F

Constitutional Law II (Bill of Rights): Case Briefs: Dennis G.
Libunao UC College of Law
Police Powers Villanueva vs. Castaneda Taxicab Operators vs BOT Facts: Facts: The public respondent issued a Circular phasing out late and dilapidated models of vehicles used for taxicab operations. The petitioners then however assailed the circular contending that it violates the petitioners constitutional rights to equal protection of the law, substantive due process and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Issue: Does the circular in question a valid exercise of police power? Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. It is well established under the Philippine law that police power is geared towards the promotion of public safety, health and welfare. To accomplish such purposes, it would restrict yet it should also balance such exercise of state powers to the liberties enjoyed by the people in order promote the benefit of the public. In the case at bar, the circular in question is based on reasonable standards since the government aims to lessen the hazards that maybe hurtful to the safety and comfort of the public from riding dilapidated taxicabs considering the heavy traffic in metro manila and that these vehicles are used practically 24 hours a day. The contention of the petitioner that it is violative to the equal protection clause because the circular is directed mainly on taxicab operators in MM and not outside of the area cannot stand since the circular in question clearly applies to all persons in similar situation. This is so since the heaviness of traffic in MM is not the same from other areas, thus, taxicab operators outside MM is not similar to those within MM. Equal protection is not therefore violated. The petition was dismissed. Substantive due process, defined A constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property for arbitrary reasons or oppressive or unreasonable incursions of government action. Procedural due process, defined Guaranteed right that every person has the right to be heard before conviction. Renders judgment only after trial. Held: Yes. The court clearly identified the land in question as part of a public land, thus, the order of the respondent to demolish illegal stalls along the land in question only aims to provide for the health and safety, to promote public prosperity and to secure the convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants of the locality. Assoc of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection They contended that in line of the Executive orders of the President to expropriate excess lands in accordance to the retention limits set by the laws in question, the president has no power to determine the expropriation but it is lodged primarily upon the decision of the court of law. They also contend that the implementation of the program is violative of equal protection of laws as agricultural lands are the only properties that will be subjected to the CARP. Issue: Does the taking of land pursuant to the CARP an exercise of police power? Held: DECS vs. San Diego (Easy case) Three-flunk rule. A violation of equal protection of law? The rule is a faithful compliance of police power aiming to protect the interest and health of the public from incompetent medical practitioners to whom the public directly entrusted their health and ultimately their lives. Not a violation of the equal protection clause since other respectable profession does not have the similar situation as that in the field of medicine. In such a way that the latter has a closer and major role that directly affects public health and lives of the people. Thus, other profession does not need to have a stricter and more vigilant regulation of admission. No. It is rather an exercise of eminent domain. As defined, eminent domain is one of the inherent powers of the state where the state may expropriate private properties for public use in exchange of a just compensation for the expropriated owner. There are basic differences between police power and power of eminent domain. The former is the power of the state to take away noxious properties, which are intended for noxious purposes, and are destroyed in order to secure and promote public welfare. The latter deals with the power of the state to take away or expropriate private properties and convert them to public use to promote public welfare, in exchange of a just compensation from the owner. In the case at bar, the properties in question (lands) are intended to be expropriated upon the implementation of the CARP, for the promotion of public use which, are given to tenants of the farmers qualified under the Agrarian Reform. Thus, it is clearly an exercise of power of eminent domain. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of CFI Pampanga, authorizing the implementation of the respondent to demolish the constructed illegal stalls referred to as taipapa in the vicinity of public Market in San Fernando Pampanga. The petitioners contend that they have the right over the land in question by virtue of previous authorization from the municipal government pf SF. The respondent however justifies their action contending that the stalls are illegal since it was constructed within a public land which form part of the public plaza/ Issue. Was it a valid exercise of police power?
Constitutional Law II (Bill of Rights): Case Briefs: Dennis G. Libunao UC College of Law
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (easy selfexplanatory) Sec of Justice vs. Lantion Facts: The petitioners forcibly took at least six per cent of the respondents private cemetery intended for the burial of paupers. They contend that the respondents are not entitled to receive just compensation since the petitioners are exercising police power. A suit was filed before the respondent judge Ericta and eventually favored the contention of the respondent Himlayang Filipino Inc. As a result, the petitioners filed a petition to review the decision of the respondent Judge. The respondent argued that the properties taken are not qualified for the exercise of police power since it is not noxious to the public safety and they are entitled to receive just compensation. Issue: Was it a valid exercise of police power? Held: No. As stated, properties acquired through police power are noxious properties which are hurtful to public welfare and is needed to be destroyed. In the case at bar, there is no reasonable relation in taking away 6 percent of public cemeteries for the promotion of public welfare. The ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power since the property is not a kind that would be hurtful to public welfare and needed to be destroyed.
(A very important case, once asked in the Bar Exams 2005)

The private respondent, Mark Jimenez filed a plea after the filing of MOR by the petitioner from the decision rendered by the Court of January 18. In his plea, the private respondent alleged that he was deprived of his right of due process, particularly his right to notice and hearing since he was not given a copy of his extradition documents during the evaluation of his extradition proceedings. Issue: Was the contention of the private respondent tenable? Held: No. He has no right for notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. According to PD 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition proceedings, that the extraditee will only have the right to access the evidence against him when the petition is filed on courts. It is well settled rule that the court cannot give an extraditee a right where there is no express provision in the treaty. This means however that the extraditee has no right, the provision only intends to temporarily withheld his right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings and will revive only when the suit is filed in extradition courts for his criminal proceedings. It is important to note that in procedural due process, it requires the determination of what process is due, when it is due and degree of what is due. All person is entitled of due process, however it should be determine if such right is due to him and the time requires it. In the case at bar, the private respondent is indeed entitled to a due process as provided by the bill of rights, however his plea for the same collides with the interest of the state which may affect the greater majority. Thus, the state commitment to the treaty and the protection of the principle of separation of powers (Judgment of the executive branch to matters relating to foreign affairs eg RP-US Extradition Treaty) should be given greater weight than that what the private respondent avers. However, as said, it is important to note that the right to due process of the extraditee-private respondent is not entirely deprived to him but only temporarily withheld because of conflict with the national interest. His right will be revive when criminal proceeding is instituted and not during the evaluation stage. DBP vs. CA Facts: The petitioners, DBP filed a petition to review the decision of CA concerning the loan obligations of CCC to the petitioner. During the hearing of the case, the counsel for APT (Asset Privatization Trust (Privatization arm of the government) continuously absented himself because of some excuses of illneses, unpreparedness etc. The lower court eventually favored the petitioner ordering CCC to pay its obligations to 61M to DBP, however, denying the motion submitted by the petitioner to foreclose some of the real and personal properties of CCC. Consequently, DBP filed an instant petition to review the decision of the lower court alleging that they were being deprived of their right of due process since they were allegedly never given a chance to cross examine the witnesses of the other party. Issue:
Requisites of Due Process (Procedural Due process) in Non-Criminal cases. Banco Espanol Filipno Case. 1. There must me a court or tribunal clothe with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard (right to notice and hearing before a impartial court of law) judgment must be rendered upon a lawful hearing.
2. 3. 4.
In Administrative cases(Fabella Case) 1. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which may affect a respondents legal rights. Real opportunity to b heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor and to defend ones rights Tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee to honesty as well as impartiality a finding of said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected
2. 3.
4.
Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan (the case of informal meeting and discussion of cases in an unknown restaurant in QC- Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
Was the failure for cross-examination due to absences a breach to right of due process? Held: No. The law prohibits absolute absences of the opportunity to be heard, thus, there can be no deprivation of right of due process if parties are afforded with time and chances to present its side but did not able to do so. In the case at bar, the court is correct by stating that the petitioners APT waived its right to present evidences and for cross-examination when their counsel repeatedly absents himself during the proceeding. They themselves, deprived their right of due process because of their failure and negligence for not appearing before the proceedings. The records shows that the lower court gave them substantial amount of time for the proceedings of the case but were not able to present evidences and conduct a cross examination because of their counsels absences. Thus, they are given the opportunity to exercise their right of due process. No deprivation happened. The petition is denied. Matuguina vs. CA Facts: The Matuguina Logging Enter. A single proprietorship venture owned by Mrs. Matuguina was given a license or concession area by the BFR to log. Later on, Mrs. Matuguina transferred all her rights, interest and ownership including the license of her concession area through a deed of sale to MIWPI in exchange for being the major stockholder of MIWPI, submitted to the Dir. Of Forest Devt and was then on acting as the owner of the said license. Davencor, later filed a complaint before the District Forestry alleging that Mrs. Matuguina/MLE is conducting an illegal logging to Davencors concession area. After an investigation, the Dir of Forest Mngt. Ordered MIWPI to pay the timber logged on the concession area of Davencor, the CA later on affirmed the order. Thus, bringing this suit. The petitioner, MIWPI filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the CA contending that they were being deprived of their right of due process since they were being made liable by the respondent despite the fact that MIWPI is not a participant to such case. The liability of Mrs. Matuguina cannot be imputed against the petitioner since they have separate personality. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: Yes. Under the Corporation law, a corporation is clothed with separate and distinct personality from that of the persons composing it. In line with this basis, it is generally accepted principle that a person who is a stranger in a case cannot be made liable, therefore the stranger is not bound to answer such liability. In the case at bar, Mrs. Matuguina/MLE cannot be made an alter ego of MIWPIU since she has separate and distinct personality from the corp. The petitioner MIWPI cannot be held liable to the acts of Mrs. Matuguina, since MIWPI is never a party to the case filed by Davencor, deciding otherwise would mean that MIWPI will be deprived of their right to due process since they were not given an opportunity to defend themselves from the case filed against Mrs. Matuguina. The decision appealed from is null and void. Facts:
People vs. CA
After the CA affirmed the enjoining of the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutors Office in the case of private respondent Jane S. Go by the Respondent Judge Espina of Tacloban City, the petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari praying the annulment of the decision and enjoin the respondent judge from conducting proceeding of the criminal case filed against another respondent Jane S. GO. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge is not clothe with cold neutrality of an impartial judge as required by due process. Issue: Was the contention with merit? Held: Yes. One of the essential requirements of procedural due process is the presence of an impartial court or tribunal clothe with judicial power to hear and determine matter filed before it. Thus, every party in a judicial process is entitled to an impartial judge to assure him or herself that the judgment rendered is just and their rights are carefully considered and protected. In the case at bar based on the evidences presented before a Special Civil action to the respondent judge wherein he enjoined the authorities for further investigation and favored the accused Go, it is enough to doubt the impartiality as required by due process, of the respondent judge in handling cases. The petition is affirmed. Javier vs. Comelec Facts: Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of election and canvass of election returns, the private petitioner filed a motion before the respondent to prohibit the proclamation of his rival, respondent Pacificador in the election of Antique (Assembly Member). However, the respondent Comelec proclaims the respondent Pacificador as the rightful winner in the held elections. The private respondent then filed a petition to annul the said decision of the Comelec. In the said decision, Comm. Opinion was asked to inhibit himself to participate in the hearing of the case filed in the ground that he was a former law firm partner of the respondent Pacificador, however, he refused and even objected to transfer the hearing of such case to other division of Comelec. Issue: Was the refusal of Comm. Opinion to inhibit himself in participation of the case a breach to due process? Held: Yes. The spirit of due process is akin to the spirit of fair play. Due process requires that every party in a litigation is entitled to an impartial judge to assure that the decision is just and to protect the rights of every litigant. Fair play calls for equality of justice. Thus there cannot be equal justice if a judge is already committed to the other party, thus, a relationship between a judge and a party may give color and distort the rendering of a just decision and the this is a clear manifestation of an impartial judge, and would be a result of breach of due process law. In the case at bar, there is no fair play in the case. The action of Comm. Opinion, and his relationship with the respondent Pacificador tarnished the right of due process of the petitioner as he gave much more weight to such
relationship rather than abiding the well-known rule of judicial conduct of fair play and impartiality. Indeed, it resulted into a unjust judgment prejudicial to the petitioner. The Comm could have just inhibit himself out of delicadeza in order to promote due process in a judicial proceeding. Paderanga vs. Azura Facts: The petitioner filed an administrative charges against the respondent judge alleging that the latter committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by denying the motion for inhibition filed by the petitioner inhibiting the respondent judge to take cognizance of the pending administrative charges where officials of the City of Gingoog are the parties. The loss of trust and confidence to the respondent judge to render impartial and just trials, bias and oppressive dispensation of justice and issuing orders against the interest of the city are the grounds of the motion for inhibition filed by the petitioner. Issue: Base on the positions and imputations of the parties against each other, should the respondent judge inhibit himself in taking cognizance of the pending administrative charges involving city officials to uphold the spirit of due process? Held: Yes. The spirit of due process calls for an impartiality and cold-neutrality of a judges in order to uphold justice and protect the integrity of the judiciary. A judge is not legally prohibited to hear cases, but if circumstances may incite his integrity and compromise the trust of the people to the judiciary, he may conduct a careful self-examination and may choose to inhibit himself to take cognizance of such cases, consequently to uphold due process. David vs. Aquilizan Facts: The Jugar brothers, shared tenants of the petitioner contended that they were refused by David to be reinstated in his land to cultivate corn crops. As a result, the Jugar brothers filed a petition for reinstatement before the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The respondent judge later without conducting any hearing rendered judgment declaring the Jugar Brothers tenants of the land of David and by virtue of PD 27, declared the Jugar brothers owners of the land. The petitioner filed am original Action with certiorari and preliminary injunction before the Supreme court contending that his right of due process were deprived by the respondent by rendering judgment without considering the petitioners right to notice and hearing. Issue: Does rendering judgment without due hearing a breach of right to due process? Held: Yes. As stated by the Banco Filipino Case, the defendant should be given opportunity to be heard and that judgment should be rendered upon lawful hearing, these two elements are indispensable for the protection of every persons right to due process. Thus, a person should have the assurance of notice and hearing and judgment of the courts should be derived from a lawful hearing.
In the case at bar, these two elements are wanting and thus, resulted into judicial usurpation and oppression, violative of the petitioners right to due process.
Equal protection clause: Requisites of

People vs. Cayat (Reasonable classification) Facts: The accused Cayat was convicted under sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639 by a peace of court in Baguio City and was sentenced to pay fifty pesos or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under the Act in question, the possession of intoxicating liquor other than native wines and liquors by any member of non-Christian tribes in the Philippines is considered unlawful and punishable under the same act. Sometime on January 1967, the accused was found unlawfully, illegally and willfully received, acquire and have in his possession a one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor not considered as a native wine or liquor and is illegal under the contemplation of Act 1639. He admitted all of the accusation against him however pleaded not guilty during his trial. He questions the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it is discriminatory ad denies equal protection of the law, violative of due process and an improper exercise of police power. Issue: Does the Act in question violative of the equal protection clause? Held: No. In the colonial history of the Philippines, colonials always believed that they have a great respondibility to civilize these less civilized people of their colony, such that they impose upon themselves the duty to free them from obscurity of ignorance. They provided different measures to bring these people to civilization. One of which is the implementation of the Act in question, implemented to secure these people the blessings of peace and harmony, to facilitate and not to spoil their march towards civilization. Under the established principle of constitutional law, the guaranty of equal protection is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Under the reasonable classification test, the following requisites should not be wanting. 1. It must rest on substantial distinctions 2. Must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3. must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, the Act in question satisfies such requirements. a. It must rest on substantial distinctions The classification is real and substantial, not merely whimsical and imaginary distinction, base on the degree of civilization and culture. Non-Christian tribes, under the Act refers not to religious belief but base on geographical area in which these people live and their degree of civilization. b. Must be germane to the purposes of the law The purpose of the Act in question tp prohibit the possession of non-Christian tribes of intoxicating liquors other than native liquors and wines where they accustomed themselves is designed to ensure peace and order in and among themselves. This is due to the fact that possession of
intoxicating liquors often resulted to lawlessness and crime that hampers the standards of living and civilization. c. Must not be limited to existing conditions only. The ACT in question is intended to apply all times as long as those conditions aimed to be prevented exist since the legislation believes that civilization of people is a slow and it must go together with security and protection. d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class The act applies equally to all members of the same class, specifically non-Christian tribes. The question on Due process of law This simply means that, 1) that there shall be a lawprescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government 2) It shall have reasonable application 3) shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed 4) shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or all of a class. In the case at bar, there is a law that prohibits such act (Act 1639), it has reasonable application of fines or subsidiary imprisonment, it does not violate any regular procedure in its enforcement and applicable of a certain class. The question on improper exercise of police power Police power, as said is the least limitable of all inherent powers such that the state can limit the liberty and property of its citizens for the promotion of general welfare. It is geared towards self-protection and public prosperity and comfort. In the case at bar, the Act in question aims to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles towards their moral and intellectual growth. Thus, it has lawful subject and reasonable means of enforcement. Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. They question the validity of the implementation of the CARP Law, contending that it is violative of their right to the equal protection clause. The Act in question primarily states that landowners will retain five to the maximum of seven hectares of their land and the excess will be given to tenant farmers, depending on the terrain, viable family size and fertility of the soil. They alleged that in the CARP law implementation, agricultural landowners are the only class that will carry the burden of the effects of the law and not any other land owners, thus, violating their right to equal protection of the law? Issue: Does the contention tenable? Held: No. The equal protection clause provided by the constitution is defined as all person or things similarly situated must be treated alike as to both rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. And as held in the Cayat case, the valid classification test should occur. In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class so as not to be bounded by the CARP Law. All of the petitioners are in the same class such that they are all agricultural landowners as contemplated by legislation. There are substantial distinction between agricultural landowners and non-agricultural landowners. The purpose of the law is to give land to the landless to balance the distribution of ownership of land resources among the people, not to mention the constitutional provision that the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. And this purpose of the law does not only meant to answer existing condition since such condition of imbalance opportunity and ownership to one of the most important resource in earth has been existent long before the implemntatin of the CARP Law. Thus, base from the case at bar, the requirement of valid classification has been met. People vs. Vera Facts: This case involves Act 4221 or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu th Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7 branch)heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA 4221, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity? Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. It is clear that under the Act in question, promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection, by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system, it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines, however, if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive peoples right to equal protection of law, then the law should be annulled, since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification, 2 requisites will be wanting. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition, however, the element of substantial distinctions, whereas there is a real
and not to capricious differences cannot be established and second, since discretion is delegated to provincial boards, it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. Act 4221 is repugnant to the constitution (Art Bill of Rights) Marcos vs. CA Facts: RTC Manila Br. 26 under respondent judge Loja Sr, convicted Imelda Marcos pursuant to Circular 960 of the Central Bank. The public respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hence, the petitoner filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the public respondent. The circular in question consolidated the various rules promulgated by the CB. One of these rules under the circular is that it requires all resident who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports on such earnings or receipts on prescribed forms with the proper CB departments and to register with the foreign Exchange department of the CB within 90 days from Oct. 21 1983. Violation of the said circular imposes criminal charges. On Dec 21 1991, marcos was allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad specifically the SBC on various dates from 68 to 91 without prior authorization from CB as contemplated under the circular in question. During the pendency of the case in the trial court, circular 1353 was issued repealing all circulars inconsistent therewith including the circular in question, however, circular 1353 has a saving clause, stating that pending criminal charges from the violation of CB circular 960 and 1318 will not be affected by the repeal. Using circular 1318 as ground, the petition filed a motion to quash the charges filed against her but however denied by the lower court, resulting to an appeal to the public respondent, contesting that the lower court has no jurisdiction since the charges was committed outside Philippine territory and that the saving clause in Circular 1318 was designed to preserve criminal charges against her, violating her right to equal protection. She even avers that the saving clause was not germane to the purpose of the law, which is to stabilize the monetary system, but purely, for the purpose of preserving the criminal charges against her. Issue: Was the contention correct such that it denies the petitioners right to due process? Held: No. In fact, the petitioners contention that the circular was issued for the purpose of stabilizing the monetary system in the Philippines is exactly the reason why the government punishes as criminal offenses the violation of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibility and function. The saving clause, thus then is anchored on the need to continue the prosecution of all of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The saving clause thus indeed germane to the purpose of the circular in question, and not merely to the paranoid and whimsical contention of the petitioner that it is lodged to preserve criminal charges against her, thereby not repugnant with the equal protection clause. Himagan vs. People The petitioner is a policeman assigned in a medical company of the PNP at Camp catitigan in Davao City. He
was accused of murder and attempted murder of Benjamin and Bernabe machitar respectively. Pursuant to DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6875), the petitioner was suspended by virtue of the order of the court under the respondent Judge, until the termination of the case. Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus to lift his suspension in the ground that Equal protection clause: Requisites of People vs. Cayat (Gin Blue boy) Facts: The accused Cayat was convicted under sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639 by a peace of court in Baguio City and was sentenced to pay fifty pesos or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under the Act in question, the possession of intoxicating liquor other than native wines and liquors by any member of non-Christian tribes in the Philippines is considered unlawful and punishable under the same act. Sometime on January 1967, the accused was found unlawfully, illegally and willfully received, acquire and have in his possession a one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor not considered as a native wine or liquor and is illegal under the contemplation of Act 1639. He admitted all of the accusation against him however pleaded not guilty during his trial. He questions the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it is discriminatory ad denies equal protection of the law, violative of due process and an improper exercise of police power. Issue: Does the Act in question violative of the equal protection clause? Held: No. In the colonial history of the Philippines, colonials always believed that they have a great respondibility to civilize these less civilized people of their colony, such that they impose upon themselves the duty to free them from obscurity of ignorance. They provided different measures to bring these people to civilization. One of which is the implementation of the Act in question, implemented to secure these people the blessings of peace and harmony, to facilitate and not to spoil their march towards civilization. Under the established principle of constitutional law, the guaranty of equal protection is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Under the reasonable classification test, the following requisites should not be wanting. 5. It must rest on substantial distinctions 6. Must be germane to the purposes of the law. 7. must not be limited to existing conditions only. 8. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, the Act in question satisfies such requirements. a. It must rest on substantial distinctions The classification is real and substantial, not merely whimsical and imaginary distinction, base on the degree of civilization and culture. Non-Christian tribes, under the Act refers not to religious belief but base on geographical area in which these people live and their degree of civilization. b. Must be germane to the purposes of the law The purpose of the Act in question tp prohibit the possession of non-Christian tribes of intoxicating liquors other than native liquors and wines where they accustomed themselves is designed to ensure peace and order in and
among themselves. This is due to the fact that possession of intoxicating liquors often resulted to lawlessness and crime that hampers the standards of living and civilization. c. Must not be limited to existing conditions only. The ACT in question is intended to apply all times as long as those conditions aimed to be prevented exist since the legislation believes that civilization of people is a slow and it must go together with security and protection. d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class The act applies equally to all members of the same class, specifically non-Christian tribes. The question on Due process of law This simply means that, 1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government 2) It shall have reasonable application 3) shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed 4) shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or all of a class. In the case at bar, there is a law that prohibits such act (Act 1639), it has reasonable application of fines or subsidiary imprisonment, it does not violate any regular procedure in its enforcement and applicable of a certain class. The question on improper exercise of police power Police power, as said is the least limitable of all inherent powers such that the state can limit the liberty and property of its citizens for the promotion of general welfare. It is geared towards self-protection and public prosperity and comfort. In the case at bar, the Act in question aims to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles towards their moral and intellectual growth. Thus, it has lawful subject and reasonable means of enforcement. Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (land for the landless case) Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. They question the validity of the implementation of the CARP Law, contending that it is violative of their right to the equal protection clause. The Act in question primarily states that landowners will retain five to the maximum of seven hectares of their land and the excess will be given to tenant farmers, depending on the terrain, viable family size and fertility of the soil. They alleged that in the CARP law implementation, agricultural landowners are the only class that will carry the burden of the effects of the law and not any other land owners, thus, violating their right to equal protection of the law? Issue: Does the contention tenable? Held: No. The equal protection clause provided by the constitution is defined as all person or things similarly situated must be treated alike as to both rights conferred and liabilities imposed. And as held in the Cayat case, the valid classification test should occur.
In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class so as not to be bounded by the CARP Law. All of the petitioners are in the same class such that they are all agricultural landowners as contemplated by legislation. There are substantial distinction between agricultural landowners and non-agricultural landowners. The purpose of the law is to give land to the landless to balance the distribution of ownership of land resources among the people, not to mention the constitutional provision that the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. And this purpose of the law does not only meant to answer existing condition since such condition of imbalance opportunity and ownership to one of the most important resource in earth has been existent long before the implementation of the CARP Law. Thus, base from the case at bar, the requirement of valid classification has been met. People vs. Vera (Probation case) Facts: This case involves Act 4221 or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7th branch)heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA 4221, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity? Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. It is clear that under the Act in question, promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection, by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system, it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines, however, if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive peoples right to equal protection of law, then the law should be annulled, since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification, 2 requisites will be wanting. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition, however, the element of substantial distinctions, whereas there is a real and not to capricious differences cannot be established and
second, since discretion is delegated to provincial boards, it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. Act 4221 is repugnant to the constitution (Art Bill of Rights) Marcos vs. CA (A case of insatiable love for money resulting to paranoia) Facts: RTC Manila Br. 26 under respondent judge Loja Sr, convicted Imelda Marcos pursuant to Circular 960 of the Central Bank. The public respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hence, the petitoner filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the public respondent. The circular in question consolidated the various rules promulgated by the CB. One of these rules under the circular is that it requires all resident who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports on such earnings or receipts on prescribed forms with the proper CB departments and to register with the foreign Exchange department of the CB within 90 days from Oct. 21 1983. Violation of the said circular imposes criminal charges. On Dec 21 1991, marcos was allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad specifically the SBC on various dates from 68 to 91 without prior authorization from CB as contemplated under the circular in question. During the pendency of the case in the trial court, circular 1353 was issued repealing all circulars inconsistent therewith including the circular in question, however, circular 1353 has a saving clause, stating that pending criminal charges from the violation of CB circular 960 and 1318 will not be affected by the repeal. Using circular 1318 as ground, the petition filed a motion to quash the charges filed against her but however denied by the lower court, resulting to an appeal to the public respondent, contesting that the lower court has no jurisdiction since the charges was committed outside Philippine territory and that the saving clause in Circular 1318 was designed to preserve criminal charges against her, violating her right to equal protection. She even avers that the saving clause was not germane to the purpose of the law, which is to stabilize the monetary system, but purely, for the purpose of preserving the criminal charges against her. Issue: Was the contention correct such that it denies the petitioners right to due process? Held: No. In fact, the petitioners contention that the circular was issued for the purpose of stabilizing the monetary system in the Philippines is exactly the reason why the government punishes as criminal offenses the violation of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibility and function. The saving clause, thus then is anchored on the need to continue the prosecution of all of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The saving clause thus indeed germane to the purpose of the circular in question, and not merely to the paranoid and whimsical contention of the petitioner that it is lodged to preserve criminal charges against her, thereby not repugnant with the equal protection clause.
Himagan vs. People (murderreeerr-reklamador) The petitioner is a policeman assigned in a medical company of the PNP at Camp catitigan in Davao City. He was accused of murder and attempted murder of Benjamin and Bernabe machitar respectively. Pursuant to DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6875), the petitioner was suspended by virtue of the order of the court under the respondent Judge, until the termination of the case. Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus to lift his suspension in the ground that under PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, his suspension should only be limited to 90 days since as a member of PNP and pursuant to RA 6975, the Civil service Decree also applies to him, thus, his suspension should not exceed 90 days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws since members of the PNP are the only class covered by the Civil Service law to be suspended in accordance to RA 6975 and not under PD 807. Issue: Was the contention tenable in so far as equal protection of law is concerned? Held: No. The petitioner misread the distinction between the application of RA 6975 and PD 807 in so far as his defense is concerned. The petitioners was charged of a criminal offense considered as a grave felony as compared to violation of RA Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices act, thus, in accordance with the deliberation of the legislature, RA 6975 which imposes suspension of more than prescribed by the Civil Service Decree provides stricter rules on prevention to members of the PNP. Second, PD 807 cannot be applied if it runs inconsistent with RA 6975. To hold that the preventive suspension imposed against the petitioner invalid is incorrect. This is so since the reason why policemen are given an imposition of suspension during the duration of the case if committed criminal offense with a penalty of more than 6 years and one day is that, policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can or may use to harass or intimidate witnesses against and may result to their silence. Thus, there is a valid classification and satisfies the reasonable classification test. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. PJA vs. Prado (An Exercise of self-preservation) The petitioners are judges of the lower court who questions the constitutionality of RA 7354, which withdraws the postal privileges of the SC, CA, RTC. MTC, LRC and Registers of Deeds. They contend that the implementation of the law in question by the respondents is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary such that it denies them of equal protection clause provided under the constitution. This is so since the privilege from the Judiciary
is withdrawn but the not the privilege of the Executive and Representatives. The respondents countered the allegations and avers that it is not discriminatory and is based on valid classification. Issue: Was there an invalid classification so as to defeat the equal protection clause? Held: Yes. The law in question is undoubtedly discriminatory and not anchored in a valid classification, thereby, violating the petitioners right to equal protection of the law. The equal protection clause does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction as this might result into unequal protection. And valid classification is anchored on substantial and not whimsical distinction. In the case at bar the court cannot locate a reasonable distinction between those that privilege has been withdrawn and those who are not. If the granting of privilege was based on the necessity of the grantee of such accommodation, the court cannot establish a reasonable justification as to why of all the government branches, it is the judiciary where privilege was withdrawn despite of the great need of such privilege of the judiciary in judicial proceedings, specifically communication with lawyers and litigants and the fact that the judiciary receive the least appropriation among the three branches. It is also in the opinion of the court that the contention of the respondents that the privilege of the judiciary must be withdrawn to prevent the crippling of the postal corporation since a large volume of mails came from this branch. The court says that sustaining such contention would mean that privilege should be withdrawn to those who are in need like the judiciary and not to those who does not really needs such privilege such as widows of former Presidents. Thus, the first element of substantial distinction that would picture a valid classification is wanting in the case at bar. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons (The case of Bakit ngaun ka lang Hernandezretroactivity) Facts: The petitioners, Gumabon, Bagolbagol. Agapito and Padua pleaded guilty in the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, kidnapping and arson, imposed to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and since imprisonment, they have served their sentence to 13 years. Subsequently, a case was adjudicated by the SC involving the same offense of rebellion complexed with kidnapping, robbery and arson and that the court ruled that there is no such complex crime under the contemplation of Art 134 of the RPC. In line with the new jurisprudence, the petitioners filed an original petition for habeas corpus, contending that by virtue of the PP vs. Hernandez case and that the petitioner had already served the maximum penalty that could have been impose on him, he should be entitled to liberty and his detention is illegal. Moreover, the petitioners assert that they were being deprived of their constitutional right to due process since in the similar charges in the Hernandez case, where the petitioners charged and convicted under the same law, the petitioners suffered reclusion perpetua while in the Hernandez case, the defendant only suffers prision mayor. Issue:
Should the petitioners be freed by virtue of the mandate of the equal protection clause? Held: Yes. The mandate of equal protection o the law stresses out that persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike with respect to their rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Thus, it calls for a uniform operation of legal norms to all persons similarly situated. In the case at bar, the petitioners and the defendant in the Hernandez case are similarly situated such that they are both charged of the same offense and punished by the same law, thus both persons belongs to the same class and has substantial similarities to each other and difference from all other classes. However, the latter has lesser penalty imposed as compared to the petitioners, thus, there is inequality of protection of the law. Base from the principle ingrained in the RPC, the jurisprudence applied to the Hernandez case should be retroactively applied to the petitioners and therefore must be granted liberty. Note: Criminal Law By virtue of the Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar Case (186 SCRA 217), affirming the landmark case of People vs. Hernandez, the Supreme Court called the attention of the Congress to modify the RPC provision on Rebellion, either to raise the penalty or the provide a clear cut definition to demarcate crimes that can or cannot be absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, the Legislative department enacted the Coup detat Law (RA 6968), which now provides that common crimes involving killings, serious violence, robbery, rape and others, even though committed by rebels in furtherance of rebellion shall bring about a complex crime. The crime of Rebellion can now be complexed with other common crimes. Please read People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil 515) and Ponce Enrile vs Salazar Case, and the explanation of Atty. Abelardo Estrada in his book Review Notes in Criminal Law. Lacson vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: After the incident of the Kuratong Baleleng rub out which is allegedly committed by the petitioner, Chief Superintendent Panfilo Lacson, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation and not a rub out as alleged. However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder filed before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same information as accessories after-the-fact. After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended information before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged
only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused Inspector Alvarez was dropped from the case. On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 [Entitled "An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended."] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 [Entitled "An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended."] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated March 26, 1996.9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan, this motion was opposed by the petitioners. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended information on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 Petition; (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412, (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" form the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. Moreover, under Section 7 of the said law, the transitory provision prescribes that the amended law shall be applicable to all cases pending in any court over which the trial has not yet began as of the approval thereof. And under Section 4, Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, brings the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and in the case at bar, it is a multiple murder allegedly committed by PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank, which is well-within the provision of the law. Thus, pursuant to RA 8349, which amends the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan issued
an addendum, granting the motion for reconsideration by the Special Prosecutor praying for the retention of the case under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of RA 8249 and alleging that it is violative of the petitioners right to due process and equal protection of law. The petitioners argue that the passage of the law is timed to frustrate their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan rules and that it is timed specifically for the purpose of retaining their criminal case under the Sandiganbayan, thereby violating their equal protection of law. Issue: Is there a violation of equal protection of law against the petitioners? Held: No. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. In relation with the first requisite the law must be based on substantial distinction, the classification between 1) those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against 2) those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan38 [Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia.] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 [Petition, p. 17.] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
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Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines. However, the amended information does not alleged that the Kuratong Baleleng rub out was committed in line of the petitioners official duty to render the case under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but it was alleged as a plain act of murder, thereby, the case is remanded in RTC Quezon City. The law in question is declared constiotutional. Basco vs. Pagcor Facts: The petitioners are lawyers who filed an instant petition before the SC seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter 1869, on the following grounds. A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; "B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; "C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization." D. Allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, (11Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.) Issue: Was there a breach of equal protection of the law? Held: No. the contention is without merit. We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries
and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. "If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) "The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651 Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy (from the dissenting opinions of J. Melo and J. Francisco) Facts: RA 8180 was promulgated on 1996 aiming to deregulate the downstream Oils industry in the Philippines. Pursuant to Section 5 of the law in questin, it imposes a different tariff rate of 3% to imported crude oil and 7% rate on imported refined petroleum products. Respondents aver that the difference in tariff rates is designed to encourage new oil players to invest in refineries in the country. This is so since the different imposition of tariff rates will entice new oil players to establish refineries in the country and to import crude oil which has lesser tariff rate rather than importing a refined petroleum which has a greater tariff rates. The petitioners think otherwise. In a consolidated petition, the petitioners seek to declare some isolated provisions RA 8180 unconstitutional in the ground that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported petroleum products violate the equal protection of the laws. The petitioners argues that the difference of imposition of tariff rates between those who imports crude oil and those players who imports refined petroleum is based on unreasonable classification, and that the law rather favors the existing oil players in the country who has established their refineries, In relation to this contention, the petitioners further avers that it runs afoul to the constitutional provision that the government shall regulate or prohibit monopolies and that unfair competition in the market shall not be allowed. Issue: Does section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the constitution? Held: No. In relation to the contention that the law in question violates equal protection of laws: We must identify if there is a valid and reasonable cassification. 1, The classification is based on real and substantial distinction. There is substantial distinction between those who imports crude oil and those who imports refined petroleum. The former has invested a large amount of money to established and maintain a refinery in the Philippines, thereby they have higher production cost, which prompted the government to lessen the tariff rate imposed on them in importing crude oils, as compared new players who does not have refineries and thereby directly importing a refined petroleum, they have lower expenses in engaging in the
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competition since they will have to distribute petroleum and not to refine them anymore, thereby prompting the government to impose higher tariff rates. Leveling the tariff rates would otherwise promote an unfair competition in the oil industry since both players will be competing in an uneven field. 2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law. It is clear that the imposition of different tariff rates is in accordance with the purpose of the law to 1) to regulate fair prices 2) to protect the consumers 3) to ensure the continuous supply of oil products in the country 4) protect the consumers as well as oil players from fly-by-night oil players that only aims to have an immediate profit without serious consideration in investing and supplying steady supply of oil products in the Philippines. By doing so, then the government would encourage new players to compete in the oil industry in the Philippines and not otherwise bar them from doing so. 3. It must no be limited to existing conditions only. It is clear that Philippines has already experiencing oil crisis because of fluctuation of oil prices in the international market. Thus, this measure cannot be limited only to existing condition.
Equal protection of Laws II

Dumlao vs. Comelec Facts: The petitioners, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, and Alfredo Salapantan, questions the constitutionality of sec. 4 of BP 52 as it is discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection clause. The law in question provides a special disqualification to those who are retired provincial, municipal or city official who have received their retirement benefits, who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: No. Equal protection of laws is anchored in valid and reasonable classification. This anchored in the reasoning that the state is permitted to apply different treatment of the law to different classes provided that such classification is base in a substantial and valid classification and not base in a capricious and arbitrary classification. For a valid classification, 4 elements should be present as decided in People vs. Vera. 1) The classification is base in a substantial classification, real differences of classes should be established 2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law 3) must be based not only in existing classification 4) applies to all members of a class. In the case at bar, all of the requisites are attained. In the first requisites, there might or may not be a reasonable classification since there are retirees who are below 65 years of age, however the Supreme Court ruled that it should be anchored to the purpose of the law, which is, to provide an opportunity of a new blood in government service, thus, such classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Note: The issue of locus standi by the petitioner is not well establish since the petitioner failed to assert the impending or actual adverse effect of the law in question to their interest in such case. The judicial review is granted to the SC as prescribed under Art. VIII, Section 5 (2), (a) and (b).
4. Must apply to all members of the same class. As stated, the different tariff rates are applied to all classes of the same class. It will not only benefit the existing oil players in the country but also benefits different oil players, whether crude or petroleum-exporting corporation. The tariff rates are uniformly applied to all members of the same class.
Note: However, the SC rendered the decision favoring the contention of the petitioners. They opined that the imposition of different tariff rates to different players placed the major league players (Petron, Shell and Caltex) in immense advantage because it will discouraged the entrance of new players in the industry to compete in the Market. Oil players, who has no refineries, will compete against the big three will be forced to increase their cost up to 4 percent so as not to sustain heavy loss. Thereby, there is violation of equal protection of law, because the law in question favors the big three. Moreover, the provision of the law in question about minimum inventory requirement is disadvantageous to players who imports refined petroleum and does not have storage and refining facilities and again favors the big three who has an established storage and refining facilities. Again violating the equal protection of the laws. Another, is that the prohibition of the law in question about predatory pricing, wherein the government prohibits the selling of oil products in an unreasonably below average cost so as to attract consumers is also detrimental to the oil industry competition because of its anti-competitive nature.
Antonio Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho Facts: The respondent, Hiu, is an employed alien in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI Manila Branch I, questioning the constitutionality of Ordinance 6537. The ordinance in question requires aliens in the city of manila to secure a employment permit from the city before engaging in any retail, trade, occupation or business in the city, it also imposes a P50.00 regulatory tax fee to aliens employed in the City. There is also imposable penalty in violating the said ordinance. The Lower court declared the ordinance in question as null and void for being violative of due process and equal protection of the law. The petitioner-mayor, then filed a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the lower court. Issue:
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Whether or not the ordinance in question is violative of due process? Held: Yes. The lower court did erred in declaring the ordinance null and void. As decided, equal protection requires valid and substantial classification base from real distinction. The imposition of P50.00 as a regulatory fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but also the ordinance in question fails to establish real and valid differences between aliens who are required to pay it, whether the alien is casual or permanently employee, fulltime or part-time, whether a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Moreover, the ordinance in question is considered an arbitrary and undefined legislation that violates the rights of equal protection. This is so since, the ordinance in question failed to provide the limitations of the exercise of the delegated power of the petitioner and that it does not provide the purposes to be attained by requiring permit for aliens before engagement of business or employment. Aliens, once admitted in the Philippines, is also entitled to the benefits of shelter of equal protection and due process laws. Ceniza vs. Comelec Facts: Sometime December 199, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51, providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. The law in questions provides that any city existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than 40M at the time of the approval shall be classified as highly urbanized city and all other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. To implement the law in question, the respondent Comelec enacted Resolution no 1421, which provides the instruction of voting provincial officials from highly urbanized and component cities. The Resolution provides that registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the elction of the officials of the province of which the city is a component, if its charter provides, but in voters in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. The effect of the law in question results to inconsistencies with other city. Two of which are; City of Cebu is considered as a highly urbanized city and its charter allows that registered voters can elect provincial officials, but pursuant to the law in question, they cannot. Also the City of Mandaue is classified as a component city but cannot vote on provincial officials since their charter prohibits them to do so. Thus, a taxpayer suit was instituted by the petitioners led by Ramon Ceniza, assailing the validity of BP 51, on which uses the annual income as basis for classification arbitrary and is not germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: Whether or not annual income as basis a reasonable and valid distinction. Whether or not BP 51 is not germane to the purposes of the law. Held: Yes. It is a substantial distinction and it is with accordance to the purpose of the law.
In the issue of its relativity to the purpose of the law, What the law in question seeks to effectuate is the constitutional provision as prescribed in the Principal and State Policies that the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, specially the barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. By enacting BP 51, it defines a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall independent from the provincial government and officials. By virtue of city classification set by BP 51, then cities, with capability of independence and self-reliance will be detached from the supervisory powers of the provincial government. Because the revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic and political unit. Also, it will show whether or not the city has a sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is located. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. Thus, if a city will have an annual income as set which is 40M, then it would be self-reliant to mange itself and the provincial will no longer lend its assistance, thus corollary to their independence, is equal to the loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs specifically in electing provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any jurisdiction and authority over these highly urbanized cities. Rufino Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: On 1979, by virtue of the PD 1486 as amended by PD 1606, RA 1379 was passed supplemented by another act, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner, Rufino Nunez was convicted by the public respondent, Sandiganbayan, of Estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. The petitioner filed a motion to quash in constitutional and jurisdictional grounds but was denied by the respondent. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that PD 1486 as amended is violative of his right to equal protection of laws. The petitioner contends that 1) an appeal, as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion, 2) appeal also was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidences and 3) there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC instead of traditional two chances, CA then SC. He also avers that other Estafa indictess are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts. Issue: Was the law in question, amending the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, violates the right of equal protection? Held: No it is not. The court ruled that the law in question satisfies the requisites laid under the People vs. Vera case, warranting it as a valid and reasonable classification. Base on substantial distinction. Since the institution of the 1973 constitution, there is already an established different procedures for an accused, a private citizen or a public official, and it is not necessarily a breach to equal protection of law.
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Germane to the purposes of the law Sandiganbayan is created to promote a accountable and honest public service since as constitution provides, public office/service is a public trust. Moreover, this special court is created in a purpose of providing remedy to a problem, which is, dishonesty in public service. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Makasiar Persons who are charged with Estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and government-owned and - controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive. It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex post facto laws. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability - and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine. P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other defendants indicted before other trial courts. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases - appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the
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Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being downgraded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan" There is no such provision in any law or in the annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefore by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentarypresidential government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of the courts. Note: It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts. Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction Jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in GOCCs, in relation to their office as maybe determined by law.- RA 1379 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor Of The State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer Or Employee And Providing For The Proceedings Therefor. Sison Jr. vs. Ancheta Facts: BP 135 was enacted and provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on 1) taxable compensation income 2) taxable net income 3) royalties, prices and other winning 4) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements 5) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership 6) adjusted gross income. Thus, the law in question imposes different tax rate to different taxpayers. 1) on net income and 2) compensation income, taxpayers. The petitioner, Antero M. Sison, filed a taxpayer suit for declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding on the validity of Section I BP 135 contending that BP 135 is oppressive and arbitrary in character and violative of the due process clause. Issue: Does the revenue measures set by BP 135 arbitrary? Held: No.
The revenue measures are anchored in a substantial distinction between taxpayers ability to pay taxes. It is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Citizens Surety vs. Puno Facts: Pursuant to Resolution 542, only laborers (obreros) who are bona fide residents in Manila whose wages does not exceed P180.00 or P6.00 a day shall have the privilege of buying lots in Barrio Obrero, Tondo Manila. The petitioner filed an appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the respondent court, contending that the Resolution in question is null and void because it bars nonlaborers to acquire lots, wherein there are also non-laborers who may exceed monthly salary as provided in the Resolution but still considered poor, thereby it is an arbitrary classification violating the due process clause? Issue: Was there an arbitrary classification? Held: No. There is a justifiable and reasonable basis to limit the sale of lots- lowly paid laborers. Lowly paid laborers are not with same class as that of lowly paid non-obreros. Moreover, the resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter of the City which is to give lots to bona fide resident of the city on easy terms, and secondary priority to laborers and low salaried employees. Peralta vs. Comelec Facts: PD 1296 otherwise known as Election Code of 1978 was enacted and provides voting system. The law in question allows either individual voting or block voting. In a consolidated petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, the petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law in question, contending that the straight party voting system is violative of the equal protection of law, because it provides undue favor to party candidates and arbitrary against independent candidates. Issue: Whether or not the straight party voting system discriminate independent candidates. Held: No. Block voting is permitted in the Philippine electoral system.
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Freedom of association entails privileges and benefits, consequential or incidental to such membership. It is an extension of individual freedom. In relation to the requisites of valid classification, candidates of a political party are distinguishable from independent candidates. The former are bound by the parties rules. They owe loyalty to the party, its tenets, its policies, platforms and programmes for the government. To the electorate, they represent the party, principles, ideals and objectives, which is not true to independent candidates. If the electoral law has bias in favor of political parties, it is because political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated." If the independent candidates are to be prejudiced by the adoption of the optional block-voting scheme, the resulting harm to their candidacy is attributable to their decision to run as such. There is nothing to prevent them from joining a party or aggrupation and hoping to be nominated as candidates. Any adversity suffered by them comes under the heading of a self-inflicted wound. Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee. The block voting scheme offends the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and is furthermore proscribed by the express injunction of the new provision in Article XII, section 9 (1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Petitioner Peralta as an independent La Union candidate complains with reason that he is unfairly discriminated against and prejudiced by the block voting scheme in that "there are three ways to vote for a KIBALI [Kilusang ng Bagong Lipunan] candidate: (1) by writing his name, (2) by writing KIBALI and (3) by writing NACIONALISTA, on the ballot. On the other hand, there is but one way to vote for an independent, like petitioner, only by writing his name." Actually, the arbitrary and oppressive edge given the KBL candidate against an independent candidate amounts to 6 to 1 for judicial notice may be taken of the ballot subject of the petition in Case L-47883 entitled "Lakas ng Bayan (Laban) vs. Comelec" complaining against the double listing of KBL candidates in Metro Manila where the Comelec recognizes three additional ways of voting for a KBL candidate viz by writing (4) KBL (5) NP (for Nacionalista Party) or (6) just a plain N unless enjoined by the Court in said pending case. Said petitioner further aptly observes that "under martial law where the freedom, privileges and immunities of the citizens are curtailed or suspended, the evils of block voting are enhanced to a hundredfold."
Issue: Was all of the requirements of the equal protection met by the resolution. Held: No. Requisites provided under PP vs. Cayat is wanting. The resolution only points out to tax centrifugal sugar milled and exported at the petitioner, and none other sugar-milling companies. For a classification to be valid, it should be related not only to existing conditions only, but also in the future. In the time of the enactment, even if the petitioner is the only existing sugar milling company available, it would still be arbitrary since it does not include others where the petitioner is in the same class. Sustaining the constitutionality of the resolution would mean that other subsequently installed sugar milling company would not be bounded by the resolution. The resolution is unconstitutional. Flores vs. Comelec Facts: The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679. He was voted punong barangay during the 1982 elections, a separate position as that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, protected the result and filed a protect before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicated Flores, should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to them. In his defense, the petitioner argued that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the same full name and one of them is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is counted in favor of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent and subsequently declared him as the punong barangay. Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he is also an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should be entitled by the rule. Issue: Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule? Held: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his position as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not within the same class as that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be regarded as running for the same office.
Ormoc Sugar vs. Ormoc City Facts: Sometime 1964, the Municipal Board of ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of sugar milled the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc in Ormoc City a Municipal tax equivalent to one (1%) percent export sale to the US and other foreign countries. The petitioner, being the subject of the said resolution filed a suit before the CFI Leyte, contending the said resolution is violative of the Equal protection of laws. The lower court upheld the constitutionality sustaining the defense of the respondent that the resolution is well within the boundaries set by the Local Autonomy Act to include all forms of taxing power of the Municiapal Board. Hence this petition.
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There is a substantial distinction between Punong barangay and kagawad. The former is vested with executive power and the latter legislative power pursuant to the LGC. Note: In 1982 procedures, there are separate election for Punong barngay and members of the Sanguniang pambarangay. In 1989 elections, the only disputed position for direct election is the Kagawad and PB will be granted by operation of law to the highest vote earned.
1.
2.
Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Define probable Cause? Who determines Probable cause?

Probable Cause, Defined Such facts and Circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the th offense are in the place sought to be searched (20 Century Fox Film. Corp. vs. CA) De Los Santos vs. Montesa Facts: This case came from the Criminal Case for the murder of Reyes et. al in San Juan Del Monte Bulacan. After the submission of an investigation by the State Prosecutor, RTC of Malolos Bulacan issued a warrant of Arrest. First, the accused filed a petition to grant bail and to Reduce Bail, subsequently withdrawn and rather filed an urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest for lack of existence of probable cause. After an examination of the lower court of the case and documents forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause, but instead of issuing of correspondent Arrest Warrant for acquiring jurisdiction of the persons involved in the crime, the respondent judge granted the petition for bail despite of the its withdrawal and lack of hearing where the prosecution would have been accorded the right to present evidence showing the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus the petitioner filed an administrative complaint charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and evident dishonesty in his exercise of his function. Issue: What should be the procedure in the determination of the existence of a probable cause? Held: What the respondent judge had in mind in the case at bar is that, since he believed that the evidence agisnt the accused are purely circumstantial and weak, he resolved to granting the petition of the accused to grant bail in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over these persons instead of issuing warrant of arrest and set hearing for the prosecutions presentation of evidence. He is thus then confused in the procedure of determining the existence of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrant and proceedings for admission to bail. What the court is given prerogative by the constitution in accordance to Sec. 2 Art III is that, it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause, hearing is not necessary. In satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either
The judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. Thus, once a judge found the probable cause, what he should have to do is to issue warrants of arrest and admission to bail shall only be granted once persons are apprehended and are under their jurisdiction. Lim vs. Felix Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutors certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
2.
Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judgex x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge.
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3.
Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release.
In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant). Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE. Amarga vs. Abbas Facts: The respondent Judge, Macapanton Abbas, after receiving; 1) An information with a certification stating that the petitioner fiscal, Amarga has conducted a sufficient preliminary investigation pursuant to the provision of RA 732, and 2) One supporting affidavit of one witness (Jubair) stating that he saw the deceased Dugusan Paspasan was shot and killed by three gunmen, Dismissed the criminal handled by the petitioner against Appang et. al on the ground that; 1) The affidavit of Jubair is hearsay and does not possess gravity for the establishment of the existence of probable cause. So as the certification of the petitioner fiscal wont warrant the existence of probable cause.
No. The constitution mandates that the determination of probable cause depends upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate in issuing warrant of arrest. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged In the case at bar, the petitioners certification that he had already conducted a preliminary investigation in the case does not sufficiently warrant the existence of probable cause. Nor the single affidavit submitted to the respondent as it is not enough for the respondent judge to exercise his judicial function to determine the existence of probable cause. However, the petition is granted to continue the hearing of the case in the ground of lack of prosecution and that refusal of the prosecution to submit additional affidavit is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a case.
20 Century Fox vs. CA Facts: After surveillance and investigation, petitioner, with the NBI apllied for three separate search warrants against the video outlets owned by private respondents, Barretto et al, and was subsequently granted and issued by the lower court. The applicants did not present the master tapes and the pirated tapes upon their application of search warrant. Instead, only the deposition of two NBI witnesses served as the basis for the existence of probable cause. Subsequently, the lower court lifted the three issued search warrants in the ground that the articles seized, which were still under the custody of NBI, could not be a basis for any criminal prosecution. Issue: Was there an establishment of probable cause for the issuance of search warrant against the respondent? Held: None. The probable cause is wanting in the issuance of the search warrant. As ingrained by law and jurisprudence, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offenses are in the place sought to be searched. The existence of probable cause requires that there should be a personal knowledge by the complainant and witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the issued search warrant on the ground of the discovery that the NBI witnesses does not have personal knowledge that the crime of Piracy has been committed. The deposition of such witnesses cannot provide a sufficient existence of probable cause necessary for the issuance of search warrant. Moreover, in accordance with PD 49 (Anti Film Piracy), the essence of such law is the similarity of the pirated and the copyrighted work. Thus, the applicants must present the court the copyrighted films and compare them with the evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether or not the crim has been violated. In the case at bar, the applicants does not provide any evidences 9master tapes and pirated tapes) that would convince the judge that violation of PD 49 has been
th
2)
Therefore, there can be no prima facie evidence as to necessity for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus contending that petitioner has already conducted a preliminary examination and thus it is ministerial function for the respondent to issue arrest warrants. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is probable cause, independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under Republic Act No. 732; and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a prima facie case. Issue: Whether or not the certification of a prosecutor is sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest. Held:
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committed, and therefore for the existence of probable cause. The articles included in the search warrant is couched in general term, making it a general warrant which is prohibited under the Constitution. Note: Search and Seizure, guaranteed rights. Protects a citizen against unreasonable searchers invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, houses, papers and effects. The privacy of a person must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need and only under stringent procedural safeguards. Thus, the government so as not to make arrest, search and seizure unreasonable should strictly follow constitutional and statutory guidelines.
1)
2)
3)
Moreover, there is also irregularity in the printing of the search warrant, wherein the crime of bribery Art 210 of RPC was superimposed by ink, which was originally Art. 282. In the case at bar, the search warrant presented was in the case of grave threats directed against the nephew of the petitioner (nephew), thus, the confiscation of he money is not related to the articles seized. The search team also violated statutory guidelines for a lawful search since there is no members of the household present while others are searching the premises. Thus it is planted and orchestrated search. Also the respondents also violated the statutory guidelines that they should issue a detailed receipt of articles seized.
Quintero vs. NBI (Marcos manipulation) Facts: After the expose of the petitioner, Eduardo Quintero st of the 1 district of Leyte in the 1971 Con-con alleging that some delegates, including him, in the Con-con are under the payroll of the first lady and then President Marcos, NBI agents raided the houses of the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant issued by the respondent Judge Elias Asuncion. The raid confiscated an amount of money amounting to 379K. The said search warrant was base from the application of two persons. One is from the affidavit of st Congressman Artemio Mate, also from 1 district of Leyte and an NBI Agent Samuel Castro, alleging that the petitioner committed the crime of bribery. The affidavit of the latter applicant however showed that he has no personal knowledge about the allegations against the petitioner. The affidavit of the statements of the Congressman also shows that his allegations are anchored upon speculations. No sufficient evidence is presented to the respondent judge. Issue: Was there an establishment of the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. The allegations and the statements of the applicants are merely anchored on hearsay and speculations. As ingrained under jurisprudence (Roan vs. Gonzales as cited), in application for a search warrant, if based on hearsay, sannot, standing alone justify the issuance of search warrant. Thus, it is indispensable that the applicants should have personal knowledge of the crime committed. In the case at bar, the deposition of the NBI agent is based on hearsay in which only and anchored on the information given by Cong. Mata. Moreover, the deposition of Cong. Mata cannot establish that he has a direct personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of the petitioner since his affidavit shows that it is only based on speculation. The element of directness and definiteness is wanting so as to establish his personal knowledge. Not to mention, there is no concrete evidence that would support their accusation, so as to validly establish probable cause. Irregularities:
The lifting of the respondent judge of the search warrant are null and void.
Presidential Anti-Dollar vs. CA (quasi-judicial body daw) Facts: The petitioner, PADS, is the presidents arm assigned to investigate and prosecute :dollar-salting activities in the country pursuant to PD 1936. Sometime 1985, PADS issued a search warrant against respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co. et al. Atty. Gatmaitan of Bureau of Customs applied for a Search warrant, a deputized member of PADS with attached affidavit by Castro, an investigator and operative of PADS. After the search procedure, the respondent contested the search warrant and subsequently declared by the lower court null and void. The respondent CA initially favored the petitioner stating that it is a quasi judicial body that ranks with RTC and that, lower courts has no jurisdiction to declare the issued search warrants of the petitioners null and void. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner Karamfil and subsequently, November of the same year, the respondent CA reversed itself. Thus, the petitioner filed an appeal alleging that the respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction by validating the restraining of the lawful orders or decrees issued by the petitioner as a quasi judicial body by the lower Court. This is so since the petitioner contends that they are quasi-judicial body that ranks with the RTC. Issue: As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals ---- the Court of Appeals and this Court. Held: Quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." Thus, these bodies has the basic function to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, unless its decisions are appealed to proper reviewing authorities. In the case at bar, the PADS is not meant to exercise quasi judicial function, that is to decide and try claims and execute its judgments, its only task is to handle the prosecution of salting or black marketing activities and nothing more.
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However, the enabling statute of the petitioner empowers them to determine the existence of probable cause and therefore power to issue warrants of arrest or search and seizure however it does not make them co-equal with RTC nor make this agency semi-court. Note: Kinds of quasi-Judicial agencies: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31 PD 1936, the enabling unconstitutional, reason. statute of PADS is
that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
Soliven vs. Makasiar (A controversial case) This case softens the doctrine laid down by the BACHE case where the court states that the judge should personally depose the complainants and witnesses under oath and in writing in determining the existence of probable cause. This is a responsibility that should not be delegated to clerk of court or other authority. Facts: This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar. In the case filed by Beltran, he alleged that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner for the crime of libel, without the respondent judge personally examining the complainant and witnesses for the determination of probable cause. The petitioner contend that the constitution requires that the judge should personally examine the complainant and/or witness for the determination of probable cause and therefore issue an arrest warrant. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: No. (Sadly) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. Pendon vs. CA (Similar Case with the 20th Century Fox) Facts:
Under the constitution, the existence of probable cause is under the sole responsibility and discretion of a judge, who, must be neutral and prudent enough for his exercise of conducting preliminary examination of the facts and circumstances of the case submitted by the fiscal. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to
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Sometime February of 1987, 1 Lt. Felipe Rojas, Officer in charge of the Philippine Constabulary - Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for a search warrant, alleging that KENER Trading is the possession of some NAPOCOR Properties, contrary to anti-fencing law. His application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes Magallanes of MTC Bacolod City supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City. Search warrant was issued by the lower court and then proceeded the search operation, seizing some articles from the premises. The petitioner, Pendon, filed an application for the return of the articles seized by the PC-CIS contending that the search warrant is illegally issued, which, however denied by the lower court. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for mandamus certiorari and prohibition in the CA assailing the legality of the Search Warrant, which also was denied by the CA stating that there is an existence of a probable cause. The petitioner contend that the applicants for the assailed warrants has no personal knowledge that the articles sought to be seized were stolen. Moreover, he also alleged that there is irregularities with the contents of the joint deposition of the two witnesses and that there is no personal examination conducted by the judge as required by the law and the rules. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is illegally issued. Held: Yes. The assailed search warrant was illegally issued. The constitution provides that search warrants are issued based solely on probable cause. And in determining probable cause, it is required that 1) 2) 3) The judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally; The examination must be under oath; and The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers
st
Moreover, the items to be confiscated listed in the SW is couched on general terms, therefore considered as a prohibited general warrants. (Galvanized bolts, aluminum wires and other Napocor tower and line parts and accessories) The items confiscated does not also fall under the personal properties that are allowed to be seized under the law. Thus the petition is granted and the articles are ordered to be return since possession thereof is not prohibited by the law. Note: Anti Fencing Law, commission of, in the case at bar, The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612) Personal properties that may be confiscated in accordance with the law, enumerate Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure a) The subject of an offense; b) Stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. If the law does not prohibit the possession of the articles sought, it should be returned to the owner.
People vs. Inting (similar to De Los Santos case) Preliminary inquiry of the prosecutor does not bind the judge for the determination of probable cause Facts:
And also, such finding of probable cause should be substantiated by the records. In the case at bar, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. Affidavits of the complainants and witness are not sufficient for determining a probable cause. Pursuant to the Anti fencing law, the records also shows that the questions asked during the deposition cannot support the finding of the probable cause There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof.
Sometime 1988, Editha Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC Mayor of Tanjay, Negros oriental with the Comelec for transferring her to a remote barangay without prior clearance from the Comelec. The complaint was handled by the provincial election Supervisor of Dumaguete City, atty. Gerardo Lituanas . after his investigation, he found prima facie evidence and then filed to the respondent Trial court under Judge Enrique Inting a criminal case in violation of Sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election Code against the OIC Mayor. An arrest warrant was issued but later set aside on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine the existence of probable cause. Hence this petition. Issue: Does the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Comelec has the jurisdiction to find the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. the phrase under Sec 2 Art II of the Constitution which reads and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law has been deleted, making the determination for the existence of a probable cause under the sole responsibility and discretion of a Judge.
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It should be distinguished that preliminary investigation for the determination of a probable cause is vested with the authority of Judges (Judicial in nature) and while preliminary investigation in determining whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore should be subjected to litigation is vested to the authority of the prosecutor (executive in nature). The separate kinds of preliminary investigation has been delineated and that the latter kind has been deleted to the authorities of judges (preliminary investigation proper). What the constitution vested the Comelec is to investigate and prosecute cases in violation of election laws (Art. IX Sec 2), however, this does not mean that the power to determine the existence of probable cause is within the scope of their authority, but rather, they are empowered only in purpose in assisting the Judge to determine the probable cause and for filing for an information. Note: The Prosecutor cannot assume roles in the prosecution of election offenses, if he has, it is because he is deputized by the Comelec to handle such election offenses. Umil vs. Ramos Facts: This is a consolidated petition for habeas corpus where the petitioners alleged that their detention is illegal and unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, making the informations filed against them are null and void. The respondents contends otherwise. In this consolidated case, all of the petitioners are charged under the Anti Subversion Law, with an exception to the case of Enrile vs. Lim (Inciting to sedition) and Nazareno vs. Station Commander. The rest are charged guilty of rebellion, a crime against the State, and is a continuing crimes in nature. They were found of the possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunitions as well as subversive documents. Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following. Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another.
Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large. Paderangs vs. Drilon Facts: Felizardo Roxas, was included as a co-accused in an amended information for the murder of Bucag et. al. The respondent state prosecutor Henrick Gingoyan was designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation and directed to include the petitioner Roxas as a co-accused in the criminal case. Contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed so as to include Roxas as a Co-accused in the case and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of the allege linkage to the crime charged, the petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but was later denied. A petition for Review was subsequently filed in the DOJ but was also denied. Thus, the petitioner filed a suit before the SC contending that preliminary investigation is not yet completed thereby, there is no existing prima facie evidence or probable cause that would justify the petitioners inclusion to the crime charged. Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation is the proper forum to present evidence to prove or disprove the guilt of the party. Held: No. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
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sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Held: Yes. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory requirements, namely; Constitutional Requirements: 1) 2) 3) Must be issued upon probable cause. The Probable cause must be determine by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person In the determination of the probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce, and The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
4)
Statutory Requirements (Rule 126 of Revised Rules of Court) 5) 6) 7) One search warrant for one specific crime/offense. The warrant cannot be served or issued on nighttime, on legal holidays, weekdays, Sundays. Must be on daytime. Should be issued and search with at least two witnesses present in the place where the search and seizure happened.
Section II: Search and Seizure provision

Requisites of a valid search warrant Uy and BIR Facts: Rodrigo Abos, after executing an affidavit and tipping of the NBI, the respondent-judge Mercedez Dadole issues three successive Search Warrants against the petitioner Uy Chin Ho, owner of Unifish Packing Corporation (Mandaue), for violation of Section 253 (attempt to evade and defeat tax) of the NIR Code. After the search, the petitioner filed an appeal to the SC, contending that the respondent judge violated the pertinent provision of the Constitution and Rules of Court in relation with the requisites of a valid search warrant. Thus, they argue that the search warrant is invalid. Contentions 1) In a caption of the A-1 Search Warrant, its address Hernan Cortes St, Cebu City is inconsistent with the address indicated in the succeeding two search warrants which is in Mandaue City. 2) There is also inconsistencies in the name of the persons named in the warrants. A-1 Search Warrants indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy while A-2 indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation. 3) Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place. 4) There is also an allegation that Probable cause is wanting. 5) There is also an alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized. They also alleged that other articles not listed in the warrants were taken (e.g. one composition notebook with Chinese characters, Surety Agreement, One bound gate pass, 2 packs of chemicals and others). Because of these irregularities, the petitioner argues contend that the warrant is invalidated and the objects seized by the police enforcers are inadmissible in evidence. Issue: Was the Search warrant issued by the respondent Judge valid?
The issuing judges disregard of such requirements for the issuance of the search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, and maybe remedied on certiorari. Such disregard will also result to the invalidity of the search warrant. Regarding the arguments of the petitioner: 1) In a caption of the A-1 Search Warrant, its address Hernan Cortes St, Cebu City is inconsistent with the address indicated in the succeeding two search warrants which is in Mandaue City: The validity of the warrant requires that there should be a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Irregularity in this requirement is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. In the case at bar, it was not established that the enforcers have difficulty of locating the place to be searched. The inconsistency of the A-1 warrant would be a sufficient ground for its invalidity. 2) There are also inconsistencies in the name of the persons named in the warrants. A-1 Search Warrants indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy while A-2 indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation. The court held that these discrepancies are hardly relevant. US jurisprudence even dictates that where a warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant. In the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but
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only a search of the premises occupied by them. Inserting their name in the warrant does not violate any constitutional right of the petitioner nor invalidate the warrant. 3) Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place The subsequent warrants issued by the judge merely seeks to correct the inconsistencies and made it more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant is issued and the description of the place to be searched. This allegation does make the warrant invalid.
need to be searched, the respondent judge still employed generic descriptions. The use of generic terms are acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ specific description will render the warrant invalid. However in the case of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices is excusable, the generic description is needed in this case since there is no way to make these documents specified because they are UNREGISTERED. The seizure of these objects is valid. In the case of the objects seized which are not specified in the warrant, it should be returned to the petitioners.
4) There is also an allegation that Probable cause is wanting. Note definition: Probable cause defined, Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in the connection of the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the determination of probable cause, the constitution and the RRC require an examination of the witness under oath. The examination should be probing and exhaustive enough and not for mere routine. The witness in return must testify under oath, it must refer to the truth within their own personal knowledge. The purpose of the oath is to convince the examining magistrate in the existence of probable cause, and that, fraud in the part of the witness will render him liable for perjury. Hearsay wont warrant a probable cause. In the case at bar, the judge deposed Nestor Labaria and Rodrigo Abos. The formers testimonies is based only on hearsay and anchored on a third persons perception. Thus it wont be sufficient enough to warrant probable cause. However, Aboss testimony is sufficient enough to produce probable cause since it is based on his knowledge as a former operating Chief of Unifish. Search Warrant, Defined A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the PPI, signed by the judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. The place to be searched in the warrant is controlling
People vs. CA Judge Cesar Casanova, RTC Malolos Bulacan. Facts: "On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan." "The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and traveling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions." According to the private respondents in their pleading On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30, 1996 . . . to wit: "1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store; 2) That there is no such number as '1207' found in the building as it is correspondingly called only as 'Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;'
4) There is also an alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized. They also alleged that other articles not listed in the warrants were taken (e.g. one composition notebook with Chinese characters, Surety Agreement, One bound gate pass, 2 packs of chemicals and others). The constitution requires that objects to be seized should be particularly described so as to eliminate general warrants. In the case at bar the things to be seized are described as: 1) Multiple sets of Books of Accounts, Ledgers, journals etc. 2) Production record Books. 3) Unregistered delivery receipts. 4) Unregistered Purchase and Sales invoices. 5) Sales, records, Job orders. 6) Corporate Financial Records 7) Bank Statements. The court held that these descriptions failed to conform the requirements set forth by the Constitution. The judge, despite of the witnesses procurement of documents
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3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store; 4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1; 5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for ingress and egress. The judgment of quashing the search warrant was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: 1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search warrant. The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant. Issue: The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. Held: The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the searched: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind - the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" - was not what the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1). The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched - although not that specified in the warrant - is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant - which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.
General or roving warrants

Stonehill vs. Diokno Violation of 1) Warrants is issued only upon probable cause, in the case at bar, an abstract violation is indicated in the Warrant, to wit, violation of CB Law, tariff and Customs, IR Code and RPC. Impliedly, the issuing judge cannot identify specific offense of the petitioners so as to warrant the validity of the Search warrant 2) Particular description of object to be seized, in the case at bar, the objects to be seized indicated in the search warrant is expressed in general terms. Thereby, violating the sanctity of Sec 2 Art III. Bache vs. Ruiz Facts: After an instruction from the Comm. Of Internal revenue, revenue Examiner, Rodolfo de Leon and his witness Arturo Logronio applied for a search warrant against the petitioners , Bache and Co (Phil) for violation of Section 46 (a) and pertinent provisions of the NIR Code, particularly 53, 72,73, 208 and 209. By means of a note, the respondent judge ordered the Deputy Clerk of the Court to depose the witnesses. After an oath, the respondent judge, Vivencio Ruiz signed the application and directed to the peace officers for the serving of the warrant. The officers confiscated 6 boxes of documents y virtue of the warrant. The petitioners, in return filed a motion to dissolve the Search warrant before the CFI Rizal, but was later denied.
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Hence this petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus praying for the quashal of the search warrant issued by the Respondent Judge. Issue: What requisites of a valid search warrant is wanting in the case at bar? Held: Constitutional provision provides 1) that a search warrant can only be issued upon probable cause 2) single warrant for a single offense 3) particular description of the objects to be seized and 4) the RRC provides that a judge should personally examine the complainant or witnesses that he may produce under oath to prove existence of a probable cause. The deposition should be in writing and should be attached to the record and any affidavits presented to him In the case at bar there is no personal examination done by the respondent judge to the witnesses. While it may be true that deposition is in printed from, subscribed and sworn, the respondent did not even asked the witnesses and the complainant any question to prove existence of a probable cause. Second, the statutory provision of a single warrant for single offense rule is also violated. The single search warrant was issued for 4 distinct offenses. a) 46 (a) failure to file income tax returns, b) b3 (Withholding income tax at source) c) 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales or business gross value output and d) 208 unlawful pursuit of business. Lastly, the search warrant does not indicated a particular or specific description to the object to be seized. A violation in the objective to eliminate general search warrant Petition granted. Castro vs. Pabalan Facts: The respondent, Ernesto Luman, in his application for a search warrant, admitted that he was informed that the petitioners, Maria Castro and Co ling, has in their possession of narcotics and other contraband. The application is accompanied with joint affidavit from the officers of the Philippine Constabulary. The officers of the Pc appeared before the respondent Judge Javier Pabalan for their application for search warrant. They were asked by the judge, however, it was not in writing and recorded. The place where to be searched is written in ink, inserting Maria Cristina to Padasil. After a routine taking of oath and examination, the judge signed the warrant. Sometime July 1967, the search warrant was issued. The search warrant only mentioned in terms of the properties to be seized, illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of the petitioners. The petitioners then filed a certiorari praying for the nullification of the search warrant in the ground that the respondent judge did not follow the constitutional and statutory requirements in issuing a valid warrant of arrest. Issue: What are the constitutional and statutory provisions of a valid search warrant did the issuing judge omitted? Held: These are. The existence of a probable cause The constitution provides that a search warrant can only be issued upon a probable cause. In the case at bar, the existence of a probable cause is not establish since the search is based on hearsay. Moreover, the alleged offense of the petitioner is abstract, since the inquiry is only brief and
the deposition is merely on writing and it was therefore not attached to the records. There should be particular description of the things to be seized and place to search. There is a mistake in indicating the place of the petitioners. But this is not grave enough to invalidate the Search warrant. However, in relation with the objects to be seized, it only indicated narcotics and contraband, which are expressed in general terms. A violation of the constitutional provision against general warrant. Single warrant single offense rule. In the case at bar, the warrant was issued against the petitioners in violation of illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband, which are also expressed in generic terms, that, which may arise from different offenses. Note: Illegality of a search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, what is prohibited is the continued possession. All the court may do is to exonerate (free somebody from guilt) the defendants from such omissions leading to invalidity of the search warrant. Asian Surety vs. Herrera Facts: On October 1965, upon a sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion. By virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the place in the office of the petitioner in Republi Market and carried away two car loads of documents, papers and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing the validity of the SW, contending that it doesnot follow the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid SW. Issue: What are the violated procedures in the case at bar? Held: Single warrant single offense rule. General warrant. The constitution requires that a SW should be issued upon a probable cause in connection with one single offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for 4 separate and distinct offenses. Estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid for it is a general warrant. Particular description of the objects to be seized. The constitution mandates that objects to be seized should be couched not on generic but specific terms. Section 2 provides that a SW may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal properties. a) Property subject to the offense b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three of the description in relation to the things to be seized in the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in
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generic terms. The respondent judge did not bother to specify the things to be seized that would be admitted as an evidence to the offense charged. The Rule on RRC that the SW should be issued on day time. In the case at bar, the SW was conducted evening of Oct 27, 1965 at 7:30 pm until morning. Remoteness of the time of the offense and the application of the SW. Joseph Varon provides rules to apply affidavits for SW. 1) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense id too remote from the time when the affidavit was made or the search warrant issued but generally speaking, a lapse of time of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
2)
No. Under the 1973 constitution, the judge has the power and legal duty to determine the existence of probable cause, also, in cases where he is not satisfied with the certification of the prosecutor in the information, he may conduct preliminary investigation authorized under Sec 6 Rule 112 of the RRC. But that power does not include the authority to dismiss outright the information if the judge believes that there is no probable cause. The judge should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable cause. If the fiscal refuses to do so, then the case may be dismissed for "lack of prosecution" as also stated under the case of Amarga vs. Abbas. The fiscal is a "responsible officer authorized by law" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights. His determination of probable cause is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, it was held that "in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail" Thus, during the 73 constitution, it is a rule that the certification that probable cause exist by the preliminary investigation of the prosecutor is a sufficient ground for a judge to issue probable cause. The judge, therefore shouldnt conduct another examination. Note: Fiscals certification is sufficient, reason: The time-saving practice has been for the judge (municipal, city or Court of First Instance) to rely on the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal as the basis for issuing the warrant of arrest. That practice is supported by the presumption that the fiscal performed his duties regularly and competently (Edillon vs. Narvios, Administrative Case No. 1753, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 174). And that practice existed even under the old Constitution when Section 1(3) of the Bill of Rights did not contain the terms "warrant of arrest" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." We hold that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary examination to determine probable cause in case the fiscal has filed an information and certified that he has conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means that there is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is justified. Placer vs. Villanueva Conflicting decision as far as the fiscals certification in the existence of probable cause is concerned Facts: The petitioners, Fiscal and assistant City Fiscal, in their submission of ten information in the court of the respondent, provides certification that probable cause exists and that there is a reasonable ground to believe that crime has been committed and the accused are probably guilty thereof and therefore be subjected to arduous litigation process.(existence of probable cause and prima facie evidence) Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders dated April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
Thus, the nearer the time at which the observation of an offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of a probable cause. In the case at bar, the alleged commission of the crime is from 1961 to 1964 and the application for SW is made 1965. thus, there can be doubt as to the establishment of a probable cause because of the remoteness of time. Petition granted. People vs. Villanueva A clear difference between the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutional provision on Sec 2 Art III (responsible officers authorized by law) Facts: Sometime 1980, the petitioners, city fiscal and assistant City fiscal filed an information against Rogelim Yee with serious slander by deed. The petitioners certified that they have already conducted a preliminary investigation and find probable cause. Instead of issuing an arrest warrant, the respondent Judge, Napoleon Villanueva conducted an ex parte preliminary examination for scanning the records to determine the existence of probable cause. After such examination, the respondent judge found out that the crime committed may wither be slander by deed or slight physical injury. However, since the information was filed 64 days after the commission of the crime, the judge dismissed the case by prescription. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In his defense, the respondent judge contends that he was not satisfied in the existence of probable cause and that he needed to conduct a separate examination for its determination and that, the case was dismissed because of prescription. Issue: Whether or not the judge may dismiss the case outright upon the absence of probable cause. Held:
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and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. On April 28, 1982, respondent judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents within five (5) days from notice. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed. Issue: Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation. Held: NO. As dictated in the Amarga case, the certification of the fiscal may relied upon by the judge bit however not binding for an automatic issuance of arrest warrant, this is so, since the issuance of warrants is not ministerial function, it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Under Section 6, Rulle 112 of RRC the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed. Note: Cases subjected to Summary Procedures, reason for requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and witnesses To enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case or require further proceedings. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit. Important: Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure On Probable cause: To be determined by the Judge, Facts:
a search or arrest warrant or not. Note however that, though the judge finds probable cause, this does not mean that he should automatically issue the same, in cases of an arrest warrant, he should determine whether there is a necessity to arrest the accused so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Otherwise, the judge may refuse to issue an arrest warrant. To be determined by the prosecutor The probable cause here is to determine whether or not there is a crime committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. This is not tantamount to the determination of guilt of the accused, what is important is that he is probably guilty thereof.
Tolentino vs. Villaluz Sometime 1973, the respondent Fiscal Mojica filed a complaint against the petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo before the Circuit Criminal Court Court of Pasig under the respondent Judge, Onofre Villaluz, for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. After preliminary examination and investigation, the respondent judge issued a resolution stating that; 1. There exists a prima facie case against the petitioners. 2. Ordering as arrest warrant against the accusedpetitioners. 3. Ordering respondent Fiscal to conduct a preliminary examination and investigation in this case to determine the criminal liability of all the members of the said City Council and thereafter to file the corresponding information in the court of competent jurisdiction, if evidence so warrant. A subsequent motion to Dismiss was filed by the petitioners but however was denied by the respondent court. Hence a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners enjoining the respondent Judge to take cognizance in the criminal case filed against them and to declare all the proceedings undertaken and orders issued by the lower court null and void. They contend that the respondent judge has limited jurisdiction as a judge of the Circuit Criminal Court to try and decided specific criminal cases. They allege that the respondent has no authority to conduct preliminary investigations pursuant to RA 519. Issue: Does the limited jurisdiction of the respondent Judge also limits its authority as to the issuance of warrants of arrest, determination of probable cause and conducting preliminary investigation? Held: No. What is limited by RA 5179 is only the scope of the cases tat maybe tried by Circuit Criminal Courts. These courts cannot try all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the CFIs as courts of general jurisdiction. They can only try cases provided under section 1 of the said law. However, these does not follow that judges under these courts also has limited power and authority. They have the same authority and powers as those conferred upon regular CFIs.
The probable cause here to be determine by the judge is to whether to issue
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Thus, the judges under these courts can also conduct preliminary investigations for the determination of prima facie case and of probable cause for the issuance of warrants. Note: Reason for the establishment of Circuit Criminal Courts. To alleviate the burden of the CFI and expedite the disposition of case. Limiting the powers conferred to judges of these courts would defeat such purpose, as the judges of the CFIs will still carry the burden to try and decide these cases. Cruz vs. Gatan Facts: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August 30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial interrogation, where he is presently detained. On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held incommunicado; that he is restrained of his liberty without due process of law and is in the custody of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court order; that he is not a member of any subversive organization covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the clays of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended. The petitioner is said to be an over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command, an unregistered veterans outfit. He is thus allegedly violated Art. 147 of the RPC (Illegal Associations). Subsequently, the counsel for the petitioner however calimed after a discussion with the petitioner claimed that his continued detention is the free will and volition of the petitioner who expressed fears that he might be harmed or injured by some members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he were free from custody while the mastermind and legal counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested. Issue: Was the petitioner illegally detained? Held: No. The privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended by virtue of the declaration of PD 1081. Moreover, the case (petition for habeas corpus) became moot and academic since the petitioner voluntarily give its consent for its detention due to threats. The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and detained by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order issued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the aforequoted General Order No. 2-A, as amended; hence, his arrest and continued detention is legal. The declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it having been settled in the case of Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile etc., et al., any inquiry by this Court into the continued detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.
Geronimo vs. Ramos Facts: On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism. After hearing, the Comelec declared his adversary for the position of mayor in the said town Bayani Ferrera as duly elected mayor. The decision of the Comelec resulted into anger and discontent from the supporters of the petitioners, they entered the municipal hall and stayed until May 13, 1982. Subsequently, Pendre filed a petition before the SC praying to cite the petitioner in contempt. After hearing, the Comelec granted the petition, sentencing the petitioner to suffer 5-month imprisonment with fine. As a result, the PC forcibly arrest the petitioner, a commotion between the PC and supporters of the petitioners happened on May 14, 1982. The incident resulted to the issuance of 5 warrants of arrest against the supporters of the petitioner for the following violations: Usurpation of Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Violation of Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic) [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Tumultuous Affray [Art. 153, RPC]; Sedition (Art. 139, RPC); Illegal Possession of Firearms; Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the Agent of such Person (Art. 151, RPC) and Alarm and Scandal (Art. 155, RPC). Thus three separate petitions were filed by the petitioner. One of these prays for the dismissal of the 75 complaints filed against the petitioner and his supporters. Issue: Was the issuance of 75 warrant in a single day valid as a matter of procedure? Held: No. It is impossible for one Judge to finish the preliminary investigation/examination of 75 persons in one day. Similar caution is warranted for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the case at bar and especially considering the background circumstances which led to the filing of charges, we find it highly improbable for the judge to be able to determine the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the offenses have been committed and that each and everyone of the seventy-six (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issuance of the warrants of arrest also on the same day. It should be remembered and the judge should have taken into account that all the offenses which were allegedly committed were only the product and result of the outburst of the feelings and emotions of the people of Baras due to the highly tense situation in the municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982 incident. The judge, therefore, in conducting his preliminary investigation should have ascertained with double care if, indeed, there was ample evidence to warrant the issuance of arrest warrants and eventually the filing of criminal informations against such a big number of persons, most of whom were impelled by different motivations and whose respective participations were of varying natures and degrees. One of the crimes charged was sedition, a particularly grave offense not to be lightly treated by any prosecuting officer or judge. The possibility of prolonged detention because of the charge should have been considered. Thus, such a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of
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arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information cannot be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. It is an undisputed fact that all the criminal charges were the result of the events that transpired before and until the May 14, 1982 incident, when Mr. Geronimo was forcibly taken out of the municipal building of Baras by the military. The charges were also filed almost successively: one on March 20; one on April 12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May 14, and one on May 19, - and with the same court and presided over by the same judge. In one of the criminal complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that the preliminary examination was conducted. A judge (Ricardo Javier in the case at bar) must first satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. The examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one intended to justify a course of action already predetermined. Thus, because of the inherent impossibility of a judge to conduct preliminary examination to all 75 complaints and finding probable cause to all of it resulting to his issuance of warrants is hasty and haphazard. Note (Very Important): Existing Ruling on determination of probable cause: Issuance of; Search and Seizure Warrant: The judge should personally examine the witnesses and complainant under oath or affirmance for the determination of probable cause. This is the doctrine embodied under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution.
his drivers license bearing other name. The police agents confiscated the gun with 10 live ammunitions. The agents also confiscated glass toothers and tin foils in the accused-appellants car together with an alleged shabu wrapped in cellophane. The accused was arrested without search and arrest warrants. Thus, two information were filed against the accused, one in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6452) and violation to PD 1866 or the Illegal Possession of firearms and ammunitions. The accused assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for two crimes. Issue: Was the warrantless arrest valid? Held: Yes. It is valid. Rules of Court and Jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without warrant, to wit; (a) In the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the accused is a fugitive from law while serving his sentence from a final conviction. In the case at bar, it is clear that the policemen saw a gun tucked in his waist when he was arrested. The gun is plainly visible and no corresponding license was found. Thus, it is a valid search under the RRC (Plain view doctrine) no arrest warrant is necessary. The case also falls under the recognize instances provided under the RRC (Search incidental to lawful arrest), thus, the police has the authority to search the accused for dangerous drugs or weapons that is used as proof to the commission of the offense. The incidental discovery and confiscation of the drug paraphernalia to his car is lawful. Note: Bail; Criminal Procedure: Admission for bail does not preclude the accused to raise question on the validity of his arrest, as long as he raised the same before he enters plea, otherwise, it will bar him from questioning the same as he place himself already under the jurisdiction of the court. Absence of Preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.
Arrest Warrant: The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses to determine the probable cause. It is enough that (a) He examines the report and supporting documents provided by the fiscal in the determination of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
(b)
Search Incidental to a valid arrest Warrantless Search and Seizure- When valid or not?
People vs. Go Facts: After an information was relayed to the intelligence and Follow Up Unit of Calamba Police that shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride is supplied in Crossing, Calamba Laguna, agents went in the place for follow up. A police agent, Panuringan, then reported that he saw the accused, Luisito Go, enter a disco House with two women with a gun tucked in the accused waist. Three policemen entered the disco House for the Operation Bakal to search for illegally possessed firearms. Thus, when the accused was ordered to stand-up, police agents saw a revolver tucked in his waist, they asked for its licensed but the accused never showed it, instead, he gave Facts: Sometime May 1904, the defendant (Ago Chi), represented by the plaintiff was charged and was convicted by the CFI Manila in the crime of assassination. He was sentenced to capital punishment but was later reduced to 20 years of reclusion temporal upon appeal in the SC. Upon the defendants arrest, the arresting officer confiscated his money amounting to P700 and was deposited in the clerk of court. The plaintiff Moreno, filed a petition to the CFI Manila under Judge Quintero praying for the court to pay the plaintiff of his legal services to the defendant in the amount of Moreno vs. Ago Chi
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P600 that will be taken from the confiscated money of the defendant. The lower court only granted P50 as legal services to the plaintiff. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the search and confiscation of the defendant is a valid search. Can the plaintiff validly claim any lien from the confiscated money? Held: No. Under the Rules of Criminal procedure, an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. In the case at bar, the defendant was convicted in the crime of assassination, thus, the confiscation of his money amounting to P700 cannot in no way be connected with the crime where he was charged or in any cases mentioned. To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than those mentioned above is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense. Thus, the money is illegally searched and confiscated and cannot be admitted as evidence. Since it was illegally confiscated, third persons cannot validly claim any liens from the confiscated money and should remain under the custody of the defendant. Case remanded to the lower court. People vs. Ang Chun Kit Facts: ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he sold to an undercover agent for P400, 000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu. His car also yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box. After tipping an information from a Confidential Informer, Chief investigator Avelino Razon arranged a buybust operation using operatives and marked money, scheduled to be operated in Cardinal Santos Hospital. The buy-bust operation was successful, the money was confiscated and nearly a kilo of shabu was seized in the defendants car. He was then brought to the Camp Crame, charged with violation to the Dangerous drugs Act. He was convicted by RTC Pasig Br. 155 in violation of RA 6425, Sec 15 Art III. Hence This petition. He argued that the confiscated articles are inadmissible as evidence since it was procured through an illegal search and seizure and that the drugs are not found in his person but in his car. Issue: Was the defendats contention correct? Held: No. It was a search and seizure incidental to a valid arrest. Under the constitutional and statutory provision, a valid warrantless arrest may be effected when the accused is actually committed, committing or about to commit a crime. And that a warrantless search and seizure can be effected when the search is incidental to a valid arrest. Moreover, a
warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In the case at bar, RA 6425 actually punishes even a mere possession of regulated drugs, thus the accused is in the process of committing a crime during the buy bust operation. It is thus then a valid warrantless arrest. Since it is a valid, the warrantless search may extend to the accused surrounding under his immediate control, thus the search seizure of shabu in his car is a valid seizure. Note: In the case at bar . the Court however agree with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was then assisted by counsel. In People v. Mauyao we said that "conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel." With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."
People vs. Lua Facts: The defendant, Rolando Chekwa Lua, was arrested by a buy bust operation under the Oplan Saturn by the Caloocan police operatives in Bagong Silang Caloocan City. In the buy bust operation, after the informant/operative successfully bought some marijuana from the accused, the police subsequently acted and arrested Lua, confiscated the marked money, the regulated drug marijuana and a .38 cal paltik and live bulletswhich was found in the accused waistline. These articles are sought outside the accuseds house The police operatives also found and confiscated a brick of marijuana inside the accuseds house. The RTC Br. 124 of Caloocan City convicted the accused in violation of RA 6425. Hence this petition. Issue: Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure? Held: Yes. The search and seizure is lawful, that being a warrantless search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest, however, the articles (brick of marijuana) seized inside the accuseds house is inadmissible evidence. Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea
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bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence. As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control. In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. People vs. Figueroa
Nolasco vs. Pano Conflicting views between the ponente Justice MelencioHerrera and Justices Teehankee and Cuevas concerning the validity place of arrest and search of the accused in connection with Lawful Search Incidental to an Arrest Facts: The petitioners, Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque and Tolentino were charged of the crime of Rebellion, Subversion and/or Conspiracy o commit Rebellion/Subversion and was arrested by Constabulary Security Group (CSG) on August 6th at 11:30 AM at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margali St, Quezon City. At 12 noon of that same day, a search was conducted at the residence of the petitioner Aguilar-Roque at 239 B Mayon St. QC. The CSG confiscated 428 written documents, typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The petitioners alleged that the search warrant and arrest warrants issued was void in the ground that there is no established existing probable cause and that the warrant is a general in nature, violative of their constitutional right. Moreover, they contend that the articles confiscated in inadmissible as evidence as the search is illegal not being a search incidental to an arrest. Issue: Was the search cannot be qualified as a lawful search incidental to lawful arrest? Held: No. The Search is lawful. UNDER Sec 12, rule 126 of the RRC, Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. - A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched". "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. The search in the residence of the petitioner Aguilar-Roque is valid since in relation with the nature of the crime of rebellion, which is a crime against public order, it is a search incidental to an arrest. The immediate vicinity of the arrest is not controlling as far as the publics interest in the prevention of the crime and apprehension of the criminals are concerned.
Facts: The accused was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions and and of RA 645 and subsequently convicted by the RTC Br. 23 of Trece Martires in Cavite. While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items. The accused questions the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and confiscated ammunition for it was discovered during a warrantless search. Issue: Was their an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. Held: No. the search and seizure of the articles sought is a valid being a search incidental to an arrest. The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While the SC might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest. As a doctrine in jurisprudence, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the `plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."
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Separate and Dissenting opinion of justices Teehankee and Cuevas Justice Teehankee The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner AguilarRoque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice Cuevas The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the statutory provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." "An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested. "The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. But the right does not extend to other places The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest. "The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL." (Papani vs. U.S., 84 F 2d 160, 163) In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6, 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILARROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record, But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place
other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule
Search of Moving Vehicles

Espano vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Sometime July of 1991, the narcotics division of the WPD conducted a by bust operation in Zamora and Pandacan Streets in Manila after the confirmation of drug pushing reports in the same area. During the operation in the area, after the police officers saw the accused selling something to a buyer, they approached Espano and frisked him. The officers seized two plastic tea bags of marijuana from the accused. They then later asked the accused if there are more marijuana in him, the Espano replied that there are more in his house. Thus, the arresting officers went to Espanos house and subsequently confiscated ten more plastic tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the police, and charged in violation with RA 6425. The RTC Br. 1 of Manila convicted him in the charges whish was later affirmed in toto by the respondent appellate court. Hence, this petition for review. As defense, the petitioner contends that the drugs confiscated are inadmissible evidence against him being search and seized illegally. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: Partly, the drugs confiscated in his person is admissible, however, the articles sought in his residence cannot be admitted as evidence by the prosecution being unlawfully seized. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides that an officer may without a warrant arrest a person when in his presence: (a) Has committed (b) Is actually committing (c) Or is about to commit a crime In the case at bar, petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner. People vs. Malsmedt With substantial dissenting opinions of Justices Narvasa (CJ) and Cruz Facts: Upon reports that vehicles coming from Sagada are transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, the First regional NARCOM was ordered to set-up a temporary checkpoint area to monitor all vehicle coming from Sagada. The accused, Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national was boarding in the rear end of the bus when the officers are inspecting. One officer saw a bulging object in the waist of the accused and asked Malmstedt to show his passport and other identification documents. The accused failed to comply and was asked to bring out whatever the object bulging in his stomach. It turns out to be haishish a derivative of marijuana. The accused was invited to step out of the bus for questioning. Before doing so, the accused first get his two traveling bags from the luggage carrier of the bus. The officers inspected the bags and saw a suspicious teddy bear, which turned out to be containing the same materials confiscated from the accused. The RTC of La Trinidad Benguet later convicted the accused with the violation of RA 6425. hence this petition for reversal. The accused contended that his arrest and seizure of his personal effects are illegal there being conducted without warrant, therefore follows that articles confiscated is inadmissible evidence against him. Issue: Were the arrest, search and seizure illegal? Held: No. It is legal, being one of the instances provided by statutory provision that warrantless arrest and seizure can be effected. It was search pursuant to a lawful arrest and search in a moving vehicle. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law (committed a crime), which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Note: Dissenting Opinions of Justices Narvasa and Cruz Justice Narvasa: If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." They are merely fishing for evidence to corroborate their speculations. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or had just been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal, since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful. Search may extend to the area "within his immediate control, defined: The area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Mustang Lumber vs. CA A consolidated petition Facts: First Case: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2 The special Action and nvestigation Division of DENr also procured a search warrant from Jusge Adriano Osorio of RTC Valenzuela, by virtue of the warrant, the team seized for truckloads of narra woods including almaciaga and supa. Moreover, the lumberyard of the petitioner was also placed under administrative seizure. For failure to produce certificates of lumber origins, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets and delivery receipts. Subsequently, the Sec of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.
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Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition contending that the search and seizure operation by the respondents is a violation under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution for not having a valid search warrant. Second case: PP vs. Capulong et al This case deals with whether the Forestry Code where the petitioner allegedly violated refers to either timber or lumber Issue: Was the warrantless search and seizure invalid? Held: No. It is a valid warrantless search being one of the statutory instances that accepted. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be made except by a virtue of a warrant. Thus a search could be lawfully conducted on a moving vehicle without a search warrant. In the case at bar, the conducted search and seizure is indeed without a valid warrant, however, it was conducted to search the materials that can be found in a moving vehicle, which is the truck of the first case.
Issue: Was the seizure of the goods unlawful? And that the BOC has no jurisdiction over the articles sought? Held: No. it is a valid seizure. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Note: The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry." As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted.
Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes

Papa vs. Mago Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counterintelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counterintelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. The respondent Mago, filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari before the CFI Manila contending that the search and seizure is illegal for lack of a valid warrant. Moreover, she also contends that such articles sought from her is not included by the law for prohibited importation and that it no longer under the control of the Tariff and Customs code for it (articles) were already sold to the petitioner. She also contends that the search seizure conducted by the respondents are illegally being made outside the jurisdiction of the BOC and that the subsequent search warrant issued by the collector of customs is not valid being not issued by a judge. The respondent Mago filed an ex-parte motion to release the confiscated articles upon her posting a bond. This motion was then granted by the respondent Judge Jarencio.
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The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. Pacis vs. Pamaran Facts: The petitioner, Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of Customs in the Port of Manila, issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile (Mercury 1957) owned by the respondent Ricardo Santos, who, by the records of his office, have not fully paid the customs duty collectible from the car. The respondent Santos filed a suit against the petitioner on the ground usurpation of justice, for the petitioner has no power granted by the constitution to issue a warrant, which, is s judicial function of a judge. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is clothe with jurisdiction to issue a warrant. Held: Yes. The Collector of customs may order seizure of untaxed goods being without being liable for usurpation of judicial function as provided under the tariff and customs Code. Hizon vs. CA Facts: Sometime 1992, the Maritime Command of the PNP Palawan arrested the petitioner who are allegedly conducting muro-ami a prohibited system of fishing while on board FB robinson. The PNP filed a complaint against the petitioners (31 of 35) charging them in violation of the Fishery Laws in the Philippines, by using sodium Cyanide in catching fishes. The RTC Puerto princesa convicted the petitioners and was affirmed by the CA., hence this petition. As defense, the petitioners alleged that the search and seizure is illegal for the absence of a warrant and the fishes sought cannot be admitted as evidence against them. Issue: Was the arrest, search and seizure invalid? Held: No. it is a valid being a search in a moving motor vehicle. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. 16 As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) A search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) Seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) Search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) Search in violation of customs laws. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. Thus, in the case at bar, the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing is valid. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. People vs. Que Facts: After receiving information that a truck loader with plate number PAD 548 contains illegally cut lumber and will pass through Ilocos Norte, the PNP then proceeded and patrol along the vicinity of General Segundo Ave. Laoag City. Sometime March 1994, the officers saw the truck with the plate number indicated, they followed and then apprehended in Marcos bridge. The officers then arrested the petitioners for failure to show the necessary documents such as (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (2) Certificate of Transport Agreement (3) Auxiliary invoice and others. The petitioners were charged for violating the Forestry Code and was convicted by RTC Laoag. The petitioners filed an appeal before the SC contending that the search and seizure is illegal and the confiscated articles cannot be used as evidence against them being fruits of a poisonous tree. Issue: Was there an illegal search? Held: No. The search is legal being conducted in search of a moving vehicle. As held in the PP vs. Bagista explaining the exception and rational of a validity in search of a moving vehicle; With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) The police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus
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properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accusedappellant. The Plain View Doctrine PP. vs. Valdez Facts: After a tip from a source hat there is a plantation of marijuana owned by the appellant at Sitio Bulan Villaverde NV, the PNP Nueva Vizcaya immediately formed an operation to verify the report with an instruction to uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of the same. Upon reaching their destination, the police say seven five-foot height marijuana flowering tops situated approximately 25 meters from the accused. Valdez admitted that the plants are his, thus, the police uprooted the plants and subject it to forensic analysis which was later found positive to be a marijuana. The accused was arrested The lower court was convicted and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death. Hence this automatic appeal. The petitioner through counsel contended that the search is unlawful since the officers has ample time to secure a search warrant, thereby the evidences cannot be admitted as evidence against him being a fruit of a proverbial poisoned tree. The respondent, through the solicitor General avers that the search is lawful since it is one of the considered as plain view doctrine/ search. Issue: Whether the search is in accordance with the plain view doctrine. Held: The search is unlawful and cannot be classified as a plain view search. As ingrained in jurisprudence, if the arresting officers has ample time to secure a arrest warrant, specially when they all have the information needed to identify the place and the person sought to be searched and/or arrested, search warrant is needed. However, statutory and constitutional provisions also allows instances where warrants are dispensable. One of which is search of plain view or the plain view doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following requisites should be present. (a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and The evidence must be immediately apparent; and Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Thus, the search is illegal and that the confiscated plants cannot be admitted as evidence being a fruit of a poisonous tree. Note: The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom. People vs. Damaso Facts: After a sequence of arrest among members of the NPA, the Philippine Constabulary officers of Lingayen Pangasinan, the apprehended NPA (Luz Tancianco) members pointed out to the PC the house of the Appellant Damaso where the same is leasing. Being pointed out that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the police went inside and eventually saw M-14 rifles, radio sets, subversive materials and pamphlets, maps, computer machines, bullets and ammunitions. These articles are confiscated to use as evidence against the accused in the crime of Subversion. He was then convicted by the RTC Dagupan in the crime of subversion, hence this appeal. The appellant contends that the seizure in his house is illegal for absence of a search warrant. Issue: Was the search unlawful? Held: Yes. The search n the house of the appellant is illegal because of absence of search warrant and even probable cause for the issuance of the same. In the testimony of the witness by the prosecution, he has no personal knowledge making its testimonies hearsay and weak to establish the existence of a probable cause. Moreover, the search conducted is not one being qualified as a valid search without warrant (1) Search incidental to an arrest. (2) Customs search. (3) Consented search (4) Search of a moving vehicle (5) Stop frisk (6) Plain view search. (Apply the Mendoza doctrine- incidental discovery of incriminating evidence to qualify as a plain view search) Moreover, the rights granted under the Bill of Rights is personal and that cannot be waived by anyone else rather than the person whose rights is invaded or one who expressly to do so in his behalf. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not established that Luz Tancianco was authorized by the appellant to allow the officers to enter the appellants house and seized the effects of the appellant upon seeing it in presumption that it is connected with the crime of subversion. Thereby violating the appellants rights of privacy and security of house and effects. Thus, the prosecutions evidences are weak and that the search being illegal, the articles sought are inadmissible as evidences being a fruit of poisonous tree.
(b)
(c) (d)
Thus, the plain view doctrine applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. In the case at bar, their discovery of the plant is not inadvertent. It is clear from the records and the orders of the officer that they have to uproot the cannabis plants when seen and that the officers testified that they first located the marijuana before the arrest of Valdez.
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People vs. Velasco Facts: A close surveillance by the Narcotics unit of the WPD confirmed that the Accused, Yolanda Velasco aka Shabu Queen is indeed engage in peedling shabu, a regulated drug, along Quirada St. in Manila. After the confirmation, the WPD organized a buybust operation involving a poseur and marked money. The operation was successful and the appellant was caught in flagranti delicto, was arrested and brought to precinct for an investigation. The confiscated five decks of shabu were found in the accuseds pockets. Hence this petition, arguing that the articles sought cannot be used as an evidence since the search was illegal being obtained through a warrantless arrest. She also allege that she was framed-up by the officers. Issue: Was there an illegal warrantless arrest? Held: No. it being one of the exceptions provided by statutory provision. The RRC provides that an officer, in his presence, can arrest even without a search or arrest warrant when the person arrested actually committed, committing or attempting to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the accused was caught in flagranti delicto (in the act of committing the crime), thus it justified the warrantless arrest conducted by the officer, thus, debunk the petitioner contention of frame up and inadmissibility of evidence against her. No evidence presented by the petitioner that the arresting officers are engage in unscrupulous discharge of their duty to back up her contention of a frame up. People vs. Leangsiri Facts: Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country approximately more than * kilo of heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In the accuseds cooperation, he was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu two other co-appellants entered Room 504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave the room, the NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. Amidu, told the officers that he is staying in Rm 413 and that the two others are in royal Palm Hotel. The officers then went to the room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of Amidu were also confiscated. In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and empty transparent bag, allegedly will be use in transporting the drugs. The appellants were charged and was convicted in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest. Issue: Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct premises of the arrest admissible as evidence? Held:
No. those article are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained not in plan view nor within the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view doctrin applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized within the direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should only be Rm. 509. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Note: Plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not, searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
When there is waiver of right or gives his consent

A Valid waiver of right in Sec 2 art III, elements (1) The right to be waived is existing (2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive (3) He or she has actual intention to relinquish the right.
People vs. Baula Facts: After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, the investigating police went to the residence of the accused-appellant, Baula et al. In the process of questioning the appellants, the police saw bloodstained bolo, short pants, polo shirts and was subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to the NBI for forensic exams. The exam resulted that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the same blood type O as that of the victim.
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Thus, the accused were arrested, charged and was convicted in the crime of murder by the RTC Lingayen and sentenced to suffer RP. Hence this appeal for review on the decision of the lower court in the ground that the articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short pants) cannot be admitted as evidence against the accused since it was seized without a valid search and seizure warrant.
Issue: Whether the articles are validly seized even without a valid search warrant and therefore admitted as evidence in the case at bar. Whether the articles when with consent given to the officers can be admitted as an evidence?
Held:
The articles are unlawfully searched and seized. A search incidental to a valid arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest should be lawful before search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A warrantless arrest may be effected by the arresting officer when in his presence the person arrested is have committed, committing or attempting to commit the crime. It cannot be reversed; otherwise, it would unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized article would be inadmissible evidence. In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. Thus, the bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence. Veroy vs. Layaguwe Facts: The petitioners, Leopoldo Veroy has a residential th house in K-8 St. Quezon City where it is under the care of two houseboys and a certain Soquilon. The bedrooms in this house are constantly locked and access to the kitchen is the only key to the caretakers. Sometime 1990, a directive issue was ordered to Capt. Obrero to search the house of the petitioner in the report that their residence is a hideout and recruiting site of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her
Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence. The officers in the following day with Maj. Macasaet, by virtue of the authority granted by the petitioner, gained an entrance to the house and first search the masters and childrens bedroom, where they saw and confiscated .45 cal handgun with live bullets, printed materials of RAM-SFP, traveling bag with assorted clothes, telescope, map, a book, medicines and religious pamphlets. The petitioners were then charged with a criminal complaint in the crime of illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in furtherance with Rebellion, and that the prosecution recommended no bail. Due to stress and anxiety, the petitioners were confined in a hospital and filed Motions for Bail and Hospital Confinement under the respondent judge Layague, which was denied. Then an order was issued by the respondent judge to transfer the petitioners from St Lukes to Camp Crame. Hence this petition. The petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room-to-room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them. Issue: Does the articles seized unlawful and cannot be admitted as evidence? or Does the consent given by the petitioners make the search and seizure lawful? Held: The articles are illegally seized therefore inadmissible as evidence. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioner is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the
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police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. In a number of cases decided by this ,Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. De Garcia vs. Locsin Facts: Mariano Almeda, an agent of Anti-usury Board applied for a search warrant before the respondent judge against the petitioner, believing that there is a probable cause that the petitioner, Leona De Garcia, keeps and conseals in her house and store at Victoria Tarlac certain books, lists, chits, receipts and documents relating to her activities as usurer, contrary to law. The search warrant was granted and with officers of the law, Almeda et al search the person and house/store of the petitioner to seized evidence related to usury. The search proceeded without the presence of the petitioner, and thus, packages of records were confiscated, turned over to the fiscal by the Anti-Usury Board and was later filed six separate complaint against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-usury law. Thus, a motion was filed by the petitioner demanding the respondent Board to return the articles seized in the search in the ground of its invalidity. The respondent judge denied such motion and contends that even though the search warrant is invalid, the articles are still admissible as evidence since there is a waiver of right on the part of the petitioner. Issue: Was there a waiver of right? If there is, would it make the search valid and therefore articles seized are admissible evidence? Held: No. There is no waiver of right and that the articles are inadmissible evidence. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.The waiver may be either express or implied. In the case at bar, no express waiver has been made. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, (1) First, that the right exists; (2) Secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (3) Lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, the invalidity of the search warrant not only anchored in the mentioned ground, but also, the respondent judge did not follow the constitutional requirement in determining probable cause to issue warrants, such that, it is the applicant that determines the probable cause in the case at bar. In 35 constitution, it mandated the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause and no other. Lopez and Velasco vs. Commissioner of Customs Confusing case where it is adverse to later jurisprudence that a waiver of right can only be waived by the person whose right against unreasonable search and seizure was invaded. Facts: After the surveillance conducted by the respondents NBI officers, NBI and PC Davao officers went to the room (Rm 220) rented by the petitioner, Tomas Velasco, to search and seized articles papers and documents including a .45 cal pistol, that became evidence that commodities confiscated in the wharf (MV Jojo Lema) allegedly smuggled from Indonesia to the country (sacks of coffee beans and copra). The search was without a search warrant, however, the officers have successfully confiscated the articles by virtue of the consent of the petitioners wife (Teofila ibanez) who also is an occupant of the room rented by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that the consent given by Ibanez cannot be regarded since she was not the legal wife of the petitioner Velasco, but a certain Corazon Velasco. The decision of CTA is adverse by the petitioner, affirmed by the SC. Issue: Was the consent valid to justify the warrantless search and seizure? Held: As far as the decision is concerned, yes, the consent given by Ibanez is a valid so as to dispense the necessity of a search warrant. The court ruled that the mere fact that Ibanez is present in a room rented by the petitioner, her consent would lead to belief that her consent as an alleged wife of the petitioner and that it would be an act on behalf of the petitioner.
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Note: Exact decision penned by J. Laurel Held: There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the above recital by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner himself reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibaez, "a manicurist by occupation." Their effort appurtenant thereto is doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even petitioner Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail.
Was the warrantless search valid? Yes. The warrantless search is valid. Under the statutory provision (RRC) warrantless arrest t may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure However, in the case at bar, the record does not show that when the officers arrested the petitioner who attempted to flee, there is no probable cause nor a personal knowledge by the officers that the appellant is actually committed or committing a crime, the apprehension was only due to the fact of suspicion by the officers that he is hiding something in the bag. Thus, it does justified a warrantless arrest. However, this does not make the arrest invalid as the case at bar falls with the exclusionary rule of stop and frisk doctrine. Jurisprudence has already dictate that warrantless arrest, search and seizure by checkpoints of military and police is justified by the stop and frisk method. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It would be useless and too late for the officers if they should first procure a warrant before searching the bag of a suspicious person. Manalili vs. People Facts: Policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Caloocan City, in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Caloocan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and
Stop and Frisk Doctrine

Defined: Stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon People vs. Posadas Facts: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade a and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Thus, this appeal was filed by the appellant in the ground that the search and seizure is unlawful and the articles sought are inadmissible evidence against him. Issue:
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examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The confiscated residue was tested positive fir marijuana. However, the petitioner rebutted the information in narrating a different facts in the case. The petitioner filed an appeal questioning the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Facts:
Malacat vs. CA
The arresting officers conducted a foot patrol due to the report that a grioup of Muslim extremists was going to explode a grenade somewhere on the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. While on patrol, they chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. The lower court then charged the petitioners and was convicted holding that the search is valid being a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The petitioner filed an appeal in the ground that the CA erred in ruling that the search is valid since they are about to or attempting to commit a crime due to their attempt to flee when the officers approached them.
Issue: Was the search qualified as a stop and frisk measure therefore justified as a valid warrantless arrest and search?
Held: Yes. The search is valid being conducted through a stop and frisk method. Stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon. This method allows police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession.
Issue: Was the search qualified as a search incidental to valid arrest or stop frisk measure?
Issue on waiver of rights: The Sc also ruled for the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he filed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) The right to be waived existed; (2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) He or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
Held: None. The lower and appellate court erred in the decision in such a way the the case at bar is neither a lawful search incidental to valid arrest nor a valid warrantless search by stop frisk method The search is not qualified as a search incidental to a valid arrest. In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement. At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
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At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, stop and frisk is limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons or any other incriminating evidence against the arrestee, which does not require probable cause but the existence of a genuine reason. A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
Lastly, the search is illegal since the officers has ample time to procure a valid search and arrest warrant.
In the issue of admissibility of conducted testimony and investigation by NBI:
(1) The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. The court did not qualify the case at bar as a valid warrantless search through stop and frisk method. For the following reasons: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared." Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Contrary to Sec 12 Art III involving right to a competent counsel and that any admission or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Umil vs. Ramos Facts: This is a consolidated petition for habeas corpus where the petitioners alleged that their detention is illegal and unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, making the informations filed against them are null and void. The respondents contends otherwise. In this consolidated case, all of the petitioners are charged under the Anti Subversion Law, with an exception to the case of Enrile vs. Lim (Inciting to sedition) and Nazareno vs. Station Commander. The rest are charged guilty of rebellion, a crime against the State, and is a continuing crimes in nature. They were found of the possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunitions as well as subversive documents. Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following.
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Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (d) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (e) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (f) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another. Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, They are limited to the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Customs searches; Search of moving vehicles; Seizure of evidence in plain view; Consent searches; A search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
A "stop and frisk."
Note: A valid warrantless arrest and valid warrantless search and seizure, circumstances differentiated. Valid Warrantless arrest: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
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Constitutional Law II (Bill of Rights): Case Briefs: Dennis G.

Libunao UC College of Law

(A very important case, once asked in the Bar Exams 2005)

Equal protection clause: Requisites of

Equal protection of Laws II

Define probable Cause? Who determines Probable cause?

Section II: Search and Seizure provision

General or roving warrants

The probable cause here to be determine by the judge is to whether to issue

Search of Moving Vehicles

Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes

When there is waiver of right or gives his consent

Stop and Frisk Doctrine

In the issue of admissibility of conducted testimony and investigation by NBI:

A "stop and frisk."

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