GDU 2021

POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Reduced Version)

By: Glydel Shialyn D. Urbano, UP Law Batch 2021

“Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 CONSTITUTION

This reviewer is patterned after the 2020/21 Bar Syllabus (Reduced Version, released on 04 January 2021), including
jurisprudence until September 2020 (cutoff). Most cases came from Prof. Gwen De Vera’s 2020 and 2019 (expanded)
syllabi. GDU added canonical cases based on her reading of Nachura (2016) and the UP Bar Operations Commission
Reviewer (2020).

Political Law
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. It
means that the Constitution has set out the allocation of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the
executive branch of government, through the President,
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret
laws [Angara v. Electoral Commission].
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. The principle of separation of powers and its concepts
of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration
of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.
When is there a violation of separation of powers
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on
the domain of another. The principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways:
1. When one branch may interfere impermissibly with the
other's performance of its constitutionally assigned
function;
2. When one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another.
The Supreme Court as the final adjudicator
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them [Angara v.
Electoral Commission].
MMDA v. Residents of Manila Bay
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an
aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the
rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay.
It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-
department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them
on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what
other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"
the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision
would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino
This Court does not have the power to audit the expenditures
of the Government or any of its agencies and instrumentalities.
The Constitution saw fit to vest this power on COA, which alone
has the power to disallow unnecessary and extravagant
government spending. The separation of powers doctrine
precludes this Court from encroaching on the powers and
functions of an independent constitutional body. Our
participation in the audit process is limited to determining
whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its audit decisions.
The principle of separation of powers also applies to
independent constitutional bodies, not just among the three
departments of government.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY; EXCEPTIONS 

General Rule: Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides
that "the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means
"what has been delegated, cannot be delegated."

SOVEREIGNTY
CONST., Article II, Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
The Republic of the Philippines
• Democratic and republican state
• Unitary and decentralized
o National government and local governments
(vertical allocation of powers)
o In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state,
sovereignty "resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." It
means that the constitutional legislator, namely
the people, is sovereign. In consequence, the
people may thus write into the Constitution their
convictions on any subject they choose in the
absence of express constitutional prohibition. A
constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-
limiting decision of the people when they adopt
it.
• Presidential form of government
o Characterized by separation of powers (horizontal
allocation of powers)
KINDS OF SOVEREIGNTY
1. Legal – power to issue final commands; Political – sum total
of all the influences which lie behind the law
2. Internal – supreme power over everything within its
territory; External – also known as independence, which is
freedom from control.
Effects of change in sovereignty
Political laws are abrogated [People v. Perfecto]. Municipal laws
remain in force [Villas v. City of Manila].
Effect of belligerent occupation
No change in sovereignty. Political laws, however, are
suspended (except: treason), Municipal laws remain in force
unless repealed by the belligerent occupant. At the end of
belligerent occupation, political laws shall automatically
become effective again.
SOVERIGNTY IN RELATION TO STATE IMMUNITY
CONST., Article XVI, Section 3. The State may not be sued
without its consent.
Legal and practical rationale
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and
on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
GDU 2021
City of Bacolod v. Phuture Visions Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289,
January 11, 2018

Consent may be express or implied, such as when the
government exercises its proprietary functions, or where
such is embodied in a general or special law. In the present
case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter's refusal to
issue a mayor's permit for bingo operations and for closing
its business on account of the lack of such permit. However,
while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses
and business permits is granted by the Local Government
Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with
corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be
sued, this Court has held that the power to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the
government's proprietary function. Instead, it is in an
exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
governmental act. As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver
of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
See: IV. Judicial Review
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Characteristics
1. Inherent in the State, may be exercised without need of
express constitutional grant
2. Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective
without them.
3. Methods by which the State interferes with private property
4. Exercised by the Legislature (as repository of all fundamental
powers of the State)
1. Police power 

Definition and basic principles
• The power of promoting public welfare by restraining or
regulating the use and enjoyment of liberty and property.
• There is no compensation. If at all, compensation comes in
the form of an “intangible, altruistic feeling that the
individual has contributed to the public good.”
• Police power has been characterized as the most essential,
insistent, and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs.
• Police power cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a treaty or a contract (hence, it prevails over
non-impairment clause)
• A law enacted in the exercise of police power could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested
rights (e.g. retroactive effect of PD 857 – Subdivision and
Condominium Protective Decree).

• Property must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, although sheltered by police power, must
yield to the general welfare.
Who may exercise police power?
GR: Congress
XPNs: Delegated (by law)
1. President
 reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed
o Examples: R.A. 6939, P.D. 260
2. Administrative Bodies
 reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not
3. Law-making Bodies of LGUs (under the General Welfare
Clause)
o E.g. zoning ordinance, land reclassification
MMDA does not have authority to exercise police power
While the law does NOT empower the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without the
need of any other legislative enactment, the same law vests the
MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law validly enacted by
legislature (local or national), the MMDA is dutybound to
confiscate drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate
[MMDA v. Garin].
MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances [Gancayco
v. City Government of Quezon City].
Limitations on delegation of police power
1. Express grant by law;
 public purpose, there is need to pay just compensation.
2. Within the territorial jurisdiction (if delegate to LGUs); and
3. Exercise must not be contrary to law
TEST OF VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
“Means Purpose Test”
1. Lawful Subject - the interests of the public, generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference and that the subject of the measure is within the
scope of the police power [Ichong v. Hernandez]. In other
words, the activity or property sought to be regulated affects
GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PUBLIC.
GDU 2021
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience. As in the case of senior
citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are
entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public
to which these citizens belong. The means employed in
invoking the active participation of the private sector, in
order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are
oppressive.
2. Eminent domain 

See: II. Bill of Rights on Rights during Expropriation
CONST., Art. III, Section 9. Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation
Definition and basic principles
• The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the
State to condemn private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation.
• Distinguished from police power: property condemned
under police power is usually noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, hence no compensation is paid. When a
property, however, is taken and appropriated for some
Who may exercise eminent domain
GR: Congress
XPN: Delegated (through charter):
1. LGUs
- see Section 19 of LGC
2. Other Government entities (e.g. DPWH)
The repository of eminent domain powers is the legislature, i.e.
exercised through the enactment of laws. But power may be
delegated to LGUs and other government entities (via charter);
still, the delegation must be by law.

Note: Strict construction will apply against the government

2. Lawful Means - the means employed are REASONABLY
agency exercising the power of eminent domain. This is
NECESSARY for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
pursuant to the well-settled principle that eminent domain
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator.
Application:
REQUISITES; SUMMARY OF RULES
• There must be a showing of imperious public necessity for
1. Necessity
the taking of private property without just compensation. It
• This is generally a political question (if power of
must also be shown that such taking is the only reasonable
eminent domain is exercised by Congress), BUT if
and calibrated response to such necessity. An ordinance
exercised by a delegate (LGU or any other government
aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the first
agency), the determination of genuine necessity is a
standard; but declaring bus terminals as nuisances per se
justiciable question.
and ordering their closure contravenes the second
standard [Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner].
• The concept of public use is no longer confined to the
traditional notion of use by the public, but held

2. Private Property
• All private property capable of ownership may be
expropriated, except money and choses in action. Even
services may be subject to eminent domain [Republic v.
PLDT].
3. Taking in the constitutional sense
• Taking need not be actual eviction. In People v.
Fajardo, an ordinance prohibiting a building from
blocking the view of the plaza was considered taking.
Hence, just compensation must be paid.
• Taking may result only in the imposition of a burden
upon the owner of the condemned property without
loss of title or possession (e.g. right of way).
• Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntary
offered by landowner for CAPR coverage. The effective
date of taking should be the date of approval of the
PARC confirming the land as covered by CARP
[Hacienda Luisita v. PARC].
• When there is taking in the constitutional sense, the
property owner need not file a claim for just
compensation with the COA, he or she may directly go
to court to demand payment.
• Requites for valid taking:
i. Expropriator must enter private property
ii. Entry must be for more than a momentary period
(i.e. Entry must be indefinite or permanent)
iii. Entry must be under warrant or color of authority
iv. Property must be devoted to public use or
purpose
v. Utilization must be in such a way as to oust the
owner or deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of
the property.
4. Public use
• Refers to general concept of meeting public need or
exigency; synonymous to public
interest/welfare/convenience
• Public use is a flexible and evolving concept; it is broad
enough to cover use which, while not directly available
to the public, redound to their indirect advantage or
benefit
5. Just compensation
• Refers to the full and fair equivalent of the property; the
FMV of the property is determined by its character (e.g.
size, shape, location) and price at the time of taking.
• Its ascertainment is a judicial prerogative. Hence,
legislative measures fixing method of just
compensation is an encroachment on judicial power.
They are not binding on the courts; treated as mere
guidelines.
i. Note: In agrarian reform cases, RTC-Special
Agrarian Court must consider the factors
enumerated under R.A. 6657 and the DAR formula
as they provide for a uniform framework by which
GDU 2021
just compensation for property subject to agrarian
reform is determined [LBP v. Eusebio].
• Means not only the correct amount to be paid to the
owner but also payment within reasonable time from
taking. If not, the State must pay landowner interest by
way of damages from the time the land was taken (12%
until June 30, 2013; 6% afterwards).
i. But when the government, before taking the
property, deposits an amount representing the
zonal value of the property, there is deemed to be
no forbearance of money and the owner is not
entitled to interest.
ii. Taxes paid by the owner after taking by the
government is reimbursable.
• Entitlement to just compensation is not limited to
owner. It includes all those who have lawful interest in
the property condemned.
• Tax credit given to commercial establishments for their
compliance with the Senior Citizens Act is a form of just
compensation.
• The Land Bank of the Philippines is an indispensable
party in expropriation proceedings. It also has
personality to initiate a petition for the determination of
just compensation.
Take-over power vs expropriation
CONST., Art. XVII, Section 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest [no
just compensation required].
Section 17. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
Government [just compensation required].
Agan v. PIATCO
On the take-over provision, Section 17
The State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its
police power.
The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the
operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As
such the government is not required to compensate the private
entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private
entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot,
likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
government is in exercise of its police power and not of its
power of eminent domain.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON EXPROPRIATION
National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, April, 3, 2019
It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery
of possession or ejectment against a public utility
corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain,
which has occupied the land belonging to the former in the
interest of public service without prior acquisition of title
thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation
proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the
public utility corporation to vacate such property is
unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of
ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and
public necessity as well as equitable estoppel.
The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss
the case without prejudice to the landowner ling the proper
action for recovery of just compensation and consequential
damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public
utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just
compensation and consequential damages assessed therein;
or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation
case and determine the just compensation and
consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation)
of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction
over the value of the subject land.
Note: In Republic of the Philippines v. Lim (2015), the SC held
that where the government fails to pay just compensation within
five years from finality of the judgment in expropriation
proceedings, the owners shall have the right to recover
possession of their property.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sps. Silvestre, G.R. No. 237324,
February 6, 2019
Just compensation, in expropriation cases, is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the loss of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. Its true measure is not the
taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to
modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a
mandatory requirement nonetheless. Thus, while it is true
that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and
the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value,
it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
GDU 2021
As such, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all." Evidently, the
recommendations of the BOC carry with it great weight and
value insofar as the determination of just compensation is
concerned.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sps. Goloyuco, G.R. No. 222551,
June 19, 2019

Time and again, the Court has held that zonal valuation,
although one of the indices of the fair market value of real
estate, cannot, by itself, be the sole basis of just
compensation in expropriation cases.
PROVISIONAL VALUE =/= JUST COMPENSATION
Moreover, in Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, the Court clarified that the payment of
the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ
of possession is different from the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated property. While the
provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal
valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair
market value of the property.
[LEONEN CASE] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace
and Elma Gloria Franco, March 12, 2019
Regional trial courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, as well
as the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In contrast to the
special agrarian courts, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board only has preliminary administrative
determination of just compensation.
Just compensation is "the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator." The
measure of the taking "is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss." The term "just" intensifies the term "compensation"
to obtain a real, substantial, full, and ample equivalent for
the property taken. The jurisdiction of the trial courts, sitting
as special agrarian courts, is "not any less 'original' and
'exclusive'" because the Department of Agrarian Reform
passes upon the question of just compensation first.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
Administrative Order No. 5 provides a comprehensive
formula that considers several factors present in determining

just compensation. However, as this Court held, it is not
adequate to merely use the formula in an administrative
order of the Department of Agrarian Reform or rely on the
determination of a land assessor to show a final
determination of the amount of just compensation. Courts
are still tasked with considering all factors present, which may
be stated in formulas provided by administrative agencies.
SC
In Land Bank v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, this Court held
that when acting within the bounds of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, special agrarian courts "are not strictly
bound to apply the [Department of Agrarian Reform]
formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with
situations that do not warrant the formula's strict
application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax
the formula's application to fit the factual situations before
them."
That said, any deviation to the basic formula made in the
exercise of judicial discretion must be "supported by a
reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on
record." A computation by a court made in "utter and
blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by
the implementing rules” amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. It must be struck down.
3. Taxation
CONST., Article VI, Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Definition
It is the power by which the State raises revenue to defray the
necessary expenses of the Government. It is the enforced
proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by
GDU 2021
the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of the
government and for all public needs.
Lifeblood theory and Necessity theory
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for without taxes,
the government can neither exist nor endure. A principal
attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power derives its
source from the very existence of the state whose social
contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public interest
and common good.
Who may exercise taxation powers?
GR: Congress
XPNs: Delegated (by Constitution)
1. Local legislative bodies – see Art. X, Sec. 5 of the 1987
CONST
2. President – see Art. VI, Sec. 28(2) of the 1987 CONST
LIMITATIONS
1. Due process of law
Taxes should not be confiscatory.
Judicial review for unconscionable and unjust tax amounting to
confiscation of property

The legislature has discretion to determine the nature, object,
extent, coverage, and situs of taxation. But where a tax measure
becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to
confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it
down; the power to tax cannot override constitutional
prescriptions [Tan v. del Rosario].
2. Equal protection clause
Taxes should be uniform and equitable.
3. Public Purpose
Tax for special purpose
Treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only;
when purpose is fulfilled, the balance, if any, shall be transferred
to the general funds of the Government [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI].
4. Double Taxation
Additional taxes laid on the same subject by the same taxing
jurisdiction during the same taxing period for the same taxing
purpose.
POLICE POWER VS. TAXATION
Gerochi v. Department of Energy
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is
the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.

Supremacy of national government over local government in
matters of taxation
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments.
There is no reason for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities for rendering essential public
services to inhabitants of local governments. The only
exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax
government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential
public services for sound and compelling policy considerations.
There must be express language in the law empowering local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any
doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local
governments.
In this case, the airports, lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax for the following reasons: (1) MIAA
is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of National Government;
(2) the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of
the Philippines, and, thus, exempt from local taxation.
II. BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
CONST., Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law[.]
Due process furnishes a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. It has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness [Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila].
Lack or deficiency in constitutional procedural due process
voids the decision made by the State.
Lack or deficiency in statutory procedural due process (e.g.
labor disputes) does NOT void the decision of the corporation
or company, if the dismissal is found to have been made with
just cause. It would only give rise to claims for nominal
damages.
Scope
Universal in application to all persons without regard to any
difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are
covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is
concerned [Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, G.R. No. 15574
(1919)].
GDU 2021
The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of
livelihood [Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, G.R. No. L-29646 (1978)].
Due process only applies in judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings
The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial power
and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. Accordingly,
one cannot claim that they were denied due process during an
NBI investigation [Shu v. Dee].
Prior notice and hearing, as elements of procedural due
process, are only required in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in
the performance of quasi-legislative or administrative functions
[Sanggunian v. Jadewell Parking].
Define the term life as used in Article III, Sec. 1.
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (2008), the right to
life is understood to include ―quality of life – which is
entitlement to a life lived with assurance that government he
established and consented to will protect the security of person
means: (1) freedom from fear; (2) guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity, and (3) guarantee of protection of one‘s
rights by the government.
Define the term liberty as used in Article III, Sec. 1.
Liberty is the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. It includes the right of the citizen
to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace
the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare.
Define the term property as used in Article III, Sec. 1.
Property has been commonly understood to include interests
therein which pertain to some form of benefit enjoyed by
owners. Thus, to have a “property interest” in a benefit, a
person or entity must clearly have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it which is more than an abstract need, desire or
unilateral expectation [NTC v. Brancomm, 2019].
Mark Anthony V. Zabal v. Rodrigo R. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467,
February 12, 2019 (Boracay closure)
Concededly, "[a] profession, trade or calling is a property
right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.
One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right
to make a living because these rights are property rights,
the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally
constitutes an actionable wrong."
Under this premise, petitioners claim that they were
deprived of due process when their right to work and earn a
living was taken away from them when Boracay was ordered

closed as a tourist destination. It must be stressed, though,
that "when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare." Otherwise,
police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital,
government measures implemented pursuant to the said
state power would be stymied or invalidated.
In any case, petitioners, particularly Zabal and Jacosalem,
cannot be said to have already acquired vested rights to
their sources of income in Boracay. As heretofore
mentioned, they are part of the informal sector of the
economy where earnings are not guaranteed. Certainly, they
do not possess any vested right on their sources of income,
and under this context, their claim of lack of due process
collapses. To stress, only rights which have completely and
definitely accrued and settled are entitled protection under
the due process clause.
KINDS OF DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of the law.
The law should not interfere with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty or property.
Procedural due process consists of the basic rights of notice
and hearing, and the guarantee of being heard by an impartial
and competent tribunal [Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion
(2000)].
Substantive Procedural
Nature
It requires that the law must It refers to the method or
be fair, reasonable, just. manner by which a law is
enforced.
Essence
Fairness and justice Notice and hearing
(opportunity to be heard)
Who should comply
Lawmakers Adjudicating body/officer
a. Substantive
State the test applied to determine compliance with
substantive due process, in general.
In general, the test is whether the government (lawmakers) has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty and
property [White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (2009)].
State the void for vagueness doctrine.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that persons of common
GDU 2021
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle [SPARK v. QC, 2018].
State the overbreadth doctrine.
The overbreadth doctrine decrees that “a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.” The overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it
is protected. [Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council
(2010)] A law is overbroad when it “needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights” [Loida Nicolas-Lewis v.
Commission on Elections (2019)].
Distinguish an as-applied challenge from a facial challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities [Disini v. Secretary of Justice
(2014)].
b. Procedural
GR: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing.
XPN: However, notice and hearing are not required in every
case, for there are an admitted number of exceptions in view of
the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need
to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
Instances when the need for expeditious action will justify
omission of these requisites, e.g. summary abatement of a
nuisance per se like a mad dog on the loose, which may be
killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the
safety and lives of the people. As such, filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. [Ynot v. IAC, G.R.
No. 74457. March 20, 1987]
Publication of laws
Before a person may be bound by law, he must be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. For the publication
requirement, “laws” refer to all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws. This does not cover internal
regulations issued by administrative agencies, which are

governed by the Local Government Code. Publication must be
full, or there is none at all [Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915
(1986)].
i. Judicial Procedural Due Process
State the requirements of judicial due process.
The requirements of judicial due process are as follows:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it;
Hence, the judge who decided the case should not be the
same person to decide it on appeal because he or she
cannot be considered an impartial judge [GSIS v. Court of
Appeals].
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant or over the property subject of the
proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
Notes: Not all cases require a trial type hearing (e.g. labor
cases where submission of position papers suffices). Right
to be heard does not mean verbal arguments in court. One
may be heard through pleadings.
If lack of opportunity to be heard was occasioned by the
negligence of his or her own counsel, petitioner cannot
invoke denial of due process. Negligence of the counsel
binds him or her [Villaruel v. Fernando].
4. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
Appeal and due process
The SC has consistently reiterated that the right to appeal is not
a natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law [Alba v. Nitorreda, G.R.
No. 120223 (1996)].
XPN: Criminal conviction for death (there is automatic review).
Preliminary investigation and due process
Right to preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right.
That said, it is a substantive right and a component of due
process in the administration of criminal justice. Hence, to deny
it to the petitioner would deprive him the full measure of his
right to due process.
GDU 2021
Be that as it may, lack of preliminary investigation does not
invalidate an information. It is not even a ground for motion to
quash. The case need only be suspended for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation [Yusop v. Sandiganbayan].
ii. Administrative Procedural Due Process
State the cardinal primary requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings.
The cardinal primary requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings were enumerated in the case of
Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940). They are as follows:
1. Right to a hearing to present own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. Decision rendered must have evidentiary support.
4. Evidence which supports the finding or conclusion is
substantial (such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accepts as adequate to support a conclusion).
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or any of its judges, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered.
Notes:
• Filing of a Motion for Reconsideration in administrative
proceedings cures the lack of opportunity to be heard
[Chua v. Court of Appeals]. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is opportunity to be heard or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
complained of [Quintos v. COMELEC].
• Right of a party to cross-examine the witness against him
even in a civil case is an indispensable part of due process
[Ortigas v. Lufthansa]. But in administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
• Ang Tibay rules does not apply in preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law merely
giving rise to statutory rights [Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman].
State the principle applicable in relation to procedural due
process in labor related proceedings.
Mariveles Shipyard Corporation v. CA (2003) enunciates that
procedural due process in labor-related proceedings does not
require a trial-type hearing, the same is satisfied when the
parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers
to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting
documents supporting their respective claims.

Twin requirements which constitute the essential elements of
due process in labor cases
The employer must furnish the employee with two written
notices before the termination of employment can be effected.
The first is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and
The second
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CONST., Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
1. Concept
 What is an intentional or purposeful discrimination, in relation
Equal protection of the laws mean that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed [Ichong v. Hernandez
(1957)].
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2014
The "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the
classification is not unreasonable.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. All that is required of a valid
classification is that (1) it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that (2) it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that (4) it must apply equally
to each member of the class.
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute
under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face
may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. [W]e see no
difference between a law which denies equal protection and
a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits
of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be
GDU 2021
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in
operation…. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
2. Requisites for valid classification
What is a classification in law?
A classification in law is one where the law distinguishes certain
groups of people through their characteristics within which such
law applies. The requisites for a valid classification in law are as
follows:
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
to enforcement of a statute (and statutory classification)?
Department of Public Works and Highways v. COA, G.R. No.
237987, March 19, 2019
An erroneous performance of statutory duty - such as an
apparent selective enforcement of the statute - could not be
considered a violation of the equal protection clause unless
the element of intentional or purposeful discrimination is
shown. There is no violation of the equal protection of the
laws in prosecuting only one of the many equally guilty
persons. This lone circumstance would not be sufficient to
uphold the claim of denial of the equal protection clause.
Absent a clear showing of intentional discrimination, the
prosecuting officers shall be presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties.
The element of intentional or purposeful discrimination may
appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a
particular class or person, or it may only be shown by
extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a
showing of "clear and intentional discrimination.”
3. Levels of scrutiny
In SPARK v. QC, as cited in Zomer v. Court of Appeals (2019)
the three tests to determine reasonableness of classification
was summarized: (i) strict scrutiny applies when a classification
either interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including basic liberties, or (ii) burdens suspect classes; (ii)
intermediate scrutiny test applies when the classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications involving gender
and legitimacy; and (iii) rational basis test applies to all other
subjects not covered by the first two tests.

[LEONEN CASE] Zomer Development Company, Inc. v. Special
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City and
Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194461, January 7,
2020
The STRICT SCRUTINY TEST applies when a classification
either
i. interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or
ii. burdens suspect classes.
A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."
Note: Suspect classifications are not limited to classifications
based on race, alienage or national origin but could also be
applied to other criteria such as religion [Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City (2017)].
Requisite for validity: (1) Compelling state interest; (2) It is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest
Rights involved: Fundamental rights (e.g. free speech,
exercise of religion, right to travel); also applies in suspect
classes.
Burden of Proof: Government (heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality)
The INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as
in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Requisite for validity: (1) Substantial government interest; (2)
Unavailability of less restrictive means
Rights involved: Does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as
in classifications based on gender and legitimacy
Burden of Proof: Government
Lastly, the RATIONAL BASIS TEST applies to all other
subjects not covered by the first two tests.
"The rational basis test requires only that there be a
legitimate government interest and that there is a reasonable
connection between it and the means employed to achieve
it."
Requisite for validity: (1) Legitimate government interest; (2)
Purpose and means correspondence
GDU 2021
Rights involved: Economic, property, commercial legislation
which do not affect fundamental rights of suspect classes
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
Republic of the Philippines v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution. It includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel,
and the right to vote.
On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed
in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare. It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress,
the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based
on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
CONST., Article III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
[LEONEN CASE] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, July 5, 2016
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but
an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has
applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to
governmental acts.
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on
expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of
speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against
regulation. The primary and incidental burden on speech
must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly
allowed in the Constitution.

. . . of expression. . .
This court has held free speech and expression and other
intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values." These rights enjoy precedence and
primacy.
a. Continuum of thought, speech, expression, and
speech acts
What is the purpose for including the term expression within
the coverage of Article III, Section 4?
The purpose of the inclusion of “expression” is to illustrate how
broad the coverage of the right is; it extends to forms of
expression other than mere speech. It has been held that the
freedom of expression is so broad that it protects nearly all
forms of communication. Speech, print and assembly regarding
secular as well as political causes are protected; the freedom is
not confined to any particular field of human interest [Chavez v.
Gonzales (2008)].
[LEONEN CASE] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, July 5, 2016
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’"such that "‘when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of
conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may
be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’"
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the
ENTIRE CONTINUUM OF SPEECH from utterances made to
conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic
manner of communication.
Ebranilag v. Dvision Super Intendent: Freedom of speech
includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the
Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to
utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty
not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its message as
clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of
expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be
prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those
raised in this petition.
Note: In NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter v. CA
[G.R. No. 163942 (2008)], it was held that the labor union
members’ violation of the hotel’s grooming standards (they
shaved their heads) constitutes an illegal strike, which is not
protected by the right to freedom of expression (note na private
entity ang nagbawal sa employees magpakalbo; bill of rights
cannot be invoked against private entities).
GDU 2021
b. Purposes of free speech doctrines
[LEONEN] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205728
1. The right of the people to participate in public affairs
includes the right to criticize government actions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out
grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected
and encouraged.
2. Free speech should be encouraged under the concept of
a market place of ideas
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought
that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us."
3. Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human
dignity
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are
not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment.
4. Expression is a marker for group identity
Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who
have similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and
forward common goals.
5. The Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to
"protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian
abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of
democratic governance]
[I]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part."
6. Free speech must be protected under the safety valve
theory
Free speech must be protected as a peaceful means of
achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression
of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to
drive a point.
2. Types of regulation

a. Prior restraint and subsequent punishment
What are the aspects of press freedom?
The aspects of press freedom are freedom from censorship or
prior restraint, and freedom from subsequent punishment.
PRIOR RESTRAINT
State the definition of prior restraint and give an example.
The concept of prior restraint refers to the censorship or
restriction of the press and of expression by the government
even before publication or dissemination.

Any law that requires the prior approval of the government in
the exercise of free speech and/or expression is prohibited by
Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution [Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931)].
Note: Not all prior restraint is invalid. But all prior restraint is
presumed invalid.
Examples of prior restraint:
• Censorship: Censorship conditions the exercise of
freedom of expression upon the prior approval of the
government. The censor serves therefore as the political,
moral, social and artistic arbiter for the people, usually
applying only their own subjective standards in
determining what is good and what is not. 
 Viewpoint neutrality stands for the idea that when government
Note: There need not be total suppression. Even restriction
of circulation constitutes censorship [Grosjean v. American
Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)].
• Permits: A law is unconstitutional if it requires that before a
magazine or newspaper may publish a certain piece, it
must seek the approval of the government. To allow
otherwise would abridge the freedom of speech and
expression that are protected by the Constitution.
• Business closure 
 Law.
WHEN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
• COMELEC prohibition against radio commentators and
newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues
involved in a scheduled plebiscite [Sanidad v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 90878 (1990)] 
 COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this
• Arbitrary closure of a radio station [Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, Jr., G.R. No. L- 59329 (1985)]; or even when there is
legal justification, such as lack of mayor’s permit
[Newsounds Broadcasting Network v. Dy, supra].

• COMELEC resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and
stickers in mobile units such as cars and other vehicles
[Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956 (1992)].
 kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or
• Searching, padlocking, and sealing of the offices of
newspaper publishers by military authorities [Burgos v.
Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261 (1984)].
 national elections because of the COMELEC notice and
• An announcement by a public official prohibiting the media
from airing or broadcasting the Garci tapes under the pain
of revocation of licenses [Chavez v. Gonzales, 2008] 

• COMELEC prohibiting playing of campaign jingles in
mobile units during campaign [Mutuc v. COMELEC]
WHEN NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
• Prohibition against pre-mature campaigning: Law which
prohibits, except during the prescribed election period,
making speeches, announcements, or commentaries for or
against the election of any candidate for office [Gonzales v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833 (1969)]. 

GDU 2021
• Prohibiting any person making use of the media from
selling or giving print space or air time free of charge for
campaign or other political purposes. Ratio: Police power
of the State to regulate media for the purpose of ensuring
equal opportunity, time, and space for political campaigns,
which COMELEC is authorized to carry out [National Press
Club v. COMELEC, 
G.R. No. 102653 (1992); Osmeña v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231 (1998)].
• The power of the MTRCB can be exercised only for
purposes of reasonable classification, NOT censorship
[NACHURA, citing Gonzalez v. Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500
(1985) and Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. v. Judge Capulong, G.R.
No. 82380 (1988)].
Define viewpoint neutrality.
actions implicate the speech rights of groups and individuals,
those actions must be done in an evenhanded way. They may
not discriminate based on the message advocated.
[LEONEN CASE] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections
In this case, the tarpaulin was NOT paid for by any candidate
or political party. There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin as part of their ADVOCACY against the RH
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and
donation of space and time for political advertisements,
limiting political advertisements to COMELEC-designated
space and time. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the
case does not apply as most of the petitioners [in National
Press Club] were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in
this case.
Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section
11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, only refers to a particular
television. In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to
give a COMMENTARY on the candidates for the 2013
letter. It was not merely a regulation on the campaigns of
candidates vying for public office.
We distinguish between political and commercial speech.
Political speech refers to speech "both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue," "foster[ing] informed and civic minded deliberation."
On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction." The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, DEFINITELY POLITICAL SPEECH.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group. It is clear
that the prohibition under the law excludes personal
opinions (ONLY SPONSORED MESSAGES ARE COVERED).
This Court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of
expression has always been wary of censorship or
subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the
speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech. This is
especially true when the expression involved has POLITICAL
consequences.
Abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of
expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real
context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract
compromises liberties.
So basically, if may advocacy aspect (political speech), gov’t
CANNOT REGULATE. But if the expression is made for
purposes of ENDORSEMENT ONLY, regulation is permissible.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Re: Prior Restraint/Censorship
GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205357, September 2, 2014
 covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
Thus, expenditure limitations represent substantial, rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and
diversity of political speech.
The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute
a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government.
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Freedom of speech includes freedom after speech. Without this
assurance, citizens would hesitate to speak for fear that they
GDU 2021
might be provoking the vengeance of the officials they criticized
(chilling effect).
Exceptions
[LEONEN CASE] Harry Roque v. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No.
214986, February 15, 2017
General Rule: Trials are public.
Exception: Disbarment cases are confidential.
Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as
the confidentiality rule.
Exception to the exception: PUBLIC INTEREST
The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is NOT
absolute. It is not to be applied under any circumstance, to
all disclosures of any nature.
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest
should not be restricted. Accordingly, matters of public
interest should not be censured for the sake of an
unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality rule.
The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings
against attorneys" be kept private and confidential. It is the
proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and
confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution
of actual disbarment complaints to the press (as in Fortun v.
Quinsayas). However, the rule does not extend so far that it
actions.
Some cases are more public than others, because of the
subject matter, or the personalities involved. A lawyer (Harry
Roque) who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes,
if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to be totally
sheltered from public interest, himself. LOL.
This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right
to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for
the proper administration of justice. However, the power of
contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of
expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling
comment on public matters. Freedom of expression must
always be protected to the fullest extent possible.
b. Content based and content neutral

CONTENT-BASED CONTENT-NEUTRAL
Object of restraint
The content: The message or Incidents of speech: the
idea of the expression. time, manner, place of the
expression in public places,
not the content.
Test
a. Clear and present danger O’Brien Test
test: There must be a clear

and present danger of a Only a substantial
substantive evil that the governmental interest is
State has a right to prevent required for its validity.
[Reyes v. Bagatsing, supra].
Intermediate approach:
b. Balancing of interests Somewhere between the
mere rationality that is
c. Dangerous Tendency required of any other law
and the compelling interest
d. Direct Incitement standard applied to content-
based restrictions [Chavez v.
Gonzales].
When does content-based analysis apply?
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. A
content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger
rule.
The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither
overbroad nor vague. Under this rule, "the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high [Diocese of
Bacolod vs Comelec (2015)].
When does content-neutral analysis apply? What are the
requirements under the O’Brien test?
Content-neutral analysis applies to regulations that are merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required
for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed
to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate
approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is
required of any other law and the compelling interest standard
applied to content-based restrictions [Chavez v. Gonzales
(2008)].
[LEONEN CASE] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, July 5, 2016
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of
expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
CONTENT-BASED REGULATION
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure. It will pass constitutional muster
only if justified by a compelling state interest, AND the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
GDU 2021
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’"
Here. there is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulins to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
"based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech." In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely
on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.
"When the speech restraints take the form of a content-
neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest
is required for its validity," and it is subject only to the
intermediate approach. Here, even if we apply the test for
content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of
COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for
evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.
Intermediate Approach (O’Brien test)
A content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently
justified:
1. If it is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
2. If it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. If if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. If the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech
& expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers
of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed
earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-
candidates.
On the second requirement, not only must the governmental
interest be important or substantial, it must also be
compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include
constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for
example, that "the welfare of children and the State’s
mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,
constitute a substantial and compelling government interest
in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast."

In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and
equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the
tension in a way that protects the right of participation.
Speech with political consequences, as in this case, should
be encouraged and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed out,
the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing
election spending considering there is no limit on the
number of tarpaulins that may be posted
The third requisite is likewise lacking. The size regulation is
not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the
maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression.
SIZE MATTERS!
The form of expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger
tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its
messages from greater distances.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the
importance of the message to the reader. From an ordinary
person’s perspective, those who post their messages in
larger fonts care more about their message than those who
carry their messages in smaller media.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces,
therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify,
explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to
communicate.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate,
not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are NOT analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected
under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, such
regulation on the size of tarpaulins (carrying a political
message) is deemed CONTENT-BASED.
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE!!!
c. Incitement and advocacy
 Loida Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
Distinguish between incitement and advocacy.
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action [Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)].
GDU 2021
Direct Incitement Test
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present
administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as
subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a
subversive organization [Salonga v. Cruz Paño, G.R. No. L-
59524 (1985)].
d. Specificity of regulation and overbreadth doctrine
What is a facial challenge and is it permissible in Article III,
Section 4 cases?
General Rule: As-applied challenge
A party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied
to him, it is unconstitutional. [Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552 (2010)].
Exception: Facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect'
upon speech protected under Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
Exception to the exception: Facial challenges do NOT apply to
criminal statutes
A facial challenge generally does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech
[Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan (2004)].
Exception to the exception to the exception (lol): The criminal
statute restricts free speech.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech,
a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine
is acceptable. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his
dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must
view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount
‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."
[Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 2014]
223705, August 14, 2019
A facial challenge of a law or statute encroaching upon the
freedom of speech on the ground of overbreadth or
vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental
purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.

Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly
restricts even constitutionally-protected rights.
On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that persons of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.
It is noteworthy, however, that facial invalidation of laws is
generally disfavored as it results to entirely striking down the
challenged law or statute on the ground that they may be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It disregards the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution in judicial
review, and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts, deviating,
thus, from the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication. Hence, an on-its-face invalidation of the law
has consistently been considered as a "manifestly strong
medicine" to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort."
The allowance of a review of a law or statute on its face in
free speech cases is justified, however, by the aim to avert
the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged.
e. Speech regulation in relation to election
 considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
With respect to speech in the context of elections, the
regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content.
For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made
with or on private property.
[LEONEN CASE] Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, July 5, 2016
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place,
and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation
may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its
content.
General Rule: NO regulation! Viewpoint neutrality
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of
the speaker and the content of his or her expression. This
view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public
officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or
message content. This should still be the principal approach.
Exception: Pwede content-neutral sometimes
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding
equality in opportunity must provide limits to some
expression during electoral campaigns. Thus clearly,
regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns
made by CANDIDATES or the members of their political
parties or their POLITICAL PARTIES may be regulated as to
GDU 2021
time, place, and manner.
Any regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are NOT candidates or
who do NOT speak as members of a political party which
are, taken as a whole, principally ADVOCACIES of a social
issue that the public must consider during elections is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Such regulation is inconsistent with
the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of
opinions coming from the electorate including those that can
catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the
criteria for the choice of a candidate.
BUT!!!!!!!!!! Regulation of election paraphernalia will STILL be
constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has
for its principal object the ENDORSEMENT of a candidate
ONLY.
To be constitutionally valid, the [content-neutral] regulation:
1. Should be provided by law,
2. Reasonable,
3. Narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing
the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and
expression, and
4. Demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place,
and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation
may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its
content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the
speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons.
As discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of
petitioners consists of a SOCIAL ADVOCACY.
f. Speech regulation in relation to media
CONST., Article XVI, Section 11. (1) xxx The advertising industry
is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law
for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the
general welfare. xxx
Four Aspects of Freedom of the Press
1. Freedom from prior restraint; 

2. Freedom from punishment subsequent to 
publication; 

3. Freedom of access to information; and 

4. Freedom of circulation [Chavez v. 
Gonzales, 2008] 


Freedom of the press =/= freedom of broadcast media
Freedom of broadcast media is lesser than that of the press
because of its pervasive presence in the lives of people and
because of their accessibility to children.
While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film,
television, and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser than the
freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media
[Chavez v. Gonzales].
But all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to
be the clear and present danger test [Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, Jr.].
[LEONEN] Re: News report of Mr. Jomar Canlas (LOL) in the
Manila Times issue of 8 March 2016, A.M. No. 16-03- 10-SC,
October 15, 2019
The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan: [F]reedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
In Re: Emil Jurado: [F]alse reports about a public official or
other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal
right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the
most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the
publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and
unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.
The Court is not immune from criticisms, and it is the duty of
the press to expose all government agencies and officials
and to hold them responsible for their actions. However, the
press cannot just throw accusations without verifying the
truthfulness of their reports. The perfunctory apology of
Canlas does not detract from the fact that the article, directly
or indirectly, tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
3. Judicial analysis, presumptions and levels and
types of scrutiny
 neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest
State the clear and present danger test.
The clear and present danger test states that speech may be
restrained in instances where there is substantial danger that
such will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to
prevent. The danger created must not only be clear (a
connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from
GDU 2021
the utterance questioned) and present (not only probable but
imminent, immediate and likely inevitable) but also traceable to
the ideas expressed [Chavez v. Gonzales (2008), citing
Cabansag v. Fernandez (1957) and Gonzales v. COMELEC
(1969)].
Note: This test has been adopted by SC and is the test most
applied to cases re: freedom of expression.
State the dangerous tendency test.
Under this test, the question is whether the words will create a
dangerous tendency that the state has a right to prevent. It
looks at the probability that a substantive evil will result, and it
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness be advocated [Cabansag v Fernandez
(1957)].
State the balancing of interest test as it applies to cases
involving Article III, Section 4.
The balancing of interest test is employed when a particular
conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional and partial
abridgment of speech. The courts determine which of the
conflicting social values and individual interests (not including
national security crimes) demand greater protection [Chavez vs.
Gonzales (2018)].
Loida Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
223705, August 14, 2019
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by
either or a combination of the following theoretical tests, to
wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which were used
in early Philippine case laws; (b) the clear and present danger
rule, which was generally adhered to in more recent cases;
and (c) the balancing of interests test, which was also
recognized in our jurisprudence.
IF CONTENT-BASED
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive
impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
IF CONTENT-NEUTRAL
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-
is required for its validity.
The intermediate approach (O’Brien Test) has been
formulated in this manner: “A governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is

unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech &
expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.”
30-DAY RESTRICTION FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IS A
CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION
The restraint, however, partakes of a content-neutral
regulation as it merely involves a regulation of the incidents
of the expression, specifically the time and place to exercise
the same. It does not, in any manner, affect or target the
actual content of the message.
APPLYING O’BRIEN TEST
Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure
the same against the intermediate test, viz.: (1) the regulation
is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) such governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of the free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no
greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest.
Here, there is a failure to meet the fourth requirement. In
the judicial review of laws or statutes, especially those that
impose a restriction on the exercise of protected expression,
it is important that we look not only at the legislative intent
or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at the
effects of such restriction when implemented. The restriction
must not be broad and should only be narrowly-tailored to
achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow
alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the challenged provision's sweeping and
absolute prohibition against all forms of expression
considered as partisan political activities without any
qualification is more than what is essential to the furtherance
of the contemplated governmental interest. On its face, the
challenged law provides for an absolute and substantial
suppression of speech as it leaves no ample alternative
means for one to freely exercise his or her fundamental right
to participate in partisan political activities.
J. Leonen: I concur in the result. Nonetheless, I maintain that
the provisions in question should be stricken down as they are
forms of prior restraint and content-based illicit prohibition on
the exercise of the primordial right to freedom of expression.
4. Special topics in free expression cases
a. Hate speech
Note: This concept is not defined in domestic law.
GDU 2021
In Chavez v. Gonzales, the Court seemed to have likened hate
speech to profane language, to wit: “[S]ince profane language
or ‘hate speech’ against a religious minority is not subject to
subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression
cannot be subject to prior restraint.”
Nevertheless, it is arguable that “hate speech” is not protected
speech. In Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the Court
recognized that [t]he right to freedom of expression is not
absolute [and that] some forms of speech are still subject to
some restrictions.
See: ICCPR, Article 20, which mandates State Parties to prohibit
by law “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
The Philippines ratified the ICCPR on 23 October 1986.
b. Defamation and libel 

Libel is not constitutionally protected speech. The government
has an obligation to protect individuals from defamation [Disini
v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 (2014)].
False reports against public officers are not shielded from
sanction by the right to free speech. Free speech has never
countenanced the publication of falsehoods, especially the
persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies [In Re:
Jurado].
GR: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious
[Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110088, February 1,
1995].
XPNs: This presumption of malice does not exist in the
following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another
in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of a confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions [Art. 353, Revised Penal
Code]
Group Libel
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be [Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-
63559 (1986)].
As the size of these groups increases, the chances for members
of such groups to recover damages for tortious libel become

elusive. This principle is said to embrace two important public
policies:
1. Where the group referred to is large, the courts presume
that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so
literally applying to each individual member; and 
 What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for
2. The limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard
freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press,
effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting
fundamental interests involved in libel cases [MVRS v.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306
(2003)]. 
 cannot be considered protected speech if the audience, about
c. Sedition and speech and relation to rebellion
Freedom of Expression and National Security

When a fictitious suicide photo and letter were published in
newspapers of general circulation expressing disappointment
in the Roxas administration and instructing a fictitious wife to
teach their children to burn photos of the President, the SC held
that such act constitutes inciting to sedition. Inciting to sedition
is an act that suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots
and tends to turn the people against the constituted authorities,
or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek
to silence the writer, which is the sum and substance of the
offense under consideration [Espuelas v. People, G.R. No. L-
2990 (1951)].
Heckler’s Veto
Heckler’s veto is an attempt to limit unpopular speech. This
occurs when an acting party’s right to freedom of speech is
curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a
reacting party’s behavior.
Under the free speech clause, the government may not silence
speech based on the reaction (or anticipated reaction) of a
hostile audience, unless there is a clear and present danger of
grave and imminent harm, which is not easy to prove.
d. Obscenity/pornography
Obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and
should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s
sound discretion
These are the various tests of obscenity:
Miller Test in Miller v. California (1973):
A work is obscene if:
1. the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to prurient interest;
2. the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
3. the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. No one will be subject to
GDU 2021
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
hardcore sexual conduct.
judicial determination and should be treated on a case-to-case
basis, and on the judge’s sound discretion [Fernando v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006].
A dance portraying the life of a widow who lost her husband
a hundred customers, was howling and shouting, “sige muna,
sige nakakalibog” (go ahead, go ahead, it is erotic), during the
performance [People v. Aparici].
e. Commercial speech 

What are considered commercial speech and are these
protected under Article III. Section 4?
Commercial speech is defined as “speech that proposes an
economic transaction” and it is not accorded the same level of
protection as those guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution. This definition was provided by Chief Justice Puno
in his concurring and separate opinion in Pharmaceutical and
Healthcare Association v Duque (2007).
In Dioces v. Bacolod v. COMELEC, the Court defined
commercial speech as one that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction." In contrast, political speech is one
both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some political issue. Commercial speech is
entitled to less protection than political speech.
Test for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech
regulations:
1. Speech must concern lawful activity and must not be false,
misleading, or proposing an illegal activity;
2. Government interest sought to be served by regulation
must be substantial;
3. The regulation must advance government interest; and
4. The regulation must not be overbroad
f. National emergencies 

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Re: Freedom of Speech and Assembly
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot
be proscribed. If the persons assembling have committed
crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be
prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws.
But it is a different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public
discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

Re: Freedom of the Press
Closure of media establishments is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end
and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give
the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without
unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal
balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency,
governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from
normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly
restrain our people’s liberty.
g. Speech of public officers 

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the members of Congress
the freedom of expression without fear of being held
responsible in criminal or civil actions before courts or fora
outside of Congress, but this does not protect them from being
held responsible by the legislative body. The members may
nevertheless be questioned in Congress itself.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have
been or could be censured, committed to prison, or even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues [Osmeña v. Pendatun,
G.R. No. L-17144 (1960)].
A libelous letter of a congressman, published in a newspaper,
does not fall under “speech or debate” protected by the
Constitution. Speech or debate refers to speeches, statements,
or votes made within Congress while it is in session, or duly
authorized actions of congressmen in the discharge of their
duties [Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905 (1966)].
5. Cognate rights
a. Freedom of assembly 
 rallyists who are able to show the police an application duly filed
CONST., Article III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
State the scope of freedom of assembly.
The right to peacefully assemble is one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Freedom of assembly
connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. Absent any clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent, the right to peaceable assembly in public
places like streets and parks cannot be denied [Reyes v.
Bagatsing, (1983)].
GDU 2021
Absent any clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent, the right to peaceable assembly
in public places like streets and parks cannot be denied [Reyes
v. Bagatsing].
City or town mayors are not conferred the power to refuse to
grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing the permit to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade may pass or the meeting may be held [Primicias v.
Fugoso, (1948)].
Government employees
Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work [GSIS v.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagagawa sa GSIS (2006)].
The suspension of public school teachers who staged a strike is
valid. The teachers are not being penalized for their exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly, but because of their successive,
unauthorized, and unilateral absences which produced adverse
effects on their students [Balingasan v. Court of Appeals].
Student rallies and demonstrations
Students do not shed their constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly at the school gate. While the Court upholds the
academic freedom of educational institutions, it must be
underscored that this right cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those who exercise their constitutional rights to
peaceful assembly and free speech [Non v. Dames].
Define maximum tolerance.
Maximum tolerance is the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall
observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same
[Sec. 3 (c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880].
As a necessary consequence and a part of maximum tolerance,
on a given date can, after two (2) days from said date, rally in
accordance with their application without the need to show a
permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the
law. It will be the burden of the authorities to show that there
has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may
be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum
tolerance provided by the law [Bayan v. Ermita].
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of

the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus, if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.
Note: B.P. 880 basically codified the ruling in Reyes v.
Bagatsing [Bayan v. Ermita].
b. Freedom of association 
 Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192, June
CONST., Article III, Section 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
How should the limitation “for purposes not contrary to law”
be interpreted?
Unless an association or society could be shown to create an
imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for
abridging the right to form associations.
The government must comply with the heavy burden of
showing that the organization in fact presents a clear and
present danger of substantive evil which the State has the right
to protect [BERNAS].
Every group has a right to join the democratic process,
association itself being an act of expression of the member’s
belief, even if the group offends the sensibilities of the majority.
Any restriction to such requires a compelling state interest to
be proven by the State [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 190582 (2010)].
A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks
to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection
of the freedom of association guarantee [Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party v. COMELEC, supra].
Freedom not to associate
Freedom of association presupposes freedom not to associate
[Roberts v. United States Jaycees].
Government actions that unconstitutionally burden that right
may take many forms, one of which is intrusion into a group’s
internal affairs by forcing it to accept a member it does not
desire. Such forced membership is unconstitutional if the
person’s presence affects in a significant way the group’s ability
GDU 2021
to advocate public or private viewpoints [Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)].
Government employees
CONST., Article IX-B, Section 2. (5) The right to self- organization
shall not be denied to government employees.
Government employees’ right to association and the right to
unionize do not include the right to conduct strikes, walkouts,
and other temporary work stoppages [SSS Employees
Association v. CA, G.R. No. 85279 (1989); Manila Public School
Teachers Assoc. v. Laguio Jr., G.R. No. 95445 (1991)].
16, 2015

In GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case), it was ruled that the acts of
GSIS employees wearing similarly colored shirts while
attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office, with
clenching of fists and orating against the then President
Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited activity
but were only an exercise of their constitutional freedom of
expression. In the GSIS case, CSC found that the acts of
respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts
to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted
activity or mass action proscribed above.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service
of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
REQUIREMENT OF REGISTRATION; WHEN VALID
[LEONEN CASE] Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v.
Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary
of Labor: The registration is not a limitation to the right of
assembly or association, which may be exercised with or
without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine
qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations or unions and the possession of
the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these
rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are
mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the
public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as
organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union
they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the POLICE POWER, because the activities in
which labor organizations, associations and union of workers
are engaged affect public interest, which should be
protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial
statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a
certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the
benefit of the members of the organization, considering that

the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as
oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts
of money due to them or to the organization.
The right to organize does not equate to the state’s
obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence. It is one thing for
individuals to galvanize themselves as a collective, but it is
another for the group that they formed to not only be
formally recognized by the state, but also bedecked with all
the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official
status. In pursuit of public interest, the state can set
reasonable regulations—procedural, formal, and
substantive—with which organizations seeking state
imprimatur must comply.
c. Freedom of information
 public interest or public concern is left to the proper
Right to access information
CONST., Article III, Section 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern [Art. III, Sec.
7, Art. III] 

1. Covers matters of public concern. “Public concern” has no
exact definition and is adjudicated by the courts on a case-
by-case basis, but examples abound in jurisprudence (e.g.
board exams, PCGG compromise agreements, peace
negotiations, civil service matters)
2. Requires demand or request required to gain access.
3. Pertains to duty to permit access to information on matters
of public concern. 

Policy of Full Public Disclosure
CONST., Article II, Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
1. Covers all transactions involving public interest, including
any matter contained in official communications and public
documents of the government agency. 
 Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
2. Does NOT require demand 
 proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
3. Pertains to duty to disclose of the 
government, pursuant
to the policy of full public disclosure. 
 information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,
What is meant by the principle that the right to information is
a public right?
It means any citizen is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the right. When a
GDU 2021
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
"public" which possesses the right.
Note: "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly
construed, it embraces every person.
What are considered matters of public interest pursuant to
Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution?
There is no rigid test to determine whether a particular
information is of public concern or public interest. These terms
cover “a wide-range of issues that the public may want to be
familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on
them or because the issues ‘naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen.’” Whether or not the information sought is of
determination of the courts on a case to case basis [Sereno v.
Committee on Trade and Related Matters (2016)].
The following were considered as matters of public concern in
jurisprudence: loanable funds of GSIS [Valmonte v. Belmonte
(1989)]; civil service eligibility of sanitarian employees [Legaspi
v. CSC (1987)]; appointments made to public offices and the
utilization of public property [Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No.
140835 (2000)]; national board examinations such as the CPA
Board Exams [Antolin v. Domondon (2010)]; names of nominees
of partylists [Bantay REpublic v. COMELEC (2007)]; and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction
[Chavez v. PEA and Amari (2002)].
What are the recognized limitations to the right to information?
The right to information may be limited based on the kinds of
information sought. Those exempted from the ambit of such
Constitutional right are:
1. Privileged information rooted in the separation of powers
2. Information pertaining to military and diplomatic secrets
3. Information affecting national and economic security
4. Information on investigations of crimes by law enforcers
before prosecution [Chavez v. PEA and Amari (2002)]
5. Other confidential matters
6. Trade secrets and banking transactions [Chavez v. PCGG
(1998)]
7. Offers exchanged during diplomatic negotiations
[Akbayan v. Aquino (2008)]
IDEALS v. PSALM
committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. HOWEVER, once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition"
on the part of the government. From this moment, the public’s
right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the

non-proprietary information leading to such definite
proposition.
Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under
the Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know
requires a demand or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular agency.
Sereno v. CTRM, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open
every door to any and all information, but is rather confined
to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
The issue is whether the CTRM may be compelled by
mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the
minutes of the meeting based on the constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern and the State's
policy of full public disclosure.
Two requisites must concur before the right to information
may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the
information sought must be in relation to matters of public
concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be
exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
FIRST REQUISITE: MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining
whether or not a particular information is of public concern
or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues
that the public may want to be familiar with either because
the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues
"naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."
SECOND REQUISITE: NOT EXCLUDED BY LAW
The second requisite is that the information requested must
not be excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee. In
that regard, the Court has already declared that the
constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information
does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and
criminal matters.
Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional
guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door
Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
THAT SAID, every claim of exemption, being a limitation on
a right constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally
construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim
of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause
for exemption from the obligation to disclose information
GDU 2021
must be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the
exemption.
BURDEN IS ON THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE
EXEMPTION
In case of denial of access to the information, it is the
government agency concerned that has the burden of
showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a
matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from
the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.
Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, April 5, 2016
The presidential and vice-presidential debates are held
primarily for the benefit of the electorate to assist the
electorate in making informed choices on election day.
Through the conduct of the national debates among
presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the electorate
will have the "opportunity to be informed of the candidates'
qualifications and track record, platforms and programs, and
their answers to significant issues of national concern." The
political nature of the national debates and the public's
interest in the wide availability of the information for the
voters' education certainly justify allowing the debates to be
shown or streamed in other websites for wider
dissemination, in accordance with the MOA.
RIGHTS DURING EXPROPRIATION
CONST., Article III, Section 9. Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.
See: II. Basic Concepts, G. Fundamental Powers of the State, 2.
Eminent Domain
Distinguish between compensable taking and regulatory
taking
Compensable taking, also known as eminent domain, the
inherent power of the State to take, or to authorize the taking
of, private property for a public use without the owner's
consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation
[Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. CA (2007)].
Regulatory taking is the State’s exercise of its police power.
Unlike in eminent domain, just compensation need not be paid
in cases of regulatory taking.
Two phases of expropriation
Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, there are two phases of
expropriation:
(a) the condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or
public use; and (b) the determination of just compensation to
be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners
[Republic v. Mupas].

QUESTION: Madlangbayan is the owner of a 500 square meter
lot which was the birthplace of the founder of a religious sect
who admittedly played an important role in Philippine history
and culture. The National Historical Commission (NHC) passed
a resolution declaring it a national landmark and on its
recommendation the lot was subjected to expropriation
proceedings. This was opposed by Madlangbayan on the
following grounds: (a) that the lot Is not a vast tract; (b) that
those to be benefited by the expropriation would only be the
members of the religious sect of its founder, and (c) that the
NHC has not initiated the expropriation of birthplaces of other
more deserving historical personalities. Resolve the opposition
raised by Madlangbayan.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Madlangbayan’s opposition is bereft of
merit. In Manosca v. CA (1996), the Court held that the power
of eminent domain is not confined only to the expropriation of
vast tracts of land. Furthermore, the Court has held that “public
use” should not be restricted to its traditional definition but
must also include public welfare. In this case, there is a public
welfare involved as the purpose is in recognizing the important
role of the founder in Philippine history and culture. The non-
initiation of expropriation of other historical personalities must
also fail, as it is at the discretion of the expropriating authority.
As held in JM Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration (1970),
there is no requirement to the adherence to the policy of “all or
none.”
1. Just compensation

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, and ample. Such "just"-ness of the
compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual
data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property.
The determination of just compensation is inherently judicial is
nature. Trial courts are required to be more circumspect in its
evaluation of just compensation due the property owner,
considering that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure
of public funds.
Note: Full payment of just compensation is not a prerequisite
for the Government’s effective taking of the property; When the
taking of the property precedes the payment of just
compensation, the Government shall indemnify the property
owner by way of interest [Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892
(2015)].
GDU 2021
WHEN IS THERE TAKING?
General Rule:
Republic of the Philippines v. Castillo, G.R. No. 190453,
February 26, 2020

Re: FMV “at the time of taking”; when was the property
“taken” – upon physical dispossession or upon filing of
original complaint for expropriation?
The Court ruled that the computation of just compensation
should be reckoned from the time of the filing of the original
complaint for expropriation. There is no actual taking prior
to the filing of the complaint. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, the Court ruled that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be substantial, full, ample
and, as must apply to this case, real. This must be taken to
mean, among others, that the value as of the time of taking
should be the price to be paid the property owner.
Exception: While generally, just compensation is determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, where actual
taking was made WITHOUT the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the
possession of the property prior to the filing
of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled
that it is the value of the property at the time of actual taking
that is controlling for purposes of compensation. Interest at
legal rate may be imposed until payment is made.
In such cases, there is taking when the following requisites
are present:
(1) The expropriator must enter private property;
(2) The entrance into private property must be for more
than a temporary period;
(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of authority;
(4) The property must be devoted to public use; and
(5) The utilization of the property ousts the owner and
deprives him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v.
Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015

Here, the government took control and possession of the
subject properties for public use without initiating
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation; while the landowners failed for a long period
of time to question such government act and later instituted
actions for recovery of possession with damages. In similar
cases, the Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market
value of the property at the time of actual taking is
controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may
appear inequitable to respondents-movants as they would
be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long
period, it should be noted that the purpose of just

compensation is not to reward the owner for the property
taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such,
the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of
cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the
loss resulted. Compensation must also be just to the public,
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
PAYMENT OF INTEREST
If property is taken for public use BEFORE compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,
the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court.
DAMAGES FOR ILLEGAL TAKING
In taking respondents' property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter
disregard of respondents' proprietary rights. Such conduct
cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal
taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for
damages to respondents.
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation
in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this
case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land
at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment.
Republic of the Philippines v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 227215,
January 10, 2018
 simple [Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport,
It is settled that the delay in the payment of just
compensation amounts to an effective forbearance of
money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference
in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the
court and the initial payment made by the government.
It bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the
date of the filing of the complaint but from the date of the
issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is
from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property
can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of
legal interest should begin from this date.
Effect of Delay; Remedy for Non-Payment
GR: For non-payment, the remedy is the demand of payment
of the fair market value of the property and not the recovery of
possession of the expropriated lots [Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587 (2002); Reyes v. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, (2003)].
XPN: When the government fails to pay just compensation
within five years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property [Republic v.
Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656 (2005)].
GDU 2021
Republic of the Philippines v. Juliana San Miguel Vda. De
Ramos, G.R. No. 211576, February 19, 2020
RE: CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
The general rule is that the just compensation to which the
owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. Market value is that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be paid
by the buyer and received by the seller. The general rule,
however, is modified where only a part of a certain property
is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also
entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property.
Nevertheless, consequential damages are only awarded if as
a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the
owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. The
sheer fact that there is a remaining portion of real property
after thee expropriation is not enough, by and of itself, to be
basis for the award of consequential damages. To be sure, it
must still be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining
portion suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
2. Abandonment of intended use and right of
repurchase
If the expropriator (government) does not use the property for
a public purpose, the property reverts to the owner in fee
G.R. No. 156273 (2005)].
In MCIAA v. Tudtud (2008), the Supreme Court held that the
expropriator has the obligation to reconvey property
expropriated but never used, on the condition that the
landowners would return the just compensation they received,
plus interest.
3. Expropriation by local government units
City of Manila v. Prieto, G.R. No. 221366, July 8, 2019
Several requisites must concur before a local government
unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit:
a. an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property;
b. the power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, OR for the benefit of the poor
and the landless;
c. there is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws; and

d. a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was NOT accepted.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
CONST., Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Who may invoke
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and
seizures is a personal right, invokable only by those whose rights
have been infringed. It protects all persons, including aliens
[Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L- 10280
(1963)].
Against whom invoked
Against the State; the right cannot be invoked against a private
individual.
[LEONEN CASE] Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz v.
Ochoa
RELEVANT TO CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
In the recent case of Saluday v. People, this Court interpreted
the text of Article III, Section 2 such that it only operates
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures; thus, when
the search is "reasonable," the requirement of a search
warrant under this provision does not apply.
What constitutes a "reasonable search" depends on
whether a person has an "expectation of privacy, which
society regards as reasonable[.]" The presence of this
expectation of privacy and society's perception of it as
reasonable render the State's intrusion a "search" within the
meaning of Article III, Section 2, and which intrusion thus
requires a search warrant.
A reduced expectation of privacy is the reason why the
inspection of persons and their effects under routine
inspections, such as those done in airports, seaports, bus
terminals, malls, and similar public places, does not require
a search warrant. These routine inspections are considered
reasonable searches, clearly done to ensure public safety.
Warrantless searches presumed unreasonable.
A reasonable search, however, is different from a
warrantless search. While a reasonable search arises from a
reduced expectation of privacy, a warrantless search, which
GDU 2021
is presumed unreasonable, dispenses with a search warrant
for practical reasons. This is why a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented
search, and extensive search of moving private vehicle do
not require a search warrant.
There is a legitimate, almost absolute, expectation of
privacy in one's residence.
In requiring a waiver in the pro forma Individual Application
for New Firearm Registration, the Philippine National Police
appears to recognize the inviolability of the home.
Nevertheless, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation
for Inspection does not result in a true and valid consented
search.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10591 provides that applicants
for Types 3 to 5 licenses "must comply with the inspection .
. . requirements." However, the law is silent as to the scope,
frequency, and execution of the inspection. This means that
the Chief of the Philippine National Police is presumed to fill
in these details in the Implementing Rules and Regulations.
However, even the Implementing Rules is completely silent
as to the parameters of the inspection. This renders
applicants for firearms licenses incapable of intelligently
waiving their right to the unreasonable search of their
homes.
True, the standard of reasonableness can be found in the law
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. However,
"reasonable" as a standard for inspection is not enough. For
the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches to be
valid, the provision allowing for the inspection must be as
INFORMATIVE AS TO DETAIL ITS SCOPE AND EXTENT.
World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 203335,
January 13, 2014
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified
privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and
informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right
to informational privacy—that those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
seek to protect.
TWO ASPECTS OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over
a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his
or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable.

1. Requisites for a valid search warrant 
 in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
Rule 126, Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search
warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.
What may be the subject of a search warrant?
Rule 126, Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
What are the requirements for the valid issuance of a search
warrant?
Rule 126, Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. (3a)
The requisites of a valid search warrant are:
1. Existence of probable cause
2. Probable cause must be personally determined by the
Judge
3. After personal examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce,
testifying on matters based on their personal knowledge of
the facts
4. There must be sufficient particularity in the description of
the places to searched and the persons or things to be
seized
5. The warrant must refer to one specific offense
Nature of search warrant proceedings
It is in no sense a criminal action or the commencement of
criminal prosecution. It is not against any person, but is solely
for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It
is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, made
necessary because of public necessity [United Laboratories v.
Isip].
Personal determination
Rule 126, Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. —
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
GDU 2021
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The examination must be probing and exhaustive, and not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, or perfunctory [People v.
Delos Reyes (2004)]. If the judge solely relied on the certification
of the prosecutor, then he cannot be said to have personally
determined the existence of probable cause [Lim v. Felix
(1991)].
The evidence offered by the complainant and the witnesses
should be based on their own personal knowledge and not on
mere information or belief. Absent personal knowledge by
applicant or the witnesses, the warrant is deemed not based on
probable cause and is a nullity [Sony Music Entertainment v.
Judge Espanol].
Probable cause requirement in search warrant cases
In the case of Burgos v Chief of Staff (1984), probable cause for
a search warrant was defined as “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.”
Particularity of description; what is a general warrant and what
is(are) the reason(s) for the prohibition against its issuance?
A general warrant is a warrant that does not describe with
particularity the things which are subject of the search and
seizure. It may also pertain to a warrant issued where probable
cause has not been properly established. Such general warrants
are prohibited for running contrary to Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. They are void.
Notes: General descriptions will not invalidate the entire
warrant if other items have been particularly described [Uy v.
BIR, G.R. No. 129651 (2000)]. Thus, where a search warrant was
issued for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia, but
probably cause was found to exist only with respect to the
shabu, the warrant is not invalidated in its entirety; it is still valid
with respect to the shabu [People v. Salanguit]. In other words,
a search warrant is severable.
In drug cases, one search warrant may be validly issued for
several violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act [People v.
Dichoso].
Failure to specify detailed descriptions in the search warrant
does not automatically make it a general warrant. The
description need not be technically accurate or necessarily
precise. It is required to be specific only insofar as
circumstances allow. Thus, an “undetermined amount of
marijuana” was held to satisfy the particularity of description
[Kho v. Judge Makalintal].

Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with
reasonable effort to place intended, and distinguish it from
other places in the community. A designation that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the police officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
The test of whether the requirement of definiteness or
particularity has been met is whether the description of the
place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and
descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises
located within the surrounding area or community. A
“place” may refer to a single building or structure or a house
or residence. Although the house number was not indicated
in the warrant, the description of the place to be searched
was sufficient as the police officers who served the same
were able, with reasonable effort, to ascertain and identify
the house of the petitioner. Further the SKETCHES show the
petitioner’s house as well as the floor plan of her house.
The requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized
does not require technical accuracy in the description of the
property to be seized.
NOTE: The Court differentiated this case from previous
cases (which annulled the SW on the ground of failure to
indicate house number in the SW). This case is different
because in all the other cases, police officers were unbridled
discretion to conduct the search in SEVERAL structures
found inside one compound. What is involved in this case is
a SINGULAR structure containing multiple units therein. A
fact that the police officers found only after securing the SW.
Court noted it would be unreasonable for the police officers
to have known. In any case, “descriptive enough” naman
because of the sketches.
People v. Gabiosa, Sr., G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020
 search are reasonable related to the search’s objectives,
As early as 1937, the Court explained that ultimately, the
purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that
probable cause exists. Thus, there is NO need to examine
both the applicant and the witnesses if either one of them is
sufficient to establish probable cause. The purpose of both
in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more
than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant
OR complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with
that of other witnesses.
GDU 2021
2. Warrantless searches 

EXCEPTIONS TO SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
1. Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized
under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which
are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d. plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government; the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed
a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances;
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; and
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations
What are the requirements for a valid work-related intrusion
(work place search)?
An intrusion into the privacy of workplaces is valid if it conforms
to the standard of reasonableness. Both inception and scope of
intrusion must be reasonable.
1. Justified at inception: if there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct.
2. Scope of intrusion is reasonable: if measures used in the
and it is not highly intrusive [Pollo v. Constantino-David,
2011]
Note: Pollo involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The search was found
reasonable.
[Custom’s Search
The police are allowed to conduct warrantless searches on
behalf of the Department of Customs. They are authorized to
open and examine any box, trunk, or other containers where he
has reasonable cause to believe that such items were hidden
from customs search [Papa v. Mago]. Sec. 219 of the Customs
Modernization and Tariff Act states that no warrant is required
for police or authorized persons to pass, enter, search any land,

enclosure, building, warehouse, vessels, aircrafts, vehicles but
not dwelling.
Routine Security Checks in Airports
The Court held that the search and seizure of an illegal drug
during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the
aviation security procedures as a constitutionally reasonable
administrative search [People v O’Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071
(2018)].
Exigent and Emergency Circumstances 

The raid and seizure of firearms and ammunition at the height
of the 1989 coup d’état, was held valid, considering the exigent
and emergency situation. The military operatives had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed, and they had no opportunity to apply for a search
warrant from the courts because the latter were closed. Under
such urgency and exigency, a search warrant could be validly
dispensed with [People v. de Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10
(1994)]. 
 justify a warrantless arrest.
Inspection of buildings and other premises for purposes of
sanitation and building regulations
This is basically an exercise of the police power of the State, and
would not require a search warrant. However, it must be
conducted during reasonable hours.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST
Rule 126, Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
(12a)
Jesus Trinidad v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 239957,
February 18, 2019
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant
before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process
cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be affected with or without a warrant.
With respect to the latter, a warrantless arrest may be done
when, inter alia, the accused is caught in flagrante delicto,
such as in buy-bust operations in drugs cases. However, if
the existence of a valid buy-bust operation cannot be
proven, and thus, the validity of the in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest cannot be established, the arrest
becomes illegal and the consequent search incidental
thereto becomes unreasonable. Resultantly, all the evidence
seized by reason of the unlawful arrest is inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
GDU 2021
Marvin Porteria v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233777,
March 20, 2019
Assuming that there was a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may only search the arrestee and the area within which he
or she may reach for a weapon, or for evidence to destroy.
The arresting officer may also seize any money or property
used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee the means of escaping or committing
violence.
Marlon Dominguez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
235898. March 13, 2019
From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso
would not have been able to identify with reasonable
accuracy the contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts
of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his
hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Marlon Dominguez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
235898. March 13, 2019
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of
the police officers was legitimate as they were patrolling the
area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent,
it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was
clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence
of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To
the Court's mind, a very small plastic sachet is not readily
apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it
can be seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet
can contain just about anything. It could even be just that —
a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more.
STOP-AND-FRISK SEARCH
This refers to the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate, and pat him or her for weapons whenever
the former observes suspicious conduct which leads him or her
to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot [Manalili v. Court
of Appeals].

It must be emphasized that the search and seizure should
precede the arrest for the principle of stop and frisk to apply
[People v. Sy Chua].
[LEONEN CASE] People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30,
2014
 frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through
facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent
through a text message. The accused who never acted
suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the accused having
been fully apprised of his rights.
STOP-AND-FRISK =/= SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL
ARREST
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted
within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is
done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted
to prevent the occurrence of a crime. "Stop and frisk" search
should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection; and (2)
the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who
appeared drunk. This man was also "wearing a camouflage
uniform or a jungle suit." Upon seeing the police, the man
fled. His flight added to the suspicion. After stopping him,
the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm"
in his possession. This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first." In this case, the police
officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a
swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of
a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs..
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney.
There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
GDU 2021
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police
that Cogaed was "suspicious."
Probable cause NOT a requirement
in Stop-and-Frisk Searches
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
There should be "presence of more than one seemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all
will not result in a reasonable search.
[This case adopted Bersamin’s dissent in Esquillo]
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds
us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.
[LEONEN CASE] Larry Sabuco Manibog v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019
For a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not
enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined
by the police officer, to warrant a belief that the person
searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of
circumstances should result in a genuine reason to justify a
stop and frisk search.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
The test for the existence of reasonable suspicion that a
person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the
circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable,
prudent police officer. There should have been "more than
one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity "to
uphold the validity of a stop and frisk search.
Here, the combination of the police asset's tip and the
arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under
petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the
arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on
petitioner.

SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES; CHECKPOINTS;
CONSENTED SEARCH
[EN BANC] People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights
of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the
people. – J. Cagiuoa
Can the police conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a
vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an
anonymous informant? On this question, jurisprudence has
vacillated over the years. The Court definitively settles the
issue once and for all: IT’S A NO!
Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the
Instant Case
Generally: checkpoints are ok so long as routine check only
(non-intrusive). According to jurisprudence, "warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant
under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are
limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
Exception; when extensive search is permissible à There
must be PROBABLE CAUSE! An extensive search of a vehicle
is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and
not a specific person." In search of a moving vehicle, the
vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal
items.
Re: Checkpoints (routine check)
The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as
long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public
order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.
However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint
to be non-violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the
following:
1. where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;
2. where the officer simply looks into a vehicle;
3. where the officer flashes a light therein without opening
the car's doors;
4. where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;
GDU 2021
5. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and
6. where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
Simply, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes
beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates
probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.
Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant
does not engender Probable Cause on the part of the
Authorities that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search
of a Moving Vehicle
Does the mere reception of a text message from an
anonymous person suffice to create probable cause that
enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive
search without a search warrant? The answer is a resounding
no.
The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in
situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion."
In People v. Cogaed [Leonen ponencia], the Court stressed
that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid
warrantless search, "[i]t is the police officer who should
observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt
the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary
to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's
person and effects." The Court explained that "the police
officer, with his or her PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act,"
and not merely rely on the information passed on to him or
her.
Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's
Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People, the Court in
Cogaed stressed that reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search. The Court emphasized that the matching of
information transmitted by an informant "still remained only
as one circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid
search warrant."
In Verdidiano v. People, the Court, again through Associate
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, held that the accused
was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any
act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to

believe that he had drugs in his possession. x x x There was
no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer
anything suspicious."
The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act
solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A
tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."
In People v. Yanson (2019), another J. Leonen ponencia, the
Court held that, in determining whether there is probable
cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless
search of a moving vehicle, "bare suspicion is never enough.
While probable cause does not demand moral certainty, or
evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the
existence of 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.'"
In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its
own, furnished by informants cannot produce probable
cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on
information tipped by informants goes against the very
nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to
the existence of such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched."
Re: Reasonable search of a bus in transit
Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following
conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in
transit:
1. the manner of the search must be least intrusive;
2. the search must not be discriminatory;
3. as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to
ensuring public safety; and
4. the courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
planted against the accused.
Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now
holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive
reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender
probable cause that permits a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search — which
include both long-standing and the most recent
jurisprudence —should be the prevailing and controlling line
of jurisprudence.
WAS IT A CONSENTED SEARCH? NO.
GDU 2021
In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective
waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right
Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, the Court has held that "[t]he
fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the
presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver
of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be
presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search
does not amount to permission thereto."
Mere passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an
implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent
and that the presence of a coercive environment negates
the claim that the petitioner therein consented to the
warrantless search.
3. Exclusionary rule
CONST., Article III, Section 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
People v. Sapla, 2019
The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality
of the search and seizure conducted by the police in the
instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens
retrieved. According to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other
words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding."
4. Effects of unreasonable searches and seizures
Consequences of an unlawful search
An unlawful search will result in the exclusion from admission as
evidence of that which was obtained from such unlawful search
and seizure.

Further, an unlawful search and seizure may justify:
 1. Senate
a) The use of self-help in the form of resistance to such
unlawful search and seizure;
b) The criminal prosecution of the searching officer;
 twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the
c) Civil damages against such officer; and
d) Disciplinary action against the officer by his administrative
officers
III. COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT ORGANS
LEGISLATIVE
COMPOSITION
CONST., Article VI, Section 1. The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
CONST., Article VI, Section 16. (1)The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep
a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall,
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses
shall be sitting.
GDU 2021
CONST., Article VI, Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
The Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to
the termination of the business of the Senate during the
expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and
proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon
the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. [Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. 234608, July 3,
2018]. 

2. House of Representatives
CONST., Article VI, Section 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section

a. District representatives and questions of
apportionment
The power to apportion legislative districts is textually
committed to Congress by the Constitution. Thus, it cannot be
validly delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly [Sema v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597 (2008)].
Under the Constitution and the LGC, apportionment and
reapportionment do not require a plebiscite [Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970 (2008)].
Population requirement
250,000 minimum population requirement pertains to cities
only with respect to its initial legislative district. In other words,
while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city
to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
A province is entitled to at least one district irrespective of its
population [Aquino v. COMELEC].
A city that has attained 250,000 population is entitled to a
legislative district only in the “immediately following election”.
Thus, a city must attain 250,000 population, and thereafter, in
the immediately following election, such city shall have a district
representative [Aldaba v. COMELEC].
b. Party-list system
ATOM PAGLAUM PRINCIPLES
• Three different parties or organizations may participate in
the party-list system:
(1) National;
(2) Regional; or (3)
Sectoral;
• National and regional parties or orgs do NOT need to
organize along sectoral lines, or represent any
“marginalized or underrepresented” sector; 

• Political parties may participate in the party-list system
provided:
a. They register under the party-list
system; 
 Step 4: Round 1 – Allocate one (1) seat each for a party-list that
b. They do not field candidates in 
legislative district
elections.
c. BUT a party that participates in the 
legislative district
elections may still participate in the party-list through
a sectoral wing. 
 Two steps in Round 2 allocation: First, the percentage is
d. The sectoral wing can be part of the political party’s
coalition, but the former must be registered
independently in the party-list system.
• Sectoral parties or orgs may either be (a) “marginalized or
underrepresented” (e.g. labor, peasant, fisherfolk); or (b)
“lacking in well-defined political constituencies” (e.g.
professionals, women, elderly, youth).
• The nominees of sectoral parties or orgs, of either type,
must (a) belong to their respective sectors, or (b) have a
GDU 2021
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
Majority of the members of a sectoral party, of either type,
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
national and regional parties must be bona fide members.
• National, regional, or sectoral parties or orgs shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided they have at least 1 nominee who remains
qualified.
THE FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS [BANAT v. COMELEC]
1. 20% Allocation - 20% of the total number of the
membership of the House of Representatives is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list
organizations
2. 2% Threshold - Garnering 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
(1) seat.

3. Additional Seats - The additional seats, that is, the
remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats,
shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including
those that received less than two percent of the total votes.
This distribution will continue until all the seats have been
filled. 

4. 3-Seat Cap - The three-seat cap is constitutional. The 3-
Seat Cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any
party from dominating the party-list system. There is no
violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution
does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list
system [BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 (2009)].
COMPUTATION
Step 1: Compute total number of seats allocated for party-list
representatives
Step 2: Rank all party-list candidates from highest to lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered.

Step 3: Compute for each party-list candidate’s percentage of
votes garnered in relation to the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates.
garnered at least 2% of the total number of votes.

Step 5: Round 2 – Assign additional seats from the balance (i.e.
total number of party-list seats minus Round 1 allocations.
multiplied by the remaining available seats. The whole integer
of the product corresponds to the party’s share in the remaining
seats available (e.g. if a party garners 2.73% of the vote, assign
it two (2) more seats; if 1.80%, assign it one (1) more seat).
Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the parties net in
rank until all the available seats are completely distributed.

Step 6: Apply the 3-Seat Cap, if necessary [See BANAT v.
COMELEC].
THE FORMULA: Remaining # of Seats (after distributing one
seat to parties who met the 2% threshold) x (Total votes for
Partylist/Total Votes of Partylists) = Every Whole Integer is 1
additional seat. Apply 3-seat cap.
[J. LEONEN] Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. 192803, December 10,
2013
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes
made for party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of
the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions
before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases.
HOWEVER, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be
excluded if the electorate is notified of the finality of their
disqualification by the Commission on Elections.
QUESTION: Greenpeas is an ideology-based political party
fighting for environmental causes. It decided to participate
under the party-list system. When the election results came in,
it only obtained 1.99 percent of the votes cast under the party-
list system. Bluebean, a political observer, claimed that
Greenpeas is not entitled to any seat since it failed to obtain at
least 2% of the votes. Moreover, since it does not represent
any of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society, Greenpeas is not entitled to participate under the
party-list system. How valid are the observations of Bluebean?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The observations of Bluebean are not
valid.
The 2% threshold under the Party-List Law has been declared
unconstitutional with regard to its application to the allocation
of additional seats.
Participation in party-list election is not limited to marginalized
and underrepresented. Three different groups may participate
in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. Sectoral parties or organizations
may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector.
GDU 2021
CASAP v. COMELEC
A term-sharing agreement is contrary to public policy because
it subjects a constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public
elective office to contractual bargaining and negotiation, and
treats the same as though it were nothing more than a
contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the
commerce of men. To accept this defense will not only open
the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more
importantly it will render inutile Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which
prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the
available seats for a party-list group or organization.
Lico v. COMELEC
Is bona fide membership in the party-list group a continuing
qualification? YES.
A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona
fide member of the party or organization for at least 90 days
preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide
membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification.
We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or
of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.
POWERS
1. Legislative Powers
See: X. Process of Legislation
1. Power to Discipline Members
CONST., Article VI, Section 16. (3) Each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
2. Electoral Tribunals
CONST., Article VI, Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 207264 (2013)]
The Court held that an Electoral Tribunal acquires jurisdiction
only after (1) a petition is filed before it, and (2) a candidate is
already considered a member of the House.
To be considered a member, in turn, there must be a
concurrence of the following:
1. a valid proclamation;
2. a proper oath before the Speaker and in open session; and
3. assumption of office.
The Court in Ongsiako-Reyes clarified the doctrine that once a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is
already lost and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins only applies
in the context of a candidate who has not only been proclaimed
and sworn in, but has also assumed office.
3. Commission on Appointments
CONST., Article VI, Section 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members.
Section 19. …The Commission on Appointments shall meet
only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of
members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power
to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution. Although its membership is confined to
members of Congress, said Commission is independent of
Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Congress but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence,
it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the
Commissioner are purely executive in nature.
GDU 2021
4. Legislative Inquiries and oversight functions
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY
CONST., Article VI, Section 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Requisites of Legislative Inquiries:
1. Must be in aid of legislation; 

2. Is in accordance with duly published rules of procedure; 

3. Right of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries
shall be respected [Bengson v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, G.R. No. 89914 (1991)] 

QUESTION HOUR (=/= Legislative inquiry)
CONST., Article VI, Section 22. The heads of departments may
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker
of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When
the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
The requirement of securing prior consent of the President prior
to appearing before either House of Congress applies only to
Cabinet Members and not to other public officials and only
when either House of Congress conducts a Question Hour and
NOT in cases of inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter should
be untrammeled because it is co-extensive with the power to
legislate [Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777
(2006)].
[LEONEN CASE] Solicitor General Calida v. Senator Trillanes,
G.R. No. 240873, September 3, 2019
Despite the constitutional grant, the power of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation is NOT absolute. An
investigation in aid of legislation must comply with the rules
of procedure of each House of Congress, and must not
violate the individual rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, this Court explained further that
a legislative inquiry must prove to be in aid of legislation and
not for other purposes, pronouncing that "Congress is
neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency."

It bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress, i.e., legislation. Investigations conducted solely to
gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those
investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional
power to expose for the sake of exposure.
Additionally, legislative inquiry must respect the individual
rights of the persons invited to or affected by the legislative
inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of legislative
inquiry must be carefully balanced with the private rights of
those affected. A person's right against self-incrimination
and to due process cannot be swept aside in favor of the
purported public need of a legislative inquiry.
It must be stressed that persons invited to appear before a
legislative inquiry do so as resource persons and not as
accused in a criminal proceeding. Thus, they should be
accorded respect and courtesy since they were under no
compulsion to accept the invitation extended before them,
yet they did so anyway. Their accommodation of a request
should not in any way be repaid with insinuations.
The basic rules of decorum and decency must govern any
undertaking done in one's official capacity as an agent of the
State, in tacit recognition of one's role as a public servant.
However, the deportment and decorum of the members of
any constitutional organ, such as both Houses of Congress
during a legislative inquiry, are beyond the judicial realm. All
this Court can do is exercise its own power with care and
wisdom, acting in a manner befitting its dignified status as
public servant and never weaponizing shame under the guise
of a public hearing.
Arnault v. Nazareno
The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the
power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not
by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for
contempt any other person. But no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire.
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Macalintal v. COMELEC
It is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude
into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. Once a law is
enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function may
spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but
GDU 2021
certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of
the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend,
and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the
Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
5. Power to judge President’s physical fitness to
discharge the functions of the Presidency
CONST., Article VII, Section 11. Whenever the President
transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
6. Power of impeachment
CONST., Article XII, Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
 GDU 2021
8. Power to propose amendments to the
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Constitution [Art. VXII, Secs. 1 and 2]
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which
See: XII. Amendmend and Revision of the Constitution
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by 9. Concur in appointments of certain officials and
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the nomination made by the President in the event of
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with vacancy in the Office of the VP [Art. VII, Sec. 9]
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
CONST., Article VII, Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in
days from receipt thereof.
the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he
was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
among the Members of the Senate and the House of
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
Congress, voting separately.
recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment 10. Power to revoke or extend suspension of writ of
is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, habeas corpus and declaration martial law [Art.
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial VII, Sec. 18]
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

See: Executive Powers, infra

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
11. Power of the Senate to concur in treaties [Art. VII,
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all Sec. 21]
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of See: Executive Powers, infra
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
12. Power relative to natural resources [Art. XII, Sec.
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate. 2]

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further See: XI. Natural Resources
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted 13. Power to declare war or state of emergency
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.
CONST., Article VI, Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
of a state of war.

7. Concur in the grant of amnesty by the President
CONST., Article VII, Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the CONST., Article XII, Section 17. In times of national emergency,
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately

owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
See: Executive Powers, infra
EXECUTIVE
COMPOSITION
CONST., Article VII, Section 2. No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and
in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
POWERS
SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
Executive Power: This is the power to enforce and administer
laws. 

Power of Appointment: The Legislative can create office, but
only the Executive can fill it; Congress cannot circumvent this
by setting very narrow qualifications, such that only one person
is qualified to hold office [Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No.
104732(1993)]. 

Power of Control: The President may (a) nullify, modify
judgments of subordinates [See Sec. 17, Art. VII]; (b) undo or
redo actions of subordinates; and (c) lay down rules for the
performance of subordinates’ duties. 

Power of Supervision: This refers to the oversight function [over
LGUs]. The Executive must see to it that rules, which it did not
make, are followed. 
 budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s
Commander-in-Chief Powers [Sec. 18, Art. VII]: 
 purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be
• Call Out Power: Armed forces to suppress lawless violence;
• Suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus:
Only (a) in times of rebellion or invasion; AND (b) when
required by public safety 
 the money had been already set apart from the public treasury
• Martial law: Only (a) in times of rebellion or invasion; AND
(b) when required by public safety; Does not suspend the
Constitution 
 Art. VI of the Constitution.
GDU 2021
Power of Legislation
• Veto Power 

• Power to Declare State of Emergency (only); exercise of
emergency power vested in Congress, but may be
delegated by it to the President 

• Integrative Power: powers shared with legislative (e.g.
appointments requiring confirmation, rule-making);
legislation during times of emergency
Diplomatic Powers: Including Power to Enter into Treaties and
executive agreements
Residual Power: To protect the general welfare of people;
founded on duty of President as steward of the people; includes
powers unrelated to execution of any provision of law [See
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211(1989)]
Power to Pardon: Reprieve, commute, pardon, remit fines and
forfeitures after final judgment [Sec. 19(1), Art. VII] 

Power to Grant Amnesty: With concurrence of majority of all
members 
of Congress 

Borrowing Power: Contract or guarantee foreign loans with
concurrence of Monetary Board [Sec. 20, Art. VII] 

Budgetary Power: Submit to congress budget of bills and
expenditures [Sec. 22, Art. VII] 

Informing Power: Address Congress during opening of session,
or at any other time [Sec. 23, Art. VII]
Power over aliens: includes power to deport [Admin Code, Ch.
3, Se. 8-11]
1. General Executive Power
CONST., Article VII, Section 1. The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.
Araullo v. Aquino, III
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the
laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the
funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the
DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because
by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive
did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Sec. 29(1),
2. Power of Appointment

CONST., Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
[Ad Interim Appointments]
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
Categories of appointments that may be made by the
President
1. Heads of the Executive Department, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him [must be with
consent of Commission on Appointments];
 appointment. However, acquisition of the civil service eligibility
2. All other officers of the government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint
When the Consent of the Commission on Appointments is
Required
In the appointment of:
1. Heads of Executive departments (except if 
it is the Vice-
President who is appointed to a cabinet position, as this
needs no confirmation); 

2. Ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls; 

3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of Colonel or Naval
Captain; 

4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by
the Constitution (e.g. Regular Members of the Judicial and
Bar Council; Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit; Members of the Regional and
Consultative Commissions; Ombudsman and Deputies)
Election Ban
CONST., Article VII, Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
GDU 2021
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
GR: 2 months immediately before the next presidential
elections (2nd Monday of May), and up to the end of his “term”
(June 30), a President (or Acting President) shall not make
appointments [Sec 15, Art. VII].
XPN: Temporary appointments to executive positions, when
continued vacancies will: (a) Prejudice public service; or (b)
endanger public safety.
Limited to Executive Departments
The prohibition against midnight appointment applies only to
positions in the executive department [De Castro v. JBC, G.R.
191002(2010)].
TYPES OF APPOINTMENTS
First Type: Permanent vs. Temporary
Permanent Appointment
A permanent appointment is extended to a person possessing
the requisite qualifications, including the eligibility required, for
the position, and thus protected by the constitutional guaranty
of security of tenure.
Temporary Appointment
Where the appointee does not possess the requisite civil service
eligibility, the appointment is considered a temporary
by a temporary appointee will not ipso facto convert the
temporary appointment into a permanent one. A new
appointment is necessary.
An acting appointment is a temporary appointment. A
contractual appointment is considered a temporary
appointment, such that when the contract is not renewed there
is no dismissal but an expiration of term.
Where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he/she shall hold the office in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced by the will of the appointing
authority [Binamira v. Garrucho].
Second Type: Regular v. Ad Interim (this only applies to the
categories of appointments made by the President under
Article VII, Section 16, requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments)
Regular appointment
A regular appointment is one made by the President while
Congress is in session after the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments and continues until the end of
the term.
Ad Interim appointment

An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while
Congress is not in session, before the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, is immediately effective and
ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by the
Commission on Appointments upon the next adjournment of
Congress. It is a permanent appointment and takes effect
immediately.
If the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim
appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new
appointment inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of
the Commission. But if an ad interim appointment is merely by-
passed, there is no final decision. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag
v. Benipayo].
3. Power of Control and Supervision
CONST., Article VII, Section 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in
matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require
the President to act personally, executive and administrative
functions are exercised through executive departments headed
by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of
the President unless disapproved by the latter [Hontiveros-
Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February
23, 2015.]
[LEONEN CASE] Philippine Institute for Development Studies
(PIDS) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212022, August 20,
2019
This Court, in applying the doctrine of qualified political
agency, decreed that "the power of the [p]resident to
reorganize the National Government may validly be
delegated to his [or her] cabinet members exercising control
over a particular executive department." Therefore, this
Court held that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Secretary is authorized to reorganize the
department offices.
Limitations
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import.
Application
GDU 2021
All the same, while this Court has at times expanded the
application of the doctrine of qualified political agency, the
doctrine remains limited to the President's executive
secretary and other Cabinet secretaries. It does NOT extend
to deputy executive secretaries or assistant deputy
secretaries.
REORGANIZATION
Doctrinal Rulings
The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct
the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as
well as the Admin Code. This recognizes the recurring need of
every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency," in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and
policies [Tondo Medical Employees v. CA, G.R. No. 167324
(2007)].
In establishing an executive department, bureau, or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency's position in
the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is
primary, but subject to the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure [Anak Mindanao v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052 (2007)].
As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office,
or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. Reorganizations in this jurisdiction
have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith [Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary].
SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
CONST., Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
CONST., Article X, Section 10. The President shall exercise
general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.
The President can only interfere in the affairs of an LGU if he or
she finds that the latter has acted in a manner contrary to law.
A law which authorizes the SOJ to review the constitutionality
of a tax ordinance is valid, so long as the SOJ does not
substitute his or her own judgment for that of the LGU [Drilon
v. Lim].
The President may suspend or remove local officials by virtue of
the power delegated to him by Congress through the Local
Government Code. The Constitution also places local
governments under the general supervision of the President,
and also allows Congress to include in the local government

code provisions for removal of local officials [See Sec 3, Art X
and Ganzon v. CA, G.R. No. 93252 (1991)].
The grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits to the local government officials
and employees does not require the approval of the President
for its validity [Province of Negros v. COA].
4. Emergency Powers
CONST., Article VI, Section 23 (2). In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
CONST., Article VI, Section 26 (2). No bill passed by either House
shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Cf. Takeover power
CONST., Article XII, Section 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Requisites for the grant of emergency powers
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus:
1. There must be a war or other emergency;
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only;
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe; and
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
“Emergency”
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger
GDU 2021
to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
Implicit in these definitions are the elements of intensity,
variety, and perception.
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the
United Sates have been occasioned by a wide range of
situations, classifiable under three principal heads: (a)
economic, (b) natural disaster, and (c) national security.
Emergency as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same
breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or
EPIDEMIC (or worse, PANDEMIC), typhoon, flood, or other
similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
May the President declare the existence of a national
emergency? 

Yes, the President may declare the existence of a state of
national emergency without Congressional enactment. Unlike
the declaration of state of war, the declaration of the existence
of a national emergency is not reserved to the Congress and
therefore may be exercised by the President. However, the
exercise of emergency powers requires a delegation from
Congress which is the repository of emergency powers.
May the President further delegate the emergency powers
granted to him or her? Explain.
NO. The President may not further delegate the emergency
powers given to him by Congress pursuant to the Latin maxim
delegata potesta non potest delegare (“a delegate cannot
further delegate”), as this exercise of emergency powers
requires the exercise of judgment and discretion on his part.
The President may, however, issue directives and exercise
powers that he or she may see fit and necessary to carry out the
national policy declared by Congress.
What are the legal consequences of a declaration of national
emergency?
The President may declare the existence of a national
emergency, but the action does not bind Congress or require
Congress to enact legislation to delegate emergency powers
to the President.
Note, further, that the President has no absolute authority to
exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII
(take over power) in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.”
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Section 17, Article XII (takeover power) must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the

President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.
GDU 2021
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

WHEN EMERGENCY POWERS CEASE The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
According to the Constitution: persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
1. Upon being withdrawn by resolution of 
the Congress; or or directly connected with the invasion.
2. If Congress fails to adopt such 
resolution, upon the next
(voluntary) adjournment of Congress. 
 During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
The fact that Congress is able to
meet in session three days, otherwise he shall be released.
uninterruptedly and adjourn of its own will prove that the
emergency no longer exists to justify the delegation [See Under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution the powers of the
Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L- 2044(1949)] 
 President as Commander-in-Chief are the following:
1. Power to call out the armed forces (or calling out power)
5. Commander-in-chief Powers for the prevention or suppression of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion; 

2. Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
CONST., Article XII, Section 18. The President shall be the
corpus in case of invasion or rebellion and when public
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
safety requires it; and 

whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
3. Power to declare martial law also in case of invasion or
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion and when public safety requires it.
rebellion.
Limitations on 2 and 3
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
(1) There must be an actual invasion or rebellion;
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
(2) The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed 60 days;
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
(3) Within 48 hours, the President shall report his action to
or any part thereof under martial law.
Congress. If Congress is not in session, it must convene
within 24 hours. Congress need not convene if it will not
[Congress’ Check]
revoke. (Fortun v. Ampatuan; Padilla v. Congress)
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
(4) Congress may be majority vote of all its members voting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
jointly, revoke the proclamation and the President cannot
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
set aside that revocation;
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
(5) By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
of the President, Congress may extend the proclamation if
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
the invasion or rebellion continues and the public safety
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
requires the extension;
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
(6) The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the proclamation and must decide the case within 30 days
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
from the time it was filed [Lansang v. Garcia]; and
safety requires it.
(7) Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of the
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of civil
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
courts and of Congress. Military courts have no jurisdiction
accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
over civilians where civil courts are able to function. [David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo]
[Supreme Court’s Check]
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
Commander-in-Chief Powers in relation to the AFP
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
over the persons and actions of the members of the armed
forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to
A state of martial law does NOT suspend the operation of the
restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers,
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or

activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law
[Gudani v. Senga].
Graduated Powers
Sec. 18, Art. VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the
least benign, these are: (1) the calling out power, (2) the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
(3) power to declare martial law.
Four (4) ways for the Proclamation of Martial Law or the
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to be
Lifted:
 (exception: amnesty);
1. Lifting by the President himself
2. Revocation by Congress
3. Nullification by the Supreme Court
4. Operation of law after 60 days (without extension)
6. Executive Clemency
CONST., Article VII, Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Forms of executive clemency
1. Reprieve is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of
time, a postponement of execution, a temporary
suspension of execution [People v. Vera, G.R. No. L- 
 employees.
45685(1937)]. 
 5. The President cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.
2. Commutation is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a lesser penalty for the one originally
imposed [People v. Vera]. 
 7. The President cannot restore public offices forfeited, even
3. Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense
[People v. Vera]. 

4. Amnesty: A sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted
by government generally to a class of persons who have
been guilty usually of political offenses and who are subject
to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often
conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within
a prescribed time. This requires the concurrence of majority
of all members of Congress.
5. Remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment 

Note: Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict
granted by a Parole Board (not the President) after serving the

minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without
GDU 2021
granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the
sentence shall be suspended.
Probation, on the other hand, is disposition where a defendant
after conviction and sentence is released subject to (1)
conditions imposed by the court and (2) supervision of a
probation officer [PD No. 968, Sec. 3(a)]
LIMITATIONS TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY; NO EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY:
1. In case of impeachment; 

2. Cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction
o Sec. 19, Art. VII prohibits the grant of pardon
whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by
the trial court. Any application therefore should
not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn [People v. Bacang, G.R. No.
116512(1996)].
3. As otherwise provided in this Constitution, 
e.g. for
election offenses: No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation by the Commission on
Election [Sec. 5, Art. IX]. 

4. The President cannot pardon members and employees
found guilty by the Supreme Court in administrative cases,
because it will encroach upon the exclusive power of
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over its
6. The President cannot grant pardon to cases of legislative
or civil contempt.
if the pardon restores eligibility for said offices.
Any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the pardoning power of the President [Risos Vidal v.
Commission on Elections, 2015].
7. Diplomatic Power
The President has the power to negotiate, enter and ratify
international treaties. As the sole organ of our foreign relations
and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign
policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to
conduct and manage the country's interface with other states
and governments [Saguisag v. Ochoa, 2016].
CONST., Article VII, Section 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
 GDU 2021
It is the President who ratifies a treaty and the Senate merely Press Release: The decision acknowledged that the President,
concurs [Bayan v. Executive Secretary, 2000]. Also, the as primary architect of foreign policy, is subject to the
President cannot also be compelled to submit a treaty to the Constitution and existing statute.
Senate for concurrence, because only the President has the sole
power to submit it to the Senate and/or to ratify it. It is the Therefore, the power of the President to withdraw unilaterally
President who ratifies a treaty, and the Senate merely concurs. can be limited by the conditions for concurrence by the Senate
or when there is an existing law which authorizes the
TREATY VS. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT negotiation of a treaty or international agreement or when there
Point of Executive is a statute that implements an existing treaty.
Treaty
distinction Agreement
Definition Treaties are formal International POWER TO CONTRACT FOREIGN LOANS
contracts between agreements CONST., Article VII, Section 20. The President may contract or
the Philippines and embodying
guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
other States- adjustments of detail Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
parties, which are carrying out well- and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
in the nature of established national
international policies and The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of
agreements, and traditions and those every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a
also of municipal involving complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
laws in the sense of arrangements of
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-
their binding more or less
owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect
nature; they are temporary nature.
of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as
formal documents
may be provided by law.
which require They are usually
ratification with the concluded to:
approval of two- 1. Adjust the details DEPORTATION POWERS
thirds of the Senate of a treaty There is no legal or constitutional provision defining the power
2. Upon confirmation to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the
by an act of Chief Executive the full discretion to determine whether an
Legislature alien’s residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect the
3. In the exercise of security, welfare or interest of the state. The Chief Executive is
the President’s the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which
independent powers would warrant the deportation of aliens [Go Tek v. Deportation
under the Board, G.R. No. L-23846(1977)].
Constitution.
Need for Senate Senate concurrence Note: The President may deport only according to grounds
legislative concurrence is is not required enumerated by law, otherwise it would be unreasonable and
concurrence always required undemocratic [Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No.
after ratification by L- 10280(1963)].
the President (2⁄3
of all members of 8. Powers relative to appropriation measures
Senate)
Force of Has force and Same as an executive See: X. Process of Legislation
authority effect of law (may issuance
amend or repeal CONST., Article VII, Section 22. The President shall submit to the
domestic laws once Congress within thirty (30) days from the opening of every
concurred in by the regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill,
Senate) a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
Subject to Yes Yes receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Judicial
Review
Note: The budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to
be passed by Congress. The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
[LEONEN] Pangilinan v. Cayetano, 2021

What is meant by saving(s) – (a) does this term appear in the
Constitution and (b) where is it defined?
Yes, the term "savings" appears in the Constitution, particularly
in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) which provides that “no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”
While the Constitution does not define "savings," it is defined
in the General Appropriations Acts of each fiscal year, and
subject to the interpretation of the Supreme Court.
What powers and prerogatives does the President exercise in
relation to savings?
The President may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for his respective office from
savings in other items of his respective appropriations. [Art. VI,
Sec. 25(5) of the Constitution].
Transfer of “Savings”
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section
25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
the Constitutional 
Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices; 

2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and 

3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an existing item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
[Araullo vs Aquino, 2014]. 

Note: In Araullo 2015, SC said that the release of
unprogrammed funds (savings) need NOT occur at the end of
the fiscal year (this statement modified Araullo 2014).
Is there a violation of the Constitution in any of the following:
(a) the President, through the Department of Budget and
Management, requires the various departments to declare as
savings any appropriation not spent within the first half of the
fiscal year and (b) the President, in re-allocating savings to
support the Commission on Audit’s IT project? Explain briefly.
a. Unconstitutional.
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are:
GDU 2021
1. Still available after the completion or final discontinuance
or abandonment of the work, activity or propose for which
the appropriation is authorized;
2. From appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; and
3. From appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems
and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets, programs and
services approved in this Act at a lesser cost [Araullo v.
Aquino, 2014]
These savings must comply with this statutory definition of such
under the General Appropriations Act for the fiscal year.
b. Unconstitutional
Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) does not authorize the President to re-allocate
savings to support the Commission on Audit’s items in their
respective appropriations. The Constitution only allows inter-
department/office augmentation of items from savings found
in their respective offices/departments. This reinforces the
fiscal autonomy of the different branches of governments and
the constitutional creations which the Commission on Audit is.
9. Residual Powers
The residual powers of the President are generally described in
Marcos v. Manglapus (1989) as the unstated powers implied
from the grant of executive power that is necessary for the
President to comply with their constitutional duty to protect
the general welfare of people. It includes powers unrelated to
execution of any provision of law.
An example of acts that come under the President’s residual
powers is the power to ban the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines, as ruled in Marcos v. Manglapus. #NEVERAGAIN!
In MEWAP v. Romulo, the court upheld the reorganization of
the DOH through EOs 102 and 1165, as it was within the
President’s residual power to restructure the executive
departments since he has the power of control over executive
departments granted by the Constitution [G.R. No. 160093,
July 31, 2007].
The power to create ad hoc bodies is a residual power vested
in the President in accordance with faithful execution clause
[Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935,
193036(2010)].

10. Veto Powers
See: X. Process of Legislation
Presidential veto is the power of the President to disapprove a
bill passed by Congress, and to return the same to the House
where it originated with his or her objections within thirty (30)
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise the bill shall
become a law as if he had signed it [Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1)].
Partial vetoes are invalid, as bills must be vetoed by the
President in its entirety, or not at all [Bengzon v. Drilon, 1992].
An exception to this is the case of an “item veto”, where the
President has the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill [Art. VI, Sec 27 (2)].
Note, however, that the power to disapprove any item or items
in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item [Bengzon v. Drilon, 1994; Gonzales v.
Macaraig, 1990].
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 210503, October 8,
2019
In the 2013 Belgica case, this Court held: “It is significant to
point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence — meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified
singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line- item.”
The requirement of singular correspondence, however, does
not mean that all lump-sum appropriations are
unconstitutional per se; hence, the specifically assailed
appropriations are constitutional.
For as long as the lump-sum amount is meant as a funding
source for multiple programs, projects, or activities that may
all be clearly classified as falling under ONE SINGULAR
APPROPRIATION PURPOSE, the lump-sum appropriation is
valid. In this sense, the "lump-sum" effectively functions as
a "line-item" that is compliant with the doctrine of singular
correspondence as amply discussed in the 2013 Belgica
Decision.
A lump-sum, albeit meant as a funding source for multiple
programs, projects and activities, may effectively function as
a proper "line-item" for as long as these multiple programs,
projects or activities are clearly classified as falling under one
singular appropriation purpose. This singular purpose may
be as general or specific as the legislative department
deems it to be, provided that such generality or specificity
does not negate the President's proper exercise of his item
veto power.
GDU 2021
JUDICIARY
COMPOSITION
CONST., Article VIII, Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit En Banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
[Cases required to be heard En Banc]
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.
[By division]
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
MUST BE HEARD EN BANC
1) Those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of:
a. Treaty 

b. Orders 

c. International or executive agreement 

d. Law 

e. Presidential decrees 

f. Instructions 

g. Proclamations 

h. Ordinances 

i. Other regulations 

2) Exercise of the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal [Sec. 11, Art. VIII] 

Note: Discipline of judges can be done by a division, BUT En
Banc decides cases for dismissal, disbarment, suspension for
more than 1 year, or fine of more than P10,000 [People v.
Gacott, G.R. No. 116049 (1995)] 


3) Cases or matters heard by a Division where the required
number of votes to decide or resolve these is not met [Sec.
4(3), Art. VIII] 

4) Modifying or reversing a doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division [Sec. 4(3), Art. VIII] 
 (Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2); Sec. 5(2)[a]) reveals that only courts of law
5) Actions instituted by citizens to test the validity of a
proclamation of Martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ [Sec. 18, Art. VII]
6) When sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal [Sec. 4(7),
Art. VII] 
 briefly.
7) All other cases which under the Rules of 
Court are
required to be heard by the SC en banc. [Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII]


Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R.
No. 173120, April 10, 2019
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, is not an appellate
court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate
jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is
considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits
veritably as the Court en banc itself.
POWERS
See: VI. Powers of the Supreme Court
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
CONST., Article VIII, Section 1. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts… to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test
the validity of executive and legislative acts on their conformity
with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.
What case do you file in invoking the Court’s expanded judicial
review power?
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. Secretary De Lima, G.R.
No. 212719, June 25, 2019
True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an
appropriate remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it
was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making or quasi-
legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently
held that "petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
GDU 2021
review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials."
May the National Labor Relations Commission determine the
constitutionality of a statute? Explain briefly.
No, a perusal of the relevant provisions under the Constitution
may determine the constitutionality of a statute. The National
Labor Relations Commission, being a quasi-judicial agency
under the Department of Labor and Employment, is not such a
court which may determine the constitutionality of a statute.
Do lower courts possess the power of judicial review? Explain
Yes. The Constitution has vested the power of judicial review
not only with the Supreme Court but in lower courts as well. This
is evident in Art. VIII, Sec. 2(a) of the Constitution, where the
Supreme Court was given the power to review, revise, reverse,
affirm, or modify appeal or certiorari, final judgments of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality of a law etc. is in
question
a. Requisites of Judicial Review
1. There must be an ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY,
meaning a genuine conflict of legal rights and interests
which can be resolved through judicial determination [John
Hay v. Lim, 2003];
2. There must be LOCUS STANDI or a party’s personal and
substantial interest in the case, arising from a direct injury
it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged
governmental action. However, this may be brushed aside
by the Court in view of paramount public interest or
transcendental importance of the issues involved [CREBA
v. Energy Regulation Commission, 2020]
3. The exercise of judicial review is PLEADED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY;
4. The constitutional issue raised is the very LIS MOTA of the
case. 

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. This precludes the courts from
entertaining the following:
1. Request for an advisory opinion [Guingona v. CA, G.R. No.
125532 (1998)];
2. Cases that are or have become moot and academic, i.e.
cease to present a justiciable controversy due to
supervening events [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396 (2006)];
3. Political questions

Ripeness
Subsumed here is the concept of ripeness. A case is ripe for
adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a
completed action such that there is a direct, concrete, and
adverse effect on the petitioner. It is, thus, required that
something had been performed by the government branch or
instrumentality before the court may step in, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to itself as a result of the challenged action.
By “ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts
may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its
inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
animosity, passion, and violence of a full-blown battle that
looms ahead. The concept describes a STATE OF FACTS
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the
issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution
without specifying how these rights translate to being legally
entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security
System contributions [Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, 2019, Per
J. Leonen].
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. Secretary De Lima, G.R.
No. 212719, June 25, 2019
Re: GCTA law. DOJ IRR provided for prospective
application. PDLs argued that the law is penal law, and
therefore retroactive in application if favorable to PDLs.
There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and
operation of the MSEC. In Pimental v. Aguirre, We
dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the
implementing evil to befall on them before they could
question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held
that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act." Concrete acts are not necessary to render the
present controversy ripe. An actual case may exist even in
the absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has
ACTUALLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTED PETITIONERS.
The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to the ripening
of a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
[LEONEN] Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, July 2020
Falcis justifies the direct recourse to this Court by citing, in
addition to the alleged transcendental importance of the issues
he raised, the supposed lack of need for trial concerning any
factual issues.
The Petition before this Court does not present an actual case
over which we may properly exercise our power of judicial
review.
GDU 2021
It is not enough that laws or regulations have been passed or
are in effect when their constitutionality is questioned. The
judiciary interprets and applies the law. "It does not formulate
public policy, which is the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government." Thus, it does not—by the
mere existence of a law or regulation—embark on an exercise
that may render laws or regulations inefficacious.
Lest the exercise of its power amount to a ruling on the wisdom
of the policy imposed by Congress on the subject matter of the
law, the judiciary does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making
prerogative by a swift determination that a rule ought not exist.
There must be an actual case, "a contrast of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."
PETITION MUST BE BASED ON ACTUAL FACTS!!!
Ultimately, petitions before this Court that challenge an
executive or legislative enactment MUST BE BASED ON
ACTUAL FACTS, sufficiently for a proper joinder of issues to be
resolved. If litigants wish to assail a statute or regulation on its
face, the burden is on them to prove that the narrowly-drawn
exception for an extraordinary judicial review (FACIAL
CHALLENGE) of such statute or regulation applies.
When faced with speculations—situations that have not yet fully
ripened into clear breaches of legally demandable rights or
obligations—this Court shall refrain from passing upon the case.
Any inquiries that may be made may be roving, unlimited, and
unchecked. FACTS ARE THE BASIS OF AN ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY. To reiterate, "there must be sufficient facts to
enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues."
LEONEN CASE] Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz v.
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019
The Petition failed to establish an actual case or controversy.
There is an actual case or controversy if it involves "a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution[.]"The issues presented
should be "definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests." Actual
facts, as opposed to hypothetical ones, must exist for there
to be an actual case or controversy.
RE: ADVISORY OPINIONS
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article
VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory
opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual
setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the
conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness
so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal
arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by
the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no
such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They
will bind the future parties who may have more motives to
choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to

be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual
facts from which courts can properly determine whether
there has been a breach of constitutional text.
Here, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 10591 because it allegedly violated their right to bear
arms, their right to property, and even the right to
presumption of innocence by disqualifying from holding a
firearm license those who have committed a crime involving
a firearm. However, they did not show that their firearm
licenses were revoked because of any of the provisions of
the law or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
When is a case considered moot and academic?
The Supreme Court Court in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (2006)
defined a "moot and academic" case to be "one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.” As a general rule, courts must dismiss moot and
academic cases that are brought before them.
Exceptions:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; 
 1.
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; 
 unconstitutional;
3. When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and 
 3.
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review [e.g.
Sanlakas case on declaration of state of rebellion].


May a petition challenging the constitutional validity of a
pending bill be validly taken cognizance of by the courts?
Explain briefly.
No. According to the case of Central Bank Employees Assoc. v.
BSP (2004), the Supreme Court has no power to declare a
pending bill in Congress as deemed enacted into law, as such
would not be the power to review legislation but is tantamount
to usurpation of a legislative function.
LOCUS STANDI
Locus standi or legal standing is a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest [Association of Flood Victims v.
Comelec, 2014].
What is the test to determine whether an entity has locus
standi? DIRECT INJURY TEST
GDU 2021
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Coporation
The direct injury test was adopted to determine locus standi in
public suits. A person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
Recognizing that a strict application of the direct injury test may
hamper public interest, the Supreme Court may relax the
requirement in cases of transcendental importance or with far
reaching implications. Being a mere procedural technicality,
locus standi may be waived in the public interest.
[LEONEN CASE] Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz v.
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019
What are the exceptions on standing?
The exceptions to the rule on legal standing were
summarized in Funa v. Villar. In that case, this Court
enumerated four (4) types of "non-traditional suitors" who,
though not having been directly injured by the assailed
governmental act, were nonetheless allowed to file the
petition because they raised issues of critical significance:
For TAXPAYERS, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
2. For VOTERS, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
For CONCERNED CITIZENS, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
4. For LEGISLATORS, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
THIRD-PARTY STANDING
Through White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, the
concept of third-party standing was introduced in our
jurisdiction as another exception to the direct injury rule.
Under this concept, a litigant may file a case on behalf of
third parties when the following criteria concur:
1. "The litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus
giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the
outcome of the issue in dispute";
2. "The litigant must have a close relation to the third
party"; and
3. "There must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests."
Associations may likewise sue on behalf of their members,
as they are but a "medium through which [their] individual
members seek to make more effective the expression of their
voices and the redress of their grievances." However, if they
are to do so, associations "must sufficiently [establish] who
their members [are], that their members authorized the
associations to sue on their behalf, and that the members

would be directly injured by the challenged governmental
acts."
[LEONEN] Falcis v. Civil Registrar General
Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or
concerned citizens, this Court has noted that the party must
claim some kind of injury-in-fact.
For CONCERNED CITIZENS, it is an allegation that the
continuing enforcement of a law or any government act has
denied the party some right or privilege to which they are
entitled, or that the party will be subjected to some burden or
penalty because of the law or act being complained of.
For TAXPAYERS, they must show "sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation[.]"
LEGISLATORS, meanwhile, must show that some government
act infringes on the prerogatives of their office.
THIRD-PARTY SUITS must likewise be brought by litigants who
have "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
dispute.
Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this
case" is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as
that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of
a "law's normative impact"; "impairment" of his "ability to find
and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships"; as well as injury to his "plans to settle down and
have a companion for life in his beloved country"; or influence
over his "decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly
country" cannot be recognized by this Court as sufficient
interest.
Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury.
Petitioner fails to show how the Family Code is the proximate
cause of his alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this
injury comes from "the law's normative impact" is insufficient to
establish the connection between the Family Code and his
alleged injury.
If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or
controversy, neither can it be a source of direct injury to
establish legal standing. This Court is not duty bound to find
facts on petitioner's behalf just so he can support his claims.
“Transcendental Importance”
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case;
GDU 2021
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency
or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.
A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading
is not enough for a court to Set aside procedural rules: Whether
an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined
on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental
importance must be supported by the proper allegations.
Enforcement of Environmental Laws; Standing
1. Any Filipino citizen; 

2. In representation of others, including 
minors or
generations yet unborn [Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771
(2015)] 

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
GR: Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
XPNs:
1. In criminal cases, at the discretion of the court;
2. In civil cases, if necessary for the determination of the case
itself; and
3. When the jurisdiction of the court is involved [People v.
Vera].
Note: The reckoning point is the first competent court. The
question must be raised at the first court with judicial review
powers. Hence, the failure to raise the constitutional question
before the NLRC is not fatal to the case [See Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, G.R. No. 167614, (2009)].
Matibag v. Benipayo
IT is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional
issue is to raise it in the PLEADINGS before a competent court
that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal."
Estrada v. Ranada
The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on
the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the
issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court
of Appeals, which is the competent court, the constitutional
question was raised at the earliest opportune time.
Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound
discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed
upon.

LIS MOTA
Judicial review of official acts on the ground of
unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of
the actions cognizable by courts of justice. The constitutional
issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the
case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of
the case, meaning the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented.
[LEONEN CASE] Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz v.
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019
SEVEN PILLARS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OR THE RULES OF
AVOIDANCE
The so-called "seven pillars of limitations of judicial review"
or the "rules of avoidance" enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority teaches that:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions "is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in
the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals.
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied."
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question,
although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction
or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute
upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications
of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the
right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself
of its benefits.
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality
is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided." . . .
GDU 2021
“PARALLEL GUIDELINES” IN PH JURISPRUDENCE
In Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., the Court summarized
the foregoing "pillars" into six categories and adopted
"parallel guidelines" in the exercise of its power of judicial
review:
1. That there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only
as required by the facts of the case
3. That judgment may not be sustained on some other
ground
4. That there be actual injury sustained by the party by
reason of the operation of the statute
5. That the parties are not in estoppel
6. That the court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality
b. Operative fact doctrine

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage
Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, Decision dated June 15,
2019
GR: It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not
a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all.
XPN: An exception to the above rule, however, is the
doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of considering its actual existence as an operative
fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity.” Whatever was done while the
legislative or the executive act was in operation should be
duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage
Realty Corporation, Resolution dated October 15, 2019

MORE STRINGENT APPLICATION
However, in the fairly recent case of Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr.,
citing Araullo v. Aquino III, the Court stated that the doctrine
of operative fact "applies ONLY to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent
conditions that will permit its application."
In applying the doctrine of operative fact, courts ought to
examine with particularity the effects of the already

accomplished acts arising from the unconstitutional statute,
and determine, on the basis of equity and fair play, if such
effects should be allowed to stand. It should not operate to
give any unwarranted advantage to parties, but merely seeks
to protect those who, in good faith, relied on the invalid law.
c. Political question doctrine 
 government properly acted within such limits.
What is a political question?
The term “political question” refers to:
1. matters to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity; or
2. those specifically delegated to some other department or
particular office of the government, with discretionary
power to act. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure [Tañada v.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520 (1957)].
Does the definition of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution do away with political questions? Explain briefly.
No. The definition under Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
includes political questions. However, the courts determination
regarding such questions is limited only as to whether there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned [See Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 160261 (2003)].
What are the types or categories (species) of political
questions?
Francisco v. HRET
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly
political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) truly political
questions and (2) those which "are not truly political
questions." T
ruly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
The more reliable standards in holding that a question is
“truly political” are:
1. a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department;
2. the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and
3. the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion.
GDU 2021
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
In 2016, the SC ruled that President Duterte's decision to have
the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB) involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. The president decided a question of policy based
on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise
of such discretion, his decision on that political question is
outside the ambit of judicial review [Ocampo v. Enriquez, 2016].
[LEONEN] Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
The Concept of a Political Question
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot
do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Re: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case,
organ of government] before a court may come into the
picture."
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially
during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing
of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the
context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
d. Judicial Hierarchy
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and
Communication, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct
recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of
law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not
mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism

designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest
law of the land.”
Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara model: ONLY
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW
In Angara, there was no dispute as to the facts. The petition
raised purely questions of law. Petitioner was allowed to file
the petition for prohibition directly before us because what
was considered was the nature of the issue involved in the
case: a legal controversy between two agencies of the
government that called for the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the final arbiter of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court.
Transcendental Importance Doctrine
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, We ruled: “The
principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the
Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The
instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue
related to the case.
To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does
not clothe us with the power to tackle factual questions and
play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance under the
Constitution when we may take cognizance of a case in the
first instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the
exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The case before us does not fall under
this exception.
Thus, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF
COURTS: PURE QUESTION OF LAW!
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the
foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator
— the issues for resolution of the Court are PURELY LEGAL.
Similarly, the Court in Diocese decided to allow direct
recourse in said case because, just like Angara, what was
involved was the resolution of a question of law, namely,
GDU 2021
whether the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in question
violated the right to free speech of the Bacolod Bishop.
We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one
or more of the so-called "special and important reasons" is
not the decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding
whether to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of its
original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs.
Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the parties
in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct
action before us.
We restate the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara that
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution.
Hence, direct recourse to us should be allowed only when
the issue involved is one of law.
ACCORDINGLY, for the guidance of the bench and the bar,
we reiterate that when a question before the Court involves
determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve
the question REGARDLESS of the allegation or invocation of
compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or
paramount importance of the case. Such question must first
be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of
which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual
questions.
[LEONEN CASE] Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020

Indeed, this Court is the final arbiter of the constitutionality
of any law — but we are not the sole and exclusive forum
before which constitutional questions may be posed.
It is settled that [Regional Trial Courts] have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."
EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed
at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court
includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative
and executive branches of the government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating
to constitutional issues of transcendental importance
prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties
when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this
court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on this matter.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided
by this Court.
V. SUPERVISION OF COURTS
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
CONST., Article VIII, Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
CONST., Article VIII, Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
Administrative Powers of the Supreme Court:
1. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations
as public interest may require
o Shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of
the judge concerned
2. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice
3. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law
4. Supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof
5. Discipline judges of lower courts or order their dismissal.
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his or her office against a
judge; he or she must first indorse the case to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action or else it will be an encroachment
into the Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel [Fuentes v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 2001].
PERIODS FOR DECIDING CASES
CONST., Article VIII, Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after
the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
GDU 2021
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period,
the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have
been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve
the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
LEONEN CASE] Re: Complaint-affidavit of Elvira N. Enalbes,
Rebecca H. Angeles, and Estelita B. Ocampo Against Former
Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro [Ret.], Relative to
G.R. Nos. 203063 and 204743, A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January
22, 2019

Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that
the 24-month period for deciding on or resolving a case is
reckoned from the date of its submission for resolution. The
24-month period does not run immediately upon the filing
of a petition before this Court, but only when the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum has been submitted.
Nevertheless, this Court has held that the constitutional
provision was merely DIRECTORY in nature. Being the court
of last resort, this Court should be given an ample amount of
time to deliberate on cases pending before it. Ineluctably,
leeway must be given to magistrates for them to thoroughly
review and reflect on the cases assigned to them.
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987
Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind this
Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a
mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of
cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
VI. POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
See V. Supervision of courts on the Administrative Supervision
over Courts and Court Personnel
CONST., Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers:
[Original Jurisdiction]
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential

decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
[Administrative Powers]
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations
as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
[Rule Making Powers]
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
RULE-MAKING POWER
Estipona, Jr. v. Hon. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15,
2017
 enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987
Constitution
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design,
vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its
legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto - Appeal from the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case
GDU 2021
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions
of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. - The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14
of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS
from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. - Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141
of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) - The
first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which
prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of
the Rules.
Plea bargaining is a procedural rule in criminal cases
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or
repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter. In determining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642,
September 10, 2019
RE: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PHILSAT
Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of
law and NOT the study of law. The Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon
the Court the authority to define the practice of law, to
determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, to
hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary

disciplinary authority over members of the Bar. The
definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad,
cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
The Rules of Court do not support the argument that the
Court directly and actually regulates legal education. It is a
reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the
qualifications in order to take the bar examinations, had
placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by
law schools. This, however, does not mean that the Court has
or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by
law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a
recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over
admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be
allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be
admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken and
completed the required core courses.
RE: LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's
Jurisdiction Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution
On legal apprenticeship and law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another
requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of
law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine
whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court.
On continuing legal education of practicing lawyers
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal
education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) of R.A.
No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the
legal education of those who are already members of the
bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches
upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-
professors" as teaching of law is practice of law.
On minimum standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT
issuances
The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-
making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of
R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to
regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on this
ground.
Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the
power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law
GDU 2021
admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the
practice of law, the power over which belongs exclusively to
the Court. The statutory context and the intent of the
legislators do not permit such interpretation.
[SUMMARY]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of
the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly
includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of
legal education which is made subject to Executive
supervision and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of
LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education
to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of
LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of
LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to adopt a system of
mandatory continuing legal education and to provide
for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in
such courses and for such duration as it may deem
necessary.
PROMULGATE DECISIONS
CONST., Article VIII, Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme
Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the
Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no
part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution
must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be
observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Note: The above-stated requirement does not apply to
administrative cases.
CONST., Article VIII, Section 14. No decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
A "Resolution" is not a "Decision" within the meaning of Sec.
14 of Art. VIII. This mandate applies only in cases "submitted
for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs

or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It
does not apply to an Order or Resolution refusing due course
to a Petition for Certiorari [Nunal v. COA, G.R. No. 78648
(1989)].
VII.QUALIFICATIONS, DISQUALIFICATIONS,
SELECTION
PRESIDENT
QUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article VII, Section 2. No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and
in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation
DISQUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article VII, Section 13. The President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall NOT, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, (1) directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, (2) participate in any business, or
(3) be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure
be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is NOT to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
GDU 2021
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of
office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character,
but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office."
Exceptions
1. The prohibition does not include posts occupied by
executive officials without additional compensation in an
ex-officio capacity, as provided by law or as required by the
primary functions of the said official’s office [Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary].
2. The Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
cabinet. 

3. The Vice-President acting as president when one has not
yet been chosen or qualified [Sec. 7(2)(3), Art. VII].
4. The Secretary of Justice sitting as ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council [Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII; Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary].
5. The President can assume any or all Cabinet posts (because
the departments are mere extensions of his personality,
according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
hence no objection can be validly raised based on Sec. 13,
Art. VII).
6. The President can assume ex officio positions (e.g. The
President is the Chairman of NEDA) [Sec. 9, Art. XII].
Compare the inhibition imposed on members of Congress
under Article VI, Section 13 of the Constitution, the President
and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 13, and those
imposed on elective and appointive officials as provided under
Article IX-B, Section 7.
The inhibition imposed on members of Congress under Art. VI,
Sec. 13 of the Constitution pertains to two offices: (1)
incompatible office, which provides that no member of
Congress may hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his or her term without forfeiting his or her
seat; and (2) forbidden office, which provides that no member
of Congress may be appointed to any office which was created
or emoluments thereof increased during his or her term. Note
that the provision does not prohibit members of Congress from
accepting any other office or employment in the private sector,
except when such office or employment requires them to
appear as counsel or when there is conflict of interest (Art. VI,
Sec. 14).
The inhibition imposed on other elective and appointive public
officials and employees under Art. IX-B, Sec. 7 mandates that
(1) no elective official shall be appointed or designated in any
capacity to any office or position in Government during his or
her tenure; and (2) no appointive official in the civil service shall
hold other offices or employment in Government during his or

her tenure unless such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his or her position. Likewise, the provision itself
does not prohibit elective and appointive officials from
accepting any other office or employment in the private sector.
This provision is to be deemed the general rule (Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, 1991).
The inhibition imposed on the President and Vice-President
under Art. VII, Sec. 13 dictates that the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants shall not hold any other office or employment during
their tenure, unless such office or employment is expressly
authorized by the Constitution or when such office or
employment is held in ex-officio capacity [Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, 1991). This provision is evidently the
most restrictive of all considering that it also prohibits the
officials mentioned from directly or indirectly practicing any
other profession, participating in any business, or being
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government. This provision is
deemed to be the exception from the general rule i.e. Art. IX-
B, Sec. 7 (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 1991).
SELECTION
ELECTION AND TERM
CONST., Article VII, Section 4. The President and the Vice-
President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall
not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at
any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
GDU 2021
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to
a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of
both houses, provided that the decisions and final report of said
Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session
of both Houses voting separately. [Lopez v. Senate, G.R. No.
163556(2004)].
Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may
continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the
presidential and vice-presidential election results without need
of any call for a special session by the President. Only when the
board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio [Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress,
G.R. No. 163783(2004)].
RULES OF SUCCESSION
CONST., Article VII, Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice-
President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their
terms.
If the President-ELECT fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-
elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
ELECT shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen
or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or
a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death,
 GDU 2021
permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in Determination by Congress 2/3 vote: Vice- President as
the next preceding paragraph. by 2/3 vote of all members, Acting President
voting separately, acting on
In what other instances does the Vice-President become the second written Otherwise: President
President? declaration by majority of the continues exercising his
The Vice-President becomes the President for the unexpired Cabinet powers and duties
term in case of (1) death, (2) permanent disability, (3) removal
from office, or (4) resignation of the President.
What if the Senate President and Speaker are also not capable
In case the (1) President-elect fails to qualify, or (2) if the to act as President?
President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President shall
also assume office as President in acting capacity and only until Vacancy before the term: Congress shall, by law, provide the
such time the President-elect is chosen and/or qualifies. manner of selecting the one who will act as President until
President or Vice President have either been chosen and
SUMMARY OF RULES qualified pursuant to special elections.
Situation Who Shall Become/Act as
President Vacancy during the term: Congress shall, by law, provide who
Before the/At the beginning of the Term will be acting President until President or Vice President have
President-elect fails to qualify Vice-President-elect either been elected and qualified pursuant to special elections.
(until the President-elect
shall have qualified) SPECIAL ELECTION
President shall not have been Vice-President-elect CONST., Article VII, Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten
chosen (until the President elect o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the
shall have been chosen and offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
qualified) accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven
Beginning of the term: Vice-President-elect shall days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President-elect died or become President President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-
became permanently five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
disabled bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under
No President and Vice- Senate President or, in case paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
President have been chosen of his inability, the Speaker become law upon its approval on third reading by the
or shall have qualified of the House shall act as Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
Both the President and Vice President (until a President charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt
President died or became or a Vice-President shall from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of
permanently disabled have been chosen and this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
qualified) suspended nor the special election postponed. No special
During the Term election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
Death, permanent disability, Vice-President to serve the months before the date of the next presidential election.
removal from office, or unexpired term
resignation of the President Vacancy timetable:
Death, permanent disability, Senate President or, in case 0 days – vacancy occurs 

removal from office, or of his inability, the Speaker 3 days – Congress convenes 

resignation of both the of the House shall act as 10 days – Law providing for special elections should be enacted
President and Vice-President President (until a President 

or a Vice-President shall 55 – 70 days – Elections should be held within this period
have been chosen and 85 – 100 days – Canvassing by Congress should be done within
qualified) this period 

Temporary Disability Resulting to Vacancy
Voluntary written declaration Vice-President as Acting SENATORS
of the President
 President
QUALIFICATIONS
First written declaration by Vice-President as Acting
majority of the Cabinet President
CONST., Article VI, Section 3. No person shall be a Senator
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the
day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to
 GDU 2021
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
the day of the election. right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
Note R.A. 9225 (re-acquisition of natural born citizenship): not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by DISQUALIFICATIONS
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn Conflict of Interest
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public CONST., Article VI, Section 12. All Members of the Senate and
officer authorized to administer an oath. the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office,
make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of
221697, March 8, 2016 interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
Re: Natural-born citizenship of which they are authors.
Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having If there is potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine filing of a proposed legislation of which they are the author,
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" they must NOTIFY. That said, they are not prohibited per se
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. from participating.
In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done
not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object Incompatible and Forbidden Office
of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
CONST., Article VI, Section 13. No Senator or Member of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
House of Representatives may hold any other office or
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
perfect it.
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Incompatible Office — “No Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
STS v. Dangerous Drugs Board
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
A candidate for senator needs only to meet the
corporations or their subsidiaries…”
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
The forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
a member’s assumption of such office deemed incompatible.
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
Thus, when a governor-elect ran for the Batasang Pambansa
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
and won, he could not hold both offices [Adaza v. Pacana, G.R.
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
No. L-68159 (1985)]
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
However, no forfeiture shall take place if the member of
force of a constitutional mandate.
Congress holds the other government office in an ex officio
capacity (e.g. JBC membership).
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
Note: The office of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the same vein,
government-owned-or-controlled corporation for purposes of
the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI [Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No.
administering election laws or promulgating rules and
175352 (2009 & 2011); but note that the structure of the PNRC
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in nature.
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a

Forbidden Office (may forever!) — “Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.”
A forbidden office is one to which a member cannot be
appointed even if he is willing to give up his seat in Congress.
The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his
seat therein but his disqualification for the forbidden office
nevertheless remains.
Other Inhibitions
CONST., Article VI, Section 14. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially
in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance as counsel
What is prohibited is “personally” appearing as counsel. This
prohibition is absolute. Thus, when an assemblyman acting as
counsel for one group in an internal dispute in a company was
denied leave to intervene, the court held that his action of
buying 10 stocks in order to be able to intervene in the
company’s dispute as a stockholder was an indirect violation of
this rule and still unconstitutional [Puyat v. De Guzman Jr., G.R.
No. L-51122 (1982)]
Prohibition from being interested in a gov’t contract. This must
involve financial interests.
Duty to Disclose SALN
CONST., Article XII, Section 17. A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
SELECTION
CONST., Article VI, Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday
of May.
GDU 2021
CONST., Article VI, Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or
in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
QUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article VI, Section 6. No person shall be a Member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Residence — physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. For election purposes, residence =
domicile.
Domicile — place of habitual residence
• A person must have a domicile somewhere 

• Once established, it remains until a new
one is acquired 

• A person can have but one domicile at a time. 

Acquisition of domicile 

• Bodily presence 

• Animus manendi (intent to stay) 

• Animus non revertendi (no intent to return) 

Requisites to change domicile 

• Actual change of domicile 

• Bona fide intention of abandoning the 
former place of
origin and establishing a 
new one
• Acts which correspond with the purpose 

Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835,
September 22, 2015
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)."
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It

is usually the place where the child's parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and
raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had
his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In
Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a
foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
What is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of
the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes material. Hence, petitioner's retention
of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine
citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished
Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Same with Senators.
SELECTION
Same with Senators.
JUSTICES AND JUDGES
QUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article VIII, Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed
Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member
of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
GDU 2021
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Members of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Court
of Tax Appeals
• Natural born citizen of the Philippines
• At least 40 years of age
• A judge of a lower court or has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines for 15 years or more
Notes:
B.P. 129 provides that “the Presiding Justice and the Associate
Justice [of the Court of Appeals] shall have the same
qualifications as those provided in Constitution for Justice of
the Supreme Court.”
RA 9282: Justices of the CTA shall have the same qualifications
as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Sandiganbayan [see PD 1486]
• Natural born citizen of the Philippines
• At least 40 years of age
• For at least ten (10) years or more had been a judge of a
court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the
bar as a prerequisite for a like period.
Regional Trial Courts
• Citizen of the Philippines
• At least 35 years of age
• Has been engaged for at least 10 years in the practice of
law or has held public office in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts
• Citizen of the Philippines
• At least 30 years of age
• Has been engaged for at least 5 years in the practice of law
or has held public office in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite
“Practice of law” is not confined to litigation. It means any
activity in and out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience
[Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113 (1991)].


In the case of judges of the lower courts, the Congress may
prescribe other qualifications. [Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII]
Kilosbayan v. Ermita
Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father.
Ruling: Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged
ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of
three Constitutions. Until this is done, Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction
from doing so. Ong is hereby enjoined from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the
functions of that office until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate
adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and
citizenship.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article VIII, Section 12. The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions [Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co., G.R.
No. L-37838 (1932)].
SELECTION
CONST., Article VIII, Section 9. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
CONST., Article VIII, Section 4(1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
GDU 2021
Are appointments to the (a) Supreme Court, (b) Court of
Appeals, and (c) trial courts, covered by the ban on midnight
appointments? Explain briefly.
No, appointments to the Judiciary are not covered by the ban
on midnight appointments. In the case of De Castro v. JBC
(2010), the Supreme Court ratiocinated that the prohibition on
midnight appointments is only applicable to positions in the
executive department.
CONST., Article VIII, Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by
the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired
Justice for two years, and the representative of the private
sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of (1)
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise
such (2) other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
OMBUDSMAN
CONST., Article XI, Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time
of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized
probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar,
and must not have been candidates for any elective office in
the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must
have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of
Article IX-A of this Constitution.

Qualifications:
For both Ombudsman and Deputies:
1. Natural born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least 40 years old at time of appointment
3. Of recognized probity and independence
 the Ombudsman. The Court did not consider the Office of the
4. Members of the Philippine bar
5. Must not have been candidate for any elective office in 
 Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence
the immediately preceding election
Additional requirement for Ombudsman: He or she must have
been for 10 years or more:
1. A judge OR
2. Engaged in the practice of law
QUESTION: State whether or not the following acts are
constitutional: The appointment by the President as Deputy
Ombudsman of a lawyer who has been engaged in the practice
of law for five years.
Constitutional. Only the Ombudsman is required to have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years prior to his
appointment. (Sec. 8, Art. XI)
QUESTION: May a complaint for disbarment against the
Ombudsman prosper during her incumbency? Explain your
answer.
A complaint for disbarment cannot be filed against the
Ombudsman during her incumbency. Article XI, Sec. 8 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution imposes membership of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification to be an Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is removable only by impeachment. If the
Ombudsman were to be disbarred, he would be removed from
office without undergoing impeachment. (Article XI, Section 2
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
DISQUALIFICATIONS
CONST., Article IX-A, Section 2. [The Ombudsman and his
Deputies] shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any
profession or in the active management or control of any
business which in any way be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
SELECTION
CONST., Article XI, Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a
list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall
be filled within three months after they occur.
GDU 2021
Section 8 (2) of RA 6770 is unconstitutional by granting
disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of
Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the
the latter enjoys under the Constitution [Gonzales III v. Office of
the President of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 196231 & 196232,
2014].
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONERS
QUALIFICATIONS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CONST., Article IX-B, Section 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
Composition
A Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
Qualifications
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines; 

2. At least 35 years of age; 

3. With proven capacity for public administration; and 

4. Must not have been candidates for any 
elective position
in the election immediately preceding their appointment.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CONST., Article IX-C, Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Composition
A Chairman and six (6) Commissioners.
Qualifications
1. Must be natural-born citizens;
2. At least 35 years of age;
3. Holders of a college degree;

4. Have not been candidates in the immediately preceding
election;
5. Majority, including the Chairman, must be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CONST., Article IX-D, Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission
on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners,
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no
time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.
Composition 
 Yes, members of the Constitutional Commissions are covered
A Chairman and two (2) Commissioners 
 by Section 7, par. 2 of Article IX-B of the Constitution.
GDU 2021
• They shall not engage in the active management or
control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office
• Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries
CONST., Article IX-B, Section 7. xxx
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Are members of the constitutional commissions covered by
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution?
Explain briefly.

Qualifications 
 In Funa v. Duque, the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition
1. Natural born Filipino citizens 
 imposed by Section 2 of Article IX-A to members of the
2. At least thirty-five (35) years of age 
 Constitutional Commissions must be interpreted in relation to
3. Must not have been candidates for any elective position in Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the
the elections immediately preceding their appointment Court’s pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
4. CPAs with not less than ten (10) years of auditing Secretary. Thus, being an appointive public official who does
experience OR members of the Philippine bar with at least not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-
ten (10) years practice of law 
 President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), a member of a Constitutional Commission is
Note: At no time shall all members belong to the same covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7,
profession. 
 paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or
employment in the Government during his tenure if such
DISQUALIFICATIONS holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position.
CONST., Article IX-A, Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or Prohibition against double compensation
employment. CONST., Article IX-B, Section 9. No appointive public officer or
Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
the active management or control of any business which in any compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
way be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument,
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including double, or indirect compensation.
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. Prohibition against partisan political activity
CONST., Article IX-B, Section 2. (4) No officer or employee in the
The following are the inhibitions imposed on the members of civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
the constitutional commissions: electioneering or partisan political campaign.
• They shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or
employment
• They shall not engage in the practice of any profession

SELECTION
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CONST., Article IX-B, Section 1. (2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner
for five years, and another Commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CONST., Article IX-C, Section 1. (2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members
for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CONST., Article IX-D, Section 1. (2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
VIII. IMMUNITY AND PRIVILEGES
IMMUNITY OF THE PRESIDENT
[LEONEN] Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, 2019
To begin with, former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, as President of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded
here.
The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal
of the judiciary under the Constitution. His or her prerogative
GDU 2021
is entitled to respect from other branches of government.
Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil
or criminal in nature, during his or her incumbency in office.
This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity
from suit.
Estrada v. Desierto
Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure, but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot
demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution
before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
Beltran v. Makasiar
This privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President
by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
NATURE OF THE ACT IS IMMATERIAL
Leila M. De Lima v. President Rodrigo R. Duterte, G.R. No.
227635, October 15, 2019

The petition must be dismissed even without the President
invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
The concept of presidential immunity is not explicitly spelled
out in the 1987 Constitution. However, the Court has
affirmed that there is no need to expressly provide for it
either in the Constitution or in law.
The President is immune irrespective of the nature of the
suit and the acts being questioned.
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential
immunity under our governmental and constitutional system
does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an
official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on
the nature of the suit.

To reiterate, the immunity makes no distinction with regard
to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not
the acts subject matter of the suit is part of his duties and
functions as President.
President need not invoke immunity.
It takes little imagination to foresee the possibility of the
President being deluged with lawsuits, baseless or
otherwise, should the President still need to invoke his
immunity personally before a court may dismiss the case
against him.
Leonen, concurring: Presidential immunity from suit only
extends to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. A
proceeding for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, as in this
case, does not determine any such liability. The Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data only requires courts to ascertain the
accountability and responsibility of the public official or
employee. Thus, the President cannot invoke immunity from
suit in a petition for such writ.
However, the proper respondent in a habeas data case for
pronouncements made by the President in his official capacity
is the Executive Secretary, following the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Aquino III. This is in accord with the doctrine that the president
should not be impleaded in any suit during his or her
incumbency, as recently reiterated in Kilusang Mayo Uno v.
Aquino III [another Leonen case].
Sabio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 233853, July 15, 2019
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, is immune from suit and may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case. However, such
immunity does not extend to his alter egos.
Thus, Sabio cannot claim immunity from suit for being an
alter ego of the President. It was the PCGG, through Sabio
and his Commissioners, not the President, who entered into
the subject lease agreements without the requisite public
bidding. It will be ridiculous to hold that alter egos of the
President are, likewise, immune from suit simply because
their acts are considered acts of the President if not
repudiated.
PRIVILEGES OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
CONST., Article VI, Section 11. A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session.
Regardless of the whereabouts of a Senator or Member of the
House, freedom from arrest holds, so long as Congress is in
session (regular or special session). Freedom from arrest applies
GDU 2021
only to offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment.
In People v. Jalosjos [G.R. No. 132875, February 3, 2000], the
SC denied the request of Cong. Jalosjos that he be allowed to
attend legislative sessions. The denial was premised on the
following: (a) membership in Congress does not exempt an
accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons; (b) one rationale behind confinement is
public self-defense; (c) it would amount to creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason; and (d) he was
provided with an office in the New Bilibid Prison.
Note: charge against Jalosjos was statutory rape (reclusion
perpetua).
Right of Detained Members to Attend Congressional Session
A Senator, who remains in detention, cannot be allowed to go
to the Senate to attend all its official functions. All prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention. The presumption of innocence does not carry with it
the full enjoyment of civil and political rights [Trillanes v. Judge
Pimentel, G.R. No 179817, June 27, 2008].
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
CONST., Article VI, Section 11. …No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
To come under the guarantee, the speech or debate must be
one made "in Congress or in any committee thereof."
Publication of an allegedly libelous letter is not covered by the
privilege.
Note: The Senator or Member of the House can still be
questioned and held liable in Congress i.e. by the House to
which he or she belongs.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question [Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L- 15905 (1966)].
Speech made in the Senate floor is protected speech. [Pobre v.
Defensor-Santiago]

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
Can a Senator be the subject of a disbarment or disciplinary
action by the Supreme Court for a speech delivered on the
Senate floor, which contained disrespectful language towards
the members of the Supreme Court? NO.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. Its purpose is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. the plea
of Senator Defensor-Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint
for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the
IX. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
Bar Bulletin 31 (04 January 2021): This topic includes
“composition, functions, powers and privileges, separation of
powers, and systems of checks and balances,” some of which
are discussed in the other parts of this reviewer.
Re: Composition, functions, and powers, see III. Composition
and powers of government organs
Re: Separation of Powers, see I. Basic principles of political law
on separation of powers
“PRIVILEGES”
Legislative
See: VII. Privileges of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives
Executive
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Executive privilege is the right of the President and high-level
officials authorized by her to withhold information from
Congress, from the courts, and ultimately from the public.
Among the types of information which have been judicially
recognized as privileged are state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters. Certain
information in the possession of the executive may validly be
claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
GDU 2021
during closed-door Cabinet meetings [Chavez v. PEA, G.R. No.
133250 (2003)].
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations
What are the forms of executive privilege?
There are 2 kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential
communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative
process privilege.
Presidential communications privilege pertains to
communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. Deliberative
process privilege includes advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers FINAL and POST-DECISIONAL
MATERIALS as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the
presidential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations.
What are the elements of presidential communications
privilege?
The elements of presidential communications privilege are:
1. The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power (e.g.
commander-in-chief powers, foreign relations],
2. The communication must be authored or solicited and
received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself; consequently, the judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the
President, and
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
For the claim of executive privilege to be properly invoked,
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter. A formal
and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and
certain reason for preserving their confidentiality. Congress
must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim

with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
Examples of quintessential and non-delegable presidential
powers: Commander-in-Chief powers, the power to give
executive clemency, power to enter technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral, petroleum, and mineral oils.
AKBAYAN v. Aquino
The policies behind the deliberative process privilege support
non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the negotiations
process if these notes were revealed. Exposure of the pre-
agreement positions of the negotiators might well offend
foreign governments and would lead to less candor in recording
the events of the negotiations process. The privilege accorded
to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence
from the privileged character of the deliberative process.
The constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
Dino S. De Leon v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte, 2019
Re: Article VII, Section 12
“In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health.”
RULING: Outright dismissal of the Petition on its face for
failure of the petition to establish prima facie case for
mandamus.
Petitioner’s claims were merely based on what he perceived
from the online news articles discussing the President’s
illness. Worse, these news articles are, as the Court has
consistently ruled, characterized as hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and without probative value.
On Article VII, Section 12
The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission: “We are called upon to be more trusting with
respect to the Office of the President that they will know
what appropriate means to take in order to release this
information to the public in satisfaction of the public’s right
to know of the presidency. The state of health or analysis as
to the actual condition of the President should be left to the
President and his doctor; the burden is left to the Office of
the President to choose the appropriate means of releasing
information to the public.”
GDU 2021
Judiciary
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
Deliberative process privilege is the privilege against disclosure
of information or communication, to enable the members of the
Court to freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
holding unpopular positions or fear of humiliation for one’s
comments. At the most basic level, members of the Court and
court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify
on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions
of the court in the exercise of its adjudicatory functions and
duties [In Re: Production of Court Records, 2012].
The following are privileged documents and communications:
(1) Court actions as the result of raffle of cases and acts done
material to pending cases
(2) Court deliberations on cases and matters pending before
the court
(3) Court records which are pre-decisional and deliberative in
nature
(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court
officials and employees
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision
Systems of Checks and Balances
J. Brion, Separate Concurring on IPAP v. Ochoa, extensively
discussing the doctrinal ruling in Angara v. Electoral
Commission on Checks and Balances
The three functions of government are concentrated in its three
great branches; with each branch supreme in its own sphere:
the Legislature possesses the power to create laws that are
binding in the Philippines, which the Executive has the duty to
implement and enforce. The Judiciary, on the other hand,
resolves conflicts that may arise from the implementation of
these laws and, on occasion, nullifies acts of government
(whether legislative or executive) that have been made with
grave abuse of discretion under the Court's expanded
jurisdiction in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government.
[CONGRESS CHECK]
Congress, while supreme in its authority to enact laws, is
checked and balanced in this authority through the President's
veto power. Congress possesses, save for the limitations found
in the Constitution, the full discretion to decide the subject
matter and content of the laws it passes, but this bill, once
passed by both houses of Congress, would have to be signed
by the President. If the President does not approve of the bill,
he [or she] can veto it and send the bill back to Congress with
reasons for his disapproval. Congress, in turn, can either
override the veto or simply accept the President's disapproval.

The same dynamics apply to the enactment of the General
Appropriations Act, which is inarguably the most important law
passed by Congress every year. The GAA is subject to the
President's item veto, a check-and balance mechanism specific
to appropriation bills.
[MARTIAL LAW CHECK]
Note, too, that the declaration of martial law, while still a power
of the President, is subject to check-and-balance mechanisms
from Congress: The President is duty-bound, within forty-eight
hours from declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, to submit a report to Congress.
Congress, voting jointly, may revoke the declaration or
suspension. The President cannot set this revocation aside.
The Court exercises a passive role in these scenarios, but it is
duty bound to determine (and nullify) acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the other branches and other government agencies.
[TREATY CHECK]
The act of entering into international agreements operate under
this wider context of separation of powers and checks and
balances among the three branches of government.
Without doubt, the President has the sole authority over, and is
the country's chief representative in the conduct of foreign
affairs. This authority includes the negotiation and ratification of
international agreements: the President has full discretion
(subject to the limits found in the Constitution) to negotiate and
enter into international agreements in behalf of the Philippine
government, but this discretion is subject to a check and
balance from the legislative branch of government, that is, the
Senate has to give its concurrence with an international
agreement before it may be considered valid and effective in
the Philippines
Who checks Congress?
The President checks Congress via his or her veto power.
The Supreme Court checks Congress when it declares a law
unconstitutional.
Who checks the President?
Congress checks the President through the following: (1) when
it overturns a presidential veto; (2) power of the purse; (3) power
of impeachment; (4) Power of Confirmation by Commission on
Appointments; (5) approval of extension or revocation of
proclamation of martial law/suspension of the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court checks the President when it nullifies the
latter’s unconstitutional acts or when it reviews the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law/suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus.
GDU 2021
Who checks the Supreme Court?
Congress checks the Supreme Court through the power of
impeachment and the power to apportion the jurisdiction of
courts.
President checks the Supreme Court through the power of
appointment and executive clemency (and quo warranto
petitions charot!).
X. PROCESS OF LEGISLATION
ORDINARY BILLS
CONST., Article VI, Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
CONST., Article VI, Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date
of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
Purpose of One Subject One Title Rule
1. To prevent hodge-podge, "log-rolling", or the smuggling
in of "riders", that is, "any act containing several subjects
dealing with unrelated matters representing diverse
interests.

2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature 
 4.
3. To fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation
that are being considered in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they should so desire. 
 i. Period of Sponsorship and Debate
4. But the title need not be a complete catalogue of a bill. In
any case, a title must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment.
5. The title of the bill is controlling over the text. [Dela Cruz v.
Paras, G.R. No. L- 42571-72(1983)]. 5.
Purpose of Three Reading Requirement
The purpose for which three readings on separate days are
required is two-fold:
1. To inform the members of Congress of what they must vote 6.
on, and
2. To give the members of Congress notice that a measure is
progressing through the legislative process, allowing them 7.
and others interested in the measure to prepare their
positions on the matter.
Generally, there are 3 ways for the bill to become a law:
(1) When it is approved by the President; 
 the bill.
(2) When the vote of the President is
overridden by a two-
thirds vote of all the members of each houses;
(3) Upon failure of the President to veto the bill and to return
it with his objections, to the House where it originated,
within 30 days after the date of receipt 
 c. The Conference Committee Report is submitted for
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
1. Preparation of the bill 8.
2. First Reading
a. On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the
title and number of the bill. The Speaker refers the
bill to the appropriate Committee/s.
3. Committee Action
a. The Committee where the bill was referred to 9.
evaluates it to determine the necessity of
conducting public hearings. If the Committee finds
it necessary to conduct public hearings, it schedules
the time thereof, issues public notice and invites
resource persons. If the Committee finds that no
public hearing is needed, it schedules the bill for
Committee discussion/s.
b. Based on the result of the public hearings or
Committee discussions, the Committee may
introduce amendments, consolidate bills on the
same subject matter, or propose a substitute bill. It
then prepares the corresponding committee report.
c. The Committee approves the Bill and submits it for
Second Reading (Plenary).
GDU 2021
Second Reading
a. On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the
number, title and TEXT of the bill and the following takes
place:
ii. Period of Amendments
iii. Voting which may be done by: (1) viva voce; (2)
count by tellers; (3) division of the House; or (4)
nominal voting
Third Reading
a. On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only
the number and title of the bill.
b. No amendment on the bill is allowed at this stage.
Transmittal to the other House
a. The Bill undergoes the same process (1-5).
Bicameral/Conference Committee
a. A Conference Committee is constituted and is
composed of Members from each House of
Congress to settle, reconcile or thresh out
differences or disagreements on any provision of
b. The conferees are NOT limited to reconciling the
differences in the bill but may introduce new
provisions germane to the subject matter or may
report out an entirely new bill on the subject.
consideration/approval of both Houses. No
amendment is allowed.
Transmittal to the President
a. Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and certified by both the Secretary of the Senate
and the Secretary General of the House, are
transmitted to the President. This is the ENROLLED
BILL.
Action of the President
a. Approval: Bill is assigned an RA number. The bill is
reproduced and copies are sent to the Official Gazette
Office for publication and distribution to the
implementing agencies.
b. Veto: If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a
message citing the reason for the veto, is transmitted to
the House where it originated.
i. If the Congress decides to override the veto, the House
and the Senate shall proceed separately to reconsider
the bill or the vetoed items of the bill. If the bill or its
vetoed items is passed by a vote of two-thirds of the
Members of each House, such bill or items shall become
a law.

10. Effectivity
a. Art. 2, Civil Code: Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
b. Even when the law provides its own date of
effectivity, the publication requirement is
mandatory, in order that a law may become
effective. The object of the publication requirement
is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct—without publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim, “ignorantia
legis non excusat.” The publication requirement is
a requirement of due process.
Exceptions to the three-reading requirement
1. When the President certifies the bill as urgent to meet a
public calamity or necessity (no need for three readings on
separate days);
2. In case of vacancy in the offices of the President/VP,
Congress may call for a special election and the bill
proposing such special election shall be deemed certified
as urgent and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading [CONST., Article VI, Section 10].
Joint Resolutions
A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact
the joint resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements
expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into
law. However, a joint resolution can be part of the
implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A joint
resolution can also be treated as a recommendation to the
Executive on how the law can be implemented. Further, neither
the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of
Representatives can amend the Constitution which recognizes
only a bill can become law. [Ang Nars Party-List v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 215746 (2019)]
JOURNAL; HOUSE RULES
CONST., Article VI, Section 16. … (4) Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered
in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Matters which are to be entered in the journal
1. Yeas and nays on third and final reading
2. Veto message of the President
3. Yeas and nays on overriding Presidential veto
GDU 2021
4. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of
members present
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by
both Houses, authenticated by the proper officers of each, and
approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President [Mabanag vs. Lopez-
Vito].
Journal Entry vs. Enrolled Bill
GR: Enrolled bill prevails.
XPN: As to matters which, under the Constitution, must be
entered in the Journal, then the Journal Entry prevails.
Astorga v. Villegas
Re: Authentication
The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add
to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon
its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
Re: Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal
department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the
fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill
to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously, this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been
said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure.
When Votes Are Required to be Recorded
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays
of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances; upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House,
however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the
same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two
chambers of Congress. The above-mentioned bills are
supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives
because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also
more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are
presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in
regard to the enactment of the legislation involved. However,
the Senate may (1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to
make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering
its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a
substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or
(4) to make no report at all.
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATION BILLS
See: Module VI. Executive Department; 8. Powers relative to
appropriation measures
CONST., Article VII, Section 22. The President shall submit to the
Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget
of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts
from existing and proposed revenue measures.
CONST., Article VI, Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
CONST., Article VI, Section 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations
for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
GDU 2021
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal
year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress.
CONST., Article VI, Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
“Appropriation made by law”
• Provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable
(made certain by legislative parameters) amount of
money;
• Allocates the same for a particular public purpose;
• Demonstrates that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists
Accordingly, PDAF cannot be considered as an appropriation
made by law because it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations
[Belgica v. Ochoa, 2013].
General rule: The President must approve a bill in its entirety or
disapprove it in toto.

Exception: The exception applies to appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, any particular item or items of which may be
disapproved without affecting the item or items to which he
does not object.
Doctrine of inappropriate provision
A provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an
appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it is not an
appropriation or revenue item.
XI. NATURAL RESOURCES
Exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
CONST., Article XII, Section 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.
GDU 2021
La Bugal Blaan, December 2004 Decision
Re: EDU Actitivies
General Rule: The State may undertake such Exploration,
Development, Utilization (EDU) activities by itself or in
tandem with Filipinos or Filipino corporations (60%).
Exceptions:
First, in small-scale utilization of natural resources, which
Filipinos may be allowed by law to undertake; and
Second, in large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and
mineral oils, which may be undertaken by the State via
"agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance" as provided by law.
FTAAS are Service Contracts with Safeguards
As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the
people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations -- as contractors who
would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State -- sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is
clear: to develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and
other resources on a large scale for the immediate and
tangible benefit of the Filipino people.
Ultimate Test: State's "Control" Determinative of
Constitutionality
The concept of control adopted in Section 2 of Article XII
must be taken to mean less than dictatorial, all-
encompassing control; but nevertheless sufficient to give the
State the power to direct, restrain, regulate and govern the
affairs of the extractive enterprises.
Control by the State may be on a macro level, through the
establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the
government to control the conduct of affairs in various
enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable or
beneficial.
Economic Activities
CONST., Article XII, Section 10. The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when
the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance
with its national goals and priorities.
Public utilities
CONST., Article XII, Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers
of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.
Roy v. Herbosa
For purposes of determining compliance with the constitutional
or statutory ownership, the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to both the (1) total number of
outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors; and (2) the total number of outstanding shares of
stock, whether or not entitled to vote.
Tatad v. Garcia
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently
and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One
can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility,
or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning
the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property
to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person
in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner
thereof.
XII. AMENDMENT AND REVISION
CONST., Article XVII, Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths [3/4] of ALL its
Members [sitting as Constituent Assembly or “ConAss”]; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
GDU 2021
Section 2. Amendments [only] to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right [not self-executory].
[Constitutional Convention]
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds [2/3] of
ALL its Members, call a constitutional convention, OR by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such a convention
[Ratificatation]
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 [ConAss or ConCon] hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 [Initiative] hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
The following are the MODES of AMENDING or REVISING the
Constitution:
1. By constituent assembly, Congress may by three-fourths
(3/4) vote of all its Members propose any amendment to or
revision of the Constitution.
2. A constitutional convention may propose any amendment
to or revision of the Constitution.
Note: The people may directly propose amendments only (not
a revision of) to the Constitution through initiative.
The (2) STEPS in amending or revising the Constitution are
proposal and ratification.
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: ¾ (overwhelming majority)
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. It is instead part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours — to make, and, hence, to amend
their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power.

Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
members of the House of Representatives act, not as members
of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function (of amending the
Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government including the Constitution itself.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
2/3 of all members. If such vote is not obtained, by majority vote
of all members with the question of whether to call a
Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite.
Three theories on the Constitutional Convention (asked before
in the Bar)
1. Theory of conventional sovereignty (basically: ConCon is
supreme, higher than Constitutional bodies – Executive,
Legislative, Judiciary, etc.)
2. Convention is inferior to the other departments
3. Convention is independent of and co-equal to the other
departments
PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE
At least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein.
Limitation: may not be exercised more often than once every
five years.
Procedure
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories
to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically
impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one
GDU 2021
of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing [Lambino v. COMELEC].
AMENDMENT, WHEN PROPER
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision
of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article,
the change may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision. For example —
a. A change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years
is an amendment and not a revision
b. A change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision
c. A change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification
of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches.
REVISION, WHEN PROPER
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. In revision, the guiding original intention
and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire
document, or of provisions of the document which have over-
all implications for the entire document, to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered.
It’s not always about the quantity
A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution
may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the
substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or
"theocratic" in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution.
Other examples of revision:
a) A switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact
on the entire constitutional structure
b) A switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system
be because of its effect on other important provisions of
the Constitution.
Each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system
of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.

TWO-PART TEST UNDER LAMBINO V. COMELEC
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of the basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry.
RATIFICATION
Doctrine of Proper Submission
A plebiscite may be held on the same day as a regular election.
The entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one
plebiscite only. The people must have a proper “frame of
reference.” No “piecemeal submission” is allowed e.g.
submission of age amendment ahead of other proposed
amendments [Lambino v. COMELEC].
Judicial Review of Amendments
See: Javellana v. COMELEC. The question on whether the
Constitution was validly amended/revised is now regarded as
subject to judicial review.
GDU 2021
Public International Law
Main source: ASIL PIL 2021
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice
1. Treaties and Conventions – international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
2. Customary International Law/International Customs –
international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
3. General Principles of Law – the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations;
4. Judicial Decisions and Legal Teachings – subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists (MHQPs) of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
(ICJ 38)
What is the difference between formal and material sources of
IL?
Formal sources are those legal procedures and methods for the
creation of rules of general application which are legally binding
on the addressees. Examples of formal sources include
legislation, treaty making, judicial decision making, and practice
of states.
Material sources, on the other hand, provide evidence for the
existence of rules, which, when proved, have the status of
legally binding rules of general application. As such, state
practice, UN Resolutions, judicial decisions, treaties, and the
writings of most highly qualified publicists are considered
material sources in so far as they provide what the obligations
are.
Is there a hierarchy among the sources?
None. The sources mentioned in Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute
simply prescribes the order ra1her than the hierarchy of the
sources that the ICJ must adhere to. Thus. a distinction must be
made between the first three sources as against the fourth
source. While the first three (i.e. treaty, custom, GAPL) are
primary sources, the fourth (I.e. judicial decisions, teachings of
MHQPs) are subsidiary m nature. As such, judicial decisions and
teachings of MHQPs have persuasive value before the court
insofar as they aid the interpretation of the primary sources.

TREATY
What is a Treaty?
A treaty is an: (a) international agreement; (b) conducted
between states; (c) in written form; and (d) governed by
international law; (e) whether embodied in a Single instrument
or in two or more related instruments. and whatever particular
designation they may be given. [VCLT, art. 2(1)(a)].
How are treaties interpreted?
Treaties must be interpreted in good faith and in accordance
with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose (VCLT, art.
31).
What is the Philippine practice with regard to treaties?
The following are the relevant Constitutional provisions:
• Foreign loans: Art. VII, Sec. 20 (with prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board)
• Treaties: Art. VII, Sec_ 21 (with concurrence of at least two-
thirds of the Senate)
• Military bases: Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 (with the U.S.; when the
Congress requires, majority of votes cast by the people in
a national referendum)
• Constitutionality of treaties: Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (concurrence of
majority of members of the Supreme Court who actually
took part in the deliberations).
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
What is Customary International Law?
According to the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, it consists
of unwritten rules evinced from the generality and uniformity of
the practice of States (custom) and is adhered to by such states
out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).
What are the requisites or Custom?
The following are the requisites for a certain practice to achieve
customary status: (a) duration; (b) uniformity and consistency of
practice; (c) generality of practice; and (d) a sense of legal
obligation or opinio juris et necessitates.
How long should a practice be before it is considered
customary?
There is no numerical requirement. Although the passage of
only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar
to the formation of a new rule of customary law, state practice
within the period, no matter how short it might be, should have
been both extensive and virtually uniform.
Should there be total uniformity for a practice to be considered
customary?
No. Total uniformity Is not required. What is needed is virtual
uniformity or consistency. Uniformity and generality of practice
GDU 2021
need not be in "in absolute conformity" with the forwarded
custom, but the same must be substantial.
Should ALL states adhere to a practice for it to be customary?
No. For a practice to be general, it must be adhered to by
majority of 'specially affected' states. This means that customary
law may even bind only two states, for as long as the party
claiming it must prove that the purported custom also binds the
other parts, as shown in Right of Passage over Indian Territory.
What is opinio juris?
According to the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, it is the
recognition and feeling of a State that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation, rather than something that
is just done out of courtesy, fairness or morality.
What is the Philippine practice with regard to customary
international law?
Under Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land." This provision, more popularly known as
the incorporation clause, considers both norms under
customary international law and generally accepted principles
of law as part of the law of the land.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTL LAW AND
DOMESTIC LAW
Monist v. Dualist
Monists believe that international law and domestic law are part
of a single legal order; international law is automatically
incorporated into each nation's legal system and that
international law is supreme over domestic law. Monism
requires that domestic courts give effect to international law,
notwithstanding inconsistent domestic law, even constitutional
law of a constitutional character.
Dualists, however, contend that international law and domestic
law are distinct, each nation ascertaining for itself when and to
what extent international law is incorporated into its legal
system, and that the status of international law in the domestic
system is determined by domestic law. Under this view, when
municipal law provides that international law applies in whole
or in part within our jurisdiction, it is but an exercise of the
authority of municipal law, an adoption or transformation of the
rules of international law. (Separate Opinion, J. Vitug,
Government of the United States v. Purganan)
Bernas and Magollana: Philippines adheres more to the dualist
theory (transformation and judicial review). Doctrine of
corporation is the exception; it is more consistent with monist
theory.

Philippine Domestic Law in Public International Law
General Rule: A State cannot invoke its own national law to
resist an international claim or excuse itself from breach of duty
under international law [Art. 6, VCLT; Polish Nationals in Danzig
Case (PCIJ, 1932); Art. 32, Articles on State Responsibility
(hereinafter “ASR”)].
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without
prejudice to article 46 [Art. 27, VCLT].
Exception: A State may invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision
of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent if that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance
[Art. 46, VCL T].
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
CONST., Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law becomes part of
the domestic sphere either by incorporation or transformation.
INCORPORATION: by mere constitutional declaration
The doctrine of incorporation is enunciated in the Constitution
and states that the generally accepted principles of
international law automatically form part of the law of the land.
No legislative action is required to make them applicable as
Philippine law or within the domestic sphere.
Generally accepted principles of international law refer to
norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a
person's right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt
servanda, among others.
Leonen ICC case (2021): “Generally accepted principles of
international law” include international customs [ICJ 38(2]
and general principles of law [ICJ 38(3]. Under the
incorporation clause, these principles form part of the law
of the land. And, "by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law."
Customary international law
Custom or customary international law means a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris). This statement contains the two
basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states
GDU 2021
behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why
they behave the way they do.
Note: Constitutional supremacy remains. In case of conflict à
Constitution and even domestic law win.
TRANSFORMATION: by constitutional mechanism
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can also become
part of the sphere of domestic law also by transformation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. Treaties become part of
the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law
must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.
Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016
We observe at this point that there are no hard and fast rules
on the propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive
agreement on a given subject as an instrument of
international relations. The primary consideration in the
choice of the form of agreement is the parties' intent and
desire to craft their international agreement in the form they
so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of
form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive
agreement, inasmuch as all the parties, regardless of the
form, become obliged to comply conformably with the time-
honored principle of pacta sunt servanda. The principle
binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the
agreements.
Everyone here knows a little secret, that somehow
has escaped you, so far:
Considering where you began and knowing what you knew,
no one in your shoes could have done better.
No one. Not even me.
You have come a long way,
– The Universe