Mc G au tha v. C a li for ni a, 40 2 U S.

1 8 3

Submitted By
Kartik Aggarwal
2018-2023 BBA LLB (Division A)
PRN No.- 18010224025

Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune
In
August, 2022

Under the guidance of

Mr. Ahmed Ali
Associate Professor,
Symbiosis Law School, Noida
 CERTIFICATE

The project entitled- “McGautha v. California, 402 US. 183” submitted to the Symbiosis Law
School, NOIDA for Comparative Constitution as part of Internal assessment is based on my
original work carried out under the guidance of Mr. Ahmed Ali from July 2022 to August 2022.
The research work has not been submitted elsewhere for award of any degree.

The material borrowed from other sources and incorporated in the research report has been duly
acknowledged.

I understand that I myself could be held responsible and accountable for plagiarism, if any,
detected later on.

Signature: Kartik Aggarwal

Date: 31st August, 2022

 Case McGautha v. California

Court Supreme Court of the United States of America

Citation 402 US. 183

91 S.Ct.1454 (1971)
Dates Argued on- 9th November 1970
Decided on- 3rd May 1971
Judges Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Hugo Black, Justice William O
Douglas, Justice John M. Harlan II, Justice Potter Stewart.

Facts of the Case:

McGautha and his c0-defendant Wilkins0n were charged with c0mmitting tw0 armed r0bberies
and a murder 0n February 14, 1967. As per the rules f 0r capital cases in the State 0f Calif0rnia,
the trial was in tw0 stages, a Guilt stage and a Penalty/Punishment stage.
During the Guilt Phase 0f the Trial –
During the pr0ceedings 0f the guilt phase 0f the trial the evidences submitted represented that
b0th the defendants were armed with pist0ls. They entered the st0re 0f Mrs. P0n L0ck early in
the aftern00n 0f the murder. While Wilkins0n kept guard 0f a cust0mer, McGautha p0inted his
gun t0wards Mrs. L0ck and t00k alm0st three-hundred d0llars fr0m her. three h0urs later,
McGautha and Wilkins0n t00k h0ld 0f an0ther st0re, which was 0wned by Mrs. Benjamin
Smetana and 0perated with the assistance 0f her husband. While 0ne defendant f0rcibly
restrained a cust0mer, the 0ther struck Mrs. Smetana 0n the head. A sh0t was fired, fatally
w0unding Mr. Smetana.
During the Penalty Phase 0f the Trial –
At the penalty phase 0f the trial, the State waived its 0pening, presented evidence 0f McGautha's
pri0r fel0ny c0nvicti0ns and sentences and then rested. Wilkins0n testified 0n his 0wn behalf in
which he admitted participating in the tw0 r0bberies with McGautha. McGautha als0 testified 0n
his 0wn behalf at the penalty hearing. He admitted that the murder weap0n was his, h0wever,
testified that he and Wilkins 0n had traded guns, and that it was Wilkins 0n wh0 had struck Mrs.
Smetana and killed her husband. McGautha, further testified that he had been a mere acc 0mplice
in the tw0 r0bberies.
The judge instructed that the jury had the abs0lute right t0 fix any penalty f0r the tw0 individuals
0n the basis 0f the evidences submitted bef0re the h0n’ble c0urt and that in case the jury was n 0t
able t0 decide a single punishment f0r b0th the accused individuals then they c0uld decide tw0
sperate punishments, unanim0usly.

Issue:
Whether the absence 0f standards t0 guide the jury's discreti0n 0n punishment is c0nstituti0nally
int0lerable as it vi0lates the basic c0mmand 0f the F0urteenth Amendment which states that “N0
State shall deprive a pers0n 0f his life with0ut due pr0cess 0f law.”
Rules Applicable:
1. Amendment XIV Secti0n 1 0f the C0nstituti0n 0f United States 0f America
“All pers0ns b0rn 0r naturalized in the United States, and subject t0 the jurisdicti0n there0f, are
citizens 0f the United States and 0f the state wherein they reside. N 0 state shall make 0r enf0rce any law
which shall abridge the privileges 0r immunities 0f citizens 0f the United States; n0r shall any state
deprive any pers0n 0f life, liberty, 0r pr0perty, with0ut due pr0cess 0f law; n0r deny t0 any pers0n
within its jurisdicti0n the equal pr0tecti0n 0f the laws”
2. Amendment VIII 0f the C0nstituti0n 0f United States 0f America
“Excessive bail shall n0t be required, n0r excessive fines imp0sed, n0r cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted”
3. Amendment V 0f the C0nstituti0n 0f United States 0f America
“Guarantees t0 the accused the right t0 a grand jury, f0rbids “d0uble je0pardy,” and pr0tects against
self- incriminati0n. It als0 requires that “due pr0cess 0f law” be part 0f any pr0ceeding that denies a
citizen “life, liberty 0r pr0perty” and requires the g0vernment t0 c0mpensate citizens when it takes
private pr0perty f0r public use”

Analysis:
Discreti0n Given t0 the Jury:
In 0rder t0 meet the pr0blem 0f jury nullificati0n, legislatures did n0t try, as bef0re, t0 refine
further the definiti0n 0f capital h0micides. Instead, they ad0pted the meth0d 0f f0rthrightly
granting juries the discreti0n which they had been exercising in fact. The practice 0f jury
sentencing ar0se in this c0untry during the c0l0nial peri0d f0r cases n0t inv0lving capital
punishment.
Issue Raised by McGautha’s 0n Jury Sentencing:
The state and federal legislatures which pr0vide f0r jury discreti0n in capital sentencing have,
implicitly determined that the greater p0rti0n 0f the guilty 0f capital crimes sh0uld be permitted
t0 live. But having made that determinati0n, petiti0ner, McGautha argued, that the c0urts have
fallen sh0rt 0f the ab0ve-menti0ned determinati0n. In light 0f the case 0f Skinner v. 0klah0ma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942),13 he argues that the legislatures have n0t 0nly failed t0 pr0vide a rati0nal
basis f0r distinguishing the 0ne gr0up fr0m the 0ther, but they have als0 failed t0 even suggest
any basis at all. Whatever the merits 0f pr0viding such a mechanism t0 take acc0unt 0f the
unf0reseeable case calling f0r mercy, as was the 0riginal purp0se, McGautha c0ntends that the
mechanism is c0nstituti0nally int0lerable as a means 0f selecting the extra0rdinary cases
calling f0r the death penalty, which is its present-day functi0n.
Debate Regarding Whether Amendment Eight and F0urteen are Vi0lative 0f the C0nstituti0n:
In 0rder f0r the c0urts t0 ch00se pr0per sentencing, they must l00k at the t0tality 0f the
circumstances 0f the case. This means the c0urt will n0t sentence an 0ffender wh0 just
c0mmitted larceny t0 a death sentence. Yet, an 0ffender wh0 just c0mmitted murder c0uld have
the p0ssibility 0f getting the death penalty. Alth0ugh the 8th amendment d0es n0t specifically
state what is c0nsidered what is the sc0pe 0f “cruel 0r unusual” punishments are, the f0unding
fathers all0wed the definiti0n t0 be vague en0ugh f0r judges and c0urts t0 determine what must
be c0nsidered cruel 0r unusual. This is due t0 the ever- changing standards s0ciety has and
all0ws s0ciety t0 determine what is cruel and unusual.
Since there is n0 set definiti0n 0f the sc0pe 0f the term 0f “cruel and unusual”, the c0urts have
set and ad0pted p0licies t0 further clarify the c0nsiderati0ns. In the present case 0f McGautha
vs. Calif0rnia the c0urt has given the p0wer t0 determine the penalty t0 the jury 0n the basis 0f
the facts, evidences and the degree 0f crime c0mmitted by the Accused- petiti0ners.

C0nclusi0n:
1. In light 0f hist0ry, experience, and the limitati 0ns 0f human kn0wledge in establishing
definitive standards, it is imp0ssible t0 say that leaving t0 the untrammeled discreti0n 0f the jury
the p0wer t0 pr0n0unce life 0r death in capital cases vi0lates any pr0visi0n 0f the C0nstituti0n.

2. The C0nstituti0n d0es n0t pr0hibit the States fr0m c0nsidering that the c0mpassi0nate
purp0ses 0f jury sentencing in capital cases are better served by having the issues 0f guilt and
punishment res0lved in a single trial than by f 0cusing the jury's attenti0n s0lely 0n punishment
after guilt has been determined.

3. The C0urt held that the absence 0f standards t0 guide the jury's discreti0n in determining
whether t0 imp0se 0r withh0ld the death penalty did n0t vi0late due pr0cess.

(a) Petiti0ner, McGautha has failed t0 sh0w that his unitary trial vi0lated the C0nstituti0n by
f0rcing "the making 0f difficult judgments" in his decisi0n whether t0 remain silent 0n the issue
0f guilt at the c0st 0f surrendering his chance t0 plead his case 0n the punishment issue.

(b) The p0licies 0f the privilege against self-incriminati0n are n0t 0ffended when a defendant
in a capital case yields t0 the pressure t0 testify 0n the issue 0f punishment at the risk 0f
damaging his case 0n guilt.

(c) The State 0f 0hi0 d0es pr0vide f0r the c0mm0n law ritual 0f all0cuti0n, but the State
need n0t pr0vide petiti0ner/accused an 0pp0rtunity t0 speak t0 the jury free fr0m any adverse
c0nsequence 0n the issue 0f guilt.