The partition of the South Asian Subcontinent on 14 August 1947 into the dominions of India and

Pakistan gave birth to a host of problems, including that of the sharing of waters of the mighty Indus
River System. The issue was of concern to Pakistan because the head works of the rivers that irrigated
Pakistan’s Punjab province mostly went to the Indian side.

On 30 December 1947, Pakistan and India concluded a ‘Standstill Agreement’ for a three-month period
under which Pakistan continued to receive water supply from the head works of Madhopur on River
Ravi and Ferozepur on River Sutlej, the two tributaries of River Indus.

As the interim arrangement ended on 31 March 1948, the next day the Government of Indian Punjab
stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from the Madhopur headwork, affecting, according to one
estimate, 5.5% of Pakistan’s irrigated area.

Pakistan raised the issue at the Inter-Dominion Conference held on 3-4 May 1948. India dismissed
Pakistan’s claim over water, from the head works on its side as a matter of right but agreed to release
water as a provisional arrangement. It was thus abundantly clear that slowly and gradually the quantity
of water would be reduced.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, who had formerly served as Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and as
Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, undertook a research tour of Pakistan and India for
writing a series of articles.

In one of his articles, he opined that it would be very beneficial for the region if the two countries
cooperated to jointly develop and operate the Indus Basin river system. He further suggested that the
World Bank might play its role in bringing India and Pakistan to agree on some plan to develop the Indus
river system for mutual benefit.

President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, picked up the idea and offered his good offices to resolve
the issue of water sharing between India and Pakistan. The two neighbors welcomed the initiative and
after tough bargaining during the protracted negotiations that spread, over nine years arrived at the
contours of the agreement.
Broad parameters thus settled the work of drafting began. Finally, in September 1960, President of
Pakistan Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan and Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru signed the
Indus Water Treaty in Karachi.

Under the Indus Water Treaty:

1. Pakistan surrendered three eastern rivers, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas to India with some minor rights to
Pakistan.

2. Largely three western rivers namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab remained with Pakistan.

3. India was allowed to use water from the western rivers for irrigation of 642,000 acres of land that
were already being irrigated from these rivers along with an entitlement to further irrigate 701,000
acres for crops.

4. India was also given specified entitlement for ‘other’ storages, including, power and flood storages
i.e., storages for non-consumptive purposes.

5. Pakistan was to meet the requirements of its eastern river canals from the western rivers by
constructing replacement works.

6. Both parties are bound to, regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.

7. A permanent Indus Water Commission, with one Commissioner from each side, was to be set up to
resolve issues.

8. The procedures were set out for settlement of ‘questions’ ‘differences’ and ‘disputes’ bilaterally and
through neutral experts and International Court of Arbitration as the case might be.

Since Pakistan required considerable time to build necessary infrastructure to divert water from western
rivers to eastern rivers and their canals on its side, India was to allow the ‘historic withdrawals’ on the
part of Pakistan during the transitory period.

According to the Treaty, two dams (Mangla on River Jhelum and Tarbela on River Indus) were to be
built. It also envisaged five barrages Marala and Qadirabad on River Chenab, Sidhnai on River Ravi, Rasul
on River Jhelum, Chashma on River Indus and Mailsi on River Sutlej.

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Besides, one siphon and seven link canals (Rasul-Qadirabad on Rivers Jhelum-Chenab, Qadirabad-Balloki
on Rivers Chenab-Ravi, Balloki-Suleimanki II and Sidhnai-Mailsi on Rivers Ravi-Sutlej, Chashma-Jhelum
on Rivers Indus-Jhelum and Trimmu-Sidhnai on Rivers Indus-Ravi), to be constructed in Pakistan.

To meet the financial cost, India was to pay a fixed amount of US $ 62.060 million over a period of ten
years. An international consortium pledged US $ 900 million. The World Bank was to administer The
Indus Basin Development Fund.

The Indus Basin Project was completed despite all hurdles those included opposition and reservations
from many quarters in Pakistan who felt that Pakistan’s rights as a lower riparian state had been
compromised. This amounted to a successful resolution of a major dispute over the world’s largest,
contiguous irrigation system with a command area of about 20 million hectares.

Although the Indus Water Treaty has been a remarkable success story, lately some projects undertaken
by India in Occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir – from where the western rivers flow into Pakistan
– have become major irritants and raised serious concerns in Pakistan:

Wullar Barrage (The Tulbal Navigation Lock)

In 1985, India started construction of a barrage some 439 feet long and with a lock at the mouth of
Wullar Lake, the largest fresh water Lake in Indian occupied, disputed and held territory.

Purportedly but not so innocently, the stated purpose of the barrage was to make possible navigation in
22km stretch between the towns of Sopore and Baramula, during the lean winter season by regulating
the flow of River Jhelum.

Pakistan raised objection to this project and the construction work halted in 1987. Pakistan contends
that India cannot store water in excess of 0.01 MAF as ‘incidental storage’ on River Jhelum.
Pakistan also apprehends that the Wullar Barrage may cause damage to its own project of linking
Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal. One important concern of Pakistan, which is
extraneous to the Indus Water Treaty but squarely a security issue, is that in case of war between the
two countries, India would take advantage from its ability to control the flow of water and make the
crossing of the river easy or difficult according to strategic and tactical military requirement.

India, as usual, but erroneously contends that the Wullar Barrage would regulate the flow of water into
Jhelum and control the floods. It would not reduce the overall quantum of water flow rather increase it
during the lean winter season. All fair weather pretension and an obvious ruse, to get away with an
extremely hurtful project to Pakistan.

The project’s impact, India asserts, would be beneficial to Mangla Dam in power generation and to
Pakistan’s triple canal system due to regulated flow of water. The matter remains unresolved.

Kishanganga Project

Outrageously the Kishanganga Project the Indians hawk on the premise that it will ostensibly bring
water from River Kishanganga to Wullar Lake, where a hydroelectric power station is proposed.

The project envisages construction of a channel and a tunnel for this purpose. Simultaneously to build a
dam, near the place where River Kishanganga crosses the Line of Control to enter Pakistan-administered
Kashmir, where it is known as Neelum.

Here Pakistan plans to construct 969 MW-capacity Neelum-Jhelum Power Plant with Chinese assistance.
The Pakistani project is to going to be completed in 2017, due to delay in construction work. Pakistan is
genuinely concerned and fears that the Kishanganga Project would lead to a shortfall of water flow into
Neelum, reducing its power generation by an estimated 9%.

The Indus Water Treaty does not bar any party from storing water for power generation as per
entitlement. However, there is the principle of ‘prior appropriation’ enshrined in the Treaty.
India intends to complete the Kishanganga Project by 2016 to avail the opportunity of diverting
Kishanganga’a water to Wullar Lake before Pakistan is able to invoke the provision of prior
appropriation. India also claims that Pakistan need not worry because the water diverted by the
Kishanganga Project would reach Pakistan through River Jhelum, no matter Neelum-Jhelum project
suffers.

Baghlihar Dam

In 1999, India began construction work of 470-feet high, 317 meter wide Baghlihar Dam, also known as
Baghlihar Hydroelectric Power Project, on River Chenab in Doda District of Indian occupied Kashmir.
Although India called it a run-of-the-river project, the dam was to have a ‘pond age’ of 15 million cubic
meters with submerged gate spillways.

Pakistan raised objection to the project design on the ground that the submerged gate spillways would
enable India to increase the storage capacity of the reservoir and, if India desired, to halt the supply of
water to Pakistan for more than three weeks during winter season.

Pakistan fears that it would lose between 7000 to 8000 cusecs of water per day for Rabi crops. Pakistan
also sensed the danger of inundation of the area above Marala Head Works, if India released water
simultaneously from Dulhasti, Baghlihar and Salal Dams into River Chenab.

Pakistan viewed the Baghlihar Project as another security risk, in times of tension or war, as India would
be able to control the flow of water facilitating or hampering the movement of Indian/Pakistani troops
according to its requirement.

After the Indus Water Commission failed to resolve the Baghlihar Dam issue, the matter was referred to
the World Bank which acknowledged that the issue amounted to a ‘difference’ and appointed Professor
Raymond Lafitte, a engineer from Switzerland, as the neutral expert to decide the matter.

On 12 February 2007, Lafitte gave his verdict directing India to reduce the capacity of ‘pond age’ by
13.5% and the height of the Dams’ structure by 1.5 meter. He also called for raising of power intake
tunnels by 3 meters to reduce flow-control capability. Pakistan had reservations about the verdict but
both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by it. The matter, it appears, stands closed.
It is heartening to see that during its recent visit to Pakistan to discuss Indus Water issues, the Indian
delegation conceded that all “water disputes must be resolved within an agreed timeframe.”

Pakistan’s Indus Commissioner Syed Jamaat Ali Shah told the Indian delegation that reduction in
supplies was jeopardizing the water transfer operation to eastern part of Pakistan. He also conveyed the
message that Pakistan wanted India to take necessary steps if deforestation and environmental impact
affected the river flow on its side.

G. Ranganathan, India’s Indus Commissioner, assured the Pakistani side that India was committed to the
Indus Water Treaty and prepared to resolve all disputes in accordance with it.

However, he significantly stated that the current water reduction was the result of weather variations
rather than any activity on the part of India. He added that India was, affected as much as Pakistan, due
to water shortage in the Indus River system.

The above review of the projects that India has undertaken shows that apart from water-sharing,
nevertheless, Pakistan’s primary concern is with the security risk they pose by granting India the
capability of manipulating and withholding water supply to Pakistan in time of crisis, tension or war.
Perhaps, Pakistan failed to foresee security dimensions of the Indus Water Treaty when it conceded
certain rights and entitlements to India on the western rivers.

As far as the scarcity of water in Pakistan is concerned, apparently it has also to do with

1. Climatic changes

2. Negligence and mismanagement of water resources by successive governments in Pakistan

The global warming has led to melting of the Himalayan glaciers and consequent depletion in the flow of
water into the Indus River system. The trend is likely to continue with rising temperature. It is not that
only agricultural sector, the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, is suffering; due to depleting water supply,
there is reduced power-generation from the hydroelectric plants, having a devastating impact on the
country’s industries too.

Pakistan has no control over the nature; however, it can improve the management of water resources.
Pakistan needs to address the following problems on urgent basis:

1. The silting of dams and barrages is a continuous process. Due to heavy sediments carried by the
rivers, Tarbela, Mangla and Chasma Dams have lost nearly 25%of their capacity.

2. An estimated 40% of water that run through canals is lost because of seepage. The reason: the canal
beds and banks are unlined, poorly lined or porous.

3. Traditional and antiquated agricultural techniques lead to excessive loss of water.

4. While water intensive varieties of crops, like sugarcane and rice, are cultivated. Optimum crop
rotation is imperative but is not done effectively.

On 2 June 2008, Pakistan’s National Economic Council met under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister
Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani and approved the development strategy based on the Medium Term
Development Framework 2005-10.

The water sector part of the overall strategy concentrates on water augmentation, water conservation
and effective use of water. It calls for the development of additional medium and large-size reservoirs
with priority.

The water storages to be completed, by 2016 include Akhori Dam, Basha-Diamer Dam, Kalabagh Dam
and Munda Dam. Simultaneously the ongoing projects such as raising the structures of Mangla Dam,
Gomal Dam, Satpra Dam, Kurram Tangi Dam and Sabakzai Dam are also to be the top priority.

The Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10 also envisages a number of other measures,
including reclamation of land from water logging and salinity, improvement of watercourses and
ground-water management etc.
Last year, 20 different UN bodies had warned; “Water is linked to the crisis of climate change, energy
and food supplies and prices, and troubled financial markets. . . . Unless their links with water are
addressed and water crises around the world are resolved, these other crises may intensify and local
water crises may worsen, converging into a global water crisis and leading to political insecurity and
conflict at various levels.”

In a recent report, the United Nations has estimated that Pakistan’s water supply has dropped from
about 5,000 cubic meters per person in the 1950s to about 1,420 cubic meters. Any further drop would
seriously jeopardize economic growth and would be a health hazard.

Not withstanding Indus Basin Treaty, The need for effective international co-operation among riparian
countries is greater now than ever before. The demand for water in all countries is escalating and
increasingly the harmful effects of activities in upstream countries are being observed.

Over a third of the 200 international river basins, are not covered, by an international agreement; only
some 30, including Pakistan and India, have co-operative institutional arrangements.

Clearly, efforts are needed to formulate and reach agreement on an international “code of conduct” or
convention in the utilization of shared water basins so that the water needs of some countries are not
undermined by irresponsible utilization of water resources by others. Improved international co-
operation is also necessary regarding the transfer of knowledge and technology in the water resources
field.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
1998, sets the standard for all agreements involving the shared use of trans boundary water resources.

It specifically establishes the dual criteria of “equitable and reasonable utilization” of the water
resources and the need to “exchange data and consult on the possible effects of planned measures on
the condition” of the water resource. The U.N. Convention provides the overall framework for Trans
boundary water sharing.

Indus Basin-A Failed Treaty

Neither country is satisfied with the Indus Water Treaty, and both are desperate for more water.
Pakistani officials criticize it privately for being biased toward India and experts seek its renegotiation.

Indian scholar and writer PR Chari believes that “[n]egotiating an Indus Water Treaty 2 would be a huge
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) as it would engage both countries in a regional economic
integration process.”

Dr Robert G Wirsing, a member of the faculty of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii
and an expert on South Asian affairs, said in a lecture in Islamabad that the Treaty had inherent
weaknesses. “The solution to water disputes is heavily tied with the fate of Jammu and Kashmir,” he
said.

“India’s intransigence on Chenab is being seen as a threat to Pakistan’s lifeline, and if India does not
relent, the letter and spirit of the peace process plus the bonhomie with the new government in
Islamabad would be undermined,” he told ISN Security Watch.

Pakistan is likely to be one of the hardest hit countries. It is yet to be seen, whether the government has
the political will and financial resources to overcome the water crisis. Sooner we evolve our Water Goals
the better. March 22, 2010 is World Water Day; we need to have an awareness campaign for Future
Water vision for Pakistan