Case Stt1dy: Dust Extraction System

You are the head of Duse excraction syste111 of a

Blast
Furnace . Blast Furnace. You took round of your plant.
'J WOl~.J!M..
The DE c:;vc;1e111 consi<:1c; of 5 du•a collection
hood 10 suck dust fron1 outlet of MB= 1. and
outlet of 1IB=2 ac bell less top charging hopper.
Dust separation occurs in bag filler. The dW)t
storage silo shall be located beneath the bag filter.
The dust shall be discharged
- from the bag... filter to
c:; torage <:ilo through con,·cyor rornry air lock
\'ah·e. The dust accu1nulate<l in storage silo shall
be periodically discha rged to dtunper nucks
through retractable chute of DCL make \Yith built
DUST DUSI
COllECTJO~ STORAGE
DISCHARGE TO in bag filter.
DUMPER
HOOD .SlLO TRUO\ Apply :Nll-L\,'Th,I 10 the haLard-. you ha\'e seen in
your pla nt.
Dust Extraction System: System Breakdown
Dust extraction
syste1n

Dtist suction Dust handling Suction

& Transfer Bag Filter unit 1.;uit

Screw Dust
Com'e ·or Storaoe Silo
Sucriou Sensing
Duer Motor
Hood Indicator ID Fan
Drive
Compressed Bag Rotmy
Pulse Jet Air Svstem ,_,,_.,,....Rl!llIDent Vane Ti s

Pressw·e Temperature Bearing & Bevel

I Flange Gear

Control loop Relief Valve Piping

Hazard Tree 500 1~
450
400
'°"
80%
350 7°"
i;-
a
300 60% "I-
~ 250
Q"
SO%
9
t "00
i..- 4°" u

Illh■■-
150 3°"

100
SO
0 1112 13 1415 16 17 1819110 l'Jlll314 15
Hl -
Incide,na

Hnzard
Hl-Hn

' - -- H Eu
Hazard Matrix
Hazard HE l)II TIT

Suc1iou hood (HE! ) Suchon hood malfiu1ciiou People/Propeny/E11,·iro11ment

Duct (HE2) • Fan Malfunction People/Propeny1En,·i.ro11men1
• Blocked 011c1 (Low. :\tedium. Serious)
• Dusi accumulation
• Corrosion
• \Velding Failure
Dust sucrioo & Pre!>!tw·e inrucator (HE3) • Zero current flow due 10 open circuit People/Property/Environment
Transfer • Heating due to sho1t circuit
• Collllllwucarion Faillu·e
• Debonding. from the frame
• Diaphragm Failure
Temperamre indicator • Zero curreot flow due 10 open circuit People/Property/Em·ironmeu1
(HE4) • Heating due to short circuit
• Scale Build up over Sensor surface
• Conummica1iot1 Faihu-e
Pulse jet (HE5) • Abra~iou People/Propeny1En,·iroun1eni
• D11$1Acrumulation
Bag compamnent (HE6) Inappropriately Sized Dust People/Propeny/Em·iromnent
Bag Filter Bearing and Flange • Lubrication Failw·e People/Properry/Eu\'i.ronment
(HE7) • Corrosion
Bevel gear (HES) • Lubrication Failm·e People/Properry/Euvironmeu1
• Dust accuruulation
• Overloadin~
Hazard Pt-ot,ablU~· St'erit>' Delt'r tabllhy RP~

HJ 7 3 8 168
Hazard Prioritization
lC 2 9 8 144
ID §. -+ 5 120
1000 too
R4 9 6 3 162 900 90
fil 9 2 8 1-14 800 80
H6 7 2 4 56 ti
?00 10 J!
H" 6 9 5 270 600 60 9'1
HS 6 5 3 90 z 500 Sll
Cl.,
.,
~ .a."'

~
B9 l 4 6 24 400 40
-a
HIO 9 7 5 3 15 300

200
30
?O
a
HI I 3 7 9 189
100 to
HJ~ 4 8 9 288 0 0
,Rl3 4 2 3 24 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~

H14 9 3 2 54 Haza.rd
HI S -+ 3 9 108
Al6 7 I 5 35
HP 7 3 J 21
 Risks are iutolerable
Hazard Control Decisions excepl 1.11 extn\Ordiuary 0
Haznr d
IlHI

111:Z
RP~
3 15

Z88
circumstauces, and 1isk
.reduction
esseotiru.
rueasures ;ire
m Accountubility
Administnl tio.u

87 270
1n101erat>le Hnznrd RPN Risk reducriou measures are
Risk
lSIJ - - ·Jesil'able. but mny not be
implemented if their cost is
IT1 168
dispropo1tiooate ro lhe benefit
achieved
Exlenl of
H2 144
ALARP loe, I
Hazard RPN 0 Acco on tability

m
I\SSGS$ffi8nt R • HS JH
HO !W
lkJ1nrtme11tnl l1t!nJ
H3 120
ll6 56
Il15 108
1114 51
R lti 3~ 0
m
Accounhlbility
H9 :?4 Snfel)· officer
No furtherrisk reduction
1113 24
measmes nre nonuo IJy needed
HJ!7 and maiuraiu the level.
Continuous Process Example-HAZOP

OAP (Diammonium phosphate) is a concentrated phosphate~based ferti lizer. Phosphorus is an

essential nutrient along with Nitrogen and plays a vital role in the development of new plant tissues and
the regulation of protein synthesis in crops.
The typical formulation is 18-46-0 (18% N, 46% P20 5 , 0% K20).
\

PHOSPHORIC ACID
STUDY
NODE l

STUDY STUDY
ANIMONL\ NODE2 NODE3
(

li- =--1
DL.V. INION Om.I
PHOSPR ~TE (DAP)
 Continuous Process Example for HAZOP
• In this process, the phosphoric acid and an1n1onia are mixed. and a
NP fertilizer, diarnmonium phosphate (DAP) results, if the reaction of
an,monia is complete.

• If too little phosphoric acid is added, the reaction is incomplete, and

excess a1l1Jnonia results.
PHOSPHORICACTD
STUDY
• Too little ammonia available to the reactor results in a safe but NODE I
undesirable product (n1ono-ammonium phosphate).
o Loss of material (phosphoric acid) STIJDY snmY
~l\!Ol\'IA· :soon ~ODEl
o Corrode do,vnstrea1n units

• The HAZOP team is assigned to investigate ''Personnel Hazards

fro1n the Reaction". ' '
DW,IMmlQUM
PR~PHATf /0.\PI
 For Stt1dy Node 1

Param.etel' :Flo"~
Guide woTd: NO
Deviation: NO & FLOW (no tlo"'· at study node 1)
PHOSPII.GRICACID
SRJDY
Causes: ; NOD.E I
• Valve A fa11s closed
STIJDY sruDY
• Phosphoric acid supply exhausted ~l\lO;..'fA. ~ODE! NODEJ

• Plug in pipe, pipe ruptures

Consequences: Excess a111monia in reactor and release to ,:vork area
(excess pressure - pressure relief v alve rupture, an1monia "'ith
do,,'ll stream products leading to a death. sub-consciousness) DL~Dlm«lUM
~A.TFm~P1
Suggested Action: Automatic closure of valve B on loss of flov.;
from phosphoric acid supply.
For St11dy Node 1
-
Guide word: OTHER THAN
Devi~tion: OTHER THAN & FLOW (material other than
phosphoric acid in line A)
PHOSPJ!ORJCACID
Causes: STUD\'
NODEI
• \vrong deli very fro1n vendor
• \-vrong 1nateria I chosen from plant ,varehouse mJDY STu'DY
iU!i\!ONIA 1-'0DE ! :l(ll)E l
Con sequences: Depends on substiunion; team men1ber assigned to
test potential substitutions based on aYailability of other materials
at site.
R ec-0mmended Actio n: Check on material ch osen before charging D~NOUM
phosphoric acid supply L3nk. PliO\Plf ~lHn~ Pl
For Study Node 1

i. R~peait the same process for .t he other pa1rameters, characteristic to the process such as
Temperature, Pressure, etc.
11. Total deviations ,causes, gaps recommen,d ations for the node -1 is done
Si,niltirly ...

• By choosing other study nodes for flo,v sheet sections.

• Different process parameters and combining them "r.ith_ the guide

,vords.

Continue this p11·ocess ...

HAZOP Study Report
■

• Each action and the person responsible for conipleti ug the action
is recorded on the record sheet.

• Report should include

• introdu ction
• brief process descrip tion
• key,word co1nbinations used
• results and analysis of n1aiu finding s
• conclnsions and reconllllendations
• references, and
• appendices.
CASE STUDY: Hazop ,vork she~t propane sto1·age & propane dilution srstem-Tata Steel (K)

SL NO NODEeNO SYSTEM PAGE NO

1 301 ROAD h-ili'KER TO PROP•..\NE STO~.\GES ..i
2 302 SUPPLY OF PROPANE TO CONSUMER 9
3 303 PROPA1\fE D (LlITION SYSTEM 14
 :,'I.ode: 301 Prop11ue Stornge Sy&tem P&ID No. G/P&l/66.5412013
.
Design Inteul TAnkt'r 10 Storn~
De,·1n1iou CA,.-5(' Conseqoeure Sn.feiunrd Rec.ommeudMioo Remin-k/Actlou
Ccm1,ressor C- O1102/()J Low filhngl'ff~ JJI S!Ol'3@r Ill.Ok Stlltldby Coll!pttSSl)!' Ptm~ded
MrufuuC'IIOD n rnrn C-01/02/03

~ Tnp ot Zl ~on2
No lillin@ lll Stan~ umk ~ safl,ty \-alve
!'lo.lLessFlow Twer&$1gned for2 1kgfcm2
h!!.ilng sboti1d ~
ROV-1 Stud Close T.1/Th'TI
i'ressure gaug~ &, Pres-;ure UlOOlpOl"8.1M m
hi.ctease Ill Pressure w Tanker way Vfllve has ~en proY!rli!d lllM1ltemuicl' i.cbedull'

WI tAllket

Thmng operation of propane

lll.'(Uld filliug from !«lad Teuker
to Storage T~nk due to t,,for,e or
!ugh flow' StalUI@ Char@e' IS
geoemtro. Ti3 aVOld !be .hsznrd R.emmDce JS lO be
More pressure differes~ m T-annr
from static ~ 111 pipehne clleclci!d for 1111
Mattl-'low SlllllC C1mge poswhle l..me Tllllker ond Tn11k Ill Eartbed .md J>ropnne slonig,e lllnk, enrthlm@ Snip and
@dTMk
Jumper lllndco of C,opptt. E.anh pn and • r«Ud
as to be mtunm1ned
Ah1mimnn or fil 5lnp fm
elfctrical conllnuity is IO be
pmnded lll nll ilnnge,;

R- 1
 Sode: JOJ PropAne S1ornge System I P&ID No GIP&l/66~411013
Desl2u Intenf Tanker· lo Storae:e
Oe,1ntlon Can~e Con.st>q_nt>uce S:tfegu:trd lle("0mmencfatiou Remnr k/AC'tiou
L>=Pmsnre Co= d in Le-..-. flow
~ e r Tcmperanui: Ext=J-fuc Fire and Explosion Hilzard PRV-01.and PO-Ol ,1~13,14 Provided

,, High pressure Oas detector pconded OLD I . ~ 3 Pl'Ov1dcd.

\V;\tc-r Sprioklcr, provided fur the S romgc: tnnl.:~

,, and Tanl!c:r unl,:iatliug 5.18Mn

PSV pro,idcd.
Low~ T(Ulpwll\tre "Soh\ue
Hi~rlevel Tramlcr no1 stopped ,n Tri ~Sllnzahon LT-H 121 31 .PTI J.Zt.Ji nrc pro\'idcd m the
high level IIlfik srunc will. close n:spccth-c ROV- ll 2L 31
(Storage Tank T-1,2.3)
Lower Level No.Issue
Coucc:rurnruul ~

1mpun1y NA
Utility Fnilw-c Pc>wcr ~o Tmmfci of Propruie All-ROY Md SV will Clt,;c:, PGJwuld Ix pro,i<ktl fui
from Tanker to S10~ h;id.::np pow.-1 fo1 dl;'
Tank. -oper:mou oiPn:,pane
,1or.i~c .,:r;1cm
,, Coniprcssor C--01. C -OZ &
C--03 will ,top. R-~
Case stu<l) -l on Maintenance 01lerabilit)TStucly (Moil)
1

In the steel plant operations, the slabs are cast to a " ·eight of 28 tons (based on the do,Ynstream coil sizes and
the yield requiren1ents).Each cast fron1 the slab ca-.ter ,,·ill ha,·e a tun of arotu1d 25000 tons. It 111eanc;. thi~
25000 tons slab continuously coining out of slab caster has to cut into approximately 893 slabs at hot
condition. Propnne continuous gas cutting 111achine is u sed fo r this ptnpose. The propane is a hazardous gas
and co1nes from the propane underground tanks. These in tum filled by the road tankers. Tue P&ID of the
propan~ gns plant is nllnched. The storage bullet hns \\ orked for live years and hence requires pre,·enti\'e
maintenance actiYity to be done.
 Pal'ameters or In ddenl C l'itical
Maintenance Operability Study (Mop) of Propane Tank Eleme111s(ICE s}
0

1. Energy isolation
Maintenance activities can be divided as follows .., Material handling{Craues failure. Ri~ing
dcf~ts)
1. Cleaning the tank, manually. 3. E~lo~ion
4. Wol'k a1 hcight
2. Inspectjon of joints by die penetration test. ins ide and outside of the jo ints. s. wdding

3 · Cl1ange th e twO Va1VeS. 6

1: Gas C\lnuli
Confined spaec rcquircmcnb
4. Paint the external surface of the tank s.
9.
Slip. mp. &11
Access
0

10. PPE s
11. Handlmg f acili11cs
List of Nodes/ Activities used in the Mop of Propane tank 12 ·
13.
Procedures
Ergonomi~
14. Comnmnicauon
15. Skills and Tmuuutt
Acthity Detail of Acthi ty System Page 16. Monng Equipment
(:xode) number l 7. Lifting 1ools
18. H.md 1ools
101 Cleaning the rank. manually. Propane gas storage
19. Pcrmn 10 work (PTW)
102 Inspection of joints by die pen etration Propane gas storage :?O. Mechanical In.regriry
test. inside and outside of the joints. 2 I. Sup=·is,on
103 Change the two valves. Propane gas
Guide words nppllied
unloading and filling L. Partially done ~01 douc
104 Pairu the external surface of the tank. Propane gas storage u. Pamally swtablc Not suitable
iii. Partially adeqnare. Not adequa1e
TSK., P.l'op:ulc S t.t.nbu..
liodb!OJ
PAnunrtc:fl' ICE. Dt,i .all.oa
clCCIDQl-eru:rl!Y pam:,l Of
oo LSObll!oo
l'ropMic cn<.rgy 1'anfal or no G:\~ trow 001 stom,cd
£:ne11gy.liollltinu, liOL:wan
N""ttroga,,~ •P:,m:u or
~ ~atll'lh
V cntilimon assur.wot
Pattial or no ir!1plernc,m11ion f"l\iit....,.,,r.
A=labdrty oflo,v wllli~
ll"-VJ liglnu\g, Palfbt er'"'
Confined s_pn.re JD'.IP,fcmtniabon.
Re$CUe meclnrusm Paru>l
or oo.llllµlcmcntctllon.
Wo1•k acht-!gbr ~au pg:r.-ruhu ofladdm-!m ~ p~oaJmoibo,
!lOIJ!B qp and 11110 llltank: ~
Welding~ . process
W,ldis,g :llld w•Jdulg operator,
.P.urud oc not SWJ:lble
M ~v WORK sm:rr FROl'&":ESTOIUG£ &- l'ROl'A.~~ DILrno;-- ,§y!iln{
Clc,,lllat;Cthuotn1nr s.aor-.1.:, 11.nk d!Ptrotl.11~ ~,urac.d.r&tt:Wa I r,~GtP&t:68SSt::OU.-StON:t-T,ank
Cutu "Rnol Catuc- Con:s""'Ju«:ntc- S;1!~u..1.1'd A,-.O.ol• R ceo.uunta.il..ldon
I
1,!mpkmtm'E.uagy soume
Entigy ScKltlt J>cople ra:iy ~•
Llck Dfknc,,mdge -,.J,c1rocm,d
fml Enet~ oolmon Ve r b ~ Idennncsnop al1II .Elfer~·
properlp 1ot,1deruified
h<,J.ruoo-fiilly
People wlul, w ~ rn
Vah...s :uc 001 bl:wked. Only lnlplcrn.:.u blanking of \'\'IM!.
lnletv:ilv~ om·blallked die mnk may be "ei!PO" .d Volv,s i<oli,tion
po;itivdr close_d Nunit>cr.-
10 .g>s
I
;!jlcr plil\!tll&~ !llnk.
N,1rogm vah'"e'n<>I N,aogen'\"alve>
Nilm~ ~ nol Mp,y,aalibn m thd tmlt Nitro¢'c,kei-iu-e closed. ~ N i u o ~ Valves
isobl=~ ti"ely
blanbi4 ~
N<'tf,clt lh< All· cu-c,tlallon sy.sl<m!! Arrtmgl!IIICDt of atr
amnm,anem:
Aspt}'Xiatiou in rhe rank
compt'tS:S:01 lines
Avnillblc -
"}lblJ l\'lDl~liiy o! Al'lllbbiliN of ~
NOi kn0\\lll¥ the
14\' 'supply m,porlal,i,•
Sllllcl<to U,e ~le
rujlply
,A,.,,:u;.bJ.. -
I
Po« Ct>U!lNj_uctl(<
ReS<uc m«,hanisw md
Non.a,-aiµ,bili,y Not P.l<wmag eoruci:
.m:u-.•~111. 'foml
•WlplJ.ca~ in.casc of
tr>inl\(I peop~ Wlthm
tbu eam
A,-:u1,1>J• -
Ml!!{~ "
"No p~e:&di<r
Tu.iit aud.m!L_c-owd bt- Av:u'Lib,!Jn•<!)f 1"'11'.,-
-Woodc:nJa<lilcs; ~\•L\il.ibk nlrl:ill!c .l.iila<n
;JU}' ~ l~
SuL<>e.1
.,,...-- 10 Ilk: .
Notswmbl• wcldmg A""11llbilityof~
m.icbwc, l)QU- W<'ldmg m:icl=. Only 1rn11sformer fy-p<: "'l'lding 1.i~ de eoooolled \\1'.ldusg
~01 kno.wn. Not n-:ubbl• Shock and o!e;o10C1111m
avadabtlirt ofcoacct cnbk<, proctdun. and m>clwio:;.oon,qttlllii,d welder machwe.
piOCC$5 and opd'>IM, operator.
 Case study of Steel Melting Shop by IIT KGP B.Tech Students

The integrated st,eel plant steel melting shop had incidents while lifting and transferring the hot meta l using
150 T ladle to LD Convertor. The students collected data live for 10 days in all the shifts and earlier data and
understood the situation using different ACM's. Analysed the data using models like Fuzzy Technic and
suggested ,impressive recommendations and upon implementation the issues are settled .
Exercise

Many bicycle accidents happen at IIT Kharagpur Campus. The Director and parents are concerned and wish that this
should be eliminated/reduced.
Work on APT model and give recommendations.
EXERSICE
\,Vitb reference to the do111int1 tltcory, consider the case of 1Vlr. Cyrus ~Iistry accident model and identify the po~sib/e
i11cide11ts and tlteir ca11ses
l\llr. Cyrus 1fistry(54) was travelliug in his l\fercedes GLC sports utility car from A.llllledabad to 1Iumbai ou 5111 of September.1022. with 3
of bis fam.ily 111embers.
Tue l'eport s uumitted by the probe SM\\'S SOIBe of tlle major concerns
• 1vlr. ~Cistry ear was travelling at a speed of around 130-140kmph. ,vhere the allowed speed limit set was only 80kmph.
• The ca1-wiis dtiveu by the fani.ily friend ofMr. l.vI.istry uamed Aualti ta Paudole (55) tllere was uo pt'ofessional dri\'er duriug the journey.
• The dnver may have lost contr ol during the journey that had le-ad to the collisiou of the car into a divider ou the bridge .
• Tue reporr also shows thar there is also a high chance of tbe riders not wearing rhe seat belr druing rhe joun1ey.
• The impacr of the collisiou was so incense that the radiator of the vehlcle was not only completely sllli\Shed but also shlfted rwo to three
feet's inside.
Some of the images of the scene has been attached for yow- references.

"Note: Some of tile safet.y highlights include 7 au-bags. c-rosswmd assist. parking assist. attenuou assist. adaptive brake hgbts. ()1e -pressure monitonn~ system.
hill des ccn1 cont1·ol, 1111d t.lerccdcs· Pre-Snfc occupant procecuon system
Identify usm g Bird Don1ino Theory:
• Ancestry and Social E nvirorunent for the cause of the acciclent.
• Fault of the Person

• Unsafe act and/or mechanic-al or physical hazar.cl, due to the

which the accident 1uighr have occurred.
• Possible Accident
• TI1e influence of managentent and n1anagerial error;
• Loss. as the result of an accideut could be production losses,
propeny datnage or wast(lge of orher assets. as well as injuries.
 Cont' d ...
~-----, I
!
Positive energy I
6't. .
------
L......-.... _ ....
isolation
I
,, - ',,
,, ...

' 1
,
:I

,, '•
, ''
• ,._"' ···•,,,_ Workers enuy ,, '
,,
1

Che~ .vI
,'
,• .\
\ \Vorkers en~}'
!i uorallowe'd I

<'; ---,
Chellll.'cal source

,
~ " <-~
', 11.llowed
•
~
I
I

.....
I
I

'I Mechauipd sourct

I
I '
I
I
I
I
'I I
I II
,,
I
~lechani
~ ' ,/
_____,,. ',, l'vfac.hine Shutdo,vu __,,-'
'
'~ _ , ,~
.
~--~- - --►--------
.- l
i
!
Mayan Pyramid concept Cont'd .... ' Type I Accidents: Fall of load
Type U Accidents: Systen1 ·s
failure as a ,:vho le i.e., faiJnre of
the supporting stnJcture le-adj11g
to crash of complete crane
structure. The example
resembles here shows basically
an occupational safety accident
Sources: Human, System
Cause:
• Operator:
• Sh'ts!i
• Fntigue
• :\Irutal hnbalaurr
• Poor trni ning
• Los\ of ronh·ol

• Worker:

- • carelessness

*Majority of the accidents in

mdustp,e s are occupational safety
:\CCiclenl'i.
Mayan Pyramid concept Cont' d ... . '
Example:
The airline industry was the pioneer for this kjnd of type I and type Il risk thinking.
In that industry. taking all necessary _precautionary measures to ensure flight safety
is regarded as fundrunentlllly differenr fro1n taking. preventative measures to
guarantee employee safety and health. T,vo databases are 1naintained by airline
companies: one is used to keep data ofnear-miss incidents affecting flight safety and
i:nfonn ation regarding workforce health and safet),·. IIence. i n lhis particular industry,

it is clear that workforce injury statistics say nothing about the risk of an aircraft
u
crash. This line of type I and type TI risk thinking can (and should) be implen1ented
111 every industry sector. The first flight of an airplane, the- &:l
Wright Flyer on December 17. 1903