This is half of the equation that the whole of theplace is trying to solve...

The other half is in a paper by Haemmerlie & Montgomery published

in 1988, that I'm still trying to find a full version of.  

Enjoy!

Overview: Basically, what we have here is another placebo effect, this time on the mind instead of body. Our behaviors (ie shyness) have a lot
to do with our interpretations of how we’re feeling, or our arousal level. So, if we’re normally shy, and we feel an increase in pulse rate, we
automatically attribute it to shyness, and behave as if we were shy. If we’re given an alternate explanation for the increase in pulse rate, then
we DON’T attach that label, and interact as if we are not shy. Pretty cool stuff.

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When specific arousal symptoms previously associated with their social anxiety were misattributed to a nonpsychological source, high-
frequency noise, these extremely shy women behaved as if they were not shy. Their verbal fluency and interactional assertiveness resembled
that of not-shy comparison women given the same treatment. Moreover, their scores on these measures were significantly elevated from the
low levels recorded by shy controls who had been led to expect shyness- rrelevant "side effects" from their exposure to noise. A male partner
(a confederate) accurately perceived whether or not the women in the two control groups were shy, but he misjudged as "not shy" the shy
women in the misattribution group.

When put in the original anxiety-producing situation, the actor may immediately invoke the dispositional label (e.g., "I am afraid of math
[snakes, men, etc.]"), which in turn may cue any or all of the response chain (e.g., avoidance of numbers, disgust at the sight of slimy
creatures, etc.).

Such dispositional labels may act as stereotypes that create their own social reality by influencing one's behavior and that of others so as to
generate behavioral confirmation (cf. Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). Such selffulfilling prophecies confirm the perceiver's stereotype and
serve to impose constraints on personal change and sense of self-efficacy.

Both the perception of arousal and its explanation are crucial to the predicted flow of the unfolding process. For example, if physiological
arousal increases, as indicated by an elevated heart rate, yet this change is not perceived, there is little reason to expect that the dispositional
label and all that follows will be immediately invoked. Alternatively, if an increase in arousal is perceived yet is easily explained away by an
external source, the proposed sequence of events may not unfold.

In the misattribution paradigm, arousal experienced from a true cause is falsely portrayed as the likely side effect of exposure to a different,
salient stimulus in the experimental setting. The subject is led to believe that this normative reaction elicited by the stimulus event is
nonmotivational (physiologically wired), thus without personal causality or responsibility. When the person is placed in the usually arousing
situation, any initially experienced symptoms are explained away as the expected operation of the placebo factor

The dispositional label typically correlated with that arousal is thus not invoked, and undesirable behaviors previously associated with this self-
labeling are modified.

These individuals, who normally report the arousal symptoms of increased pulse and heart rate in response to this shyness-inducing situation,
were informed that the current source of their arousal symptoms was the presence of highintensity noise. Such reactions were described as
commonly observed side effects of this physical stimulus. When they next experienced this social situation, which ought to have made them
feel socially anxious, it was predicted that they would relabel their arousal as a nonpsychological reaction, one of noise-induced irritability, for
which they bore no personal responsibility.

By breaking the naturally occurring correlations between situational characteristics, arousal symptoms, and the shyness label, we predicted
that inhibitions on social responding would be reduced. If so, more socially responsive behavior might emerge. Moreover, given the usually
high level of anxious arousal that these chronically shy people typically experience in shyness-eliciting situations, the transient, noise-related
arousal should, by comparison, be tolerated as relatively mild.

If neither the shyness label nor its associated schema were invoked, because of the misattribution manipulation, then the excessive self-
monitoring of the shy might diminish and they might talk more, recognize that they are appropriately responsive, enjoy the new social
experience, and become less anxiously aroused, despite the bothersome noise.

Those who are reticent to carry on a conversation or who appear anxious while doing so will be judged as shy, whereas those who are fluent
and more at ease will be perceived as not shy. The shy misattribution group should, therefore, be mistakenly judged as either not shy or only
slightly shy if, as predicted, they talk freely and without anxiety.

The misattribution treatment, then, is assumed to first redirect the arousal from an anxiety-laden social source (being alone with a member of
the opposite sex) to a nonpsychological source (the noise). This altered cognition provides an explanation for the experienced symptoms
without resorting to the shyness label or any anxiety conceptions.

Because of their learned history of not initiating conversations, these shy women ought not to risk breaking the initial silence (as those who
are not shy readily do), but they should be responsive to questions and answers from their partner. In contrast with other similar social
situations, which are threatening, this anxiety-free setting would be one in which the subject observes herself interacting more freely; thus,
her sense of efficacy should be enhanced (Bandura, 1980).

Rarely did any shy women in either condition break the silence, whereas half of the not- hy did initiate a conversation

However, once the ice was broken, the shy women in the misattribution condition responded during the interaction with the male partner as if
they were not shy.

Though they were apparently hesitant to break the silence, the behavior of shy women who were offered an extrinsic explanation for their
arousal symptoms of shyness was in a number of ways indistinguishable from that of their not-shy cohorts but quite different from the
behavior of shy controls drawn from the same population.

Immediately following each interaction, the confederate, who was blind as to the selfreported shyness of the subjects, indicated whether he
judged the partner to be shy or not, and if shy, to what degree—(from extremely shy to only slightly shy).

He accurately detected all but 3 of the 16 not-shy women (81%) and 9 of the 14 shy comparison women (64%).

His perception of the shy women in the misattribution condition seems to have been biased by their volubility and assertiveness. In 60% of
the cases, he mistakenly judged them as not shy or he was uncertain of their shyness status.

Even when the confederate did evaluate these shy misattribution women as shy, they were all judged to be "only slightly so." Hence, to the
confederate, these women with the alternative explanation for their arousal did not appear to be obviously shy, even though they were
selected because of their extreme shyness.

The basis for these person-perception differences becomes evident when we examine the self-reports on the final questionnaire.

As opposed to the women in the not-shy and shy misattribution conditions, those in the shy comparison condition made unsolicited references
to shyness (even though they were unaware of our interest in shyness) or social anxiety, for example: "I prefer to participate alone because I
am basically a shy person," "I feel nervous with people I don't know," "It [the situation] is uncomfortable because I don't know him and he
seemed a little shy," and "The room is small and I feel awkward with someone I don't know." In dramatic contrast, there was not a single
mention of shyness or social anxiety in any of the protocols from the shy misattribution group. To the contrary, their experience was enjoyable
because of its sociable quality, as revealed in many statements, typical of which are the following: "I was more likely to talk because it relieved
the noiseproduced anxiety"; "I may have felt more nervous had I been alone with no one to exchange smiles with"; "It's nice to share the
experience. We had time to get more in depth in conversation"; "I liked being with someone else. It's nice to have a quiet room with someone
to talk to after the noise"; "Because we spent time together in a similar, unusual experience—in tight quarters—it's hard not to talk to some
extent"; "I prefer being with another because I can see what it [noise] does to another person as well as to myself'; and "The noise kind of
made me want to talk to him [the confederate] as a relief from the mechanical noise." For the usually sociable women who were not shy, the
minimal social situation was hardly as interesting as it appeared to be for those in the shy misattribution condition.

Their self-reports were brief and described the encounter in rather banal terms: "We talked," "We just made small talk," "I had little interest in
interacting," and "I got bored."

When asked on the final questionnaire to speculate about their affiliation preferences in this specific situation ("Would you have preferred to
participate in this experiment alone or with another participant? Explain"), the shy women in the misattribution condition stood apart from
those in either of the other groups. As might be predicted, shys do not voluntarily choose to affiliate; only 2 of the 14 in the shy comparison
group selected this alternative, whereas about 30% wanted to be alone and 57% reportedly did not care. This indifference was also the modal
response (56%) of the not-shy women. But the shy women who, as a consequence of misattributing their social anxiety, talked more and
were not perceived by their partner as shy, did care. Fully two thirds of them endorsed togetherness in this situation.

The results suggest that by misattributing arousal to an external source, social behavior can be altered in specifiable ways. Shy women, when
given an alternative explanation for their social anxiety, talked significantly more than did those in the shy comparison group whose chronic
shyness suppressed verbal participation during an interaction with a stranger of the opposite sex. This availability of a tenable, affectively
neutral explanation disrupted the previously existing correlations between the shyness label, physiological arousal, and inhibited social
behaviors

Once most women in the shy misattribution group passed the barrier of initiating the conversation (which the misattribution manipulation did
not alter), they talked freely, indeed, as much as the not-shys. They also were as assertive as the not-shys in changing the domain of the
conversation, a social control strategy rarely observed among shy people.