PRINCIPLES
No duty rests on such body
1. The power to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum must be conferred by
statutes upon administrative agencies.
Hence, administrative officers do not have
inherent power to require the attendance of
witnesses before them, put witnesses under
oath and require them to testify, or to require
the production of books, papers, and
documents or other evidence.
The power given by the statute must be clear
and cannot be inferred from a grant of
authority to summon and examine witness.
What to do in case no such power is expressly
granted? Compulsion through judicial process.
Apply before the court for subpoena to
enforce obedience or the giving of a
testimony before it. The court may punish
contumacy or refusal as contempt.
2. Contempt proceedings. Persons failing to
attend, give testimony, and produce records
at an investigative proceeding may be
punished for contempt. An administrative
body, however, cannot exercise its power to
punish a person for contempt in the absence
of any statutory grant, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
Of course, before one can apply to the courts
for the punishment of a hostile witness, the
agency must first have the authority to take
testimony or evidence. (Carmelo v. Ramos,
November 30, 1962)
3. While hearings may be held, hearing is not
a necessary part of an investigation by an
administrative body or official.
4. In administrative proceeding, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.
5. Right to counsel is not always imperative
in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measure against erring public officers and
employees. Thus, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by a
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondent’s capacity to
represent himself.
to furnish the person being investigated the
option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. The hearing conducted by the
investigating authority is not part of a criminal
prosecution.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
(Rule-Making Power)
Legislative Power
Legislative power is the power to make, alter
and repeal laws. The essential feature of the
legislative function is the determination of the
legislative policy and its formulation and
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of
conduct.
 The doctrine of separation of power
prohibits the delegation of purely
legislative power. (Bar Question)
 The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual
division in the framing of our
Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance
of matters placed within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere.
In other words, the power to declare whether
or not there shall be a law, to determine the
general purpose or policy to be achieved by
the law, and to fix the limits within which the
law shall operate is a power which is vested in
the legislature and may not be delegated.
 The Constitution does not, however,
absolutely prohibit delegation of
legislative power.
 The prohibition does not embrace every
power the legislature may properly
exercise. What the doctrine precludes is
the delegation of those powers which are
strictly or inherently and exclusively
legislative such as determining what the
law shall be, to whom it may be applied,
 or what acts are necessary to effectuate
the law.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
Corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers. "The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata
non delegari potest.”
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:
1. Delegation of tariff powers to the
President under Section 28 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
2. Delegation of emergency powers to
the President under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
3. Delegation to the people at large;
4. Delegation to local governments; and
5. Delegation to administrative bodies.
Delegation of legislative power to the
President
The President is permitted in Sections 23(2)
[refers to national emergency] and 28(2)
[refers to fixing and imposition of tariff rates,
etc] of Article VI of the Constitution. The
Administrative Code of 1987 also delegates to
the President certain ordinance powers, in the
form of presidential issuances.
Ordinance Power of the President
1. Executive Orders. - acts of the
President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers.
Example: EO No. 102, s. 2019 (January 10,
2020) – Modifying the rates of import duty on
certain imported articles in order to
implement the Philippine Tariff Commitments
pursuant to the Free Trade Agreement
between the ASEAN and HK, China.
2. Administrative Orders - acts of the
President which relate to particular
aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as
administrative head.
Example: Administrative Order No. 20, s. 2019
(January 10, 2020) - Authorizing the grant of
gratuity pay for FY 2019 to JO and COS
workers in government.
3. Proclamations - acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend. This
shall have the force of an executive
order.
Example: Proclamation No. 889 (January 24,
2020) – Creating and designating a building
and the parcel of land on which it stands
located in the AFP-RSBS Compound, Km. 12
East Service Road, C5, Taguig City as Special
Economic Zone (Information Technology
Center), pursuant to RA 7916 as amended by
RA 8748.
4. Memorandum Orders - acts of the
President on matters of
administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer
or office of the Government.
Example: Memorandum Order No. 41, s. 2019
(Nov. 15, 2019) – Creating a TWG for the
establishment of a military camp in
Kapantaran, Marawi City
5. Memorandum Circulars - acts of the
President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the
attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or
offices of the Government, for
information or compliance.
Example: MC No. 75 (January 13, 2020) on
suspension of classes in all levels in the
Province of Batangas on January 14, 2020.
6. General or Special Orders - Acts and
commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Example: General Order No. 1 (May 30, 2017)
– Implementing Proclamation No. 216 dated
May 23, 2017 placing Mindanao under Martial
Law for a period not exceeding 60 days.
Delegation of legislative power to the
Supreme Court
 The Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court the power to “Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
 The power vested in the Supreme Court,
as above provided, empowers it not only
to promulgate rules of procedure but also
to repeal procedural laws, such as those
which prescribe the method of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion.
 Parts of statutes which deal with
procedural aspects can be modified or
repealed by the Supreme Court by virtue
of its constitutional rule-making powers.
Delegation of legislative power to local
governments
Section 48 of the Local Government Code of
1991 provides that “Local legislative power
shall be exercised by the sangguniang
panlalawigan for the province; the
sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the
sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and
the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.
Rule-making power of administrative refers
to the power to issue rules and regulations
which result from delegated legislation in the
administrative level.
It is the agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule.
 Administrative agencies may exercise
quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers only if there exists a law
which delegates that power to them.
 An administrative body may
implement broad policies laid down in
a statute by filling in only the details
which the Legislature may neither
have time nor competence to provide.
This is called the Power of
Subordinate Legislation. This is
effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary
regulations, which have the force and
effect of law.
 Vesting administrative agencies with
this power is necessary because of the
impracticability of providing general
regulations for various and varying
details of management by the
lawmakers.
Nature of rule-making power
 This is the exercise of delegated legislative
power, involving no discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority
to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law
itself.
Case: Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v.
Secretary Defensor (Aug. 3, 2006)
 The SC said that quasi-legislative power is
the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that
is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separation of powers.
 Rules and regulations issued by
administrative authorities pursuant to the
powers delegated to them have the force
and effect of law; they are binding on all
persons subject to them, and the courts
will take judicial notice of them.
KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS
A. Supplementary or detailed legislation
(legislative rules)
Legislative rules are in the nature of
subordinate legislation and designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing
the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory
obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by Congress.
B. Interpretative rules
Interpretative rules are intended to interpret,
clarify or explain existing statutory regulations
under which the administrative body
operates.
Their purpose or objective is merely to
construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the
statute.
No vested right can be acquired on a wrong
construction of the law by administrative
officials and such wrong interpretation does
not place the government in estoppel to
correct or overrule the same.
C. Contingent rules
Contingent rules are those issued by an
administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which
the enforcement of the law depends.
These rules take effect upon the happening of
future specified contingencies leaving to some
other person or body the power to determine
when the specified contingency has arisen.
They involve the delegation of the power to
ascertain the existence of certain facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into
effect of a law.
What the President (or authorized person by
the law) is required in this kind of act is simply
in the execution of an act, not in the making
of the law. He becomes a mere agent of the
legislature in ascertaining and declaring the
event upon which its expressed will is to take
effect.
Requirements of notice, hearing and
publication
 In general, an administrative regulation
needs to comply with the requirements
laid down by the Administrative Code of
1987 on prior notice, hearing, and
publication in order to be valid and
binding, except when the same is merely
an interpretative rule.
 This is because when an administrative
rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed.
 When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate
or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency
to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
Republic v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Inc.
(March 5, 2014)
HELD: In resolving this issue, there is a need to
determine whether or not the aforesaid
circulars partake of administrative rules and
regulations and, as such, must comply with
the requirements of the law for its issuance.
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers only if there
exists a law which delegates these powers to
them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting
statute and must involve no discretion as to
what the law shall be, but merely the
authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of the policy set out in the law
itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of
separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative
power.
An administrative regulation may be classified
as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a
contingent rule.
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances
would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually
the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE
testing requirement as a component of
applications for the issuance of CPRs covering
certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is
considered an administrative regulation – a
legislative rule to be exact – issued by the
Secretary of Health in consonance with the
express authority granted to him by RA 3720
to implement the statutory mandate that all
drugs and devices should first be registered
with the FDA prior to their manufacture and
sale. Considering that neither party contested
the validity of its issuance, the Court deems
that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the
requirements of prior hearing, notice, and
publication pursuant to the presumption of
regularity accorded to the government in the
exercise of its official duties.
On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: (a)
implement a primary legislation by providing
the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or
explain existing statutory regulations under
which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain
the existence of certain facts or things upon
which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends.
In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is
for the FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s.
1989, including those covering the BA/BE
testing requirement, consistent with and
pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has
sufficient authority to issue the said circulars
and since they would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek
to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking,
administrative regulations in the first place –
no prior hearing, consultation, and publication
are needed for their validity.
In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1
and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding
to all concerned parties, including the
respondents in this case.
Victoria’s Milling Company , Inc. v. Social
Security Commission (March 17,1962)
HELD: It is an interpretative rule.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the
Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social
Security Law defining the term
"compensation". Prior to the amendment,
bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given
in addition to the regular or base pay were
expressly excluded, or exempted from the
definition of the term "compensation", such
exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for
the Social Security Commission to interpret
the effect of such deletion or elimination.
Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to
apprise those concerned of the interpretation
or understanding of the Commission, of the
law as amended, which it was its duty to
enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that
was not already in the law as amended. It
merely stated and circularized the opinion of
the Commission as to how the law should be
construed.
Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise
employers-members of the System of what, in
the light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which
the social security contributions should be
based, and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity.
ADMIN RULE V. ADMIN INTERPRETATION
Admin Rule
- When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law;
- A rule is binding on the courts so long
as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the
courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate
wisdom
Admin Interpretation
- When it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law;
- Administrative interpretation of the
law is at best merely advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what
the law means.
Manila Jockey Club v. CA (December 15,
1998)
HELD: A reasonable reading of the horse
racing laws favors the determination that the
entities enumerated in the distribution
scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and
6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and
89, are the rightful beneficiaries of breakages
from mid-week races. Petitioners should
therefore remit the proceeds of breakages to
those benefactors designated by the aforesaid
laws.
While herein petitioners might have relied on
a prior opinion issued by an administrative
body, the well-entrenched principle is that the
State could not be estopped by a mistake
committed by its officials or agents. Well-
settled also is the rule that the erroneous
application of the law by public officers does
not prevent a subsequent correct application
of the law.
Although there was an initial interpretation of
the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could
not be precluded from setting that
interpretation aside if later on it is shown to
be inappropriate.
Cruz v. Youngberg (October 26, 1931)
HELD: The true distinction, therefore, is
between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE-MAKING POWER
1. Administrative agencies may exercise
quasi-legislative powers only if there
exists a law which delegates these
powers to them.
2. The rules so promulgated must be within
the confines of the granting statute and
must involve no discretion as to what the
law shall be but merely the authority to
fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of the policy set out in the
law itself.
3. The function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of the law into effect.
4. The administrative body may not make
rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of,
or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
5. In case of discrepancy between the basic
law and a rule or regulation issued to
 implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law.
6. A rule or regulation should be uniform in
operation, reasonable, and not unfair or
discriminatory.
Requisites for validity
a) Issued under authority of law;
b) Within the scope and purview of the law;
c) Reasonable.
d) Publication
A. Issued under authority of law;
There must be a valid law which delegates
legislative powers to the administrative
agency.
Case: DOH v. Philip Morris Phils.
Manufacturing (March 25, 2015)
B. Within the scope and purview of the
law
Thus, administrative regulations cannot
extend the law or amend a legislative
enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. An
administrative regulation may not, by its rules
and regulations, amend, alter, modify, extend,
supplant, enlarge or expand, restrict or limit
the provisions or coverage of the statute as
this power belongs to the legislature. It
cannot engraft additional requirements or
embrace matters not covered or
contemplated by the statute.
However, administrative bodies are allowed,
under their power of subordinate legislation,
to implement the broad policies laid down in
the statute by “filling in” the details.
All that is required is that the regulation be
germane to the objectives and purposes of
the law; that the regulation does not
contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.
Land Bank v. CA (Oct. 6, 1995)
HELD: The DAR clearly overstepped the limits
of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued AO 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for
his property because Section 16(e) of RA 6657
is very specific that the deposit must be made
only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands — xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession
of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (emphasis
supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any
other form. If it were the intention to include
a "trust account" among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express,
or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded construction of
the term "deposit".
In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because
these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA (June 29, 1998)
HELD: It is axiomatic that an administrative
agency, like the PPA, has no discretion
whether to implement the law or not. Its duty
is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there
is any conflict between the PPA circular and a
law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
Eastern cannot insist on paying its pilotage
fees based on memorandum circulars issued
by the PPA. Because the PPA circulars are
inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and
ineffective. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. Eastern has no legal basis to
refuse payment of pilotage fees to DPA, as
computed according to the rates set by EO
1088. DPA cannot be faulted for relying on the
clear and unmistakable provisions of EO 1088.
In fact, EO 1088 leaves no room for
interpretation.
Public Schools District Supervisors Assoc. v.
de Jesus (June 19, 2006)
HELD: The provisions are valid. The provisions
merely reiterate and implement the related
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. A plain reading of
the law will show that the schools district
supervisors have no administrative
supervision over the school heads; their
responsibility is limited to those enumerated
in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional
advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning
centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be
assigned by proper authorities.
A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District
Supervisor has limited responsibilities, and
that the power to exercise administrative
supervision over the ESPs is not covered by
responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither is that
power covered by the directive that the
District Supervisor shall have an office staff for
program promotion. The only logical
conclusion, therefore, that can be derived
from the aforesaid enumeration of
responsibilities is that the District Supervisor
may only exercise administrative supervision
over ESPs when such function is assigned by
proper authorities. And, since the DepEd
Secretary specifically declared through the IRR
of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall
not exercise administrative supervision over
the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized,
petitioners cannot complain against the said
declaration.
Public Schools District Supervisors Assoc.
It must be stressed that the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment. The implementing rules
and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
legislature.
It bears stressing, however, that
administrative bodies are allowed under their
power of subordinate legislation to
implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details. All that is
required is that the regulation be germane to
the objectives and purposes of the law; that
the regulation does not contradict but
conforms with the standards prescribed by
law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, this
Court accords great respect to the decisions
and/or actions of administrative authorities
not only because of the doctrine of separation
of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale
for this rule relates not only to the emergence
of the multifarious needs of a modern or
modernizing society and the establishment of
diverse administrative agencies for addressing
and satisfying those needs; it also relates to
the accumulation of experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a
particular statute.
REASONABLE
It is an axiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear
no reasonable relation to the purposes for
which they are authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.
Lupangco v. CA (April 29, 1988)
HELD: The Resolution is not valid. On its face,
it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in
that an examinee cannot even attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like,
or receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university,
or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or
similar institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that
one who is caught committing the prohibited
acts even without any ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the
Commission can manage to have a watchful
eye on each and every examinee during the
three days before the examination period.
PUBLICATION
- Publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation, as
provided in EO 200.
- Publication must be in full, or there is
no publication at all [Tañadav.Tuvera].
- Publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law
- Any rule which fixes rates shall not be
valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published and hearings
conducted with the rules on
contested cases to be observed in
case of opposition.
- However, interpretative rules and
regulations, or those merely internal
in nature, or the so-called letters of
instruction issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of
their duties, may be simply posted in
conspicuous places in the agency
itself. Such posting already complies
with the publication requirement.
as well as rules and regulations.
Nacu v. CSC (Nov. 23, 2010)
HELD: No publication is required for such a
regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order
No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that
clearly falls within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the
publication requirement, as set forth in the
prevailing case of Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules on guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
PITC v. COA (June 25, 1999)
HELD: On the need for publication of subject
DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative.
Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada,
publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10
is in the nature of an administrative circular
the purpose of which is to enforce or
implement an existing law. Stated differently,
to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No.
10 must go through the requisite publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is
decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances
and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere
interpretative or internal regulation. It is
something more than that. And why not,
when it tends to deprive government workers
of their allowances and additional
compensation sorely needed to keep body
and soul together. At the very least, before
the said circular under attack may be
permitted to substantially reduce their
income, the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and
alerted by the publication of said circular in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines – to the
end that they be given amplest opportunity to
voice out whatever opposition they may have,
and to ventilate their stance on the matter.
This approach is more in keeping with
democratic precepts and rudiments of
fairness and transparency.
PITC
It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC
No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and
submitted for publication in the Official
Gazette per letter to the National Printing
Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the
subsequent publication thereof cure the
defect and retroact to the time that the
above- mentioned items were disallowed in
audit?
The answer is in the negative, precisely, for
the reason that publication is required as a
condition precedent to the effectivity of a law
to inform the public of the contents of the law
or rules and regulations before their rights
and interests are affected by the same. From
the time the COA disallowed the expenses in
audit up to the filing of herein petition the
subject circular remained in legal limbo due to
its non-publication. As was stated in Tanada v.
Tuvera , "prior publication of laws before they
become effective cannot be dispensed with,
for the reason that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it."virtua1aw
TESTS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF
DELEGATION
Completeness test: Ideally, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature so that when it
reaches the delegate, it will have nothing to
do but to enforce it.
A statute may be complete when the subject,
the manner, and the extent of its operation
are stated in it. It must describe what must be
done, who must do it, and the scope of
authority.
Sufficient standard test:
The law must offer a sufficient standard to
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and specify
the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. The standard is usually
embodied in the law itself.
Echegaray v. Secretary (Oct. 12, 1998)
HELD: Empowering the Secretary of Justice in
conjunction with the Secretary of Health and
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to
promulgate rules and regulations on the
subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to
administrative bodies.
Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself - it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable - to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of
R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds
that the law sufficiently describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.
Echegaray
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards
which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the
public agencies which will apply it. it indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "[t]he death
sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under
the sentence during the lethal injection as
well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "[t]he Director of the
Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The
legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot
see that any useful purpose would be served
by requiring greater detail. The question
raised is not the definition of what constitutes
a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying
out the penalty already imposed by the
Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of
discretion by the administrative officials
concerned is, to use the words of Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an
area for exercise of discretion by the
Secretary of Justice and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections under delegated
legislative power is proper where standards
are formulated for the guidance and the
exercise of limited discretion, which though
general, are capable of reasonable
application.
United States v. Ang Tang Ho (Feb. 27, 1922)
Held: When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the
violation of the proclamation of the Governor-
General which constitutes the crime. Without
that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice
at any price. In other words, the Legislature
left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
General to say what was and what was not
"any cause" for enforcing the act, and what
was and what was not "an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under
certain undefined conditions to fix the price at
which rice should be sold, without regard to
grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when,
and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and
when the law should be suspended. The
Legislature did not specify or define what was
"any cause," or what was "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither
did it specify or define the conditions upon
which the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no crime was
committed. The alleged sale was made a
crime, if at all, because the Governor- General
issued the proclamation.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorize the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the price of rice, and to make the
sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (March
20, 1987)
Held: The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and reasonable guidelines, or
better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their
distribution. Definitely, there is here a ‘roving
commission,’ a wide and sweeping authority
that is not ‘canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing,’ in short, a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Procedural Rules
These are rules describing the methods by
which the agency will carry out its appointed
functions – rules which make the provisions
for the filing of applications, the resolution of
complaints, the serving of papers, the conduct
of hearings, and the like. They generally
involve matters relating to the internal
organization of an agency, conduct of its
proceedings, and its practice requirements.
Administrative rules of procedure are mere
tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice. They are construed liberally in order
to promote their object to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims. Strict
compliance with them in administrative case
is not required by law.
Administrative issuances of Secretaries and
heads of bureaus, offices or agencies
(a) Circulars – issuances prescribing
policies, rules and regulations, and
procedures promulgated pursuant to
law, applicable to individuals and
organizations outside the
Government and designed to
supplement provisions of the law or
to provide mean for carrying them
out, including information relating
thereto;
(b) Orders - issuances directed to
particular offices, officials, or
employees, concerning specific
matters including assignments, detail
and transfer or personnel, for
observance or compliance by all
concerned.
Internal rules and regulations
- They refer to administrative rules and
regulations issued by a superior
administrative officer to his
subordinates for the proper and
efficient administration of the law.
- They are administrative in nature and
do not pass beyond the limits of the
department or agency to which they
are directed or in which they are
published, and therefore, create no
rights in third persons. They are based
on, and are the product of, a
relationship in which power is source,
and obedience, their object.
Penal rules and regulations
They refer to rules and regulations carrying
penal or criminal sanctions for violation of the
same. Administrative bodies have the
authority to issue administrative regulations
which are penal in nature where the
delegating statute itself makes the violation of
the administrative regulations punishable and
provides for its penalty.
Requisites for validity
1. The law which authorizes the
promulgation of rules and regulations
must itself provide for the imposition of a
penalty for their violation;
2. It must fix or define such penalty;
3. The violation for which the rules and
regulations impose a penalty must be
punishable or made a crime under the law
itself;
4. The rules and regulations must be
published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The rule is that the lawmaking body cannot
delegate to an administrative agency or
official, the power to declare that acts shall
constitute a criminal offense and how it shall
be punished.
In the absence of a law granting an
administrative agency the authority to fix or
impose administrative fines, such
administrative agency cannot provide for such
fines in its implementing rules and
regulations.
The Administrative Code of 1987 requires that
“every rule establishing an act, which
pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or
subject to a penalty, shall in all cases be
published in full text.”
People v. Maceren (Oct. 18, 1977)
HELD: Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. The lawmaking body
cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute
a criminal offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make
rules and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal
statute. An administrative agency can have
only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon it.
People v. Que Po Lay (March 29, 1954)
HELD: Publication is required for the
effectivity of Circular No. 20. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a
statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover,
as a rule, circulars and regulations especially
like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
In the present case, although circular No. 20
of the Central Bank was issued in the year
1949, it was not published until November
1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said
circular, particularly its penal provision, did
not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazette or
after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its
violation, for it was not binding at the time he
was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.
Requirements of notice and hearing
General Rule: Prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules and
regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct.
When the rules, even when they involve the
fixing of rates, are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines, no previous notice is required.
e.g. DECS Order prescribing the maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for a particular school
year. (Phil. Consumers’ Foundation, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Education; Aug. 31, 1987).
Exception: Notices of proposed rules must be
given when required by law.
Where such rules and/or rates apply
exclusively to a particular party and are
predicated upon a finding of fact (e.g. COA
report), which fact is denied by said party, the
agency in making such finding of fact,
performs a function partaking of a quasi-
judicial character the valid exercise of which
demands a previous notice and hearing to
satisfy the requirement of due process.