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Horizontal, Vertical, and Hybrid: An Empirical Look

at the Forms of Accountability

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AASXXX10.1177/0095399720912553Administration & SocietyReddick et al.

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Horizontal, Vertical, and

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Accountability

Christopher G. Reddick1 , Tansu Demir1,

and Bruce Perlman2

Abstract
The existing accountability research in public administration either provides
conceptual analyses and definitions of forms of accountability or case studies
on accountability. They focus on the structure of responsibility or responding
behavior. This article is different in that it tests actors’ perceptions of the
three commonly cited forms of accountability identified in the literature—
vertical, horizontal, and hybrid. We test accountability on a national survey
sample of city managers across the United States. Our structural equation
model indicates that there is both vertical and horizontal accountability
present in city governments in the United States supporting a hybrid model.
The results of this study add to the literature because most of the existing
research on accountability does not test this important relationship nor
examine actors’ perceptions.

Keywords
bureaucratic accountability, accountability forms, structural equation
modeling, survey research, local government

1
The University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
2
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, USA

Corresponding Author:
Christopher G. Reddick, Department of Public Administration, College of Public Policy, The
University of Texas at San Antonio, 501 W. Cesar Chavez Blvd., San Antonio, TX 78207,
USA.
Email: Chris.Reddick@utsa.edu
2 Administration & Society 00(0)

Introduction
Accountability in public administration has long been studied. It is the means
by which public agencies manage diverse expectations generated from inside
and outside of an organization (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Accountability
can be seen as a relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain
and to justify conduct to someone else (Bovens et al., 2014). At its core,
accountability is present when public administrators are motivated to answer
for their actions or performance (Dubnick, 2005; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).
Most of the existing research on accountability is conceptual, focusing on
the meaning of the term itself. Empirical research on accountability is lacking
with few quantitative studies and consisting of mostly case studies (Brandsma
& Schillemans, 2012). In this article, we test empirically two of the forms of
bureaucratic accountability most commonly found in the literature—vertical
and horizontal—against the reported views of the actors themselves. They
are tested using survey data from a national sample of city managers in the
United States. The principal research question of this article is as follows:

Research Question 1: Does an analysis of the survey data show a com-

mon view of accountability held by the respondents?

A related question is as follows: “What are the implications of this for the
three forms found in the literature (i.e., vertical, horizontal, or hybrid)?”
To answer these questions, this article is divided into six sections. The first
section is the brief introduction. The second section is a literature review of
accountability in public administration in which the notion of bureaucratic
accountability is discussed, and the concepts of vertical, horizontal, and
hybrid accountability are developed. The third section presents our research
design. Our fourth section provides statistical analysis using structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM). This is followed by a discussion of our results in the
fifth section. Finally, we present a conclusion in the last section.

Literature Review
The Definition and Practice of Accountability
Technically, accountability can be defined as a relationship between an actor
and another or a forum to which the actor must respond for specified actions.
Being accountable means that the actor has an obligation to explain and jus-
tify actions to the other or the forum which can pose questions, evaluate, and
pass judgment on the actions. The actor should be able and feel obligated
Reddick et al. 3

(motivated) to inform the forum about the conduct in question and there
should be an attempt to explain and justify the actions. Finally, both parties
know that judgment will be passed on the actor and consequences provided
(Bovens et al., 2008; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012).
This structural and practical notion of accountability is taken from the
Westminster system of government with the electorate having the right to be
informed about the actions and expenditures of the executive and legislative
branches of government. Accountability can be seen in terms of ministerial
responsibility and the detection of fraud. Ultimately, the minister is respon-
sible for what happens in an agency and is accountable for any faults (Kluvers,
2003). Parliament requires that officials and ministers participate directly in
public accountability practices. The original idea was that Parliament had the
right to require a public justification from those officials that were responsi-
ble for the management of public accounts (Uhr, 1993). In most democracies,
the dominant form of public accountability is the traditional top-down or
vertical form. This has been especially true for those parliamentary systems
that operate under a system of ministerial responsibility such as Belgium, The
Netherlands, and Germany. According to Aucoin and Heintzman (2000),
accountability serves three purposes in practice: control of the abuse and mis-
use of public authority, providing an assurance to the law and public service
values, and encouraging and promoting continuous improvement and better
public management.

Answerability.  In public administration, notions of accountability are tied to

the requirement that appointed public servants answer to those who appointed
them for the actions they take in government organizations or bureaucracies.
In other words, the concept of accountability implies answerability, in that
administrators are accountable to the degree to which they are required to
answer for their actions (O’Loughlin, 1990). Traditionally, principal–agent
theory was the most common way of analyzing accountability. This rests on
the idea that the appropriate focus to examine accountability was the struc-
tural relationship created by the delegation of responsibility from appointers
to appointees and the resulting actor–other dyad. At first, the emphasis was
on the structural relationship of command and compliance and not on the
perceived or felt obligation to comply or the source of commands.

External structural accountability and a sense of responsibility.  In the 1930s, an

influential debate took place, which presented two competing views of
accountability: one focusing on it as an external responsibility created by
structure and legitimizing coercive compliance and the other as a felt obliga-
tion grounded in a sense of responsibility. This debate was between Carl
4 Administration & Society 00(0)

Friedrich, who emphasized the need for an inculcation of internal profes-

sional standards and codes to ensure administrative accountability, and Her-
man Finer, who believed in the creation of external checks and balances for
accountability (Wang, 2002). Finer (1941) focused on the external structural
relationship and forces needed to ensure responsibility. Finer took the ortho-
dox Weberian view of the civil servant’s obedience to the government, call-
ing for “subservience” (Bovens, 2010). Friedrich, however, argued for clear
discretion for bureaucrats and the higher purposes of public service (Mulgan,
2000). Friedrich argued for a sense of personal responsibility to ensure the
accountability relationship (Jackson, 2009) and looked upon responsibility as
a personal virtue. Faithful performance, Friedrich believed, must be elicited
and not compelled (Jackson, 2009). This article focuses more closely on this
latter idea.
While the debate between Friedrich and Finer can be best understood in
the context of national governments, the idea of forced accountability and a
sense of responsibility as presented in this article focuses on local govern-
ments which have their own unique context. In that context and the context
of this research, often public officials are faced with dealing with citizens
directly because policy implementation decisions and actions greatly, imme-
diately, and obviously affect the local community. It is common for a city
manager to be engaged with the public repeatedly on a policy, especially with
the budget process (Ebdon, 2002). Citizens tend to be more involved in pol-
icy formulation and again during implementation than they are in the federal
government. Local leaders must engage the public at various stages to get
their support for both policy formulation and implementation. Moreover, the
sources of oversight are more numerous at the local level. Evaluating sources
of oversight on local government managers, Koehler (1973) cites citizen
complaints, business community, professional associations, and local news-
papers as important means of information, and argues that they help city
managers direct policy implementation better. Abney and Lauth (1985), in
their study of interest group influence in city policy making, cite the influ-
ence of neighborhood groups as an important factor.
Streib’s (1992) survey study found that about 60% of managers believed
that the activities of concerned citizens’ groups are vitally important to local
government. The same study, however, reported that 70% of managers agreed
that problems could arise if citizens became overly involved in major
decisions.
Similar to federal executives, city managers are considered implementers
of public policies. However, city councils often fail to provide clear and con-
sistent policy direction due to the complexity of problems and political con-
flict, which forces city managers to engage with the public to craft solutions
Reddick et al. 5

and clarify direction encapsulated in policy, which ultimately raises account-

ability challenges (Svara, 1990). Interest group politics becomes problematic
in a democratic society whenever it results in special advantages for some
which are not readily available to others who are similarly situated (Abney &
Lauth, 1985, p. 160). This context makes local government appropriate for
testing accountability models. Our survey aims to tap this challenge of
accountability in an environment in which managers seek guidance from citi-
zens, businesses, and interest groups.

Modern Views of Accountability

Nonetheless, the foregoing points of view gloss over a great deal in public
administration, including how public administrators manage their own expec-
tations and those of the others to whom they respond (O’Loughlin, 1990).
Moreover, this point of view fails to examine the potential sources of the public
administrators’ felt obligation to respond or what can be called their sense of
responsibility. In addition, because of a more educated and informed citizenry,
well-organized interest groups, and more aggressive mass media, modern gov-
ernments at all levels now operate under greater demands for accountability
and performance (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000) and a more complicated system
of governance. Today, government accountability is a complex set of intercon-
nected subsystems of agents linked to their principals and to citizens within
government and outside of government (Dunn & Legge, 2001).

Organizations and collaboration.  This has led some to examine both the sources
and development of accountability from a whole organization perspective
rather than the relationship among individuals in an organizational structure.
For example, Greiling and Halachmi (2013) have looked at accountability as
a dynamic concept in organizational learning that can be used to improve
organizational goals, structure, standard operating procedures, and data col-
lection. Organizational learning requires an open and continuing dialogue
focusing on long-term development. From the organizational learning per-
spective, accountability can yield improvement of individuals, groups, pro-
cesses, and policies. A short term and structural view of accountability can
lead to a blame culture, which undermines organizational learning and cre-
ation of a sense of responsibility. Collaborative governance stresses the
importance of collaboration to drive public accountability. Accountability
can be accomplished through learning that assists public officials to develop
knowledge and competencies (Sørensen, 2012). In this regard, the social con-
tingency model which comes from social psychology has been used fruitfully
to study accountability (Bovens et al., 2014).
6 Administration & Society 00(0)

Arbitrariness.  In addition, some recent authors have added the notion of arbi-
trariness in accountability which in some respects is the flipside of the idea
of answerability. Arbitrariness is best conceived as the idea that some policy
instruction can result in administrative discretion that is too broad or limited
only by conscience (Kathleen Deutscher et al., 2019) or without clear refer-
ence to public purposes or with multiple purposes without priority order.
Arbitrariness is different from discretion in that public officials deviate inten-
tionally or unintentionally from stated policy, by, as Finer (1941) stated it,

changing the range and object of the policy without specific grants of authority
from elected political superiors. [Its] essence is that the administrator, elected
or appointed (and most usually at the local level, the latter), cannot determine
the range or object of that policy. He has authority, but it is a conditioned,
derived authority. (p. 343)

In such cases, while administrators may feel a sense of responsibility to limit

their discretion with a suitable referent, what counts as suitable is wholly
arbitrary and within their power to decide.
One example of an area in which this arbitrariness has increased is in new
waiver programs that are being operated by federal agencies in which admin-
istrators have exceedingly broad powers to change rules, occasionally even
laws, almost at will. This has been noted as producing a condition of perpet-
ual bargaining in which federal administrators hold all the power. In this way,
federal administrators gain arbitrary power (Frohnen, 2016). Likewise, De
Graaf’s (2010) research indicates that in the case of the Netherlands, the
notion of principal in the principal–agent relationship is a set of both multiple
principals and multiple values, which often are contradictory and leave the
agent with broad discretion and almost arbitrary decision-making power.
In U.S. local government, research has reported numerous cases of arbi-
trariness in city managers’ use of discretion (Svara, 1990). Often, long-serving
managers can no longer be challenged because of their political, bureaucratic,
and community support. Basically, appointed managers become the masters to
whom citizens, interest groups, and their elected officials defer out of respect
and dependency. In such cases, discretion is not limited by a sense of respon-
sibility that supports answerability but instead is mooted by a sense of power
that supports arbitrariness. This phenomenon can occur within city bureaucra-
cies in line-departments as well, especially in those that have technical opera-
tions such as traffic engineering, bond issuances, building certification, or
animal control, among others. In these instances, long-serving operations
managers and service deliverers who achieve highly satisfactory working rela-
tionships with their respective client communities can achieve the same sort of
arbitrariness in action.
Reddick et al. 7

Forms of Bureaucratic Accountability

As described in the literature, the structure and practice of accountability in
government organizations, that is, bureaucratic accountability, takes multi-
ple forms due to the interaction of structure and authority in bureaucratic
relations. Therefore, within a bureaucracy, accountability takes place on two
dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Cendon, 2000). The vertical dimension
is the relationship that links the inferior administrative position with the supe-
rior one. Horizontal accountability links an administrator as an actor in public
administration as a whole with citizens, interest groups, and others who are
both in and served by government. This bureaucratic practice and relation-
ship needs to be distinguished from the sort of political or constitutional one
that occurs in across branches within national governments. Rather than
cross-branch checks and balances which place structural limits by one branch
on the actions of another, for example, the executive by the courts, this is the
limitation of discretion within a branch as in the case of parliamentary gov-
ernments, national executive branch departments, or the considerable service
delivery apparatus of local governments.
The new public management places importance on the role of citizens as
clients and focuses on this horizontal dimension of accountability in the lit-
erature (Cendon, 2000). Nonetheless, it is not necessary to reduce citizens to
clients or customers when examining their exercise of accountability mecha-
nisms on bureaucracies. So, accountability can mean representing various
classes or groups who get organized to more effectively implement change
and have an impact on governance (Haque, 2000). Public administrators typi-
cally work in an environment of many different accountability relationships,
essentially a web of relationships with multiple and overlapping account-
abilities (Johnston & Romzek, 1999). Because of their position in the middle
of a web of competing interests, as Herring (1936) suggests, or between civil
society and state, as Spicer (2005) puts it, public administrators possess a
good vantage point to make substantive, meaningful, and informed contribu-
tions to public policy. As the literature indicates, there are three basic forms
of bureaucratic accountability.

Vertical accountability.  The vertical form of public accountability is based on

the principal–agent relationship (Bovens et al., 2014). It requires the identifi-
cation of a superior and subordinate and the delegation of authority from the
former to the latter in creation of a responsibility to answer for actions. This
form of accountability is most identified with the view of public administra-
tors being responsible to their superiors in a hierarchy, whatever the bureau-
crats’ motivation to comply or latitude of action. The two key elements in a
8 Administration & Society 00(0)

vertical accountability relationship in public administration are as follows: (a)

Policy direction, which is the end states and goals given in instructions from a
principal to an agent or an appointed actor, and (b) Implementation monitor-
ing, which is the continuous observation of progress toward the instructed end
states and goals and any legal or ethical limits on the manner in which they are
realized. As indicated above, it is important to note that accountability of this
sort takes place within a branch of government, most commonly the execu-
tive, and not between or among branches. In the United States, this can be
muddled somewhat at the local level due to the fact that the legislature (e.g.,
council or commission) and the executive (e.g., mayor, administrative officer,
city manager) are really collaborating parts of a municipal corporation as
much as independent branches that check each other.
What does the existing empirical research reveal about vertical account-
ability? A survey of local government managers in the United States showed
that earlier models outlined above are too narrow and do not describe the
complex interrelationship that public managers apply in practice (Dunn &
Legge, 2001). In a survey of the role of city managers, a mere 4.38% of them
operate under the conditions consistent with the principal–agent model as
passive agents (Selden et al., 1999). Also, research shows that there are mul-
tiple accountability strategies used in government. Four of the most common
ones are hierarchical, legal, political, and professional (Romzek, 2000).
There is a trade-off between administrative efficiency and accountability.

Horizontal accountability. Accountability has become an increasingly com-

plex subject due to the advent of performance management, network gover-
nance, public participation, and ideas from organizational learning (Willems
& Van Dooren, 2012). In practice and in concept, traditional accountability
notions based on hierarchical vertical relationships have been subject to grad-
ual erosion and are often replaced by horizontal relationships. Rather than
just superiors and subordinates, accountability involves citizen participation,
interest groups, and the communities affected as part of the accountability
relationship (Michels & Meijer, 2008).
This form of public accountability is most accurately called horizontal
accountability. As governments increase their reliance on partners and col-
laborators to deliver services, these partners have an influence on policy and
outcomes, and because all parties are empowered, they are thus answerable
or accountable to one another. In practice, collaboration increases horizontal
accountability.
The differences between horizontal and vertical accountability are clear.
Vertical accountability features subordinate actors, command behavior, asym-
metrical communication, and limited autonomy. Horizontal accountability is
Reddick et al. 9

marked by cooperation, negotiation, symmetrical communication, and ample

autonomy (Michels & Meijer, 2008). Examples of horizontal accountability
include ombudsman, corruption control agencies, legislative investigative
commissions, and administrative courts. At the local level of government in
the United States, they include town halls, web-based budget preparation, citi-
zen oversight commissions for police and corrections, indicators and goals
progress commissions, procurement panels, and others.
Some form of horizontal accountability is a necessity for the democratic
process to work as it allows citizens the information that they need to pass
judgment on the effectiveness of government conduct. The opening up of
government to public participation is a way to improve accountability
(Ackerman, 2004). Horizontal accountability can introduce openness and
transparency to a system that could be inward looking and resistant to change
(Bovens et al., 2008). Public accountability enables citizens to make those
holding office answer for their deeds. It is important to note that this sort of
accountability takes place across bureaucratic boundaries, and individuals,
organizations, and social groups from outside. Largely, it is not the operation
of the checks of other branches on the bureaucracy but the repeated and mul-
tiple inputs of those outside the bureaucracy beyond their political inputs into
policy formulation.
What does the existing empirical research on horizontal accountability
say? It seems to be of great importance at the local level within and outside
the United States. Public hearings and community consultation in preparation
for policies are methods for promoting horizontal accountability. A survey of
community involvement in Australian municipalities showed that respon-
dents viewed this type of accountability as highly important (Martin & Kloot,
2001). An examination of Finnish city managers showed that multiple con-
nections to citizens were the most important source of accountability, fol-
lowed by legislators and local managers (Salminen & Lehto, 2012).

Hybrid accountability. The study by Ari Salminen and Kirsi Lehto (2012)

showed also that multiple accountabilities can exist within and across the
vertical and horizontal forms of accountability. There is a growing body of
literature that argues for understanding accountability as a hybrid model
(Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). Most of this work combines vertical accountability
and horizontal accountability into different forms. For example, McGarvey
(2001) reviewed alternative conceptions of accountability such as traditional,
democratic, professional, managerial, regulatory, and rational choice as well
as how they affect the wider public, and concluded that there is a need for a
hybrid multidimensional perspective. Accountability has three functions
which are democratic, constitutional, and performance. A study by Willems
10 Administration & Society 00(0)

and Van Dooren (2012) found that a multidimensional approach to account-

ability suggests more of a nuanced approach than vertical and horizontal
accountability. Their research shows that the more idealist forms of account-
ability are not always effective and therefore a hybrid form seems to be war-
ranted. This is true especially at the local level in the United States, wherein
the focus on performance in service delivery and the closeness of the service
consumer to the service deliverer is very tight.
What does the existing empirical research on hybrid accountability say?
Most of the research consists of case study reviews. For example, in their case
study analysis of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, Romzek and Dubnick
(1987) present four types of accountability: legal, political, bureaucratic, and
professional. These authors were the first to challenge traditional conceptions
of accountability (i.e., vertical and horizontal) and argue for a hybrid and mul-
tidimensional perspective. Examining two case studies, in India, of citizens
engaging in public forums, Goetz and Jenkins (2001) make the case for hybrid
forms of accountability. They show that for these forums to be effective, citi-
zens must have a vertical relationship of legal standing within public-sector
oversight institutions as well as an interest in the issue as a citizen showing the
importance of both vertical and horizontal forms of accountability (Goetz &
Jenkins, 2001). In a case study demonstrating the importance of using a hybrid
form of accountability, Koppell (2005) looked at the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which assigns Internet domain
names. He posited that the organization suffered from multiple accountability
disorders. To analyze and address these, the author proposed a hybrid model
of accountability that has the five dimensions: transparency, liability, control-
lability, responsibility, and responsiveness.

Other Empirical Research on Forms of Accountability

There are limited empirical studies testing the forms of accountability. In a
survey on administrative accountability with city managers, findings revealed
that the most common form was financial accountability such as budgets,
financial reports, and audit reports (Wang, 2002). This survey of city manag-
ers focuses more on the tools for accountability, not the motivation for
accountability as this article does. The studies in public administration on
public accountability have a tendency to focus on the forms of accountability
in public service delivery such as the regulation and structural forms of
accountability (Bovens et al., 2014). An analysis of survey evidence on
accountability in 78 Victorian municipalities found that personal values such
as openness, cooperation, and service are important for bureaucratic account-
ability to function well. The analysis revealed that all three of these values
Reddick et al. 11

enhanced the accountability relationship, while an emphasis on individual

ambition, manipulation, and power impeded the relationship (Kluvers &
Tippett, 2010). One interesting study De Graaf (2010) looked at the loyalties
of Dutch public administrators using Q-methodology to form a four-category
typology of public administrators’ responsiveness to taking direction in their
decision making. This study notes that at least one group can be styled as
independents. Clearly, the concept of accountability needs more systematic,
comparative, and empirical studies. Research on accountability needs to
move away from the two-person principal–agent model of accountability to a
more multifaceted understanding (Bardach & Lesser, 1996).

Research Design
Constructs
The research reported here is an attempt to extend the empirical study of the
forms of accountability laid out above in a U.S. local government context.
This focus is important to note because of the importance of service delivery
at the local level, which is essentially policy implementation. It does so by
creating constructs to operationalize the three forms of accountability—verti-
cal, horizontal, and hybrid—using the five key concepts in all public bureau-
cratic relationships found in the literature review and mentioned above. In
turn, these constructs are related in a theoretical model, which is employed to
test the strength of the presence and relationship of the three forms using
survey data. The five key concepts are as follows:

1. Policy direction: Instructions given by bureaucratic superiors to sub-

ordinates about the ends, means, and resources to be used for carrying
out public policy goals through organizational action by the subordi-
nates. In policy direction, the relationship between superiors and sub-
ordinates is vertical or top-down (traditional principal–agent
relationship).
2. Implementation monitoring: Oversight provided by bureaucratic
superiors of subordinates to check the decisions taken, means
employed, and progress toward achieving public policy goals through
organizational action by the subordinates. In implementation moni-
toring, the relationship between superiors and subordinates is vertical
or top-down.
3. Answerability: The degree to which bureaucratic actors feel obliged to
respond for their actions on policy direction and implementation mon-
itoring whether to bureaucratic superiors, peers, groups or outside
12 Administration & Society 00(0)

groups, and the public at large. Answerability occurs in both vertical

and top-down as well as lateral relationships.
4. Arbitrariness: The degree to which bureaucratic actors feel uncertain
about or free to choose their obligation to respond for their actions on
policy direction and implementation monitoring whether to them-
selves, professional values, bureaucratic superiors, peers, groups or
outside groups, and the public at large. Bureaucratic actors change the
range and object of policy without specific grants of authority.
Arbitrariness occurs in both vertical and top-down as well as horizon-
tal relationships.
5. Horizontal checks: The extent to which bureaucratic actors are given
feedback on their decisions and progress toward achieving public
policy goals through organizational action by citizens, interest groups,
and other clientele who are both in and served by government.
Horizontal checks include lateral relationships such as collaboration,
negotiation, or investigation.

Theoretical Model
Figure 1 presents a theoretical model that relates these concepts as constructs
to be tested. The upper part of the model features the construct of vertical
accountability (top-down). It is made up of two concepts: policy direction
and implementation monitoring. As indicated above, in both concepts, con-
trol and direction are top-down and influence flows from higher levels of
authority to lower levels. Taken together, these two constructs capture the
source and provision of policy direction and review of progress in carrying it
out to ensure that administrators implement policies in line with the instruc-
tions of superiors, whether embodied in directives, orders, legislative intent,
or participatory mechanisms.
The lower part of the theoretical model features the constructs of hori-
zontal accountability and degree of accountability. Horizontal account-
ability is operationalized as the concept of horizontal checks. This is the
extent to which bureaucratic actors are given feedback on their decisions
and progress toward achieving public policy goals such as through town
halls and citizen feedback on policy proposals. As indicated above, hori-
zontal checks are those extra-organizational, non-hierarchical, external
checks on administrative action. The construct, degree of accountability,
uses the concepts of answerability and arbitrariness as two variables to
operationalize the level of the sense of responsibility of the respondents.
Each variable (concept) represents one aspect of the respondents’ potential
view on the effect of vertical or horizontal accountability on their sense of
Reddick et al. 13

Figure 1.  Forms of accountability theoretical model.

responsibility and the mediating effect of these on policy direction and

implementation monitoring.
The theoretical model in Figure 1 allows the specification of potential
relationships among the concepts and constructs found in the literature and
operationalized above. Testing the presence of the operationalized concepts
and constructs on the survey data set can answer the second research
question:

Research Question 2: Is there a common view of accountability held by

the respondents?

Also, examining the relationships among these operationalized concepts and

constructs can shed light on the related question: “What are the implications
of this for the forms found in the literature (i.e., vertical, horizontal, or
hybrid)?”
To do this, the research reported here posits several relationships among the
operationalized constructs. These relationships are based on the understanding
from the literature that (a) policy direction is necessary but not sufficient for
14 Administration & Society 00(0)

the perception of the need to respond to the direction (answerability) to occur,

(b) implementation monitoring when combined with policy direction provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for the perception of the need to respond
to the direction (answerability) to occur, (c) answerability and arbitrariness are
related because the former reduces the wide latitude of choice in response
which is inherent in the latter, and (d) horizontal checks strengthen answer-
ability thus reducing arbitrariness and increasing the sense of responsibility.
Accordingly, this research tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Policy direction will lead to better policy implementation

monitoring.
Hypothesis 2: Policy direction will lead to a higher degree of
answerability.
Hypothesis 3: Policy implementation monitoring will lead to a higher
degree of answerability.
Hypothesis 4: A higher degree of answerability will lead to a lesser level
of arbitrariness.
Hypothesis 5: Horizontal checks on administration will make administra-
tion more answerable.
Hypothesis 6: Horizontal checks on administration will make administra-
tion less arbitrary.

Sample
City managers serving in local governments across the United States were
sampled for this study. City managers were chosen because they are the chief
appointed administrative officers for the city government and are accountable
to different stakeholders such as city council and citizens within a formal
bureaucratic structure. City managers are full-time professional public admin-
istrators who are hired by and serve at the pleasure of elected bodies of govern-
ment. City managers have been studied in public administration in accountability
research (Salminen & Lehto, 2012; Selden et al., 1999; Wang, 2002).
In total, 2,000 city managers were drawn randomly from an International
City/County Management Association (ICMA) database of city managers.
After two iterations of mailings and one follow-up reminder, 500 city manag-
ers returned usable surveys, for a 25% response rate.

Data Collection
To collect data, a survey instrument was developed that included statements
measured with a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
Reddick et al. 15

Table 1.  Constructs, Variables, Characteristics, and Survey Statements.

Variable name Survey statement

Vertical accountability
1. Policy direction
Clear direction The council provides a very clear direction for us.
Policy specificity Our city policies are very specific and detailed.
2. Implementation monitoring
Problem identification The council is very quick in identifying policy
problems and bringing them to our attention.
Reporting I keep elected officials up-to-date about the
implementation of policies/programs by presenting
periodic reports.
Monitoring Elected officials monitor policy implementation very
closely.
Degree of accountability
3. Answerability When making a discretionary administrative
decision during the implementation of city policy,
we must provide substantial evidence to support
that decision.
4. Arbitrariness When various interest groups seek “exceptions”
to a policy during implementation (e.g., lenient
enforcement), I ask them to talk to elected
officials about their concerns.
Horizontal accountability
5. Horizontal checks
Interest group influence The variety and strength of the interest groups
in my city function as a check and balance that
serves to maintain the overall integrity of our city
government.
Clientele influence When we respond to routine matters during policy
implementation, we place much importance on
the reactions of groups most affected.
Citizens’ influence When we respond to routine matters during policy
implementation, we place much importance on
the preferences of citizens.

“strongly agree.” The statements for each of the five constructs above are laid
out in Table 1 along with a shortened variable name grouped by the pertinent
form of bureaucratic accountability (vertical, horizontal) and the degree of
accountability (sense of responsibility). The survey statements were designed
16 Administration & Society 00(0)

from our review of the literature on accountability in public administration.

For example, policy direction is measured by agreement with statements about
clarity and specificity of instructions, and implementation monitoring is
related to statements about feedback on the implementation of policy.
Likewise, horizontal checks are measured by the strength of response on the
role of external groups. In addition, answerability and arbitrariness are gauged
by agreement on statements concerning the perception of discretion and the
willingness to refer or grant exception, respectively. Taken together, these
statements get at a series of factors, which have been outlined in the literature
review and operationalized in the five constructs above. These factors will be
analyzed to see how prevalent the three forms found in the literature really are
in a group of practitioners (Research Question 1). In addition, they will be
modeled to see whether the hypothetical relationships posited above hold true
(Research Question 2).
In the spring of 2015, a small pilot study was administered with a copy
of the survey sent to a sample of Texas city managers to identify and address
potential issues. In light of the city manager comments and our review of
summary statistics, survey items were improved, and final version of the
survey was mailed to city managers across the United States in the summer
of 2015 with a cover letter explaining the scope and purpose of the research
project. Table 2 presents the characteristics of the responding cities and city
managers.

Data Analysis: SEM

We employ SEM methodology to test the different forms of accountability.
This method helps researchers test two or more relationships among directly
observable or unmeasured latent variables. It employs a confirmatory
approach and is particularly useful to evaluate theoretical models with mul-
tiple relationships. Reported fit indices are assessed to determine the extent
to which a specified model fits empirical data. As the theoretical model used
in this research deals with fairly broad concepts, SEM is especially suitable
in that it allows using multiple indicators to more accurately capture the
abstract concepts. SEM has certain advantages, especially when testing
mediational effects. Hierarchical regression models for mediational analysis
are subject to measurement errors. When variables are measured with errors,
the significance of the mediation effect is likely to be underestimated
because measurement errors bias parameter estimates. SEM controls for
measurement errors when parameters are estimated (Cheung & Lau, 2008;
MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993).
Reddick et al. 17

Table 2.  Respondent Characteristics.

Responding cities
Average budget 2015 US$55 million
Average city council size Six elected officials
Responding city managers
Average age 54 years
Average tenure 7.6 years
Master’s degree 67.3%
Gender
 Male 82.4%
 Female 17.6%
Race and ethnicity
 White 92.9%
  African American 2.5%
 Hispanic/Latino 2.1%
 Asian 0.8%
 Other 1.7%

SEM programs generate a large number of fit indices. There is no consen-

sus in the literature on which ones should be used to assess the goodness of
the model fit. Kline (2015) suggests reporting at least four fit indices. Hooper
et al. (2008) suggested reporting root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), comparative fit
index (CFI), and one parsimony index such as parsimony normed fit index
(PNFI). Hu and Bentler (1999) propose a two-index format.
We used CFI, non-normed fit index (NNFI), normed fit index (NFI), and
RMSEA to assess model fit, because they are the ones least affected by the
sample size (Fan et al., 1999). The values of comparative fit indices such as
CFI and NNFI indicate the proportion of the improvement of the overall fit of
the researcher’s model relative to a null model.
The typical null model is an independence model in which the observed
variables are assumed to be uncorrelated. For example, a value of 0.90 for
NNFI is interpreted to suggest that the relative overall fit of the researcher’s
model is 90% better than that of the null model estimated with the same
sample data (Kline, 2015, p. 129). The values of CFI, NFI, and NNFI should
be at least .90 to suggest an adequate model fit. RMSEA tells how well the
model, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter estimates, would fit
the population covariance matrix. Values of RMSEA lower than 0.08 have
long been taken to suggest adequate model fit (MacCallum et al., 1996).
18 Administration & Society 00(0)

Data Reliability
As our data were collected only from city managers based on their perception,
one concern is with common source bias which threatens the reliability of
results. When data for both exogenous and endogenous variables come from
the same source, it is possible that the data may be biased. The methodology
literature suggests various strategies to deal with this issue to minimize the
impact of common source bias on data (Jacobsen & Jensen, 2015; Meier &
O’Toole, 2013). We implemented Common Latent Factor technique in SEM to
accurately model the variance attributable to common source bias. The test
results did not yield any problem. Shared common variance was less than 10%.
Using surveys to capture accountability raises a concern as well.
Respondents may report socially desirable ratings. To address this concern,
we avoided statements that would elicit desirable yet inaccurate responses
(such as partisan activities of respondents). Public administration research on
local government in general and city managers in particular have long relied
on non-intrusive surveys (Demir & Nyhan, 2008; Dunn & Legge, 2001;
Nelson & Svara, 2015; Wang, 2002).

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics showing our 10 variables used in the
SEM analysis. These descriptive statistics show survey statements on a
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
Most of the statements are in the mid-3 range. This indicates that city manag-
ers are neutral in their assessment of many of the questions. There are devia-
tions with variables that scored a high mean score of 4.2 for reporting, while
monitoring scored the lowest mean of 2.7.

Correlations
Table 4 reports on Pearson’s correlations among the 10 variables. We note
that many of the variables are correlated with each other. With significant
correlations among the variables, it is appropriate to use SEM as our statisti-
cal measure of accountability.

Fit of SEM to the Data

Prior to testing the entire model, we tested vertical and horizontal models
of accountability separately and each test yielded results that confirmed
Reddick et al. 19

Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics.

Variables Minimum Maximum M SD

Clear direction 1 5 3.23 0.996
Policy specificity 1 5 3.49 0.864
Problem identification 1 5 3.16 1.011
Reporting 1 5 4.20 0.757
Monitoring 1 5 2.97 0.961
Answerability 1 5 3.66 0.814
Arbitrariness 1 5 2.70 1.209
Interest group influence 1 5 3.22 0.994
Clientele influence 1 5 3.35 0.850
Citizens’ influence 1 5 3.48 0.813

our hypotheses. The models showed adequate fit to the data. As reported in
Table 5, RMSEA is below 0.08, and the values of NFI, NNFI, and CFI are
above 0.9. Comparing our fit index values with those thresholds endorsed
by SEM researchers, we deem that our theoretical models achieve a good
fit to the data.
After using maximum likelihood estimation, we tested the full model that
included the top-down control and horizontal checks. The full model con-
verged after nine iterations with a chi-square value of 54.232 (p < .001). The
fit values show that the specified hybrid model is acceptable. Having con-
firmed the model fit, we examine path coefficients to see whether they are
statistically significant and in the expected direction. Figure 2 shows path
coefficients and statistical significance. Table 5 provides more detailed fit
indices. Finally, Table 6 shows the detailed model statistics.

Discussion
Effects of Variables in SEM
As seen in Figure 2, policy direction from city councils does not have a posi-
tive and significant impact on the city manager’s answerability. However, an
indirect relationship is supported by the results through implementation mon-
itoring. Policy direction from city councils increases the impact of implemen-
tation monitoring, and more monitoring leads to a higher degree of
answerability supporting the vertical accountability form. It is interesting that
the literature suggests that one of the most effective means of limiting admin-
istrative discretion and increasing accountability is to write clear and detailed
rules. However, the test results did not show a positive and significant
20
Table 4.  Pearson’s Correlations.
Clear Policy Problem Interest group Clientele Citizens’
Variables direction specificity identification Reporting Monitoring Answerability Arbitrariness influence influence influence

Clear direction .48** .32** .21** .28** .01 –.01 .22** .12** .10
Policy specificity .23** .22** .24** .13** .04 .18** .13* .07
Problem identification .22** .33** .09 .02 .20** .13* .12*
Reporting .23** .22** .00 .19** .10 .12*
Monitoring .20** .03 .23** .19** .19**
Answerability .11* .16* .24** .18**
Arbitrariness .09 .14** .19**
Interest group influence .39** .28**
Clientele influence .46**
Citizens’ influence  

Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
Reddick et al. 21

Table 5.  SEM Fit Indices for the Accountability Models.

Variables RMSEA NFI NNFI CFI

Vertical accountability .038 .94 .94 .97
Horizontal accountability .00 .98 .98 1.00
Hybrid (full) accountability .045 .90 .91 .95

SEM = structural equation modeling; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation;
NFI = normed fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index.

Figure 2.  Forms of accountability SEM results.

Note. SEM = structural equation modeling.
*Significant at the .10 level.
**Significant at the .05 level.

association between policy direction and the degree of accountability. As

seen in Figure 2, policy direction facilitates implementation monitoring, and
this monitoring increases the degree of accountability. These results provide
empirical support for the importance of micromanaging and casework, or in
a more popular term, of rowing, because it is clear that steering alone is not
sufficient for keeping administration in check.
22 Administration & Society 00(0)

Table 6.  SEM Analysis Results.

Variables Estimate SE C.R. p

Implementation monitoring ← Policy 0.560 0.092 6.092 ***
direction
Answerability ← Policy direction –0.370 0.189 –1.957 .050
Answerability ← Policy 0.672 0.264 2.544 .011
implementation monitoring
Answerability ← Horizontal checks 0.445 0.111 4.006 ***
Clear direction ← Policy direction 1.000  
Policy specificity ← Policy direction 0.750 0.100 7.467 ***
Problem identification ← Policy 1.000  
implementation monitoring
Reporting ← Policy implementation 0.615 0.108 5.699 ***
monitoring
Monitoring ← Policy implementation 0.991 0.154 6.433 ***
monitoring
Accountability arbitrariness ← 0.075 0.079 0.945 .344
Accountability answerability
Interest group influence ← Horizontal 1.000  
checks
Clientele influence ← Horizontal 1.213 0.168 7.208 ***
checks
Citizens’ influence ← Horizontal 0.928 0.128 7.248 ***
checks
Arbitrariness ← Horizontal checks 0.464 0.153 3.028 .002

Note. SEM = structural equation modeling; C.R. = Critical Ratio.

***Significant at the 0.01 level.

Horizontal checks also have a positive impact on increasing city manag-

ers’ degree of their sense of responsibility. Horizontal checks are positively
associated with answerability and arbitrariness. One way of looking at this is
that the reporting managers need look outside their own hierarchy for feed-
back on their actions whether that is based on a felt obligation to respond or
a felt freedom not to respond. These results provide support to the model of
horizontal accountability as a cross-cutting one.
However, the main conclusion from the SEM analysis is that empirical
analysis supports a hybrid form of accountability in practice. The full model,
which represents hybrid accountability, fits the data as well as vertical and
horizontal forms tested separately. This means that, in practice, at the local
level, both horizontal and vertical accountability models partially describe
what is taking place in the creation of a sense of responsibility in the report-
ing officials.
Reddick et al. 23

Hypothesis Testing
As indicated in Table 7, most of the hypotheses regarding the accountability
relationships of the five constructs were supported. Only Hypotheses 2 and 4
were not. Essentially, this means that vertical relationships, instantiated as
direction and monitoring, support perceived accountability relationships. We
can speculate that this occurs because clear policy direction sets the context
for monitoring, and, as indicated in Hypothesis 3, there is a cascading effect
in which this monitoring oversight increases answerability and the sense of
responsibility. Likewise, horizontal checks increased the degree of account-
ability felt by the respondents. Likely, this is due to two notions. First, that
extra-bureaucratic actors provide additional oversight by increasing answer-
ability for direction and implementation. Second, that additional intra- and
extra-bureaucratic oversight makes both principals and agents feel that over-
sight actions are less arbitrary and that answerability is more important, thus
increasing the sense of responsibility and making respondents more respon-
sive as shown in Hypotheses 5 and 6.
Interestingly, an increase in the degree of accountability (answerability)
through policy direction alone is not supported as seen in Hypothesis 2. One
might surmise that this rests on the idea that direction without the implied
oversight of monitoring is not enough in itself to incentivize accountability.
Perhaps the most provocative idea to be found in the hypotheses tested is that
implied by a lack of support for Hypothesis 4 which relates answerability and
arbitrariness. In the perceptions of the respondents to the survey research
reported here at least, the notion that the degree of accountability as indicated
by answerability does not reduce arbitrariness as a factor in the sense of
responsibility. Perhaps what this means is that being answerable can be an
arbitrary relationship.

Conclusion
This article reviewed the literature on accountability and examined three
forms of accountability found there and empirically tested them on national
survey data from city managers in the United States. As discussed, most of
the existing work on bureaucratic accountability has provided either concep-
tual frameworks or case study applications (Brandsma & Schillemans, 2012).
This research is different because it empirically tests forms of accountability
using data from practitioners. In addition, it seeks to lay out the interactions
of these models in practice and their effects on the views of practitioners.
Most of the six hypotheses were supported, with the exception of Hypotheses
2 and 4.
24 Administration & Society 00(0)

Table 7.  Results of Hypotheses Tested.

Hypothesis Construct Support

Hypothesis 1 Policy direction will lead to better policy Supported

implementation monitoring.
Hypothesis 2 Policy direction will lead to a higher degree Not supported
of answerability.
Hypothesis 3 Policy implementation monitoring will lead Supported
to a higher degree of answerability.
Hypothesis 4 A higher degree of answerability will lead Not supporteda
to a lesser level of arbitrariness.
Hypothesis 5 Horizontal checks on administration will Supported
make administration more answerable.
Hypothesis 6 Horizontal checks on administration will Supported
make administration less arbitrary.
a
When we tested the top-down accountability model, this hypothesis was supported. In the
full model, however, the relationship is not statistically significant.

In our SEM, we found evidence that vertical accountability (our top-down

model) has a positive impact on the clarity of oversight by the city council,
which made the city manager feel more accountable. There was an indirect
relationship between this outcome through policy implementation monitor-
ing supported by the results as well. This supports the traditional model of
accountability as a top-down process.
While supporting the vertical accountability model, the SEM analysis also
supported the importance of citizens, groups, and other stakeholders in secur-
ing accountability. The model showed a positive relationship between horizon-
tal accountability and vertical accountability. This shows the importance of a
hybrid form of accountability, supporting much of the existing conceptual and
case study research (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012).
What do these results mean for public administration research? We know
that accountability has changed with the more open and transparent govern-
ment in which citizens can have a more active role in government. It is very
difficult for the government not to include important stakeholders and be
accountable for their policies in our information age. However, the traditional
notion of accountability as seen in the principal–agent model should not be
discounted as being an important and accurate depiction of the way account-
ability works out in practice. Our results show that both of these models work
together to secure the sense of responsibility of city managers.
There is an extensive literature that discusses the accountability chal-
lenges when managers seek guidance from and engage with public. The con-
cern has been that managers will be captured by private interests, build too
Reddick et al. 25

much power in the community, and abuse their power. Our empirical findings
did not provide any support for these concerns. Svara (1999, 2001) argues
that administrative competence will have a restraining influence on tenden-
cies toward corruption and domination.
There are important limitations to this study. First, the generalizability of
our findings is limited due, in part, to the responding rate of our sample of
city managers. We may not be getting the most robust conclusions given our
limited data set. Second, we assume that city managers can be a proxy for
other public administrators, but there may be context effects, which limit
generalizability to other bureaucratic venues to which our analysis is not sen-
sitive. Third, we use only indirect measures of city managers’ perceptions of
accountability because we use a survey instrument. This is the city manager’s
own self-assessment of accountability, which is difficult to validate. Lack of
forethought and pretested surveys increase challenges when designing a sur-
vey instrument.
These limitations suggest future research possibilities. Clearly, one could
examine a larger sample size. In addition, to account for context and cultural
dependence, the research could be extended to comparing several countries.
Other future research could examine more direct measures of accountability
possibly through performance data of managers. Despite these limitations,
this study is one of the first to systematically conduct an empirical test of the
major forms of accountability. Also, it is one of the first to use an SEM in the
context of city managers in the United States. It is hoped this research will
spur more empirical studies on accountability given the importance of this
topic for modern democracies.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.

ORCID iD
Christopher G. Reddick https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3882-5302

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Author Biographies
Christopher G. Reddick, PhD, is a professor in the Department of Public
Administration at the University of Texas at San Antonio. His research interests are in
information technology and public-sector organizations.
Tansu Demir, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Public
Administration at the University of Texas at San Antonio. His research areas include
politics and administration, power, local government, city managers, and profession-
alism. He has published articles in such journals as Public Administration Review,
American Review of Public Administration, and Administration & Society.
Bruce Perlman, PhD, is Regents’ Professor and Director of the School of Public
Administration at the University of New Mexico. His principal research areas are
state and local government, comparative and international administration, and public-
sector organization and management.

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