Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

Philosophisches Seminar
PS: Imagination and Dreaming
Lecturer: Daniel Gregory
Semester: Winter Semester 2020/21

Refusal or Inability – which is

the source for imaginative
resistance?

Task: Is Gendler’s solution to ‘the puzzle of imaginative resistance’ right or wrong? If it is

wrong, can the problem be solved? If so, how?

Student Number: 4197634

12 January 2021
Words: 1536
 In her paper “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” (2000), Gendler argues that
rather than inability being the cause for imaginative resistance, it is, in fact, the readers
unwillingness to imagine moral scenarios they are opposed to. Gendler’s hypothesis is that
imaginative resistance occurs when the reader tries to import fictional truths into the actual
world. This shows that the reader actually is able to imagine morally deviant propositions,
they are just unwilling to consider a view that goes against their own morals in fear of
changing them. However, if the reader resists the urge to export these morally deviant
propositions, imaginative resistance can be avoided.
In this paper I will argue unwillingness cannot be the answer to imaginative resistance.
Gendler conflates belief with imagination which hurts her argument. Additionally, I will
argue that there is a difference between imagining something that is morally wrong and
accepting that it can be morally right. Moreover, I agree with Kathleen Stock that people may
imagine something they do not wish to imagine.
Gendler argues that the reader is able to imagine morally deviant propositions, they are
simply unwilling to do so. Although, imaginative resistance can be avoided if the reader
resists the urge to export these morally deviant propositions. Gendler claims that the reader
refuses to imagine the morally deviant scenarios because they do not want to even imagine
believing in them. She argues that “cases that evoke genuine imaginative resistance will be
cases where the reader feels that she is being asked to export a way of looking at the actual
world which she does not wish to add to her conceptual repertoire” (Gendler 2000). However,
earlier in the paper, she says that make-believe and believe are two separate entities and can
exist independent of each other. Therefore, the reader is afraid of the imagined scenarios
being able to change their beliefs and refuses to imagine said scenario. People want to believe
things that are mostly true, consequently, they want to believe what they believe to be morally
right. If the reader gets a different perspective on these beliefs, that then may hurt their
original beliefs as they may become less true. But I would argue that the reader can uphold
their belief and still imagine a fictional world with different moral beliefs. Of course, one can
change their beliefs, but they cannot simply decide to do so (see Gendler 2000). Instead, the
change of beliefs is a process. It is much easier to make-belief a change in beliefs. However, I
would argue that the imagined beliefs in fiction should not affect the readers beliefs as they
are simply fictional.
Gendler also claims that it’s the reader’s fault for not following the author’s direction.
Instead of imaginative resistance relying on the fact that the author is writing about something
that is impossible and therefore impossible to imagine, it is the fault of the reader for refusing
to imagine it. This is because the reader tries to export these propositions into the real world
which they do not want to do. The author’s intention is to have these moral deviations to just
exist in the fictional world and not be exported to the real world. If the reader understands
this, imaginative resistance can be avoided. She rightly states “What is fictionally true in a
given world is largely […] up to the author of the narrative” (Gendler 2000). I would argue,
however, that the reader is not necessarily inclined to import these immoral behaviors into
their own worldview. If Giselda kills her baby because it is the right thing to do, I can accept
that that is true in the story, but I can still judge it as morally wrong. Said propositions are
only true in the fictional world, they are not meant to be imported into the real world: “the
very fact of deviance is sufficient indication that literal export is not the intention” (Gendler
2000). Moreover, Gendler argues that a proposition, even though it is conceptually
impossible, can be imaginable if it is true in the context of a story. For example, five and
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seven not adding up to twelve. This is where I disagree. Simply because it is true in the world
of the story does not make it imaginable. One can accept the truth of conceptually impossible
propositions, however, not be able to create a mental representation of it. I can accept that she
has told a story where five and seven simultaneously do and do not add up to twelve,
however, I cannot form a mental representation of it. The reader is able to accept that five and
seven simultaneously do and do not add up to twelve as a true fact in the fictional world and
not in the real world, so why should it be different with morals?
I would also argue that one can imagine scenarios that go against one’s moral compass
without agreeing to them. And Gendler actually touches on to this as I mentioned in the
paragraph above: “As long as I take myself to be in no way implicated in the way of thinking
that M presupposes, and as long as I take the claims of M to be restricted to the realm of the
merely hypothetical, I feel no more resistance in supposing M than supposing P” (Gendler
2000). In my opinion, imagining something immoral can be morally right and imagining that
something can be morally right in a different context are two different things. I believe that
burning red headed women at the stake is morally wrong. However, I can imagine that people
used to burn witches and that they did in fact, believe this to be the right thing to do. I can
procure a mental image of it and I can imagine this without changing my own beliefs. If you
take yourself out of the equation and take the claims as solely hypothetical, imaginative
resistance vanishes. I think it is important to acknowledge that it is different to imagine
morally deviant propositions and to accept that these morally deviant propositions can be
morally right in the fictional or historical world. My example shows, additionally, that this
does not only apply to fictional scenarios. If you stay within the context of fictionality or
history, one is able to imagine morally deviant scenarios or conceptually impossible
scenarios. In a more recent publication, Liao and Gendler herself write that imaginability is
related to context (see Liao, Gendler 2016). As Gendler states “moral claims are often taken
to be categorical, in the sense that, if they are true at all, they are true in all possible worlds”
(2000). I disagree with that statement. The readers morals may not change, but they are able
to imagine that the morals in the story or in a different historical time or even just a different
country may be different.
Gendler’s argument is based on unwillingness, however, Kathleen Stock argues that
unwillingness is not the answer to imaginative resistance. A reader of American Psycho may
imagine the horrible things written about in the novel even though they do not want to. Even
though imaginative resistance should occur, the reader cannot help but imagine them (Stock
2005). Therefore, the opposite can be true. The reader imagines something they are morally
opposed to and they do not wish to imagine. Consequently, Gendler’s hypothesis cannot be
true and it cannot be a matter of willingness or unwillingness. If a reader imagines morally
deviant scenarios and accepts them to be purely fictional and not true of the fictional world,
her claim that the reader refuses to imagine these propositions because they may change their
real-life beliefs cannot be true. Additionally, imagining or not imagining these propositions is
not a conscious decision. If Gendler’s hypothesis were true, the reader should not be able to
imagine something they do not want to imagine.
This paper does not throw away Gendler’s argument entirely. All in all, Gendler also
argues that if the reader removes themselves from the imagined immoral scenario the
imaginative resistance vanishes and I would agree to that. Gendler makes some compelling
arguments. However, I do believe that she also leaves some questions unanswered. For
example, why are people more inclined to import moral truths than non-moral truths? Why
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are people more likely to accept non-moral proposition than moral propositions? She claims
that it is both hard to believe in moral and non-moral claims that one does not agree with, but
that we accept non-moral propositions as simply fictional but not moral propositions. Though,
I do believe, as I have stated above, that imagining something and accepting that it can be true
in a different context are two different things. I would also like to add that imagining moral or
immoral scenarios is very subjective. This can be seen when Gendler gives the example of her
view changing when Giselda’s baby changes from a girl to a child being born on January 19
or a changeling. To me this makes no difference, I still feel like it is the immoral thing to do. I
do think that for Giselda in her story it may be the right thing to do, but I can still condemn
her choice.

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 References
Gendler, T. S. (2000), ‘The puzzle of imaginative resistance’, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 55-
81.
Liao S. and T. S. Gendler (2016), “The Problem of Imaginative Resistance”, The Routledge
Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, 1-20.
Stock, K. (2005), “Resisting Imaginative Resistance”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 607-
624.

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