking water samples taken from various provinces of Argentina. Drinking
water consumed by people living in the main cities of 22 provinces and in the city of Buenos
Aires and its surroundings was monitored.
The values obtained were compared with the reference values accepted for drinking water and
226
doses resulting from consumption of these waters, due to their Ra and natural uranium
contents, were calculated.
The drinking water samples were directly obtained from tap water systems or from private wells,
collected in polyethylene bottles, and sent to the lab to be analyzed, without any addition or
previous treatment.
187
The volumes of water analyzed varied from 900 to 2300 ml, according to availability, but all the
samples were evaporated, on a hot plate, until an 800 ml volume was reached.
226
Ra determination was carried out by a technique which first step consisted of a co-precipitation
with BaSO4 and a complete precipitate dissolution using hot alkaline EDTA solution. Then, the
solution obtained was transferred to a glass scintillation vial and liquid scintillation cocktail, with
toluene as solvent, was added to obtain a biphasic system. The vial was sealed, with a plastic
222
sealer, and the date was noted as the start of Rn ingrowth time (12).
226
After a minimum period of 20 days, to allow equilibrium of Ra and its decay products, the
aqueous and organic phases were separated in order to avoid a possible aqueous phase
contribution to the organic phase liquid scintillation counting. The scintillation vial was sealed
222
again and the organic phase, with the dissolved Rn and its decay products, was counted 30
220
minutes after phase separation, in order to allow the Rn decay, that may have been present.
Liquid scintillation counting was performed with a Packard 2550TR/AB liquid scintillation
counter, with automatic luminescence correction, using the pulse shape alpha/beta
discrimination system and after the optimization of the level of discrimination and the counting
window (13).
222
The counting times varied from 100 to 1900 minutes. Correction for the Rn decay, during the
counting time and between the phases separation and the beginning of the counting, was taken
into account.
226
In order to measure the natural uranium concentration in the supernatant of the Ra analysis, a
co-precipitation with CaHPO4, as a carrier, was performed. The precipitate was solubilized and the
natural uranium concentration was measured with a Jarrell-Ash fluorimeter on three 600 µl
aliquots (14).
Taking into account the referred techniques and the calibration factors, the estimated minimum
-1 226
detectable activities for 1.5 liter samples and a 95 % confidence level were: 0.3 mBq.l for Ra
-1
(1000 minutes counting time) and 0.01 µg.l for natural uranium (15).
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
226
The national survey to evaluate Ra and natural uranium concentration levels in drinking water
included samples taken from tap water systems and private drilled or dug wells. Among the
drinking water samples analyzed, 62 % were taken from tap water systems and they included
surface and ground waters, depending on the availability of the sources and due to their
seasonal nature. The rest of the samples analyzed were taken from private wells and the
samples were considered as representative of the aquifer they came from. In Table 1, are listed
the provinces or the geographic areas where the drinking water samples were collected and the
population consuming them.
188
Table 1. Provinces and geographic areas of Argentina included in the drinking water survey.
Province or (A) (B) (C) Province or (A) (B) (C)

Geographic area Geographic area
City of T 6 2965 Mendoza T 6 264

Buenos Aires W 4 19
Greater T 25 3358 Misiones T 3 58
Buenos Aires W 21 2236 W 2 71
Buenos Aires T 49 1739 Neuquén T 8 299
-1
W 34 671 W 1 8.10
Catamarca T 1 102 Río Negro T 12 380
W 4 2 W 3 8
Chaco T 2 329 Salta T 9 389
W 1 7 W 3 2
Chubut T 9 296 San Juan T 1 115
-1
W 5 7 W 2 3.10
Córdoba T 27 1821 San Luis T 3 121
W 7 110 W 6 27
Corrientes T 4 291 Santa Cruz T 3 76
Entre Ríos T 2 358 Santa Fe T 7 1404

W 4 68 W 9 389
Jujuy T 3 173 Santiago del T 7 182
Estero W 3 25
La Pampa T 14 119 Tierra del Fuego T 2 62
W 15 62
La Rioja T 3 110 Tucumán T 3 465
-1
W 1 4.10 W 3 2
(A) Type of sample:

T = drinking water samples taken from tap water systems
W = drinking water samples taken from private wells
(B) Number of samples analyzed
(C) Number of people consuming the type of drinking water considered, expressed in thousands (16).
Among the drinking water samples analyzed some of them came from plain areas and other
came from either the central sierra regions of the country or the Argentinean west high mountain
sources.
The selection of the sampling points was made taking into account the areas with largest
populations, so drinking water consumed by people living in the main cities of Argentina was
monitored.
In Figure 1, is shown the location of the sampling points in 22 provinces of Argentina. Water
samples taken from the surroundings of uranium mining and milling sites were also analyzed.
In Figure 2, is shown the location of the sampling points of the Province of Buenos Aires, the
Greater B.A. and the City itself, where over 15 million people live, representing 48% of the
population of Argentina.
189
ARGENTINA
500 km
Figure 1. Map of Argentina showing location of drinking water sampling points.

Drinking water samples from: (i) tap water system; (u) private well.
GREATER
BUENOS AIRES
10 Km
PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES
250 km
CITY OF
BUENOS AIRES
5 Km
Figure 2. Map of the Province of Buenos Aires, the Greater B.A. and the City of Buenos Aires,
showing location of drinking water sampling points.
Drinking water samples taken from: (i) tap water system; (u) private well.
190
226
Table 2. Natural uranium and Ra concentrations measured in drinking water in Argentina.
-1 226 -1
Province or (A) µg.l )
Natural uranium (µ Ra (mBq.l )
Geographic area
Concentration Geometric Concentration Geometric
Range* Mean Range* Mean
City of T 0.10 - 0.30 0.19 1.0 - 2.4 1.6
Buenos Aires
Greater T 0.12 - 4.6 0.57 0.7 – 13 1.6
Buenos Aires W 2.7 - 11 4.5 0.7 - 6.1 1.8
Buenos Aires T 0.10 - 8.9 2.7 <0.3 – 15 1.1
W 0.10 - 50 2.8 <0.3 – 11 1.1
Catamarca T 1.6 ± 0.2 - 1.5 ± 0.2 -
W 0.8 - 20 3.1 0.7 - 2.1 1.0
Chaco T 0.03 - 0.12 0.06 1.0 - 1.9 1.4
W 9±1 - 3.2 ± 0.7 -
Chubut T 0.06 - 2.3 0.44 <0.2 - 0.7 0.6
W 0.09 - 6.1 0.54 <0.3 – 0.9 0.7
Córdoba T 0.09 - 20 1.3 0.2 – 11 1.3
W 1.0 - 29 5.4 <0.4 - 2.5 1.2
Corrientes T 0.10 - 1.1 0.24 0.8 - 1.7 1.1
Entre Ríos T 0.17 - 0.26 0.21 0.4 - 1.3 0.7
W 0.23 - 24 2.1 5 - 22 10
Jujuy T 0.12 - 1.0 0.37 0.6 - 2.4 1.1
La Pampa T 1.1 – 20 5.4 <0.3 - 1.6 0.9
W 0.7 - 42 5.6 0.4 - 3.4 0.9
La Rioja T 2.0 – 21 7.7 1.3 - 5.9 2.2
W 1.6 ± 0.1 - 0.6 ± 0.2 -
Mendoza T 0.20 - 2,0 0.7 0.7 - 1.8 1.2
W 0.17 - 2.3 0.5 0.6 - 2.6 1.2
Misiones T 0.078 - 0.10 0.09 <0.7 - 4.5 1.8
W 0.06 - 0.17 0.10 <0.4 -
Neuquén T 0.07 - 0.6 0.16 <0.3 - 1.7 0.6
W 2.6 ± 0.2 - 1.8 ± 0.3 -
Río Negro T 0.03 - 1.1 0.22 <0.3 - 0.9 0.6
W 0.09 - 0.9 0.25 <0.2 - 2.3 2.3 ± 0.2*
Salta T 0.17- 1.9 0.55 0.5 - 4.0 1.5
W 3.6 - 8.1 5.5 1.0 - 6.9 2.8
San Juan T 1.4 ± 0.1 - 1.7 ± 0.3 -
W 0.7 - 5.4 1.9 2.3 - 4.8 3.3
San Luis T 0.21 - 3.0 0.72 0.6 - 1.8 0.9
W 4.0 - 25 9.0 1.0 - 3.6 2.0
Santa Cruz T 0.10 - 0.30 0.17 0.5 - 1.4 0.9
Santa Fe T 0.2 – 14 2.1 0.6 - 4.3 1.2
W 2.9 - 14 8.0 0.6 - 5.1 1.6
Santiago del T 0.22 - 4.1 1.7 0.9 - 3.0 1.6
Estero W 1.1 - 48 4.6 0.4 - 1.2 0.7
Tierra del Fuego T 0.15 - 0.26 0.20 0.4 - 0.9 0.6
Tucumán T 0.4 – 24 2.9 0.8 - 1.7 1.3
W 0.7 - 2.3 1.3 1.1 - 1.6 1.3
(A) Type of sample:

T = drinking water samples taken from tap water systems
W = drinking water samples taken from private wells.
* In the case that, only one sample was analyzed or only one sample was significant different from the detection limit,
the concentration value ± σ is presented.
191
The natural uranium concentration in the 337 drinking water samples analyzed proved to be
-1 -1
statistically different from the detection limit. Values ranging from 0.03 to 24 µg.l and 0.06 to 50 µg.l ,
were measured for samples taken from tap water systems and private wells, respectively.
In Table 2, is shown the natural uranium range of concentrations measured and the geometric
means calculated in the drinking water samples analyzed.
In Figure 3 (A), is shown the frequency distribution of natural uranium concentrations measured
in the drinking water samples taken from the tap water systems. The distribution shows the
presence of two subpopulations, due to the fact that this kind of samples included surface and
ground waters. In Figure 3 (B), is shown the frequency distribution of natural uranium
concentrations for drinking water samples taken from private wells, where all the samples
analyzed were ground waters. In these samples, and in most of the provinces, the concentration
ranges measured were larger, when compared with the data coming from the analyses of
drinking water samples taken from the tap water systems, and the geometric means calculated
were also significantly higher.
35
Percentage of samples (%)
30 (A)
n = 209
25
20
15
10
0
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10 20 50
Natural uranium concentration (µg.l-1)
Figure 3 (A). Frequency distribution of natural uranium concentrations measured in drinking

water samples, taken from tap water systems, in Argentina.
(Vertical axis is the percentage of samples that fall in each range and
n = number of samples analyzed)
(B)
35
n = 127
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10 20 50
Natural uranium concentration (µg.l-1)
Figure 3 (B). Frequency distribution of natural uranium concentrations measured in drinking

water samples, taken from private wells, in Argentina.
192
226
Measurable values of Ra concentration were observed in 93% and 92% of the drinking water
samples taken from tap water systems and private wells, respectively. In Table 2, is shown the
226
Ra range of concentrations measured and the geometric means calculated in the drinking
water samples analyzed, for the different provinces and geographic areas of Argentina.
-1 -1
Concentrations up to 15 mBq.l and to 22 mBq.l were found for drinking water samples taken
from tap water systems and private wells, respectively.
226
In Figure 4 (A), is shown the frequency distribution of Ra concentrations measured in the
drinking water samples analyzed that were taken from the tap water systems. The frequency
226
distribution of Ra concentrations measured in the drinking water samples, taken from private
wells, is shown in Figure 4 (B). Comparing both figures, it can be seen a similar pattern of
distribution of frequencies.
226
Although no consistent relation to their source location was found, the highest Ra and natural
uranium concentration data correspond to drinking ground waters from drilled and dug wells.
35 (A)
30
n = 208
25
20
15
10
0
0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 5.0 10 20 50
226
Ra concentration (mBq.l-1)
226
Figure 4 (A). Frequency distribution of Ra concentrations measured in drinking water
samples, taken from tap water systems, in Argentina.
35 (B)
30
n = 128
25
20
15
10
0
0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 5.0 10 20 50
226
Ra concentration (mBq.l-1)
226
Figure 4 (B). Frequency distribution of Ra concentrations measured in drinking water
samples, taken from private wells, in Argentina.
193
In order to evaluate the relative importance of the radionuclides analyzed to the population
radiation exposure, the collective and average individual doses were calculated for people living
in the main city of Argentina.
226
Based on the mean concentrations values of Ra and natural uranium in the drinking water
and using the conservative approach of a single intake (17, 18), committed effective doses of
-1 -1
2.7 µSv.y and 0.49 µSv.y were estimated for infants (<1 year) and adults (>17 years) living in
the City of Buenos Aires, respectively. These estimations were made considering water intake
-1 -1
data from a local survey (290 l.y for infants and 730 l.y for adults).
Taken into account the age distribution of the City of Buenos Aires inhabitants (16), an annual
collective effective dose of 1.9 man Sv was calculated for the ingestion of both natural
radionuclides analyzed in drinking water.
When the effective dose was assessed considering an adult consuming 2 liters per day of drinking
water (19) from a private well located in Médanos (province of Buenos Aires), containing the
-1
highest measured concentration of uranium, the committed effective dose was 43 µSv.y . The
highest committed effective dose calculated for an adult consuming tap water was estimated to
-1
be 18 µSv.y and correspond to the inhabitants of Cura Brochero, a town located in the
province of Córdoba.
The results of the survey show that, the concentration of both natural radionuclides measured in
the drinking water consumed by more than 19 million people in Argentina, representing 59% of the
-1
total population of the country, are well below the derived values for drinking water (180 mBq.l for
226 -1
Ra and 100 µg.l for natural uranium) (20, 21). The expected doses from consumption of
drinking water are insignificant compared with other natural sources.
Since natural uranium also has chemical toxicity it should be added that all concentrations
reported herein were below the recommended chronic suggested-no-adverse-response level
based on uranium chemical toxicity (22).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to express our thanks to all the persons who helped with the collection of samples.
Thanks are also due to Mr. J. Cava and Mr. J. Isaias for their assistance on graphics.
REFERENCES
1. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and
Effects of Ionizing Radiation. UNSCEAR 1993 Report to the General Assembly, New York:
United Nations (1993).
2. C.T.Hess, J.Michel, T.R.Horton, H.M.Prichard and W.A.Coniglio, The Occurrence of

Radioactivity in Public Water Supplies in the United Sates. Health Phys. 48(5), 553-586 (1985).
3. C.R.Cothern and W.L.Lappenbush, Occurrence of Uranium in Drinking Water in the United

States. Health Phys. 45(1), 89-99 (1983).
4. M.Asikainen, Natural Radioactivity of Ground and Drinking Water in Finland. STL-A39

(Institute of Radiation Protection, Helsinki) (1982).
5. B.Glöbel and H.Muth, Natural Radioactivity in Drinking Water, Foodstuffs and Man in
Germany, Seminar on the Radiological Burden of Man from Natural Radioactivity in the
Countries of the European Communities. CEC Doc. V/2408/80, p. 385-418 (1980).
194
238 234 230 232
6. Z.Pietrzak-Flis, M.M.Suplinska and L.Rosiak, The Dietary Intake of U, U, Th, Th,
228 226
Th and Ra from Food and Drinking Water by Inhabitants of the Walbrzych Region. J.
Radioanal. Nucl. Chem. 222(1-2), 189-193 (1997).
226 222
7. J.Soto, L.S. Quindos, N.Diaz-Caneja et al. Ra and Rn in Natural Waters in Two Typical
Locations in Spain. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 24(1/4), 93-95 (1988).
8. National Environmental Protection Agency. Nationwide Survey of Environmental

Radioactivity Level in China (1983-1990). 90-S315-206. The People’s Republic of China (1990).
9. H.S.Dang, V.R.Pullat, D.D.Jaiswal et al. Daily Intake of Uranium by Urban Indian

Population. J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem. 138(1), 67-72 (1990).
10. M.Sohrabi, M.M.Beitollahi, S.Hafezi, M.Asefi and M.Bolourchi, Effective Dose to the Public
226
from Ra in Drinking Water Supplies of Iran. Health Phys. 77(2), 150-153 (1999).
226
11. A.M.Bomben, H.E.Equillor and A.A.Oliveira. Ra and Natural Uranium in Argentinean
Bottled Mineral Waters. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 67(3), 221-224 (1996).
12. A.M.Bomben and A.C.Canoba, A Simple Method for the Determination of Natural Uranium
226
and Ra in Waters and Soils. J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem., Letters 212(3), 209-219 (1996).
13. A.M.Bomben, A.C.Canoba and F.López, Determinación de Radón en Agua: Comparación

de Diferentes Métodos de Medición. 4 to. Congreso Regional IRPA, La Habana-Cuba, 12-23
Oct.1998, tomo 4 14/1-4 (in Spanish).
14. F.A.Centanni, A.M. Ross, M.A.DeSesa, Fluorimetric Determination of Uranium. Anal. Chem.
28, 1651-1657 (1956).
15. T.Sumerling and S.Darby, Statistical Aspects of the Interpretation of Counting Experiments
Designed to Detect Low Levels of Radioactivity. NRPB-R113 (NRPB, Harwell) (1981).
16. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 1991.
Resultados Definitivos. INDEC - República Argentina (1991).
17. International Commission on Radiological Protection. Age-dependent Doses to Members of

the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 2. Ingestion Dose Coefficients. Annals of the ICRP
23(3/4). ICRP Publication 67, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1994).
18. International Commission on Radiological Protection. Age-dependent Doses to Members of

the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 3. Ingestion Dose Coefficients. Annals of the ICRP
25(1). ICRP Publication 69, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1995).
19. Organización Mundial de la Salud. Guías para la Calidad del Agua Potable. Volumen 1.
Recomendaciones. Segunda edición. OMS, Ginebra, (1995).
20. W.L.Lappenbusch and R.Cothern, Regulatory Development of the Interim and Revised
Regulations for Radioactivity in Drinking Water-Past and Present Issues and Problems. Health
Phys. 48, 535-551 (1985).
21. McD.Wrenn, P.W.Durbin, D.L.Willis and N.P.Singh, The Potential Toxicity of Uranium in
Water. Research and Technology, 177-184 (April1987).
22. NAS. Drinking Water and Health, Vol. 5, 147-157. National Academy of Science,
Washington, DC (1983).
195
Indoor Radon Measurements in Argentina
Canoba, A.C.; López, F.O.; Arnaud, M.I. and Oliveira, A.A.
th
INDOOR RADON MEASUREMENTS IN ARGENTINA
Canoba, A.C.; López, F.O.; Arnaud, M.I. and Oliveira, A.A.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
222
Rn is the most important source of natural radiation and is responsible for approximately half
of the received dose of the totality of the sources. Most of this dose comes from the inhalation of
222
the progeny of Rn, and this happens especially in closed atmospheres. Due to this, the
222
control of the levels of Rn concentration in the different geographic areas is important where
human activities are developed.
The radon gas concentration has been measured in houses of different cities of the Argentine
Republic. The chosen cities of the different provinces are representative of the different geologic
zones from our territory: uraniferous zone, mountainous zone, level land and sedimentary zone.
For this purpose, they were used as measurement methods nuclear track detectors, electret
detectors and detectors based on activated charcoal adsorption.
A total of 2034 houses were analyzed from 1983 to the date. The studied cases were houses in
which the predominant materials of construction are concrete and brick. The average values
3 3
found in the different cities do not exceed 50 Bq/m . The values over 200 Bq/m are very few and
3 3
none of them overcome a value of 300 Bq/m . The average value of our country is 34,2 Bq/m ,
with a geometric mean of 25,0, being the effective annual dose of 0.84 mSv. For this reason, it
can be assumed that, until this moment, the indoor radon levels in the Argentine Republic are
within acceptable values for the population, not causing significant radiological risk.
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years national authorities and the public in general have shown a renewed
interest in natural radiation and the environment and in particular in the concentration of radon
gas in homes.
In some countries, the concentration of radon gas in dwellings is now subject to legislation due
to the high doses found as a consequence of the elevated radon concentrations measured. This
is especially true in countries with cold climates where, due to the energy crisis of the seventies,
homes were built more hermetically so as to minimise uncontrolled ventilation.
Radon gas is the most important natural radiation source and the one that most contributes to
the effective dose received by man from natural sources. It has been estimated that radon and
its short lived decay progeny contribute with three quarters of the annual effective dose received
by man from natural terrestrial sources and is responsible for about half of the dose from total
sources (1).
Radon emanates to a certain degree from all the different types of soils and its concentration in
the atmosphere depends upon the uranium and radium concentrations present in the soils. Its
presence in the biosphere is due to its semidesintegration period of nearly 4 days, which allows
it to diffuse from the earth’s crust into the air we breath. The radiological importance of radon
does not lie on the concentration of radon gas itself, but in that of its short lived decay
daughters, polonium, bismuth and lead which are inhaled and deliver the bronchial radiation
dose.
222 -3
The mean concentration levels of Rn in air over continents are in the range of 1-10 Bq m (1).
199
The factors which influence the diffusion of radon from the soil into the air are (2):
- The uranium and radium concentration in soil and rocks.
- The emanation capacity of the ground.
- The porosity of the soil or rock.
- Barometric pressure gradient between the interfaces.
- Soil moisture and water saturation grade of the medium.
- Other variables.
-2 -1
The mean emanation rate for continental soils is 16 mBq m s .
The concentration of indoor radon depends on the emanation rate of the gas from the soil, of
226
the content of the precursor nuclide Ra, and the ventilation rate of the dwelling. It is important
to remember that although a reduced ventilation rate helps to increase the radon concentration
and that of its daughters in air, it is predominantely the presence of an important emanation
226
source such as a Ra rich soil or construction material the principal cause of a high radon
concentration.
Many different measurement techniques have been developed to determine the radon
concentration in air, such as thermoluminicent detectors (3), solid state nuclear track detectors
(4), electret detectors (5) and devices based on the absorption of radon gas by activated
charcoal (6).
This work presents the results of the measurement of indoor radon gas concentrations in
dwellings in the Argentine Republic.
Type and location of dwellings
The cities chosen for the monitoring program are representative of different geological zones
present in Argentina:
Provinces Geological Zone
Mendoza Uraniferous
Santiago del Estero Thermal
Corrientes and Chaco Brasilia Plate
Cordoba and San Luis Pampean Mountain Range
Rio Negro and Chubut Andes Mountain Range
Santa Fe Pampean Prairie
Buenos Aires Sedimentary
The houses that were monitored are family homes built of different materials but mainly of brick
and concrete and with a variety of ventilation systems.
200
Analitycal methods
The measurements of radon concentration were done using solid state nuclear track detectors,
electret detectors and detectors based on activated charcoal adsorption.
For time integration measurements, nuclear track detectors employing a policarbonate film
-3
(Makrofol) (4) were used. The lower detection limit was 10 Bq.m . This method measures the
integrated concentration of radon in a period of three months and this type was chosen because
it is the most convenient to obtain a value that is representative of the mean concentration value
found in homes as it is well known that instantaneous measurements at different times of the
day, different days or months vary considerably according to the ventilation rate in homes due to
the days activities or the season.
Electret (5) and activated charcoal detectors (7) were used as screening methods so as to
obtain a quick estimate of the radon concentrations. The lower detection limit for the first
-3 -3
method was 6 Bq.m and 5 Bq.m for the second one.
All the measurements were done with the nuclear track detectors except in the case of the city
of Buenos Aires were electret and activated charcoal detectors were also used.
3
All the devices were calibrated in a 1m acrylic reference chamber where controlled conditions
of humidity, temperature and radon concentrations can be maintained.
Table 1 summarises the average radon concentration values found in each monitored city and
also the number of homes monitored in each case.
Figure 1 shows de frequency distribution for each activity range of radon concentration.
-3
The radon concentration averages in the different cities vary between 11,1 and 49,6 Bq.m ,
-3 -3
with a geometric mean of 23,9 Bq.m and a weighted arithmetic mean of 33,8 Bq.m .
The average indoor radon concentration published for dwellings of different cities around the
-3 -3
world vary between 8,7 Bq m (Australia) and 190 Bq m (German states of Saxony and
-3
Turingia), with a weighed arithmetic mean, for all the cities considered, of 40 Bq m (UNSCEAR
1993). These values show that those measured in our country are well within the mean values
measured elsewhere.
Table 2 shows the radon concentration values for the city of Buenos Aires measured using
electret detectors. The 100 cases analysed show a clear seasonal relation of the radon
concentration measured, with the temperature, as it is directly related to variations in the
ventilation rate, showing maximum values in autumn and winter, and lower values in spring and
summer.
201
Cities and Provinces Radon Dwellings
concentration
-3
(Bq m )
Malargüe 38,9 239
Mendoza 49,6 139
General Alvear 45,0 106
San Rafael 30,8 413
Corrientes 48,0 109
Buenos Aires 26,0 354
Resistencia 49,0 35
Rosario 31,0 61
San Luis 30,7 204
Chubut 33,0 70
Santiago del Estero 28,0 62
Bariloche 36,0 18
Cosquín 48,2 70
Córdoba 23,3 154
Argentina 34,2 2034
Table 1. Summarises the average radon concentration value found in each monitored city and
the number of dwellings monitored in each case.
800
700
600
Frequency
500
400
300
200
100
0
20 60 100 140 180 220 260 300
3
Bq/m
Figure 1. Frequency distribution for each activity range of radon concentration
202
Period Average Radon Dwellings
temperature concentration
-3
(º C) (Bq m )
Jul-Sep 1996 13,3 40,9 23
Oct-Dec 1996 21,1 26,1 21
Jan-Mar 1997 23,6 13,3 20
Apr-Jun 1997 15,3 37,2 36
Table 2. Variation of the radon concentration with the temperature

in 100 dwellings in Buenos Aires.
CONCLUSIONS
With the object of estimating the dose to the Argentine population due to exposure to indoor
-1 -3
radon gas, a conversion factor of 25 µSv a per Bq m (UNSCEAR 1993) was used which gives
-1
an effective dose of 0.86 mSv.a as a result of the irradiation of the bronchial radiation by the
-3
short-lived daughter products of radon, considering the mean concentration of 34,2 Bq m for
our country.
On the basis of the results obtained to this day, we may conclude that in our country the levels
of indoor radon are well within the acceptable values for the population.
REFERENCES
1. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Sources and effects
of ionizing radiation, UNSCEAR 1993 Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annexes.
New York: United Nations; 1993.
2. Schery, S.D.; Gaeddert, D.H. Factors affecting exhalation of radon from a gravelly sandy
loam. J. Geophys. Res., 89, 7299, 1984.
3. George, A.C. and Breslin, A.J. Measurements of environmental radon with integrating
instruments. Workshop on Methods for Measuring Radiation In and Around Uranium Mills,
Hardward, E.D., Ed. (Atomic Industrial Forum, Washington), 1977.
4. Urban, M.; Binns, D.A.C.; Estrada, J.J. Radon Measurements in Mines and Dwellings. KfK
3866, CNEN 1101, 1985.
5. Kotrappa, P.; Dempsey, J.C.; Hickey, J.R. and Stieff, L.R. An Electret Passive Environmental
222
Rn Monitor Based On Ionization Measurement. Health Physics 54, 1, 47-56, 1988.
6. Cohen, B.L. and Cohen E.S. Theory And Practice Of Radon Monitoring With Charcoal
Adsorption. Health Physics 45, 2, 501-508, 1983.
7.Canoba, A.C.; López, F.O. and Oliveira, A.A. Radon Determination By Activated Charcoal
Adsorption And Liquid Scintillation Measurement. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear
Chemistry, Vol.240, No.1, 237-241, 1999.
203
Regulatory Framework for the Management
of Radioactive Wastes in Argentina
DÁmato, E.; Siraky, G.; Petraitis, E. and Novo, R.G.
Presentado en International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,

Córdoba, España, 13-17 marzo 2000
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE
WASTES IN ARGENTINA
DÁmato, E.; Siraky, G.; Petraitis, E. and Novo, R.G.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
The legal and regulatory framework within which the radioactive waste management is carried
out in Argentina are exposed. The activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) in
relation to facility inspections, safety assessments and collaboration with international agencies
in the matter are also presented. Further, the regulatory criteria applied to waste management
are reported.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are two nuclear power plants in operation in Argentina, Atucha I (KWU, PHWR, 340
MWe) since 1974 and Embalse (CANDU, 600 MWe) since 1984. A third one, Atucha II (PHWR,
600 MWe) is in an advanced stage of construction. Three research reactors and three critical
assemblies are also in operation. There are several facilities related to the front-end of the
nuclear power and research reactor fuel cycle, including chemical and physical uranium
concentrate production and fuel element assembling. Three Atomic Centres are devoted mainly
to research and development in the nuclear field and about 1400 users around the country
involve radioactive materials in their activities, mainly related to the medical and industrial area.
A waste management facility for the final disposal of LLRW, located at the Ezeiza Atomic
Centre, is in operation. The spent fuel elements from the nuclear power plants are temporarily
stored on site in decay pools and dry storage silos until a decision on their future treatment is
taken. The National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) is the governmental organisation
responsible for the radioactive waste management. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority, at
present in charge of nuclear activity regulations and control concerning radiological and nuclear
safety, regulates and controls such practice.
2.LEGAL FRAMEWORK
During the period 1950 to 1994 the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) had, among
other areas of competence, the regulatory function in the field of radiological and nuclear safety,
particularly on those aspects concerning the human health protection against the harmful effects
of ionising radiation, the nuclear installations safety and the control of nuclear material use. In
1994 the Government transferred the Authority for regulation of nuclear activities from the
Regulatory Branch of CNEA to the National Board on Nuclear Regulation (ENREN) through the
Decree No. 1540, 1994.
In April 1997, Act No. 24804; “National Law of Nuclear Activity” [1] was passed, proclaiming (in
its Article 7) the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN). This authority is in charge
of nuclear activity regulations and control concerning radiological and nuclear safety,
safeguards and physical protection, giving, in addition, advice to the Executive Power on
subjects of its competence. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority, as an autarchic entity within the
jurisdiction of the Presidency of the Nation, has full legal power to act in the fields of public and
private rights, being the successor of the ENREN.
207
The “National Law of Nuclear Activity” establishes, also, that CNEA is the governmental
organization responsible for radioactive waste management. In this sense, the Act establishes
that for the definition of repository sites for high, medium and low-level radioactive wastes,
CNEA, as Responsible Entity, shall propose a place. The site shall be approved by the ARN in
relation to radiological and nuclear safety, and, shall also be approved by an Act of the
Provincial State where is proposed to install the repository.
In September 1998, Act No. 25018, “Radioactive Waste Management Regime” [2] was passed,
establishing responsibilities concerning the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), as the
Responsible Organization for waste management. In addition, it sets the “National Program of
Radioactive Waste Management” within the CNEA, that shall:
• design the strategy for RWM, which requires the approval of the National Congress
• propose, plan, co-ordinate, execute, assign funds and control research and development
projects on RWM technologies and methods
• project, construct and operate systems, equipments, facilities and repositories for High,
Medium and Low Level RW.
• conduct the management of RW generated in nuclear activities, including
decommissioning and mining activities, establishing acceptance criteria and
management procedures
• perform any other activity required to fulfil the RWM objectives
This Law also establishes that this Program of the CNEA shall comply with the regulatory
standards issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) and other relevant regulations of
national or provincial level. The Act sets a “Fund for Radioactive Waste Management and
Disposal” to finance the above mentioned Program as well.
3. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Act No. 24804 empowers the Regulatory Body to establish standards, which regulate and
control nuclear activities, of application along the whole national territory. The first regulatory
standards were initially produced some 20 years ago. In the course of time a normative system
was established comprising subjects such as radiological and nuclear safety, safeguard of
nuclear materials and physical protection. The system, known as “AR Standards” (AR meaning
“Autoridad Regulatoria” - Regulatory Authority), has at present 51 standards.
The regulatory standards are based on a set of fundamental concepts, which are part of the
philosophy sustained by the regulatory system concerning radiological and nuclear safety,
safeguard and physical protection. Such concepts, are the following:
Basic criteria of radiological and nuclear safety: The basic criteria in which radiological and
nuclear safety is supported are being applied since long time ago and they are in agreement
with the ICRP recommendations (in its publications No. 26 and No. 60). On the other hand the
Regulatory Body has contributed to formulate recommendations issued by international bodies
(such as IAEA, ICRP and UNSCEAR), so that it is usual to find, in its own standards, concepts
dealing with radiological and nuclear safety that appear in such recommendations. Further,
nowadays, ARN is taking part of the IAEA´s Waste Safety Standards Advisory Committee
(WASSAC), the Transport Safety Standards Advisory Committee (TRANSSAC), the Radiation
Safety Standards Advisory Committee (RASAC), and the Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory
Committee (NUSAC).
Responsibility for safety: The regulatory system considers that the owner and operating
organisation, known as Responsible Organisation is responsible for the radiological and nuclear
safety of the installation as well as for the physical protection and safeguards of nuclear material
in the facility. The mere compliance with the regulatory standards does not exempt the
organisation from the mentioned responsibility. For this reason the regulatory standards are not
208
prescriptive but, on the contrary, they are “performance-based” standards, that is to say, they
establish the fulfilment of safety objectives. The way of reaching these objectives is based on
engineering experience, on the qualification of designers, constructors and operators and on
suitable decisions taken by the Responsible Organisation itself. Therefore, the Responsible
Organisation must demonstrate and convince the Regulatory Body that the installation is safe.
As for every practice involving radioactive material, the standard AR 10.1.1 - “Basic Standard of
Radiological Safety” [3] is the fundamental one the operators involved in waste management
activities shall comply with. Nevertheless, since some time ago, a specific standard applicable
to waste management activities is under discussion. Such standard is intended to complement
the standard AR 10.1.1 for which it includes a criterion set, fully in accordance with
internationally agreed principles, to be applied in the field of waste management.
4. LICENSING SYSTEM AND REGULATORY ACTIVITIES
A basic aspect of the regulatory system is the approach adopted, in which the Responsible
Organisation dealing with the design, construction, commissioning, operation and
decommissioning stages of the significant nuclear installations, is completely responsible for
their nuclear and radiological safety as well as physical protection and safeguards.
The regulatory standards establish that the construction, commissioning, operation or

decommissioning of a significant nuclear installation shall not start without the corresponding
licence, required by the Responsible Organisation and issued by the Regulatory Body. The
validity of such licences is subordinated to the compliance with their stipulated conditions, and
to standards and requirements issued by the Regulatory Body. The non-compliance with any of
these requirements may be enough reason for the Regulatory Body to suspend or cancel the
corresponding licence validity, according to the sanction regime in force.
Since the early days of the nuclear activities in the country, the Regulatory Body has performed
assessments as well as multiple and different regulatory inspections and audits as frequently as
considered necessary, with the purpose of verifying that nuclear installations satisfy the
standards, licences and requirements in force.
Act No. 24804, “National Law of Nuclear Activity”, authorizes the Regulatory Body to continue
with such inspections and regulatory assessments and audits, performed by its personnel.
Concerning waste management in particular, ARN performs assessments of radiation and

waste safety to practices and systems of radioactive waste management. The main aim of such
assessments is to verify fulfilment of the criteria in force and the regulatory requirements put to
the Responsible Organization, applying in both cases, the regulatory tools presented in the
previous paragraph. All phases of waste management are controlled in the installations under
regulatory control: from waste generation to its disposal, through predisposal activities. In the
NPP there are resident inspectors, performing routinely inspections of nuclear, radiation and
waste safety. Other installations are regularly controlled by the inspectors, with a variable
frequency, according the installation characteristics.
In the case of safety assessment of radioactive waste disposal, ARN has developed some
computational tools. These tools are models to compute source term releases from near surface
disposal facilities, radionuclide transport in three dimensions and doses due to several
scenarios (normal and intruder, including various exposure paths). These codes participated in
the NSARS inter-comparison exercise of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
developed codes can also be used to aid in making regulatory decisions. At the moment, ARN
is taking part of the IAEA´s Co-ordinated Research Programs “Improving Safety Assessment
Methodologies” (ISAM) and “BIOsphere Modelling and ASSessment methods” (BIOMASS).
Decree No. 1390 (1998) [4], that dictates rules for the execution of Act No. 24804, added to the
current activities of the Regulatory Body those related to the revision of the annual contribution
made by waste generators to the Fund for Radioactive Waste Management.
209
5. REGULATORY CRITERIA APPLIED TO WASTE MANAGEMENT
ARN has developed some basic regulatory criteria applicable to the radioactive waste
management with the aim of providing assessment targets on radiological and waste safety for
the demonstration period, and other regulatory requirements.
5.1. Risk Limits: The radiological protection criteria applied by ARN to the final disposal of
radioactive wastes establishes that no individual of the critical group shall be exposed to a risk
-5 -1
higher than 10 y with optimization of the protection systems, and if the risk is not higher than
-6 -1
10 y , the optimization requirement is not considered necessary, taking into account that
further reduction in the detriment could only be achieved with a deployment of resources not
balanced with the dose abatement.
5.2. Optimization of protection systems: The radiological protection systems used for waste
management shall be optimized taking into account the reduction of the effective doses, the
cost of several options, the uncertainties associated to the long term and, as a boundary
condition, the dose/risk constraints.
5.3. Responsibilities: The waste generators (namely the operators of nuclear installations, or
other users of radioactive material) shall be responsible for ensuring the wastes they generate
are managed with an adequate level of protection of workers and public. These operators could
delegate the management of the wastes, without transferring their responsibilities. The criteria
for the final waste disposal are based on the fact that once the decision to proceed is taken,
such waste will not be subject to further treatment or other use not foreseen. The final disposal
of radioactive wastes shall be previously and explicitly authorized by the Regulatory Authority in
the licence or operation authorization. Additionally, to dispose of materials subject to safeguards
as waste a previous specific authorization of the Regulatory Authority is required.
5.4. Liquid and Gaseous Wastes: To comply with the radioactive effluent discharge limits set
by the regulation in force, gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes shall be either treated by
radioactive decay or retention, if necessary. Finally, wastes not fulfilling the previous criteria
shall be solidified or immobilized.
5.5. Solid Wastes: The final disposal of solid wastes shall be performed through multiple barrier
systems. These barriers shall be the appropriate for the required confinement time, and
composed by barriers of geologic nature and others with engineering features, with
independent, and redundant character. The final closure of a waste disposal facility, or a
particular system within this facility, shall previously be authorized by the Regulatory Authority.
The operator of the facility shall extend its responsibilities to the phase between operation
ending and the closure, the closeout stage and the following institutional control period
established by the Regulatory Authority.
When applying for the construction and operation licence, the Responsible Organization shall
demonstrate the system can be closed adequately and that after closure it will meet the safety
goals.
5.6. Safety Assessment of disposal systems: The safety assessments of waste final disposal
systems shall cover design, construction and operational stages, as well as their state after
closure and their future evolution. Several type of scenarios shall be taken into account, among
them: “normal evolution” (considering average degradation of the system) and “incidental or
accidental scenarios” (resulting from possible disruptive events). The Safety Assessment shall
be reported in terms of doses for normal scenarios, in terms of risk for probabilistic events, or by
any other safety indicator considered as appropriate to the required confinement period, to the
satisfaction of the Regulatory Authority. In the case of “normal scenarios”, the estimated doses
to future generations shall not exceed the dose constraint established at the time of disposal.
For disruptive events, risk limits as defined above should be used.
5.7. Reporting to Regulatory Authority: The Responsible Organization of a waste generator

facility or a waste disposal facility shall maintain an updated inventory of the wastes disposed of,
during its operative phase, on their own third parties. The disposed inventory shall be informed
210
annually to the Regulatory Authority. The inventory records shall be sent to the Regulatory
Authority after ceasing activities.
6.REFERENCES
[1] Ley No. 24804 - “Ley Nacional de la Actividad Nuclear”, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1997.
[2] Ley No. 25018 - “Régimen de gestión de residuos radiactivos”, Buenos Aires, Argentina,
1998.
[3] AUTORIDAD REGULATORIA NUCLEAR, Norma AR 10.1.1, “Norma básica de seguridad

radiológica”, Revisión 1, Buenos Aires, 1995.
[4] Decreto No. 1390/1998, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1998.
211
Separación de uranio, plutonio y
americio empleando resinas Eichrom
Serdeiro, N.H.; Grinman, A.D.R. y Bongiovani, S.

SEPARACIÓN DE URANIO, PLUTONIO Y AMERICIO
EMPLEANDO RESINAS EICHROM
1 1 2
Serdeiro, N.H. ; Grinman, A.D.R. y Bongiovani, S.
1
2
Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica
Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
El presente trabajo describe un método rápido y sencillo para la determinación de uranio, plu-
tonio, americio y curio en aguas, empleando resinas Eichrom UTEVA y TEVA para la sepa-
ración de los mencionados elementos. El método es aplicable a aguas de diferente naturaleza,
tanto ambientales como no ambientales. Su ventaja reside fundamentalmente en la rapidez y
eficiencia de la separación, muy bajo consumo de reactivos, comparado con los métodos tradi-
cionales, y altos rendimientos químicos.
METODOLOGÍA
Con el objeto de disminuir el LD del método, las muestras de agua son concentradas, ya sea
por evaporación en medio nítrico o coprecipitación con oxalato de calcio, y el residuo acondi-
cionado en el medio adecuado antes de la separación por columna. Es necesario la destruc-
ción del oxalato como paso siguiente a la precipitación.
El método empleado para reducir el volumen de agua dependerá de la matriz y del tamaño de
la muestra; para un volumen mayor de 5 litros de agua muy salina es conveniente la precipita-
ción, en caso contrario se emplea la evaporación.
Las columnas empleadas están empacadas con resina Eichrom UTEVA y TEVA y fueron
adquiridas como “pre-packed columns” a Eichrom Industries Inc. Como método separativo em-
plea la cromatografía de partición, con fases estacionarias específicas para cada situación.
UTEVA retiene uranio y actínidos tetravalentes Np (IV) y Th (IV), y TEVA es empleada para la
separación de Pu (IV) y Am (III) en las condiciones del presente trabajo.
El sistema de medición es espectrometría alfa empleando fuentes electrodepositadas prepara-

das a partir de los eluídos de las columnas.
MATERIALES Y REACTIVOS
- Columnas empacadas con resina UTEVA

- Columnas empacadas con resina TEVA
- Ácido nítrico 3 M
- Solución de nitrato de aluminio 1M y ácido nítrico 3M
- Solución de sulfamato ferroso (NH2SO3)2 Fe 0,6 M
- Ácido ascórbico p.a.
- Ácido clorhídrico 9 M
- Solución de ácido oxálico 0,05 M y ácido clorhídrico 5 M Ácido clorhídrico 0,01 M
215
- Materiales y reactivos para electrodeposición de actínidos
- Sistema de medición por espectrometría alfa con detectores de Ion Implantado.
PROCEDIMIENTO
MUESTRA
OPTATIVO CONCENTRACIÓN EVAPORACIÓN / HNO3

COPRECIPITACION CON OXALATO DE Ca
Siembra: HNO3 3M + Al(NO3)3 1 M + (NH2SO3)2 Fe 0,6 M +
Volumen: 10 - 12 mL + Ac. Ascórbico
UTEVA
2 1 Siembra + Lavados
Elución : HCl 0,01 M HNO3 2,5 M : Siembra
Pu (III) + Am (III) + matriz NaNO2
Fe, Ca, Al
TEVA
2 1
U (VI) Elución : HNO3 0,02M S+L Fe(OH)3
+ HF 0,002M Am (III)
Mineralización Disolución
Pu (IV) HCl 9M
Electrodeposición
™
Mineralización Bio Rad
AG 1X 4
100-200 mesh
Electrodeposición
Espectrometría Alfa Electrodeposición Am - Cm
ELIMINACIÓN DE NP (IV) Y TH (IV)
Los elementos Np y Th en estados de oxidación 4+ quedarán retenidos en la columna UTEVA.

Por lo tanto eluirán junto al U en presencia de HCl 0,01 M, interfiriendo en el posterior análisis
por espectrometría alfa. Ambos elementos son eliminados, previo a la elución del U, con HCl 9
M y luego con HCl 5 M + ácido oxálico 0,05 M.
216
RENDIMIENTOS QUÍMICOS
Para poner a punto el procedimiento y estimar los rendimientos químicos se procesaron una
serie de muestras con cantidades conocidas de U, Pu y Am. Una vez estandarizada la técnica,
se analizaron las muestras QAP provenientes del EML-DOE. Las actividades de los radionu-
cleidos presentes se tomaron como valores de referencia. La siguiente tabla resume los rendi-
mientos del proceso, sin considerar la precipitación con oxalato de calcio.
QAP 9803 QAP 9809 QAP 9903 QAP 9909
U 92% 91% -- 91%

238 + 234
Pu 71% 61% 75% 64%

238 + 239
Am -- 49% 51% 43%

241
El tiempo promedio de análisis está estimado entre 5 y 7 días, sin considerar el tiempo de me-
dición.
Las cantidades analizadas fueron las siguientes:
UN : 0,02 Bq / l hasta 3,5 Bq / l ó 0,8 µg / l hasta 140 µg / l
Pu : 0,3 Bq / l hasta 5 Bq / l
Am : 0,5 Bq / l hasta 4 Bq / l
Los Límites de Detección, para un volumen de muestra de 1 l y un tiempo de medición de 3000

minutos, se detallan a continuación:
UN : 0,2 mBq / l ó 8 ng / l
Pu : 0,2 mBq / l
Am : 0,4 mBq / l
CONCLUSIONES
• Método rápido y sencillo

• Eficiencia de separación entre 98 y 100%
• Rendimientos altos comparados con los métodos tradicionales
• Emplea pequeñas cantidades de reactivos
• La concentración de ácidos utilizados es menor, por lo tanto no es necesario trabajar
bajo campana radioquímica
• Permite un amplio rango de trabajo
• Es aplicable a todas las matrices, con algunas modificaciones según el caso.
217
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
1) New Chromatographic Materials for Determinations of Actinides, Strontium and Technetium

in Environmental, Bioassay and Nuclear Waste Samples; E. Philip Horwitz
2) Rapid Actinide-Separation Methods; Sherrod L. Maxwell, III
218
Participation of ARN- Argentina in the
Quality Assessment Program,
EML-USDOE since 1995 to 1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.;

Gavini, R.M.; Grinman, A.D.R.; Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.;
Bombén, A.M. y Diodati, J.M.
th
Presentado en NRC-5 International Conference on Nuclear and Radiochemistry,
Pontresina, Suiza, 3-7 setiembre 2000
PARTICIPATION OF ARN- ARGENTINA IN THE QUALITY ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM, EML-USDOE SINCE 1995 TO 1999
Equillor, H.E.; Serdeiro, N.H.; Bonino, N.O.; Fernández, J.A.; Gavini, R.M.; Grinman, A.D.R.;
Lewis, E.C.; Palacios, M.A.; Bombén, A.M. y Diodati, J.M.

Argentina
A radiochemical laboratory must apply optimized analytical techniques and calibrated measurement
systems so as to obtain accurate results. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to participate in
intercomparison programs with specialized laboratories, as well as to have internal controls that
must routinely be done, like efficiencies, backgrounds and chemical yields.
The Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, in charge of the radiological protection in the República
Argentina, participates since 1995 in the Quality Assessment Program (QAP) carried out by the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory-United States Department of Energy. The aim of this
participation is to assess the quality of the reported measurements. The results of these ten
partaking are detailed and analyzed in this work.
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) prepares the samples that are sent to the
participant laboratories. Four matrixes are analyzed: filter, soil, vegetation and water. Each sample
is spiked with alpha, beta and gamma emitters. Two additional samples, water and filter, are sent
for gross alpha and gross beta measurements.
The laboratories analyze and measure the samples and report a value for each radionuclide. The
deadline is three months later from the ship date. More than 130 laboratories participate in the QAP
program.
The EML analyzes the data and establishes the Upper Limits and the Lower Limits for each nuclide
in order to classify the reported value like A (acceptable), W (acceptable with warning) and N (not
acceptable).
The radionuclides to be informed in each QAP are illustrated in the following table:
Matrix Radionuclides Total

3 55 60 63 90 137 234 238 238 239 241
Water H, Fe, Co, Ni, Sr, Cs, U, U,U(Bq),U(µg), Pu, Pu, Am 13
GrossWater Gross Alpha, Gross Beta 2

54 57 60 90 106 137 234 238 238 239 241
Filter Mn, Co, Co, Sr, Ru, Cs, U, U,U(Bq),U(µg), Pu, Pu, Am 13
Gross Filter Gross Alpha, Gross Beta 2

40 60 90 137 238 239 241 244
Vegetation K, Co , Sr, Cs, Pu, Pu, Am, Cm 8
40 90 137 212 212 214 214 228 234 238 239 241
Soil K, Sr, Cs, Pb, Bi, Pb, Bi, Ac, U, U,U(Bq),U(µg), Pu, Am 14
221
Gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, liquid scintillation counting, ZnS (Ag) counting, gross
alpha-gross beta counting and fluorimetry are used to assess the levels of the mentioned
radionuclides.
Three aliquots or more of each sample are processed separately for the radiochemical treatment,
55 3 90
that is necessary when actinides, Fe, H and Sr are determined. The general procedure is
described by three steps:
90
Previous Treatment Actinides, Sr
3 55
Separation H, Fe
Gamma emitters
Gross alpha and beta Measurement
Related tracers and prepared standards are used for yield determinations and calibrations.
In the following table the general results are presented taking into account the EML reports, from
1995 to 1999:
Class A Class W Class N
Year QAP n n%
ARN All the ARN All the ARN All the
% labs % labs % labs
1995 42 35 68.6 54 67 34 22 11 11
1995 43 18 34.0 94 70 6 21 0 9
1996 44 33 51.6 82 74 3 19 15 7
1996 45 29 58.0 72 69 14 21 14 10
1997 46 28 52.8 54 70 39 20 7 10
1997 47 36 69.2 78 77 17 14 6 9
1998 48 43 87.8 91 75 9 16 0 9
1998 49 41 69.5 88 77 12 13 0 10
1999 50 40 80.0 85 77 15 15 0 9
1999 51 49 90.7 88 74 6 17 6 9
Average 79 73 15 18 6 9
Reported data Total: 352
QAP: Quality Assessment Program number

n: quantity of ARN reported data
n %: ARN reported data percent, referenced to the quantity of radionuclides to be informed
ARN %: ARN reported data percent, classified as A, W, N, referenced to “n”
All the labs %: all the participating laboratories reported data percent, classified as A, W, N
222
The quantity of ARN reported data since 1995 to 1999 was 352. The Class A data average for ARN
was 79 % and for all the labs was 73%. The Class N data average for ARN was 6% and for all the
labs was 9%.
Figure 1 shows the average of the “ARN reported data” since 1995, for each classification A, W and
N. Figure 2 shows the average of the “mean reported data” of all the participating laboratories,
according to the classification A, W and N:
Average of the ARN reported data Average of the mean reported data
1995-1999 of all the participants 1995-1999
6%
15% 9%
Class A Class A
18%
Class W Class W
Class N Class N
79%
73%
Figure 1 Figure 2
Analyzing the graphics, it may be observed that the average of the ARN reported data is higher
than the average of the mean reported data of all the participants for “Class A data”. And is lower
for “Class W and N results”. That means ARN has achieved better results than the mean of the
laboratories. This may be observed in eight of the ten participations.
In addition, the quantity of ARN reported data was increasing since 1995 as well as the percent of
Class A data. According to this situation, the percent of Class W and Class N data’s was
decreasing.
The following chart shows all the reported values (all the analyzed nuclides in each QAP) as the
relation “ARN Value / EML Value”. The optimal relation is “1”, that means ARN value corresponds to
223
EML value. The largest part of the ARN values are around the EML values, that means around 1 in
the chart, more especially since 1997. The width of QAP abscissa is proportional to the quantity of
ARN reported data. That is why QAP 43 is the narrowest and the QAP 51 is the widest, in the
graph.
When the results are analyzed according to the type of emission, the classification is shown in the
next table:
Emission n n% nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%
Alpha 170 62,0 139 81,8 20 11.8 11 6,5
Beta 36 41,9 25 69,4 9 25 2 5,6
Gamma 146 89,6 115 78,8 24 16,4 7 4,8
n: quantity of ARN reported data

n %: ARN reported data percent, referenced to the quantity of radionuclides to be informed
nA: quantity of class A data; the same for W and N
nA%: class A data percent, referenced to “n”.
In the following table the results according to the type of matrix are analyzed:
Matrix n n% nA nA% nW nW% nN nN%
Filter 123 74,5 102 82,9 11 8,9 10 8,1
Soil 72 58,5 56 77,8 14 19,4 2 2,8
Vegetation 60 75,9 44 73,3 13 21,7 3 5,0
Water 97 62,2 77 79,4 15 15,5 5 5,2
After analyzing the 352 reported data of ARN in the last five years, the results showed a good
correlation with the current state of art. The average of the Class A results, in the five years, was
higher than the same for all the participants labs. The number of reported data was increasing
through the five years, as well as the quantity of Class A results.
The improvements were achieved with continuous effort to develop better radiochemical
techniques, new measurement methodology, new spectrum analysis programs, and permanent
calibration of tracers and standards.
The participations in the Quality Assessment Programs have allowed to assess radiochemical
procedures and measurement methodologies through the years, in order to obtain more accurate
results.
224
Argentine Republic Intercomparison
Programme for Personal Dosimetry
Gregori, B.N.; Papadópulos, S.B.; Saraví, M. and Kunst, J.J.
th
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC INTERCOMPARISON
PROGRAMME FOR PERSONAL DOSIMETRY
1 1 2 1
Gregori, B.N. ; Papadópulos, S.B. ; Saraví, M. and Kunst, J.J.
1
2
National Atomic Energy Commission
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
In 1997 began an Intercomparison Program for individual monitoring in order to test the
performance in absorbed dose and personal dose equivalent determinations. The aim of the
program was also to gain some insight into general aspects related to the type of personnel
dosimeter employed, the calibration procedures, the phantom spectral dependence and the
management of radiological quantities.
The program began with a workshop to present the quantities, Personal Dose equivalent,
Hp(10) and Extremities Dose Equivalent, Hs(d)
The program was prepared to test the laboratories, on a voluntary basis, for the response of
their dosimeters to X and gamma radiation fields.
The Radiological Protection Department of the Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) organized
the previous national exercise in 1989 and 1990 (1).
In Argentine, twenty laboratories are doing routine radiation surveillance; ten of these are
commercial and the remaining are governmental: five work under public health offices, two
belongs to the CNEA, two work for the Nucleoelectric Argentine (NASA) and the other to the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN).
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM
The Regional Reference Center for Dosimetry (CCR), belonging to CNEA and the Physical
Dosimetry Laboratory of ARN performed the irradiation. Those were done air free and on ICRU
phantom, using X-ray, quality ISO: W60, W110 and W200; and 137 Cs and 60 Co gamma rays.
The estimated uncertainties associated with the kerma free in air carried out by CCR are of the
order of 3.5% and 4% for ARN. The irradiation was made following ISO 4037 (2)
recommendations.
Doses were selected for testing the detectable minimum dose of their dosimeter and to evaluate
the capability of high doses detection.
The chronology and the characteristics of the different exercises are showing in the next table.
227
1997
Free in air, Phantom,

normal incidence normal incidence
Number of dosemeter Dose range Number of dosemeter Hp(10), range

irradiated (mGy) irradiated
11 0.3 - 120 5 0.3 - 80
Number of control dosimeter: 2
1998
Free in air, Phantom,

normal incidence normal incidence
Number of dosemeter Dose range Number of dosemeter Hp(10), range

irradiated (mGy) irradiated
3 1.5 - 3 12 0.3 - 80
1999
Phantom Phantom,
normal incidence Angular incidence
Number of dosemeter Dose range Number of dosemeter Angle Energy

irradiated (mSv) irradiated (Grade)
12 0.3 - 100 3 0, 30, 60 W60
A control of the reference laboratory was performed in 1996, by Physikalish Technische

Bundesanstal (PTB) with TLD-Pill Box system and by ARN. The difference between them was
4%. In view of these results ARN was designed as checker laboratory for this program.
The results were analyzed using trumpet curve analysis recommended by ISO 14146d(3).,
based on the ICRP-60 (4) and ICRP-35 (5).
All the results included into the accepted range are described by the following expression:
(1 / 1.5)1 − 2 Ho  Hm
≤ ≤ 1 . 5

1 +
Ho 
 Ho + Hr  Hr  2 Ho + Hr 
Hr: reference dose

Hm: measures dose
Ho: detection limits (0.2 mSv)
228
RESULTS
The results were analyzed according to the trumpet curve. Graphic 1 and Graphic 2 show the
1997 – 1998 air free irradiation results. Graphic 3,. Graphic 4 and. Graphic 5 show 1997, 1998
and 1999, phantom irradiation results, respectively.
The performance of TLD and films systems is showed in Table 1. In Table 2 is presented the
performance for both systems in terms of the energy used in the program.
1997 1998 1999
Absorbed dose, free in air Absorbed dose, free in air Hp(10)
TLD film TLD film TLD film
98% 66% 98% 91% 91%
Hp(10) Hp(10) Angular response
TLD film TLD Fim TLD film
100% 57% 100% 79% 79% 91
Table 1. Performance evolution
W60 W110 W200 γ
Absorbed dose in free air
TLD 90% 100% 100% 96%
film 93% 60% 35% 25%
Hp(10)
TLD 93% 100% 100% 100%
film 87% 84% 67% 53%
Table 2. Energy Performance for both detection systems
CONCLUSIONS
The results show a better performance of TLD systems, but in the particular analysis of film
processor like L1 and L3 we can see its appropriated results and its good evolution in time.
In 1998, the laboratory L8 had better performance as they began to make calibrations on
phantom.
In 1999 the laboratory L9 changed to a system that checking diary calibrations.
229
Table 3 shows the percentage of laboratories, which have the 90% of results inside trumpet
curve.
Air free Phantom

(%) (%)
1997 33 58
1998 54 63
1999 - 54
Table 3: Laboratories results with 90% inside the trumpet curve
The following information was subtracted from the questionnaire
• Laboratories whose staff was training by CNEA have obtained the best performance.
• The dosimeter complexity does not affect the result accuracy. The dosimeters with a
simple design (L2 and L4) have shown a good performance such us L5 and L11 and
better than L3 and L9.
• The capability of the dosimeter system to discriminate energies is not related to the
result accuracy.
• The 55% of the laboratory do not informed about the procedure used for dose
evaluation.
• Wrong results are due, principally, to the fact that the laboratories don’t take into account
the importance of a reference calibration and they do not know how to use theirs
response algorithms.
• Related to the quantities informed, at the end of the third exercise, the 60% of the results
have been expressed in terms of dose and the unit use was mSv. The 20% expressed
them in term of deep dose and the other 20% expressed in Hp(10).
• Only the 60% processors did their calibration at CCR facility that offers it as a paid
service.
• Processors that applied correctly their algorithms informed Hp (10) with an accuracy of
100%.
The program allowed the radiation protection authority to obtain a general view of the personal
dosimetry services performance. It is necessary to work on those cases, which have shown
important deviations from the expected values and to make an important effort in retraining the
laboratories staff.
The positive evolution of the results allows to evaluate the program’s efficiency for the
standardization of the doses informed by the laboratories.
230
FUTURE TASK
On 2000 a meeting of the participating laboratories to discuss the results of those three
exercises willbe carried out.
A particular irradiation exercise will be organised for those laboratories outside the established
requirements. As usual they will be invited to participate. One of ours aim is to obtain the
participation of all laboratories so the program will be continued.
A Quality assurance program will be organised with the laboratories interested to be included on
it.
Graph 1: Results of 1997 exercise; irradiation condition: free in air
231
Graph 2: Results of 1997 exercise; irradiation condition: phantom
Graph 3: Results of 1998 exercise; irradiation condition: free in air
232
233
REFERENCES
1. Massera, G.E.; Spano, F. Personnel Dosemeter Intercomparison in Argentina. Radiation

Protection Dosimetry . Vol 30 No 4 pp 271-274 (1990).
2. Reference Photon Radiations: Calibration of area and personal dosemeters and the
determination of their response as a function of photon energy and angle of incidence.
International Standarization Organization ISO 4037.1995.
3. Criteria and Performance Limits for Periodic Testing of External Individual Dosimetry for X
and Gamma Radiation. International Standarization Organization ISO 14146d. 1996.
4. General 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological

Protection. ICRP reporte 60. Pergammon Press. 1990.
5. General Principles of Monitoring for Radiation Protection Workers. International

Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP reporte 35 Pergammon Press. 1975.
234
Gamma Radiation Field
Extremity Personal Dosimeter:
Calibration and Implementation
Papadópulos, S.B.; Gregori, B.N. and Cruzate, J.A.
th
GAMMA RADIATION FIELD EXTREMITY PERSONAL DOSIMETER:
CALIBRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Papadópulos, S.B.; Gregori, B.N. and Cruzate, J.A.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
Because of the fact of the increasing of the therapeutically and diagnostic practices in nuclear
medicine, it has been necessary to make an exhaustive control of the doses received by the
workers related WITH Those practices.
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) has begun a study of those practices in different
hospitals (1).
At the same time, it is important to fulfil the dosimetric controls to other workers like the one
involved in the radioactive source transfer and those related with gammagraphy techniques.
In the context of those works it is necessary to improve the dosimetric evaluation quality in
finger and arm. The ARN, Physical Dosimetry Laboratory, has evaluated the extremity dose
equivalent-air kerma conversion factors and has studied the energy response of the dosimeter
used in those practices.
EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLODY
There were used several radiation source as Co-60 and Cs-137 of the Regional Reference
Dosimetry Centre (CRR) of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and from ARN. In
the same way RX wide spectrum irradiation were made in the ISO-4037(2) qualities W60, W110
and W200. The irradiations were made on an appropriated phantom with normal incidence.
Extremity dosimeters, based on termoluminiscent dosimeters (TLD) LiF7 (TLD-700, Harshaw)

have been irradiated on designed as finger and arm phantom. The detectors have been chosen
with a sensibility CV less than 2%. They have been located on the phantom surface as
recommended by the ISO 4037-3. The detectors are in accordance with the performance
requirements suggested by the ISO/TC85/SC2/WG7 WG (3). The total combined uncertainty in
the kerma determination is less than the 4% for 95% confidence level.
The finger phantom is been characterised as a solid cylinder made of polymethylmethacrylate

(PMMA) 19mm diameter and 300mm height. The arm phantom is a cylinder 73mm external
diameter with PMMA walls 2.5mm thick filled with water and 300mm height.
The detectors were processed in a Harshaw 3500Q reader with the thermal treatment used by
the laboratory.
In order to obtain the conversion factors in the range of X rays energy it has been used TL
detector cover by a 50 µm Kapton filter (Bayer trade mark) as a surrogate equivalent tissue to
2
simulate the 0.07mg/cm depth. In the case of Co- and Cs the irradiations were performed with
electronic equilibrium (e.e).
Conversion factors have been got with the rate between the net values free in air and in
phantom (Lphancorr/Laircorr).
The extremity dosemeter used in our laboratory has been tested, not modified for X ray
137 60
irradiations and with an adequate thickness added in the case of Cs y Co (e.e).
237
THEORETICAL METODOLOGY
At the same time the conversion factors have been theoretically obtained. In order to achieve
this the finger and arm phantoms have been modelled and the photon and electron transport
have been done with the Monte Carlo Code MCNP -4B. The library used is ENDF/B-VI. The
finger phantom has been considered as solid ICRU tissue and the arm phantom has 2.5mm wall
thickness ICRU tissue and with water inside.
Normal incidence has been modelled, parallel planned, the phantom completely covered by the
beam. The results referred to the middle phantom plane show an statistical error less than 1%.
RESULTS
In Table 1 and Table 2 are shown the experimental and theoretical values obtained for both
phantoms.
Table 1. Finger Conversion Factors
Energy Theoretical Experimental Dosimeter

h(d;0°)Sv/Gy
W60 0.98 1.16 1.15
W110 1.11 1.13 1.05
W200 1.16 1.09 1.15
137
Cs 1.11 1.06 1.00
60
Co 1.11 1.04 1.00
Table 2. Arm Conversion Factors
Energy Theoretical Experimental Dosimeter

h(d;0°)Sv/Gy
W60 1.17 1.26 1.32
W110 1.31 1.29 1.37
W200 1.29 1.24 1.39
137
Cs 1.14 1.07 1.05
60
Co 1.12 1.03 1.01
In Table 3 and Table 4 are shown the theoretical values obtained in this work and those
presented in the bibliography.
238
Table 3. Theoretical Finger Conversion Factor Comparation
Energy ARN Grosswendt

h(d;0°)Sv/Gy h(d;0°)Sv/Gy
W60 0.98 1.10
W110 1.11 1.16
W200 1.16 1.16
137
Cs 1.11 1.11
60
Co 1.11 1.11
Table 4. Theoretical Arm Conversion Factor Comparation
Energy ARN Grosswendt

h(d;0°)Sv/Gy h(d;0°)Sv/Gy
W60 1.17 1.30
W110 1.31 1.38
W200 1.29 1.30
137
Cs 1.14 1.14
60
Co 1.12 1.12
The values obtained have a good agreement with those presented by Grosswendt values.There
are significant differences between both calculus only in the condition W60, showing a
maximum discrepancy of 12%. Probably this difference is related with the fact of working with
another library(4).
There was a good agreement between the theoretical and experimental results, showing a
different less than 8% for all the qualities with exception of W60 that shows 18% difference.
Considering that in this difference are included the associated errors of the measurements and
as the phantoms are not identical, the performance of the dosimeter is satisfactory (5).
AN APLICATION
In the Argentine Republic a pilot programme has been initiated in order to evaluate the extremity
doses for workers in nuclear medicine. This task has begun with four hospitals in Buenos Aires.
The therapeutical use of I-131 has a range between 3.7 E+9- 7.4E +9 Bq. The I-131 percentage
distribution shows that only the 20% are used for therapy.
The conversion factors have been applied in the evaluation of the finger dose equivalent in
workers of nuclear medicine services with I-131. The factor obtained is 1.03mSv/mGy.
239
The values obtained for finger dose equivalent are between 0.25 and 3.3 mSv. No relation has
been found between the finger equivalent dose and administrated activity. Large variations were
presented in the same centre for the same administrated activity .
As a result of this pilot experience it has been suggested that: a prior check of the activity
available should be made with an adequate activimeter; a written procedure of the sample
treatment and its administration to the patient and a complete training of the workers involved in
the treatment.
CONCLUSIONS
1. In the case of X rays, in spite of the fact of the high value limit assigned to extremities
(500 mSv/year)(6) it is necessary to make the corrections because if not the extremity doses
are going to be undervalued in a 40%.
137 60
2. The calibrations free in air are enough for the energies of Cs y Co (it means, that it is not
necessary to correct for the phantom).
3. No evaluation with respect to the different angles has been made, because the theoretical
values show a no significant angular variation. For the finger phantom, in the quality W60, in the
0 0
range 0 - 90 the variation is less than 4%; and for the arm phantom, in the same preceding
conditions, the variation is less than 10%.(4)
AGREEMENTS
The authors want to thank to the members of the CCR : M. Saraví, C. Lindner, G. Montaño y P.
Alvarez for the collaboration in this work..
REFERENCES
1. DiTrano J.L. y col. Dosis debidas a prácticas terapéuticas con I-131. IV Congreso Regional
(IRPA) I Congreso Iberoamericano de la Soc. Prot. Radiol. La Habana. Cuba. 19/23 Octubre
1998.
2. Reference Photons Radiations: Calibration of area and personal dosemeters and the
determination of their response as a function of photon energy and angle of incidence.
International Standarization Organization (ISO) 4037. 1995.
3. Individual Thermoluminiscence dosimeters for extremities and eyes ISO/TC85/SC2/WG7

WG Draft (1993)
4. Grosswendt, B. Angular dependence factors and air kerma to dose equivalent conversion
coefficients for 1.9 cm rod and 7.3 cm pillar phantoms irradiated by extended monodirectional X
ray beams. Rad. Prot. Dos. V 59 (3) 1995.
5. Roberson, P.; Eichner, F.; Reece, W.D. Determination of photon conversion factors relating
exposure and dose for several extremity phantom designs. Health Phys. V 57 .1989
6. General 1990 Recommendations of the International Commision on Radiological Protection,

ICRP Report 60, Pergammon Press (1990).
240
Multisphere Neutron Spectrometric System
with Thermoluminescent Detectors
Cruzate, J.A.; Gregori, B.N.; Papadópulos, S.B. and Kunst, J.J.
th
MULTISPHERE NEUTRON SPECTROMETRIC SYSTEM WITH
THERMOLUMINESCENT DETECTORS
Cruzate, J.A.; Gregori, B.N.; Papadópulos, S.B. and Kunst, J.J.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
(1,2)
The Bonner sphere spectrometer (BSS) is commonly used for neutron spectrum
measurements in radiological protection. A BSS system consists of a detector sensitive mainly
to thermal neutrons located in the centre of a set of polyethylene spheres with a wide range of
diameters. Generally the thermal neutron detector is an active one, such as proportional
10 3 6
counters filled with BF3 or He gas, or scintillators ( LiI(Eu)) combined with a photomultiplier.
Typically the systems described above allow the characterisation of neutron fields extending
from thermal range to hundreds of MeV.
The neutron spectrum is obtained using the different moderation degree from the set of
spheres. The sphere with the smallest diameter is more sensitive to the lower energy range and
by contrary the largest one is more sensitive to the highest energy range. The systems
described work very well in the majority of practical cases of radiation protection, although they
exhibit poor resolution. But there is a limitation to the use of active detectors: when they are
used in high intensity or pulsed radiation fields, pulse pile-up and dead time effects are
encountered, so that the system fails. In these cases the solution is to use passive detectors
(3) (4) (5) (6)
such as activation detectors like Au , Mn , Dy , track detectors and thermoluminescense
(6)
detectors .
From the radiation protection point of view, we need to do measurements of neutron spectrum
at pulsating fields originated at medical accelerators, investigation accelerators and neutron
fields of up to 100 MeV such as that present during the assessment of air transport doses. At
the same time the very low neutron measurements during commercial flights can be achieved
with a passive system. Our system consists of 12 spheres made of high-density polyethylene
with diameters between 2 and 12 inches, and TL detectors sensitive to thermal, epithermal and
gamma radiation (TLD600). The gamma component is subtracted using the data from TLD700
that are sensitive mainly to gamma radiation. The couple of detectors is located in the centre of
the spheres.
CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE MATRIX
The neutron response matrix for our Bonner sphere spectrometric system was calculated using
(7)
the MCNP Monte Carlo code version 4B from Los Alamos National Laboratory , using the
cross sections tables obtained from the library ENDF/B-VI included in this code. In order to take
in account the effect of chemical binding and crystalline structure during the scattering of
thermal neutrons it is used the S(α,β) treatment. The density of polyethylene spheres was
3
supposed 0.95 g/cm because this is the density found in most of commercial polyethylene and
3
the dimensions of the TLD chip 3×3×0.9 mm . The composition of TLD600 modelled was the
6 7 3
following: 73.24% of fluorine, 25.59% of Li and 1.17% of Li by mass, with density 2.64 g/cm .
The response of the BSS to neutrons was calculated for broad parallel beam geometry for
incident monoenergetic neutrons perpendicular to the face of the TLD600 chip (located in the
geometrical centre of the sphere) in the energy range from thermal to 100 MeV.
243
The response of the system was defined in two different ways. Firstly the response was defined
as the integrated flux of neutrons within the range from 0 to 0.512 eV (cadmium cut off) per
incident neutron fluence, so that it results an adimensional quantity. The results for bare
detector and detector within spheres of 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4.2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 inches
diameters are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
A second definition of the response was the number of (n,α) reactions per incident neutron
2
fluence, expressed in cm . This response matrix is shown in Tables 3 and 4. The responses
were calculated for the same sphere diameters and in the same neutron incident energy range
that it was used for the first responses calculated. In all the energy points of the calculated
matrices the statistical uncertainty was less than 5 per cent.
The results obtained in this work are compared with those reported by Vega Carrillo et al in
Figures 1 to 4. The response are larger in magnitude but the shape of the curves are very
similar. The difference is attributed to the different cross section library used. In this work the
library was ENDF/B-VI, meanwhile the other work used ENDF/B-V.
Table 1. Responses calculated for bare detector and 2”, 2.5”, 3”, 3.5”, 4.2” and 5” sphere
2
(thermal flux)(cm )
E(MeV) Bare 2” 2.5” 3” 3.5” 4.2” 5”
2.50 10-8 0.19144 0.09688 0.08493 0.07409 0.06233 0.04975 0.03592

3.00 10-7 0.48719 0.22753 0.19998 0.16958 0.14360 0.11294 0.08282
1.00 10-6 7.34269 10-5 0.26729 0.24921 0.22072 0.18970 0.14761 0.11094
-5
1.00 10 0.00000 0.25746 0.27584 0.26800 0.24442 0.20112 0.15571
1.00 10-4 0.00000 0.19883 0.24513 0.26359 0.25860 0.22563 0.17672
1.00 10-3 0.00000 0.14128 0.19867 0.23367 0.24661 0.23092 0.19213
0.01 0.00000 0.09622 0.15305 0.19953 0.22705 0.23694 0.20436
0.10 0.00000 0.05849 0.10943 0.16385 0.20552 0.23736 0.23358
0.25 0.00000 0.04104 0.08575 0.13916 0.18620 0.23060 0.25425
0.50 0.00000 0.02731 0.06254 0.10954 0.15898 0.21807 0.25563
1.00 0.00000 0.01635 0.04074 0.07735 0.11861 0.17794 0.22883
3.00 0.00000 0.00532 0.01502 0.03201 0.05588 0.09513 0.14300
6.00 0.00000 0.00245 0.00716 0.01589 0.02861 0.05369 0.08283
9.00 0.00000 0.00126 0.00401 0.00900 0.01693 0.03090 0.05285
12.00 0.00000 0.00101 0.00312 0.00715 0.01327 0.02512 0.04209
18.00 0.00000 6.79764 10-4 0.00213 0.00490 0.00902 0.01765 0.02873
-4
20.00 0.00000 6.03274 10 0.00192 0.00442 0.00821 0.01561 0.02610
-4 -4
30.00 0.00000 2.63087 10 8.42968 10 0.00205 0.00391 0.00813 0.01438
40.00 0.00000 1.58308 10-4 5.40540 10-4 0.00130 0.00255 0.00526 0.00941
50.00 0.00000 1.23763 10-4 4.19677 10-4 9.29458 10-4 0.00201 0.00388 0.00691
-4 -4 -4
60.00 0.00000 1.05290 10 3.53381 10 8.28044 10 0.00165 0.00354 0.00633
70.00 0.00000 9.52736 10-5 3.37280 10-4 7.11750 10-4 0.00149 0.00288 0.00551
80.00 0.00000 8.59781 10-5 2.86561 10-4 6.95401 10-4 0.00133 0.00279 0.00516
-5 -4 -4
90.00 0.00000 7.89398 10 2.68442 10 6.03925 10 0.00123 0.00260 0.00468
100.00 0.00000 6.53363 10-5 2.53563 10-4 5.89172 10-4 0.00112 0.00238 0.00442
244
2
Table 2. Responses calculated 6”, 7”, 8”, 9”, 10” and 12” sphere (thermal flux) )(cm )
E(MeV) 6” 7” 8” 9” 10” 12”
2.50 10-8 0.02424 0.01524 0.00963 0.00654 0.00364 0.00113

-7
3.00 10 0.05344 0.03393 0.02367 0.01244 0.00827 0.00321
1.00 10-6 0.07234 0.04669 0.02858 0.01729 0.01120 0.00398
1.00 10-5 0.10123 0.06159 0.04242 0.02510 0.01490 0.00562
-4
1.00 10 0.12035 0.07807 0.05084 0.03044 0.01838 0.00709
1.00 10-3 0.13659 0.09470 0.05811 0.04155 0.02163 0.00856
0.01 0.15728 0.10774 0.07037 0.03923 0.02806 0.00973
0.10 0.19070 0.14223 0.10876 0.06636 0.04208 0.01729
0.25 0.23726 0.17981 0.14134 0.08637 0.05958 0.02474
0.50 0.25570 0.22240 0.17825 0.13577 0.09573 0.04011
1.00 0.25342 0.26033 0.22338 0.19762 0.15161 0.07392
3.00 0.18919 0.22361 0.22298 0.24132 0.22150 0.17387
6.00 0.12149 0.14710 0.17574 0.19042 0.19729 0.18220
9.00 0.08150 0.10781 0.12018 0.13753 0.15220 0.14857
12.00 0.06472 0.09023 0.10256 0.11780 0.12876 0.13707
18.00 0.04605 0.06123 0.07572 0.08583 0.09537 0.10450
20.00 0.04201 0.05675 0.07198 0.07751 0.09159 0.10114
30.00 0.02352 0.03209 0.04346 0.05274 0.05923 0.07185
40.00 0.01520 0.02245 0.02964 0.03700 0.04178 0.05315
50.00 0.01219 0.01774 0.02317 0.02804 0.03317 0.04100
60.00 0.01055 0.01478 0.02011 0.02438 0.02836 0.03672
70.00 0.00952 0.01353 0.01773 0.02255 0.02648 0.03167
80.00 0.00853 0.01263 0.01691 0.02149 0.02287 0.02904
90.00 0.00824 0.01182 0.01575 0.01856 0.02104 0.02868
100.00 0.00752 0.01097 0.01537 0.01857 0.02127 0.02659
NEUTRON SPECTRUM UNFOLDING
Our main aim is to have a method for determining the spectrum of any arbitrary neutron field
present at a radioactive facility. Any unfolding method needs the measured responses of the
detectors in addition to some physical information. Most of known methods have problems of
stability and difficulties with the resolution of the solution. These problems arise mainly from
inaccuracies and small number of measured responses, uncertainties in the response matrix
and the inherent nonuniqueness and instability of the solution. To overcome this limitations
(9)
Routti introduced two generalised least square methods for the numerical solution of the
neutron spectrum. In both methods the uniqueness and the stability of the solution was
improved by combining the available a priori physical information of the solution (as for example
smoothness, nonnegativity, etc.) with the information in the measured responses. These
(10)
methods were implemented in a computer code named LOUHI78 and in the later version
LOUHI82.
245
Table 3. Responses calculated for bare detector and 2”, 2.5”, 3”, 3.5”, 4.2” and 5” sphere
((n,α) reactions)
E(MeV) Bare 2” 2.5” 3” 3.5” 4.2” 5”
2.50 10-8 0.08879 0.03689 0.03232 0.02817 0.02372 0.01887 0.01375

3.00 10-7 0.07304 0.07889 0.07265 0.06322 0.05380 0.04292 0.03138
1.00 10-6 0.05400 0.09166 0.08908 0.08052 0.07038 0.05536 0.04159
1.00 10-5 0.02269 0.09244 0.09980 0.09760 0.08978 0.07497 0.05839
1.00 10-4 0.00790 0.07543 0.09041 0.09655 0.09562 0.08378 0.06565
1.00 10-3 0.00257 0.05608 0.07579 0.08731 0.09123 0.08582 0.07227
0.01 8.26108 10-4 0.03950 0.05969 0.07579 0.08552 0.08761 0.07631
0.10 3.73408 10-4 0.02459 0.04345 0.06323 0.07823 0.08922 0.08821
0.25 0.00169 0.01772 0.03441 0.05416 0.07186 0.08820 0.0959
0.50 2.19940 10-4 0.01192 0.02542 0.00430 0.06181 0.08272 0.09671
1.00 1.27168 10-4 0.00713 0.01659 0.03033 0.04557 0.06850 0.08699
3.00 9.15758 10-5 0.00240 0.00618 0.01261 0.02188 0.03657 0.05450
6.00 3.84604 10-5 0.00110 0.00299 0.00633 0.01111 0.02067 0.03208
9.00 2.42667 10-5 5.80730 10-4 0.00164 0.00353 0.00659 0.01193 0.02029
12.00 2.12535 10-5 4.61606 10-4 0.00129 0.00284 0.00514 0.00961 0.01605
18.00 2.07970 10-5 3.22502 10-4 8.80815 10-4 0.00196 0.00353 0.00683 0.01104
20.00 2.03702 10-5 2.86761 10-4 8.00268 10-4 0.00176 0.00322 0.00600 0.01004
30.00 0.00000 1.35244 10-4 3.75290 10-4 8.30203 10-4 0.00152 0.00316 0.00548
40.00 0.00000 9.17679 10-5 2.39439 10-4 5.31219 10-4 9.96058 10-4 0.00207 0.00361
50.00 0.00000 7.30505 10-5 1.90718 10-4 3.87822 10-4 7.89969 10-4 0.00152 0.00270
60.00 0.00000 6.70516 10-5 1.63727 10-4 3.50684 10-4 6.63570 10-4 0.00138 0.00246
70.00 0.00000 6.32937 10-5 1.55108 10-4 3.06786 10-4 6.03890 10-4 0.00112 0.00212
80.00 0.00000 5.81485 10-5 1.37908 10-4 2.92542 10-4 5.39886 10-4 0.00110 0.00198
90.00 0.00000 5.53067 10-5 1.27901 10-4 2.66001 10-4 5.04591 10-4 0.00101 0.00181
100.00 0.00000 5.00482 10-5 1.24312 10-4 2.57180 10-4 4.63885 10-4 9.39178 10-4 0.00171
This work
R(cm )
2
Vega Carrillo et al
-1
10
-2
10
-3
10
-4
10
-5
10
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
E(MeV)
Figure 1. Comparison between bare detector response calculated in this work

and Vega Carrillo et al.
246
Table 4. Responses calculated 6”, 7”, 8”, 9”, 10” and 12” sphere ((n,α) reactions)
E(MeV) 6” 7” 8” 9” 10” 12”

-8
2.50 10 0.00925 0.00577 0.00354 0.00243 0.00137 4.23262
-7 10-4
3.00 10 0.02013 0.01278 0.00879 0.00489 0.00321
0.00116
1.00 10-6 0.02733 0.01751 0.01079 0.00678 0.00425
-5
0.01617 0.00947 0.00569 0.00154
1.00 10 0.03855 0.02328
-4
0.01156 0.00718 0.00220
1.00 10 0.04472 0.02957 0.01908
0.00260
1.00 10-3 0.05208 0.03539 0.02194 0.01544 0.00824
0.01520 0.01062 0.00316
0.01 0.05920 0.04018 0.02598
0.10 0.07188 0.05333 0.04072 0.02524 0.01553 0.00364
0.25 0.08974 0.06823 0.05361 0.03275 0.02343 0.00628
0.50 0.09552 0.08400 0.06867 0.05171 0.03635 0.00967
1.00 0.09732 0.09847 0.08520 0.07500 0.05707 0.01509
3.00 0.07177 0.08537 0.08562 0.09043 0.08304 0.02830
6.00 0.04658 0.05612 0.06714 0.07135 0.07479 0.06634
9.00 0.03110 0.04053 0.04646 0.05222 0.05774 0.06817
12.00 0.02464 0.03423 0.03830 0.04514 0.04910 0.05708
18.00 0.01766 0.02326 0.02880 0.03292 0.03630 0.05171
20.00 0.01608 0.02203 0.02768 0.03001 0.03476 0.03969
30.00 0.00904 0.01232 0.01640 0.02009 0.02278 0.03811
40.00 0.00584 0.00862 0.01129 0.01404 0.01580 0.02779
50.00 0.00459 0.00674 0.00889 0.01075 0.01276 0.02001
60.00 0.00408 0.00564 0.00753 0.00931 0.01077 0.01530
70.00 0.00360 0.00518 0.00663 0.00852 0.01012 0.01406
80.00 0.00326 0.00481 0.00639 0.00804 0.00866 0.01232
90.00 0.00309 0.00449 0.00595 0.00712 0.00802 0.01105
100.00 0.00293 0.00428 0.00574 0.00713 0.00815 0.01083

0.01003
This work
R(cm )
2
Vega Carrillo et al
0.1
0.01
1E-3
1E-4
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
E(MeV)
Figure 2. Comparison between 2” sphere response calculated in this work and

Vega Carrillo et al.
247
This work
R(cm )
2
Vega Carrillo et al
-1
10
-2
10
-3
10
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
E(MeV)

Vega Carrillo et al.
This work
R(cm )
2
Vega Carrillo et al
-1
10
-2
10
-3
10
-4
10
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
E(MeV)
Vega Portillo et al.
248
In order to calibrate the system, a conversion factor between measurement quantities in the
laboratory (i.e. the electronic charge in nC) and neutron flux will be obtained.
It has been irradiated spheres of different diameters (2.5”, 3”, 9”10”and 12”) with TLD located in
the centre of them with AmBe source at a distance of 70 cm.
The TLD were TLD-600 and TLD-700. The gamma contributions has been evaluated with TLD-
700. The thermal treatment was 400°C (1h) and 100°C (3h), and preheated of 100°C (20 min).
The lecture rate was 10°C /seg.
The thermal flux inside the spheres was calculated with the MCNP, using AmBe spectrum given
(11)
by ISO 8529 , in the actual irradiation geometry.
The results of TLD measurements and MCNP calculations are shown in Figure 5 in addition to
the corresponding least squares straight line which slope represents the conversion factor
between the TLD reading and the incident flux on it. This slope resulted to be:
n / cm2
( 45532 ± 608 )
nC
7
2.0x10
neutron flux (cm )
-2
7
1.6x10
7
1.2x10
6
8.0x10
6
4.0x10
0.0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
system response (nC)
Figure 5. Correlation between TLD reading and thermal neutron flux
The integrated flux below cadmium energy cut off is an excellent quantity to be considered as
response of the BSS.
The matrix elements shown in Table 1 and Table 2 may be used coupled with LOUHI82
computer programme to obtain the neutron spectrum present in any radiation field.
249
REFERENCES
(1) Bramblett, R.L., Ewing, R.J. and Bonner, T.W. A New Type of Neutron Spectrometer. Nucl.
Instrum. Methods 9,1-12 (1960).
(2) Awschalom, M. and Sanna, R.S. Applications of Bonner Sphere detectors in neutron field
Dosimetry. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 10 (1-4), 89-101 (1985).
(3) Sanna, R.S. Thirty One Group Responses Matrices for the Multisphere Neutron
Spectrometer over the energy Range Thermal to 400 MeV. Health and safety laboratory, Rep.
HHASL-267(1995).
(4) Caizergues, R. And Pollout, G. Calcul de la Response des Spheres de Bonner pour les
Detecteurs Li, He et Mn – Comparaison avec les Donnees Experimentales pour l’Iodure de
Lithium. Rep. CEA-R-4400 (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Centre d’Etudes Nucleaires de
Saclay, Gif-sur-Yvette) (1977).
(5) Alberts, W.G , Cosack, M., Klunge, H., Lesiecki, H., Wagner, S. and Zill, W. European
Workshop on Neutron Dosimetry for radiation Protection. RTep. PTB-ND-17 (Physikalisc
Technische Bundesanstalt, Braunschweig) (1979).
(6) Dhairyawan, M.P., Nagarajan, P.S. and Venkataraman, G. Further Studies on the
Response of Spherical Moderated Neutron Detectors. Nucl. Instrum. Methods 175, 561-564
(1980).
(7) Briesmeister, J.F., MCNP – A General Monte Carlo Code for Neutron and Photon
Transport. Version 3A. LA-7396 (September 1986).
(8) Vega Carrillo, H.R., Wehring, B.W., Veinot, K.G. and Hertel. N.E., Response matrix for a
6
multisphere Spectrometer Using a LiF Thermoluminescence Dosemeter, Radiat. Prot. Dosim.
81 (2) 133-140 (1999).
(9) Routti, J.T., Ph. D. Thesis: High Energy Neutron Spectroscopy with Activation Detectors,
Incorporating new Methods for the Analysis of Ge(Li) Gamma Ray Spectra and the Solution of
Fredholm Integral Equations, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkely,
UCRL-18514.
(10) Routti, J.T. And Sandberg, J.V., General Purpose Unfolding Program LOUHI78 with Linear
and Nonlinear Regularisations. Comput. Phys. Commun. 21 (1980) 119-144.
(11) ISO 8529: Neutron reference radiations for calibrating neutron-measuring devices used
for radiation protection purposes and for determining their response as a function of neutron
energy.First edition 1989-10-01.
250
Passive and Active Detection of LEU
Beneath Hydrogenated Absorbers:
Simulation and Validation
Cruzate, J.A; Papadópulos, S.B.; Kunst, J.J.;

Gregori, B.N. and Barrios, L.A.
st
Presentado en 41 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Materials Management,
Córdoba, España, 13-17 marzo 2000
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE DETECTION OF LEU BENEATH HYDROGENATED ABSORBERS:
SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
Cruzate, J.A; Papadópulos, S.B.; Kunst, J.J.; Gregori, B.N. and Barrios, L.A.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority has developed a method for the detection of UF6 cylinders
based on non-destructive active and passive neutron measurements. Those measurements
were planned to detect the diversion of nuclear material in case of failure of safeguards
surveillance. This paper shows the development of the practice and its simulation.
The instrumentation set-up used by both methods was described.

19 24
The simulation was made considering first the neutron source produced by F(α,n) Na
238
reaction and the U spontaneous fission neutrons. The AmBe source contribution was added
to the neutron transport .
Also it was necessary to characterize the slab detector as a matrix structure .
This work was made in complexity increasing steps in order to test the different variables
involved.
This process began with the SLAB response modeling to an AmBe source and the attenuation
of the polyethylene thickness (from 0 to 8 inches). This simulation was confirmed with
measurements.
After that the modeling of the whole system (AmBe source, UF6 cylinder and SLAB
DETECTOR) started. Several corrections have been made related to the physical distribution of
the inside cylinder material.
The experience modeling with natural and 20% enrichment was compared with the measured
values.
The aim was to validate the simulation to extend the results to other enrichment and uranium
composition.
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
A system consisting in an AmBe source, the UF6 cylinder, a set of polyethylene slabs and a
SLAB DETECTOR has been modeled.
3
The detector was manufactured by National Nuclear Corporation, with five He proportional
counter tubes, 4 atm associated with an electronic device Neutron Coincidence Analyzer
Canberra JSR-12.
To calculate the system response for the different experimental configurations the simulation
code was MCNP4B with the ENDF/B-VI library.
3
The SLAB response was simulated counting the (n,p) reactions produced by He neutron
capture.
253
The UF6 neutron source spectrum was obtained applying the code SOURCE-3A. Its
composition has been taking into account using the data provided by the cylinders owner and
by the available bibliography.
The AmBe neutron spectrum was based on ISO 8529 and the geometry of the real source has
been considered.
The system configuration was made putting the slab in an horizontal position.
The geometrical centers of the cylinder, the AmBe source and the slab were aligned.
The SLAB DETECTOR and the source were 31 cm (effective center) and 9 cm over the floor
respectively. The distance between the source and SLAB external border was 226 cm.
The UF6 cylinder was located on the floor with its center 105 cm far away from the SLAB
external border. The cylinder was surrounded with a set of one inch width polyethylene slabs of
3
0.973 g/cm density till 14 inches.
The total uranium content was normalized to 15.342 kg.
A sketch of the arrangement used can be seen in Figure 1
Figure 1. Modeling arrangement
The UF6 cylinders, natural, 3% and 20% of enrichment were simulated.
The contribution from each neutron source to the slab response has been well defined. In this
way it is available both the UF6 source (emission) and the total (transmission) contributions.
The Figures 2 and 3 show the response dependence on uranium enrichment for active and
passive conditions (emission and transmission respectively). It can be seen that all the curves
234
have the same shape and in the case of uranium 20% the curves shift because of the U
neutron contribution.
254
160
20%
net counts/s
3%
140 natural
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 2 4 6 8 10
polyethylene thickness (inches)
Figure 2. UF6 cylinder transmission - uranium enrichment dependence.
40 20%
net count/s
3%
natural
30
20
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 3. UF6 cylinder emission - uranium enrichment dependence.
EXPERIMENTAL DATA
The experimental measurements have been set up in order to validate the Monte Carlo
simulation. An AmBe source of 2.9E+5 n/s for interrogation of the system have been used. Two
5A UF6 cylinders of 0.7 and 20% enrichment have been employed for the measurements.
255
MCNP
160 experimental
net counts/s
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 4. Comparison between modeled and measured UF6 cylinder transmission

for the case of 20% of uranium enrichment.
120 MCNP
net counts/s
experimental
100
80
60
40
20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
polyethylene thicness (inches)
Figure 5. Comparison between modeled and measured UF6 cylinder transmission

for the case of natural uranium.
256
MCNP
40
experimental
net counts/s 30
20
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 6. Comparison between modeled and measured UF6 cylinder emission

for the case of 20% of uranium enrichment.
MCNP
net counts/s
1.8
1.6
experimental
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 7. Comparison between modeled and measured UF6 cylinder emission

for the case of natural uranium.
Figures 4 up to 7 show that there is a good agreement between the measurements and the
simulation. The differences that are seen for small polyethylene thickness could be caused by
the unknown internal distribution of the UF6 and this effect decreases for greater thickness.
257
CONCLUSIONS
The simulation results and the measurements show a good agreement, with a difference not
more than 20%. In the case of active measurements for thickness over two inches the results
are coincident.
The simulation validation let us infer the results for a case of any enrichment (up to 20%) and for
a large variety of mass contents.
The Monte Carlo simulation is a save time measurement powerful tool.
REFERENCES
1. Doug Reilly, Norbert Ensslin, Hastings Smith Jr., and Sarah Kreiner, “Passive Non
Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials (March, 1991), Chapter 14”.
2. CCC-661:SOURCES-3A: W.B. Wilson, R.T. Perry, W.S. Charlton, E.D. Arthur, M. Bozoian, T.
H. Brown, T.R. England, D.G. Madland, T.A. Parish, and J.E. Stewart, “SOURCES-3A: A code
for calculating (alpha,n), spontaneous fission, and delayed neutron sources and spectra”,
LAUR-97-4365 (Ocober 1997).
3. Los Álamos Monte Carlo Group X-6, “MCNP - A general Monte Carlo code for Neutron and
Photon Transport, version 2B” , Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-7396-M, Rev.
(November 1979).
4. ISO 8529 Neutron reference radiation for calibrating neutron-measuring devices used for
radiation protection purposes and for determining their response as a function of neutron
energy.
258
Characterization of
Radiation-Induced Apoptosis in
Developing Central Nervous System
Pérez, M. del R.; Gisone, P.A.; Dubner, D.L.;

Michelin, S.C. and Sanjurjo, J.
th
CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIATION-INDUCED APOPTOSIS IN
DEVELOPING CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
Pérez, M. del R.; Gisone, P.A.; Dubner, D.L.; Michelin, S.C. and Sanjurjo, J.

Argentina
INTRODUCTION
Prenatal exposures to ionizing radiation may cause a variety of effects on Central Nervous
System (CNS) including microcephaly, severe mental retardation and lower intelligence tests
score. The highest risks occur between 8° and 15° week of gestational age, simultaneously with
the greatest neuroblastic proliferation and migration to cerebral cortex (1).
Apoptosis is a gene-driven cell death process widely distributed under both normal and
pathological conditions (2) characterized by chromatin condensation and endonuclease-
mediated cleavage of desoxi ribonucleic acid (DNA) into multiple 180 base-pair fragments.
Programmed cell death plays an important role in embryogenesis and can also be induced in
different situations such as growth factor deprivation, chemical insults, hyperthermia and
exposition to ultraviolet (UV) and ionizing radiation (3). It has been first described in 1972 but
the mechanisms involved in radiation-induced apoptosis have only recently been studied in
different tissues. It has been shown that ionizing radiation induces apoptosis in CNS, primarily in
neonatal or early postnatal brain. The purpose of the present study was the characterization and
quantification of the radiation-induced apoptosis in developing CNS. To gain an insight about
the mechanisms involved in radiation-induced neuronal injury, the response of the system to the
action of protein synthesis inhibitor, antioxidants compounds, nitric oxide synthase (NOS)
inhibitors and glutamate receptor modulators was tested.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
For prenatal samples, female adult Wistar rats were mated with males overnight and sperm
positive vaginal smears were considered as 0 embrionic day (ED). Fetuses were removed on 15
and 17 ED and fetal forebrains were excised under sterile conditions. For experiments using
postnatal samples, brains were removed on 5 postnatal day (PN) and a similar methodology
was followed to carry out the cultures. Primary cell cultures were prepared according to the
method of micromass described by Flint (4) with some modifications Briefly, samples were
submerged in the culture medium (Dulbecco and F12 in the proportion of 1:1 v/v supplemented
with 10% fetal bovine serum and appropiate antibiotics). Then, they were mechanically
dissociated by repeated flushing through glass pipettes until obtaining an homogeneous cell
5
suspension. Dissociated cells were seeded in 24-well plates at a density of 5 x 10 cells per
well. After 2 h of incubation at 37°C with 5% CO2 and 95% air for cell attachment, the
irradiations were performed according to the protocol given below.
The effect of the different chemical agents was assayed in samples irradaited with 2 Gy. The
various reagents were added directly in the culture medium at the indicated concentrations.
Different incubation times were tested in order to find optimal conditions.
Cells were irradiated in a Teletherapy Cobalt 60 unit Picker C4M60 (Regional Reference Center
for Dosimetry/CNEA/CAE), at room temperature, with doses from 0 to 2 Gy, at a dose-rate of
0.3 Gy/min. The irradiations were carried out with at least one equilibrium thickness of water-
equivalent material in order to provide secondary electron equilibrium. Control samples were
sham-irradiated. The cells were then incubated in the aforementioned conditions and harvested
at different time points for assessment of apoptosis.
261
Apoptotic cells were identified using conventional morphological criteria after dying with May
Grunwald Giemsa. In order to discriminate living, apoptotic and necrotic cells by fluorescent
microscopy, a mixture of propidium iodide (IP), fluorescein diacetate (FDA) and Hoescht 33342
was used (5).
Analysis of DNA fragmentation was carried out on 1,8% agarose gel stained with ethidium
bromide, visualized and photographed by UV illumination (5).
For flow cytometric apoptosis quantification cells were fixed for 30 minutes at 4°C in 70%
ethanol, washed and resuspended in PBS containing 4 ug/ml IP and 100 ug/ml RNAse.
Apoptotic cells were observed as a hypodiploid or sub-G1 peak in a DNA histogram. (6).
Satistical comparisons were done using ANOVA test.
RESULTS
Morphological changes observed in irradiated samples 20 h a.i. included chromatin

condensation with nuclear shrinkage, nuclear fragmentation into several rounded basophilic
masses and formation of apoptotic bodies. After staining cell suspensions with the fluorescence
dyes, apoptotic cells showed a green cytoplasm and blue spotted nuclear bodies.
Conventional agarose gel electrophoresis revealed internucleosomal fragmentation 20 h a.i. for

different radiation doses. More pronounced DNA laddering was observed with higher doses.
Flow cytometric apoptosis quantification in the 15 ED cultures revealed a dose-effect

relationship showing a significant difference starting from 0,4 Gy (Figure 1).
50
.
✶✶
45
40
✶✶
35
APOPTOSIS %
30
25
20 ✶
15
10
0
0 Gy 0.2 Gy 0.4 Gy 1 Gy 2 Gy
DOSE
Figure 1. Percent of apoptotic cells vs radiation dose in 15ED

cultures, 20h ai ∗ p < 0.05 ∗∗ p < 0.01
There was an inverse correlation between radiation-induced apoptosis and developmental age.
Even though the spontaneous apoptosis increased progressively in control cells between 4 to
48 h in culture, the irradiated samples showed a significantly higher apoptotic rate during the
studied period (Figure 2).
262
45 ✶✶✶
15 ED. - 2 Gy
40 17ED - 2 Gy
15 ED Control ✶✶✶
35 17 ED Control ✶
APOPTOSIS %
30
25
✶✶ ✶✶✶
20 ✶✶✶
15
10 ✶✶
✶✶ ✶✶✶
✶✶
5
0
0 4 8 12 20
HOURS POST-IRRADIATION
Figure 2. Time course of development of apoptosis in 15ED and 17ED cultures

∗∗ p < 0.01 ∗∗ ∗ p < 0.001
Increasing concentrations of cycloheximide (CHX), a translation inhibitor, provided protection

against both radiation-induced and spontaneous apoptosis. 0.1mM CHX decreased 52% the
radiation induced apoptosis(p< 0.01) and 1mM CHX reduced 80% (p< 0.001). The spontaneous
rate was decreased 50% (p< 0.01).
Mannitol, a free radical scavenger, and trolox, a water soluble vitamin E analogue, partially
inhibited apoptosis in irradiated samples (15%, p< 0.05) without significant changes in the
control ones.
N-Acetyl cysteine (NAC), a thiol antioxidant and glutathione precursor, blocked apoptosis only in
irradiated samples (50% p< 0.01), when present from 24h before irradiation up to 20h ai.
Apoptosis was significantly increased in irradiated cells ( 38%, p< 0.05) after the inhibition of
Nitric Oxide Synthase (NOS) by Nω-Nitro-L-Arginine Methyl Ester (L-NAME) and Nω-Nitro-L-
Arginine (NA). No change was observed in control cells.
Related to the other neuromodulators, no antiapoptotic effect has been shown. N-Methyl-D-
aspartic acid (NMDA), a glutamate receptor agonist, didn´t change apoptotic response in
irradiated cells but increased the spontaneous rate (39%, p< 0.05).
Inversely, the addition of dizocilpine maleate (MK 801), a NMDA receptor antagonist resulted in a
higher apoptotic death in irradiated cells (30%, p< 0.05). By pre-treating the cultures with MK 801
prior to NMDA exposure, a higher spontaneous and induced rates were found.
DISCUSSION
Developing brain is a tissue of exquisite radiosensitivity and apoptosis has been described as
the major mode of fetal brain cell death from ionizing radiation.
This study was designed to provide additional evidences on developmental age, time and dose-
related apoptotic response, just as possible mechanisms implicated in the complex pathways of
radiation induced apoptosis in this system.
The micromass cultures of fetal cortical brain cells provided a useful “in vitro” system for the
study.
263
We observed an inverse correlation between radiation induced apoptosis and developmental
age, and so the majority of test were performed at 17ED.
The dose-response relationship and the time-course of the phenomenon was characterized,
showing to be an early and radiosensitive event in the studied conditions.
Macromolecular synthesis is an important feature often associated with apoptosis (7) The
addition of CHX, blocked notably the apoptotic process, appearing the protein synthesis as a
necessary part of the radiation induced cell death in this instance.
Several lines of evidennce support an important role for oxidative stress in radiation induced
damage (8). We observed a significant protective effect of mannitol and trolox. These
antioxidants have been found to block apoptosis triggered by other different agents (9,10).
NAC, an active thiol antioxidant and glutathione precursor, have been reported to block
apoptosis in some systems (10). In the same context, glutathione synthesis is also thought to be
an important factor in cellular defense against radiation insult (11). In our system, NAC was
protective only when present for the entire period: from 24h prior irradiation up to 20h ai. When
it was removed 2 h ai. none protective effect was observed. Inversely, incubation with BSO
increased the apoptotic death ( data non shown ).
These results would suggest an antiapoptotic effect for NAC, not only trough glutathione
synthesis but by the modulation of redox state.
Accumulating evidence supports a key role for nitric oxide (NO) in glutamate neurotoxicity
mediated by NMDA receptors (12). Cytotoxicity as a result of NO generation is now established
to initiate apoptosis (7,13).
In attempting to explore the participation of these processes in the radiation induced apoptosis,
inhibitors of NOS and NMDA receptor antagonists were assayed.
The exposure to L-NAME and NA, a more potent NOS inhibitor, increased the apoptotic
response to radiation, suggesting a neuroprotective role for NO in our experimental conditions.
Cellular antioxidant and prooxidant actions of NO has been reported (14).
Previous reports (15) have shown that blockade of NMDA glutamate receptors during late fetal
or early neonatal life triggered widespread apoptotic neurodegeneration in the developing rat
brain, suggesting that excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate control neuronal survival.
Our data show a proapoptotic effect of MK801 in response to irradiation, but not in the
spontaneous apoptotic rate. In contrast, the toxicity caused by NMDA was observed in the
control cultures, but not in the irradiated ones.
When the blockade with MK801 was followed by a brief challenge with NMDA a higher
spontaneous and induced rates were found.
Clearly from this study emerge a picture of connections between oxidative stress, NO regulation
and excitotoxicity mechanisms. More studies are necessary to further characterize the pathways
involved in the gamma radiation induced apoptosis in fetal brain .
264
REFERENCES
1. UNSCEAR, Sources and effects of ionizing radiation, Anex H Radiation effects on the
developing brain Report (1993).
2. G.C. Gobé, B. Harmon, J. Leighton and J. Allan, Radiation-induced apoptosis and gene
expression in neonatal kidney and testis with and without protein synthesis inhibition Int. J.
Radiat. Biol. 75(8), 973-983 (1999).
3. M. Guo , C Chen, C. Vidair, S Marino, W Dewey and C Clifton Ling. Characterization of

radiation-induced apoptosis in rodent cell lines Radiation Research 147 295-303 (1997).
4. O.P Flint A micromass culture method for rat embryonic neural cells., J. Cell Sci. 61, 247-
262 (1983).
5. J Piñero, M López-Baena, T. Ortiz and F. Cortés Apoptotic and necrotic cell death are both
induced by elctroporation in HL60 human promyeloid leukaemia cell, Apoptosis 2, 214-220
(1997).
6. M.G. Ormerod, The study of apoptotic cells by flow cytometry , Leukemia, 12, 1013-1025
(1998).
7. F.Finiels, J Robert, M Samolyk, A. Privat, J. Mallet and f. Revah Induction of neuronal

apoptosis by excitotoxins associated with long-lasting increase of o-tetradecanoylphorbol 13-
acetate-responsive element-binding activity. J.Neurochem 65, 1027-1034 (1995).
8. J. Weiss and K. Kumar Antioxidant mechanism in radiation injury and radioprotection at

Cellular Antioxidant Defense Mechanism, VolumeII 163-188,. C.K. Chow ed. CRC Press, Boca
Raton, Florida (1988).
9. A.Baker, M. Briehl, R. Dorr and G. Powis Decreased antioxidant defence and increased
oxidant stress during dexamethasone-induced apoptosis: bcl-2 prevents the loss of antioxidant
Cell
enzyme activity Death and Differentiation 3, 207-213 (1996).
10. C. Atabay, C. Cagnoly, E. Kharlamov, M. Ikonomovic and H. Manev Removal of serum

from primary cultures of cerebellar granule neurons induces oxidative stress and DNA
fragmentation: Protection with antioxidants and glutamate receptor antagonists J. Neurosci..
Res 43,465-475 (1996).
11. M. Iwanaga, K. Mori, T.Iida, Y. Urata, T. Matsuo, A. Yasunaga, S. Shibata and T. Kondo
Nuclear factor Kappa B dependent induction of gamma glutamylcysteine synthetase by ionizing
radiation in T98G human glioblastoma cells Free Rad. Biol. Med. 24, 1256-1268,(1998).
12. H.Spanggord, R. Sheldon, D.Ferriero Cysteamine eliminates nitric oxide synthase activity
but is not protective to the hypoxic-ischemic neonatal rat brain Neurosci. Lett.213, 41-44 (1996).
13. B. Brune, K. Sandau , A. von Knethen Apoptotic cell death and nitric oxide: activating and
antagonistic transducing pathways Biochem. (Mosc) 63 (7),817-825 (1998).
14. M. Joshi, J. Ponthier and J. Lancaster, Jr. Cellular antioxidant and pro-oxidant actions of
nitric oxide Free Rad.Biol. Med. 27, 1357-1366 (1999).
15. C. Ikonomidou, F. Bosh, M. Miksa, P. Bittigau, J. Vockler, K. Dikranian, T. Tenkova, V.

Stefovska, L. Turski, J. Olney Blockade of NMDA receptors and apoptotic neurodegeneration in
the developing brain Science 283,70-74 (1999).
265
Latin-American Radiopathology Network:
Medical Response for Radiation
Accident Management in the Region
Gisone, P.A.; Cárdenas, J.; Valverde, N.; Sanhueza, S.;

Pérez, M. del R. and Di Trano, J.L.
th
LATIN-AMERICAN RADIOPATHOLOGY NETWORK: MEDICAL RESPONSE
FOR RADIATION ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN THE REGION
1 2 3 4
Gisone, P.A. ; Cárdenas, J. ; Valverde, N. ; Sanhueza, S. ;
1 1
Pérez, M. del R. and Di Trano, J.L.
1
Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear / ARN, Argentina
2
Centro de Protección e Higiene de las Radiaciones / CPHR, Cuba
3
Lab. de Ciencias Radiológicas / Universidade do E. do Río de Janeiro, Brasil
4
Comisión Chilena de Energía Nuclear / CCHEN, Chile
INTRODUCTION
The probability of accidental overexposures to ionizing radiation in Latin America has been
increased in the past decades along with the rising use of radioactive sources all over the
region. Between 1962 and 1999, 19 accidents ocurred in the region among which only one was
a nuclear accident and the other 18 cases were radiological accidents involving medical and
industrial sources.
These events must be analyzed taking into account the particular characteristics of the region:
a) The cultural and geographical conditions are heterogeneous.
b) Some of the countries lack of suitable regulatory policies.
c) The emergency preparedness for assistance to multiple victims is not equally developped.
d) Human resources are not enough and in some cases they are not suitably trained to deal
with radiation casualties.
With the purpose of overcoming this situation, a Regional Cooperation Programme has been
proposed within the frame of the Regional Agreement of Cooperation for the Promotion of
Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and Caribe (ARCAL).
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMME
This programme has been intended to be developped in two phases. The first one, which will be
held between 1999-2000, consisted in the Project RLA/9031 (ARCAL XXXVII)" Medical
Treatment in Radiological Accidents", technically and financially supported by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the contribution of the institutions of the participating
countries. It will be directed toward the consolidation of reference centers for diagnosis and
treatment of radiation injuries in Cuba, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. It is intended to continue
during the second part of the programme extending the scope of the project to contribute in the
consolidation of radiopathology task groups in other countries of the region in order to arrive to
the constitution of a Latin- American Radiopathology Network.
The Project which is now being carried out includes the following aspects:
1) Consensus in diagnostic and therapeutical criteria to be applied in case of:
• acute radiation syndrome

• radiological burns
• combined injuries
• external and internal radioactive contamination
269
2) Activities regarding biological dosimetry:
• Technical interchanges between laboratories

• Agreement regarding the conditions for the management of biological samples
• Development of quality assurance programs
• Intercomparisons of the results
• Evaluation of the potential applicability of new dosimeters and biological indicators
3) Organization of medical assistance to radiological accidents:
• Identification of the population at risk (triage criteria)

• Agreement regarding intervention levels for different medical actions
• Standardization of medical protocols for management of the different situations
• Medical emergency planning
4) Supply of material resources according to the need of each country:
• medical and laboratory equipments

• hardware and software devices.
• disposable materials
• diagnostic kits and laboratory reagents
5) Human resources training:
• Discussion about the theoretical and practical contents to be included in the training
activities
• Setting quality standards for medical education in the region
• Definition of an education programme to be performed at national and regional level
• Organization of scientific visits and training stays through the laboratories and reference
centers
6) Elaboration of a Regional Notification System and a database for radiological accidents

ocurred in the region.
1-The ellaboration of different updated guidelines for the medical management of radiation
injuries are in progress in this Programm. The first step was the agreement in the First meeting
for the Ellaboration of Recommendations and Guidelines for the management of radiation
injuries and Planification of Medical response that took place in Brasil e the last year
concerning:
• The Prognosis and Medical Handling of individuals exposed to external radiation and
Acute Radiation Syndrome: types of external exposure, clinical picture, main diagnostic
procedures, treatment, use of hematopoietic growth factors, criteria for therapy.
• Contamination with radionuclides: mode of entry, pattern of distribution, site of
depositions in the organs, nature of radiation emission, amount of radioactivity on/in the
body, physic and chemical nature of the contaminant, diagnosis, treatment,
decontamination procedures, decorporation.
• Planification of the Medical Response in the differents levels: Local, Regional,
International. The minimal requirements for the National Reference Centers. The linkage
between National Systems and IAEA, OMS-REMPAN.
In this year a new workshop will be held in Cuba dealing with the following topics: Local
Radiation injury and Radiological Burns and Regional Programms.
270
2- The scope of this activity is the developing and improvement of biological dosimeters and
prognosis indicators. Biological dosimetry tends to evaluate the severity of an exposure to
ionizing radiation by determination of biological parameters, being its objectives: a) the
evaluation of the absorbed dose, b) the evaluation of the prognosis and follow-up of Irradiated
Persons.
Most of radiation overexposures are not homogeneous and either chronic, fractionated or
combined, a single parameter has not proved sufficient to solve all these situations. New
methods must be added to the conventional dosimeters in order to set up a multiparametric
approach.
The following dosimeters and indicators were included in this Programm:
• Cytogenetic dosimeters: conventional techniques, micronucleus and FISH.

• Oxidative stress Parameters: TRAP, SOD, TBARS, Gluthation Peroxidase / Total
Gluthation.
• Hematological Indicators: Reticulocytes Populations by Flow Citometry (Reticulocytes
Maturity Index), Radioinduced Apoptosis in Lymphocytes, Behaviour of the CD34
population after irradiation.
• Assessment of Nucleic Acids in peripheral blood leuokocytes.
3-The main subjet of this topic is the establishment of a well coordinated programm regarding
the medical preparedness and assistance in radiation emergency.
Basically, the Programm is based on the consolidation of previously existing centers in each
country and the consensus about the criteria of sorting injured persons (Triage). The
organization of medical treatment should be assessed on the basis of whether an injury
constitutes an emergency or not. In this way is really important the linkage between the
organization involved in Radiological Accidents and the National System of Health. Planning is
very important and should be adapted to the system of medical care for catastrophic event
situations.The Programm has defined three levels of organization :
• Local level that includes conventional and radiopathological assistance in case of

radioactive contamination.
• Locoregional level: include assistance in the closest unit to the incident (Regional
Hospital).
• National reference centers: provide specialized assistance to victims seriously injured.
The criteria adopted concerning the categories of exposed persons are:
• Individuals whether overexposed or suspected of overexposure that display signs of

conventional injuries and/or chemical contamination.
• Individuals who are likely to have been exposed externally or who have external or
internal contamination .
• Individuals who are likely to have received only low doses and are free from any other
injury.
The conclusions of this topic is now in a draft version.
4-Supply of material resources .
5-In the workshop concerning the rationale in Planification of Trainings Courses on Medical
Preparedness for radiological accidents that took place in Chile last year, a modular programm
was approved.
In 1999 it was developped in Argentina a National Training Course concerning Diagnosis and
Treatment of radiation injuries.
271
Activities in the coming year will be directed toward a Regional Training Course for medical and
nursing staff, to be held in Argentina, with the participation of professionals from the four
countries The goal of this Training Course is to improve the knowledge and the response
capacity for the professionals dealing with radiation emergency. On the other hand, concerning
biologicals indicators a new workshop is planned to be held in Chile with the purpose of set up
a FISH intercomparation.
6-The purpose of the data base for cases histories of radiation accidents is:
• To rapidly provide case histories from radiological accidents ocurred in the Region in the
past.
• To notificate news radiation casualties.
• To enable-us to bring together and share the clinical data from multiple regional centers
involved in the treatment and follow-up of the victims.
The first step is formed by the collection of all available case histories in a standardised and
comprehensive way with a questionnaire. The database center is placed in the Río de Janeiro
University (Brasil).
All the conclusions and recomendations will be publish as an IAEA document at the end of the
Programme.
272
Determinación de emisores alfa en
residuos radiactivos.
Extensión del procedimiento para
emisores beta en residuos radiactivos de
media y baja actividad
Diodati, J.M. y Equillor, H.E.
th
Presentado en 8 International Symposium on Low Level Measurements of Actinides and Long-Lived
Radionuclides in Biological and Environmental Samples,
Ibaraki, Japón, 16-20 octubre 2000
DETERMINACIÓN DE EMISORES ALFA EN RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS
EXTENSIÓN DEL PROCEDIMIENTO PARA EMISORES BETA EN

RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS DE MEDIA Y BAJA ACTIVIDAD
Diodati, J.M. y Equillor, H.E.

Argentina
INTRODUCCIÓN
Tanto en el monitoreo periódico de descargas líquidas al medio ambiente, como en el interés

por conocer el inventario alfa, beta y gamma existente en tanques de residuos de media y baja
actividad (de los cuales, luego de varios pasos sucesivos de descontaminación y disminución
de los niveles de actividad se ponderan las muestras de líquidos que son liberadas al medio
ambiente), se requiere de la determinación de por lo menos aquellos emisores que más daño
radiológico pueden causar, tanto en el trabajador expuesto como en el público. La actividad
gamma existente en estas muestras es medida en forma directa, mientras que tanto los
emisores alfa como los emisores beta deben ser separados químicamente como etapa previa a
la medición por métodos como espectrometría alfa y centelleo líquido.
El presente trabajo describe un método separativo basado en técnicas analíticas corrientes y

en el uso de materiales cromatográficos específicos, diseñados tanto para muestras
(1-4)
ambientales como para residuos radiactivos .
DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA TÉCNICA
Sobre un volumen de 100 ml de aguas de descargas o 20 ml de residuos líquidos, se agregan

243 242 232
10 mg de Cs portador y una actividad estimada de Am, Pu y U como trazadores para
espectrometría alfa, y se destila a sequedad. Del destilado, se toma una alícuota de 1 ml y se le
3
agregan 10 ml de centellador Instagel, midiéndose H por centelleo líquido.
El residuo es redisuelto primero con 20 ml de HCl 2 M y llevado a 100 ml con sucesivos

lavados de agua destilada. Luego 10 mg de Y, 5 mg de Sr, 2 mg de Ni y 60 mg de Fe son
agregados como portadores. Una precipitación lenta y agitando con varilla, es llevada a cabo
mediante el agregado de amoníaco concentrado hasta pH 9-10.
El precipitado de Fe(OH)3 (conteniendo todos los emisores alfa y algunos beta/gamma) es

90 63
separado del sobrenadante (que contiene Sr, Ni y otros emisores beta) mediante
centrifugación a 1800 rpm durante 15 minutos.
Fracción alfa
El Fe(OH)3 conteniendo los emisores alfa es disuelto en HNO3 y Al(NO3)3 hasta una
concentración final en HNO3 de 2,5-3 M y 0,5 M en Al(NO3)3. Acido ascórbico y ácido sulfámico
son agregados hasta una concentración final de 0,1 M de ambos. Luego de esperar 10-15
minutos la solución se pasa por un tándem de tres columnas cromatográficas Eichrom, TEVA,
+6
U-TEVA y Tru-Spec, en las cuales fueron retenidos Np (TEVA), U (U-TEVA), y Am y Pu
(TRU-Spec).
Luego el tándem de columnas es lavado sucesivamente con solución de HNO3 2,5 M + ácido
ascórbico 0,1 M + ácido sulfámico 0,1 M y cada una de las columnas es separada eluyéndose
cada uno de los actínidos en forma individual.
275
Cada fracción es evaporada a sequedad y luego redisuelta en una mezcla de H2SO4 /
(NH4)2SO4, previa a una electrodeposición para la medición por espectrometría alfa.
Fracción beta
Los emisores beta más importantes contenidos en la fracción sobrenadante de la precipitación

63 90 90 140
de Fe(OH)3 son Ni, Sr / Y y Ba, los cuales permanecen en solución. Sobre esta fracción
se ajusta el pH a 8-9 y se agrega 1 ml de dimetilglioxima al 10% en etanol. El precipitado es
filtrado en embudo Goosh, (porosidad 4) lavado con solución de HCl de pH 4 y disuelto en 2 ml
de HNO3 (c), recibiendose esta solución en vial de centelleo. El vial se coloca sobre plancha
calefactora hasta la total evaporación del HNO3, el residuo es mineralizado con H2O2 y HNO3 y
luego redisuelto en 5 ml de HNO3 0,05 M. La solución resultante se mezcla con 15 ml de
centellador Ultima Gold y se mide por centelleo líquido.
El sobrenadante de la precipitación con dimetilglioxima, donde permanece el Sr, se ajusta a pH

7 con gotas de HCl (c) y fenolftaleina como indicador, se hidroliza todo el NH4Cl sobre plancha
calefactora, agregando en forma gradual NaOH 6 M, manteniendo levemente rosado el
indicador. Luego se precipita el Sr con 25 ml de Na2CO3 1 M, se filtra por embudo Goosh
(porosidad 4), se seca y se disuelve en HNO3 8 M. La solución resultante es pasada luego por
columna cromatográfica Sr-Spec, eluyéndose con 10 ml de HNO3 0,05 M y midiéndose
posteriormente por centelleo líquido con Ultima Gold como centellador.
RESULTADOS
En la Tabla 1 pueden observarse los resultados obtenidos sobre 10 muestras contaminadas

241 239 237 90 63 3 137 140 144
con Am, Pu, U, Np, Sr, Ni y H, y, Cs, Ba y Ce (interferentes en la fracción de
Sr). Los espectros de centelleo líquido muestran la ausencia de interferentes en las distintas
90 63 3
fracciones beta de interés ( Sr, Ni, H), según puede verse en las Figuras 1, 2 y 3
respectivamente.
En las fracciones alfa de Pu y Np (Figuras 4, 5 respectivamente), los picos muestran una

separación sin interferentes, mientras que en las fracciones de U y Am se observan trazas de
Np y Pu (Figuras 6 y 7 respectivamente). En el primer caso esta interferencia es eliminada
mediante el lavado con 10 ml de una solución 0,05 M en ácido oxálico + 2,5 M en HNO3. En el
caso de la fracción de Am, la interferencia de Pu se elimina asegurando la valencia +4 con
NaNO2 0,5 M.
Radionucleido Rendimiento % Límite de detección

(Bq/l)
3
H 97,0 ± 2,0 2
63
Ni 82,7 ± 5,9 0,7
90
Sr 81,0 ± 7,0 0,5
237
Np 74,4 ± 7,1 0,1
U 72,0 ± 10 0,5
241
Am 67,0 ± 9,0 0,1
239
Pu 53,0 ± 7,0 0,1
Tabla 1. Rendimientos y límite de detección logrados con la técnica descripta.
276
CONCLUSIONES
La simpleza de las etapas separativas hacen de éste un método atractivo. Luego de la

3
destilación para separar el H, solo hace falta una precipitación para separar los emisores alfa
de los beta. El uso de material cromatográfico específico para la separación de actínidos, y
medición por espectrometría alfa, permiten su determinación con muy bajos niveles de
detección, tales como los esperados en las descargas al medio ambiente.
La separación de Ni y Sr, y la ausencia de Cs, Ba y Ce en esta última fracción muestran la

eficiencia del método para separar emisores beta y su posterior medición por centelleo líquido
con bajos niveles de detección.
Hasta el momento la técnica se aplicó a muestras de descargas líquidas de las centrales

nucleares de Embalse y Atucha I desde marzo de 2000, así como también a muestras de
residuos líquidos de la planta de residuos existente en Ezeiza.
La determinación de Ni y Sr fue partícipe de los programas de intercomparación de técnicas y

mediciones con el EML (Environmental Measurenment Laboratory) durante el año 2000,
obteniéndose una calificación A (aceptable) y una calificación W (aceptable con reservas).
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
1. E. Philip Horwitz y otros, Analytica Chimica Acta,310 (1995) 63-78.
2. M. Navarrete y otros, J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem., Letters 199(6) 493-497 (1995).
3. Sherrod L. Maxwell III, Radioactivity and Radiochemistry, 8, 4, 1997.
4. Eichrom Industries, Analytical Procedures, SRW03, Draft 0.1, 1-11 (1999).
90
Figura 1. Espectro de centelleo líquido correspondiente a la fracción de Sr.
277
63
Figura 2. Espectro de centelleo líquido correspondiente a la fracción de Ni.
3
Figura 3. Espectro de centelleo líquido correspondiente a la fracción de H.
278
239
Figura 4. Espectro de medición alfa correspondiente a la fracción de Pu.
237
Figura 5. Espectro de medición alfa correspondiente a la fracción de Np
279
Figura 6. Espectro de medición alfa correspondiente a la fracción de Uranio.
241
Figura 7. Espectro de medición alfa correspondiente a la fracción de Am.
280
Tracking and Position Recognition Applied
to Remote Monitoring to be Used in
Integrated Safeguards
Bonino, A.D.; Pérez, A.C.; Krimer, M.J.; Teira, R.O.; Vigile, R.S.;
Valentino, L.I.; Giordano, L.A. and Ferro, J.M.
st
New Orleans, EE. UU., 16-20 julio 2000
TRACKING AND POSITION RECOGNITION APPLIED TO REMOTE
MONITORING TO BE USED IN INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS
Bonino, A.D.; Pérez, A.C.; Krimer, M.J.; Teira, R.O.; Vigile, R.S.;
Valentino, L.I.; Giordano, L.A. and Ferro, J.M.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
In the framework of the Strengthening and Integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and
tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional
Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approaches to declared facilities thus their
thorough review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems
and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On
Load Reactors (OLRs). A Remote Monitoring System (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent
fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse NPP. In connection with the
RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System
(GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the
requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements.
The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the
welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts.
The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the Integrated
Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina.
The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in
Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the
safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode,
what means without human being attention.
INTRODUCTION
The first application of this system took place at Embalse, Córdoba. It was assigned to the
tracking of a flask containing spent fuels, from the welding cell area to the silos field.
The system had to be designed as an unattended one. The main objective was to reduce the
inspector’s effort invested in the oversight of spent fuel disposal procedures helping to
safeguards purposes.
Software and hardware efforts were directed to ensure the complete autonomy and redundancy
of the information flow and energy management, without any operator involvement.
The system allows the continuous monitoring of the flask placement and so it is also possible to
know exactly in which silo is discharged. Besides, this system allows to assure that the flask did
not leave an admitted zone previously determined by the safeguards authority.
This paper describes some of the components, as well as the general layout, of the remote
monitoring system.
The scheme of the area upon which the spent fuels canister should be tracked on its way to the
silo field is shown in the following figure:
283
1 2
3
1. - Re-Radiation Antenna
2. - Welding Cell Area
3. - Base Unit
4. - Flask Atop Silo #63

6
4 5. - Travel Path to Silos Area
6. - Travel Path to Welding

Cell Area
INVOLVED TECHNOLOGIES
GPS SYSTEM
The Global Positioning System is a satellite navigation system designed to provide

instantaneous position, velocity and time information almost anywhere on the globe at any time,
and under any weather conditions. These are the advantages that make GPS the first
technology selected. Not only can it track the placing and velocity of the monitored asset, but
also provides to the system an accurate clock (as the GPS is in fact one of the most accurate
time servers available), a highly appreciated feature for the keeper system. It allows
synchronizing the recollection of the data by the interested parts even from places distant one
from another, and even not linked at all between them.
The system is easily adaptable to the different weather conditions and geographical
characteristics our country presents.
Short Description of a Well-Known Technology:
The GPS system consists in network of satellites in near circular orbits at a nominal height of
20,183 km above the Earth and with a period of 12 sidereal hours, operating at the 1.475 GHz
band.
The GPS system may be viewed simply as a continuous series of radio signals broadcast from
these orbiting satellites to a radio receiver on the surface of earth. These signals contain
ephemeris information on the known placement of the satellites, as well as measurement data
indicating the distance, or range, to each satellite and information describing the relative velocity
of the satellites with respect to the receiver.
Positions are determined by intersecting distances between the GPS satellites and the receiver,
traditionally, the technique is called trilateration.
284
There is an extra unknown in this solution, the radio signal travel time. That means it is
necessary to have at least measures from four known points (four satellites), instead of three.
Single receiver GPS positioning gives, at best, horizontal accuracy of about 16m with a
confidence level of 95%, simply due to the effect of hardware, environmental and atmospheric
error sources.
(The intentional degradation of the GPS system known as Selective Availability (SA), has been
nd
off since the first minutes of May 2 , 2000.)
As the monitoring requisites were not compatible with that accuracy, it was decided to make use
of Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) techniques that use a separate base station in
a known location to reduce errors.
To improve the system’s security and redundancy these differential corrections were
implemented in two ways: through the standard RTCM format for real time tracking, and with an
off-line post-processing of the “raw” GPS satellite data (i.e. carrier phase and ephemerides
information).
The idea behind this approach was to ensure the capability of the system to obtain a
differentially corrected position, even in the absence of a link between both GPS receivers.
In order to make it independent from the availability of a local provider of DGPS corrections and
impervious to any external influence through them, it was decided to endow the system with its
own Base Station and proprietary software to generate the RTCM (Radio Technical
Commission for Maritime Services) corrections. Additional post processing software was
developed and tested for this system.
DIFFERENTIAL GPS
DGPS relies on the concept that the errors in the measurements to any given satellite for one
GPS receiver at one location are similar to those for any other GPS receiver within a given area.
By recording GPS measurements at a point with known coordinates, these errors can be
quantified and corrections can be applied to the other locations.
These corrections can be used in real time, by means of any link between a base (fixed GPS
receiver) and the roving one. By applying these corrections in real-time, the accuracy of GPS for
instantaneous positioning is significantly improved. DGPS is now a well-practiced technique for
areas such as navigation, tracking, offshore surveying and seismic surveying.
A generic DGPS infrastructure consists of three main components: the reference station, the
mobile station, and the connecting medium - the data link.
Two ways of performing DGPS are implemented in this system:
• Real Time
A dedicated PC linked to the base GPS receiver is used to generate the corrections. The
processor also converts the corrections into a standard binary format (RTCM SC-104), which is
then sent to the data link equipment and modulated onto a carrier frequency that is
subsequently transmitted to the mobile station. The GPS receiver embedded in this station has
the necessary software to evaluate then its placement taking those corrections into account.
285
• Post Processing
The measures taken by both the base station and roving GPS are combined “off-line” with the
ephemeris data to determine the course. This is done with software capable not only for
computing the coordinates of the roving GPS, but also for assessing the accuracy of the derived
information and the quality of the measurement derived data.
RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION
This technology is used to make redundant placement checking, in parallel with the GPS.
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) involves sequential transmission of FM signals and

electronic data capture. Primary to the system, there are transponders, each one specially
programmed with a unique code.
Radio Frequency Identification uses radio transmissions to send energy to a transponder, which
in turn sends that unique identification code back to the data collection reader mounted on the
flask.
The RFID “tags” used carry a 20 digit tamper-proof identification number. They are passive; so
they need no maintenance, and, having in mind the quantity of silos tagged, avoid the disposal
of multiple batteries upon their occasional renewal. Also their ruggedness and weather
resistance were strictly specified.
The transponders (RFID tags) are attached to or embedded in objects along the trajectory and
at relevant locations (atop each silo, on the transport platform floor of the roving buggy where
the flask sits on the route to the silos field, etc)
The RFID positive readings of these transponders along the monitored container way should
indorse the solution provided by the GPS.
The short range allowed by the RFID recognition and the "stick" RFID antenna directivity
insures the proximity of the flask to the tagged position.
OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM
BASE UNIT ROVER UNIT BU1. - Host PC104

BU2. - GPS & Choke
Ring Antenna
OUTSIDE
BU2 BU3 RU3 RU2
AREA BU3. - RF Transceiver
BU4. - Power Unit
BU1 BU4 RU4 RU1 RU5
PU1. - Central Processor
RRG PU2. - Power Unit
RRF RU1. - Host Processor
PROCESSING UNIT ROVER UNIT RU2. - GPS & Antenna
RU3. - RF Transceiver
WELDING PU2
RU3 RU2 RU4. - RFID Reader
CELL AREA
PU1 RU5. - Power Unit
RU4 RU1 RU5
RRF. - RF Re-Radiation
RRG. - GPS Re-Radiation
To Review Station
286
DESCRIPTION:
• BASE UNIT
It comprises a choke ring antenna, especially developed to avoid multipath and interference
effects, and a 12 channel GPS receiver. There is also an RF transceiver included with its own
RF antenna. A host PC 104 computer commands both.
The GPS receiver, as well as the one mounted in the rover is a Standard Positioning Service
(SPS) single board twelve channel for embedding in Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
units. It has code and carrier tracking capability and provides those measurements as "raw data
" allowing for post-processing. It can also supply position information, calculated by its own
navigator, on real time.
The base unit was mounted at an elevated place, on the highest roof available, where the
choke–ring GPS antenna would have an undisturbed view of the sky, additionally allowing the
RF modem antenna to cover the entire area.
The Base Unit is connected through an RS-485 link with the Processing Unit located inside the
Welding Cell Area.
• ROVER UNIT
It comprises fundamentally a vehicular GPS antenna, a 12 channel GPS receiver, an RFID
reader, and an RF transceiver dedicated to receive the “real time” RTCM corrections emitted by
the base, and passes them to its hosted “moving” GPS receiver.
All these devices are fixed to the flask. To avoid any operator hindrance in its customary
management the size of the Rover Unit had to be reduced, as well as the level of toughness of
the package improved, having into account the considerable weights involved in the charge and
discharge procedures.
The RFID reader unit with its own “stick” antenna transmits to the host processor the unique
identification codes it gathers along the way. This antenna had to be mounted on the flask
structure, and its shape and height were selected as to avoid any physical interference with the
habitual manipulation of the flask.
The Rover Unit is endowed with a special connector through which an RS-485 and power link
gets established with the Processing Unit when the flask is back in the welding cell area.
• PROCESSING UNIT
Its function is to unify the information sent by both Rover and Base Units.
Additionally, it processes that “raw” information (measures from each receiver to the satellites
they see, carrier phase and ephemerides) into solved positions, and compares them with the
“real time” solutions.
It is located inside the flask’s welding cell. It has a mating connector that allows it to
communicate with the Rover Unit through RS-485 upon its arrival, and to properly recharge the
rover's battery.
When the flask gets loaded on the tractor, the battery charge is checked against the
requirements of an outing. In case that requirement was not properly fulfilled the operator would
be alerted before the tractor goes out.
287
• GPS RE-RADIATION ANTENNA AND AMPLIFIER
It has its own GPS antenna mounted atop the welding cell and amplifies and retransmits the
GPS signals received to its interior.
Its function is to provide the necessary GPS signals to the flask while it is inside the welding cell.
In this way the flask mounted GPS receiver keeps its clock synchronized, as well as the satellite
ephemerides updated, even when it has not any view of the sky.
This helps to minimize the GPS time to first fix (TTFF) once the flask leaves the welding cell, as
well as to provide a continuous tracking of the flask.
Besides that, the fact of having GPS signals inside the welding cell, by properties of the GPS re-
radiation antenna, makes the rover GPS receiver mounted atop the flask to report the position
of the welding cell when it is enclosed.
That, added to the fact that every other point in the permitted area (silos field, road) has a clear
view of the sky, allows for a permanent tracking of the flask whereabouts at any time.
• RF RE-RADIATION PASSIVE ANTENNA

It is located atop the welding cell and provides a radio link between the flask and the base RF
modem, when the former is inside the cell, and has not a direct RF link.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SOFTWARE
The Position Tracking and Recognition software comprises three main programs:
AUDITOR PROGRAM
The first program, called AUDITOR has the following tasks:
It stores the raw data from both GPS receivers in a database. Additionally, it receives the
positions calculated in real time by the rover through the BASE program, and organizes them
accordingly.
Periodically, or after an outing has concluded, AUDITOR executes a “Single differences”

subroutine which converts the stored “raw data” (ranges and carrier phase measurements plus
ephemerides) in effective positions for the flask. This post-processing fills any interval of time for
which the RF link for corrections was lost.
It also organizes the data and generates the files for input to the review station. Additionally, the
information generated by the program is stored so as to allow that at any time the last seven
days activity data could be offloaded and reviewed off-line by the inspectors.
ROVER PROGRAM
This is the second program and is the one that commands the Rover Unit activity
It stores the data generated by the rover GPS receiver (position and raw data) as well as the
codes yielded by the RFID reader on regular intervals according to its own energy saving
strategy.
288
It has an algorithm to synchronize its reading times with the ones the Base Unit stores, in order
to simplify the eventual post-processing of the raw data
The position and raw data obtained by the program is transmitted by radio frequency to the
Base Unit by RF, and also stored in a database to be downloaded upon arrival back to the
welding cell.
BASE PROGRAM
The third program, called BASE, operates in an unattended mode and collects data
continuously from the Base Unit receiver.
The measurements taken by the base GPS are subjected to an integrated Doppler-smoothing
filter (a smoothing filter based on the carrier phase of the GPS signal).
Simultaneously, the program calculates the location of every GPS satellite in view from the
ephemerides data and its clock. With these values it computes the real range, from the
previously surveyed position of the base antenna to each satellite.
Comparing the real versus the measured ranges the program estimates the error for each
satellite range. These values are conveniently encoded as corrections in standard RTCM format
and transmitted to the moving GPS, which will use them to calculate its own position in Real
Time.
At the same time the program uses the Base Unit RF transceiver to receive from the Rover Unit
the positions it calculates on real time and the raw measurements.
Both, this set of ranges and the ones taken from the Base Unit GPS are then passed to the
Processing PC on regular intervals, where they are stored.
DATA MANAGEMENT REDUNDANCE
To ensure the availability of the tracking information upon technical shortages on anyone of the
components of the system, redundant methods were implemented to solve the position at any
time.
The first one makes use of the capability of the GPS receiver mounted on the roving unit to
compute its own coordinates with an error of less than 2 meters. To do this, the receiver must
be timely endowed with the RTCM corrections calculated by the BASE program. These values
are transmitted over the RF link, and the rover uses the same link to make position data
available on real time to the base, and consequently to the server.
The coordinates calculated, as well as the “raw data” (pseudoranges and their time tags), are
stored by the ROVER program, in prevention of an eventual loss of the RF link. In that case, the
second method takes relevance. As it has been said, when the flask arrives back to the welding
cell area, an RS-485 link is established between the Rover Unit mounted atop the flask and the
Processing Unit.
Through that link any raw data corresponding to the RF link failure lapses are downloaded, and
the former used to calculate any missing position by a post-processing program. In the case of
the positions calculated by the rover under an RF link shortage, they are probably not RTCM
corrected (because RTCM corrections depend on RF link). In that case, they are "not RTCM"
marked, and so that they are eventually discarded in favor of its corresponding post-process
solution when it is obtained.
289
To have the possibility of customizing the programs to the place where they would be used,
both the RTCM corrections generator, and the post-processing program were conjointly
developed in-house and matched one to another.
The GPS solution about a relevant position should be countersigned by the positive
identification of the respective RFID transponder provided by the Unique Identifier Reader
mounted atop the flask.
Both “eyes” (RFID and GPS) of the system have been made independent so as to insure that
when one of them gets blinded (no GPS signal at all, for example) the other sensor would be
reporting any significant placement of the flask.
RESULTS
The design provides a continuous tracking of the flask with automated data collection and
storage. The organization of the data makes it possible for inspectors to remotely retrieve them
and allows the monitoring authority to receive information on real time and also a convenient
stored database including the last seven days activity.
The accuracy in the position output obtained in real time was 2 meters with a confidence level of
95%, using RTCM corrections (being the real time position the most compromised, as the post-
processing can improve the calculus conditions notably in many ways). That accuracy was
deemed compatible with the physical size of the silos outer diameter and the inter-silos
distance, allowing discriminating between them when the flask was positioned over one of them.
(Additionally, the RFID transponders embedded atop each silo act as "Unique Identifiers" to
confirm the position).
290
Environmental Sampling
for Safeguards Purposes
Castro, L.B.; Fernández Moreno, S.; Vicens, H.E.; Valentino, L.I;

Saavedra, A.D.; Maceiras, E. y Mairal, M.L.
st
New Orleans, EE. UU., 16-20 julio 2000
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING FOR SAFEGUARDS PURPOSES
Castro, L.B.; Fernández Moreno, S.; Vicens, H.E.; Valentino, L.I;
Saavedra, A.D.; Maceiras, E. y Mairal, M.L.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
Program 93+2 was initiated aiming at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
efficiency of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards systems. In this
framework, the application of new safeguards techniques will allow drawing qualitative
conclusions rather than quantitative. In particular environmental sampling proved to be a
powerful tool to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear activities at certain declared facilities
or at undeclared facilities. In the development of the Strengthening Safeguards and the
Integrated Safeguards Systems, the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear
Material (SSAC) will undoubtedly play an important role.
In this framework, the National Regulatory Authority (ARN) of Argentina is implementing

environmental sampling techniques as part of SSAC and this may offer the possibility of sharing
the laboratories capabilities with the international safeguards agencies. A brief description of
current co-operation on this area is also described.
This paper shows the experience obtained with environmental sampling in some facilities of
Argentina and a general reference to the procedures used by SSAC’s inspectors for sample
collection. It also gives a brief description about laboratories already settled in Argentina to
perform the analysis of the samples.
INTRODUCTION
In the early 90’s, the IAEA decided to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of its
safeguards system. Environmental sampling was one of the measures identified by safeguards
experts as a useful tool to improve the international safeguards system.
That is because whatever the process used, the production scale of the facility involved or the
protection fences built, usually there will be small quantities of radionucleides released to the
environment. The detection of these emissions are the base of the technique that allows to
follow the activities carried out in declared locations and the detection of signatures of
undeclared nuclear activities.
From the beginning of Program 93+2, the ARN has co-operated with the IAEA in the evaluation
of environmental sampling as a safeguards measure, participating in field trials and advisory
groups. This co-operation is based on ARN experience in the application of this technique with
radiological protection purposes, in the existence of appropriate laboratories and in its interest
of contributing to a more effective and the efficient safeguards system. Some activities related
to environmental sampling are also being carried out by the ARN in co-operation with other
organizations.
293
BACKGROUND
SWIPE SAMPLES AT THE URANIUM DIFFUSION ENRICHMENT FACILITY
An environmental monitoring field trial was carried out in April 1994 between Argentina and the
IAEA to test this technique at the enrichment facility. On that occasion, samples of soil and
vegetation were taken at several locations up to 8 km away from the facility. Also water,
sediment and biota samples were taken from the nearest river up and downstream of the facility
and swipes samples in different locations inside the facility. The results were discussed
afterward between ARN and IAEA and showed consistent results with the activities performed
at this facility, as declared by the operator. The experience obtained during the environmental
sampling field trial in the enrichment plant contributed to demonstrate that this technique is a
useful tool to confirm operators’ declaration and to detect any enrichment beyond declared
values. In 1996, the Agency started the implementation of Part 1 of 93+2 Program on a routine
basis. Special attention and priority was given to implement this technique at enrichment and
reprocessing facilities as well as facilities with hot cells. The application of environmental
sampling was included in the “IAEA Safeguards Criteria 1991-1995” for all facility types.
In 1996, and as a part of the IAEA’s plan to routinely implement part 1 measures, the IAEA
requested additional swipe samples to complete the information needed to establish the
baseline of the enrichment plant. For this, additional points inside the process buildings to those
of the field trial were identified.
Although the field trial was very useful in establishing the baseline for routine safeguards use,
arrangements and procedures prior the actual sampling were needed. These procedures dealt
with sample collection, cross contamination, duplicate and archive samples, features of
sampling kits and means for future identification of selected points. From the ARN perspective,
the collection of duplicate samples for its own analysis was an important element of the
arrangements not only to reach its conclusions but also to contribute better to the discussion of
results. All parties found such discussions very fruitful.
The baseline campaign results were consistent with the field trial results and with the expected
nuclear signatures. From this baseline, swipe samples are taken from randomly selected points
in the plant with a frequency of once per year.
SWIPE SAMPLES AT FACILITIES WITH HOT CELLS
The first experience of the application of environmental sampling in Argentinean hot cells took
place in 1996. It was aimed at determining the baseline in radiochemical cells with ten years
operation that contained high-enriched uranium used as a target material to obtain Mo-99 for
medical purposes. The process includes the separation of molybdenum from the remaining
fission products and the fissile material. The baseline was limited to the taking of swipe
sampling within the facility.
Before the sampling taken, procedures were also agreed between ARN and the IAEA for the
inside and the outside of the cells, based on the IAEA requirement and the ARN criteria. These
procedures involved radiological protection aspects, collection of archive and duplicate
samples, prevention of cross contamination and samples conditioning for shipment. For the
samples taken in exterior points of the hot cells a similar procedure to the one established to the
enrichment facility was applied, while in the points belonging to the interior of the hot cells, the
collection and the shipment of the samples were carried out following a specific procedure
which included the using a plastic tool usable in telemanipulators. The sampled points for the
baseline were chosen considering Agency’s recommendations.
The ARN analyzed its set of samples by gamma and alpha spectrometry and by fluorimetric
method. As in the case of the enrichment plant, the results were discussed between ARN, IAEA
294
1
and ABACC and the conclusions obtained were that particle and bulk analysis results were
consistent with the declared activities and expected nuclear signatures. The analysis results
shown the presence of irradiated HEU and evidence of the radiochemical separation of
Molybdenum.
The second swipe sampling experience with this type of facilities was carried out in 1999 and
consisted in the determination of the “swipe sample baseline” for hot cells devoted to post-
irradiation studies.
The IAEA’s objective was to determine the baseline beforehand the entrance of nuclear material
to the facility. For this, information of past use of the hot cells was needed to properly evaluate
the samples results. The sampling taken process was carried out during the last phase of
construction of the facility. At this time, the high integrity hot cell was still being set up (i.e. open
and without equipment).
The results obtained have not yet been analyzed with IAEA and ABACC. ARN preliminary
analysis of the samples taken inside the hot cell had shown consistency with the previous use
of the hot cells.
ARN ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING ANALYSIS CAPABILITY FOR SAFEGUARDS

PURPOSES: STATUS AND FORECAST
Argentina acquired experience in techniques to measure emission of radionucleides to the

environment from the beginning of the nuclear activity in our country, towards the end of the 50-
decade.
Traditionally, these techniques have been routinely used for the detection of radionucleides of
interest for environmental radiological protection purposes such as Tritium, Cesium 137, Cobalt
60, Iodine 131, Strontium 90, and Radium 226. The ARN has an analysis capability that permits
to carry out environmental monitoring in the whereabouts of any installation that carries out
nuclear activities (e.g., nuclear power plants, mining and milling facilities, research and
development centers, conversion plants, etc.).
Since the use of environmental sampling for international safeguards purposes begun, the ARN
convinced of the usefulness of this technique for more effective and efficient safeguards
decided to increase its traditional capacity in this area.
Nowadays, the ARN has capability to perform bulk analysis of environmental samples for
safeguards purposes on routine bases. Particle analysis capability is being improved.
At present, to perform these activities the ARN works with:
- Gamma spectrometry laboratories, one of them with controlled conditions and equipped
with GeHp detectors with 60% and 100% efficiency. These are used in special
measurements in which very low detection level is required.
- Laboratories of alpha spectrometry and measurement of alpha activity and total beta that
consist of separate facilities for sample measurement with level of activities consistent
with the radiological levels for workers and for the measurement of samples of very low
activity.
- Radiochemical laboratories for sample preparation
- Mass spectrometric equipment for bulk method (ICP-Ms spectrometer).
1
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material.
295
- For particle analyses: laboratories of uranium particle detection that counts with
equipment of analysis with electronic auto radiography in swipe samples and also a Mass
Spectrometry Center with an electrostatic accelerator granted by the Mc Master
University of Ontario (Canada) is being set up.
To certify the laboratories to provide an adequate service for ABACC, the ARN in co-operation
with this Agency is participating in inter-comparison programs among which it is worth to
mention the Safeguards Measurements Evaluation (SME) from New Brunswick Laboratory, the
EQRAIN N° 9 (CETAME) program and NUSIMEP II. Additionally, training courses for ABACC
inspectors are being performed.
Within the collaborative efforts, it is worth to mention: i) the exchange of experiences between
ARN and the US Department of Energy (DOE) in the field of environmental sampling under the
ARN-DOE Co-operation Agreement; ii) the ARN's participation in the "Qualification of
Environmental Network Laboratories" under the Argentine Support Program to IAEA
Safeguards, and iii) the co-operation in inter-comparison exercises of different analytical
methods related to environmental sampling between ARN and ABACC.
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING-APPLICATION BY THE SSAC
In the framework of current safeguards, the information available to the SSAC and its current
verification scheme is wide and enough to maintain an adequate control of all nuclear activities
carried out in the Country. Nevertheless, a more effective and efficient SSAC and international
safeguards have always been a goal of the ARN. Therefore, the ARN assigns great importance
to the development and use of new methods and techniques that allow fulfilling this goal. On the
2
other hand, the Agreement between Argentina and Brazil foresees that both countries shall
make their technical capability available to ABACC in support of its activity (i.e., implementation
3
of the SCCC) .
In this context, the routine application of swipes sampling at enrichment facilities and hot cells
for safeguards purposes let the ARN increase its analysis capacity for such purposes. The ARN
requires duplicated swipe samples at each opportunity that IAEA and ABACC take ones. The
samples are used to arrive at independent conclusions, to have a proper statistic about the
concordance of the samples taken with the baseline, to evaluate the performance of the ARN
laboratories and to observe the influence of the operative changes introduced after the
determination of the first baseline.
As it was said, for the swipe samples taken at the uranium enrichment plant and at facilities with
hot cells, procedures for the sampling and shipment which were also agreed with the IAEA and
ABACC. These procedures describe the number of samples and the order in which they are
taken at each selected point, the steps to be followed and the sampling kits, the exact position
of the sampled place, the sample identification, the levels of superficial contamination of the
package and the allowed radiation level to be removed from the facility.
On the other hand, since some nuclear installations work on demand and thus by campaigns,
there are periods of inactivity during which only the maintenance of such facilities is carried out.
In such cases, swipe sampling can be used to confirm the non operational status (for example,
in hot cells where fissile products of short half-life are found, the collection of swipe samples
allows to confirm the non operative status of the plant for long periods). Regarding the uranium
enrichment plant (that at present is in a non-operational status), the ARN is evaluating the
potential application of environmental sampling to confirm the operational status of the facility in
a less intrusive and more efficient way than under the present safeguards approach. This
evaluation is conducted in the framework of the integrated safeguards approach to Argentinean
fuel cycle installations.
2
Bilateral Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
3
Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material.
296
FINAL REMARKS
The collection and analysis of duplicate samples by the ARN are aimed at obtaining its own
conclusions and to better contribute to the discussions of the results. A positive experience was
obtained by the ARN in the collection and analysis of the swipe samples taken to establish the
baseline of the uranium enrichment plant and the hot cells.
The ARN is performing bulk analysis on routine bases while particle analysis capability is being
increased.
Inter-comparison exercises and other activities are being performed as part of the co-operation
in this field between the ARN, ABACC, IAEA, DOE, and others. It is expected that ABACC and
IAEA use ARN’s capability under appropriate arrangements.
The ARN is reviewing current safeguards criteria and approaches within its analysis of
integrated safeguards for the Argentina fuel cycle. A more intensive use of environmental
sampling at certain facilities may contribute to more cost-effective safeguards approaches.
ARN's environmental sampling capability might also be useful to the SSAC to clarify questions
and inconsistencies once the Additional Protocol to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement
has entered into force.
REFERENCES
(1) Environmental monitoring for safeguards applications, Erwin Kuhn; INMM, 7/95.
(2) General guidelines for Environmental swipe sampling during inspections and DIV visits at
Enrichment Facilities and Hot Cell Facilities, IAEA, 1996.
(3) Técnicas específicas de muestreo (Specific Sampling Techniques), Lic. Hector Bruno,
Workshop sobre monitoreo ambiental y técnicas analíticas (Workshop on Environmental
Monitoring and Analytical Techniques), November 1997, Argentina.
(4) Determinación de partículas (Particles Determination), Lic. J.C. Gomez, Dr. Cayetano
Pomar, Workshop sobre monitoreo ambiental y técnicas analíticas (Workshop on Environmental
Monitoring and Analytical Techniques), November 1997, Argentina.
(5) Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the
Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (1991).
(6) Co-operation Agreement between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) of Argentina
(7) Collaboration Arrangement between ABACC and ARN.
(8) IAEA Annual reports and publications related to strengthening the safeguards regime.
th
(9) Use of environmental sampling, Jill Cooley, ABACC, 4 Safeguards Training Course for
ABACC’s inspectors, June 2000.
297
Training in Radioprotection at
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Level
at the School of Pharmacy and
Biochemistry, Buenos Aires University
Bergoc, R.; Caro, R.A.; Rivera, E.S. and Menossi, C.A.
th
TRAINING IN RADIOPROTECTION AT UNDERGRADUATE AND
POSTGRADUATE LEVEL AT THE SCHOOL OF PHARMACY AND
BIOCHEMISTRY, BUENOS AIRES UNIVERSITY
1 1 1 2
Bergoc, R. ; Caro, R.A. ; Rivera, E.S. and Menossi, C.A.
1
Radioisotopes Laboratory, School of Pharmacy and Biochemistry, Buenos Aires University
2
Argentina
INTRODUCTION
The advances of knowledge in molecular and cell biology, biochemistry, medicine and
pharmacology that has taken place in the last 60 years is really outstanding and the application
of radioisotope techniques in these fields has contributed significantly to them. The research on
metabolisms, biodistribution of pharmaceuticals, pharmacodynamics, etc., is mostly carried out
by means of techniques employing radioactive materials. Radioisotopes and radiation are
frequently used in medicine both as diagnostic and therapeutic tools. Thus, in Nuclear Medicine,
many diagnostic procedures are done with radiopharmaceuticals; their production and control
are sometimes the responsibility of biochemists. Also, radiometric assays are today a routine
method to determine many hormones in endocrinology and in clinical medicine. Receptor
determination and characterization is a steadily growing methodology used in clinical
biochemistry, pharmacology and medicine.
Therefore we consider of great importance to teach radioisotopes methodology at the

undergraduate and postgraduate level in medicine and biomedicine and give to the future
professionals, graduates and technicians, an adequate knowledge of this current tool. At the
same time it is necessary to harmonize the use of radioisotope methodologies with the
environment preservation.
At present, the School of Pharmacy and Biochemistry of the University of Buenos Aires offers
four different Courses on Methodology of Radioisotopes in which the Radiological Protection is
focused on under different aspects: 1) A Course for students at the undergraduate level, in the
Biochemistry cycle; 2) A Course for post-Graduates in Medicine, Biochemistry, Biology,
Chemists or other related disciplines to the health. 3) Another one for professionals wishing to
up-date their skills; and finally, 4) A Course for Technicians in Nuclear Medicine and/or
Biomedicine.
OBJECTIVES AND COURSES ORGANIZATION
1) Undergraduate level: At the undergraduate level the subject Methodology of Radioisotopes

has been taught since 1960. We began to teach some notions of radioactivity and measurement
techniques included in the Physics syllabus for students of Biochemistry. Consecutive up dating
of the Biochemistry syllabus added Radiochemistry as an optional subject and since 1978
Radioisotope Methodology has been a compulsory subject for biochemistry students, which is
given at the Radioisotope Laboratory in the first term of each year. Its objective is to provide
theoretical and practical knowledge, even though this knowledge does not imply the possibility
of obtaining a license to work with radioactive materials.
Since 1975 Pharmacy students have also been taught some very elementary notions of
radioactivity in the Physics courses at the same Department and some notions of
Radiopharmacy at the Pharmaceutical Technology Department.
301
Undergraduate students have 84 hours of theory and 56 hours of practical work. In order to
estimate the degree of knowledge acquired in the practical work students must take two partial
examinations and one final examination. Radioprotection is one of the main topics both in the
course and in the exams.
The theoretical syllabus includes a first part of basic and general concepts and a second part
where all the specific applications of radioisotopes to the biochemical area are studied,
maintaining a continuous up-date of new methodologies. The topics include: basic knowledge of
atomic nuclei, radioactive decay mechanisms, interaction of particles and radiation with the
matter, instrumentation, biochemical applications of radioisotopes with special emphasis on
125
radioimmunoasay and I protein labeling, radioprotection and safe handling of radioisotopes in
the laboratory, radioactive wastes management, environmental criteria, national and
international regulations, radiobiology.
The objectives of the training in radioprotection at undergraduate level in Biochemistry are:
¾ to give guidelines for the adequate application of radioactive materials and the
radioprotection philosophy, with special emphasis on biochemical-clinical practices and on
radioisotope techniques utilized in different research areas,
¾ the planification of professional practices with an adequate training of the personnel,
¾ the optimization of procedures,
¾ also we emphasize the aspects related to the specific future activities of the students
attending the Course. Students tend either to neglect or to enhance radiological risks
associated with the work with radioisotopes due to lack of knowledge. In this sense,
students are led to acquire adequate criteria by the analysis of different practical situations.
Today, one of the most common practices with radioisotopes in Argentina at biochemical level
125
for the diagnosis of different diseases is the labeling of molecules with I and their utilization
on different radiometric assays.
125
If we analyze the decay scheme of I, we note that more than 95 per cent of the photon
emissions are X-rays of approximately 27 KeV, originated as a consequence of orbital electron
reaccommodations after electron capture and/or internal conversion. The remaining fraction
(5%) corresponds to γ-rays of approximately 35 KeV. Therefore, the principal risk is not the
irradiation of workers: if we calculate specifically the Dose Equivalent Rate received by an
125
operator working with 5 mCi (185 MBq) of I at a distance of, for example, 20 cm during the
labeling of proteins or other molecule:
2
Γ = 0.06 R m / h Ci fλ = 0.96 d = 20 cm.
Therefore, dH/dt will give 0.072 mSv/h.
This basic approach allows to analyze particular situations. For example, if we consider that
glass tubes commonly used for radiolabelling have a wall thickness of approximately 1 mm with
a µ equal to 3.54 cm , then e µ will be equal to 0.7,
-1 - x
dH/dt = A Γ e µ / d
- x 2
Thus, the dH/dt received by the operator will be approximately of 0.05 mSv/h.
Taking into account that the duration of the practice is about two hours (including the purification
of the labeled compound), and that in this type of laboratories the same biochemist generally
performs two labeling per month, the Dose Equivalent, H, is equal to 2,4 mSv per year. Under
these conditions, the practice can be considered as radiologically safe (limit for workers: 10 Sv
per 5 years).
302
For instance, if we shield the working place with ordinary lead bricks 5 cm thick. Since µ is 422
cm , e µ will be 10
-1 - x -916
!, which implies a clearly overestimated attenuation factor and, instead,
the eventual utilization of these lead bricks could cause accidents with contamination since the
manipulation would be uncomfortable for the operator.
2) Post-graduate Course on Methodology of Radioisotopes: In the case of the Course at

post-graduate level, it begun in 1962 and at present 1233 professionals has passed their
examinations.
Posgraduates have 122 hours of theory and 100 hours of practice. In order to estimate the
degree of knowledge acquired the professionals take two partial examinations and one final
examination.
The syllabus includes: Nuclear stability. Binding Energy. Nuclear models. Radioactive decay
mechanisms and kinetic equations. Particles and radiation interaction mechanisms.
Instrumentation: ionization chamber, proportional counters, Geiger-Müller tubes, mono and
bidimensional radiochromatograph analyzers, solid and liquid scintillation spectrometry, solid
state detectors, radioautography (whole sample, histologic, cellular), absolute activity
determination. Detection efficiency. Statistics of radioactivity measurements. Production of
radioisotopes and radiopharmaceutical materials. Purity control and criteria. Activation analysis.
Biochemical applications of radioisotopes. Radiometry: radioimmuneassay and receptor
characterization. Medical applications: image diagnosis and the adequate radiopharmaceutical
drugs for each study.
Regarding radioprotection the syllabus includes: Definitions, Magnitudes and Units of: Dose,
Dose Equivalent, Collective Dose Equivalent, Exposure. Internal and external sources.
Shielding. General aspects of radioprotection: justification, optimization and dose limitation.
Biological effects of ionizing radiation. Radiobiology. Classification of working areas.
Occupational radiological protection. Internal and external contamination. Monitoring.
Instruments for radioprotection. Regulation for the transportation of radioactive materials.
International and national regulations for the utilization of radioactive material in Argentina. The
teaching of radioprotection is formative, because the approval of the subject habilitate to ask
from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority the authorization to work with radioactive material.
With respect to the laboratory practical experiments, the graduates attend the following
practices:
¾ Instrumentation: ionization chamber, proportional counters, Geiger-Müller tubes, mono

and bidimensional radiochromatograph analyzers, solid and liquid scintillation
spectrometry, detection efficiency, statistics of radioactivity measurements. A special
emphasis is given to equipment calibration.
¾ Decay schemes analysis. Criteria for detection and radioprotection of different nuclides
on basis of the radioactive decay mechanism.
¾ Production of radioisotopes and radiopharmaceutical materials. Purity control and
99m
criteria. Labeling of radiopharmaceuticals with Tc.
125
¾ Labeling of different proteins with I. Purity control.
¾ Radioimmunoanalysis and radiometric assay.
¾ Receptors: characterization and quantification.
¾ Radioprotection. The training in radioprotection aspects is very intensive,
125
encompassing: Dosimetric magnitudes and units. Internal and external dosimetry of I,
131 201 99m 32 59 51 60 153
I, Tl, Tc, P, Fe, Cr, Co, Sm and other isotopes. Qualification of areas.
Working conditions. Barriers of contamination. Shielding. Justification, optimization and
dose limits. Monitoring. Instruments for radioprotection. Radioactive wastes.
Responsibilities and legal aspects. National and international legislation. The intensity
of the training is in accord with the requirement of each graduate. Calculus. Software.
303
The objective of the training in radioprotection at post-graduate level consists in:
¾ Acquisition of criteria for the adequate application of the radioprotection philosophy,

independently of the previous university training of the graduates attending the course,
emphasizing the importance of this practice as well as the potential environmental impact
that it may have,
¾ Planification of professional practices with an adequate training of the personnel involved
in order to keep the doses as low as it is reasonably possible (ALARA principle),
¾ Calculation of the Absorbed Doses by the personnel during the practices,
¾ Adequation of the procedures taking into account: elements to be utilized, detail of
techniques, overcoming of eventual difficulties, time required for the practice to be
completed, eventually associated radiological risks for patients and workers.
99m
In the case of physicians, Tc is the radionuclide mostly used in Argentina. Its Γ value is
2 125 99m
0.08 Rm /hCi, quite similar to that of I. However, in the case of Tc, activities of 0.5 to 1 Ci
are used which obviously increases the dose due to irradiation.
125
For biochemists, the calculus of Dose is similar to the I above analysed.
3) Post-graduate up-dating Course on Methodology of Radioisotopes. This Course has

been given since 1992 and up-dates the knowledge in a modular form according to needs of
graduates attend it.
4) Course for Technicians in Nuclear Medicine: This Course is done from 1997 and
emphasizes fundamentally the operational aspects of radioprotection at technician level:
radioactive columns elution, injection of radioactive drugs to patients, decontamination of areas,
procedure with radioactive waste.
RESULTS
Results are quite satisfactory: 95% of the total registered students passed their respective
levels; the requirement to pass the examination is the acquisition of criteria according to each
graduate/technician responsibility.
Since the beginning of the Course for undergraduate until 1999, a total of more than 4700
students have passed their examinations. The students demonstrated an unusual interest in the
course that led us to increase the number and extension of practical works.
In the case of the Course for post-graduates, the radioprotection training has shown that
graduates acquire criteria for the adequate application of the radioprotection philosophy,
calculation of Absorbed doses and adequation of procedures taking into account devices to be
utilized, detail of the techniques, time required in each practice and eventual associated
radiobiological risks.
Since the beginning of this course until 1999, a total of 1233 graduates have passed their
examinations. It should be mentioned that the graduates are chosen not only taking into
account their academic profiles but also considering the necessity of their respective working
institutions to count with well-trained personnel in radioisotope techniques. We receive mainly
biochemists, physicians, chemists, biologists, engineers, pharmacists among others.
304
Figure 1 illustrates the number of the graduates along the years. The preponderance of
biochemists and physicians is evident.
1200
1000
800
Total Number
600 Bioch.
Phys.
Others
Total
400
200
0
60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99
Time (years)
Figure 1. Total of the graduates attending to the Methodology Radioisotopes Course.
Figure 2 shows the increasing trends of the number of physicians as a function of time, with a
notorious peak in 1996-1999. It can be observed in the last years that the number of physicians
is steadily growing. This is due to the expansion of medical diagnosis with radioisotope
techniques, principally in cardiology.
The participants come principally from Buenos Aires city and its surroundings (88%). However
in the last few years the proportion of graduates from the provinces is increasing. This fact
should be due to a growing interest in smaller cities to have, at least, certain minimal
radioisotope used in health care practices, both in medicine and biochemistry. Also, during
these years, graduates from different Latin American countries (Perú, Venezuela, Colombia,
Brazil and Uruguay) have attended and passed their final exams successfully.
305
% PROFESSIONALS / PERIOD
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0 BIOCHEMISTS
PHYSICIANS
40.0
OTHERS
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
60-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-99
Figure 2. Proportion of attendants at post-graduate Methodology Course
CONCLUSIONS
The application of radioisotopes and radiation to professional activities is currently common in

modern science and technology. However, these activities must be carried out in the framework
of radiological safety and in harmonization with the ecosystem.
The four training courses we describe are organized with this purpose in mind and a
background of 40 years in teaching activity.
REFERENCES
1. J. Dutreix, A. Desgrez, B. Bok and C. Chevalier. In: Física y Biofísica: radiaciones. Edit. AC,
Madrid (1980).
2. P. Sprawls, Jr. In: Physical Principles of Medical Imaging. Aspen Publishers Inc., Maryland,
USA (1987).
3. M. Tubiana, J. Dutrieux and A. Wambersie. In: Introduction to Radiobiology. Taylor & Francis,
London, New York, Philadelphia (1990).
4. Annals of the ICRP, Publication 60. Recommendations of the International Commission of
Radiological Protection. Ed. H. Smith, Pergamon Press, USA (1991).
5. G. Gordon Steel. In: Basic Clinical Radiobiology.Arnold, London (1997).
6. M.A. Statkiewicz-Sherer, P.J. Visconti and E.R. Ritenour. In: Radiation Protection in Medical
Radiography. Mosby Inc. St. Louis, Missouri (1998).
Corresponding author: Prof. R.M. Bergoc, Radioisotopes Laboratory, School of Pharmacy and
Biochemistry, Junín 956 St.-1113 Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Fax: +54 (11) 4 964 8202; Tel: +54 (11) 4 964 8277
E-mail: rmbergoc@arnet.com.ar/rmbergoc@huemul.ffyb.uba
306
Criterios de uso y validación
de códigos de seguridad nuclear
Ventura, M.A.
Presentado en Jornadas de Protección Radiológica y Seguridad Nuclear de la SAR,

CRITERIOS DE USO Y VALIDACIÓN
DE CÓDIGOS DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR
Ventura, M.A.

Argentina
1. USO DE CÓDIGOS
El uso adecuado de códigos de cálculo en general y particularmente de códigos termohidráuli-

cos, requiere de un conjunto de conocimientos a tener en cuenta:
El alcance del código, es decir a qué fenómenos físicos exactamente se aplica,
El entrenamiento del usuario para interpretar los requerimientos del mismo,
La educación del usuario por medio del conocimiento de la documentación de la experiencia

acumulada en modelizaciones, proveniente de las recomendaciones de los que han desa-
rrollado el código, respecto a como se ha concebido que sea usado.
La experiencia en aplicaciones que indica en qué casos ha funcionado correctamente o no.
El buen uso de un código, debe tender a reducir la incerteza asociada con la simulación reali-
zada por el usuario. Esto no implica que la incerteza puede ser eliminada ni aún cuantificada en
todos los casos. El rango de posibles configuraciones es muy grande y los transientes que
pueden simularse están en desarrollo continuamente.
Influyen en la buena simulación varios factores como la nodalización, el intervalo de tiempo

usado y el criterio de la modelización usada, que a su vez depende del usuario. Los efectos
que producen estos factores en los resultados obtenidos, no son completamente cuantificados.
1.1 Valuación de sistemas de códigos termohidráulicos
Es necesario poder validar los complejos sistemas de códigos termohidráulicos, principalmente

porque inevitablemente hay un cúmulo de diversas aproximaciones en la totalidad del código:
dentro de los modelos teóricos que están en los fundamentos de los códigos son incluidas
aproximaciones. Muchas veces los rangos previsibles en las aplicaciones de los códigos son
más amplios que los rangos de validez de las correlaciones empíricas presentes en los mis-
mos. Hay aproximaciones que provienen del método de la solución numérica adoptada que
pueden estar relacionadas a la razonabilidad del tiempo de cálculo utilizado. El traslado del
sistema geométrico real en tres dimensiones a un sistema simplificado unidimensional apropia-
do para la solución de las ecuaciones, también suma aproximaciones.
Cuando se comienza con un proceso de valuación de un código, se debe chequear que se

trata de un código o versión del mismo “congelada” que sea internacionalmente reconocido. La
base de datos experimentales que se use para su confrontación debe ser calificada. No deben
haberse detectado deficiencias especiales en la predicción de los fenómenos a ser considera-
dos. El usuario o grupo de usuarios deben ser calificados. Se debe poder comparar con resul-
tados que provengan de facilidades que tengan un diseño integral apropiado, que hayan sido
construidas bajo un escalado y factores de diseño que no permita distorsiones. Deben diseñar-
se diversos tests, para corroborar que el escalado es correcto y para dar credibilidad a los sis-
temas de datos experimentales obtenidos. La instalación de la computadora y el compilador del
código deben ser calificados. La nodalización debe ser calificada.
309
2. DESARROLLO DE LA NODALIZACIÓN
Para realizar una nodalización de un sistema complejo hay que seguir las recomendaciones del
manual del usuario del código. Además debe tenerse en cuenta que el nivel de detalle para las
mallas térmicas e hidráulicas deben guardar cierta coherencia para lograr una nodalización
homogénea. Lo más recomendable es usar opciones standard, aunque no se excluye la posibi-
lidad de mejoramiento del rendimiento del código en situaciones especiales cambiando las
opciones standard.
Se puede decir que una nodalización que representa un sistema real, está validada si
describe toda su geometría, si tiene todos los pasos de flujo simulados, si reproduce las
condiciones de estado estacionario de referencia del sistema y si muestra un comporta-
miento satisfactorio en transitorios conocidos.
3. USO DE CÓDIGOS TERMOHIDRÁULICOS EN LA ARN
La ARN utiliza para el estudio de la seguridad nuclear de plantas nucleares de potencia,

la serie de programas de predicción RELAP5/MOD3.X. Participa de las actividades de
evaluación y mantenimiento de dichos códigos a través de convenios específicos con la
NRC.
Es necesario contar con programas de este tipo ya que la ARN licencia la construcción y ope-
ración de PNPs y otras instalaciones relevantes, inspecciona y regula su operación de acuerdo
a sus propias normas. Con estas herramientas se auditora los cálculos que las entidades res-
ponsables efectúan para avalar la operabilidad de las PNPs atendiendo las mencionadas nor-
mas. El análisis con códigos computacionales es usado como una herramienta para lograr el
mejor entendimiento del comportamiento de la planta en unión con el criterio de ingeniería, los
cálculos manuales, el análisis de datos y la experiencia en la operación de la máquina.
3.1 RELAP5
El código RELAP5, es un código de análisis de transientes genéricos para sistemas termohi-

dráulicos que usa un fluido que puede ser una mezcla de vapor, agua y no condensables. Es
apropiado para el análisis de interacciones entre las componentes de un sistema. No así, para
la simulación de procesos dentro de cada componente.
El modelo hidrodinámico y el esquema numérico utilizado están basados en el uso de volúme-

nes de control de fluido. Pueden ser vistos como tubos de corriente con uniones de entrada y
salida. Las velocidades están localizadas en las uniones y están asociadas con la masa y flujo
de energía entre los volúmenes de control. Los volúmenes de control están conectados en
serie, usando uniones para representar el paso entre ellos. Un flujo y su contracorriente no
pueden ser representados por una unión simple. Esto debe especificarse explícitamente. Un
fenómeno como éste, cuando lo modelamos en un tubo, presenta alguna dificultad en la noda-
lización. Cuando lo modelado es un generador de vapor, esto se simplifica porque está explí-
citamente contemplado la posibilidad de usar separador y paso de flujo de recirculación.
El paso del flujo de calor, también está modelado en un sentido unidimensional, usando una
malla de diferencias finitas para calcular temperaturas y los vectores flujo de calor. Los con-
ductores de calor pueden ser conectados por volúmenes hidrodinámicos para simular el paso
de flujo normal al paso de flujo de fluido. Para simular los elementos de calentamiento, los ele-
mentos combustibles y las superficies de intercambio de calor, se usan estructuras de calor.
Estas están térmicamente conectadas a los volúmenes hidrodinámicos a través de flujo de
calor que es calculado usando correlaciones de transferencias de calor.
Hay variados modelos incluidos como para simular entre otros, casos de reflujo a baja presión,
cinética de reactores etc. Se pueden definir sistemas de control para simular algún proceso
310
concentrado en los cuales pueden ser definidos en término de variables del sistema a través de
operaciones, lógicas, algebraicas, o de diferenciación o integración. Los sistemas de control
son acoplados a las componentes térmicas en serie, son realimentados por los modelos térmi-
cos e hidrodinámicos en el paso de tiempo sucesivo, o sea que son explícitamente acoplados.
4. VALIDACIÓN DE LA NODALIZACIÓN DE LA CNA-I EN BASE A RELAP5/3
La nodalización básica de la CNA-I se ilustra en la Figura 1, incluye 338 volúmenes, 360 unio-
nes, 67 estructuras de calor 421 puntos en la malla. Cumple con lo estipulado, es decir que
reproduce satisfactoriamente los principales valores termodinámicos de la planta en el estado
estacionario (se muestra en la Tabla 1).
Se comparan los valores que se alcanzan, en un incidente registrado en planta (pérdida de las
bombas principales QF), con los obtenidos en la simulación del mismo con la nodalización rea-
lizada. También la comparación es satisfactoria (Figuras 2 y 3).
Se muestra como ejemplo, la nodalización utilizada para el cálculo termohidráulico de la simu-

2
lación de un evento de rotura de 60 cm en la rama fría de la CNA-I (Figura 4). Los resultados
obtenidos, se los compara con los obtenidos por Serrano, P. [1], usando también el código
RELAP5/3 pero con una nodalización propia distinta.
En las Figuras 5, 6 y 7 se ilustra la comparación. En este caso, los coincidentes valores obteni-
dos, sólo nos permite hacer una verificación de los mismos, pero no una validación ya que no
están contrastados con datos registrados.
311
Figura 1. Nodalización de la CNA-I en base a RELAP5/3
312
Tabla 1: Comparación de parámetros del estado estacionario con valores de planta
1 2 3
Parámetros Valores de Diseño Valores de Planta Relap5/3
Potencia Térmica 1179 MW 1179 MW 1179 MW
Presión en el Primario (115 ata)

116,5 bar 117,0 bar 114,17 bar
Temperatura en el Primario a la 296,1 ºC 301,8 ºC 297,54 ºC

salida del Reactor
Temperatura en el Primario 261,7 ºC 266,7 ºC 262,97 ºC

a la entrada del Reactor
Caudal de Refrigerante (20000 t/h)

en el Primario 5555,5 kg/s 6231,35 kg/s 6251,2 kg/s
Caudal del Moderador (1400 t/h)

388,9 kg/s 424,03 kg/s 425,36 kg/s
Temperatura del Moderador 147,7 ºC 155,96 ºC 140,83 ºC

a la entrada del Reactor
Temperatura del Moderador 208,6 ºC 219,95 ºC 192,64 ºC

a la salida del Reactor
Caudal de Vapor en el G.V. (929 t/h)

258,06 kg/s 260,23 kg/s 263,18 kg/s
Caudal de Alimentación 258,20 kg/s 260,13 kg/s

de Agua al G.V.
313
INCIDENTE DE PÉRDIDA DE BOMBAS PRINCIPALES EN LA CNA-I
WinGraf 2.2 - 10-26-2000
240
Moderator System
X Oulet Reactor Temperature
220
Y Recorded Plant values
200
Y
Temperature (C)
X
Y XY Y Y
X X X X
X X X X X
180 X X X X
X X X X
160
XXX STPQF TEMPF434030000

YYY CNA-I MDTEMP-MED
140
120
0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0
Time (s)
Figura 2. Temperatura del moderador a la salida del reactor, comparada con los
valores registrados en planta
WinGraf 2.2 - 10-26-2000
330.0
Primary System
320.0
X Hot Leg Inleet SG2 Temperature
310.0
X Y Recorded plant values
300.0
Temperature (C)
290.0
XXX STPQF TEMPF201020000
280.0 YYY CNA-I QHO2-TOO8
X
270.0 Y Y
260.0
Y
X
250.0
X X X X XY X X X X X X X X X X X Y
240.0
230.0
0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0
Time (s)
Figura 3. Temperatura a la entrada del SG2, comparada con los valores registrados en planta
314
315
Figura 4. Nodalización de la CNA-I en base a RELAP5/3
315
2
CÁLCULOS TERMOHIDRÁULICOS PARA UNA ROTURA DE 60 CM
EN LA RAMA FRÍA DE LA CNA-I
WinGraf 3.2 - 12-30-1999
600
Temperatura del fluido en el downcomer
500 XXX pt1 tempf301010000

YYY fig14a tempdc
400
Temperatura (C)
300
X
Y
Y
X Y
200 Y Y
X Y Y Y Y Y
X X X X X X X X X Y Y
X Y Y Y Y
X X X X XY Y
X XY
100
0
0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0 1000.0
Time (s)
Figura 5. Temperatura del fluido en el Downcomer, comparada con los obtenidos por Serrano, P. [1]
WinGraf 3.2 - 12-30-1999
18.0
Nivel de líquido colapsado en el downcomer

16.0
XXX pt1 cntrlvar9

14.0 YYY fig13 niveldc
12.0
10.0
Nivel (m)
8.0
X X X YX XY X YX XY X YX X X X X X X YXYY YXY Y
X Y Y Y Y Y Y YY
6.0 X
4.0
2.0
0
0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0 1000.0
Time (s)
Figura 6. Nivel de líquido colapsado en el downcomer, comparado con los valores

obtenidos por Serrano, P. [1]
316
WinGraf 3.2 - 12-30-1999
600
Temperatura del fluido en la rama fría
500 XXX pt1 tempf115020000

YYY fig16a tempramafria
400
Temperatura (C)
300
X
Y Y
200 X Y
X Y XY
Y
X XY X YX X YX X X
Y X
X
Y X
100 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
X X XY
X X
0
0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0 1000.0
Time (s)
Figura 7. Temperatura en la rama fría, comparada con los valores obtenidos en Serrano, P. [1]
REFERENCIAS
[1] Serrano, P. IT. CNA-I. “Análisis de seguridad del recipiente de presión.

2
Cálculos termohidráulicos. Rotura de 60 cm en la rama fría”. ENACE.
o
N 446/1998.
317
Sistema Nacional de Contabilidad y
Control y Cooperación con las
Salvaguardias Internacionales
Valentino, L.I.; Maceiras, E. y Fernández Moreno, S.

SISTEMA NACIONAL DE CONTABILIDAD Y CONTROL Y COOPERACIÓN
CON LAS SALVAGUARDIAS INTERNACIONALES
Valentino, L.I.; Maceiras, E. y Fernández Moreno, S.

Argentina
SISTEMA NACIONAL DE CONTABILIDAD Y CONTROL DE MATERIALES NUCLEARES
La Ley Nacional de la Actividad Nuclear (Nº 24.804) crea a la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear
(ARN), sucesora del Ente Nacional Regulador Nuclear, con la función de regular y fiscalizar la
actividad nuclear en todo lo referente a los temas de seguridad radiológica y nuclear,
protección física y no proliferación nuclear, según se establece en sus artículos 7 y 8 c). La
ARN tiene como objetivo establecer, desarrollar y aplicar un régimen regulatorio para todas las
actividades que se realicen en la República Argentina. Uno de los propósitos de este régimen
regulatorio es el de verificar que las actividades nucleares no se desvíen hacia fines no
autorizados y que se realicen cumpliendo con los compromisos internacionales asumidos por la
Nación. Esta actividad se desarrolla a través de la Gerencia de Asuntos Institucionales y No-
Proliferación, Subgerencia de salvaguardias.
La ARN establece un sistema de control que le permita asegurar que los materiales nucleares
no son desviados hacia fines no autorizados y que éstos y las actividades nucleares se realicen
en conformidad con todos los compromisos internacionales asumidos por la Argentina, según
se especifica en el artículo 1 de la Ley Nuclear. La Argentina ha asumido el compromiso de uso
exclusivamente pacífico de la energía nuclear a través de distintos tratados y acuerdos
internacionales. Entre ellos cabe mencionar el Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas
Nucleares en América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco), el Tratado de No Proliferación
de Armas Nucleares (TNP) , el Acuerdo entre la República Argentina y la República Federativa
del Brasil para el Uso Exclusivamente Pacífico de la Energía Atómica (Acuerdo Bilateral) y.
Asimismo, ha aceptado la aplicación de las salvaguardias internacionales de la ABACC y del
OIEA (Sistema Común de Contabilidad y Control y Acuerdo de Salvaguardias Cuatripartito).
Como parte del sistema de Control de la ARN, mediante la Norma de Garantías de No

Desviación de Material Nuclear, Material, Equipos e Instalaciones de Interés Nuclear (AR
10.14.1), se define al Sistema Nacional de Contabilidad y Control (SNCC) como el conjunto de
medidas y procedimientos aplicables a todos los materiales nucleares, materiales, instalaciones
y equipos de interés nuclear con los fines de: a) prevenir que dichos materiales nucleares,
materiales, etc. sean desviados a un uso no autorizado; y b) proveer las bases adecuadas para
una efectiva aplicación de las salvaguardias del Sistema Común de Contabilidad y Control”
(SCCC) y de los acuerdos de salvaguardias con el OIEA.
Argentina considera importante mantener un Sistema Nacional efectivo y eficiente, destinado a

asegurar con un grado razonable de certeza que todos los materiales nucleares, materiales,
equipos e instalaciones de interés nuclear sean utilizados de conformidad con lo estipulado en
las licencias y autorizaciones emitidas por la ARN y en total observancia de los compromisos
internacionales asumidos por el país. De modo que el Sistema Nacional de Contabilidad y
Control tiene dos objetivos distintos pero complementarios a su vez.
El sistema Nacional de Contabilidad y Control se aplica a todo el material nuclear y a todas las
actividades nucleares llevadas a cabo en la Argentina. Nuestro Sistema Nacional establece
como requerimiento por parte del operador de cualquier instalación , la implementación de un
sistema de contabilidad y control con fines de salvaguardias. Este sistema tiene que incluir un
esquema de mediciones y análisis que permita determinar el inventario de material nuclear y
sus cambios. Debe incluir, además, procedimientos para el cálculo de errores, exactitud,
evaluación de incertezas, así como un control de calidad, para cumplir con las estándares
internacionales.
321
Por lo tanto el operador tiene que implementar un sistema coherente y consistente de registros
e informes para cada Área de Balance de Material, basada en la documentación soporte,
documentos operativos y fuente que puedan ser auditados por la Autoridad Nacional, la
ABACC y la OIEA. También es obligación del operador presentar a la ARN la información de
Diseño de su instalación y los sucesivos cambios que se realicen a la misma, mediante un
documento llamado Informe Cuestionario de Diseño (DIQ). Toda la información suministrada
por los operadores a la ARN tiene carácter de declaración y es a su vez, nuestra
documentación fuente para informar a las Agencias Internacionales de salvaguardias acerca de
las actividades de las áreas de balance y sus inventarios.
Como un sistema de verificación independiente y para alcanzar nuestras metas y objetivos

antes explicadas, el Sistema Nacional incluye un programa de inspecciones rutinarias y
especiales (por ej. inspecciones de verificación física, inspecciones de verificación de diseño)
realizadas por inspectores de la ARN. En base al DIQ, la Subgerencia de salvaguardias
desarrolla las actividades de inspección necesario para cumplir con las metas de inspección en
cada Area de Balance de Material. Los resultados y conclusiones de las inspecciones
nacionales se detallan en un informe de inspección interno, el que permite el seguimiento de
las situaciones en cada instalación.
Además, la ARN participa en programas de entrenamiento permanente para inspectores y

operadores mediante la asistencia a cursos regionales e internacionales en temas de
salvaguardias.
La ARN cuenta también con varios laboratorios de análisis no destructivos y destructivos y uno
para el análisis de las muestras ambientales. Algunos de ellos procesan las muestras
obtenidas de las inspecciones nacionales y habitualmente están relacionadas con programas
de inter-comparación para mantener los estandares de operación requeridas.
La Subgerencia de salvaguardias ha implementado dos bases de datos que interactúan entre

ellas para tratar toda la información contable y los datos de inspecciones de un modo eficiente.
El software fue desarrollado para optimizar la programación de las inspecciones y su
evaluación y para mejorar la recepción y envío de los informes contables, además cumple con
todos los requerimientos emergentes de los acuerdos de salvaguardias en vigencia y las
normas nacionales. El Sistema de Control de Material Nuclear (SCMN) apunta a centralizar
todos los datos contables de salvaguardias de todas las instalaciones y el Sistema de
Inspecciones de Salvaguardias (SIS) tiene por objeto el procesamiento de todos los datos de
las inspecciones nacionales. Actualmente, se esta implementando en cada una de las
instalaciones el Sistema del Operador (SOP) destinado a interactuar con las otras dos bases
de datos; disminuyendo el margen de error contable y facilitando al operador la confección de
informes y a la Subgerencia de salvaguardias y las Agencias la auditoria de los mismos.
En lo referente a medidas de contención y vigilancia, el sistema nacional prevé su utilización

como una medida complementaria por ejemplo, sellos, cámaras digitales, sensores de
radiación y de movimiento.
Un aspecto relevante del SNCC se refiere a la cooperación con los organismos internacionales
de aplicación de salvaguardias, la ABACC y el OIEA. Al respecto, se puede distinguir la
cooperación obligada de las Partes de aquella orientada a fortalecer y mejorar las
salvaguardias. Tanto el Acuerdo Bilateral como el Acuerdo Cuatripartito, contienen la obligación
de las Partes de facilitar la aplicación de salvaguardias. Evidentemente, la existencia de un
SNCC bien estructurado y dotado de capacidad técnica y de todos los elementos necesarios
para efectuar un control efectivo, contribuye al mejor cumplimiento de este tipo de cooperación.
Un aspecto relevante de la cooperación se refiere a la coordinación de las actividades de
inspección en las instalaciones. El SNCC a través del diálogo e interacción permanente con los
operadores, claramente ejerce un rol de coordinación que facilita las actividades de verificación
de la ABACC y del OIEA.
La Subgerencia de salvaguardias se vincula con otros sectores de la ARN como el de Apoyo

Científico Técnico para desarrollar nuevas aplicaciones, tales como los sistemas no atendidos
con y sin transmisión remota de información relevante para las salvaguardias, para aumentar
322
su capacidad analítica de muestras ambientales y para incrementar la capacitación con
respecto a las medidas de fortalecimiento de las salvaguardias. Otro objetivo igualmente
importante en el constante desarrollo de nuevas técnicas y métodos de salvaguardias es el de
aumentar su eficiencia y minimizar la intrusión en las actividades nucleares.
La existencia del SNCC contribuye a suministrar mayores garantías sobre el cumplimiento de

los compromisos de no proliferación, facilita la aplicación de las salvaguardias internacionales
(ABACC y OIEA) y promueve la mejora de la efectividad y eficiencia de las salvaguardias a
través del desarrollo de nuevas técnicas y métodos.
COOPERACIÓN CON LAS SALVAGUARDIAS INTERNACIONALES
Además de la cooperación prevista en los acuerdos de salvaguardias y en el acuerdo Bilateral,

Argentina mantiene permanente cooperación en el desarrollo y ensayos de nuevas técnicas y
métodos de salvaguardias con la OIEA y la ABACC. La ARN trabaja en el campo de las
salvaguardias y la no-proliferación conjuntamente con otras organizaciones tales como el
Departamento de Energía de los Estados Unidos, laboratorios nacionales de ese país, el
órgano regulador canadiense, etc., lo que fomenta el intercambio científico, incrementa la
confianza en nuestra competencia técnica y la credibilidad en un régimen global de no-
proliferación.
Como ejemplo desde 1994, la ARN participó en el International Remote Monitoring Project
(IRMP) coordinado por el DOE para demostrar la factibilidad del uso del Sistema de Monitoreo
Remoto con fines de salvaguardias. Más tarde, en cooperación con el DOE y el US National
Laboratories, se comenzó el diseño y desarrollo de las distintas aplicaciones de este sistema a
instalaciones argentinas. Como resultado se llevaron a cabo nuevas actividades conjuntas
entre la Argentina, USA, la OIEA y el ABACC para la implementación del Sistema de Monitoreo
Remoto en la Central Nuclear de Embalse.
En muchas Centrales CANDU los elementos combustibles gastados son transferidos a un

almacenamiento en seco en silos de concreto, los que normalmente están bajo medidas de
contención y vigilancia de la OIEA. La verificación de estas transferencias consumen un gran
esfuerzo de inspección. Los combustibles son cargados en canastas en el área de la pileta y
luego transportados a los silos en el predio de la Central. La verificación de esta actividad
mediante un sistema no atendido con posibilidad de transmitir datos relevantes de
salvaguardias de modo remoto mejoraría la eficiencia de éstas.
Para el caso específico de la transmisión remota de datos relevantes de salvaguardias

directamente a la OIEA desde sistemas integrados de sensores no atendidos ubicados en
instalaciones nucleares distribuidas en el mundo puede permitir colección de datos en tiempo
casi real e interrogación remota de parámetros significativos. El sistema de monitoreo remoto
podría reducir el número y la duración de las inspecciones de salvaguardias en el campo.
REFERENCIAS:
(1) Norma Regulatoria AR.10.14.1. ARN.(1992)
(2) Informe Anual – Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear – año 1999
(3) The SSAC of Argentina – Possible Areas to Increase Co-operation with ABACC and IAEA.
(4) El Rol de los Sistemas Nacionales en la Aplicación de Salvaguardias.
323
LEY NUCLEAR
ARTÍCULO 7°.- La Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear tendrá a su cargo la función de

regulación y fiscalización de la actividad nuclear en todo lo referente a los temas de
seguridad radiológica y nuclear, protección física y fiscalización del uso de materiales
nucleares, licenciamiento y fiscalización de instalaciones nucleares y salvaguardias
internacionales, así como también asesorar al Poder Ejecutivo nacional en las materias
de su competencia.
ARTÍCULO 8°.- La Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear deberá desarrollar las funciones de

regulación y control que le atribuye esta ley con los siguientes fines:
a) Proteger a las personas contra los efectos nocivos de las radiaciones ionizantes;
b) Velar por la seguridad radiológica y nuclear en las actividades nucleares desarrolladas en la

República Argentina;
c) Asegurar que las actividades nucleares no sean desarrolladas con fines no

autorizados por esta ley, las normas que en su consecuencia se dicten, los
compromisos internacionales y las políticas de no proliferación nuclear, asumidas por la
República Argentina;
d) Prevenir la comisión de actos intencionales que puedan conducir a consecuencia

radiológicas severas o al retiro no autorizado de materiales nucleares u otros materiales o
equipos sujetos a regulación y control en virtud de lo dispuesto en la presente ley.
ARTÍCULO 1°.- En materia nuclear el Estado nacional fijará la política y ejercerá las funciones
de investigación y desarrollo, regulación y fiscalización, a través de la Comisión Nacional de
Energía Atómica y de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear.
Toda actividad nuclear de índole productiva y de investigación y desarrollo que pueda ser
organizada comercialmente, será desarrollada tanto por el Estado nacional como por el sector
privado.
En la ejecución de la política nuclear se observarán estrictamente las obligaciones

asumidas por la República Argentina en virtud del Tratado para la Proscripción de las
Armas Nucleares en América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco); el Tratado de no
Proliferación de Armas Nucleares; el Acuerdo entre la República Argentina, la República
Federativa del Brasil, la Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de
Materiales Nucleares, y el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica para la
Aplicación de Salvaguardias, así como también los compromisos asumidos en virtud de
la pertenencia al Grupo de Países Proveedores Nucleares y el Régimen Nacional de
Control de Exportaciones Sensitivas (Decreto 603/92).
NORMA AR 10.14.1
SNCC: conjunto de medidas y procedimientos aplicables a todos los materiales nucleares,

materiales, instalaciones y equipos de interés nuclear con los fines de:
a) prevenir que dichos materiales nucleares, materiales, etc. sean desviados a un uso no
autorizado; y
b) proveer las bases adecuadas para una efectiva aplicación de las salvaguardias del Sistema
Común de Contabilidad y Control” (SCCC) y de los Acuerdos de Salvaguardias con el OIEA.
324
El SNCC:
- Fiscaliza el cumplimiento de lo establecido en las licencias y autorizaciones emitidas por la

ARN,
- Verifica el cumplimiento de los compromisos internacionales sobre la no proliferación

nuclear que han sido asumidos por el país.
SN requiere al operador de instalaciones, laboratorios o depósitos:
- La implementación de un sistema de contabilidad y control,
- Presentar a la ARN la información de Diseño de su instalación y los sucesivos cambios que

se realicen a la misma, mediante un documento llamado Informe Cuestionario de Diseño
(DIQ).
Toda la información suministrada por los operadores a la ARN tiene carácter de

declaración y es a su vez, es nuestra documentación fuente para informar a las Agencias
Internacionales las actividades de las áreas de balance y sus inventarios.
ARN
- Cuenta con Inspectores que cumplen un programa de inspecciones rutinarias y especiales
- Ha establecido programas de entrenamiento permanente para el personal que realiza

inspecciones y operadores mediante la asistencia a cursos regionales e internacionales.
- Cuenta con varios laboratorios de análisis no destructivos y destructivos y uno para el

análisis de las muestras ambientales.
La Subgerencia de salvaguardias implementó dos bases de datos :
- El Sistema de Control de Material Nuclear (SCMN): centraliza todos los datos contables de
salvaguardias de todas las instalaciones, y
- El Sistema de Inspecciones de Salvaguardias (SIS): procesa todos los datos de las

inspecciones nacionales.
Actualmente, se esta implementando en cada una de las instalaciones el Sistema del operador
(SOP).
El software fue diseñado para cumplir con todos los requerimientos emergentes de los
acuerdos de salvaguardias en vigencia y las normas nacionales.
Un aspecto relevante de los SNCC se refiere a la cooperación con los organismos

internacionales de aplicación de salvaguardias, la ABACC y el OIEA.
325
La existencia de un SNCC bien estructurado y dotado de capacidad técnica y de todos los
elementos necesarios para efectuar un control efectivo, contribuye a la cooperación.
La Subgerencia de salvaguardias se vincula con otros sectores de la ARN

como el de Apoyo Científico Técnico:
- Para el desarrollo de nuevas aplicaciones, tales como los sistemas no atendidos con y sin
transmisión remota,
- Para aumentar su capacidad analítica de muestras ambientales
El objetivo del constante desarrollo de nuevas técnicas y métodos de salvaguardias es el de

aumentar la eficiencia y minimizar la intrusión en las actividades nucleares.
La existencia de los SNCC contribuye a suministrar mayores garantías sobre el cumplimiento

de los compromisos de no proliferación, facilita la aplicación de las salvaguardias
internacionales (ABACC y OIEA) y promueve la mejora de la efectividad y eficiencia de las
salvaguardias a través del desarrollo de nuevas técnicas y métodos.
COOPERACIÓN CON LAS SALVAGUARDIAS INTERNACIONALES
Desarrollo y ensayos de nuevas técnicas y métodos de salvaguardias con la OIEA y la ABACC.
La ARN trabaja en el campo de las salvaguardias y la no-proliferación conjuntamente con otras

organizaciones tales como:
- El DOE,
- Laboratorios nacionales de USA,
- El órgano regulador canadiense, etc.
Desde 1994, la ARN participó en el International Remote Monitoring Project (IRMP) coordinado
por el DOE.
Más tarde, en cooperación con el DOE y el US National Laboratories, se comenzó el diseño y

desarrollo de las distintas aplicaciones de este sistema a instalaciones argentinas.
El sistema de monitoreo remoto podría reducir el número y la duración de las inspecciones de

salvaguardias en el campo.
La Cooperación fomenta el intercambio científico, incrementa la confianza en nuestra

competencia técnica y la credibilidad en un régimen global de no-proliferación.
326
Calculation of Sensitivity to Parameters
in Single-Phase Natural Circulations
Flows Using Adifor
Ferreri, J.C. and Ambrosini, W.
Presentado en XI ENIEF – XI Congreso sobre Métodos Numéricos y Aplicaciones,

San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, 24-29 noviembre 2000.
Publicado en Mecánica Computacional, vol. XIX, p. 25-30, 2000
It will only be mentioned here that ADIFOR is a pre-processor code which, given a FORTRAN 77
code that computes a function, automatically generates another, augmented, FORTRAN 77 code. It
must be considered that any code may be put in the form of a function, simply by introducing a call to
a main routine after setting parameter values. The latter computes the function and the derivatives with
respect to a list of variables. The user must specify the list of dependent and independent variables.
After generating the augmented code that calculates the specified derivatives via ADIFOR, the user
must provide a new driving FORTRAN 77 code that takes into account the new set of variables. Some
hints to help on the very first use of ADIFOR may be readily found in [10]-[12]. Many references
document the accuracy of the derivatives calculated in this way. This is neither the only way to apply
ADIFOR, nor ADIFOR is the only tool: the reader is referred to the aforementioned literature.
We are now interested in showing the sensitivity of the neutral stability boundary to nodalization and
system parameters in natural circulation flows. The results reported here deal with the pioneering work
Welander [13], because the stability properties of this prototypical problem have been the subject of
the above-mentioned analytical and theoretical studies.
ALGORITHM
This paragraph presents an alternative procedure to the one presented by the authors in [4] for the
calculation of the margin to neutral stability (∆ρ) sensitivity to system parameters. In what follows the
analysis leading to its definition will be sketched.
A finite-difference procedure may be written as
(
F y n+1 , y n , p = 0 ) (1)
where y is the vector of nodal unknowns, p the vector of parameters, n is the time step number such
that tn+1 = tn + ∆tn
Steady-state conditions for a given set of parameters satisfy the relationship:

(
F ys , ys , p = 0 ) (2)
By assuming small perturbations around steady-state:
y n = y s + dy n y n+1 = y s + dy n +1 (3)
st
Introducing this in (1) and expanding up to the 1 order:
s s
(
Fy n+1 n
) ( ∂F
∂y
s s ∂F
∂y
)
, y , p = F y , y , p + n δy n + n+1 δy n+1 + ... = 0 (4)
then, using (2) and (4), it is

s s
∂F ∂F
δy n + n+1 δy n+1 = 0 (5)
∂y n
∂y
and, finally:
−1
 ∂F s
  ∂F s

n+1
δy = −  n +1  ⋅ n  ⋅ δy n (6)
 ∂y   ∂y 
Then, in the adopted notation:
−1
 ∂F s
  ∂F s

A = −  n+1  ⋅ n  (7)
 ∂y   ∂y 
The value of ∆ρ given by:
∆ρ = ρ(A) – 1 (8)
where ρ(A) is the spectral radius of the matrix A. As told before, ∆ρ is used as a measure of the
margin in excess to neutral stability and to quantify the degree of damping or amplification. It takes
negative values for stable conditions and positive ones for unstable conditions.
The calculation of the sensitivity of ∆ρ to parameters is based on the following approach:

• Define A and AT , respectively as the matrix relating perturbations at time steps n and n+1 and its
transpose. This matrix may be specified using ADIFOR. However, second order derivation to get
derivatives of A with respect to pi is beyond the objective of this paper. Consequently, A will be
specified analytically.
• Use of ADIFOR to automatically calculate the derivative of A with respect to system parameters
• Calculation of the eigenvalues of A, λi, and its eigenvectors, x.
• Calculation of the eigenvectors of AT , v.
• Determination of the eigenvalue corresponding to the spectral radius of A, λi, and the
corresponding eigenvectors of A and AT .
• Calculation of the sensitivity of λi with respect to system parameters.
• Calculation of the spectral radius sensitivity with respect to system parameters.
In what follows, the above-mentioned steps will be expanded, specifying some details of the different
procedures.
1 Calculation of A and its transpose

The algebraic expressions leading to A come from the standard Finite-difference method. The analysis
was performed using the volumetric flow rate and the temperature as system variables. It is focused on
the results obtained using the implicit coupling of the momentum and energy equations and the
forward time, upwind-space finite-difference method (FTUS) for the momentum equation. It may be
argued that the consequences of using this approximation on the results are well known, i.e. obtaining
a first order accurate solution in the space and time increments. What is not too evident is the
quantification of these effects (and those of the coupling) on the stability limits in systems working in
the natural circulation flow regime.
It must be emphasized that this algorithm is general. No particular assumptions are made with respect
to A, except being real, that is always the case in finite-differences models in Fluid Dynamics.
Parameters are considered to be independent of time in this analysis; however, this condition may be
released at the price of feasible, more laborious analysis. Given A, its transpose is also determined.
2 Use of ADIFOR to automatically calculate the derivatives of A

ADIFOR 2.0D has been used to generate the augmented FORTRAN code to calculate the derivatives
of A with respect to system parameters. In a general system, there are several parameters pk. In this
paper, only two scalar parameters, namely COU, the cell Courant number (≡Q.∆t/∆s)=0.8 and ξ =1.75
(≡2-θ, where θ is the exponent in the friction law), will be considered. A is a real matrix, non-
symmetrical and almost sparse. However, the momentum equation is a full row, relating node
temperatures, flow-rate and heat transfer boundary conditions.
3 Calculation of the eigenvalues of A, λ i, and its eigenvectors, x

The vector of complex eigenvalues of A has been obtained using the classical EISPACK routines in
their complex variable version. It may be argued that A is real, but to avoid problems of de-packing
complex eigenvalues, the complex version was the adopted package. Simultaneously, the complete set
of eigenvectors, x, was calculated.
4 Calculation of the eigenvectors of AT, v

In order to calculate the eigenvectors of AT , it was necessary to perform once again the complete
calculation of eigenvalues + eigenvectors, since no path in EISPACK (and LAPACK also) is available
-to authors’ knowledge- to perform the simultaneous calculation for a matrix and its transpose. It did
not pose problems in practice, because convergence of calculations was quite fast.
5 Determination of the eigenvalue corresponding to the spectral radius of A, λ i, and the

corresponding eigenvectors of A and AT
The calculation of the spectral radius of A is quite obvious: it was a simple search for the maximum
modulus of the eigenvalues vector. The interest of this search is also finding the index of the
eigenvalue, denoted by i. The corresponding eigenvector, xi, was found by simple correspondence of
index. The corresponding eigenvector of AT was found by an ad hoc routine performing the scalar
product of the eigenvectors of A and those of AT . It used the well-known property of their
eigenvectors, namely:
x i ⋅ v j = 0 if λi ≠ λ j
This procedure was needed because the eigenvalues of AT are not necessarily calculated in the same
order as those of A. In this way, computing the scalar products and letting the zero to almost machine
precision, the corresponding eigenvector of AT has been found without any trouble.
6 Calculation of the sensitivity of λ i with respect to system parameters

This sensitivity is measured by the derivative of λi with respect to system parameters. It may be
obtained from the following expression [14]:
 ∂A 
 x i , v i 
∂ λ i ∂ ℜ(λ i ) ∂ ℑ(λ i ) ∂p
= +i = ℜ ∂ k + i ⋅ ℑ∂ k = k 
∂ pk ∂ pk ∂ pk (x i , v i )
where ℜ(λi) and ℑ(λi) are the real and imaginary part of the eigenvalue corresponding to the spectral
radius, ℜ ∂k and ℑ∂ k are the real and imaginary part of the derivative of λi with respect to the k-th
parameter and (a, b) indicates the scalar product between complex vectors. This formula may be
deduced by application of the chain rule of derivation to the definition of the eigenvalue problem and a
suitable permutation coming from the definition of the left eigenvalue problem. It constitutes a faster
alternative to the direct calculation of ℜ ∂k and ℑ∂ by automatic differentiation of the program
k
calculating the eigenvalue. The latter was the approach adopted by the Authors in previous work [4].
7 Calculation of the sensitivity of the spectral radius with respect to system parameters
The sensitivity of the spectral radius of A (coincident with the sensitivity of the margin to instability)
is calculated from:
∂ ∆ρ ∂ ρ( A) ℜ(λ i ) ⋅ ℜ∂k + ℑ(λ i ) ⋅ ℑ ∂k

= =
∂ pk ∂ pk ℜ2 ( λ i ) + ℑ 2 ( λ i )
This expression comes from the definition of the spectral radius and considering that the eigenvalues
of A are generally complex.
Figure 1 shows the stability map in the plane of α and ε, the system physical parameters. They
measure, respectively the buoyancy and friction resistance in the loop. This map has been obtained
using 31 nodes (dimensionless space increment ∆s = 1/30), Courant number COU≡Q.∆t/∆s = 0.8 and
the exponent of flow rate in the friction term of momentum equation given by ξ =1.75. The selection
of these values for COU and ξ was not arbitrary: despite the low number of nodes, they ensure low
numerical diffusivity while keeping the calculations stable, on one hand, and impose turbulent flow
friction, on the other. The theoretical neutral stability boundary corresponds to Welander’s analysis
[13] and is shown as a reference.
The interest in the analysis to follow is showing how the solution depends on the cell Courant number
(COU) and ξ (≡2-b, where b is the exponent in the friction law). This has been quantified by calculating
the following derivatives: ∂∆ ρ ∂C OU and ∂∆ρ ∂ξ .
Figure 1 Map of ∆ρ for the first-order, explicit momentum, implicit

temperature coupling, COU=0.8 and ξ=1.75, ∆s = 1/30
Figure 2 Sensitivity map of ∆ρ to cell Courant number (∂∆ρ/∂COU) for the first-
order, explicit momentum and implicit temperature coupling. [COU=0.8, ξ=1.75
and ∆s=1/30]
The results obtained were coincident with the ones in [4]. One of the maps, giving the variation of
∂∆ ρ ∂C OU is shown in Figure 2. However, the present algorithm leads to a much faster code than
using ADIFOR to get the derivative of ∆ρ.
CONCLUSIONS
A new algorithm has been developed, allowing for the calculation of the sensitivity of the margin to
instability (∆ρ) to system parameters. It is based on the use of ADIFOR to evaluate the derivatives of
the matrix of perturbations (A) and a formula relating this derivative and the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of this matrix and its transpose. The results so obtained are coincident with the ones
previously reported by the authors [4], obtained with a more massive and, then, time-consuming use of
ADIFOR. The procedure is now much faster and general. It may be stated that it may be applied to
linear stability analysis based on the behavior of ∆ρ in a general case.
REFERENCES
[1] Ambrosini, W., P. Di Marco and J.C. Ferreri, Linear and non-linear analysis of density wave instability
phenomena, Int. J. Heat and Technology, 18, No. 1, 2000, pp.27-36 (preliminary version in ATTI XVI UIT
National Heat Transfer Conference, C. Bartoli (Ed.), Siena, Italy, June 18th -19th , pp. 597-610, 1998)
[2] Ambrosini, W. and J.C. Ferreri, Stability analysis of single-phase thermosyphon loops by finite-difference
numerical methods, Nuclear Eng. & Design, 2000, to appear, Selected from Proceedings of Post SMIRT 14
Seminar 18 on ‘Passive Safety Features in Nuclear Installations’, Pisa, August 25-27th 1997, pp. E2.1-E2.10.
[3] Ferreri, J.C. and W. Ambrosini, Verification of RELAP5/MOD3 with theoretical and numerical stability
results on single-phase, natural circulation in a simple loop, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Report, NUREG IA/151, 1999.
[4] Ferreri, J.C. and W. Ambrosini, Parameter sensitivity in single-phase natural circulation via automatic
differentiation of FORTRAN codes, Proceedings Eurotherm Seminar No. 63, Genoa, Italy, 6 -8 September, M.
Misale and F. Mayinger (Eds.), 1999, pp. 397-405.
[5] Ferreri, J.C., Single-phase natural circulation in simple circuits -reflections on its numerical simulation -,
Invited lecture, Proceedings. Eurotherm Seminar No. 63, Genoa, Italy, 6-8 Sept., M. Misale and F. Mayinger
(Eds.), 1999, pp. 17-30.
[6] Ambrosini, W. and J.C. Ferreri, The effect of Truncation Error on Numerical Predictions of Stability in a
Natural Circulation Single-Phase Loop, Nuclear Eng. & Design, 183, 1998, pp. 53-7
[7] Ambrosini, W. and J.C. Ferreri, Numerical analysis of single-phase, natural circulation in a simple closed
loop, Proceedings of 11th Meeting on Reactor Physics and Thermal Hydraulics, Poços de Caldas, M.G., Brazil,
August 18-22th., 1997, pp. 676-681
[8] Ferreri, J.C., W. Ambrosini and F. D’Auria, On the Convergence of RELAP5 Calculations in a Single-Phase,
Natural Circulation Test Problem, Proceedings of X-ENFIR, Aguas de Lindoia, S.P., Brazil, 7-11th August,
1995, pp. 303-307.
[9] Bischoff, C., A. Carle, P. Khademi and A. Mauer, The ADIFOR 2.0 System for the automatic differentiation
of FORTRAN 77 programs, ANL/MCS-P481-1194, 1994.
[10] A.N.L., Computational Differentiation Technical Reports, Argonne National Laboratory,
http://www.mcs.anl.gov/autodiff/tech_reports.html, 1999.
[11] Goenka, P., Example derived from a code used at General Motors Research in friction and lubrication
analysis of automotive engines,
http://www-unix.mcs.anl.gov/autodiff/ADIFOR/adifor_demo, 1999.
[12] Rightley, M.L.J., R.J. Henninger and K.N. Hanson, Adjoint Differentiation of Hydrodynamic Codes, Los
Alamos Nat. Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA,
http://cnls-www.lanl.gov/Highlights/1998-04/html/April_98.html, 1998.
[13] Welander, P., On the Oscillatory Instability of a Differentially Heated Fluid Loop, J. Fluid Mech.,
vol. 29, pp. 17-30, 1967.
[14] Tomovic, R. and M. Vukobratovic, General Sensitivity Theory, Elsevier N.Y., 1972.
Regulatory Control of Maintenance
Activities in Argentine Nuclear
Power Plants
Calvo, J.C. and Caruso, G.J.
Publicado en Advances in Safety Related Maintenance,

IAEA-TECDOC-1138, p- 33-37, OIEA, Viena, Austria, march 2000
REGULATORY CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINE
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Calvo, J.C. and Caruso, G.J.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
The main maintenance objective is to assure that the safety features of structures, components
and systems of nuclear power plants are kept as designed. Therefore, there is a direct
relationship between safety and maintenance.
Owing to the above mentioned, maintenance activities are considered a relevant regulatory
issue for the Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN).
This paper describes the regulatory control to maintenance activities of Argentine nuclear power
plants. It also addresses essential elements for maintenance control, routine inspections,
special inspections during planned outages, audits and license conditions and requirements.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Law N° 24,804 "Nuclear Activity National Law" defines the regulatory activity's scope and
gives to Nuclear Regulatory Authority the responsibility for the nuclear activities control and
regulation referring to radiological and nuclear safety issues. Maintenance activities are
considered important to plant safety so it is one of the relevant regulatory issues.
The Regulatory Standard AR 3.7.1 - "Documentation to be submitted to the Regulatory Authority

prior to the commercial operation of a nuclear power plant", requires the presentation of the
installation Maintenance Program within one month prior to the request of an operating license
for full-power operation.
The operating license of the argentine NPP's is granted by Regulatory Authority and, it
establishes that degradation of components, equipment and systems shall be prevented by
means of adequate preventive and predictive maintenance. Besides, such license requires the
implementation of both in-service inspection and surveillance programs.
2. NPP'S REGULATORY CONTROL
The regulatory control in each NPP is performed by two on-site inspectors in charge of
inspection regarding radiological and nuclear safety to ensure that plants are operated in
accordance to regulatory requirements and license conditions. In case of inspection activities
requires specialized expertise, it is foreseen that other specialists of the Regulatory Authority
supporting and supplementing on-site inspectors activities.
The regulatory activities related with NPP's maintenance are mainly focused on the safety-
related systems, and includes: selecting the safety related maintenance activities, assessing the
applicable procedures and work instructions and, witnessing such activities by regulatory
inspectors.
The above mentioned regulatory activities are divided into regulatory inspections, audits and
evaluations. Regulatory inspections are subdivided into routine inspections and special
inspections (non-routine inspections).
337
2.1. Maintenance routine inspections
Routine inspections are performed during plant normal operation by on-site inspectors,
emphasizing control on safety-related systems. The main routine inspections activities are the
following:
• Procedures control review.
• Controlling that all maintenance activities are carried out in such a manner that the
radiation exposure of site personnel is kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
• Witnessing during maintenance works and post maintenance testing.
• Verifying compliance of preventive and predictive maintenance program. Checking that

frequencies of maintenance - with the procedures applied - are performed in accordance
with such program.
• Periodic tests follow-up: The plant periodic tests are performed in accordance with the
surveillance program. Such periodic tests are carried out on safety systems to check that
components availability is maintained all the time. The Regulatory Authority has
implemented an updated data base of periodic tests that includes the component
performance during such tests.
• Regulatory requirements follow-up.
• During plant construction works progress follow-up: stored components condition,

mechanical assembly, electrical assemblies and civil works.
2.2. Maintenance special inspections
Special inspections are performed by both on-site inspectors and specialists of Regulatory
Authority. Such inspections are basically performed during planned outages and in case of
abnormal events occurrence. The main special inspections activities are the following:
- Planned outages:
During planned outages the inspection activities are similar those routine inspections.
Additional regulatory control in this case of both fulfillment in service inspection program
and design modification are included.
- Abnormal events:
In case of abnormal event occurrence an inspection team is organized to review: corrective

actions, root cause analysis and lessons learned.
2.3. Audits
Audits are prepared on a "check-list" based on: applicable documentation analysis and
assessment, audit team members expertise and both specialists and on-site inspectors
recommendations.
Upon the audit completion, the audit team issued an audit report that includes: findings,
strengths, weaknesses, observations and recommendations of the audited activities. Then, as
required, follow up audits to verify the finding related corrective actions taken by the utility will be
performed.
338
2.4. Evaluations
Evaluations consists in the analysis and assessments of data resulting from routine and special
inspections, audits, operational experience and abnormal event occurrences. Such evaluations
involve the use of deterministic and probabilistic methods, computer codes, termohydraulic
analysis, reactor kinetics, and reliability calculations, etc. The main evaluation activities related
with maintenance are the following:
• Abnormal event assessment occurred at both argentine and foreign NPP's.
• Operating experience assessments.
• Radiological safety assessment to detect weaknesses in practices and to propose

measures to reduce personnel doses (ALARA).
• Periodic test: procedures assessments and review of acceptation criteria
• Assessment of preventive, predictive and corrective maintenance activities.
This activity includes the evaluation of the scope maintenance works and criteria applied.
Results trend to evaluate component performance and aging effects are analyzed.
• Definition and implementation of performance indicators.
• Design modifications and backfitting assessment.
• Assembly procedures assessment.
• Commissioning procedures assessment.
• Regulatory requirements.
3. MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY UTILITIES
The NPP's maintenance program is fundamentally based on manufacturer recommendations,

operating experience, safety analysis and engineering judgment. The licensee’s preventive and
predictive maintenance programme is defined establishing the scope, methods to be
implemented, the planning activities and the applicable controls in accordance with the following
considerations:
- Maintaining and improving reliability and availability of components, equipment and

systems
- Reducing failures to minimize outages.
- Reducing maintenance costs.
- Reducing doses by applying adequate techniques and procedures.
- Collecting historical maintenance data from all plant components to evaluate component
performance.
- Assessing operational parameters of equipment, components and systems for early

detection failures.
339
4. REVIEW OF MAINTENANCE REGULATORY POLICY
Considering the recognized dependency between maintenance and plant safety, that argentine
regulatory philosophy is based on performance-based regulation (non-prescriptive regulation)
and regulatory applications of PSA methodology, the Regulatory Authority decided to face a
reviewing process of the maintenance regulatory policy.
The overall objective of such reviewing process is to improve the maintenance activities
regulatory control. The effort will be focused on monitoring the results of the maintenance
activities, assessing the evaluation equipment performance carried out by utility and verifying
the safety assessment before programming the maintenance activities schedule.
The above mentioned reviewing process is in progress. However, at present it is possible to

comment that the following issues have been highlighted:
• Need to issue a specific maintenance regulatory standard based on monitoring results of

maintenance activities.
• Maintenance related indicators: Presently the Regulatory Authority is working in a

regulatory project aimed at defining the performance indicators that include preventive,
predictive and corrective maintenance and will be used to assess the maintenance
programs effectiveness. Some of the issues below are being discussed:
- Number of deficiency reports.
- Number of pending deficiency reports.
- In service inspection programe compliance.
- Maintenance re-working
- Spare parts availability applied to safety systems.
• Encourage the use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) applications and Reliability
Centered Maintenance (RCM) by the licensees. Such tools are useful for maintenance
optimization.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The maintenance activities are regulated through regulatory standards, license conditions and
limiting condition for operation. To verify the above mentioned compliance, both on-site
inspectors and specialists personnel inspect, audit and evaluate the NPP's maintenance
activities.
The maintenance regulatory policies review in progress, will produce:
• Strengthen the licensee’s maintenance self-monitoring system related with its

effectiveness.
• Use of performance safety indicators to assess the maintenance programs effectiveness.
• Encourage utilities to use maintenance optimization tools as probabilistic safety

assessment and reliability centered maintenance.
340
Control of the Safety of Radiation
Sources and The Security of
Radioactive Materials
Oliveira, A.A.
International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the Safety of Radiation
Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 11-15 diciembre 2000
CONTROL OF THE SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES AND THE
SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Oliveira, A.A.

Argentina
REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE
Since its creation in 1950, the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) was established
as the competent authority in the control of nuclear applications in relation to the protection
against the hazardous effects of ionizing radiation and the safety of installations. In 1958, the
Executive issued Decree 842 approving the Regulation for Using Radioisotopes and Ionising
Radiations, to control use and application of radioactive materials and radiation emitted by them
or from nuclear reactions. A part of the CNEA, the Regulatory Branch, was then formed and
very rapidly established itself as the national authority in the areas of radiation and nuclear
safety, safeguards and non-proliferation assurances, and physical protection.
When the separation of regulatory functions from actual R&D and technological development
became an issue, Decree 1540 (1994) created the Nuclear Regulatory Board (ENREN), an
independent governmental body performing all the regulatory control activities formerly under
the competence of CNEA Regulatory Branch. In 1997, Act 24804, passed by Congress, created
the ARN (Nuclear Regulatory Authority) an independent agency reporting to the Executive, as
the successor of ENREN. In the present paper, only the control of radioactive sources will be
presented.
The ARN is empowered to establish standards and enforce their application to the possession
and use of radiation sources. The regulatory goals are:
Ensure that the radioactive materials are imported, exported, produced, transferred,
stored, used, or disposed of, only by registrants or licensed persons in authorised or
licensed installations, as required by Argentine regulations.
Ensure that registrants or licensees do everything reasonable and compatible with their
possibilities regarding safety and security of radiation sources.
Ensure that the radioactive materials are handed over to another user, or are disposed of
as radioactive waste, only when transfer or disposal was specifically authorised by the
Regulatory Authority.
Keep an updated database of all the sealed radioactive sources in use in the country.
Prevent the illicit traffic of radiation sources.
Ensure safety and security of disused radioactive sealed sources, doing whatever
necessary to maintain the required control.
Ensure that technical characteristics of imported or locally produced radioactive sources

comply with Argentine safety requirements.
343
THE LICENSING SYSTEM
Act 24.804 establishes that any person or organisation using radioactive sources in medicine,
industry, research, and teaching shall have an authorisation or license issued by the Regulatory
Authority. It also sets that the Authority’s licensing system shall grant licenses and
authorisations only to applicants (the Responsible Organization) that fulfil the safety and
security requirements established in the regulations.
The Argentine licensing system sets up that potentially high risk’s installations (industrial
irradiators, therapy units, gammagraphy), shall be constructed, commissioned, operated or
decommissioned only after the pertinent stage license or authorisation have been granted by
the Regulatory Authority. Licensees must comply with the conditions, standards, and
requirements established by ARN. Non-compliance, according to the sanctions regime in force,
may be enough for the Authority to suspend or cancel the license. Workers should be qualified
and adequately trained for the job. Safety related tasks require a specific license.
Other lower risks installations (oil well-logging, gauges, etc.) must be operated only after the
Authority has granted the corresponding authorisation.
The applicant (the Responsible Organisation) should appoint an individual as Responsible for
the safety and security of the sources. Such person must have a Permit for the practice. The
organisation must supervise the Responsible performance and provide the support needed to
perform his or her duties.
Inspections and enforcement actions performed by the Authority are intended to verify
compliance of regulations and requirements by the Responsible Organisation, implementing the
pertinent actions to avoid situations that could lead to radiological accidents. Deterrence by the
possibility of sanctions imposed to persons or organisations for non-compliance with regulations
helps to prevent accidents. The inspections are performed periodically consistent with the
practice’s risk, i.e. industrial gammagraphy services and radiotherapy centres are inspected,
basically at random, once a year, while well logging services and nuclear medicine centres
every two years.
Inspections look at safety issues such as: users individual permits, radioactive contamination,
shielding integrity of portable gauges or level gauges, pig-tail connector in gammagraphy
projectors, safety interlocks, approved signs display and radiation monitors, occupational doses
records and abnormal events log books. Inspectors also pay attention at security aspects like:
sealed sources inventory, well logging or gammagraphy sources log books and security
measures to prevent burglary of radioactive sources storage sites.
BASIC RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Licensees and registrants must comply with the following basic safety requirements of the
Regulatory Authority, in order to reduce the risks of a radiological accident:
• No radiation source can be owned or used unless its owner has been granted a license
or authorisation by the Authority for an specific purpose,
• Radiation sources are used by persons with the appropriate knowledge and training in
radiological protection or under their supervision,
• Licensees and registrants maintain the sealed sources’ inventory in their premises, and
check the effectiveness of measures to prevent intrusion of storage bunkers.
344
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMME
Enforcement actions are based on requirements to the licensees, and can be classified into four
broad categories:
1. Licensee or registrant has the obligation to correct minor deviations from regulations.
Such request is usually carried out during inspection.
2. Licensee or registrant is requested to correct safety problems, or to stop incurring into

minor safety violations. Requirements are issued immediately after a safety review, and
the Responsible Organisation shall promptly carry out the corrections.
3. Licensee or registrant authorization is withdrawn temporarily to avoid health risks to

workers or members of the public. Inspectors can enforce such requirement, although
cautiously in medical practices, where possible detriment to patients’ health shall be
taken into account.
4. Licensee or registrant has the obligation to dispose of or store any disused radioactive
source, at the Atomic Energy Commission disposal site.
If inspectors find that a radioactive source might be a risk to people’s health, the Regulatory
Authority preventively impounds and stores it safely. In case of a deliberate obstruction to such
actions, Authority’s officials can ask a Federal judge to grant access to the registrant’s premises
and its sources.
KEY ACTIONS FOR AN APPROPRIATE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
• The Regulatory Authority keeps an active communication with the Border Military Police
and the Coastguards, responsible for the country borders control, to prevent illicit
trafficking of radioactive sources.
• The ARN promotes the installation of radiation monitors at ports of entry (by sea or by
road) to prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive sources, to detect orphan sources within
imported scrap, and to impede importation of radioactivity contaminated materials.
• The Authority encourages the installation of portal monitors at steel mills, to detect
orphan sources within the scrap used in steel making.
• ARN keeps an active interaction with the Federal Police, which is responsible for the
localisation of stolen radioactive sources.
• The Nuclear Regulatory Authority has an agreement with Customs to ensure that:
¾ An authorisation, granted by the Authority, is necessary to import or export

radioactive materials.
¾ Importers of industrial plants, gauges, or laboratory equipment that may include

sealed radioactive sources, have to declare if the goods to be imported contain
such sources. If so, the importer shall present the corresponding authorisation
from the ARN.
¾ The agreement also insures that Customs report about any radioactive material left
in customs storage premises for more than 30 days, allowing the Authority to store
or to dispose of it at the CNEA disposal site.
345
• Authority personnel verify that the design of both imported and locally produced
radioactive sources is properly certified according to ISO or similar standards. They also
make sure that the corresponding competent authority has licensed the manufacturer,
and each source has been calibrated and leak tested.
• An authorisation, from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, is necessary before any transfer
of sealed radioactive sources among importers, producers, users, exporters, and for
disposal of at CNEA disposal site.
• In case of bankruptcy or lack of corporate memory of disused radioactive sources, the

Authority compels the Responsible Organisation to promptly deposit the sources in a safe
site. Regulatory Authority personnel pay particular attention to such situations, as they
are prone to increase dramatically the probability of the sources ending up in the public
domain.
• In case of bankruptcy, the Authority goes to court to prevent auctioning of the radioactive
sources. Meantime, the bankruptcy liquidator is advised on measures to secure the
sources until the court authorises the Authority to impound them.
• The regulatory staff verifies that requirements imposed to the Responsible Organisation
are complied in due time. Procedures established by the Authority prompt to carry out
corrective actions immediately to avoid situations of chronic non-compliance. Such
actions increase credibility on the enforcement policy.
• Audits looking for early warning deviations from safety conditions are performed regularly
at installations authorised for practices such as gammagraphy, cobalt therapy, etc.
Checks during the audits may include safety interlocks in radiotherapy bunkers;
radioactive sources inventory, gammagraphy equipment care, etc.
LICENSED ORGANISATIONS USING SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
Type of installation Number
Radioisotope fractionating and Radioactive Sealed Sources production 5
Industrial irradiators 4
Therapy units 74
Manual, HDR and LDR brachytherapy 116
Gammagraphy, mobile and fixed 62
Gauges and chromatography. 341
Research and teaching 194
Importers 11
Total number 807
346
INVENTORY OF SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
The amount of radioactive sealed sources in use in medicine, industry, research, and teaching,
classified according to the potential damage that they can cause, is given in the table.
Category Number
1 765
2 1104
3 1412
Total number of sources 3281
Category 1: Sources used in gammagraphy, cobalt therapy units, and irradiators. The total
amount considers separately each radioactive sources of the array in the irradiator.
Category 2: Brachytherapy sources; high activity sources (higher than 37 GBq) used in
industrial gauges and well logging.
Category 3: Low activity sources used in industrial gauges and chromatography.
MANAGEMENT OF DISUSED SOURCES
Act 25.018, set in force on August 1998, establishes that CNEA is responsible for the
management of the radioactive wastes, understanding as radioactive waste “any radioactive
material for which no later uses are foreseen”. The Act also establishes that the producer is
responsible for the conditioning and safe storage of wastes, in accordance with the Argentine
radiological safety criteria, until handed out to the Atomic Energy Commission which operates a
disposal site.
The ARN enforces registrants or licensees either to dispose of or to deposit in a safe location
any disused radioactive source, to reduce the probability of sources being found in the public
domain. Found orphan sources are impounded for their safe management.
The Atomic Energy Commission may reuse some disused sources, such as those from therapy
units or gamma irradiators, for R&D work, as long as new uses are justified according to the
Argentine safety regulatory criteria.
ABNORMAL EVENTS AND EMERGENCIES
The Argentine regulations establish that persons or organisations using radiation sources
should implement emergency plans or procedures. The Authority determines emergency criteria
and evaluates procedures for scenarios like: theft or loss of a source, breach of shielding
integrity, in-site fire or explosion events, etc. The Authority also verifies that all parties involved
with the safety and security of these sources, are ready to assume their responsibilities in
abnormal events or accidents.
For installations using Category 1 radiation sources, the applicant ought to implement an
emergency plan before commissioning, while at installations that use other categories of
347
radiation sources the emergency procedures shall considered typical accidents and be
designed to lessen their consequences.
The Radiological Emergency Intervention System (SIER) within the Regulatory Authority
organization is prepared to give assistance to cope with an emergency with radioactive sources.
The intervention group, on duty night and day all year round, have the necessary equipment
and infrastructure for a prompt and efficient intervention in installations or in public areas.
In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority has established co-operation agreements with the
Federal Police, the Border Military Police and Coastguards, and other organisations for co-
ordinated actions during a radiological emergency.
Orphan sources
The Authority has taken several actions to prevent orphan sources ending up in the public's
domain. Some are of institutional character such as the agreement with Customs, which
established mechanisms to avoid non-authorised import of radioactive sources. Other actions
are based on the licensing, inspection and control programme, that ensures radioactive sources
are permanently under control while in use, and are properly stored when disused or disposed
of when they are declared as radioactive waste.
As previously mentioned, the Regulatory Authority promotes the use of automatic radioactive
material detection systems at places where orphan sources are likely to be found, such as steel
mills and the border entries. It also provides training and technical support to those who are
involved with the detection of orphan sources, and co-ordinates with the Atomic Energy
Commission the management of radioactive sources.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority requires an individual undergo the appropriate training for the
practice (both theoretical and practical formation in safety and security aspects), before applying
for a permit. Training is based on specific courses given by different organisations recognized
by the Regulatory Authority.
The ARN maintains the continuous formation of specialists in radiological and nuclear safety,
safeguards, and physical protection through training courses, the participation in congresses
and experts meetings.
The Regulatory Authority carries out those activities through a Training Division responsible for
the definition, organisation, and co-ordination of courses, workshops, and seminars. The Post-
Graduate Course in Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety is a joint effort with the
University of Buenos Aires and the Ministry of Health. The International Atomic Energy Agency
endorses these courses and supports them by granting scholarships to Spanish-speaking
University graduates from countries mainly of the region, some from Europe and Asia. In the
last 20 years more than 540 participants, half of them foreigners, attended the Post-Graduate
Course.
348
Determination of Iodine-129 in Samples of
Conifers Collected in Argentina
Quintana, E.E. and Thyssen, S.M.
th
Linear and Nonlinear Analysis of
Density Wave Instability Phenomena
Ambrosini, W.; Di Marco, P. And Ferreri, J.C.
Publicado en International Journal of Heat and Technology, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 27-36, 2000
recalled that also some experimental data by Saha, Ishii and proposes a more complex mechanism in which both flow and
Zuber [9] show a longer period of oscillation compared to density perturbations play a key role.
twice the transit time. Finally, it was concluded that, in the
Kakaç and Liu [7] describe density-wave instabilities with
considered region of the parameter space, the phenomenon
reference to an horizontal evaporator duct followed by an
seems to be more likely governed by mixture volumetric flux
exit restriction. Inlet and outlet plenum pressures are kept
rather than by mixture density oscillations.
constant and the vapour generation is assumed constant as
It is interesting to note that descriptions proposing
well. A sudden outlet pressure drop perturbation, e.g.
density-wave oscillations as a phenomenon mainly governed
resulting from a local microscopic increase in void fraction,
by flow perturbations also appeared in literature (see e.g.
is assumed to trigger instability by propagating at the speed
[10]). In addition, previous studies [11] identified various
of sound a corresponding low pressure pulse to the channel
types of both Ledinegg and density-wave instabilities, the
inlet.
latter characterised by different characteristic oscillation
As pressure in the inlet plenum is assumed to be
periods. This clearly suggests a more complex picture of
constant, this causes an increase in inlet flow. An enthalpy
these phenomena than in simplified explanations of the basic
wave is therefore generated which propagates towards the
mechanism.
boiling boundary, where it is transformed into a denser fluid
The above summarised criticisms by Rizwan-uddin
wave reaching the exit restriction after some additional time.
are the starting point for the present paper, having the
The total time needed to the inlet flow perturbation to affect
objective to provide additional information for discussing the
the outlet section is the particle transit time through the
mechanisms at the basis of density wave oscillations. Both
channel.
the linear stability conditions and the transient distribution of
In turn, the denser fluid reaching the outlet section
relevant thermal-hydraulic variables during oscillations are
produces a pressure drop perturbation of opposite sign with
here considered, in the aim to discuss the pictures previously
respect to the one which started the process. Therefore, it is
proposed for describing the density-wave oscillation
expected to experience an inlet flow decrease and the
mechanism.
propagation of a lighter fluid wave toward the exit section,
In particular, use is made of linear and nonlinear
thus closing the cycle. As the overall process requires the
predictive tools developed in previous activities [12-15] and
propagation of a positive and a negative wave to be
of a discretised model recently set up on the basis of a semi-
completed, the period for density-wave oscillations should be
implicit numerical method. The latter model has been
in the range of twice the transit time. Since in less idealised
developed as an application to boiling channel stability of a
systems distributed friction occurs, this relation is only
methodology of analysis adopted in previous works for
approximate.
assessing the effect of numerical methods on stability
predictions in single-phase thermosyphon loops [16-17]. On the other hand, Podowski [10] starts considering
As in the paper which stimulated the present analysis the different speeds of propagation of velocity perturbations
[8], the homogeneous equilibrium balance equations are used in the single-phase and the two-phase regions. It is observed
for providing the basic mathematical description of boiling that in the liquid region these perturbations travel at the speed
channel dynamics. This is a clear limitation in the present of sound, covering the non-boiling length in a very short
work as well as in the work by Rizwan-uddin, which must be time; when appearing at the boiling boundary they give rise
duly considered to avoid extending the validity of the to increases or decreases in the local void fraction which
obtained results beyond the reasonable limits of a discussion propagate at the kinematic velocity which characterises
around the very basic mechanism of density-wave density-waves, closer to the vapour velocity than to the speed
instabilities. However, though it is obviously understood that of sound. The changes in both flow and void fraction result in
such a simplified description will miss some details of the pressure drop perturbations, with a different effect of velocity
actual system dynamics, it is nevertheless believed that the variations from the hydrodynamic and the thermal points of
homogeneous equilibrium model can provide useful view; in fact, decreasing the flow would tend to decrease also
information for understanding the gross behaviour of a the pressure drop, but this effect is counteracted by the
boiling channel under unstable conditions, without the corresponding increase in void fraction due to greater
complications coming from the use of more sophisticated vaporisation.
models. Since the density-waves propagate slowly in the two-
To partly compensate for this limitation, the results of phase region, the overall constraint of a constant pressure
calculations previously performed with a two-fluid system drop across the channel may lead to conditions in which the
code [18] are also taken into consideration for supporting the single-phase region and the two-phase region pressure drop
obtained findings. oscillate in counterphase and the oscillations are self-
sustained.
2. DESCRIPTIONS OF DENSITY-WAVE
It is clear that Rizwan-uddin’s criticisms mainly apply
INSTABILITIES
to descriptions of the first kind, while they are in not in
Let us now start the discussion, presenting two representative
disagreement with the second one. Summarising, the main
descriptions of density-wave phenomena appeared in
concerns raised in his paper [8] are the following:
previous literature. The first one, by Kakaç and Liu [7],
presents a classical point of view, in which the phenomenon • the exit pressure drop does not always increase or
is governed by lighter and heavier fluid pockets propagating decrease simultaneously with exit density;
along the channel. The second one, by Podowski [10], • the period of density wave oscillations may be
considerably longer than twice the fluid transit time;
• as a whole, the phenomenon is more likely governed by where an arbitrary reference pressure is assumed to evaluate
flow oscillations than by density waves. the fluid properties which are considered independent from
the local value of pressure. From this assumption it follows
In the following, it will be tried to provide material for 1 1
ρ* = = if h* ≥ 0
( )
discussing the applicability of these criticisms.
ρ f v f + x th v fg 1+ h *
3. DISCRETISED BOILING CHANNEL MODEL ρ =1

*
if h* < 0 (3)
The reference physical model consists of a boiling channel
which are the dimensionless state relationships for our
coupled with constant pressure boundary conditions at the
problem. In the calculations an appropriate smoothing is
inlet and the outlet sections (the so-called “parallel channel”
adopted for density when h * approaches 0, in order to avoid
conditions), with both singular and distributed pressure drops
numerical problems arising from the discontinuity in
and an arbitrary distribution of heat flux from the heating
derivatives. The velocity scale appearing in equations (2),
wall. The singular pressure drops are assumed to be
w0 , is here defined to be the inlet velocity. As a consequence
concentrated at the inlet and at the outlet of the channel.
Neither heater dynamics nor neutron feedback are here of these assumptions, in steady-state conditions it is jin* = 1
considered for the sake of simplicity and in order to focus the and it is also G * = ρin* everywhere in the channel.
attention on purely thermal-hydraulic phenomena. The resulting dimensionless equations are:
The homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) is ∂ ρ* ∂ G*
adopted for describing the boiling channel flow behaviour. + =0
∂ t * ∂ z*
The related mixture balance equations are:
∂ G* ∂  G *  ∂ p*
2
∂ρ ∂ρ j
+ =0 + +
∂t ∂z ∂ t * ∂ z*  ρ *  ∂ z *
∂ ρ j ∂ ρ j2 ∂ p ρ*
− [Λ + K inδ * ( z * ) + K exδ * ( z * − 1)] *
2
+ + G* (4)
∂t ∂z ∂z =−
Fr ρ
 f  ρ j2 ∂ ρ * h* ∂ G * h*
= − ρg −  + 2 Kinδ d ( z ) + 2 K exδ d ( z − L) (1)
+ = N pch f q* ( z * )
 Dh  2 ∂ t* ∂ z*
∂ ρh ∂ ρh j Π where δ * and f q* are respectively a dimensionless Dirac's
+ = q0′′ h f q ( z )
∂t ∂z A delta function and the heat flux distribution function, both
where δ d is a dimensional Dirac's delta function [m-1]. These depending on z * . In the case of forward flow at both the inlet
equations were chosen to be essentially the same as those and the outlet sections, constant values of dimensionless
adopted in previous works [12-15], in order to keep pressure in the two plena and hin* = − N sub are assumed as
consistency with the results there obtained. The only boundary conditions for transient analysis.
difference is the introduction of the heat flux distribution Solution of the above equations is obtained by a semi-
function, f q , which has been used in subsequent work to implicit numerical technique [19]. The boiling channel is
perform sensitivity analyses on the effect of non-uniform subdivided into N n equally spaced nodes (see Figure 1) in
channel heating. However, in this work a uniform channel which dimensionless pressure, density and enthalpy are
heating is always assumed, i.e. f q = 1 . defined. At the junctions separating adjoining volumes
It must be emphasised that the adopted form of the dimensionless mass fluxes are defined, resulting in a classical
thermal energy balance is a very convenient approximation of staggered mesh scheme.
the exact equation, obtained by neglecting the energy Mass and energy balance equations are discretised in
dissipation due to friction and the contribution to the enthalpy conservative form, giving:
n +1 n +1
change due to fluid expansion along the channel. The former n +1 G * i − G * i +1 *
ρ *i = ρ *i +
n
∆t (i = 1,..., N n ) (5)
approximation is rather obvious for most of the systems of ∆z *
practical interest; on the contrary, the latter one, though fully
justified in the operating conditions characterising boiling Upper
water reactors, may be relatively inaccurate in very extreme Plenum
conditions, not considered in the present work, characterised Junct. N n + 1
by both low pressure and low channel power. Node N n
Junct. N n
The above equations are then made dimensionless to
increase generality of the calculated results. In this aim, the
following definitions are adopted: Node 3
ρ h − h f v fg j t w0 Junct . 3
ρ* = h* = j* = t* = Node 2
ρf h fg v f w0 L
Junct. 2
z p w02 Node 1
z* = p* = G* = ρ* j* Fr = (2) Junct . 1
L ρ f w02 gL Lower
f L q 0′′ Π h L v fg h f − hin v fg Plenum
Λ= N pch = N sub =
2 Dh ρ f w0 h fg A v f h fg vf
Figure 1 – Boiling channel discretisation
(ρ h ) ( ) [ n ∆t
] analysis, which is initiated by an impulse perturbation in
*
* * n +1
= ρi* hi* + Gi* hi* − Gi*+1 hi*+1
n n +1 n n +1
i i
∆z * outlet plenum pressure.
+ N pch f q ( z i )∆t
* * *
(6) In order to get a more clear picture of stability
conditions in the parameter space, the above described
where f q* ( zi* ) is an appropriate average over the i-th node of discretised equations are also linearised by perturbation,
the heat flux distribution factor and the quantities h * n and i
according to a methodology successfully adopted in previous
works for analysing single-phase thermosyphon loop stability
hi*+1 are the “donored” enthalpies to be evaluated according
n
[16-17]. The discretised equations and the related boundary
to the sign of the dimensionless mass flux at each junction, in conditions are firstly written in the form of a system of
compliance with the rules of upwind differencing. 3N n + 1 nonlinear relationships
F ( y n , y n +1, ∆z* , ∆t * , N pch , N sub ,l) = 0
The evaluation of Gi* n+1 and Gi*+1n+1 , whose values are (11)
required in the above equations, is performed using the
involving the values of the components of the vector of
momentum equation, discretised in space and time in the
independent variables
{ }
form:
y T = p * , p * ,..., p * , h * , h * ,..., h * , G * , G * ,..., G * (12)
[ ]
n +1
 G * n 2 G *n 2  ∆t * 1 n ∆t
* 1 2 Nn 1 2 Nn 1 2 N n +1
Gi* = Gi* +  i −*1 n − i *n  * − ρi*−1 + ρi*

n n
 ρi −1 ρi  ∆z 2 Fr at two subsequent time-steps ( t = t n and t = t n +1 ). Then,


n n +1
small oscillations around the steady-state conditions are
[ ]
2 Gi* Gi* assumed, by writing
− Λ + K inδˆ ( z ) + K exδˆ ( z − 1)
* * * *
∆t *
y n = y s + (δ y ) y n +1 = y s + (δ y )
n n +1
i i (13)
ρ * n
i −1 +ρ *n
i
( )
Finally, by introducing these definitions in the discretised
∆t *
* n +1 * n +1
(i = 1,..., N n + 1)
+ p − pi i −1
(7) equations (11) and considering that in steady-state it must be
F ( y s , y s , ∆z* , ∆t * , N pch , N sub ,l) = 0
∆z * (14)
where δ is a Dirac's delta function operating over a
second order terms are neglected and the linear relationship
discretised domain and Gi*−1n and Gi*n are node average mass
between old and new time-step perturbations around the
fluxes. This equation is firstly put in the form: steady-state conditions is found to have the form
Gi*
n +1
(
= C pn,i pi*−1
n +1
− pi*
n +1
)+O i
n
(i = 1,..., N n + 1) (8) ( y n+ 1
)
(δ y )n +1 = − J s −1 ⋅ J s ⋅ (δ y )n = A ⋅ (δ y )n
yn
(15)
in which C p and O are appropriate constants and the values where J s and J s are the Jacobian matrices of the
yn y n+ 1
of dimensionless pressure at the inlet and the outlet are used
nonlinear discretised equations with respect to y n and y n+ 1
for i=1 and i=Nn+1. Then, mass and energy balance
equations are discretised in nonconservative form and evaluated at steady-state conditions:
s s
combined in order to give a relationship between junction ∂F ∂F (16)
J ys n = J ys n +1 =
mass fluxes: ∂y n ∂y n+ 1
n +1 n +1
Γin+1,i Gi*+1 = Γin,i Gi* + Θ in (i = 1,..., N n ) (9) Therefore, calculation of the spectral radius ρ( A) of
Combining the last two equations results in a tridiagonal matrix A allows discussing stability; in particular, ρ( A)
algebraic system in nodal pressures greater than unity defines unstable conditions. Furthermore,
− Γin, i C pn,i p i*−1
n +1
[ ]
+ Γin,i C pn ,i + Γin+1,i C pn, i +1 p i*
n +1
− Γin+1,i C pn, i +1 p i*+1
n +1
putting:
= Θ in + Γin,i Oin − Γin+1,i Oin+1 (10) ρ( A) = λmax (17)
which is solved by a standard algorithm [20] giving the nodal where for the eigenvalue having maximum modulus, λmax ,
dimensionless pressures. Equation (8) is then used to update the following expansion is adopted
λ max = exp{(z R + i z I ) ∆t * } = e zR ∆t [cos(z I ∆t * ) + isin(z I ∆t * )] (18)
*
junction mass fluxes, involved in the above described
conservative forms of mass and energy balance equations, to it follows that
evaluate ρi* n+1 and hi* n+1 . A common problem at this stage is ln( ρ ( A)) 1  Re(λmax )  (19)
zR = and z I = * arccos  
 ρ ( A) 
related to mass error, that is the difference between the nodal ∆t * ∆t
density calculated by mass conservation and the one
corresponding to the value given by state relationships. In the The first quantity measures the degree of damping (if
present case, to avoid accumulation of mass error, the value negative) or amplification (if positive) of small perturbations
of nodal dimensionless density at the new time-step is and can be used to set up stability maps; the second one
assumed equal to the one corresponding to the new allows to evaluate the dimensionless frequency of the fastest
dimensionless enthalpy. This is justified by the fact that the growing (or less damped) perturbation, given by:
z
mass error at each time step is very small. *
f fast = I (20)
Calculation initialisation is performed computing 2π
steady-state conditions at constant dimensionless inlet mass It will be interesting in the following sections to
flux. Once the channel pressure drop corresponding to the compare the resulting dimensionless period of small
* −1
prescribed channel parameters ( N sub , N pch , Λ , K i , K e , oscillations, T fast*
= f fast , with the dimensionless transit time
f q* (z * ) ) has been evaluated in steady-state, this is imposed as of the fluid mixture in the channel, defined as:
Nn
ρ * ∆z *
boundary condition to the boiling channel during the transient *
Ttrans =∑ i * (21)
i =1 Gi
Considering the above described methodology for
linear stability analysis, it can be noted that it is conceptually
δ(∆~
p 2*Φ )
similar to the usual stability analysis of ordinary differential
Π *j1 (s * )
equation systems. Nevertheless, it differs from it because it is ~
δ(∆p tot )= 0
applied to both space and time discretised algebraic ~ ~*
δjin* _
equations. +
In addition to provide information on the stability of
+ +
the addressed physical system when well converged solutions
Γ *j1 (s * )
~ −1
are considered, this methodology is capable to highlight the
effects of numerical grid parameters (node size and time-step δ(∆~
p1*Φ )
duration) on stability predictions (see e.g., [16-17; 21]). For
the results presented in this work a reasonable degree of
Figure 2 – Boiling channel schematisation and block diagram
numerical convergence was ascertained; however, in
for the distributed parameter model
presenting stability maps the adopted grid parameters will be
reported to precisely identify the calculation assumptions.
3 L2 Two − Phase Region

4. DISTRIBUTED PARAMETER AND LUMPED
PARAMETER MODELS
A distributed model and a lumped parameter model have
been developed in previous activities [12] to investigate 1
boiling channel stability by linear and nonlinear techniques.
In both cases, the adopted HEM balance equations are L1
Single − Phase Region
essentially the same as the ones used in the above described
discretised model. As these models have been already 2 L3
described elsewhere [12-15], only the main modelling
choices adopted in their development will be here
summarised. Figure 3 – Boiling channel schematisation
In the distributed parameter model (Figure 2), suitable for the lumped parameter model
for the linear stability analysis of single-channel and multi-
channel configurations, the HEM partial differential integrated over each channel node and converted into
equations are firstly perturbed and the steady-state solution is dimensionless form to obtain a set of nonlinear ODEs. Semi-
eliminated to give two linear equation sets (one for the empirical relations are needed to this aim. A heater model is
single-phase region and the other for the two-phase region) also available, which anyway is not adopted in the present
which are then Laplace transformed. After conversion from analysis. Linearisation by perturbation of the goverming
the time to the frequency domain, integration of the obtained equations and application of the Routh-Hurwitz criterion
ordinary differential equations along the channel axis allows allows studying the linear stability conditions. Conversely,
to reach closed forms for the Laplace transform of the numerical integration in time of the ODEs by the Adams
perturbed variables. Combination of these expressions and predictor-corrector method makes it possible to study the
conversion to dimensionless form allows expressing the nonlinear transient behaviour of the boiling channel.
transforms of the dimensionless pressure drop perturbations
in the single-phase and the two-phase regions as a function of 5. MODEL APPLICATION
the inlet dimensionless volumetric flux perturbation 5.1 Linear Stability
δ (∆~p1*Φ )(s * ) = Γ *j1 (s * ) δ jin* (s * )
~ ~ The models described in the previous sections have been
(22)
applied to relevant parameter cases. For purpose of
δ (∆~p * )(s * ) = Π * (s * ) δ j * (s * )
~ ~ (23)
2Φ j1 in comparison with the lumped and the distributed parameter
*
where s is the dimensionless complex variable. In the models, a stability map has been set up with the linearised
particular case of a single channel with constant inlet and discretised model for a nearly horizontal channel without
outlet plenum pressures (i.e., in the “parallel channel” distributed friction and uniform heat flux. In the aim to obtain
condition), the constraint of zero total pressure drop a reasonable convergence, 48 nodes have been used in the
perturbation allows to combine the single-phase and the two- channel and a maximum Courant number of 0.9 has been
phase pressure drop transfer functions to reach a adopted to minimise numerical diffusion. The map has been
characteristic equation (see Figure 2) obtained calculating the values of z R (see Eq. (15)) within
1 + Π j1 (s* ) Γj1 (s* ) = 0
~ ~ (24) the range 0-30 for N pch and 0-20 for N sub with a step of 0.25
whose roots can be discussed to identify the neutral stability for both coordinates. Contour plots providing a clear picture
conditions. of stability conditions have been built up on this basis.
The lumped parameter model is based on the same Such a plot is shown in Figure 4, in which curves at
HEM balance equations adopted for the distributed parameter constant z R are shown. The typical features of the density
model. However, in this case the boiling channel is wave and Ledinegg instability regions clearly appear.
subdivided into three moving boundary nodes, two of them Comparing with Figure 5, in which the marginal stability
representing the single-phase region, the other one adopted boundaries are shown for the distributed and the lumped
for the two-phase region (Figure 3). Balance equations are parameter models, a good agreement is observed.
20 15
Some difference can be anyway noted which is partly
10
due to the different methods adopted to set up the maps; in
15 5
Ledinegg particular, it clearly appears that the construction of a contour
0 zR
plot from discrete values of z R makes it impossible to
-5
Nsub
10 -10
carefully describe the thin Ledinegg instability region at low
Density Waves -15
inlet subcooling. On the other hand, the good agreement of
-20
the marginal stability boundary for density wave oscillations
5 at high inlet subcooling predicted by the models with the
-25
-30 simplified Ishii criterion (see e.g., [22]) can be observed.
0 -35 In addition to provide a reliable description of the
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
marginal stability boundary, the discretised model allows an
Npch interesting quantitative look to the degree of damping or
Figure 4 – Stability map obtained by the discretised model
amplification throughout the stable and the unstable regions.
( N n =48, Cmax=0.9, Fr = 105 , Λ = 0,Kin = 6, Kex = 2, f q* = 1 )
In particular, it is shown that on either side of the stability
20 boundary z R changes smoothly except in the vicinity of the
Ishii Criterion
Physical Limit zero exit quality line ( N sub = N pch ), where a sort of
15 Distr. Parameter
“continental platform” has its leading edge. The sharpness of
Lump. Parameter
this edge is certainly decreased with respect to the actual
Nsub
10 0 trend, owing to the use of smoothed fluid properties across

the boiling boundary.
The ratio between the fluid transit time and the period
5
of oscillation at the onset of instability as obtained by the
discretised model throughout the Ishii-Zuber plane is shown
0 in Figure 6. It can be noted that the period of density wave
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 oscillations is not predicted to be everywhere equal to twice
Npch the transit time. In particular, a continuous distribution of
Figure 5 - Stability map obtained by the distributed and the frequencies exists going from low inlet subcooling to the
lumped parameter models ( Fr −1 = 0, Λ = 0, K in = 6, K ex = 2 ) boundary for Ledinegg instability, where excursive behaviour
occurs, characterised by an infinite period of oscillation.
20
1.3 Figure 7 shows similar results obtained for a vertical
1.2 channel with distributed friction. The comparison with Figure
1.1 6 indicates that the main factor affecting the distribution of
15
1.0 T *
0.9 trans the frequency of oscillation in the Ishii-Zuber plane is the
*
0.8 T fast location of the Ledinegg instability region, limiting the zone
Nusb
Nsub
10 0.7
0.6 in which the period of oscillation may have a finite value.
0.5
0.4
5
0.3 5.2 Nonlinear behaviour
0.2 Figures 8 and 9 show stable limit cycles obtained by the
0.1 discretised model and the lumped parameter model in the
0 0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 case of very large Froude number (e.g. horizontal channel, or
Npch microgravity conditions) with friction losses concentrated at
Figure 6 – Ratio between the channel transit time and the the inlet and at the outlet of the channel. The similarity of the
period of oscillations obtained by the discretised model trends obtained by the two models can be noted.
( N n =48, Cmax=0.9, Fr = 105 , Λ = 0,Kin = 6, Kex = 2, f q* = 1 ) It is also interesting to investigate by the discretised
model the distribution of relevant variables along the channel
20 during these limit cycle oscillations. The results obtained for
1.3
1.2 density, pressure, mass flux and momentum flux are shown in
15
1.1 * Figure 10. Some relevant features appear in the figure:
1.0 Ttrans
0.9 *
• all the variables oscillate with a relatively long frequency
0.8 T fast due to the vicinity of the operating point to the Ledinegg
Nsub
10 0.7 instability region (see Figure 6);

0.6
0.5 • density oscillations occur almost simultaneously along the
0.4 whole two-phase region as the time needed to propagate
5
0.3
0.2 density waves is much shorter than the period of
0.1 oscillations;
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.0
• singular pressure drops over the inlet and the outlet
Npch sections oscillate almost counterphase; it is interesting to
Figure 7 - Ratio between the channel transit time and the note that, due to the absence of distributed losses and
period of oscillations obtained by the discretised model gravity along the channel, very small pressure drops
( N n =48, Cmax=0.9, Fr = 0.033, Λ = 2.85,Kin = 6, Kex = 2, f q* = 1 )
occur in the non-boiling region, while in the boiling Λ = 0.0, Fr=1.e5, Ki=6, Ke=2, Nsub=9, Npch = 14.4
Dimensionless Outlet Mass Flux

1.30
region acceleration losses appear;
1.20
Λ=0.0, Fr=1.e5, Ki=6, Ke=2, Nsub=9, Npch=14.5
1.30
Dimensionless Outlet Mass Flux
1.10
1.20
48 Nodes, C=0.9 1.00
1.10
0.90
1.00
0.80
0.90 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30
Dimensionless Inlet Mass Flux
0.80
0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30
Dimensionless Inlet Mass Flux
Figure 9 – Limit cycle obtained by the lumped parameter
model
Figure 8 – Limit cycle obtained by the discretised model
boiling region, as a consequence of the constraint on the
Dimensionless Density Dimensionless Pressure
Dimensionless Mass Flux Dimensionless Momentum Flux
Figure 10 – Distribution of relevant variables during a limit cycle as predicted by the discretised model
( N n =48, Cmax=0.9, Fr = 105 , Λ = 0.0,Kin = 6, Kex = 2, N pch = 14.5, N sub = 9, f q* = 1 )
overall pressure drop;

• oscillations in outlet pressure drop do not occur in phase
• mass flux perturbations propagate instantaneously in the with those in outlet density and outlet mass flux;
non-boiling region and with some delay in the boiling however, they are obviously in phase with oscillations in
one; on the other hand, momentum flux perturbations outlet momentum flux.
oscillate nearly counterphase in the non-boiling and the
1.0
1.0
0.9
Dimensionless Length
0.8 0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.4 0.5
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.0 0.2
45.0 45.5 46.0 46.5 47.0 47.5 48.0 48.5 49.0 49.5 50.0
0.1
Dimensionless Time
a) Dimensionless density distribution

Figure 12 – RELAP5/MOD3: void fraction at different levels
along a boiling channel during density wave oscillations
(from [18])
Figure 11a shows in the form of a contour plot the
results obtained for density along the channel during slowly
diverging oscillations in such a case. It can be seen that,
owing to the reduced length of the liquid region, the delays in
propagation of density perturbations are enhanced. In this
case the oscillations in the outlet pressure drop (Figure 11b)
are more closely related with those in outlet channel density
and in exit mass flux (Figure 11c). This behaviour suggests a
combined role of both velocity perturbations and density
waves in this parameter range.
b) Dimensionless pressure distribution
Results similar to the ones previously described were
found in the case of vertical channels with distributed
friction. This suggests to consider density-wave oscillations
as the result of both velocity and density perturbations, whose
combination occurs in different ways in the various regions
of the parameter space.
In order to better support the previous findings at least
in the case of low inlet subcooling, Figure 12 shows the
results obtained in a previous work [18] by the
RELAP5/MOD3 code for density wave instability in a
downscaled boiling water reactor simulator with nearly
saturated water at channel inlet. The calculation assumed that
neutron kinetics could be simulated in the experimental
apparatus by an appropriate processing of core level
measurements, to account for density-reactivity feedback.
c) Dimensionless mass flux distribution
Though this situation is more complex than the single
channel one addressed in the above analyses, since it includes
Figure 11 –Distribution of main variables during oscillations
also loop and point kinetics effects, it is clear from the figure
( N n = 48, Cmax = 0.9 , Fr = 105 , Λ = 0.0,Kin = 6, K ex = 2,
that density does not change simultaneously along the
N pch = 8.5, N sub = 2, f q* = 1 ) channel; in particular, density-wave propagation is clearly
predicted by the two-fluid model, in similarity with the
results obtained by the homogeneous equilibrium model at
As this quantitative information is related to a low inlet subcooling (see Figure 11a).
particular region of the Ishii-Zuber plane, where the period of
oscillations is much larger than the fluid transit time, a 6. CONCLUSIONS
similar analysis has been repeated at a lower value of inlet This study aimed to contribute to the understanding of the
subcooling near the “nose” of the stability boundary, where mechanisms characterising density-wave oscillations in
the period of oscillations is closer to twice the transit time. boiling channels under different operating conditions. The
starting point of the analysis has been the criticism raised by The relative weight of either kind of mechanism is
Rizwan-uddin [8] in a previous work against the classical different in different regions of the parameter space, showing
description of the phenomenon. that at low inlet subcooling the classical descriptions of
The use of different linear and non-linear analysis density wave phenomena may be possibly considered
tools and, in particular, of a recently developed space and applicable, while at high inlet subcooling they clearly are
time discretised model allowed to get quantitative inadequate to explain the observed behaviour.
information about the behaviour of a boiling channel under
constant pressure drop conditions.
NOMENCLATURE
On the basis of the obtained data, it is possible to
Roman Letters
conclude that:
A cross section area [m2]
• considering channel conditions close to the stability
A matrix
boundary at high inlet subcooling, it was possible to
Cmax maximum Courant number in the channel
confirm the picture proposed by Rizwan-uddin [8] for
Cp constant
boiling channel oscillations, in which:
Dh hydraulic diameter [m]
♦ the period of oscillations is considerably longer than vector function of the discretised equations
F
twice the fluid transit time; Fr Froude number [-]
♦ the outlet density does not oscillate in phase with f friction factor [-] or frequency [s-1]
outlet pressure drop; heat flux distribution function [-]
fq
♦ the density-wave phenomenon looks mostly
governed by flow perturbations rather than by actual G mass flux [kg/(m2s)]
density wave propagation; g gravity [m/s2]
• on the other hand, considering slowly diverging h specific enthalpy [J/kg]
oscillations at low inlet subcooling it was found that the J Jacobean matrix
system behaves in greater similarity with what suggested j volumetric flux [m/s]
by classical descriptions: K singular pressure drop coefficient [-]
♦ the period of oscillations is closer to twice the fluid L channel length [m]
transit time; Nn number of nodes [-]
Npch phase change number (see Eqs.2) [-]
♦ outlet density oscillations are more closely
Nsub subcooling number (see Eqs.2) [-]
correlated with outlet pressure drop oscillations;
O constant
♦ density wave propagation can be observed along the
p pressure [Pa]
channel;
q 0′′ heat flux [W/m2]
• even in the case of high Froude numbers with friction
concentrated at the inlet and the outlet sections, the T period [s]
period of density-wave oscillation is roughly equal to t time [s]
twice the channel transit time only in a limited range of v specific volume [m3/kg]
parameters; therefore, the deviation of the ratio w0 reference velocity scale [m/s]
* *
from 0.5 cannot be explained with the effects y vector of independent variables
Ttrans / T fast
z axial coordinate [m]
of distributed friction or gravity; z R , z I real and complex exponents
• the continuous distribution of the ratio Ttrans
* *
/ T fast which
Greek Letters
has been found throughout the Ishii-Zuber plane shows Γ constant or transfer function
that the Ledinegg instability can be found in the limit of δ Dirac’s delta function [-]
density wave instabilities at zero oscillation frequency; Θ constant
as a consequence, the position of the Ledinegg stability Λ dimensionless friction parameter [-]
boundary, depending on the static characteristics of the λ eigenvalue [-]
channel, strongly affects the distribution of Ttrans
* *
/ T fast . Πh heated perimeter [m]
In summary, as it was partly expected, the obtained Π transfer function
results show that both flow perturbations and density waves ρ density [kg/m3] or spectral radius
superimpose and interact during boiling channel oscillations, Subscripts
resulting in the observed complex behaviour. As a d dimensional value
consequence, comprehensive descriptions of the phenomenon ex exit
should account for the combination of both, avoiding to focus f liquid
on a single effect. fast fastest growing perturbation
g vapour Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, Seoul, Korea,
h heated November 1988, pp. A1-88- A1-98
i node index [11] K. Fukuda and T. Kobori “Classification of Two-
in inlet Phase Flow Instability by Density Wave Oscillation
j volumetric flux Model” J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 16(2), pp. 95-108, 1979
max maximum [12] P. Di Marco “Sviluppo e convalida di modelli per
trans transit l’analisi lineare e non lineare di oscillazioni dovute ad
yn related to yn onde di densità nei canali bollenti”, Research
Superscripts Doctorate Thesis in Nuclear Engineering, University
n referred to the old time-step of Pisa, February 1989 (in Italian)
n+1 referred to the new time-step [13] F. D’Auria, P. Di Marco, A. Soldati “A distributed
a* dimensionless quantity model to perform a linear analysis of density-wave
a node average quantity instabilities in a natural circulation loop”, VII UIT
aD donored quantity National Heat Transfer Conference, Florence, June
a~ Laplace transformed variable 15-17, 1989
[14] P. Di Marco, A. Clausse and R.T. Lahey, Jr. “An
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[2] J. March-Leuba and J.M. Rey, “Coupled “A nodal analysis of instabilities in boiling channels”,
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[4] R.T. Lahey and F.J. Moody “The thermalhydraulics of [17] W. Ambrosini and J.C. Ferreri, 1998 “The effect of
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[6] K. Svanholm and J. Friedly “An elementary [18] W. Ambrosini, F. D’Auria, G. Galassi, M. Mazzini
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Trends in Nuclear System Thermohydraulics', Pisa, of Boiling Channel Stability by a Finite-Difference
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[10] M.Z. Podowski, “Instabilities in Boiling Systems”, Pressurized Water Reactors", American Nuclear
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Dosis absorbida en el feto
Rojo, A.M.; Gómez Parada, I.M. y Di Trano, J.L.
Publicado en Seguridad Radiológica, no. 18, p. 17-19, 2000

Operación de instalaciones radiactivas y
nucleares de Argentina en 1988.
Dosis en la población
Curti, A.R. y Alonso Jiménez, M.T.

Planta de fabricación de
elementos combustibles en Japón.
Accidente de criticidad
Canavese, S.I.

Lutetium-177-EDTMP for Bone Pain Pallation.
Preparation, biodistribution and
pre-clinical studies
Rutty Solá, G.A.; Argüelles, M.G.; Bottazzini, D.L.; Furnari, J.C.;

Gómez Parada, I.; Rojo. A.M. and Vera Ruiz, H.
Publicado en Radiochim, vol. 88, no. 3-4, p. 157-161, 2000

Determination of 129I in Conifer Samples
Around Nuclear Facilities in Argentina
Quintana, E.E. and Thyssen, S.M.
Publicado en Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, vol. 245, no. 3, p. 545-550, 2000
New Dedicated AMS System at the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority in Argentina
Beninson, D.J.; DÁmato, E.; Oliveira, A.A; Stark, J.W., Bonino, N.O.;
Bustos, G.R.; Alvarez, D.E.; Amodei, A.J.; Bonino, A.G.;
Giannico, M.A. and Pomar, C.
Publicado en Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research B, vol. 172, no. 1-4, p. 24-28, 2000
Stability Analysis of Single-Phase
Thermosyphon Loops by Finite Difference
Numerical Methods
Ambrosini, W. and Ferreri, J.C.
Publicado en Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 201, no. 1, p. 11-23, 2000
cases, the system to be described is too complex and the feasibility and has been the subject of very interesting
necessary description too detailed to make feasible other theoretical and experimental studies ([5], [6], [7]).
techniques for predicting transient behaviour. However, the
Finally, the third considered loop (Figure 1c) is perhaps
price to achieve this goal by space and time numerical
the most popular example of natural circulation single phase
discretization is the introduction of truncation errors, which
loop and consists in a toroidal loop with asymmetric heating
may considerably change the predicted dynamics.
[8] [9]. The version of the problem addressed in this paper is
In this paper, sample applications of finite difference
the one with imposed heat flux in both the heated and the
numerical methods for evaluating the linear stability
cooled lengths [10] and has been chosen to fully cover the
conditions in single-phase thermosyphon loops are
panorama of the possible boundary conditions.
presented. The method of analysis, discussed in a
forthcoming paper [2], is based on the linearization by
perturbation around a selected fixed point of the finite
2. EQUATIONS OF LOOP DYNAMICS
difference equations obtained discretizing the PDEs
governing the transient behaviour of the addressed systems.
2.1 Welander's Problem
In this respect, this method can be considered the numerical
The dimensionless equations representing the dynamics of
analogue of the usual linear stability analysis of PDE
the loop in Figure 1a are the following:
problems and has also similarity with the techniques adopted
1
for discussing stability of numerical methods. dq
= α ⌠ θ ds - ε qξ (τ > 0) (1)
The examples of application reported in the paper are dτ ⌡
related to three different natural circulation loops (Figure 1) 0
whose characteristics have been thoroughly analyzed for momentum and
theoretically and, in some cases, also experimentally by other ∂θ ∂θ
+q =0 (0 < s < 1, τ > 0) (2)
investigators [3]. ∂τ ∂s
The first considered loop (Figure 1a) is the one studied in for energy, where the following definitions apply
the '60s by Welander in the above mentioned paper [1]. It is S t Q T - T0
s= L τ= L q= θ= (3)
a very schematic representation of a thermosyphon loop, κ A ∆S ∆T
consisting in point heat source and sink with imposed wall 2 2 κ ∆S
temperature and heat transfer coefficient. Source and sink are Πw h
connected by two adiabatic legs along which the fluid is κ= A (4)
ρ Cp
transported by pure advection due to the resulting buoyancy
(Tw)heater + (Tw)cooler (Tw)heater - (Tw)cooler
forces. This loop has been considered by the Authors in T0 = ∆T = (5)
previous works [4] [2] as a benchmark problem for studying 2 2
the effect of truncation error on stability prediction. The
g β ∆T L a ρ D κ ∆S1-b
main results from this work will be shortly summarized to α= ε = 16  εWel ξ=2-b
introduce the discussion on new developments. 2 (κ ∆S)2  µ 
The second considered system (Figure 1b) consists in a (6)
rectangular loop with constant heat flux heating at the bottom Here, εWel is the friction dimensionless parameter defined
and heat exchanger cooling at the top. This kind of by Welander as
arrangement, including mixed boundary conditions, is the
more realistic one from the point of view of practical
Sink
Cooling Heat Exchanger
s=1
imposed heat flux

cooling
imposed heat flux

heating
s=0=L
s=0 s=2 ~
Source Electrical Heating
a) b) c)
Figure 1 - Considered natural circulation single phase loops
-2-
RL µ 2.2 Rectangular Loop with Mixed Boundary Conditions
εWel = R = 32 (7)
2 κ ∆S ρ D2 The dimensionless balance equations for this loop have been
developed in a previous work [6], in which the scaling laws
The Boussinesq approximation for fluid density variation to be assumed to reduce experimental data concerning
is accepted. Integration of the PDE momentum equation single-phase natural circulation loops have been established.
along the loop and the adoption of a macroscopic friction Different dimensionless parameters were identified as the
law lead to equation (1), making the flow rate dependent relevant ones in this purpose; these include geometrical
only on time, while θ is a function of both s and τ. The aspect ratios of the loop and of the heating and of the cooling
dimensionless variables α and ε are a buoyancy and a sections, the length over diameter ratio and modified Grashof
friction parameter, which fully characterize from the physical and Stanton numbers. The latter quantities are found the key
point of view the system, and ξ is a friction law exponent. parameters which determine stability.
The develompents needed to reach the above equations The main assumptions at the basis of the development of
are very similar to the ones suggested by Welander in his balance equations are the usual ones in this field:
paper (see [2]). With respect to the original Welander's • the legs are assumed to be adiabatic;
treatment, relating only to laminar flow, the above equations • the Boussinesq approximation is applied;
have been derived considering a general friction law having • axial heat conduction in the fluid is neglected;
the form: • the flow is one-dimensional.
a With the above assumptions the momentum and energy
f' = (8)
b balance equations assume the form:
Re
dω Grm ⌠ p L ω 2 -b
which results in the following definition for ξ: = 3 o θdz - b D 2 . (11)
dτ Re ⌡
ξ=2-b (9) ss Ress
In this work, the value adopted for ξ is 1.75, coherently with ∂θ ∂θ V
+φω = (heater) (12)
the adoption of the Blasius law for wall friction. ∂τ ∂s Vheater
An interesting feature of this problem is that the ∂θ ∂θ
temperature distribution along the loop is antisymmetric with +φω = -Stm θ (cooler) (13)
∂τ ∂s
respect to the center of the loop. In particular, Welander ∂θ ∂θ
suggested (an it is possible to rigorously show) that if the +φω =0 (legs) (14)
∂τ ∂s
temperature distribution along the loop is antisymmetric at
the beginning of the transient it will keep antisymmetric
where
during the whole time evolution. This allows for solving the
W Z S
energy balance equation along the ascending leg only, i.e for ω=W z=H s=H (15)
s ∈ (0,1). ss
t Wss T - Ts D Wss
Considering antisymmetry, the boundary conditions for τ= θ= Ress = (16)
temperature are imposed only at the inlet and at the outlet of Vρ (∆Theater)ss Aµ
the ascending leg, that is in the points just after the source D3 ρ2 b g P H 4 Num
(s=0+) and before the sink (s=1-). Following the treatment by Grm = Stm = (17)
µ3 A Cp Ress Pr
Welander, these boundary conditions have the form: Ui
L Cp µ V
 -1 Num = k Pr = k φ=AH (18)
θ(0+,τ) + θ(1-,τ) = (1 + θ(1-,τ)) 1- e q for q > 0 , τ > 0
  In deriving the above equations, a friction law having the
(10) form
p
 -1 f' = b (19)
θ(0+,τ) + θ(1-,τ) = (-1 + θ(0+,τ)) 1- e |q| for q < 0, τ > 0 Re
 
was assumed.
The above relationships specify the effects of the source and
Steady-state conditions involve both positive and
the sink on the flowing fluid and have been derived by
negative flow rates and, due to the symmetry of heating with
Welander on the basis of a quasi-steady approach. They are
respect to the vertical axis, the two fixed points are the
justified by assuming that the source and the sink have an
mirror image of each other. It is easily understood that the
infinitesimal length, even though their heat transfer
zero flow conditions cannot be steady in the present case
capability is still assumed to be finite.
owing to the presence of the imposed heat flux heating.
Steady-states involve positive, negative and zero flow
rate conditions. In particular, the negative flow fixed point is
just the mirror image of the positive flow one. Therefore, 2.3 Toroidal Loop with Imposed Heat Flux
The present problem has been studied both theoretically and
neglecting the zero flow case which is not relevant for heat
experimentally by several Authors considering different
transfer applications, the greatest interest is in establishing
kinds of boundary conditions [8], [9], [10], [11]. In the work
the relationships for stability of the positive flow steady-state
by Sen et al, (1985) [10], the specific boundary conditions
conditions.
addressed in this paper are considered.
With respect to the dimensionless form of governing
equations adopted in that paper, the need was felt here to
establish a set of dimensionless groups more directly related
-3-
to engineering applications. In fact, many of the sets of negative flow, in a limited range of γ, which is the angle of
dimensionless groups previously proposed for single-phase asymmetry in heating.
natural circulation loops have the following disadvantages: As well known, the problem is amenable to a very simple
• it is not very intuitive to locate in the dimensionless modal solution, in which only three equations are found to
parameter space the region of interest for practical fully govern the dynamics of the loop [8]. With the present
applications; notation, assuming the following expression dimensionless
• it may be difficult, or even impossible, to properly heat flux (corresponding to uniform heating and cooling in
account for physical phenomena which are known to be the two halves of the loop)
governed by parameters other than those adopted in the ∞
dimensionless equations.
The former of the two above observations becomes clear
q"*(s) =
4 (-1)k
(2l+1) π ∑ γ
cos [(2l+1) π (s - )]
π
(26)
while trying to establish whether interesting phenomena l=0

devised in theoretical analyses may be possibly confirmed by the three modal ODEs are obtained by expanding the
real life experiments. The latter observation points out that temperature distribution in series of trigonometric functions
phenomena as flow and heat transfer transition regime are and applying the usual weighting technique
hardly accounted for in analytical models, unless the dRe Ψ L
= Gr 21 - D f'(Re) Re |Re|
appropriate dimensionless groups governing the transition dτ
are included. dΨ1 4
= π Re Ω1 - π2 Fo Ψ1 + sin γ (27)
A typical case is related to the choice of the wall friction dτ π
law. In the available literature dealing with stability of dΩ1 4
= - π Re Ψ1 - π2 Fo Ω1 + cos γ
natural circulation in single-phase loops, a choice is always dτ π
made about the form of the wall friction law to be used in were Ψ1 and Ω1 are the coefficients of the sinus and cosinus
analytical developments and also about the coefficients to be of the first mode. In particular, the case with Fo = 0 is
adopted; examples are reported above for the two other considered in this paper.
considered natural circulation loops. This limits the analysis To check for the effect on the stability boundary of the
to either laminar flow or turbulent flow conditions, without choice of flow regime transition criteria, three different laws
any possibility to account for transition between them, since for the Fanning factor have been used. In particular, the laws
the Reynolds number is not used as an independent flow adopted are:
variable.
Trying to compensate for the above discussed 1. the Blasius law
deficiencies in available models, a step forth towards a 0.079
f'(Re) = (28)
greater realism in the analytical description of natural Re0.25
circulation loops is tried in the present paper, selecting the 2. a law with smooth transition between laminar and
Reynolds number as main flow variable in the dimensionless turbulent flow
equations for the toroidal loop. The resulting equations are: 2 2
f'(Re) = f''lam + f'turb (29)
• momentum balance equation with
2 16 0.079
dRe 1 ⌠ L f''lam = f'turb = 0.25 (30)
= Gr 2 g*(s) θ(s) ds - D f'(Re) Re |Re| (20) Re Re
dτ ⌡ 3. the formulation by Churchill [12], with an ε/D ratio of
0 0.0001
• energy balance equation The different relationships are reported in Figure 2.
∂θ ∂θ ∂2θ
+ Re = q"*(s) + Fo 2 (21)
∂τ ∂s ∂s The linear stability analysis of the system in Eqs. (27) for
where the positive flow steady-state conditions, identified by the
ρ2 g0 β ∆T D2 L ρwD relationship
Gr = Re = (22)
2 µ2 µ 2 Gr L ss2
π2 cos γ = D f'(Re ) Re |Re |
ss ss (31)
2S T(s) - T0 2 L q"0
s= θ(s) = ∆T = (23) can be easily performed by the usual linearization
L ∆T Cp µ
10
q"(s)
Fanning Factor
g(s) 1
g*(s) = g q*(s) = (24)
0 q0" 0.1 Smooth Transition
t ρDL α 0.01
τ= = Fo = (25) Blasius Law
2µ 2 Churchill Law
(L / 2) 0.001
Concerning the boundary conditions it is assumed that the 10 100 1000 10000 100000
heat flux is uniform and constant in both the heating and the Reynolds Number
cooling sections. With these conditions, the problem has two
Figure 2 - Different friction laws adopted for the toroidal
steady-state solutions, one for positive and the other for
loop
-4-
techniques. In this work, stability maps have been obtained thermal-hydraulic system codes, the proposed method of
mapping the real part of the eigenvalue of the linearized analysis is quite general and has been applied to different
ODE system having maximum norm, zr. This quantity first order and second order numerical methods, both explicit
measures the degree of amplification or damping of and implicit [2].
perturbations and is used to define the conditions for neutral Time and space discretization of the governing PDEs by
stability (zr = 0) and the regions of stability (zr < 0) or the finite difference numerical method results in a system of
instability (zr > 0). algebraic equations having the form
The maps in Figures 3 to 5 clearly show the impact of the n n+1
F
_ ( _y , _y , ∆τ, ∆s, physical parameters) = 0 (32)
choice of the friction law on the linear stability boundary. In
this connection it must be remarked that the use of a simple which relates the values of the vector of unknowns, _y, at the
power law for the Fanning factor, which is the usual choice times τn and τn+1, grid parameters and physical parameters.
in literature on thermosyphon loops, gives a very poor To get information about stability of steady-state conditions
representation of the situation occurring when a realistic law as predicted by the numerical method, this equation can be
is adopted. linearized by perturbing the vector _y around steady-state
1E+008
conditions
90°
1E+006 n s n n+1 s n+1
_y = _y + (δy
_) _y = y_ + (δy
_) (33)
60° Stable 1E+004
1E+002
30° 1E+000
-1E+000
zr s
γ 0° Unstable
-1E+002
where _y represents the steady-state value of _y and is a
-1E+004
-30° -1E+006
-1E+008 solution of the equation:
-60° -1E+010
n s n+1 s
-90°
-1E+012
-1E+015 F
_ ( _y = _y , _y = _y , ∆τ, ∆s, physical parameters) = 0
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017
log10 (Gr) -1E+019 (34)
As in classical stability analyses, a linearized relationship
Figure 3 - Modal stability map for the toroidal loop relating perturbations at the two different time levels is
(Blasius law, L/D = 100) reached
1E+008 n+1 s -1 s n
90° 1E+006 (δy
_) = - (J yn+1) . J yn . (δy_) (35)
60°
1E+004
1E+002
= =
Stable
1E+000 n n+1
30° -1E+000 where the Jacobian matrices of F _ with respect to _y and _y
γ 0°
-1E+002
-1E+004
zr
Unstable -1E+006
calculated at steady-state conditions appear.
-30° -1E+008
-1E+010
It is clear from the above that assuming an exponential
-60° -1E+012 amplification or damping of perturbations
-1E+015
-90°
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017 n+1 z∆τ n
-1E+019 (δy
_) =e (δy
_) (36)
log10(Gr)
Figure 4 - Modal stability map for the toroidal loop stability can be discussed considering the eigenvalues of the
(smooth transition, L/D = 100) matrix
1E+008 s -1 s
90° 1E+006 A = - (J yn+1) . J yn (37)
60°
1E+004
1E+002
= = =
Stable
30°
1E+000 n+1
-1E+000 where the inverse of the jacobian with respect to _y
γ 0° -1E+002
-1E+004
zr
Unstable
-1E+006
always exist for any meaningful numerical method.
-30°
-1E+008
-1E+010
Considering the spectral radius of A, ρ(A), the quantities
-60°
-1E+012
= =
-90°
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-1E+015
-1E+017
ln (ρ(A))
=
-1E+019
∆ρ = ρ(A) - 1 and zr = max (Re(zi)) =
log10(Gr)
= i ∆τ
Figure 5 - Modal stability map for the toroidal loop (38)
(Churchill formula, ε/D = 0.0001, L/D = 100) are then defined, which are negative for stable conditions and
positive for unstable ones. They can be used as a measure of
the margin in excess to neutral stability and are related to the
predicted degree of amplification or damping of
3. METHOD OF ANALYSIS perturbations. The latter with respect to ∆ρ has the advantage
that its range does not depend directly on the time step
The technique here adopted for analyzing the linear stability adopted in the numerical solution and can be compared with
of natural circulation loops starts with the discretization of the eigenvalues of ODE systems representing the considered
the governing equations by a suitable numerical method. physical problem obtained by other techniques (see Sect. 2).
Though applications reported in the present paper will Both quantities are anyway useful to set up quantitative
mostly refer to the upwind explicit numerical method (see stability maps, showing the location of the stability boundary
e.g., Mincowycz, 1988), chosen for its relevance for some and the different degrees of amplification or damping of the
-5-
numerical solution. Examples of such maps are provided in less diffusive than the implicit upwind one; this is clearly
this paper shown in the figure by the comparison of the maps obtained
A characteristics which makes the present methodology by the two methods with a same time step and using the same
useful in numerical study of fluid dynamic instabilities is that number of nodes. The theoretical stablity boundary reported
the effect of truncation error on linear stability can be in the figures was obtained by a truncated modal solution and
quantitatively assessed for different discretizations and was found to be coincident with the neutral stability line
numerical methods, thus providing a guidance for choosing obtained by classical means.
the optimum noding and time step in transient analyses. On the other hand, second order accurate methods
provide a better performance in predicting stability than first
On the other hand, the unstable conditions identified by
order ones. As it can be noted in Figure 6, even with only ten
the methodology may have both physical and numerical
nodes and with a ten times lower time-step they are anyway
origin; therefore, care must be taken in discriminating
able to approximate with relatively high fidelity the actual
between them in the obtained linear stability maps.
stability boundary. These results suggest that second order
terms appearing in truncation error of first order methods
have the greatest impact on numerical diffusion. This
4. RESULTS
conclusion has been independently confirmed by the stability
analysis of the mentioned modal solution in which a second
The governing equations for Welander's problem have been
order term equivalent to the one brought about by
discretized adopting four different numerical schemes and
discretization through the FTUS method was purposely
stability was studied by the methodology discussed in Sect.
added [2].
3. In particular, the following schemes have been considered
(see e.g., [13]): For the rectangular loop, theoretical stability maps have
• the first order upwind explicit scheme (Forward Time been presented by Vijayan and Austregesilo [6]
Upwind Space = FTUS); characterized by a bell shaped neutral stability line in the
• the first order upwind implicit scheme (Implicit Time plane Grm-Stm. Similar stability maps were obtained by
Upwind Space = ITUS); linearization of a first order uwpind explicit numerical
• the second order MacCormack scheme; method applied to the energy equation with the usual Euler
• the second order upwind explicit scheme (Warming- explicit integration scheme for the momentum equation. The
Beam). values of the dimensionless parameters adopted in obtaining
As an example, the discretized forms of the energy and the maps are the following:
momentum equations adopted for the first order upwind D/L = 9.25x10-4 ∆τ = 10-3
explicit scheme are the following: p = 22.26 b = 0.6744 (43)
V/Vheater = 8.1 φ=3
• q>0
The results are reported in Figure 7 in the form of
n+1 n n
θi = (1 - C) θi + C θi-1 (i=2, ... , N-1) quantitative stability maps based on ∆ρ. Various numbers of
nodes have been used in the legs and in the heater and cooler
∆τ ∆τ
θN = 1 - C- (qn) θN + C θN-1 -
n+1 n n
F F (qn) to point out the effect of spatial discretization on the shape
 ∆s nod  ∆s nod
and the extension of the unstable area.
(39)
It can be noted that with only 40 nodes in the whole loop
n+1 n+1 (10 in each leg and 10 in both heater and cooler) prediction
θ1 = - θN of instability conditions is very poor compared with the
solutions obtained with greater number of nodes. In fact,
• q<0
increasing the number of nodes in the legs, larger and larger
n+1 n n
θi = (1 + C) θi - C θi+1 (i=2, ... , N-1) unstable areas are found in the considered parameter space.
The effect of discretization in the heater and the cooler
∆τ n ∆τ
θ1 = 1 + C- (qn) θ1 - C θ2 +
n+1 n
F F (qn) (40) appears less relevant than that in the legs as it can be noted
 ∆s nod  ∆s nod
comparing the maps with 50 nodes in the legs and 10 and 30
n+1 n+1 nodes, respectively, in both heater and cooler. This result
θN = - θ1 might be explained arguing that the pipes connecting the
heater and the cooler have a dominant role in determining the
 N-1
 timing for amplification of thermal perturbations which lead
 α
∑ 
n n
θi + θi+1 to instability and the greatest care should be put in their
qn+1 = qn + N-1 - ε (qn)ξ ∆τ
  (41) discretization.
2
 i=1  Also in the case of the toroidal loop a first order upwind
explicit method has been used to set up stability maps. In this
where
case, zr was preferred to allow for direct comparison with the
qn ∆τ 1
C= ∆s = N-1 (42) maps obtained by the modal solution. Figure 8 reports the
∆s
obtained maps showing the modifications which the stability
Figure 6 reports sample stability maps obtained by the boundary undergoes due to numerical diffusion.
application of the above numerical methods. As expected,
the first order upwind explicit method is found to be much
-6-
10 10
8 Theoretical SB 8 Theoretical SB
Stable Region
6 Stable Region 6
ε ε
4 4
Unstable Region Unstable Region
2 2
0 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
α α
FTUS with 50 nodes and ∆τ = 10-3 MacCormack with 10 nodes and ∆τ = 10-4
10 10
8 Theoretical SB 8 Theoretical SB
Stable Region
6 Stable Region 6
ε ε
4 4
Unstable Region
2 Unstable Region 2
0 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
α α
ITUS with 50 nodes and ∆τ = 10-3 Warming-Beam with 10 nodes and ∆τ = 10-4
Figure 6 - Welander's Problem: stability maps for first order and second order numerical schemes (ν = 1.75)
20 20
19 5E-004 19 5E-004
4E-004 4E-004
18 3E-004 18 3E-004
Unstable 2E-004 2E-004
17 1E-004 17 1E-004
log10 (Grm)
log10 (Grm)
0E+000 0E+000
16 -1E-004 16 Unstable -1E-004
-3E-004 -3E-004
15 Stable -5E-004 ∆ρ 15 -5E-004 ∆ρ
-7E-004 -7E-004
14 -9E-004 14 -9E-004
-1E-003 Stable -1E-003
13 -1E-003 13 -1E-003
-2E-003 -2E-003
12 -2E-003 12 -2E-003
-2E-003 -2E-003
11 -1E-002 11 -1E-002
10 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Stm Stm
10 nodes in each leg, 10 nodes in heater and cooler 30 nodes in each leg, 10 nodes in heater and cooler
20 20
19 5E-004 19 5E-004
4E-004 4E-004
18 3E-004 18 3E-004
2E-004 2E-004
17 1E-004 17 1E-004
log10 (Grm)
log10 (Grm)
0E+000 0E+000
16 -1E-004 16 -1E-004
Unstable -3E-004 Unstable -3E-004
15 -5E-004 ∆ρ 15 -5E-004 ∆ρ
-7E-004 -7E-004
14 -9E-004 14 -9E-004
Stable -1E-003 -1E-003
13 -1E-003 13 Stable -1E-003
-2E-003 -2E-003
12 -2E-003 12 -2E-003
-2E-003 -2E-003
11 -1E-002 11 -1E-002
10 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Stm Stm
50 nodes in each leg, 10 nodes in heater and cooler 50 nodes in each leg, 30 nodes in heater and cooler
Figure 7 - Rectangular loop: quantitative stability maps obtained with a first order upwind explicit method
(D/L = 9.25x10-4, ∆τ = 10-3, p = 22.26, b = 0.6744, V/Vheater = 8.1, φ = 3)
-7-
1E+008 1E+008
90° 90° 1E+006
1E+006
1E+004 1E+004
60° 60°
1E+002 1E+002
1E+000 Stable 1E+000
30° 30°
Stable -1E+000 -1E+000
-1E+002
γ 0° -1E+002
zr γ 0°
-1E+004 zr
-1E+004
-30° -1E+006 -30° -1E+006
-1E+008 -1E+008
Unstable -1E+010
-60° -1E+010 -60°
Unstable -1E+012 -1E+012
-90° -1E+015 -90° -1E+015
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017
-1E+019 -1E+019
log10 (Gr) log10(Gr)
10 Nodes 30 Nodes
1E+008 1E+008
90° 1E+006 90° 1E+006
1E+004 1E+004
60° 1E+002 60°
Stable Stable 1E+002
1E+000 1E+000
30° -1E+000 30°
-1E+000
-1E+002 -1E+002
γ 0°
-1E+004 zr γ 0°
-1E+004 zr
-1E+006 -1E+006
-30° Unstable -30° Unstable
-1E+008 -1E+008
-1E+010 -1E+010
-60° -60°
-1E+012 -1E+012
-1E+015 -1E+015
-90° -90°
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -1E+017
-1E+019 -1E+019
log10(Gr) log10(Gr)
50 Nodes 100 Nodes
Figure 8 - Toroidal loop: quantitative stability maps obtained with a first order upwind explicit method
(Churchill law, ε/D = 0.0001, L/D = 100, ∆τ = 10-7)
5. CONCLUSIONS observed for Welander's problem, 2nd order methods

provide a reasonable representation of the conditions for
In the present work, stability maps were set up for three stability with a much smaller number of nodes than 1st order
different single-phase thermosyphon loops making use of ones. Moreover, explicit numerical methods must be also
finite difference numerical schemes. Though the presented preferred since they show smaller diffusion than implicit
sample applications are related to systems which may be ones.
considered idealized from many respects, it is clearly It must be remarked that convergence of the obtained
understood that more complex systems could be addressed numerical stability maps to the theoretical ones is always
with a reasonable effort. possible increasing the spatial discretization detail or using
In selecting the configuration of the three loops attention higher order methods [2]. In this respect, it can be noted that
was paid in choosing boundary conditions representative of the adopted methodology allows a direct control of
the whole range of systems considered in literature. So, truncation error effects and may be used as a guidance for
temperature controlled heat transfer, heat flux controlled heat judging reliability of nonlinear transient calculations
transfer and mixed boundary conditions were assumed. performed making use of the same numerical method.
In the cases of Welander's problem and of the rectangular Finally, it must be observed that linear stability analysis
loop with mixed boundary conditions, the form of is only the first step in studying stability conditions in single-
dimensionless governing equation was taken from previous phase loops. In practical applications, nonlinearities play an
literature. For the toroidal loop, it was preferred to propose important role in defining the actual conditions for stability,
dimensionless equations including the Reynolds number as since finite perturbations may lead the system into instability,
flow variable. This form, which is fairly general and could though it is linearly stable, due to the presence of subcritical
have been used even in the case of the other thermosyphon bifurcations. A certain degree of spreading in stability
loops, has the advantage that transition between laminar and boundaries has been is in fact observed during experiments
turbulent flow is easily obtained, making use of a traditional [14] and can be experienced also by nonlinear calculations
formulation for friction factors. close to the linear stability boundary, as a consequence of the
The obtained results clearly show the effect of truncation differences in initial conditions. Some degree of
error on stability prediction: greater stability than in reality is conservativism must be therefore considered in making use
generally predicted when a coarse nodalization is used. As of linear stability analysis results.
-8-
ρ(A) Spectral radius
NOMENCLATURE =
t Dimensionless time [s]
Roman Letters φ Ratio of loop volume on leg volume
A Area [m2] Ψ1 Coefficient of sinus 1st term in modal expansion
A Matrix Ω1 Coefficient of cosinus 1st term in modal expansion
=
a, b Coefficients of the friction law ω Ratio of actual to steady-state flow rate
C Courant number
Cp Specific heat at constant pressure [J/(kg K)] Subscripts
D Diameter [m] cooler cooler
F
_ Vector equation expressing a numerical scheme heater heater
Fo Fourier number lam laminar
Fnod(q) Source-sink heat transfer multiplier leg leg
f' Fanning factor m modified
g Gravity [m2/s] max maximum value
Gr Grashof number r real
H Heigth [m] ss steady-state
h Heat transfer coefficient [W/(m2K)] turb turbulent
J Jacobian matrix w wall
= Wel Welander
k Heat Conduction [W/(m K)] yn, yn+1 related to the corresponding vectors
L Loop length 0 reference or initial value
N Number of nodes
Order of the algebraic system
Superscripts
P Power [W] n Value at time level n
Pr Prandtl number n+1 Value at time level n+1
p Fanning factor coefficient s Steady-state value
Q Volumetric flow rate [m3/s] * Dimensionless value
q Dimensionless volumetric flow rate
q" Heat flux [W/(m2K)]
R Friction parameter (from Welander)[1/s] Abbreviations
Re Reynolds number based on pipe diameter[-] FTUS Forward Time Upwind Space
S Axial coordinate along the loop [m] ITUS Implicit Time Upwind Space
St Stanton number ODE Ordinary Differential Equation
T Fluid temperature [K] PDE Partial Differential Equation
t Time [s] SB Stability Boundary
Ui Heat conductance in the cooler
V Loop volume [m3]
W Mass flow rate [kg/s] REFERENCES
_y General vector of unknowns [1] P. WELANDER, 1967 - On the oscillatory instability of a
Z Height coordinate [m] differentially heated fluid loop, J. Fluid Mech. (1967),
z Eigenvalue or dimensionless height coordinate vol. 29, part. 1, pp. 17-30
[2] W. AMBROSINI AND J.C. FERRERI, 1997 - The effect of
truncation error on numerical predictions of stability
Greek Letters boundaries in a natural circulation single-phase loop,
α Buoyancy parameter in dimensionless momentum To be published, June 1997
equation [-]
β Isobaric expansion coefficient [K-1] [3] R. GREIF, 1988 - Natural Circulation Loops, J. Heat
γ Angle of asymmetry in toroidal loop Transfer, Transaction of the ASME, Vol. 110,
ε Friction parameter in dimensionless momentum November 1988, pp. 1243-1258
equation (Welander's problem) [4] J.C. FERRERI, W. AMBROSINI, F. D'AURIA, 1995 - On
θ Dimensionless temperature [-] the convergence of RELAP5 calculations in a Single-
θs Dimensionless fluid temp. in the source Phase Natural Circulation Test Problem, X Encontro de
κ Variable group in Welander's problem Fisica de Reatores e Termo-hidràulica (ENFIR), Aguas
λ Eigenvalue de Lindoia - SP, Brazil, August 7-11, 1995
µ Fluid-dynamic viscosity [kg/(ms)] [5] M. MISALE AND L. TAGLIAFICO, 1987 - The transient
ξ Exponent of q in dimensionless momentum equation and stability behaviour of single-phase natural
(Welander's problem) circulation loops, Heat and Technology, Vol. 5, No. 1-
Π Perimeter [m] 2, 1987
ρ Fluid density [kg/m3]
-9-
[6] P.K VIJAYAN, H. AUSTREGESILO, 1994 - Scaling laws [10] M. SEN, E. RAMOS AND C. TREVIÑO, 1985 - The
for single-phase natural circulation loops, Nuclear toroidal thermosyphon with known heat flux, Int. J.
Engineering and Design, 152, (1994), pp. 331-347 Heat Mass Transfer, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 219-233, 1985
[7] P.K. VIJAYAN, H. AUSTREGESILO, V. TESCHENDORFF, [11] H.F. CREVELING, J.F. DE PAZ, J.Y. BALADI AND R.J.
1995 - Simulation of the unstable behavior of single- SCHOENALS, 1975 - Stability characteristics of a single-
phase natural circulation with repetitive flow reversals phase free convection loop, J. Fluid Mech. (1975), vol.
in a rectangular loop using the computer code 67, part. 1, pp. 65-84
ATHLET, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 155,
[12] S.W. CHURCHILL, 1977 - Friction equation spans all
(1995), pp. 623-641
fluid flow regimes., Chemical Engng, 84 (24), 91-2
[8] J.E. HART, 1984 - A new analysis of the closed loop
[13] W.J. MINKOWYCZ, E.M. SPARROW, G.E. SCHNEIDER,
thermosyphon, Int. J. Heat Mass Transfer, Vol. 27, No.
R.H. PLETCHER, 1988 - Handbook of Numerical Heat
1, pp. 125-136, 1984
Transfer, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.1988
[9] J.E. HART, 1985 - A note on the loop thermosyphon
[14] M. FROGHERI, M. MISALE, F. D'AURIA, 1997 -
with mixed boundary conditions, Int. J. Heat Mass
Experiments in Single-Phase Natural Circulation, To
Transfer, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 939-947, 1985
be published
- 10 -
Measurement of the Unattached Fraction
of 222Rn Progeny Using Wire Screens
Canoba, A.C. and López, F.O.
Publicado en Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, vol. 245, no. 3, p. 539-544, 2000
MEASUREMENT OF THE UNATTACHED FRACTION OF 222RN
PROGENY USING WIRE SCREENS
Canoba, A.C. and López, F.O.

Argentina
ABSTRACT
A method for the measurement of the unattached radon progeny based on the electrostatic
deposition on wire screens has been implemented and calibrated, using only one sampling
pump.
The importance of being able to measure the short-lived radon progeny resides in the special
radiological significance that the unattached fraction has. It was possible to apply this
measurement method to several dwellings of Argentina and then, have an estimated value of
the unattached fraction under different aerosol sources conditions.
The remarkable aspect of this method is its simplicity, not only in the sample collection
equipment used, but also in the measurement instruments used, as well as the counting
protocols that are simple and fast.
INTRODUCTION
Radon gas is the most important source of natural radiation. Its radiological importance resides
not in the gas itself, but in its short-lived progeny, which, if are inhaled, they deposit and
irradiate the respiratory tract.
The measurement of the total radon progeny activity in air has been the traditional procedure
used to control the levels of exposure due to the inhalation of these nuclides. Nevertheless, two
important physical parameters used in lung dosimetry are the activity median diameter of the
218 1,2,3,4
attached radioactive aerosols and the unattached fraction of Po . A considerable fraction
exists which remains unattached to aerosols, which is transported by ultra-fine aerosol particles
that are easily deposited in the respiratory tract due to their high diffusion, which is inversely
proportional to the diameter of the particles. Therefore, the measurement of the unattached
fraction of the short-lived radon progeny is very important in the estimation of the dose to the
respiratory tract.
Different procedures have been used for the measurement of the unattached fraction: diffusion,
5,6
impactation and electrostatic deposition methods . Nevertheless, very few are sufficiently
reliable for field measurements. Because of the difficult physical conditions and the limited time
available in the places to sample, it is important to count with a simple method based on
relatively short and simple procedures.
Within these conditions is found a method based on the electrostatic deposition, which uses
wire screens as deposition surface. The main advantages of this method are: its low cost, its
simplicity, and also the determinations are made by means of simple measurement protocols
7 8
such as Kusnetz or Rolle methods.
This work describes the steps made in the implementation of a method based on electrostatic
deposition onto wire screens as a means to monitor the unattached progeny in different
environments of interest.
427
In the present work, the unattached fraction, f, was defined in terms of the concentration of
potential alpha energy (C∝), as the relation between (C∝) of the unattached progeny and (C∝) of
the total progeny.
(Cα ) unattached
f = (1)
(Cα ) total
For the determination of the unattached fraction, a method using wire screens was used. There
are four variants of this type of method: three of them use two sampling pumps for the
222
determination of the concentration of the unattached progeny of Rn, the fourth one uses a
9
single pump . This last method was chosen for this work in order to avoid the simultaneous use
of two sampling pumps due to the uncertainties that appear related to the fluctuation of the
sampling flow rates, and to try to use the least possible equipment.
The selected method of measurement of the unattached fraction, consists in the sampling of air
during a specific period (10 minutes) through an open-faced filter holder that contains a wire
screen and a membrane filter (used as backup) Figure 1. During the sampling, an important
portion of the unattached fraction is collected on the wire screen, while the backup filter collects
the rest of the progeny. Once the sampling is complete, the wire screen as well as the filter are
measured by an alpha counter with a SZn(Ag) disc.
Figure 1. Device made up of an open-faced filter holder containing the wire screen,
the O-rings and the back up filter.
Experimental development
The measurements were made in two radon calibration chambers that contain uranium mineral
as source of this gas. In one of the chambers, the maximum radon concentration reached was
3 3
2000 Bq/m , whereas in the other one, the maximum concentration reached was 16000 Bq/m .
Radon progeny concentrations were established for each chamber, and different equilibrium
conditions were obtained either by the movement of the air mass or by yhe variation of the
particle concentration.
222
As measurement method of Rn progeny, 0.8 µm Millipore membrane filters placed on a 25 mm.
-1
diameter filter holders were used. The sampling flowrate was established between 2-3 L.min
using Sensidyne sampling pumps Figure 2. This filter was used as the reference filter.
Kusnetz´s as well as Rolle´s measurement methods were used. The general expression for the
calculation of the concentration of the potential alpha energy (WL) is:
(G − B)
WL ( filter ) = (2) ,
E K Q t s tk
428
where G is the total counts, B the background counts, E is the counting efficiency, K is an
adjustment factor, Q is the fowrate, ts is the sampling period and tk is the counting time of the
sample.
Figure 2. Sensidyne sampling pump using a reference filter
9
An electrostatic deposition method was used for the measurement of the unattached radon
progeny. For this purpose, a filter holder similar to the previous one was used. A 100-mesh wire
screen was placed in it over a filter as was previously described. The screen was separated
214
from the filter by means of a 4 mm metallic ring, sufficient separation to avoid Pb atoms
5
deposited on the filter from reaching the wire screen due to recoil energy . The activities on the
membrane filter (backup filter) as well as that on the wire screen and the reference filter were
counted in a Ludlum 2200 alpha counter with a SZn(Ag) disc. The general expression for the
calculation of the concentration of potential alpha energy in the case of the wire screen is the
following one:
(G − B) C f / b
WL ( wire screen) = (3) ,
E K Q t s tk
where Cf/b is the geometric correction factor based on the front-to back ratio relation of the wire
screen. (See section: Experimental Determination of the Geometric Correction Factor (Cf/b)).
Assuming that the wire screen collects the unattached fraction with a certain efficiency (Ec), (see
222
section: Collection Efficiency of Wire Screens for Unattached Rn Progeny), and that its
counting efficiency is null for the combined fraction, the concentration of potential alpha energy
for the unattached fraction in air, WL (u.), is given by:
WL( wire screen) (G − B ) C f / b

WL ( u ) = = ( 4) ,
Ec E K Q t s t k Ec
This method uses only one sampling pump. This may be done by having a good collection
efficiency factor, Ec, and geometric correction factor Cf/p. Both are described below.
9
The unattached fraction is given by the following expression :
C f / b Aws
f = (5) ,
Ec (C f / b Aws + AFB )
429
where Aws. is the activity of the wire screen and ABF is the activity of the backup filter. It must be
noted that Cf/b Aws. is equal to the potential alpha energy (working level = WL) of the wire screen
and ABF is the potential alpha energy, WL, of the backup filter.
As it may be also observed, Cf/b Aws. / Ec and (Cf/b Aws + ABF) correspond to the unattached and
total concentration of potential alpha energy respectively.
With the purpose of corroborating these measurements, and to the objective of verifying that no
losses of activity took place in the sampling device, another sampling pump with a membrane
filter was simultaneously placed (reference filter) and its deposited activity was measured in the
same way (RF). If the sampling device was hermetic, without losses, the following would be
verified:
ARF = C f / b Aws + ABF (6)
Once the method has been calibrated, this step is no longer necessary.
Experimental determination of the geometric correction factor (Cf/b)
To assess this factor two simultaneous samplings were made within the reference chambers. In
each case, the sampling device consisted of a filter holder with a wire screen, a 4 mm. metallic
ring and a membrane filter. In one of them the front part of the wire screen was measured (F),
whereas, in the other device, the back part of the wire screen is counted (B). The correction
9
factor was expressed as :
(1 + ( F / B) −1 )
Cf /b = (7 ) ,
(1 − α L )
where αL is the specific activity loss due to the interception of the α particles. This value is a
proportionality constant that relates the number of particles intercepted by neighbour wires to
the number of total particles emitted away from the wires’ surfaces. This value was estimated to
10
be 7% .
222
Collection efficiency of the wire screens for the unattached Rn progeny.
The collection efficiency of the wire screens was calculated by means of the equation proposed
11
by Thomas and Hincliffe :
Ec = 1 − (0,82 e −0, 233 H + 0,18 e −16,7 H ) (8) ,
2 -1
where H = (100 M d D) / V, Ec is the collection efficiency, M = mesh.cm , d = the wire diameter
218 2 -1 -1
(cm), D = diffusion coefficient for Po atoms (0.06 cm .s ), V = linear air velocity. (cm.s ).
The value of the efficiency was checked experimentally by means of a simple procedure:
instead of using one backup filter and a wire screen, two screens were placed in the filter
holder. The activities on both screens were measured simultaneously. By means of the
12
following relation it is possible to obtain the experimental value of the collection efficiency
N 2 E (1 − E ) N2
= o E = 1− (9) ,
N1 E N1
where N2 is the activity on the backup screen and N1 is the activity on the prescreen.
430
RESULTS
Experimental determination of the geometric correction factor (Cf/b)

13
The measurements were made in the calibration chambers previously mentioned , where the
222
concentrations of Rn as well as its progeny, were produced under controlled environmental
conditions. The particle concentration was varied by means of introducing or not cigarette
smoke within the chamber, so as to obtain representative atmospheres of high particle
6 -3 -3
concentration (~1,2 10 partícles.cm ) and low concentration particles(~200 partículas.cm ).
Five wire screens (100 mesh/inch) were used alternatively. The sampling time was always 10
minutes and the radioactivity was measured by means of a SZn(Ag) disc during 5 minutes in
Ludlum 2200 alpha counters. The efficiency of the measurement was 0,485. This value was
214
determined by means of a series of parallel measurements of Po activity in alpha counters
(Ludlum 2200) and in a liquid scintillation counter (Tri-Carb 2550 Low-Level Packard). The
-1
flowrate during the samplings was maintained between 2-3 L.min . In that experiences where
the sampling flowrates did not coincide, the counts were normalized.
A total of 16 determinations were made: 10 under low aerosol concentration and 6 under high
aerosol concentration. The results can be observed in Table 1.
-1 -1
From this data, with an average flowrate of 2.5 L.min that implies a linear air velocity of 12 cm.s ,
the average value of the geometric correction factor is 1.36, with a standard deviation of 0.12.
14
In the work reported by Phillips , we observe that with a wire screen of 100 mesh/inch and an
s-1
air velocity of 13.18 cm. , an average value of 1,36 for the correction factor was obtained. On
10
the other hand, Holub and Knutson obtained, with wire screens of the same size, an average
value of 1,38.
Table 1. Values of the geometric correction factor (Cf/b) for high and
low particle concentrations
Particle Concentration Cf / B
Low 1,42
High 1,42
High 1,08
High 1,34
Low 1,37
Low 1,36
Low 1,40
Low 1,41
Low 1,44
High 1,32
Low 1,39
High 1,51
Low 1,36
Low 1,40
High 1,08
Low 1,50
431
Experimental determination of the collection efficiency Ec
To calculate the collection efficiency Ec, the methodology previously described was followed. Air
samples from the reference chamber were taken initially by means of filter holders that
contained two wire screens of 100 mesh/inch (39 mesh/cm). The air flowrate was adjusted to
-1
2.5 L.min that, for the sampling devices of an effective diameter of 21 mm, meant a linear air
-1
velocity of 12 cm.s . The diameter of the wire of these screens was 0.01 cm and a diffusion
2 -1 11
coefficient D of 0.06 cm .s was assumed. The sampling time was 10 minutes. Then, the
activities of both screens were measured simultaneously in two alpha counters of known
efficiency and applying equation (9), the collection efficiency was calculated experimentally
Afterwards, the theoretical efficiency was calculated for the same conditions, using equation (8).
In order to obtain different values of H factor, a series of measurements varying the sampling
flowrate, and using different wire screens (100, 120 and 150 mesh/inch) were made. The results
can be observed in Table 2.
Table 2. Correlation between the experimental and theoretical collecting

efficiency (Ec) for different values of H factor.
Experimental Difference in
H Factor Theoretical efficiency
efficiency percentage
5,5 0,77 0,82 6,4
8,3 0,85 0,89 4,7
9,4 0,91 0,91 0
11,5 0,94 0,94 0
12,3 0,95 0,95 0
16,5 0,98 0,96 2,1
16,9 0,98 0,95 3,1
31,9 0,99 0,98 1,0
34,8 0,99 0,96 3,0
55,6 0,99 0,97 2,0
As can be observed, a very good correlation exists between the Ec obtained by means of this
simple experiment and the theoretically calculated values.
In Figure 3 the values of the experimental efficiency Ec for the different values of H factor are
shown.
1.05
0.95
Efficiecy EC
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
5 15 25 35 45 55
H Factor
Figure 3. Curve that shows the experimental collection efficiency (Ec) as a function of H factor.
432
In the following experiences in order to measure the unattached fraction, f, the conditions of the
wire screens and air velocities used resulted in an average H factor equal to 8.2. Then, it may
be deduced from Figure 3 that our collection efficiency was approximately equal to 0.9.
Sampling and calibration

222
The concentration of Rn was measured in the reference chambers, instantaneously, by
15
means of scintillation cells . The unattached fraction, f, was measured under variable
conditions of ventilation and aerosol concentration, so as to have different equilibrium factors F.
The measurement method used was the same as described previously. The experiences were
made through filter holders using the wire screen-backup filter combination. The WL
measurements were calculated by means of Rolle or Kusnetz methods. Additional
measurements were made with reference filters. The values of the WL based on the
measurements of the reference filter were compared with those obtained by the wire screen-
backup filter combination. The unattached fraction f, was calculated according to equation (5).
A summary of the measurements of the unattached fraction under different environmental

conditions is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Measurements of the unattached fraction for different conditions of equilibrium factor (F).
F: equilibrium factor; f: unattached fraction; Ec: collection efficiency, WLrf, WLbf, WLws represent
working levels measured in the reference filter, backup filter and wire screen respectively.
f
222
Rn WLws Number of
-3 F WLrf WLws+WLbf Ec (WLws+WLbf)
(Bq.m ) measurements
14600 0,06 0,24 0,11+0,12 0,5 7

2270 0,097 0,05 0,023+0,040 0,4 8
12800 0,11 0,375 0,08+0,30 0,23 9
13600 0,23 0,87 0,16+0,63 0,21 8
15400 0,37 1,5 0,18+1,20 0,14 10
2270 0,48 0,31 2,1E-3+0,3 0,026 6
2180 0,5 0,3 2E-3+0,3 0,007 8
1920 0,65 0,34 4E-4+0,33 0,001 6
Analysing the relationship that exists between the measured data of the unattached fraction, f,
and the corresponding equilibrium factors, F, we deduce that for higher values of F (greater
particle concentration), the values of f are smaller and the inverse is true when the values of F
are lower. This shows a total dependency between f and the particle concentration. If the values
of f as a function of F are graphed, Figure 4, we find that the data adjusts to an equation of type
b
f = aF , where a and b are empirical coefficients.
On the base of the empirical data obtained by means of the study regression, we find that the
values of the coefficients are the following: a = 0.0353 and b = -0,956, with a correlation
coefficient equal to 0.96, giving then the following relation:
- 0,956
f = 0,0353 F (10)
16,17,18
This form of the equation is similar to the data obtained by other authors .
On the other hand, analysing Table 3, it is possible to observe that the values of the WLrf agree
with the values found when adding WLws and WLbf, We deduce therefore, that the method of
measuring the unattached fraction may be done perfectly well with a single sampling pump
since no loss of activity exists. Equation 6 is verified this way.
433
0.6
0.5
Unattached fraction (f)

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Equilibrium factor (F)
Figure 4. Curve that relates the unattached fraction (f) as a function

of the equilibrium factor F
CONCLUSIONS
A sufficiently reliable method for routine measurements of the unattached fraction has been
implemented based on the electrostatic deposition on wire screens. The remarkable aspect of
this measurement method is its simplicity, not only in the equipment used to collect the samples,
but also in the instrument used for the measurements. Moreover, the counting protocols are
simple and fast.
The measurements of the unattached fraction were made under different environmental
conditions, using, in parallel, the measurement of reference filters. The comparison of the
obtained results demonstrated that this method, that uses only one sampling pump, could be
applied, as the device lacks losses. This method can also be implemented because the
collection efficiency as well as the geometric correction factor were precisely characterised.
Because the unattached fraction implies a greater radiological risk than the same amount of
activity attached to aerosols, an important improvement in the determination of the radiological
risk can be obtained carrying out measurements of the unattached progeny in a simple way
during the different samplings.
From both, the data obtained in dwellings (low radon gas concentrations) and the data obtained
in the experiences made in the reference chamber, Table 4, it is observed that these values
agree with the calibration curve values (made with high radon gas concentrations so as to have
a good statistics). This means that this curve is valid and may be applied to all radon gas
concentrations.
It was possible to apply this measurement method to several dwellings of Argentina and then,
have an estimated value of the unattached fraction under different aerosol sources conditions.
These measured values agree with values found for other authors. This is the way to initiate in
our country a better dose estimation of the population due to radon gas hazard.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to acknowledge the assistance we received in the translation and revision of this
paper from Marta Arnaud and Hugo Equillor.
434
Table 4. Concentrations of radon gas, corresponding f and F values, and the aerosol particle
conditions of measurements in dwellings of Argentina. F: equilibrium factor; f: unattached fraction.
222
Rn Additional
Dwelling -3 f F
(Bq.m ) Aerosols
yes 0,020 0,63

yes 0,070 0,44
1 150-200 no 0,090 0,31
no 0,150 0,25
no 0,240 0,11
yes 0,017 0,66
no 0,090 0,33
2 80-100
no 0,190 0,17
no 0,290 0,14
yes 0,030 0,55
yes 0,070 0,40
3 20-40
no 0,160 0,31
no 0,200 0,20
yes 0,023 0,50
yes 0,070 0,43
4 8-15 no 0,150 0,35
no 0,240 0,26
no 0,200 0,22
Table 5. Concentrations of radon gas, corresponding f and F values, and the aerosol particle
conditions of measurements in a reference chamber. F: equilibrium factor; f: unattached fraction.
222
Rn Additional
Experience -3 f F
(Bq.m ) Aerosols
yes 0,010 0,64
yes 0,010 0,58
1 1800-1900
yes 0,019 0,43
no 0,150 0,25
yes 0,024 0,56
yes 0,019 0,42
2 1100-1200 yes 0,047 0,4
no 0,036 0,34
no 0,180 0,17
yes 0,010 0,55
yes 0,080 0,4
no 0,090 0,36
3 700-900 no 0,145 0,2
no 0,376 0,09
no 0,590 0,06
no 0,900 0,01
yes 0,010 0,70
yes 0,028 0,62
4 300-500 no 0,120 0,3
no 0,150 0,11
no 0,850 0,07
435
REFERENCES
th
1- A.C. James, J.R. Greenhalgh, A. Birchall, Proc. 5 Congress IRPA, Jerusalem, 2, (1980),
1045-1048.
2- W. Jacobi, K. Eisfeld, GSF report S-626, Gesellschaft fur Strahlen-und Umweltforschung,

Munich-Neuherberg, (1980).
3- N.H. Harley, B. S. Pasternack, Health Phys.,42 (1982) 789.
4- U.S. Department of Energy, A Critical Review of Measurements of the Unattached Fraction

of Radon Decay Poducts, Technical Report Series, (1990), DOE / ER-0451P.
5- M. Raghavayya, J.H. Jones, Health Phys., 26 (1974) 417.
6- A.W. Van der Vooren, A. Busigin, C.R. Phillips, Health Phys., 42 (1982) 801.
7- H.L. Kusnetz, Am. Industr. Hyg. Assoc., Q. 17 (1956) 85.
8- R. Rolle, Health Phys., 22 (1972) 233.
9- R. Janica, Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa, Canada, Wire Screens as a Tool for
Survey Measurements of the Unattached Radon Progeny in Mines, Report, (1996), INFO-0655.
10- R.F. Holub, E.O. Knutson, Radon and Its Decay Products, Hopke,ed., (1987), ACS,
Washington, DC.
11- J.W. Thomas, L.E. Hinchcliffe, J. Aerosol Sci., 3 (1972) 387.
12- E. Stranden, L. Berteig, Health Phys., 42 (1982) 479.
13- A.C. Canoba, F.O. López, A.A. Oliveira, J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem., 240 (1999) 237.
14- C.R. Phillips, Determination of the Collection and Counting Efficiency Properties of Wire
Screens for unattached Radon Progeny, (1989), Draft Report to the AECB.
15- H.L. Lucas, Rev. Sci. Instrum., 28 (1957) 680.
16- A. Reineking, K.H. Becker, J. Porstendorfer, Sci. Total Environ., 45 (1985) 261.
17- A. Reineking, J. Porstendorfer, Health Phys., 58 (1990) 715.
18- E. Stranden, T. Strand, Rad. Prot. Dosim., 16 (1986) 313.
436
Gestión de residuos radiactivos
Pahissa Campá, J. y Pahissa, M. H. de

GESTIÓN DE RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS
1 2
Pahissa Campá, J. y Pahissa, M. H. de
1
2
Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica
Argentina
439
Transitorio de pérdida del caudal de
alimentación a los generadores de
vapor en CNA1 con RELAP5/MOD3
Marino, E.J.L.

TRANSITORIO DE PÉRDIDA DEL CAUDAL DE ALIMENTACIÓN A LOS
GENERADORES DE VAPOR EN CNA1 CON RELAP5/MOD3
Marino, E.J.L.

Argentina
RESUMEN ABSTRACT
Se presentan los resultados de los The results of the calculations are

cálculos realizados utilizando el código presented carried out by utilizing the code
RELAP5/MOD3 [1], sobre la base del evento RELAP5/MOD3 [1], upon the basis of the
inicial postulado de pérdida total de postulated initial event of total loss of feed
caudal de alimentación a los dos water to the two steam generators in the
generadores de vapor en la Central Nuclear Nuclear Power Plant Atucha 1, CNA1. The
Atucha 1, CNA1. Se analizó la evolución de evolution of the installation systems during
la instalación durante el desarrollo del the transient was analyzed in different
transitorio en diferentes condiciones de conditions of availability: condenser, relief
disponibilidad de los sistemas localizados valve and safety valves in the secondary
en los circuitos primario y secundario de la system, safety valves in the primary system
instalación que resultan relevantes en este and system of long-term subsequent
evento: condensador, válvula de alivio y cooling. Located in the primary and
válvulas de seguridad en el sistema secondary systems of the installation they
secundario, válvulas de seguridad en el turn out to be prominent in this event. Upon
sistema primario y sistema de refrigeración this basis the sequences of possible
posterior a largo plazo. Sobre esta base evolution were calculated and those that
fueron calculadas las secuencias posibles would conduct the system toward the
de evolución y se determinaron las que setting called "damage to the core" were
conducirían al sistema hacia el escenario determined. Also those in which would
denominado “daño al núcleo” y aquellas en arrive to a state of "safe shutdown" were
las que se arribaría a un estado de “parada determined. These results were utilized in
segura”. Estos resultados se utilizaron en la the verification of the tree of events utilized
verificación del árbol de eventos empleado in the Final Report of the Probabilistic
en el Informe Final del Análisis Safety Analysis [2] for the sequence of
Probabilístico de Seguridad [2], para la events T9, made from calculations carried
denominada secuencia de eventos T9, y out with the code DINETZ [3]. From this
que fueron fundamentados en cálculos compare some differences were determined
realizados con el código DINETZ [3]. De la and are presented in the modified version of
comparación se determinaron algunas tree of events.
diferencias y son presentadas como un
árbol de eventos modificado.
455
1. INTRODUCCIÓN
Para la realización del trabajo fue necesario previamente trabajar en la construcción de la

representación de los sistemas primario, secundario y moderador de la CNA1 (figura 1.a), en el
lenguaje de datos de entrada utilizado por el código RELAP5/MOD3. El comportamiento de
esta nodalización (figura 1.b) se probó en diferentes condiciones para asegurar el correcto
funcionamiento de los elementos incorporados al circuito básico, en cuanto a los valores de
regulación o disparo, o su desempeño en general. En esta etapa fueron incorporados, entre
otros elementos, los siguientes componentes relevantes: extracción del sistema de control de
volumen, ducha auxiliar del presurizador, sistema de duchas normales de control de presión del
sistema primario, calefactores del presurizador, válvulas de seguridad del sistema primario,
tanque de alivio, sistema de ruptura a la contención, válvula de venteo a la atmósfera para
control de presión en el sistema secundario, válvulas de aislación en el sistema secundario,
válvulas de seguridad en el sistema secundario y líneas de vapor en el sistema secundario,
sistema de refrigeración posterior o a largo plazo. Para todos los sistemas incorporados se
introdujo la lógica de control correspondiente, sobre la base de los datos del diseño del reactor
[4] [5].
Sobre esta base se verificó que se alcanzara el estado estacionario, en valores normales de
funcionamiento a 100% de potencia, para los diferentes parámetros y cada uno de los circuitos.
Este cálculo se realizó sobre 1000 s de simulación. Los valores alcanzados en este
estacionario inicial se utilizaron para inicializar el cálculo en todas las simulaciones posteriores
a partir de 0 s Las diferentes secuencias fueron iniciadas luego de un nuevo cálculo
estacionario hasta los 100 s en que se imponen las condiciones de contorno para iniciar el
evento en estudio. Para esto, se redujo el caudal de alimentación en ambos generadores de
vapor, rama fría del sistema secundario, hasta anularlo completamente. Resulta interesante
mencionar que se considera como evento representativo a las “roturas en el colector común de
las tuberías de impulsión de las bombas de alimentación”, tal como fuera justificado en la
referencia [2], debido a que en este caso se considera imposible la recuperación por parte del
operador y se obtiene un escenario de máxima exigencia a los sistemas de seguridad que
deberán actuar.
2. DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA CNA1 Y DEL EVENTO ANALIZADO
La central CNA I es un reactor de 1170 MW térmicos generados por uranio natural y utilizando
D2O como moderador y refrigerante (figura 1.a). El circuito primario de refrigeración está
formado por dos loops independientes, con un generador de vapor y bomba centrífuga
3
impulsora de 11.750 m /h en cada uno de ellos. Este sistema funciona a una temperatura de
305°C a la salida del reactor y 272°C a la salida de los generadores de vapor. El caudal del
circuito primario circula por 253 canales refrigerantes del reactor. El moderador circula por un
sistema de dos loops independientes con intercambiadores de calor y bomba cada uno de
ellos, siendo la temperatura promedio de funcionamiento de este sistema de 195°C. Ambos
2
sistemas, primario y moderador, se encuentran a la misma presión de 115 kg/cm , considerada
a la salida del reactor en el circuito primario. El presurizador sobre uno de los circuitos del
sitema primario permite el control de presión durante la expansión y contracción del inventario
del circuito de refrigeración y funciona con un sistema de duchas y calefactores para regular
estas variaciones, y un sistema de válvula de alivio hacia un tanque auxiliar de recuperación.
El sistema primario - moderador cuenta también con un sistema de control de volumen y

purificación que incrementa su extracción en caso de expansión del inventario.
Además del sistema de alimentación de agua normal para las duchas, desde el circuito
primario en la rama fría, se cuenta con un sistema de duchado frío y caliente a menor
temperatura que el normal y cuyo caudal es provisto por el sistema de control de volumen y
456
purificación del reactor. La operación de las válvulas que controlan el ingreso de este caudal se
requiere en determinados transitorios previstos originalmente en el diseño del reactor, como
forma de evitar la acción de la válvula de seguridad del sistema primario durante un aumento
de presión en el sistema o para llevar rápidamente el sistema a baja presión durante la rotura
de tubos de los generadores de vapor.
El transitorio analizado en este cálculo es el generado por todas aquellas fallas que inhabilitan
ambos generadores de vapor como sumideros de calor. Causas incluidas dentro de este
evento pueden ser: roturas del sistema de agua de alimentación externas a la contención o
fallas combinadas de válvulas y bombas que inhabiliten el sistema de agua de alimentación.
La disminución hasta la pérdida total del caudal de alimentación a los generadores de vapor,
estando el reactor a plena potencia, introduce una rápida disminución del inventario en el lado
secundario de los mismos debido a que continúa el suministro de caudal de vapor hacia la
turbina. Esta disminución genera una pérdida de transferencia de calor desde el lado primario
de los tubos, induciendo un calentamiento inicial progresivo del sistema primario. También, al
no haber circulación de precalentamiento por el secundario de los intercambiadores del sistema
moderador, se produce un calentamiento adicional en el sistema moderador. Este proceso
continúa hasta producirse el disparo del reactor por bajo nivel en los generadores de vapor.
3. RESULTADOS OBTENIDOS
Luego de los 100 s iniciales de cálculo en condiciones de estacionario, se induce la detención

de la alimentación a los dos generadores de vapor en forma simultanea. Esto genera la
constante disminución de nivel en el lado secundario de los generadores de vapor, debido a
que el flujo de salida de vapor continúa al igual que la generación de calor en el núcleo. Esta
disminución continúa hasta alcanzar el valor de disparo por bajo nivel en que se produce la
detención del reactor. A partir de este momento se tendrán diferentes evoluciones según el
correcto accionar o no de los sistemas involucrados.
3.1 Evolución normal durante el evento con disponibilidad total de sistemas
En este caso se determinó que luego del evento iniciante de reducción del caudal de
alimentación en ambos generadores de vapor (figuras 3.1.a y 3.1.b), se alcanza la condición de
detención para la generación de potencia en el reactor en t ≅ 42 s (figura 3.1.c). Seguidamente
se produce la detención de turbina y la conmutación del by-pass de salida de vapor directa al
condensador (figura 3.1.c). Luego la evolución continúa con una disminución constante en el
nivel de los generadores de vapor, posterior a la recuperación inicial que produce el cierre de
turbina, y que se produce en condiciones de regulación constante de presión en el sistema
secundario. Como puede apreciarse, el sistema evoluciona hacia el descubrimiento del lado
secundario de los tubos en ambos generadores de vapor.
En el sistema primario y moderador, la evolución del evento produce el rápido incremento

inicial en la presión (figura 3.1.d), por pérdida de la transferencia térmica hacia el secundario,
hasta comenzar el descenso posterior al disparo de detención de la generación de potencia,
por bajo nivel en el secundario. Luego de esta disminución hasta un valor mínimo, comienza a
incrementarse nuevamente la presión por el mismo efecto de falta de transferencia térmica
hacia el secundario y por la continua expansión del sistema moderador, en el cual se observa
el continuo incremento de temperatura. En t ≅ 270 s de iniciado el transitorio comienza a actuar
la regulación de la presión en el sistema primario (figura 3.1.d), el cual evoluciona hacia la
condición ∆t < 20° para las temperaturas primario y moderador, de conmutación a refrigeración
posterior, para tiempos superiores a los 2000 s desde el inicio del evento.
En el presurizador (figura 3.1.e) se observan evoluciones iniciales similares en la presión y el

nivel, y luego de la detención de la generación de potencia y conmutación en el sistema
secundario, se produce una disminución seguida del posterior incremento constante en el nivel
457
hasta alcanzar un valor superior a los 7 m hacia el final de cálculo, para los 2000 s desde el
inicio del evento. La presión, al igual que en otros puntos del sistema primario, se mantiene en
el valor de regulación constante por efecto de la ducha normal de regulación (figura 3.1.f).
Los resultados indican también que si bien el caudal en ambas ramas del sistema primario se
estabiliza en valores constantes (figura 3.1.g), las temperaturas de entrada y salida en los
tubos de los generadores de vapor (figuras 3.1.h y 3.1.i) tienden a igualarse en la etapa inicial
del transitorio, indicando una rápida pérdida de la transferencia de calor hacia el secundario,
debido al descubrimiento de los tubos. Esta pérdida de capacidad de transferencia se observa,
en este caso, luego de t ≅ 150 s o 2.5 min. desde iniciado el evento (dado que el evento se
inicia luego de 100 segundos de cálculo inicial en condiciones de estacionario esto es para t ≅
250 s en las mencionadas figuras).
En los parámetros del moderador (figura 3.1.j) se observa que las temperaturas de entrada y
salida tienden a igualarse para luego continuar un incremento constante hacia la temperatura
del sistema primario. Esta igualación se debe a la pérdida de transferencia en los
intercambiadores de calor del moderador, cuyo lado secundario (fuente fría), es en este caso la
etapa de pre-calentamiento del caudal de alimentación de los generadores de vapor, caudal
que se ha anulado para dar origen al evento.
En este caso, los resultados obtenidos indican que el calentamiento constante y la expansión
del sistema moderador, debido a la pérdida de transferencia térmica hacia el secundario,
produce un incremento constante en el nivel del presurizador. El sistema evoluciona en la
dirección de la apertura de la válvula de seguridad en el sistema primario, en condiciones tales
que producirá una pérdida de inventario en fase líquida, siendo altamente probable la falla en el
cierre de la válvula.
3.2 Evolución normal durante el evento con disponibilidad total de sistemas y

conmutación a refrigeración posterior
En este caso, y según los resultados obtenidos en 3.1, la evolución del evento iniciante es tal
que permitiría conmutar al sistema de refrigeración posterior luego de los 2000 s transcurridos
desde el inicio del mismo. Para verificar el resultado o efecto que esto tiene en los parámetros
que caracterizan los diferentes sistemas, se procedió a continuar el cálculo para t ≥ 2000 s en
condiciones de conmutación al sistema de refrigeración posterior. Para esto se incorporó a la
nodalización las correspondientes conexiones alternativas en el lado secundario de los
intercambiadores del sistema moderador y su correspondiente aislamiento del sistema de
alimentación a los generadores de vapor, que lo utiliza como etapa de precalentamiento
durante el funcionamiento normal. Esta conmutación es la que garantiza la evolución del
sistema, en última instancia, hacia el estado de parada segura en cuanto a la extracción del
calor residual del núcleo.
La evolución de la presión en ambas ramas del sistema primario de refrigeración (figuras 3.2.a
y 3.2.b) indica que la misma tiende a un valor de estabilización luego de los 1000 s iniciales.
Esto se debe al accionar del sistema de regulación de presión en el presurizador, calefactores,
que tienden a mantener la presión luego de la disminución inicial. En esta etapa se consideró
que dejan de actuar las bombas impulsoras del caudal refrigerante en el sistema primario, no
habiendo disponibilidad de duchas para la regulación de presión. En cuanto a las temperaturas
se observa que tanto la de entrada como la de salida, en ambas ramas del sistema primario,
disminuyen por debajo de la temperatura de salida del sistema moderador. Esto se debe a que
el sistema moderador es ahora el mecanismo de extracción del calor residual. En la rama con
conexión al presurizador se observa un efecto de aumento en la temperatura de entrada debido
al accionar del sistema de calefactores, correlacionable con las variaciones observadas en la
presión (figura 3.2.b).
El efecto de la conmutación es la estabilización de la presión en un valor menor y la detención

del incremento constante en el nivel que se venía observando desde el comienzo del transitorio
(figura 3.2.c).
458
Los resultados obtenidos en este caso indican que el sistema se estabiliza y puede ser
conducido hacia un estado seguro en cuanto a la extracción del calor residual en el núcleo.
En el caso de fallar esta alternativa, el sistema seguirá evolucionando como en la situación

calculada en el punto 3.1 de manera tal que irá en la dirección de un escenario final de daño al
núcleo debido a que no estaría garantizada la refrigeración a largo plazo.
3.3 Evolución del evento con falla o indisponibilidad del sistema condensador
En este caso se determinó que luego del evento iniciante, reducción del caudal de alimentación
en ambos generadores de vapor (figura 3.3.a), se alcanza la condición de detención para la
generación de potencia por bajo nivel en los mismos (figura 3.3.b). Posteriormente se produce
la detención de turbina y se induce la condición de falla en la conmutación del by-pass de
salida de vapor directa al condensador (figura 3.3.b). Luego la evolución continúa con una
disminución constante en el nivel de los generadores de vapor, posterior a la recuperación
inicial que produce el cierre de turbina, y que se produce en condiciones de falla en la
regulación de presión del by-pass. Esto genera un aumento rápido en la presión en el sistema
secundario, quedando como alternativas para su reducción la apertura de la válvula de alivio
(figuras 3.3.a y 3.3.c). En este caso, los resultados obtenidos indican que además se produce
la apertura de las válvulas de seguridad para disminuir la presión en el sistema secundario
(figura 3.3.c) debido al rápido incremento de la presión luego de la falla o indisponibilidad de la
regulación vía el condensador. Luego de esta apertura y cierre, el sistema alcanza la presión
de regulación establecida por la válvula de alivio (figuras 3.3.a y 3.3.c).
En este caso, si bien el sistema evoluciona hacia el descubrimiento del lado secundario de los
tubos en ambos generadores de vapor, el proceso es más lento que en el transitorio
considerado en el punto 3.1. Esto es lo que indican los resultados si se comparan las curvas de
disminución del nivel en el lado secundario de los generadores de vapor obtenidas en cada
caso.
En el sistema primario se observa, en forma similar a lo obtenido en el caso discutido en 3.1,

un incremento inicial de la presión debido a la disminución de inventario en el secundario y
disminución de área de transferencia térmica para la evacuación hacia la turbina. Este
incremento continúa hasta la detención del reactor por bajo nivel y luego se produce la
disminución hasta la acción del sistema de regulación en el primario (figura 3.3.d) El nivel de
incremento de la presión en el sistema primario, en este caso, resulta mayor que el obtenido en
el punto 3.1 y fundamentalmente debido a que el nivel de presión de apertura del alivio en el
secundario es mayor que el correspondiente a la regulación del by-pass al condensador. El
estado final en el sistema indica que evoluciona hacia la condición de conmutación al sistema
de refrigeración posterior (figura 3.3.d), mientras exista inventario en el lado secundario de los
generadores de vapor (figura 3.3.a).
Según los resultados obtenidos en este caso (figura 3.3.f) las temperaturas en la rama fría y
caliente del sistema primario tienden a igualarse y permanecen en un valor constante desde los
600 s del cálculo. Esto indica que, teniendo en cuenta los 100 s iniciales hasta el comienzo del
evento iniciante, que luego de 8.3 minutos desde el comienzo del evento se anula la
transferencia térmica hacia el secundario. El incremento de la temperatura en el sistema
moderador y su expansión, estando activa la regulación de presión en el sistema primario
(figura 3.3.h) genera como resultado el incremento continuo en el nivel del presurizador (figura
3.3.g). Este incremento es más pronunciado en este caso si se compara con el resultado
obtenido en el transitorio analizado en 3.1 (figura 3.1.e). Es decir, en este caso el
comportamiento es más lento en cuanto al descubrimiento del lado secundario pero más rápido
en cuanto al incremento de nivel en el presurizador por inundación desde el sistema primario
en expansión. En este caso el sistema evoluciona hacia la apertura de la válvula de seguridad
en el sistema primario, siendo la conmutación a refrigeración posterior la alternativa de evitarlo,
garantizando la refrigeración a largo plazo.
459
3.4 Evolución del evento con falla o indisponibilidad del sistema condensador y falla
posterior del sistema de válvulas de seguridad
En este caso se consideró, teniendo en cuenta los resultados del punto 3.3, la posibilidad que
luego de la apertura del alivio en el sistema secundario, este sistema deba actuar solo en el
control de la presión. Para esto se inhabilitó el sistema de válvulas de seguridad, que habían
alcanzado la condición de apertura en el comienzo del transitorio, según el cálculo presentado
en el punto anterior.
Los resultados obtenidos indican que el incremento en la presión en el lado secundario es mas
elevado en este caso (figura 3.4.a) si se lo compara con los transitorios analizados
previamente. El valor máximo estimado en este caso alcanza las 68 atm y superaría, según
este cálculo, el valor de diseño, 60 atm.
En cuanto a la presión en el sistema primario (figura 3.4.b) se obtiene un incremento mayor y

más rápido y lo mismo se observa en los parámetros del presurizador (figuras 3.4.c y 3.4.d).
3.5 Evolución del evento con falla o indisponibilidad de los sistemas condensador y
válvula de alivio del sistema secundario
En este caso se calculó la evolución del sistema suponiendo la falla sucesiva de la derivación o
by-pass al condensador, luego de la detención de turbina, y posteriormente la de la estación de
venteo. En estas condiciones, se produce un incremento constante en la presión del
secundario de los generadores de vapor hasta alcanzar el valor de apertura de las válvulas de
seguridad (figura 3.5.a). Debido a que en este caso este es el único mecanismo de extracción
del calor residual del núcleo, el sistema deberá seguir actuando en forma sucesiva para
controlar el progresivo calentamiento del primario y la consiguiente presurización del sistema
secundario.
Los resultados obtenidos indican que de no producirse la falla en el cierre de alguna de las
válvulas de seguridad, que produciría el enfriamiento y despresurización abruptos del sistema
primario, el sistema evoluciona hacia la condición para conmutar a refrigeración por el
moderador o refrigeración posterior (figura 3.5.b). Se observa que el tiempo entre las sucesivas
aperturas y cierres de las válvulas se hace cada vez menor, aumentando la demanda del
mismo (figuras 3.5.c y 3.5.d). El efecto del venteo por el sistema de seguridad produce el
enfriamiento en el lado primario y las variaciones de presión correlacionadas con cada apertura
y cierre (figura 3.5.c). Esto se observa también en los parámetros del presurizador (figuras
3.5.d y 3.5.e). En este caso, el incremento en el nivel del presurizador es más rápido que en los
casos anteriores y el sistema evoluciona rápidamente hacia el llenado del sistema por la
expansión en el primario y moderador. La disminución en el nivel del secundario de los
generadores de vapor es más lenta que en los casos anteriores.
válvula de alivio del sistema secundario, con conmutación a refrigeración posterior
Sobre la base del evento calculado en el punto anterior se continúo el cálculo desde los 2000
segundos, considerando condiciones de conmutación a refrigeración posterior o vía los
intercambiadores del sistema moderador. En este caso, suponiendo que el sistema de válvulas
de seguridad ha sido exitoso en cada demanda de apertura y cierre, se observa que la
conmutación introduce una reducción de la presión en el lado secundario (figura 3.6.a) que
acompaña la variación de temperaturas en el primario y moderador (figura 3.6.b). Las
temperaturas en la salida del núcleo y moderador muestran la inversión de los flujos de calor y
debido a que el sistema tiende a extraer calor vía los intercambiadores del moderador, la
temperatura a la salida de este pasa a ser más elevada (figura 3.6.b). Durante la conmutación
se produce una reducción en la presión del primario (figura 3.6.d) que es recuperada por el
sistema de regulación del presurizador (figura 3.6.e) y tiende a estabilizarse hacia los 3500
460
segundos del cálculo. Esta estabilización también se observa en la detención de la expansión
en el presurizador (figura 3.6.d) y su reducción en el nivel hacia un valor estable.
Los resultados indican en este caso que luego de la conmutación, el evento queda controlado,
no requiriéndose nuevas aperturas de las válvulas de seguridad en el sistema secundario.
Todos los parámetros tienden a estabilizarse en las nuevas condiciones de presión y
temperatura en el sistema primario.
válvula de alivio del sistema secundario, con posterior falla abierta de una válvula de
seguridad
En este caso se calculó la evolución del sistema considerando el cálculo en las mismas
condiciones que el realizado en el punto 3.5 e induciendo la falla abierta de una de las válvulas
de seguridad luego de la primer demanda por exceso de presión en el sistema secundario. El
cálculo se extendió sobre los primeros 1000 s del evento.
La evolución en la presión del sistema secundario (figura 3.7.a) indica un rápido incremento
inicial hasta alcanzar el valor de apertura de las válvulas de seguridad (figura 3.7.b). Luego de
esta apertura se produce el cierre de una de las válvulas y la falla de la otra, quedando abierta
en forma permanente durante el cálculo considerado (figura 3.7.b). El resultado obtenido indica
una despresurización ∆p ≈ 30 atm en 500 s en el sistema secundario.
La evolución en la presión en el sistema primario (figura 3.7.c) indica un rápido incremento

inicial, debido a la presurización del secundario y la disminución de transferencia térmica hacia
el lado secundario de los generadores de vapor. Luego de la apertura de las válvulas de
seguridad y la posterior falla de una de ellas, en el sistema secundario, se produce el rápido
enfriamiento y despresurización del sistema primario (figura 3.7.c). El resultado del cálculo
indica que se produce una despresurización ∆p ≈ 20 atm en 500 s, y una disminución ∆T ≈ 110°C
en la temperatura a la salida del núcleo, en el mismo lapso de tiempo. Este transitorio de
despresurización descontrolada en el secundario genera la despresurización y enfriamiento
descriptos en el sistema primario, obteniéndose un transitorio diferente a los casos discutidos
hasta el momento. En particular, la expansión observada previamente en el primario y el
consiguiente crecimiento en el nivel del presurizador no se produce en este caso, sino lo
contrario. En este caso el nivel y la presión en el presurizador disminuyen en forma constante
luego de la apertura y falla de la válvula de seguridad en el secundario (figura 3.7.e). El sistema
de control de presión actúa inicialmente bien, pero pierde progresivamente su eficiencia de
transferencia térmica por la reducción en el nivel en el presurizador hacia el final del cálculo
considerado (figura 3.7.f).
válvula de alivio del sistema secundario, con posterior falla cerrada de ambas válvulas
de seguridad
En este caso se analizó el comportamiento del sistema cuando se produce la falla de la

totalidad de los mecanismos de evacuación del calor desde el sistema secundario. Para esto,
luego del evento iniciante y habiendo fallado sucesivamente el desvío al condensador y la
apertura del alivio, se introduce la falla de la apertura de ambas válvulas de seguridad. En
estas condiciones, en el sistema secundario se incrementa rápidamente la presión (figura
3.8.a) y según este cálculo se supera la presión de diseño del sistema de 60 atm en los
primeros 50 segundos desde comenzado el evento.
Teniendo en cuenta el resultado alcanzado, todo cálculo posterior a esta condición debe ser
comprendido en una especulación de cómo evolucionaría el sistema de no haber ocurrido
daños estructurales en el secundario que producirían la despresurización rápida del mismo y el
consecuente sobrenfriamiento y despresurización del sistema primario.
461
El cálculo se continuó hasta los 1000 segundos. Inicialmente la presurización rápida del
sistema secundario produce la presurización del sistema primario hasta alcanzar el valor de
apertura de la válvula de seguridad en el sistema presurizador (figura 3.8.b). Luego de esta
apertura y posterior despresurización, el sistema evoluciona en forma similar a los casos
anteriores. El sistema presurizador regula la presión en forma estable pero el calentamiento
progresivo del moderador hace que se expanda y genere el incremento del nivel en forma
constante (figuras 3.8.b, 3.8.d y 3.8.e).
4. CONCLUSIÓN
4.1 Según los cálculos realizados y los resultados obtenidos, que se presentan en el punto
3 de este trabajo, existen varias combinaciones de eventos o secuencias, que de producirse
luego del evento iniciante postulado, llevarían al sistema en la dirección de un escenario final
de “Daño al Núcleo”, DN, en el cual no se podría garantizar la refrigeración a largo plazo de los
elementos combustibles en el núcleo del reactor.
Estas secuencias corresponden a las calculadas en los siguientes puntos:
a. La evolución normal del evento iniciante analizada en 3.1 seguida de la falla de la

alternativa de conmutación a refrigeración posterior analizada en 3.2.
b. Evolución normal del evento iniciante analizada en 3.1 sin recurrir a la alternativa de
conmutación a refrigeración posterior y con falla de la apertura de las válvulas de alivio del
sistema primario.
c. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.3, con falla del desvío o by-pass del
condensador, y habiendo actuado el alivio del sistema secundario y válvulas de seguridad,
se produce posteriormente la falla de la alternativa de conmutación a refrigeración
posterior.
d. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.3, con falla del desvío o by-pass del
no se recurre a la alternativa conmutación a refrigeración posterior y se produce la falla en
la apertura de las válvulas de alivio del sistema primario.
e. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.4, con falla del desvío o by-pass del
condensador, y habiendo actuado el alivio del sistema secundario se produce la falla en la
apertura del sistema de válvulas de seguridad.
f. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.5, con falla sucesiva del by-pass del
condensador, alivio del sistema secundario y posterior falla de la alternativa de
conmutación a refrigeración posterior analizada en 3.6.
g. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.5, con falla sucesiva del by-pass del
condensador, alivio del sistema secundario y sin recurrir a la alternativa de conmutación a
refrigeración posterior se produce la falla en la apertura de las válvulas de alivio del sistema
primario.
h. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.8, con falla sucesiva del by-pass del
condensador, alivio del sistema secundario y válvulas de seguridad en el secundario.
4.2 Las combinaciones de eventos o secuencias, que luego del evento iniciante postulado,
llevarían al sistema en la dirección de un escenario final de “Parada Segura”, evitando las
evoluciones mencionadas en el punto 4.1, son las siguientes:
a. La evolución normal del evento iniciante analizada en 3.1 seguida de la conmutación

exitosa a refrigeración posterior analizada en 3.2.
462
b. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.3, con falla del desvío o by-pass del
se produce posteriormente en forma normal la conmutación a refrigeración posterior.
c. La evolución del evento iniciante analizada en 3.5, con falla sucesiva del by-pass del
condensador, alivio del sistema secundario y posterior éxito de la alternativa de
conmutación a refrigeración posterior analizada en 3.6.
Para visualizar los resultados, se presentan en la figura 4.1 esquematizados en forma de árbol
de eventos, en el cual se han utilizado las mismas denominaciones para las cabeceras que
fueran utilizadas en el informe final del Análisis Probabilístico de Seguridad de nivel I para la
CNA1 [2]. El árbol de eventos para este evento iniciante y las definiciones de las cabeceras
utilizadas en esta referencia se resumen en el anexo I a los efectos de comparar los resultados
con el presente cálculo.
5. ESQUEMAS Y GRÁFICOS DE RESULTADOS
463
464
Figura 1.a. Esquema representativo de los sistemas y

circuitos fundamentales de la CNA1.
464
198 288
188 298
700
701
813
812
803 805 808 810

186 187 189 289 287 286
285
290
284
190
801 802 804 806 807 809 811
185
184
299 297 296
196 197 199
751 295 294
194 195 752
192 292
191 193 750 293 291
182 282
281
181
601 280 271
180 220
171
904
607
273
173 219 221
qcapyag
207
602 279 276
107
903
176 179
223 277
224 222
606
177
901 205 209
604
109 105
101 201 202 203
115 217 216 215
211
114 300 304 214
111
213
432
113
112 212
301
303
306
307
308
574 576
266
476 474 431
166
434
569
469
430 914 252
152 910
468
568
302
253
153
464 465 467 567 565 564

563
156 254 256

463
154
907 908 561
461
470
570
471 571
573
557 559 561

473
457
436
461 459 258

158 456 556
453 450 550 553
159 259
554
454
262 264
164 162
260
160
455 555
912 916
150 148 146 144 244 246 248 250

143
141
Figura 1.b. Esquema representativo de la nodalización

utilizada en los cálculos con RELAP5/MOD3.
465
5.0
secondary system 300
6 steam generator one
4.4x10
pressure
level 4.0 250
inlet flow
6
4.2x10
200
pressure (Pa)
3.0
level (m)
flow (Kg/s)
4.0x10
6 150
2.0
100
6
3.8x10
1.0
50
6
3.6x10
0
0.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.a: Presión lado secundario del generador de vapor 1,

nivel y caudal de alimentación.
secondary system 5.0

300
steam generator two
6
4.4x10 pressure
level 4.0 250
inlet flow
6
4.2x10 200
pressure (Pa)
3.0
flow (Kg/s)
level (m)
6
150
4.0x10
2.0
100
6
3.8x10
1.0 50
6
3.6x10
0
0.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.b: Presión lado secundario del generador de vapor 2,

466
9
secondary system
1.2x10
200.0
9
1.0x10
8
8.0x10
power 150.0
steam flow (Kg/s)

core power (W)
turbine steam flow (1/4)

8 condenser steam flow (1/4)
6.0x10
100.0
8
4.0x10
50.0
8
2.0x10
0.0 0.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000

time (s)
Figura 3.1.c. Potencia generada en el reactor, caudal de vapor

hacia la turbina y condensador.
primary pressure
outlet core temperature 570
7
1.18x10 outlet moderator temperature
560
7
550
1.16x10
540
7 530
temperature (K)
1.14x10
pressure (Pa)
520
7 510
1.12x10
500
1.10x10
7 490
480
1.08x10
7 470
460
7
1.06x10 450
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.d. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas en los

sistemas primario y moderador.
467
pressure 8.0
7
pressurizer
1.18x10 level
7
1.16x10
7
1.14x10
pressure (Pa)
level (m)
6.0
7
1.12x10
7
1.10x10
7
1.08x10
7
1.06x10 4.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.e. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
8.0
pressurizer
7
1.18x10
7
1.16x10 6.0
pressure
flow
shower flow (Kg/s)
pressure (Pa)
7
1.14x10
4.0
7
1.12x10
7 2.0
1.10x10
7
1.08x10
0.0
7
1.06x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.f. Evolución de la presión y caudales en la ducha de

regulación en el presurizador.
468
3500
9
1.2x10
primary system
9 3400
1.0x10
core power
branch without pressurizer
mass flow (Kg/s)

8
8.0x10
branch with pressurizer 3300
power (W)
8
6.0x10
3200
8
4.0x10
8
2.0x10 3100
0.0
3000
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.g. Potencia generada en el reactor y caudales en ambas

ramas del circuito primario durante el transitorio.
primary system
1.18x10
7 branch whitout pressurizer
570
7
1.16x10
560
7
temperature (K)
1.14x10
pressure (Pa)
hot branch pressure 550

7 hot branch temperature
1.12x10
cold branch temperature
540
7
1.10x10
7 530
1.08x10
7
1.06x10 520
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Fig. 3.1.h. Presión y temperatura en ramas fría y caliente del circuito primario.
469
primary system
7 branch with pressurizer
1.18x10 570
7
1.16x10
560
temperature (K)
1.14x10
pressure (Pa)
hot branch pressure 550

7
hot branch temperature
1.12x10
540
7
1.10x10
7 530
1.08x10
7
1.06x10 520
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.i. Presión y temperatura en ramas fría y caliente del circuito primario, circuito al que
conecta el presurizador.
520
7
moderator system
1.18x10
500
7
1.16x10
7 480
1.14x10
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
1.12x10
7 pressure 460
inlet temperature
1.10x10
7 outlet temperature
440
7
1.08x10
420
7
1.06x10
400
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.1.j. Presión y temperaturas de entrada y salida en el circuito moderador.
470
1.20x10
7
primary system
branch without pressurizer 580
560
7
1.15x10
540
temperature (K)
520
pressure (Pa)
7
1.10x10
500
480
7
1.05x10 460
pressure
440
inlet primary temperature
1.00x10
7 outlet primary temperature 420
outlet moderator temperature
400
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
time (s)
Figura 3.2.a. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas en los

7
1.20x10 primary system 580
branch with pressurizer
560
7
1.15x10 540
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
520
7
1.10x10 500
480
7
1.05x10 460
pressure
440
inlet primary temperature
7
1.00x10
outlet primary temperature 420
400
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
time (s)
Figura 3.2.b. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas en los sistemas

primario y moderador. Rama con conexión al presurizador.
471
1.20x10
7
pressurizer 8.0
7
1.15x10
6.0
pressure (Pa)
7
1.10x10
level (m)
7 4.0
1.05x10
pressure
level
7
1.00x10
2.0
6
9.50x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
time (s)
Figura 3.2.c. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
5.0x10
6 steam generator one 6.0
secondary side
pressure
6
4.0x10 level
4.0
6
3.0x10
pressure (Pa)
level (m)
6
2.0x10 2.0
6
1.0x10
0.0
0.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

time (s)
Figura 3.2.d. Presión y nivel del lado secundario del generador de vapor 1.
472
5.0
300
6
secondary system
5.20x10
steam generator one
4.0 250
5.00x10
6 pressure
level
6
inlet flow 200
4.80x10
3.0
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
level (m)
6
4.60x10 150
6
2.0
4.40x10 100
6
4.20x10
1.0 50
6
4.00x10
0
6
0.0
3.80x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.a. Presión lado secundario del generador de vapor 1,

9 160
1.2x10
secondary system 140
9
1.0x10
120
power
steam flow (Kg/s)
core power (W)
8
8.0x10 100
turbine steam flow (1/4)
8
condenser steam flow (1/4) 80
6.0x10
60
8
4.0x10
40
8
2.0x10 20
0
0.0
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.b. Potencia generada en el núcleo y flujos de

vapor en el sistema secundario.
473
240
6
220 5.2x10
relief valve
200
safety valve sg one 6
5.0x10
180
safety valve sg two
160
secondary pressure 6
4.8x10
140
flow (Kg/s)
pressure (Pa)
120 6
4.6x10
100
6
80 4.4x10
60
6
4.2x10
40
20 6
4.0x10
0
6
-20 3.8x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.c. Presión y flujos de vapor en el sistema secundario:

válvula de alivio y válvulas de seguridad.
7
1.22x10
primary pressure 570
7 outlet core temperature 560
1.20x10
outlet moderator temperature 550
7
1.18x10
540
7 530
1.16x10
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
520
7
1.14x10 510
7 500
1.12x10
490
7
1.10x10 480
7
470
1.08x10
460
7
1.06x10 450
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.d. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas de los

474
3500
9
1.2x10 primary system
9 3400
1.0x10
core power
8.0x10
8
mass flow (Kg/s)

power (W)
3300
8
6.0x10
3200
8
4.0x10
8
2.0x10 3100
0.0
3000
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.e. Potencia generada y caudales en

ambas ramas del sistema primario.
1.22x10
7 primary system
branch whitout pressurizer
570
1.20x10
7
hot branch pressure
7
1.18x10 cold branch temperature 560
pressure (Pa)
7
1.16x10
temperature (K)
550
7
1.14x10
7
1.12x10 540
7
1.10x10
530
7
1.08x10
7
1.06x10 520
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.3.f. Presión y temperatura en ramas

fría y caliente del circuito primario.
475
7
1.22x10 8.0
pressurizer pressure
7
level
1.20x10
7
1.18x10
7
6.0
pressure (Pa)
1.16x10
level (m)
7
1.14x10
7
1.12x10
7
1.10x10 4.0
7
1.08x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000

time (s)
Figura 3.3.g. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
7
1.22x10 25
pressurizer
6
7 pressure 2.0x10
1.20x10
heaters 20
7 shower
1.18x10 6
1.5x10
pressure (Pa)
7 15
1.16x10
power (W)
flow (Kg/s)
6
7 1.0x10
1.14x10
10
7
1.12x10 5
5.0x10
5
7
1.10x10
0.0
7
1.08x10 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Figura 3.3.h. Evolución de la presión, caudal en la ducha de regulación

y potencia de los calefactores en el presurizador.
476
7.0
300
6
secondary system
7.0x10
steam generator one
6.0 250
6
6.5x10 pressure
level
6 inlet flow 5.0 200
6.0x10
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
level (m)
5.5x10
6
4.0 150
6
5.0x10 100
3.0
6
4.5x10
50
2.0
6
4.0x10
0
6 1.0
3.5x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.4.a. Presión lado secundario del generador

de vapor 1, nivel y caudal de alimentación.
570
7
1.25x10 primary pressure 560
7 outlet moderator temperature
1.20x10 540
530
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
7 520
1.15x10
510
7
500
1.10x10
490
480
7
1.05x10 470
460
7
1.00x10 450
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.4.b. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas de los

477
8.0
7
pressurizer
1.25x10
pressure
level
7 7.0
1.20x10
pressure (Pa)
level (m)
7
1.15x10
6.0
7
1.10x10
5.0
7
1.05x10
7
1.00x10 4.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.4.c. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
pressurizer 40
7
1.25x10 pressure 2.0x10
6
heaters power
shawer flow 30
7
1.20x10 6
1.5x10
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
20
power (W)
7
1.15x10
6
1.0x10
7
1.10x10 10
5
5.0x10
7
1.05x10
0 0.0
7
1.00x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.4.d. Evolución de la presión, caudal en la ducha de regulación

478
300
6
5.4x10 steam generator one
250
6 5.0
5.2x10
6 200
5.0x10
4.0
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
level (m)
6
4.8x10 150
6 3.0
4.6x10 pressure 100
level
6
4.4x10 inlet flow 2.0 50
6
4.2x10
0
6 1.0
4.0x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)

580
7
1.20x10 primary pressure
7
1.18x10
540
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
7
1.16x10 520
7 500
1.14x10
480
7
1.12x10
460
7
1.10x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)

479
primary system
1.20x10
7 branch whitout pressurizer 570
hot branch pressure
7
1.18x10
560
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
7
1.16x10
7 550
1.14x10
7
1.12x10
540
7
1.10x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.5.c. Presión y temperatura en ramas

fría y caliente del circuito primario.
7
1.22x10 10.0
pressurizer
pressure
7
1.20x10 level
7
1.18x10 8.0
pressure (Pa)
level (m)
7
1.16x10
7
1.14x10 6.0
7
1.12x10
7
1.10x10 4.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.5.d. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
480
7
1.22x10 25
pressurizer
6
7
2.0x10
1.20x10 pressure 20
shawer flow
7 heaters power 6
1.18x10 15 1.5x10
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
power (W)
7
1.16x10 10 1.0x106
7
1.14x10 5
5
5.0x10
7
1.12x10 0
0.0
7
1.10x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time (s)
Figura 3.5.e. Evolución de la presión, caudal en la ducha de regulación

481
6 secondary system 300
6.0x10
steam generator one 5.0
6
5.0x10 250
pressure 4.0
6 level 200
4.0x10
inlet flow
3.0
pressure (Pa)
flow (Kg/s)
6
3.0x10 150
level (m)
2.0
6
2.0x10 100
1.0
6
1.0x10 50
0.0
0.0 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

time (s)

primary pressure
7 outlet core temperature 580
1.20x10
560
7
1.15x10
540
520
pressure (Pa)
7
1.10x10
temperature (K)
500
7
1.05x10
480
1.00x10
7 460
440
6
9.50x10
420
6
9.00x10 400
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (s)

482
3500
primary system
9
1.2x10
3000
9
1.0x10
2500
core power
8
8.0x10 branch without pressurizer
mass flow (Kg/s)

2000
power (W)
8
6.0x10
1500
8
4.0x10 1000
8
2.0x10 500
0.0 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

time (s)
Figura 3.6.c. Potencia generada y caudales en

10.0
7
pressurizer pressure
1.20x10
level
7
8.0
1.15x10
7
1.10x10 6.0
pressure (Pa)
level (m)
7
1.05x10
4.0
7
1.00x10
2.0
6
9.50x10
6
9.00x10 0.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (s)
483
pressurizer pressure 2.5x10
6
7 25
1.20x10 shawer flow
heaters power
6
7 2.0x10
1.15x10 20
7 6
pressure (Pa)
1.10x10 1.5x10
flow (Kg/s)
15
power (W)
7
1.05x10 6
1.0x10
10
7
1.00x10
5
5.0x10
5
6
9.50x10
0.0
0
6
9.00x10
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (s)
Figura 3.6.e. Evolución de la presión, caudal en la ducha de regulación

484
5.0 300
6
secondary system
5.0x10
steam generator one
250
4.0
6
4.0x10
pressure 200
3.0
level
pressure (Pa)
6
3.0x10
flow (Kg/s)
level (m)
inlet flow 150
6
2.0
2.0x10
100
6 1.0
1.0x10 50
0.0 0.0 0
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)

300
6 secondary system
5.0x10
250
6
4.0x10
pressure
200
valve one flow
pressure (Pa)
6
3.0x10 valve two flow
flow (Kg/s)
150
6
2.0x10
100
6
1.0x10 50
0.0 0
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.7.b. Presión en el sistema secundario y

caudales en las válvulas de seguridad.
485
7 580
1.2x10 primary pressure
7
1.1x10
540
temperature (K)
pressure (Pa)
7
1.0x10 520
6 500
9.0x10
480
6
8.0x10
460
6
7.0x10 440
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.7.c. Evolución de la presión y las temperaturas de los

9
primary system
1.2x10 3600
9
1.0x10 3500
8
mass flow (Kg/s)
8.0x10 3400
power (W)
8 core power 3300

6.0x10
8
4.0x10 3200
8
2.0x10 3100
0.0 3000
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.7.d. Potencia generada y caudales en

486
pressurizer
7
1.2x10
6
7
1.1x10 pressure
level
4
pressure (Pa)
7
1.0x10
level (m)
6
9.0x10
2
6
8.0x10
0
6
7.0x10
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.7.e. Evolución de la presión y el nivel en el presurizador.
pressurizer 6
2.5x10
7 25
1.2x10
pressure 6
7
1.1x10 shawer flow 20 2.0x10
heaters power
6
15 1.5x10
pressure (Pa)
7
flow (Kg/s)
1.0x10
power (W)
6
10 1.0x10
6
9.0x10
6 5
8.0x10 5 5.0x10
6
7.0x10 0.0
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.7.f. Evolución de la presión, caudal en la ducha de regulación

487
6
8.0x10
6
7.5x10
8.0
6
7.0x10
6
6.5x10
pressure (Pa)
6.0
level (m)
6
6.0x10
6
5.5x10
pressure 4.0
5.0x10
6
level
6
4.5x10
2.0
6
4.0x10
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.8.a. Presión y nivel en el lado

Secundario del generador de vapor 1.
7
1.26x10 580
7
1.24x10 560
7
1.22x10 primary pressure 540
pressure (Pa)
outlet core temperature

temperature (K)
1.20x10
7
outlet moderator temperature 520
7
1.18x10 500
7
1.16x10 480
7
1.14x10 460
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)

488
9
primary system
1.2x10 3300
9
1.0x10
core power
3200
8 branch with pressurizer
mass flow (Kg/s)

8.0x10 3100
pressure (Pa)
8
6.0x10 3000
8
4.0x10 2900
8
2.0x10
2800
0.0
2700
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.8.c. Potencia generada y caudales en

pressurizer 12.0
7
1.24x10
pressure
1.22x10
7 level 10.0
pressure (Pa)
7
1.20x10
level (m)
8.0
7
1.18x10
7
1.16x10 6.0
7
1.14x10
4.0
0 200 400 600 800 1000
time (s)
489
pressurizer 40
7
1.24x10
7 30
1.22x10
pressure
shower flow (Kg/s)

flow
pressure (Pa)
7
1.20x10
20
7
1.18x10
10
7
1.16x10
7 0
1.14x10
0 200 400 600 800 1000

time (s)
Figura 3.8.e. Evolución de la presión y caudal en la

ducha de regulación en el presurizador.
490
ESTADO
T9 K N1 N2 N3 0 H-1 X1 L FINAL
1 PS
2 DN
3 S2a
4 DN
5 PS
6 DN
7 S2a
8 DN
9 T11
10 DN
11 PS
EVENTO 12 DN
INICIANTE
13 S2a
14 DN
15 T11
16 DN
17 DN
Figura 4.1. Diagrama del árbol de eventos concordante con los

resultados de los cálculos presentados en este trabajo.
491
ANEXO I
Cabeceras y criterios de éxito
Se definen a continuación las cabeceras correspondientes al árbol de eventos del grupo de

eventos iniciantes, denominado T9, “pérdida total del caudal de agua de alimentación a los
generadores de vapor”. Estas definiciones son las utilizadas en el Análisis Probabilístico de
Seguridad [2].
K: Falla del “Corte del Reactor”
La interrupción total del caudal de agua de alimentación a los generadores de vapor, conducirá
al disparo del reactor (NZ50) por bajo nivel en los generadores de vapor.
Criterio de éxito: Inserción de reactividad de corte mayor que el 70% (por lo menos 8 de 24
barras) en un lapso de tiempo de 3 s En caso de falla de este sistema se dispara la señal NZ51
que inyecta ácido deuterobórico al tanque del moderador. Con la inyección de un solo ramal se
concreta la detención del reactor. El fracaso del corte del reactor conduce a un estado final de
daño al núcleo (DN). El estado final deseado es el de parada fría y sistema primario
despresurizado.
N1: Falla la “Evacuación del Calor Vía Condensador”
El disparo del reactor (NZ50) produce la señal de detención o cierre rápido de turbina (NZ61).
Esto genera un incremento en la presión del secundario hasta alcanzar el valor de apertura de
las válvulas del sistema SF de desvío o by-pass de vapor al condensador (41.5 atm).
Criterio de éxito: La apertura de estas válvulas y el mantenimiento de la disponibilidad del

condensador conducen al éxito de esta cabecera. Estas condiciones deben mantenerse
durante el tiempo en que se disponga de inventario en los generadores de vapor. Debido al
escaso tiempo disponible para implementar manualmente la alimentación auxiliar a los
generadores de vapor, no se da crédito a esta alternativa de evacuación de calor en caso de
falla de la cabecera L.
N2: Falla la “Evacuación del Calor Vía Válvula de Alivio Vapor Vivo”
En caso de fallar la apertura del by-pass de vapor al condensador, la presión de vapor vivo
ascenderá al valor de apertura de la válvula de alivio (44 atm). Esta válvula requiere la
habilitación previa de las válvulas de aislación y la apertura de al menos una de ellas
Criterio de éxito: El éxito de esta cabecera está dado por la apertura de la válvula y al menos
una de las de aislación y el mantenimiento de estas condiciones en el corto plazo, hasta agotar
el inventario de los generadores de vapor. Debido al escaso tiempo disponible para acciones
manuales, no se considera esta vía como alternativa a largo plazo en caso de falla de la
cabecera L.
N3: Falla la “Apertura de Válvulas de Seguridad de Vapor Vivo”
La falla combinada del desvío al condensador y de la válvula de alivio conduciría a un aumento

de presión de vapor vivo hasta el valor de apertura del sistema de válvulas de seguridad (54 atm).
Criterio de éxito: Apertura de al menos una válvula de seguridad cada vez que sea
demandada por el valor alcanzado por la presión y hasta tanto se alcance, en el corto plazo, la
conmutación a refrigeración posterior. El fracaso significa la falla del sistema de válvulas de
seguridad y generaría una sobrepresión que, en forma conservativa, conduciría a un estado
final de daño al núcleo.
492
O: Falla el “Cierre de Válvulas de Seguridad de Vapor Vivo”
La falla cuando se demanda el cierre de una de las válvulas de seguridad llevaría a una brusca
despresurización y evaporación del inventario en los generadores de vapor, dando lugar a un
transitorio en condiciones similares a las consideradas en el grupo T11, “Despresurización
descontrolada de la línea de vapor vivo”.
Criterio de éxito: Cierre adecuado de todas las válvulas de seguridad abiertas cada vez que
ello sea requerido por el valor de presión durante el soplado intermitente y durante el corto
plazo hasta alcanzarse la conmutación a refrigeración posterior.
H-1: Falla del “Operador”
Se considera en esta cabecera la falla de la acción del operador en la implementación de un

sistema de refrigeración a largo plazo para llevar la planta a una condición de parada segura,
evitando llegar a la pérdida pequeña denominada LOCA S2a, a través de las válvulas de
seguridad del sistema primario. En este caso se evalúa el aspecto cognoscitivo de la acción
humana del pasaje a refrigeración posterior como única alternativa para evitarlo. Se incluyen
las acciones manuales derivadas que afectan componentes de la cabecera L.
Criterio de éxito: Acción exitosa por parte del operador de la conmutación a refrigeración
posterior. El fracaso está dado en este caso por la interpretación incorrecta de la secuencia en
curso o por fallas en la ejecución de las acciones, que impliquen llegar al escenario de LOCA
S2a vía el presurizador.
X-1: Falla la “Apertura de las Válvulas de Seguridad del Presurizador”
Durante el transitorio, al llenarse el presurizador por la expansión del inventario en el sistema

primario y moderador, se demanda la apertura de al menos una válvula de seguridad para la
evacuación del inventario hacia el tanque de alivio.
Criterio de éxito: Apertura de las válvulas de seguridad del presurizador demandadas. La falla
en la apertura conduce a un estado de daño al núcleo.
La opción de cierre de las válvulas de seguridad, cabecera Q, no se considera en este caso

porque estas válvulas están diseñadas para funcionar en fase vapor y en este transitorio al ser
demandadas abrirían evacuando líquido y tendrían una probabilidad de cierre cercana a uno. El
escenario considerado luego de la demanda de apertura es un LOCA S2a.
L: Falla la “Evacuación del Calor Vía Sistema de Refrigeración Posterior”
Corresponde a la remoción del calor hacia el secundario de los intercambiadores de calor del
sistema moderador.
Criterio de éxito: Para el éxito de esta cabecera se requiere al menos un tren de refrigeración
posterior operativo, conmutación correcta de válvulas y funcionamiento adecuado de bomba.
Del lado secundario del sistema debe estar operativo al menos un circuito RR refrigerado por el
sistema UK. El éxito de esta cabecera conduce a un estado final de parada segura. La falla
lleva a un escenario de daño al núcleo.
493
ESTADO
T9 K N1 N2 N3 0 H-1 X1 L FINAL
1 PS
2 DN
3 S2a
4 DN
5 PS
6 DN
7 S2a
8 DN
9 PS
10 DN
EVENTO
INICIANTE
11 S2a
12 DN
13 T11
14 DN
15 DN
Árbol de eventos propuesto en la referencia [2]
494
REFERENCIAS
[1] RELAP5/MOD3.2 code manual, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 5535 –
INEL-95/0174.
[2] Análisis Probabilístico de Seguridad, Informe Final, NASA/CNA1, 1996.
[3] CNA1, Pérdida Total del Caudal de Agua de Alimentación a los G.V., Castaño J, ENACE,
CNA1-APS IT 834, 1995.
[4] Planos y diagramas de los sistemas de la Central Nuclear Atucha I, CNA1, Argentina, 1998.
[5] Datos Técnicos de los sistemas de la Central Nuclear Atucha I, CNA1, Argentina, 1998.
495
Dosis ocupacional debida a
neutrones en aceleradores lineales
de uso médico
Larcher, A.M.; Bonet Durán, S.M. y Lerner, A.M.

DOSIS OCUPACIONAL DEBIDA A NEUTRONES EN
ACELERADORES LINEALES DE USO MÉDICO
Larcher, A.M.; Bonet Durán, S.M. y Lerner, A.M.

Argentina
I. MÉTODO SEMIEMPÍRICO PARA EL CÁLCULO DE DOSIS DEBIDA A

NEUTRONES Y GAMMA DE CAPTURA NEUTRÓNICA EN ACELERADORES
LINEALES MÉDICOS DE ALTA ENERGÍA
I.I. Introducción
Un acelerador lineal de electrones para uso médico (Figura 1), es un equipo destinado al tra-
tamiento de tumores mediante haces colimados de electrones y/o fotones. Estos aceleradores
son dispositivos que emplean ondas electromagnéticas de alta frecuencia, para acelerar elec-
trones que se utilizan directamente en el tratamiento de tumores superficiales, o bien, si se los
hace impactar sobre un blanco apropiado, pueden producir fotones de alta energía destinados
al tratamiento de tumores profundos.
Figura 1. Acelerador lineal de electrones para uso médico
Dependiendo de la energía de los electrones y fotones y de los materiales que componen el

cabezal del acelerador y el blanco, estos equipos producirán además de la radiación antes
mencionada, campos neutrónicos de regular intensidad, los cuales aparecen como una radia-
ción no deseada que supone un riesgo radiológico adicional para pacientes, trabajadores y
público. A la dosis equivalente debida a los propios neutrones, se suman las dosis debidas al
campo gamma de captura neutrónica, producido por la captura de neutrones térmicos en el
499
hormigón del bunker, y las dosis gamma debidas a fenómenos de activación neutrónica de
elementos del propio acelerador (colimadores, cuñas, etc.) y del aire del recinto.
En este trabajo se presenta un método semiempírico para el cálculo de:
• Dosis equivalente debida a neutrones en el interior del recinto del acelerador y en el labe-
rinto.
• Dosis equivalente debida a gamma de captura neutrónica en el laberinto.
I.II. Generación y transporte de neutrones en un acelerador lineal de uso médico
El campo de radiación en torno de un acelerador lineal de uso médico, es una complicada

mezcla de fotones provenientes de las fugas del cabezal, fotones dispersados por el paciente,
los detenedores de haz y las paredes del bunker, y fotones generados por los electrones dete-
nidos en cualquier otra parte distinta del blanco.
Si la energía del acelerador es suficientemente alta para producir neutrones (E ≥ 10 MeV),

existirá además una componente neutrónica del campo de radiación. La producción primaria de
neutrones se debe a reacciones (γ,n) existiendo una pequeña contribución debida a reacciones
(γ,pn) y (γ,2n) si la energía así lo permite. La generación directa de neutrones por electrones es
inferior en aproximadamente dos órdenes de magnitud.
En el rango de energías estudiado (10 MeV – 25 MeV), la producción de neutrones se origina

en un fenómeno de interacción llamado “Resonancia Gigante Fotonuclear” o “Resonancia Gi-
gante” (RG) a secas.
La sección eficaz para la RG se caracteriza por poseer una energía umbral, un rápido creci-
miento hasta un pico prominente y un decrecimiento más gradual a energías mayores. Para
nucleidos medianos y pesados (A>40) que son los que más interesan en el problema estudia-
do, por el tipo de materiales constitutivos del blanco y del cabezal del acelerador, el pico ocurre
a energías entre los 13 MeV y 18 MeV, en tanto que las energías umbral para la reacción (γ,n)
oscilan entre 6 y 13 MeV.
Elemento Nº atómico Abundancia isotópica Energía umbral para (γγ,n)

[%] [MeV]
Pb 206 25,1 8,08
207 21,7 6,74
208 52,3 7,37
Fe 54 5,8 13,40
56 91,7 11,20
W 182 26,4 8,05
183 14,4 6,19
184 30,6 7,41
186 28,4 5,75
Tabla 1. Energías umbral para reacciones fotoneutrónicas. Mc Call [1]
500
Sección eficaz (mb)
Energía del fotón (MeV)
Figura 2. Secciones eficaces para reacciones (γ,n) [+++] y (γ,xn) [xxx]

208
para Pb. NCRP 79 [19]
La curva de rendimiento de fotoneutrones crece rápidamente con la energía de los electrones

hasta aproximadamente los 25 MeV y mucho más suavemente para energías mayores, ha-
ciéndose prácticamente constante para E > 35 MeV.
El espectro neutrónico en la resonancia gigante contiene dos componentes: un espectro de

evaporación y un espectro de emisión directa. El espectro de evaporación constituye la mayor
componente y puede ser descripto adecuadamente por una distribución maxwelliana de la for-
ma:
dN En
= En
(1)
dEn 2 (- )
T e T
Donde T es un parámetro característico para cada núcleo, denominado “temperatura nuclear”,

que se mide en unidades de energía [MeV], y es también función de la energía de excitación.
Uno debería notar que el pico del espectro corresponde a Ên = T (energía más probable) y la
_
energía promedio es E n = 2T.
Los neutrones de evaporación, se emiten isotrópicamente.
Los neutrones de emisión directa tienen, en general, mayor energía que los de evaporación y
pueden ser emitidos en forma no isotrópica. Para materiales con número atómico medio o alto
y energías cercanas al pico de resonancia, la emisión directa alcanza entre un 12% y un 15%
del total de neutrones.
501
Número relativo de neutrones por ½ MeV
Neutrones de fisión
Energía neutrónica, E , (MeV)

n
Figura 3. Comparación de un espectro típico en energía para fotoneutrones

con un espectro de neutrones de fisión Mc Call [1]
La Figura 3 muestra un espectro típico de fotoneutrones donde se ve que la emisión directa de

neutrones es responsable por el salto que se produce en la región de altas energías. El espec-
tro se compara contra un espectro típico de fisión con el que presenta una notoria similitud.
Tal como se dijo, la generación de fotoneutrones en un acelerador lineal depende fundamen-

talmente de la energía de los electrones/fotones y del material de los distintos elementos que
componen el cabezal del acelerador.
502
blanco
colimador primario
blindaje del carousel
cámara iónica
filtro aplanador
colimador secundario
plomo
tungsteno
colimadores móviles
Figura 4. Principales componentes del cabezal de un acelerador Varian Clinac 2500
Elemento Energía de los electrones [MeV]

blanco
10 15 20 25
Al 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,03
Cu 0,0 0,0 0,11 0,25
Fe 0,0 0,0 0,07 0,17
Pb 0,0 0,25 0,70 0,93
W 0,0 0,25 0,70 1,00
Tabla 2. Rendimiento relativo de fotoneutrones en blancos de espesor semi-infinito, en función

de la energía de los electrones incidentes. Los valores están normalizados a la unidad para
blanco de tungsteno y energía de 25 MeV.
503
Fuente Peso relativo
Cañón de electrones 1
Blanco (tungsteno sobre cobre) 1,9
Colimador primario 2,4
Filtros de acero estándar 0,6
Filtro de tungsteno experimental 1,5
Colimador secundario:
Campo 40x40 0,8
Campo 0x40 1,9
Campo 40x0 2,2
Campo 0x 0 1,9
Tabla 3. Peso relativo de los diferentes componentes de un acelerador Varian Clinac 2500
como fuente generadora de neutrones
Pb
Fe
Pb
W
Cu
Fe
Pb
W W
1. Blanco
W 2. Colimador primario
3. Filtro aplanador
4. Colimadores móviles
W
Fe
Figura 5. Simulación geométrica completa del cabezal de un

acelerador Varian Clinac 2100-2300
504
Pb
Fe
W W
Pb Pb
1. Blanco
2. Colimador primario
3. Filtro aplanador
4. Colimadores móviles
Figura 6. Simulación geométrica simplificada del cabezal de un

acelerador Varian Clinac 2100/2300
Modo 20 MV Modo 18 MV Modo 15 MV Modo 10 MV

(energía sobre blanco 22,3 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 18,8 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 14,9 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 10,3 MeV)
Componente Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento

por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones
incidente relativo incidente relativo incidente relativo incidente relativo
Blanco 3,8 x 10-4 (W, Cu) 17,1 1,9 x 10-4 (W, Cu) 15,5 4,1 x 10-5 (W, Cu) 9,2 1,7 x 10-9 (Cu) 0,013
-4 -4 -4
Colimador 7,9 x 10 (W) 35,5 4,9 x 10 (W) 39,9 1,7 x 10 (W) 38,0 5,9 x 10-6 (W) 44,2
primario
Filtro 2,3 x 10-4 (Fe, Ta) 10,3 1,1 x 10-4 (Fe, Ta) 9,0 1,0 x 10-4 (W) 22,4 4,5 x 10-9 (Cu) 0,034
aplanador
Colimadores 8,0 x 10-4 (W) 36,0 4,2 x 10-4 (W) 34,2 1,3 x 10-4 (W) 29,1 7,3 x 10-6 (W) 54,7
móviles
Otros 2,4 x 10-5 1,1 1,7 x 10-5 1,4 5,8 x 10-6 1,3 1,4 x 10-7 1,0
Total 2,2 x 10-3 100,0 1,2 x 10-3 100,0 4,5 x 10-4 100,0 1,3 x 10-5 100,0
Neutron por
Gy en el 1,2 x 1012 1,2 x 1012 6,8 x 1011 3,8 x 1010
isocentro
Tabla 4. Fuentes de neutrones calculadas en un acelerador Varian Clinac 2100/2300 (geome-

tría completa con colimador cerrado) Kase et al. [8].
505
Modo 20 MV Modo 18 MV Modo 15 MV Modo 10 MV
(energía sobre blanco 22,3 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 18,8 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 14,9 MeV) (energía sobre blanco 10,3 MeV)
Componente Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento Neutrones Rendimiento

por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones por electrón de neutrones
incidente relativo incidente relativo incidente relativo incidente relativo
Blanco 3,8 x 10-4 (W, Cu) 17,2 1,9 x 10-4 (W, Cu) 15,6 4,1 x 10-5 (W, Cu) 9,0 1,8 x 10-9 (Cu) 0,013
-4 -4 -4
Colimador 7,6 x 10 (W) 34,5 4,7 x 10 (W) 38,4 1,7 x 10 (W) 37,5 5,6 x 10-6 (W) 42,7
primario
Filtro 2,3 x 10-4 (Fe, Ta) 10,3 1,1 x 10-4 (Fe, Ta) 9,0 1,0 x 10-4 (W) 22,2 4,8 x 10-9 (Cu) 0,035
aplanador
Colimadores 8,2 x 10-4 (W) 37,4 4,4 x 10-4 (W) 36,3 1,4 x 10-4 (W) 30,6 7,4 x 10-6 (W) 56,4
móviles
Otros 1,4 x 10-5 0,64 8,3 x 10-6 0,68 3,1 x 10-6 0,68 1,1 x 10-7 0,87
Total 2,2 x 10-3 100,0 1,2 x 10-3 100,0 4,5 x 10-4 100,0 1,3 x 10-5 100,0
Neutron por
Gy en el 1,2 x 1012 1,2 x 1012 6,8 x 1011 3,8 x 1010
isocentro
Tabla 5. Fuentes de neutrones calculadas en un acelerador Varian Clinac 2100/2300 (geome-

tría simplificada con colimador cerrado) Kase et al. [8]
Las Figuras 4, 5 y 6 presentan cortes simplificados (empleados para realizar simulaciones me-
diante el Método de Montecarlo) del cabezal de distintos aceleradores lineales y las Tablas 3, 4
y 5 dan cuenta respectivamente, de los rendimientos neutrónicos de los distintos elementos
componentes de cada acelerador.
El espectro neutrónico resultante de las reacciones (γ,n) se degradará en energía como conse-
cuencia de las interacciones de los neutrones con estructuras del propio acelerador. Los únicos
mecanismos significativos de pérdida de energía en los elementos pesados que constituyen el
cabezal del AL son: el scattering inelástico y las reacciones (n,2n). El primero domina a bajas
energías y las segundas a energías mayores.
El tungsteno (W) es considerablemente más efectivo que el plomo (Pb) en reducir la energía
neutrónica, pues si bien las secciones eficaces no elásticas (inelásticas+ (n,2n)) son casi igua-
3
les en ambos elementos, el W tiene 1,9 veces más átomos/cm y el scattering inelástico en el
W se extiende hasta energías mucho menores. El Pb es virtualmente transparente a los neu-
trones por debajo de los 0,57 MeV.
Además de estas reacciones existen gran cantidad de colisiones elásticas que si bien no pro-
ducen pérdida energética, incrementan la trayectoria de los neutrones dentro del blindaje y
aumentan por lo tanto la probabilidad de reacciones (n,2n).
En un AL con cabezal de W se considera que puede absorberse hasta un 15% de la fluencia

neutrónica. Cuando el elemento predominante en el cabezal es el Pb, se considera cero ate-
nuación. Puede haber por el contrario, en este último caso, un pequeño efecto de build up de-
bido a la producción de reacciones (n,2n).
I.III. Fluencia y energía del espectro fotoneutrónico en el interior del bunker
Los efectos de un blindaje de hormigón sobre el espectro de neutrones generados en un AL

fueron estudiados hace ya 20 años por Richard Mc Call [1], [2] y [3] quien investigó el problema
mediante simulaciones con el Método de Montecarlo empleando el código MORSE, y desarro-
lló a partir de esos cálculos un método semiempírico sobre el cual se han basado el NCRP-79
[19] y la mayoría de los trabajos posteriores.
506
Los fundamentos del modelo son los que se enuncian a continuación:
La fluencia neutrónica en un punto del recinto que alberga al acelerador puede describirse co-
mo una suma de componentes: una componente directa (φdir) que proviene directamente de la
fuente (cabezal); una componente de scattering (φsc) debida a neutrones rápidos dispersados
por las paredes de hormigón y una componente térmica (φth).
Según el citado modelo, la componente directa sigue la ley de la inversa del cuadrado de la
distancia, en tanto que las componentes dispersa y térmica resultan aproximadamente cons-
tantes en el interior del recinto y son inversamente proporcionales a la superficie del mismo.
Las expresiones halladas para cada una de las componentes de la fluencia son:
φdir = aQ (2)
4πd 2
φsc = 5,4aQ (3)

S
φth = 1,26Q (4)

S
donde:
Q es la intensidad de la fuente neutrónica expresada en neutrones emitidos por unidad de dosis

gamma entregada en isocentro.
a es una constante que depende del acelerador y expresa un factor de transmisión según el
tipo de blindaje del cabezal del AL: a = 0,85 para W y a = 1 para Pb.
2
S es la superficie interior del recinto expresada en cm .
d es la distancia de la fuente al punto donde se evalúa la fluencia, expresada en cm.
En el modelo propuesto por Mc Call, la componente térmica se trata separadamente y se ob-

serva que su contribución a la dosis neutrónica total es despreciable en comparación al aporte
de los neutrones rápidos. Por ello se emplea la fluencia total debida a neutrones rápidos (φf), es
decir todos los neutrones con energía mayor que la energía de “cut-off” del Cadmio (0,41 eV),
para calcular la energía promedio del espectro y a partir de ella, la dosis equivalente en el inte-
rior del recinto:
La fluencia debida a neutrones rápidos resulta:
aQ
φ f = φdir + φ sc = + 5,4aQ (5)
4πd 2
S
Nota: Recientemente en un trabajo conjunto de Mc Call y Mc Ginley [25], los autores sugieren
una posible corrección al valor de la fluencia debida a neutrones dispersos (φsc) medida en el
punto interno del laberinto (A), la cual disminuiría en un factor 2π, de modo que:
φ sc
φ´sc = (6)
2π
Siempre, según el modelo de Mc Call, la energía promedio de la componente dispersa se rela-
ciona linealmente con la energía promedio de la componente directa, tal como puede verse en
la Figura 7.
507
Neutrones monoenergéticos
Espectro de neutrones
Figura 7. Relación entre la energía promedio de un espectro de neutrones primarios

y un espectro de neutrones dispersos en el hormigón del bunker Mac Call [1]
Para el rango de energías de interés en aceleradores médicos, la relación está adecuadamente

representada por la expresión:
_ _
E sc = 0,24 E dir (7)
A su vez la energía promedio de la componente directa se obtiene a partir de la energía pro-

_
medio del haz primario de neutrones E o (Tabla 6) correspondiente a los neutrones de primera
generación provenientes de las reacciones (γ,n) producidas en el blanco.
Espectro Energía neutrónica promedio

Eo [MeV]
10 MeV W 0,65
15 MeV W 1,8
25 MeV W 2,2
25 MeV Pb 2,3
252
Cf 2,15
Artificial 3,8
Pu (α,n) Be 4,4
Neutrones monoenergéticos 1,5
Neutrones monoenergéticos 6
Tabla 6. Energía promedio del haz primario de neutrones para diferentes espectros Mac Call [1].
508
La relación está dada por la expresión:
x
_ _ 1 HEL
  (8)
E dir = E o  
2
Donde HEL (Figura 8) es el valor de la capa hemirreductora en energía ; x es el espesor del

blindaje del cabezal y x/HEL es número de hemiespesores en el blindaje del cabezal.
capa de hemi-energía (cm)
E0 (MeV)
Figura 8. Espesor de un blindaje esférico requerido para reducir a la mitad la energía promedio
del espectro neutrónico, los datos están dados para Fe, Pb y W Mac Call [1]
Entonces la energía promedio del espectro de neutrones rápidos será:
_ _
_ E dir φdir + E sc φsc
E= (9)
φdir + φ sc
_ _ 1 - 4,1πd 2
E = E dir (10)
S + 5,4 4πd 2
x
_ _
 1 1 - 4,1πd 2
E = E o   HEL (11)
2 S + 5,4 4πd 2
509
_
A partir de las expresiones de la fluencia total rápida (φf) y la energía promedio del espectro ( E )
podrá obtenerse la dosis equivalente debida a neutrones empleando los factores de conversión
apropiados, dosis equivalente/fluencia, en función de la energía del espectro (Figura 9).
Interpolación de Lagrange (cúbica)

GSF
IHEP
PTB-1
(H*(10) / Φ) (pSv cm )
PTB-2
2
Universidad de Texas
Energía neutrónica (MeV)
Figura 9. Coeficientes de conversión de referencia para dosis equivalente ambiental

debida a neutrones proporcionados por varios institutos. ICRP 74 [27]
I.IV. Cálculo de dosis debida a neutrones en el interior del laberinto
Los recintos para aceleradores médicos son diseñados en general en forma laberíntica a fin de
evitar puertas con blindaje masivo que deberían tener sistemas hidraúlicos de apertura y cierre.
Existen en la literatura dos o tres métodos empíricos para el cálculo de dosis debida a neutro-
nes que se emplean en el diseño de laberintos y puertas de recintos blindados:
1) El primer método simplificado debido a Mc Call y colaboradores [2] es un método de albedo

que puede describirse como sigue:
Se determinan sobre el plano del recinto la porción de paredes, piso y techo que pudieran ser
irradiadas en forma directa por neutrones provenientes del acelerador y que son visibles desde
la entrada del recinto. Se selecciona (sin demasiada precisión) un centro efectivo para cada
una de esas cuatro áreas (piso, techo y dos paredes en ángulo). Se miden los ángulos de inci-
dencia y reflexión respecto de esos puntos y se hace la simplificación de que todos los neutro-
nes que chocan contra esa área efectiva, pasan por el punto central. Luego se calcula la dosis
albedo α, según el método desarrollado por French y Wells (1964):
α = α( _ o) (cos θi)2/3 cos θr (12)
θi: ángulo de incidencia y θr: ángulo de reflexión, medidos respecto de la normal a la pared.
510
_
Para el rango del espectro neutrónico usual en AL, el valor α( E o) = 0,11, resulta una buena
aproximación para hormigón.
A continuación se asume que tanto la variación de dosis equivalente entre el acelerador y los
centros efectivos, como entre dichos centros y la puerta del recinto, sigue la ley de la inversa
del cuadrado de la distancia y se suman las distintas contribuciones de dosis, cada una de las
cuales tiene una expresión del tipo:
2
D α (Eo )(cosθi ) 3 cosθr A
H= (13)
d 12 d 22
[H]= [mSv/Gy fot]
A: cada una de las áreas consideradas
d1: distancia isocentro-punto central del área definida
d2: distancia punto central del área definida-puerta
Nota: este cálculo sólo es válido para neutrones rápidos
2) El segundo método es el desarrollado por Mc Ginley [15] en base a un cálculo original de

Kersey.[12]. Calcula la dosis equivalente debida a neutrones en la entrada del laberinto en ba-
se a los siguientes supuestos: 1) la variación de dosis equivalente neutrónica en el interior del
recinto sigue la ley de la inversa del cuadrado de la distancia; 2) La atenuación en el laberinto
cae logarítmicamente con la distancia y 3) Kersey plantea que una longitud de 5 metros resulta
una buena aproximación a la longitud decirreductora de la dosis equivalente para el rango de
energías de interés:
Mc Ginley y Burker [15] realizaron una validación del método de Kersey para 13 recintos de
aceleradores, encontrando que la relación de dosis equivalente calculada por el método de
Kersey, a la dosis medida, variaba entre 0,82 y 2,3.
Mc Ginley presenta la ecuación empírica de Kersey de la siguiente manera:
2 d2
T  do  −
H = Ho   10 5 (14)
To  d 1 
Ho: es la dosis equivalente neutrónica a una distancia do del blanco (Ho corresponde a la dosis
debida a neutrones directos, dispersos y térmicos. Las últimas dos componentes variarán con
la superficie interna del recinto. Para pequeños recintos las dosis debidas a neutrones disper-
sos y térmicos son mayores que para grandes recintos).
T/To: es la razón entre la menor y la mayor de las áreas transversales de la parte interna del
laberinto. En la mayoría de los recintos T/To ≅ 1.
d1: distancia en metros desde el isocentro al punto de la línea central del laberinto desde el cual
se hace visible el isocentro (punto A).
Para un laberinto con una sola rama d2 es la longitud del laberinto (distancia entre A y B en la
Figura 10). Si el laberinto tiene dos ramas deben sumarse las longitudes de ambas ramas (AB’
+ B’C).
511
isocentro
Figura 10. Plano en planta para un recinto laberíntico típico de un acelerador lineal
Los autores observaron experimentalmente que la existencia de una segunda rama reducía las
dosis neutrónicas en un factor 3. Sobre esta base plantearon la siguiente relación para un labe-
rinto con dos ramas:
2 d2 d3
 T   do  − − 1
H = Ho     10 5 10 5   (15)
 To   d 1   3
Donde, d2 y d3 son respectivamente la longitud de la primera y la segunda ramas del laberinto
Conociendo la dosis neutrónica en el extremo del laberinto, puede calcularse el espesor de

material necesario para blindar la puerta
Nota: la dosis neutrónica varía con la posición del gantry y la apertura del colimador, obtenién-
dose los máximos valores con el colimador completamente cerrado.
I.V. Cálculo de la dosis debida a radiación gamma de captura
Muchas puertas de recintos blindados para aceleradores se diseñan con un espesor de plomo
suficiente como para blindar los fotones que fugan del cabezal y los dispersados desde el re-
cinto de tratamiento hacia el laberinto. Sin embargo, en la puerta del recinto aparecerá una
componente fotónica adicional de alta energía debida a captura neutrónica en los materiales
utilizados para construir el laberinto. La energía promedio de los gamma de captura en hormi-
gón es de aproximadamente 3,6 MeV.
512
Mc Ginley [14], basándose en una técnica similar a la utilizada para el cálculo de la dosis neu-
trónica en el laberinto, desarrolla un método empírico para estimar la dosis debida a fotones de
captura en la puerta de recintos de aceleradores lineales.
La dosis gamma de captura(Hγ) en la entrada del laberinto por unidad de dosis debida a foto-
nes en isocentro está dada por la expresión:
d2
−
Hγ = K φtotal 10 TVD 2
(16)
K: es la razón de la dosis debida a gamma de captura respecto a la fluencia neutrónica total en

el punto A (Figura 10). A partir de datos experimentales resulta un valor para K de:
-2 2
K = 0,77 10 cm Gy
d2: longitud del laberinto
La distancia decirreductora TVD2 es aproximadamente 6,2m para energías del equipo entre 16
y 22 MeV.
Qa 5,4 a Q 1,26 Q
φtotal = + + (17)
4π d 1 2
S S
d1: distancia del isocentro al punto A de la Figura 10.
Para laberintos donde la distancia AB > 3 m, el campo fotónico de captura es dominante y la

componente fotónica dispersa puede ser ignorada.
513
II. VALIDEZ DEL MODELO SEMIEMPÍRICO DE CÁLCULO.
APLICACIÓN DEL MÉTODO AL CÁLCULO DE LA DOSIS DEBIDA A NEUTRONES Y
GAMMA DE CAPTURA EN LOS ACELERADORES LINEALES DE
15 MV EN OPERACIÓN EN EL PAÍS
En el país se encuentran en operación a la fecha (abril de 2000), ocho aceleradores lineales de

uso médico con la posibilidad de acelerar fotones hasta 15 MeV, los cuales serán identificados
en este trabajo como AL1 hasta AL7 (dado que no pudieron efectuarse mediciones en uno de
los aceleradores citados).
El Proyecto ACDOS-9-P-1 de la ARN ha tenido como objetivo la validación del modelo se-
miempírico de cálculo presentado en la primera parte de este trabajo, a través de mediciones
de dosis debidas a neutrones y gamma en los aceleradores de 15 MeV en operación.
A continuación se presenta un resumen de los resultados obtenidos del cálculo y las medicio-
nes y un análisis de los mismos.
II. I. Mediciones y cálculo de dosis
II.I.1 Condiciones de medición
Las mediciones realizadas con instrumentos de campo consistieron en mapeos de dosis neu-
trónica en diversos puntos por fuera del blindaje de hormigón y mediciones de dosis debida a
neutrones y gamma en el exterior de las puertas de los recintos blindados. En los recintos AL3
y AL6, dado su buen diseño y la longitud de los laberintos (Figura 11) pudieron efectuarse tam-
bién mediciones en puntos situados en el interior del laberinto inmediatamente antes de la
puerta.
Todas las determinaciones de dosis fueron realizadas con el gantry de los aceleradores a 0º,
para un campo de 10x10 cm, un rendimiento de 2Gy/min (120 Gy/h) y en contacto con la
puerta de los recintos a la altura de gonadas.
Los equipos de medición utilizados, fueron:
Para medición de dosis gamma:

Equipo Automess
Modelo: Monitor 6150 AD3 S/N 83436
Fecha de calibración: 7/7/98
Límite de detección: 0,1 µSv/h
Para medición de dosis neutrónica:

Equipo Ludlum Measurement, Inc.
Modelo 12-4;Count Ratemeter NºSerie:141281.
Fecha de calibración: 8/9/98
Límite de detección: 0,1 µSv/h
II.I 2. Hipótesis de cálculo
En el cálculo de las dosis debidas a neutrones mediante el modelo semiempírico presentado se

hicieron las siguientes suposiciones:
• El material constitutivo del cabezal de los aceleradores es fundamentalmente tungsteno

(W), con lo cual se consideró un valor del parámetro a = 0,85 y un espesor de blindaje
equivalente x = 10cm para todos los casos.
514
• Dado que no se encontraron en la literatura valores de rendimiento neutrónico (Q) para
aceleradores SIEMENS de 15 MeV se utilizó para dichos aceleradores un valor de Q toma-
do como promedio de los valores consignados en la Tabla I.1 (Apéndice I) para todos los
aceleradores de 15 MeV. Para el acelerador Varian Clinac 20 se tomó de manera conser-
vadora el rendimiento neutrónico más alto disponible en la citada tabla.
• Los valores de E0 también se consideraron iguales para todos los aceleradores ya que se
empleó el espectro correspondiente a fotones de 15 MeV sobre tungsteno (Tabla 6).
• El valor T/T0 se consideró igual a 1 en todos los casos como hipótesis conservadora.
• Se tomó en cuenta la corrección al modelo introducida por Mc Call y Mc Ginley [25] y se

introdujo el factor de reducción 2π para el cálculo del término correspondiente a la fluencia
de scattering.
515
. . . . .
Marca Q S ϕf ϕtot H n H n H γl H γc H γ
Acelerador y 1012 10
4
d2[cm] 10
6
10
6
(calculada) (medida) (calculada) (calculada) (medida)
2 2 2
Modelo [n/segGy] [cm ] [n/cm Gy] [n/cm Gy] µSv/h]
[µ µSv/h]
[µ µSv/h]
[µ µSv/h]
[µ µSv/h]
[µ
AL1 SIEMENS 0,64 126,5 400 0,67 1,47 3800 150 0,8 35 30
KD 7760 C/B
SIEMENS
AL2 Mevatron 0,64 147,6 250 0,43 0,96 5700 80 0,6 36 20
67 C/B
SIEMENS
AL3 Mevatron 0,64 144,0 700 0,43 1,14 91 15 0,004 8 2
* MD S/B
AL4 SIEMENS 0,64 147,0 180 0,49 1,04 6400 110 22 50 65
KDS2 S/B
516
VARIAN
AL5 Clinac 20 0,97 144,0 430 0,68 1,52 2400 40 0,13 30 18
C/B
CGR 580
AL6 Saturne 41 0,47 139,4 0,34 0,74 108 7 0,002 7 4
* S/B
CGR
AL7 Saturne 41 0,47 173,0 450 0,25 0,59 750 15 0,003 10 10
C/B
* Los recintos blindados de los aceleradores AL3 y AL6 tienen laberintos con una segunda “pierna” de dimensión d3= 150 cm. Las dosis neutrónicas medidas antes de la puerta de
AL3 y AL6 fueron de 100 µSv/h y 80 µSv/h, respectivamente.
Tabla 7. Rendimiento neutrónico Q; dimensión del laberinto d2; superficie del recinto blindado S; fluencia de neutrones rápidos ϕf ; fluencia neutrónica total
.
ϕtot ; tasa de dosis neutrónica calculada (antes de la puerta) y medida (después de la puerta) H n; tasa de dosis por gamma de captura calculada (antes de
. .
la puerta) y medida (después de la puerta) H γc ; tasa de dosis por gamma de baja energía H γl
516
II.II. Análisis de los resultados obtenidos
Todas las mediciones por fuera del hormigón, tal como estaba previsto, arrojaron valores infe-
riores al límite de detección del instrumento empleado.
La Tabla 7 presenta los valores de dosis debida a neutrones y gamma, medidos en el exterior
de las puertas de los recintos blindados, junto con los valores calculados por el método
semiempírico propuesto que permite estimar las dosis neutrónicas y las debidas a gamma de
captura neutrónica, en puntos situados inmediatamente antes de la puerta.
Sólo se pudieron obtener planos constructivos de las puertas de los aceleradores AL3, AL6 y
AL7, pero se pudo establecer (aunque sin posibilidad de verificación) que los recintos de los
restantes aceleradores, a excepción del AL7, tienen puertas que utilizan madera como blindaje
para neutrones. El espesor de madera es de aproximadamente 10 cm. Todas las puertas están
revestidas además con espesores de entre 3 y 5 mm de Pb para absorber la radiación gamma
dispersa.
La puerta del recinto del AL3 tiene además 0,5 mm de cadmio metálico como absorbente de
neutrones y 10 mm de plomo para detener la radiación gamma emergente, incluidos los
gamma de captura neutrónica.
El blindaje contra neutrones de la puerta del AL7 está constituido por 97 mm de parafina bora-
3
da (el espesor decirreductor de la parafina de 0,9 g/cm de densidad es similar al de la madera
3
de 0,8 g/cm para las energías en cuestión) y el blindaje para gamma de esta puerta, es de
5mm de plomo.
Con estos datos se analizó el comportamiento del modelo de cálculo para lo cual se hicieron
suposiciones e inferencias que si bien se fundamentan en datos de la bibliografía, lamentable-
mente no han podido ser corroboradas por otro conjunto independiente de mediciones tal como
se había pensado en la formulación original del proyecto.
II.II.1. Dosis debida a neutrones
En función de los valores hallados para hemiespesores de madera y Pb se estableció que una
puerta estándar de las analizadas (10 cm de madera y 3-5 mm de Pb) produciría una reducción
en la dosis neutrónica de entre 5 y 10 veces y detendría con gran eficiencia la radiación gamma
dispersa de baja energía (5mm de Pb corresponden al espesor decirreductor para radiación
gamma de 0,5 MeV y la radiación dispersa que alcanza la puerta del recinto tendrá energía
promedio entre los 100 y 200 keV).
Se postuló entonces que las dosis debidas a neutrones medidas en el exterior, en contacto con
la puerta, deberían ser aproximadamente 10 veces menores que las existentes antes de la
puerta (3ª columna, Tabla 8).
De la comparación de la dosis neutrónicas calculadas con las medidas, surge que los valores
calculados para los recintos de los aceleradores AL1, AL2, AL4, AL5 y AL7 estarían sobreesti-
madas en factores que van desde 2,5 a 7 veces. En cambio en los aceleradores AL3 y AL6,
donde existe una rama más en los laberintos, el modelo se comporta muy bien y además la
dosis medida antes de la puerta coincide prácticamente con la calculada.
Parecería que la hipótesis de la caída logarítmica de la dosis en el laberinto se comporta mejor

para aquellos laberintos cuya longitud es mayor que la distancia decirreductora de 5 m postula-
da [15]. En los primeros 5m la reducción de la dosis con la distancia resultaría más pronuncia-
da. Esta observación coincide con la aproximación que realiza McGinley para laberintos con
517
una segunda rama, (normalmente bastante más corta que la distancia decirreductora), donde al
-d3/5
decaimiento logarítmico 10 le añade un factor de reducción de 1/3. Dicho factor es comple-
tamente empírico y surge de los resultados de mediciones realizadas por el autor en algunos
recintos.
En nuestro caso se logra un mejor ajuste del modelo aplicando un factor de reducción 1/5 en
todos los casos en los que di < 5m. Utilizando dicho factor se construyó la Tabla 7 para mostrar
la relación entre valores calculados y valores medidos.
Dosis neutrónica Dosis neutrónica Dosis neutrónica

Acelerador calculada antes de la estimada después de la medida después de la
µSv/h]
puerta [µ µSv/h]
puerta [µ µSv/h]
puerta [µ
AL1 760 76 150

AL2 1140 114 80
AL3 90 9 10
AL4 1280 128 110
AL5 480 48 40
AL6 108 10 7
AL7 150 15 15
Tabla 8
Puede verse que con esta suposición los valores ajustan muy bien dentro del error promedio
del 50% atribuido a la aproximación [15].
II.II.2. Consideraciones particulares para cada acelerador
Observando el diseño de cada bunker (Figura 11) podría decirse que aquellos que presentan
características más inadecuadas para reducir las dosis neutrónicas, son los recintos de los
aceleradores AL2 y AL4. por la escasa longitud del laberinto, y el AL1 porque su superficie es
pequeña (aprox. 20% menor que el promedio) y el laberinto está diseñado de modo que el iso-
centro queda más “expuesto” y por lo tanto la contribución del haz directo es significativa. Estos
hechos se reflejan en los valores de dosis medidos.
En el acelerador AL5, hay que considerar una contribución a la dosis medida, debida a la fuga
neutrónica proveniente de la parte superior de la puerta por falta de un solapamiento adecuado.
Este hecho fue subsanado oportunamente e incluso se adicionó un espesor de 10 cm de poli-
carbonato borado a la superficie interna de la puerta.
518
AL1 AL2
AL3 AL4
AL5 AL6
AL7
Figura 11. Esquemas de diseño de bunker
519
II.II.3. Dosis debida a gamma de captura
Tal como puede observarse en la Tabla 8, la tasa de dosis gamma medida en el exterior de las
puertas es casi totalmente atribuible a radiación gamma de captura neutrónica. Sólo en los
aceleradores AL2 y AL4 que tienen laberintos muy cortos (d2<3m), se hace significativa la con-
tribución de la dosis gamma debida a radiación dispersa.
Con respecto a los blindajes, en los aceleradores AL3 y AL5 que tienen 10mm de Pb en su
puerta, se aprecian reducciones de la dosis gamma correspondientes a 1 ó 2 hemiespesores.
En los demás, los blindajes de 3 a 5mm de Pb diseñados para detener los gamma de baja
energía provenientes de la fuga del cabezal y radiación dispersa (columna 3 Tabla 9), resultan
insuficientes para las energías correspondientes a gamma de captura.
Dosis gamma de Dosis gamma dispersa Dosis gamma

Acelerador captura calculada antes calculada antes de la medida después de la
µSv/h]
de la puerta [µ µSv/h]
puerta [µ µSv/h]
puerta [µ
AL1 35 0,8 30
AL2 36 6 20
AL3 8 0,004 2
AL4 50 22 65
AL5 30 0,13 18
AL6 7 0,002 4
AL7 10 0,009 10
Tabla 9
II.III. Consideraciones de protección radiológica
Se efectúo una evaluación conservadora de la dosis debida a neutrones y gamma que recibiría
un operador situado “en contacto” con la puerta del recinto blindado durante un tiempo de 70
horas/año correspondiente a la siguiente suposición:
20 pacientes diarios (25% del total) con un minuto de tratamiento (rendimiento 2 Gy/min) du-
rante 5 días a la semana y 40 semanas por año.
Acelerador Dosis anual n+γγ [mSv/año]

AL1 12,6
AL2 7
AL3 1,2
AL4 12,4
AL5 4*
AL6 0,7
AL7 1,7
* Esta dosis se ha reducido en la actualidad sensiblemente, por el agregado de blindaje de policarbonato borado.
Tabla 10
Los resultados que se consignan en la Tabla 10, indican la necesidad de efectuar nuevas me-
diciones en los aceleradores AL1, AL2 y AL4 y si se confirman los valores hallados se deberá
analizar la necesidad de adecuar los blindajes de las puertas de dichos recintos para que se
cumplan las restricciones de dosis establecidas en la normativa vigente
520
II.IV. Conclusiones
El relevamiento efectuado en el marco del Proyecto ACDOS-9-P-1 demostró claramente que

las dosis ocupacionales debidas a neutrones y gamma de captura neutrónica en aceleradores
de 15 MeV son significativas y deben ser tomadas en cuenta en futuras evaluaciones de blindajes
para equipos de dichas energías o mayores.
Se dispone ahora de una metodología de cálculo sencilla para efectuar dichas evaluaciones.
Lamentablemente no pudo llevarse a cabo una validación del modelo con doble chequeo tal
como se había planificado. No obstante, con pequeños ajustes como el efectuado para labe-
rintos cuya pierna es de menor longitud que la distancia decirreductora, el modelo parecería
funcionar adecuadamente (también existen datos en la literatura internacional que lo avalan).
Los resultados del relevamiento demuestran así mismo, la necesidad de continuar con la inves-
tigación de las dosis debidas a neutrones en recintos de aceleradores lineales de alta energía,
dado que se han instalado nuevos equipos de 15 MeV en el último año y se prevé que se ins-
talen en el país aceleradores de mayor energía aún.
521
APÉNDICE I
Tabla I.1. Datos de rendimiento neutrónico [neutrones/Gy de fotones en isocentro]
para aceleradores lineales de distintas marcas, modelos y energías.
Acelerador Energía nominal Rendimiento

Marca - Modelo [MeV] [n/Gy fot]
Varian Clinac 18 10 6,5 E10
10 5,7 E10
10 5,6 E10
Varian Clinac 2100/2300 10 3,8 E10
Toshiba LMR-15 10 4,6 E11
GE Saturne 41 12 2,4 E11
Siemens Mevatron XX 14 7,7 E11
14 9,8 E11
14 8,2 E11
14 8,0 E11
14 8,0 E11
15 9,7 E11
15 8,9 E11
Varian Clinac 2100/2300 15 6,8 E11
Philips SL 20 17 6,9 E11
18 2,2 E12
18 3,5 E12
18 3,5 E12
18 2,8 E12
18 3,0 E12
18 2,9 E12
Varian Clinac 2100/2300 18 1,2 E12
Mitsubishi 18 2,3 E12
AECLTherac 20 18 4,1 E12
18 5,8 E12
18 5,0 E12
18 4,8 E12
18 5,5 E12
Philips SL 75-20 18 8,0 E12
Siemens KD 18 2,2 E12
20 2,4 E12
20 2,7 E12
Varian Clinac 2100/2300 20 1,2 E12
Philips SL 25 22 2,4E12
24 3,1 E12
25 6,6 E12
25 6,6 E12
CGR Sagittaire 25 4,8 E12
25 5,2 E12
25 4,5 E12
25 6,5 E12
25 5,5 E12
25 3,8 E13
CGR Saturne 25 1,0 E13
AECL Therac 25 25 6,0 E12
25 4,1 E12
25 6,4 E12
Mc Call [3] Mc Ginley [24] Mao [8]
522
APÉNDICE II
AII. 1. Propiedades de materiales para blindajes contra neutrones
Los neutrones rápidos producidos por aceleradores médicos que operan por encima de los
10 MeV son atenuados eficientemente por materiales con alto contenido de hidrógeno.
El hormigón común tiene un contenido de hidrógeno relativamente alto. Los fotoneutrones pro-
venientes de aceleradores médicos tienen espesores decirreductores (TVL’s) del orden de 21
cm en hormigón, en tanto que el haz primario de fotones tiene TVL promedio de 44 cm para las
energías de interés. Los neutrones rápidos se moderan por scattering elástico al interactuar con
el hidrógeno, convirtiéndose en neutrones lentos. Estos neutrones de baja energía producen
reacciones de captura con distintos materiales que dan lugar a radiación gamma de captura
muy penetrante. En hormigón, el espectro de gamma de captura se extiende hasta los 8 MeV
con energía promedio de 3,6 MeV y un pico pronunciado debido a la captura por hidrógeno,
situado en los 2,21 MeV.
Algunos materiales como el boro y el cadmio tienen grandes secciones eficaces de captura de
neutrones lentos y bastan unos pocos milímetros de dichos materiales para absorber la mayo-
ría de los fotoneutrones. El boro puede incluirse dentro del polietileno, el cual tiene un alto
contenido de H y la mezcla constituye un blindaje altamente eficiente para neutrones (ver II.2).
De hecho el polietileno con un contenido de B al 5% en peso, se produce comercialmente y se
emplea a menudo en este tipo de blindajes. La captura de neutrones lentos por el B produce un
gamma de captura de 0,473 MeV. No hay mucha información disponible sobre la transmisión
de los gamma de captura en polietileno. O’Brien et al. presentan un gráfico (Figura II.1) que
permite ver la atenuación que provee el polietileno para n y γ de captura y compararla con la
atenuación que produce cierto tipo de madera comercial.
madera (Spruce Plywood (n))
polietileno (γ)
Porcentaje de máxima lectura
polietileno (n)
(detector a 1 m)
laberinto
Posición de
los detectores
Espesor de atenuación
Figura II.1
Figura II.1. Atenuación de neutrones debida a polietileno y madera en la puerta

de un acelerador Therac 25. O`Brien [10]
523
Un resumen de las propiedades de distintos materiales blindantes se ofrece en la Tabla II.1
Material Contenido de H n rápidos n lentos γ captura Activación

3
[atom/cm ] TVL [cm] TVL [cm] TVL [cm] neutrónica
Hormigón 0,8 – 2,4 E 22 21,0 * 34,0 45,0 Baja

Polietileno 8 E 22 4,5 ** 77,0 ---- Muy baja
Polietileno 5% Boro ---- ---- 1,27 ---- Muy baja
Acero ---- ---- 10,7 13,5 Mediana
Plomo ---- ---- 410 6,1 Baja
* Neutrones de fuga del cabezal

** Neutrones del laberinto
Tabla II.1. Propiedades de materiales para blindaje contra neutrones
En la Figura II.2 se presenta un gráfico de TVL vs. energía promedio del haz directo obtenido
de los cálculos realizados por Mc Call [1], empleando el Código MORSE, para espectros neu-
trónicos continuos con una geometría de celda esférica. Allí se ha hecho un ajuste por cuadra-
dos mínimos de cada conjunto de puntos obteniéndose las siguientes ecuaciones:
Geometría laminar esférica

concreto
polietileno
polietileno (con neutrones monoenergéticos)
Figura II.2. Espesor decirreductor (TVL) equivalente para un blindaje esférico en función de la
energía promedio de la fuente neutrónica para distintos materiales. NCRP [19].
524
1) Para hormigón
_
TVL= 15,5 + 5,6 E dir
2) Para polietileno
_
TVL= 6,2 + 3,4 E dir
Estos valores pueden proveer también una buena aproximación al blindaje para neutrones en
aceleradores de uso médico, aunque se trata de resultados que no han sido suficientemente
chequeados. La última línea del gráfico corresponde a neutrones monoenergéticos. La visión
conjunta de las tres curvas muestra que la práctica común de emplear datos de atenuación
para neutrones monoenergéticos de una energía correspondiente al promedio del espectro, no
es una práctica correcta ni conservadora.
AII.2. Estudio por simulación computacional de la relación óptima del contenido de boro
en un blindaje para minimizar la dosis neutrónica en la puerta de un acelerador lineal
Se ha simulado de manera simplificada el recinto de un acelerador en operación y de su puer-

ta, mediante de un modelo unidimensional plano. Se utilizó una fuente de neutrones de fisión, y
se hizo un cálculo de transporte de neutrones y gamma. En el cálculo no se consideró el efecto
de la fuente gamma que aparece como radiación de frenamiento de los electrones que consti-
tuyen el haz original, pero que es posible contemplarla sin demasiada dificultad.
AII.2.1. Método de cálculo.
La Figura II.3 muestra un esquema (fuera de escala) del modelo elegido.
Como término fuente se ha utilizado en el cálculo una fuente de neutrones de fisión, sin radia-
ción gamma. Esta última aparece como producto de la captura neutrónica en los materiales
presentes.
Se ha modelado una región de agua representando la eventual presencia de un cuerpo huma-

no.
La región de hormigón representa una pared interpuesta entre la fuente y la puerta, modelando
un laberinto típico en forma aproximada.
Las capas de acero, plomo, parafina borada y acero están representadas con las dimensiones
reales de la puerta de un acelerador lineal en operación (AL6).
Se ha llevado a cabo el cálculo utilizando el código ANISN de transporte de neutrones y

gamma con la biblioteca de datos nucleares asociada, VITAMIN-C contenidos en el sistema
MTR_PC.
AII.2.2. Cálculos realizados

3
La densidad de la parafina es aproximadamente de 0,90g/cm . Por otra parte, la fórmula gene-
ral de un hidrocarburo es del tipo Cn H2n+2 que, para n suficientemente grande permite obtener
las siguientes relaciones:
mH / mtotal = 0,152
mC / mtotal = 0,848
525
La parafina, al igual que otros compuestos orgánicos tales como el polietileno, tiene un alto
contenido de hidrógeno, lo cual contribuye eficientemente a moderar los neutrones rápidos y
epitérmicos provenientes del recinto. Los neutrones térmicos son entonces absorbidos por el
boro, que tiene una alta sección eficaz de absorción térmica, minimizando así la dosis prove-
niente de los gamma de captura.
Se calcularon flujos neutrónicos rápido (E > 1 MeV), epitérmico (0,4 eV < E < 1 MeV) y térmico
(E < 0,4 eV), y las dosis de neutrones y gamma debidos a la fuente de fisión (sin incluir la
fuente directa de gamma, presente en los aceleradores de este tipo), realizándose un análisis
paramétrico en función del porcentaje de boro en la parafina.
Las tablas siguientes muestran los resultados obtenidos (la última columna representa la rela-
ción porcentual de la magnitud considerada, del lado externo de la puerta del recinto, respecto
del interno):
Cara interna puerta Cara externa puerta Emerge (%)

(*)
Flujo rápido 9,629 E02 6,923 E01 7,19
Flujo epitérmico 3,347 E03 1,769 E02 5,29
Flujo térmico 3,791 E03 3,621 E02 9,55
(**)
Dosis n 603,0 43,9 7,28
Dosis gamma 55,4 9,5 17,15
Tabla II.2. Sin contenido de boro en la parafina

(*)
Flujo rápido 9,631 E02 7,159 E01 7,43
Flujo térmico 2,604 E03 7,382 E01 2,83
(**)
Dosis n 593,3 42,9 7,24
Dosis gamma 45,4 4,4 9,70
Tabla II.3. Con 3% de boro natural en la parafina

(*)
Flujo rápido 9,633 E02 7,325 E01 7,6
Flujo térmico 2,569 E03 4,663 E01 1,82
(**)
Dosis n 592,9 43,6 7,35
526
(*)
Flujo rápido 9,633 E02 7,408 E01 7,69
Flujo térmico 2,560 E03 3,911 E01 1,53
(**)
Dosis n 592,9 43,8 7,39

(*)
Flujo rápido 9,635 E02 7,577 E01 7,86
Flujo epitérmico 3,330 E03 2,092E02 6,28
Flujo térmico 2,547 E03 2,933 E01 1,15
(**)
Dosis n 592,9 44.5 7,51
Dosis gamma 44,9 4.1 9,15

(*)
Flujo rápido 9,638 E02 7,803 E01 8,1
Flujo térmico 2,535 E03 2,093 E01 0,82
(**)
Dosis n 592,9 45,4 7,66
Dosis gamma 44,8 4,05 9,04
(*) en unidades de n/cm2 s

(**) en unidades de µSv/h
La Figura II.5 muestra la variación relativa del flujo neutrónico sobre la cara externa de la puer-
ta, respecto del valor en la cara interna de la misma, como función del contenido de boro natu-
ral en la parafina que constituye el interior de la puerta. Se observa en esta figura la reducción
en el flujo térmico relativo a medida que aumenta el contenido de boro.
De los resultados de las tablas que preceden y de la figuras Figura II.4 y Figura II.5 se pueden
observar los dos mecanismos diferentes y competitivos que tienen lugar en el interior de la
puerta. Un bajo contenido de boro aumenta el flujo de neutrones térmicos, y por lo tanto los
gamma de captura. Pero un alto contenido de boro, a su vez, disminuye relativamente la canti-
dad de hidrógeno en el material blindante (en este caso parafina), con lo cual aumenta el flujo
neutrónico rápido, con el consiguiente aumento de la dosis por neutrones, que depende esen-
cialmente de los neutrones rápidos. Existe entonces un rango óptimo de contenido de bo-
ro, que, como es posible observar en la Figura II.4, está entre el 4 y el 7%, coincidente
con los valores consignados en la literatura específica.
527
1 2 3 2 4 2 5 6 7 5 2
Materiales representados:
1 Combustible
2 Aire
3 Agua
4 Hormigón
5 Acero inoxidable
6 Plomo
7 Parafina borada
Límites de los intervalos (cm) determinados por cada región:

0 0,5 100 130 280 300 330 330,3 331,3 341,0 341,3 441,3
Figura II.3. Modelo plano para el cálculo de transporte
528
Valores relativos porcentuales de tasas de dosis n y gamma
9.8
9.6
9.4
9.2
8.8
Valor relativo porcentual
8.6
8.4
8.2
7.8
7.6
7.4
7.2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
% de boro natural en parafina
Dosis n Dosis gamma Dosis n + gamma
Figura. II.4. Valores relativos porcentuales de tasas de dosis n, gamma y total en la cara exter-
na de la puerta respecto de su cara interna, como función del contenido de boro natural en la
parafina de su interior.
Relación de flujos neutrónicos vs %de boro en parafina
10
7
Flujos neutrónicos relativos
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
%de boro natural
Flujo ráp Flujo epi Flujo térm
Figura II.5. Valores relativos porcentuales de flujos neutrónicos rápido, epitérmico y térmico en
la cara externa de la puerta respecto de su cara interna, como función del contenido de boro
natural en la parafina de su interior.
529
AII.3. Soluciones de diseño para reducir las dosis en la entrada del recinto
Mc Ginley [13] señala tres modificaciones al diseño de recintos para aceleradores que implican
una reducción sensible de las dosis en la puerta del recinto. Ellas son:
a) Reducir la abertura de la entrada interna al laberinto.
b) Adicionar una puerta liviana con un absorbente neutrónico en la entrada interna del
laberinto.
c) Colocar una puerta de polietileno borado al 5% en la entrada interna del laberinto.
Los resultados logrados se resumen en las Figuras II.6 y II.7.
Dosis equivalente
de neutrones por
unidad de dosis
equivalente de rayos x
en el isocentro
Figura II.6
530
Dosis de fotones por
unidad de dosis
de rayos x
en el isocentro
Figura II.7
531
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
[1] Neutron Sources and their Characteristics. R.C. Mc Call, W.P. Swanson. NBS SP 554, 1979.
[2] Personnel Hazards from Medical Electron Accelerator Photoneutrons. R.C. Mc Call, T.M.
Jenkins, R.A.Shore (y) P.D. LaRiviere. 5 Congress of the International Radiation Protection,
Jerusalem, Israel, Mar 1980, Oxford.
[3] Neutron Yield of Medical Electron Accelerators R.C. Mc Call. SLAC–PUB 4480, 1988.
[4] Transport of Accelerator Produced Neutrons in a Concrete Room.R.C. Mc Call, T.M. Jenkins
and R.A. Shore. IEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol NS-26, Nº 1, Feb. 1979.
[5] Radiation Transport in a Radiotherapy Room. S. Agosteo, A. Foglio Para, B. Maggioni, V.
Sangiust, S. Terrani, G. Borasi. Health Phys. 68 (1): 27-34; 1995.
[6] Monte Carlo Simulations of Neutron Transport in a Linac Radiotherapy Room. S. Agosteo, A.
Foglio Para, M. Silari, A. Torresini, G. Tosi. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Re-
search B72, 1992. 84-90. North Holland.
[7] Energy and Spatial Dependence of Neutron Fluxes in Radiotherapy Rooms for a Simple
Dose Estimate Method. S. Agosteo, A. Foglio. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics
Research B93, 1994, 362-369. North Holland.
[8] Neutron Fluence and Energy Spectra arround the Varian Clinac 2100C/2300C Medical Ac-
celerator. K.R. Kase, X.S. Mao, W.R. Nelson, J.C. Lin, J. H. Kleck, M. Elsalum. Health Phys.
74(1): 38-47, 1998.
[9] Neutron Sources in the Varian Clinac 2100C/2300C Medical Accelerator, Calculated by the
EGS4 Code. X.S. Mao, K.R. Kase, J.C. Lin, W.R. Nelson, J. H. Kleck, S.Johnsen. Health Phys.
72(4): 524-529, 1997.
[10] Radiaction Protection Aspects of a New High Energy Linear Accelerator P. O´Brien, H.B.
Michaels, B. Gillies, J.E. Aldrich, J.W. Andrew. Med. Phys. 12 (1), Jan/Feb 1985.
[11] Neutron Sources in a 24 MeV Medical Lineal Accelerator. Philip D. LaRiviere. Med. Phys.
12 (6), Nov/Dec 1985.
[12] Estimation of Neutron and Gamma Radiation Doses in the Entrance Mazes of SL-75 Linear
Accelerator Treatment Rooms. W. Kersey. Medicamundi, Vol.24, Nº 3. 1979.
[13] A Method of Eliminating the Maze Door of Medical Accelerator Rooms. Patton H. Mc Gin-
ley, Marc S. Miner. Radiation Protection Management, Vol. 12, Nº 5 Sept/Oct 1995, pp 29-37.
[14] A Method for Calculating the Dose Due Capture Gamma Rays in Accelerator Maze. Patton
H. Mc Ginley, Marc S. Miner., M.L. Mitchum. Phys. Med. Biol.40, 1995, 1467-1473.
[15] Evaluation of Neutron Dose Equivalent Levels at the Maze Entrance of Medical Accelerator
Treatment Rooms. Patton H. Mc Ginley, E. Butker. Med. Phys. 18 (2), Mar/Apr 1991.
[16] Stray Photoneutron Fields Produced by The GE Saturne Accelerator. J.O. Fenn, Patton H.
Mc Ginley. Radiation Protection Management, Vol 12, Nº 6, Nov/dec 1995, pp. 39-45
[17] Neutron Contamination of X-Ray Beams Produced by the Varian Clinac 1800. Patton H. Mc
Ginley, J.C. Landry. Phys. Med. Biol. 34, Nº6, 1989, 777-783.
[18] A Study of Photoneutron Dose Levels Produced by the Philips SL Medical Accelerators.
Patton H. Mc Ginley, Sh Ghavidel, J. Landry. Radiation Protection Management, Vol 10, Nº 1,
Jan/Feb 1993, pp. 45-50
[19] Neutron Contamination from Medical Electron Accelerators. National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurement, NCRP Report Nº 79, Nov 1984.
[20] Neutron Fluxes in Radiotherapy Rooms. S. Agosteo, A. Foglio Para, B. Maggioni. Med.
Phys. 20 (2), Pt 1, Mar/Apr 1993.
[21] Absorbed Dose to Technician Due to Induced Activity in Linear Accelerators for Radiation
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532
[22] Induced Activity in a High Energy Linear Accelerators. L. Ahlgren and L.E. Olsson. Phys.
Med. Biol. Vol 33, Nº3, 1988, 351-354.
[23] Measurements of Induced Activity in Medical Linear Accelerators. S.J. Thomas and M.P.
Hayball. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Vol 37, Nº3, 1991, 195-196.
[24] Shielding Techniques for Radiation Oncology Facilities. Mc Ginley P.H., Medical Physics
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533

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MEMORIA TÉCNICA 2000

EVALUACIÓN DOSIMÉTRICA DE UN CASO DE INCORPORACIÓN CONTINUA

LOCALIZED IRRADIATIONS, EVALUATION THROUGH “COMET ASSAY”

BIOLOGICAL DOSE ESTIMATION OF PARTIAL BODY EXPOSURES IN

DETERMINACIÓN DE DOSIS EN LA POBLACIÓN.

MODELING OF THE HYDROGEN GENERATED DURING OXIDATION

BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY OF MIXED NEUTRON – γ RAY FIELD

RETROSPECTIVE DOSIMETRY USING CHROMOSOME PAINTING

ARGENTINE RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETY

RISK PERCEPTION AND BENEFITS PERCEPTION

THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS IN THE APPLICATION OF QUALITY SYSTEMS IN

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FEDERATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION

MÉTODO PARA EL ANÁLISIS DE ESPECTROS ALFA

RESULTADOS DE LA PARTICIPACIÓN DE LA ARN EN EL PROGRAMA DE

NATURAL RADIONUCLIDES IN DRINKING WATER IN ARGENTINA

INDOOR RADON MEASUREMENTS IN ARGENTINA

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE

SEPARACIÓN DE URANIO, PLUTONIO Y AMERICIO EMPLEANDO

PARTICIPATION OF ARN- ARGENTINA IN THE QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC INTERCOMPARISON PROGRAMME FOR

GAMMA RADIATION FIELD EXTREMITY PERSONAL DOSIMETER:

MULTISPHERE NEUTRON SPECTROMETRIC SYSTEM WITH THERMOLUMINESCENT

PASSIVE AND ACTIVE DETECTION OF LEU BENEATH HYDROGENATED

CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIATION-INDUCED APOPTOSIS IN DEVELOPING

LATIN-AMERICAN RADIOPATHOLOGY NETWORK: MEDICAL RESPONSE FOR

DETERMINACIÓN DE EMISORES ALFA EN RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS.

TRACKING AND POSITION RECOGNITION APPLIED TO REMOTE MONITORING

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING FOR SAFEGUARDS PURPOSES

TRAINING IN RADIOPROTECTION AT UNDERGRADUATE AND POSTGRADUATE LEVEL

CRITERIOS DE USO Y VALIDACIÓN DE CÓDIGOS DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR

CALCULATION OF SENSITIVITY TO PARAMETERS IN SINGLE-PHASE

REGULATORY CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINE

CONTROL OF THE SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES AND THE SECURITY

DETERMINATION OF IODINE-129 IN SAMPLES OF CONIFERS COLLECTED

LINEAR AND NONLINEAR ANALYSIS OF DENSITY WAVE INSTABILITY PHENOMENA

DOSIS ABSORBIDA EN EL FETO

OPERACIÓN DE INSTALACIONES RADIACTIVAS Y NUCLEARES DE ARGENTINA

PLANTA DE FABRICACIÓN DE ELEMENTOS COMBUSTIBLES EN JAPÓN.

LUTETIUM-177-EDTMP FOR BONE PAIN PALLATION.

DETERMINATION OF 129I IN CONIFER SAMPLES AROUND NUCLEAR FACILITIES

NEW DEDICATED AMS SYSTEM AT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY

STABILITY ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-PHASE THERMOSYPHON LOOPS BY FINITE

GESTIÓN DE RESIDUOS RADIACTIVOS

TRANSITORIO DE PÉRDIDA DEL CAUDAL DE ALIMENTACIÓN A LOS

DOSIS OCUPACIONAL DEBIDA A NEUTRONES EN ACELERADORES LINEALES

Gómez Parada I. y Rojo A.M.

Publicado como PI 1/00 de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear

Gómez Parada I. y Rojo A.M.

Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear

En el presente informe se presenta la evaluación dosimétrica realizada en un caso de

Las mediciones de actividad retenida en todo el cuerpo se realizaron, en un principio

En el ejercicio de intercomparación se pedía a los participantes estimar la incorporación total

MEDICIONES DEL CONTADOR DE TODO EL CUERPO

En la Figura 1 se muestran las mediciones de actividad de Cs 137 retenida en todo el cuerpo.

Figura 1. Actividad de Cs 137 en todo el cuerpo en función del tiempo

La actividad incorporada se estimó en base a un esquema de incorporación continua y

El código de cálculo utilizado para la estimación de la incorporación, y posteriormente de la

Comparación de las mediciones de carga corporal con las curvas

Actividad retenida (Bq)

Figura 3. Ajuste de la fecha de inicio del período de incorporación.

Comienzo de la incorporación: 20-05-86

Con las hipótesis propuestas, esto es:

− Incorporación crónica y constante por ingestión